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A     N 

ESSAY 

O  N    T  H  E 

ORIGIN  of  E  V  I  L 

By  Dr.  William  King,   late  Lord 
Archbifliop  of  DUBLIN. 

Tranflated  from  the  Latin,  with  large  Notes;  tending 
to  explain  and  vindicate  fome  of  the  Author's  Principles  Againft 
the  Objedtions  of  Bayle,  Leibnitz,  the  Author  of  a  Philofophical 
Enquiry  concerning  Human  Liberty ;  and  others. 

^To   which    is    prefix'd 

A    DISSERTATION 

Concerning  the 
Fundamental  Principle  and  immediate  Criterion  of  Virtue, 

AS     ALSO, 

The  Obligation  to,  and  Approbation  of  it. 

With  fome  account  of 

The  Origin  of  the  TaJJions  and  j4ffe^ions. 


LONDON: 

Printed  for  W.  T'burlbourn  Bookfeller  in  Cambridge;  and  fold  by 
R.  Knaplock,  J.  and  J,  Knapton,  and  M^.  Innis  in  St.  Paul's 
Church-Tard   London.    M.DCC.XXXI.    , 


f  >*>. 


3^ 


\ 


THE 


Tranllator  s  Preface. 


5\Have  always  look'd  upon  an  Enquiry  into  the  Caufe 
and  Origin  of  Evil,  as  one  of  the  nobleft  and  moft 
important  Subjeds  in  Natural  Theology :  It  leads 
us  into  the  moft  exalted  Speculations  concerning 
the  Exiftence  and  Attributes  of  God,  and  the  Ori- 
ginal of  Things.  It  jfirft  difcovers  the  true  Intent 
of  the  Deity  in  creating  any  Beings  at  all,  and  then 
purfucs  that  Intent  thro'  the  fcveral  Works  of  his  Creation:  it  fhews 
how  this  is  fully  anfvver'd  by  the  Inanimate  and  Brute  Part,  and  how 
it  might  and  fliould  be,  and  why,  and  in  what  refpedl  it  is  not  by 
the  Rational.  It  contemplates  the  Divine  Oeconomy  in  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Univerfe,  fearches  into  the  various  Schemes  of  Provi- 
tlencc,  and  takes  in  the  whole  Compafs  of  Nature.  Neither  is  its 
Ufefulnefs  inferior  to  its  Extent.  It  concerns  every  Man  who  pretends 
to  acft  upon  any  ferious  Views  here,  or  to  entertain  any  folid  Hopes  of 

a  2  FuturitvJ 


363750 


iv,  T  R  E  F  A  C  E. 

Futurity.  The  Knowledge  of  it,  in  fome  degree,  is  abfolutely  ne- 
ceffary  in  order  to  the  fettling  in  our  Minds  right  Notions  of  the 
Nature  and  Will  of  God,  and  the  Duties  \*'e  owe  him  j  in  order  to 
the  due  Apprehenfion  of  his  Defign  in  creating,  preferving,  and  di- 
^  redling  us,  and  to  the  regular  Condudt  of  our  Lives,  and  Enjoyrrienc 
of  ourfelves  in  that  State  and  Condition  wherein  he  has  placed  us. 
Nay,  while  we  are  ignorant  of  this  one  Point,  what  rational  Plea- 
fure  can  we  take  in  knowing  any  other  ?  When  I  enquire  how  I 
got  into  this  World,  and  came  to  be  what  I  am  j  I'm  told  that  an 
abfolutely  perfect  Being  produced  me  out  of  Nothing,  and  placed  me 
here  on  purpofe  to  cojiimunicate  fome  Part  of  his  Happinefs  to  mo, 

and  to  make  me,  in  fome  meafure,  like  himfclf^ This  End  is  not 

obtain'd;  —  the  diredt  contrary  appears; — jl  find  myfelf  furrounded 

with  nothing  but  Perplexity,  Want  and  Milfery; by  whofe  fault  I 

know  not,  —  How  to  better  myfelf  I  cannot  tell. What  No- 
tions of  God  and  Goodnefs  can  this  afford  me? What  Ideas-,  of 

Religion? —What  Hopes  of   a  future  State  ?-^— For,,  if 

God's  Aim  in  producing  me  be  entirely  unknown ;  if  it  be  neither 
his  Glory,  (as  fome  will  have  it)  which  my  prefent  State  is  far  from 

advancing ; nor  mine  own  Goody  which  the  fame  is  equally  in- 

confiftent  with  ^  how  know  I  what  I'm  to  do  here,  and  in  what  man- 
ner I  muft  endeavour  to  pteafe  him  ?  or  why  (hould  I  endeavour  it 
at  all  ? For,  if  I  muft  be  miferable  in  this  World,  what  Secu- 
rity have  I  that  I  fhall  not  be  fo  in  another  too  j  (if  there  be  one) 
fince,  if  it  were  the  Will  of  my  Almighty  Creator,  I  might   (for 

ought  I  fee)  have  been  happy  in  both? Such  Thoughts  as 

thefe  muft  needs  difturb  a  Perfon  that  has  any  Concern  for  his  Ma- 
ker's Honour,  or  his  own  Happinefs;  that  defires  to  pay  him  a  rcafo- 
nable  Service,  and  anfwer  the  End  of  his  Creation  :  in  fhort,  that 
happens  either  to  think  at  all  upon  thefe  things,  or  to  think  for  him- 
felf.  And  therefore  an  Endeavour  to  rid  the  MiAd  of  fome  of  thefe 
Perplexities,  cannot  fure  be  unacceptable,  and  a  Solution  of  any  one 
of  thefe  Doubts,  is  doing  a  piece  of  Service  to  Mankind,  which  can 
never  be  unfeafonable. But  the  Ufefulnefs,  as  well  as  Antiqui- 
ty, of  the  prefent  Debate  i  and  the  Abfurdity  of  the  Manichean 
Scheme  of  accounting  for  Evil,  have  been  often  explain'd,  and  need 

not 


-nW*^-^* 


T  R  E  F  A  C  B-  V. 

not  here  be  infifled  on:  all  that  ever  feem'd  wanting  to  an  entire 
Conqueft  ovejT  thefe  Hereticks,  and  their  abfurd  Hypothefis,  was  on- 
ly a, tolerable  Solatioh  of  the.  many  Difficulties  which  drove  them 
into  it:  and  this  our  Author  has  effeBed,  as  I  hope  to  make  appear 
befor<5^1  have  done. 

Tnere ,  are  two  general  ways  of  Reafoning,  called  Arguments 
a  Priori,  and  a  Pojieriori  y  or,  according  to  what  Logicians  com- 
monly ftile  the  Synthetical  and  Analytical  Method:  The  former  lays 
down  fome  evident  Principles,  and  then  deduces  the  feveral  Confe- 
quences  necefTarily  refulting  from  them :  The  latter  begins  with  the 
Phcene7nena  themfelves,  and  traces  'em  up  to  their  Original,  and 
from  the  known  Properties  of  thefe  Phcenomena  arrives  at  the  Na- 
ture of  their  Caufe.  Now  the  former  of  thefe  is  evidently  prefera- 
ble, where  it  can  be  had,  (and  I  think  it  may  be  had  almoft  every 
where,  but  in  the  hrft  Gaoie)  fince  the  Utter  mufl  depend  upon  a 
large  Indudion  of  Particulars,  any  of  which,  when  failing,  invali-?' 
dates  the  whole  Argument,  and  quite  fpoils  a  Demonflration,  "  It  is 
*'  very  true  (fays  Dr.  J.Clarke  on  Natural  Eijil,  p.  79.)  that  this  is 
"  not  a  Arid:  Demon ftration  of  the  general  Conclufion,  becaufe  that 
"  can  be  had  no  other  way  than  by  trying  all  the  Experiments 
*'  that  can  poffibly  be  made  every  where,  which  is  infinite  and 
"  endlefs;  but  it  is  the  beft  that  the  Nature  of  the  thing  is  capa- 
^*  bk  of." 

'Now,  if  the  Thing  before  us  will  admit  of  the  former  Method, 
then  I  think  it  is  capable  of  a  much  better  j  and  an  Attempt  to  {licw 
that  it  is  fo,  muft  be  very  defirable :  And  this  our  Author  feems  to 
have  done,  without  any  precarious  Syftem,  or  ill-grounded  Hypo- 
thpfis  whatfoever.  His  fuperior  Excellence  (as  I  apprehend)  confifts 
in  having  laid  down,  and  previoufly  eftabliih'd  fuch  folid  fubftantiar 
Principles  as  may  be  drawn  out.  in  infirtitum,  and  eafily  apply'^i  to  all 
the  Difficulties  that  attend  the  prefent  Queftion.  He  firft  of  all  en- 
quires into  the  Nature  and  Perfedions  of  the  Deity,  and  his  Defign 
in  the  Creation  j  fettles  the  true  Notion  of  a  Creature,  and  examines 
whether  any  could  be  perfed ;  and  if  not,  whether  all  /hould  have 

been 


vi.  T  R  E  F  A  C  E. 

been  made  equally  imperfe£l  -,  or  feveral  in  very  diflferent  Claffes  and 
Degrees.  Having  proved  the  laft  of  thcfc  Opinions  to  be  the  true  one, 
he  proceeds  to  the  lovvell  Clafs  of  Beings :  viz.  Material  Ones:  He 
enquires  into  the  Nature  and  eflential  Properties  of  Matter^  and  the 
Laws  of  its  Motion^  and  thereby  eftabliflies  fuch  Rules  as  direct  us 
to  the  Solution  of  all  the  Difficulties  attending  it,  as  diftributed  in- 
to various  Majfes^  Syftems  and  Animated  Bodies.  He  {hews  the  una- 
voidablenefs,  and  abfolute  neceffity  of  contrary  Motions  in  Matter,  for 
the  fame  Reafons  that  it  had  any  Motion  at  all,  and  confequently 
of  Attrition^  Corruption  and  DiJIolution,  and  all  the  Natural  Evils 
that  attend  them.  In  the  next  place,  from  the  Nature  of  a  Self- 
moving  Principle,  and  the  manner  of  its  Operation,  he  deduces  all 
the  Irregularities  incident  to  Volition^  and  the  Adlions  confequent 
thereupon.  He  ftates  at  large  the  true  Notion  of  Free-Will^  aiid 
dcmonftrates  the  abfolute  Neceffity  for  it  in  every  Rational  Being, 
in  order  to  its  Happinefs.  Then  accounts  for  the  feveral  Abufes  of 
it,  and  the  Moral  Evils  arifing  from  thence,  and  examines  all  the 
poffible  Ways  of  preventing  them ;  and  upon  the  whole  makes  it  ap- 
pear, that  none  of  thefe  could  have  been  originally  avoided,  or  can 
novv  be  removed,  without  introducing  greater ;  and  confequently 
that  the  very  Permiflion  of  thefe  Evils,  and  the  Produ(5tion  and  Pre- 
fervation  of  thefe  Beings,  in  the  pref^nt  State,  is  the  higheft  In- 
ftance  of  infinite  Wifdom,  Power  and  Goodnefs.  Novv  thefe  are 
not  mere  Arguments  ad  ignorantiam :  This  is  not  telling  us,  that 
we  muft  believe  fuch  and  fuch  things  to  be  the  fure  Effects  of  an 
infinitely  wife  and  good  God,  tho'  no  Marks  of  either  Wil'dom  or 
Goodnefs  appear  in  them  ;  which,  tho'  it  may  be  true,  and  all  that 
perhaps  can  be  faid  in  fome  particular  Cafes,  yet.  has,  I  think,  but 
very  little  Tendency  towards  either  the  Conviction  of  an  Infidel,  or 
the  Satisfaction  of  a  true  Believer.  When  a  Perfon  is  fcrioully  con* 
tcmplating  any  Parts  of  Nature,  and  folicitoufly  enquiring  into  their 
feveral  Ends  and  Ufes,  no  Pleafure  furely  can  arife  to  himfelf,  nor 
Devotion  toward  the  Author  of  it,  merely  from  the  Perplexity  and 
Unaccountablenefs  of  thofe  Parts.  Nay  every  fuch  Inllance,  one 
would  think,  muft  caft  a  damp  upon  his  Spirits,  and  prove  an  un- 

tjuj  .,  i.  grateful 


PREFACE. 

grateful  Refled:ion  on  his  Weaknefs,  a  mortifying  Argument  of  his 
Imperfedion.  Whereas  one  fjngle  Perplexity  clear'd  up,  or  Ohiec- 
tion  anfwer'd,  is  a  piece  of  real  Knowledge  gain'd,  upon  which  he 

can  congratulate   himfelf,    ard  glorify  his  Maker. Our  Author 

therefore  was  not  content  with  mere  Negative  Arguments.,  and  bare- 
ly ^'ue/Vz/zg-  Difficulties,  by  removing  all  Defe8s  from  external  things 
to  ourfelves,  and  multiplying  Inftances  of  the  Narrownefs  and  Weak- 
nefs of  Human  Underftanding :  (which  any  one  that  thinks  at  all 
will  foon  be  convinced  of,  and  heartily  deliroiis  of  having  it  fome- 
what  enlarg'd  and  improved,  to  which  this  manner  of  Argumen- 
tation, I  fear,  contributes  very  little.)  But  he  attacks  his  Adverfarics  in 
their  ftrongefl  Holds,  and  plucks  up  the  Mankkean  Hcrefy  by  the 
Roots :  he  fhews  by  certain  pre-eftabli{h'd  Rules,  and  neceflary  Con- 
fequence,  that  we  can  eafily  reduce  all  to  one  fupreme  Mead,  and 
clearly  comprehend  how  the  prefent  ftate  of  things  is  the  very 
beft,  in  all  refpe<fts,  and  worthy  of  a  mofl  wife,  povierful,  and  be- 
neficent Author  :  And  why,  taking  the  whole  Syflem  of  Beings  to- 
gether, and  every  Clafs  of  them  in  its  own  Order,  none  could  pof- 
iibly  have  been  made  more  perfect,  or  placed  in  a  better.  He 
proves,  in  the  firft  place  (as  we  obferv'd)  that  no  created  Beings 
could  be  abfolutely  perfect,  and  in  the  next,  that  no  manner  of  E- 
vil,  or  Imperfection,  was  tolerated  in  them,  but  what  was,  either 
in  their  Clafs  and  manner  of  Exiftence,  abfolutely  unavoidable,  or 
clfe  productive  of  fome  Good  more  than  equivalent :  In  both 
which  Cafes  ther€  will  be  the  fame  Reafons  for  the  Creation  of 
fuch  Beings  in  fuch  Circumftances,  together  with  their  concomi- 
tant Evils,  as  there  was  for  any  Creation  at  all :  For  which  the 
Jblfe  Reafon  will  appear  to  be  an  Intention  in  the  Creator  of  com- 
municating Happinefs  to  as  many  Beings  as  could  be  made  capa- 
ble of  it,  on  the  very  beft  Terms ;  or  a  Refolution  not  to  omit  the 
leaft  Degree  of  pure  Good  on  account  of  fuch  Evils,  as  did  not 
Gounterballance  it:  Or  (which  is  the  very  fame,  fince  'twill  be  c- 
vidcnt,  that  the  Prevention  of  all  the  prefent  Evils  in  any  concei- 
vable Manner,  would  have  been  of  worfe  Confequence  than  the 
Permiffion  of  them)  an  Intention  always  to  choofe  the  leaft  of  two 

Evils, 


vu. 


,viii.  T  K  E  F  A€  E. 

Evils,  when  both  cannot  be  avoided. This  nluft  be  granteel, 

to  come  up  to  the  Point;  and  when  it  is  once  made  apparent, 
will  be  a  full  and  fufficient  Anfwer  to  that  old  triumphant  Que- 
ftion,  w'Mv  TO  YixKov ;  'twill  be  an  ample  Vindication  of  the  Di- 
vine Providence,  a  Demonftration  of  the  Power,  and  Wifdom, 
and  Goodnefs  of  God,  in  the  Produdlion,  Prefervation,  and  Go- 
vernment of  the  Univerfe ;  and  as  much  as  a  reafonable  Man  can 
either  expecl  or  defire.  And  I  heartily  wi(h  this  Method  had 
been  taken  by  more  of  thofe  Authors  that  have  wrote  on  the  pre^ 
fent  Subjed:,  and  the  Argument  purfued  a  little  farther  by  Natu- 
ral Lighty  in  order  to  give  fome  Light  and  Confirmation  even  to 
Revelation  itfelf,  in  thefe  inquifitive  Days,  wherein  a  great  many 
fecm  unwilling  to  be  determined  by  its  fole  Authority;  wherein 
Men  are  not   a   little  inclined  to   call  every  thing  into  queftion  j 

and  a  weak  Argument  is  fure  to  be  exploded.- Even  the  moft 

•learned  and  ingenious  Writer  on  thig  Subject  often  flies  to  Scrip- 
ture when  a  Difficulty  begins  to  prefs  him :  which,  in  my  Opi- 
■nion,  is  deferting  the  Argument,  and  owning,  with  Mr.  Bayle  ( in 
:his  Explanation  touching   the  Manichees  at  the  End  of  his  Did:io- 

jiary)  "  that  the  Queftion  cannot  be  defended  on  any  other  foot." ■ 

Whereas,   if  the  Difficulty  be  really  unanfwerable  by  Rcafon, 

or  a  plain  Contradi:Hon  to  our  natural  Notions  of  God;  if  (as 
the  fore-mentioned  Author  often  urges)  "  we  perceive  by  our 
"  clear  and  diftinti  Ideas,   that  fuch  a  thing  is  entirely  repugnant 

'•  to  his  Nature  and  Attributes," referring  us  to  Scripture,  which 

declares  that  an  infinitely  perfedt  Being  did  conftitute  it  thus,  will 
be  no  manner  of  Satisfadion,  fince  (upon  this  Suppofition)  we  can- 
not have  greater  Aflurance  that  this  Scripture  comes  from  him,  than 
we  have  that  the  Dotirine  therein  contain'd  is  abfurd  and  impof- 
fible.  And  what  that  ingenious  Perfon's  Intent  might  be  in  repre- 
fenting  the  Matter  thus,  and  then  referring  us  to  Scripture  for  an 
Anfwer,  I  cannot  determine.  But  fure  I  am,  that  his  Account  of 
it  ferv.es  rather  to  betray  the  Caufe,  and  undermine  the  Authority 
of  both  Reafon  and  Revelation,  and  is  enough  (if  no  better  could 
be  given)  to  jnake  a  Perfon  that  argues  confequentially  reject  all 
kinds  of  Religion.  Farther,  every  one  muft  have  obferv'd,  that  moft 
Authors  upon  this  Subject  treat  of  God's  Difpenfations  toward  Man, 

as 


T  KEF  ACE.  ix. 

as  if  they  were  fpeaking  of  one  Man's  Behaviour  toward  ano- 
ther. They  think  it  fufficient  to  make  the  Almighty  choofe  the 
moft  prudent^  likely  Means  of  bringing  Man  to  Happinefs;  and 
a6t  upon  the  higheft  Probability^  tho,  upon  what  account  foever 
it  matters  not,  he  fail  of  his  End.  This  may  indeed  be  the  heft 
manner  of  ad:ing  in  all  finite,  imperfed;  Beings,  and  fufficient  to 
acquit  theGoodnefs  and  Jurtice  of  God,  but  is  very  far  from  fatisfy- 
ing  his  JVifdom.  To  a  perfed  Being  who  forefees  the  EfFeds  of  all 
poflible  Caufes  and  Means,  as  the  fame  Authors  allow  God  to  do, 
thefe  only  appear  fit  and  eligible  for  the  effeds  and  Ends  w^hich  they 
will  certainly  produce.  Nor  is  it  any  reafon  why  I  fhould  purfuc  a 
Method  which  is  apt  and  wont  to  fucceed  in  moft  Cafes,  if  I  know  it 
will  fail  in  this.  To  a  Perfon  therefore  that  takes  all  the  Attributes  of 
God  together,  and  confiders  the  whole  Scheme  of  Providence  from 
end  to  end,  it  will  not  appear  a  complete  and  fatisfadory  Vindication 
of  them,  to  affert  that  God  either  now  makes  Men,  or  fuffers  them 
to  make  themfelves  miferable,  for  rejecting  that  Happinefs  which  he 
at  fir  ft  made  them  capable  of,  and  endow'd  them  with  fuch  Powers, 
and  placed  them  in  fuch  Circumftances  as  render'd  it  naturally  poffible 
and  even  eaiie  to  be  attain*d  by  them :  tho'  this  may  indeed  clear  his 
Juftice  and  lay  the  Blame  upon  oiirfelves :  And  yet  thefe  Writers  ge- 
nerally content  themfelves  with  going  thus  far:  They  bring  all  our 
Sin  and  Mifery  from  the  abufe  of  Free- Will,  i.  e.  a  Power  whereby 
Man  might  have  adted  otherwife,  and  prevented  it; without  ever  ex- 
'  plaining  the  Nature  of  this  Principle,  or  fliewing  the  Worth  and  Ex- 
cellence of  it,  and  proving  that,  as  far  as  we  can  apprehend,  more 
Good  in  general  arifes  from  the  donation  of  fuch  a  Self-moving  Po- 
wer, together  with  all  thefe  forefeen  Abufes  of  it,  than  could  poflibly 
have  been  produced  without  it.  To  demonftrate  this  was  an  Attempt 
worthy  of  our  Author,  who  has  at  leaft  laid  a  noble  Foundation  for 
it,  and  feems  to  be  the  firft  that  has  propofed  the  true  Notion  of  hu- 
man Liberty,  and  explained  it  confiftently :  All  the  Doubts  and  Diffi- 
culties attending  which  intricate  Queftion,  will,  I  hope,  be  tolerably 
cleared  up ;  or  at  leaft,  fuch  Principles  eftablifh'd  as  may  be  fufficient 
for  thatPurpofe,  by  this  Treatife  of  his,  and  the  Notes  upon  it.  But 
fo  much  for  the  Subjed:  and  our  Author's  way  of  treating  it. 

As  for  the  Tranjlation^  'tis  barely  Literal :   I  endeavour'd  to  keep 
clofe  to  the  Author's  Senfe,  and  generally  to  his  very  Words :  fo  tliat  the 

b  Reader 


*-.  T  R  E  F  A  C  E.  ^ 

Reader  may  be  pretty  fure  of  finding  Dr.  King  here  at  leaft.  I  once 
intended  to  have  cut  off  every  thing  that  I  could  not  defend,  efpvcially 
about  the  Bep;inning  (which  ufed  to  difcoura^e  moft  Readers  from  per- 
ufing  the  reu  of  his  valuable  Book,  and  might  perhaps  as  well  have 
been  omitted;)  but  coniidering  that  he  h.\d  involv'd  it  fo  clofcly  in 
the  reft  of  his  Scheme,  that  the  whble  would  feem  confufed  without 

it that  others  might  perhaps  have  a  different  Opinion  of  it ^and 

that  fome,  probably,  would  be  defirous  of  feeing  even  the  moft  im- 

perfcd  Notions  of  fo  great  a  Philofopher  ; I  contented  myfelf 

with  omitting  only  part  of  his  firft  Note,  and  obviating  the  reft  all  a- 
long,  both  from  other  Authors,  and  fuch  Obfervations  of  my  Ovvn  as 
occurr'd  upon  the  Subjedl. 

Some  perhaps  may  think  the  frequent  and  long  Quotations  very  te- 
dious, and  introduced  only  to  ftuff  up. 1  can  only  anfvver,  that  I 

intended  the  Notes,  and  References  together,  to  point  out  a  fort  of 
Compendium  of  MetapfjyficSy  or  Speculative  Divinity;  by  directing  the 
Reader  to  a  Set  of  true  Notions  on  the  various  Subjeds  which  our  Au- 
thor toucli'd  upon;  and  which  could  not  be  found  in  any  one  particular 
Book,  nor  coUeded  from  feveral,  without  much  Trouble  and  Confufi- 
on,  and  unnecellary  Reading.  I  chofe  rather  to  quote  the  very  Words 
of  the  Authors,  than  either  ufe  worfe  of  my  own,  or  pretend  to  difcover 
what  had  been  often  difcovered  before;  or  repeat  the  fame  things  over 
and  over  again,  which  is  endlefs.  I  hope  the  Reader  will  find  that  a 
citation  of  two  or  more  Authors  on  the  fame  Point  is  not  always  tauto- 
logy :  and  I  believe  it  will  appear,  that  in  the  multitude  of  References 
more  than  one  is  fcarce  ever  made  to  the  fame  Place,  except  upon  a  ve- 
ry different  Occafion,  or  in  fome  different  Light.  A  Writer  feems  to 
me  to  do  more  good  to  the  Public  by  (hewing  the  ufe  of  fome  of  thofe 
many  Volumes  which  we  have  already,  than  by  offering  new  ones;  tho' 
this  be  of  much  lefs  Advantage  to  his  private  Charader.  I  determin'd 
therefore  not  to  fay  any  thing  myfelf  where  I  could  bring  another  con- 
veniently to  lay  it  for  me;  and  tranfcribed  only  fo  much  from  others  as 
I  judg'd  abfolutely  neceffary  to  give  the  Reader  aftiort  View  of  the  Sub- 
ject we  were  upon,  and  by  that  Sketch  to  induce  thofe  who  have  leifure, 
opportunity  and  inclination  to  go  farther,  and  confult  the  Originals  j  and 
to  afford  fome  prefent  Satisfadion  to  thofe  who  have  not.  ■'-''/'  , 

But  how  judicioufly  this  is  perform'd,  the  Notes  themfelves  rhtift  te- 
ftify,  for  ail  that  I  can  fay  by  way  of  Preface  will  never  mend  the  matter. 


?7sq  ai'M     ^ 

gViQfi   ti  J  — — r-^ 


-yjlUtoi>il5^nlJi^Ydol.r:  Concerning  the  ,,    i^ 


-r>cv  \((n  iQ  iaoiUv.vj}^/  i\:»ui  un  y,. 


)(>S 


•',r* 


c§^')^ 


33  Y^3v  F  U  N  D  A  M  E  N  T  A  L     pR  I  N  C  I  P  L  £'  'f'^ 

ionJ^^  O    F     - 

^ri'RTUE  or  MORALITY 

HO'  all  Writers  of  Morality  have  in  the  main  agreed  what 
particular  Acftions  are  virtuous  and  what  otherwife  j   yet  they 
have,  or  at  leaft  feem  to  have  differ'd  very  much,  both  con- 
cerning the  Criterion  of  Virtue,  viz.  what  it  is  which  denomi- 
nates any  Adtion  virtuous  j  or,  to  fpeak  more  properly,  what  it  is  by 
which  we  mufl  try  any  Adion  to  kn(nv  whether  it  be  virtuous  or  no; 
^  and  alfo  concerning  the  Frinciple  or  Motive  by  which  Men  are  indu- 
^  ced  to  purfue  Virtue. 

/      As  to  the  former,  fome  have  placed  it  in  aBing  agreeably  to  Na- 
.,  ture^  or  Reafon  j  others  in  the  Fitnefs  of  things ;  others  in  a  Conformi- 
ty with  Truth  j  others  in  promoting  the  Common  Good  j  others  in  the 
r  Will  of  God y  &c.     This  Difagreement  of  Moralifts   concerning  the 
n  Rule  or  Criterion  of  Virtue  in  general,  and  at  the  fame  time  their 
almoft  perfe(5l  Agreement  concerning  the  particular  Branches  of  it, 
would  be  apt  to  make  one  fufpe<5t,  either  that  they  had  a  different 
.y.  Criterion  (tho'  they  did  not  know  or  attend  to  it)  from  what  they 
jcj  b  2  profefs'd; 


XJi 


•u. 


adi.  Treliminary  J)ijfcrtaUon, 

profefs'dj  or  (which  perhaps  Is  the  true  as  well  as  the  more  favoura- 
ble Opinion)  that  they  only  talk  a  different  Language,  and  that  all  o£ 
ihem  have  die  fame  Criterion  in  reality,  only  they  have  exprefs'd  it  in 
different  Wotds. 

And  there  will  appear  the  more  room  for  this  Conje6\ure,  if  we 
confider  the  Ideas  themfclves  about  which  Morality  is  chiefly  conver- 
sant, viz,  that  they  are  all  mixed  Modes,  or  compound  Ideas  arbitrarily 
put  together,  hating  at  firfl  no  Archetype  or  Original  exifting,  and  af- 
terwards no  other  than  that  which  exifts  in  other  Mens  Minds. 
Now  fince  Men,  unlefs  they  have  thefe  their  compound  Ideas,  which 
are  Cgnify'd  by  the  fame  Name,  made  up  precifely  of  the  fame  fim- 
ple  ones,  mufl  neceffarily  talk  a  different  Language  j  and  fmce  this  dif- 
ference k  fo  difficult,  and  in  fome  Cafes  impoffible  to  be  avoided,  it 
follows  that  greater  Allowance  and  Indulgence  ought  to  be  given  to 
ihefe  Writers  than  any  other:  and  that  (if  we  have  a  mind  to  undcr- 
fland  them)  we  fhould  not  always  take  their  Words  in  the  common 
Acceptation,  but  in  the  Senfe  in  which  we  find  that  particular  Au- 
thor which  we  arfe  reading  ufed  them.  And  if  a  Man  interpret  the 
Writers  of  Morality  with  this  due  Candor,  I  believe  tbeir  feeming  In- 
confiftencies  and  Difagreements  about  the  Criterion  of  Virtue, 
would  in  a  great  meafure  vanifh  j  and  he  would  find  that  aBing  a- 
greeably  to  Nature^  or  Reaforiy  (when  rightly  underffood)  would  per- 
feQly  coincide  with  the  Fit?iejs  of  things -y  the  Fitnefs  of  things  (as  far 
as  thefe  Words  have  any  meaning)  with  Truth',  Truth  with  the  Com- 
mon Good ;  and  the  Common  Good  with  the  Will  of  God. 

But  whether  this  Difference  be  real,  or  only  verbal,  a  Man  can  fcarce 
avoid  obferving  from  it,  that  Mankind  have  the  Idtas  of  moft  par- 
1^  ticular  Virtues,  and  alfo  a  confufed  Notion  of  Virtue  in  general,  be- 
fore they  have  any  Notion  of  the  Criterion  of  it,  or  ever  did,  neither 
perhaps  can  they,  deduce  all  or  any  of  thofe  Virtues  from  their  Idea 
of  Virtue  in  general,  or  upon  any  rational  Grounds  fhew  how  thofe 
A<!lions  (^which  the  World  call  Moral,  and  moft,  if  not  all  Men  evi- 
dently have  Ideas  of)  are  diftinguifh'd  from  other  Adions,  or  why 
they  approve  of  thofe  Adions  call'd  Moral  ones,  more  than  o- 
thers. 

But 


Ti-etmM^  2>iJferfatM 

"Biif'rince't'hc  Idea  of  Virtue  among  all  Men  (however  they  differ 
in  other  refpeds)  includes  either  tacitly  or  exprefly,  not  only  the  Idea 
of  Approbation  as  the  Confequence  of  it  j  but  alfo  that  it  is  to  every 
one,  and  in  all  Circumftances,  an  Obje(5l  of  Choice  j  it  is  incumbent 
on  all  Writers  of  Morality,  to  flicw  that  that  in  which  they  place 
Virtue,  whatever  it  be,  not  only  always  will  or  ought  to  meet  with 
Approbation,  but  alfo  that  it  is  always  an  Objc'^i  of  Choice  y  which 
is  the  other  great  Difpute  among  Moralifts,  viz.  What  is  the 
Principle  or  Motive  by  which  Men  are  induced  to  purfue  Vir- 
tual -' 

^l'\  For  fome  have  imagin'd  that  that  is  the  only  Objed:  of  Choice 
't6  a  rational  Creature,  which  upon  the  whole  will  produce  more 
Happinefs  than  Mifery  to  the  Choofer  j  and  that  Men  are  and  ought 
to  be  guided  wholly  by  this  Principle ;  and  farther,  that  Virtue  will 
produce  more  Happinefs  than  Mifery,  and  therefore  is  always  an 
Objed:  of  Choice :  and  whatever  is  an  Obje6t  of  Choice,  that  we  ap- 
prove of. 

'-'^  But  this,  however  true  in  Theory,  is  infufficient  to  account  for 
Matter  of  Fad,  /".  e,  that  the  generality  of  Mankind  do  approve  of 
Virtue,  or  rather  virtuous  Anions,  without  being  able  to  give  any 
Reafon  for  their  Approbation  j  and  alfo,  that  fome  purfue  it  with- 
out knowing  that  it  tends  to  their  own  private  Happinefs ;  nay  even 
when  it  appears  to  be  inconfiflent  with  and  deftrudive  of  their  Hap- 
pinefs. 

And  that  this  is  matter  of  Fad,  the  ingenious  Author  of  the  E«- 
qtiiry  into  the  Original  of  our  Idea  of  Virtue  has  fo  evidently  made 
appear  by  a  great  Variety  of  Inftances,  that  a  Man  mufl  be  either 
very  little  acquainted  with  the  World,  or  a  mere  Hobbifi  in  his  Tem!- 
per  to  deny  it. 

And  therefore  to  folve  thefe  two  Difficulties,  this  excellent  Au- 
thor has  fuppofed  (without  proving^  unlefs  by  fhewing  the  infuffici- 
ency  of  all  other  Schemes)  a  Moral  Senfe  to  account  for  the  for- 
mer, and  a  public  or  benevolent  AffeSlion  for  the  latter:  And  thefe, 
xiz.  the  Moral  Senfe  and  Public  AfFe61ion,  he  fuppofes  to  be  im- 
planted in  us  like  Injiin^s^  independent  of  Rea/bn,  and  previous  to 

any 


any  Inft:ru6\ion;  and  therefore  his  Opinion  is,  that  no  account  can 
be  given,   or  ought  to  be  expected  of  them,  any  more  than  we 

i  pretend  to  account  for  the  Pleafure  or  Pain  which  arifes  from 
Senlation  ;  /.  e.  Why  any  particular  Motion  produced  in  our  Bo^ 
dies  Ihould  be  accompany'd  with  Pain  rather  than  Pleafure,  and  W- 
ce  *verja. 

But  this  Account  feems  ftill  infufficient,  rather  cutting  the  Knot 
than  untying  it,  and  if  it  is  not  a-kin  to  the  Dodtrine  of  Innate  Ideas^ 
yet  I  think  it  relifhes  too  much  of  that  of  Ocult  ^mlities.  This  in- 
genious Author  is  certainly  right  in  his  Obfervations  upon  the  Infuf- 
ficiency  of  the  common  Methods  of  accounting  for  both  our  EleSfion 
and  Approbation  of  Moral  Actions,  and  rightly  infers  the  Neceflity  of 

'  fuppoling  a  Moral  Senfe  (i.  e.  a  Power  or  Faculty  whereby  we  may 
perceive  any  Adtion  to  be  an  Objedt  of  Approbation,  and  the  Agent  of 
Love)  and  public  AfFedtions,  to  account  for  the  principal  Ad:ions  of 
human  Life.  But  then  by  calling  thefe  InJlinBs^  I  think  he  ftops  too 
foon,  imagining  himfelf  at  the  Fountain-head,  when  he  might  have 
traced  them  much  higher,  even  to  the  true  Principle  of  all  our  Ac- 
^         tions,  our  own  Happinefs, 

And  this  will  appear  by  {hewing,  that  our  Approbation  of  Mo- 
rality, and  all  Affedlions  whatfoever,  are  finally  refolvable  into  Rea~ 
fin,  pointing  out  private  Happinefs,  and  are  converfant  only  about 
things  apprehended  robe  means  tending  to  this  end  j  and  that  when- 
ever this  end  is  not  perceiv'd,  they  are  to  be  accounted  for  from 
the  AJJbciation  of  Ideas^  ^nd  may  properly  enough  be  call'd  Habits. 

For  if  this  is  clearly  made  out,  the  Neceflity  of  fuppofing  a  Mo- 
ral Senfe,  or  public  Atfedtions  to  be  implanted  in  us,  fince  it  arifeth 
only  from  the  InfulHciency  of  all  other  Schemes  to  account  for  hu- 

:  cman  Actions,  will  immediately  vanifli.  But  whether  it  be  made  out 
or  no,  we  may  obferve  in  general,  that  all  Arguments  ad  Tgnoran- 
tiatn,  or  that  proceed  a  Remotione  only  (as  this,  by  which  the  Moral 
Senfe  and  public  Affedtions  are  eftablifh'd  to  be  Inftindts,  evidently 
does)  are  fcarce  ever  perfedtly  fatisfadlory,  being  for  the  moft  part 
fubjedt  to  this  Doubt,  viz.  Whether  there  is  a  full  Enumeration  of 
dl  the  Parts i  and  liable  alfo  to  this  Objedlion,  17/;^. That  tho'  lean- 
not 


Preliminary  U)iffertation, 

not  account  for  Phaenomena  other  wife,   yet  poffibly  they  may  be-  o- 
^tlierwife  accounted  for.  f*^'^^*4^  ^|^'»  ^luitjianb  ort£  ^  iioiBoiflnl  'vns' 
'^    But  before  we  can  detefftiiiife  this  Point,  it  will  be  neccfTary  to 
^'fettle  all  the  Terms :     We  fhall  in   the  firft  place  therefore  enquire 
*.\0nf  is  meant  by  the  Criterion  of  Virtue.    '  xd^^'-^ 

.      .  .  . ,     .  ,^.  ■.  ■      ' 


XV* 


5*,iik^j'A'd  ijo  fjrc.a  're. 

u.^iiip^,ar^i      S  F  r  T      r  -'"* 

*to,'i/i35 A  od^  Lftfi  .no: ;  ida w  ? r> A'   . 

ooi^q...  Comerning  the  Criterion  of  Virtue       -' 

3vijd  jrlgifXT' .^:-i  irvH  '. 
-oA.iuo  ik  ^  i-. 

^'TT^  H  E   Criterion  of  any  thing  is  a  Rule  or  Meafure  by  a  Con- 

.     L     formity  with  which  any  thing  is  known  to  be  of  this  or  that 

*forr,  or  of  this  or  that  degree.     And  in  order  to  determine  the  Cri- 

,terion  of  any  thing,  we  muft  firft  know  the  thing  whofe  Criterion 

.^.we  are  feeking   after.     For   a  Meafure  prefuppofes  the  Idea  of  the 

"thing  to  be  meafured,  otherwife  it  could  not  be  known  (fince  what 

is  the  proper  Meafure  of  one  thing  is  not  fo  of  another)  whether  it 

'was  fit  to  meafure   it  or   no.     Liquids,  Cloth,  and  Flefh,  have   all 

different  Meafures ;  Gold  and  Silver  different  Touchflones.     I'his  is 

very  intelligible,  and  the  Method  of  doing  it  generally  clear,  when 

either  the  Quantity  or  Kind  of  any  particular  Subftance  is  thus  to  be 

.  afcertain'd. 

,  r     But  when  we  extend  our  Enquiries  after  a  Criterion  for  abftradt, 

inix'd  Modes,  which  have  no  Exiftence  but  in  our  Minds,  and  are 

fo  very  different  in  different  Men ;  we  are   apt  to   be  confounded, 

'and  fearch  after  a  Meafure  for  we  know  not  what.     For  unlefs  we 

'^  are 


xvi.  Trcliminary  ^}(fertalion.\ 

are  firfl  agreed  concerning  the  thing  to  be  meafur'd,  we  ihall  in  vain 
cxpedt  to  agree  in  our  Criterion  of  it,  or  even  to  underftand  one  a- 
nother. 

But  it  may  be  faid,  if  we  are  cxa£lly  agreed  in  any  mix'd  Mode, 
what  need  of  any  Criterion^  or  what  can  we  want  farther  ?  What 
we  want  farther,  and  what  we  mean  by  the  Criterion  of  it  is  this  j 
viz.  to  know  whether  any  inferior  or  particular  thing  do  belong  ro 
this  mix'd  Mode  or  no.  And  this  is  a  very  proper  Enquiry.  For 
let  a  Man  learn  the  Idea  of  Intemperance  from  you  never  fo  clear- 
ly, and  if  you  pleafe  let  this  be  the  Idea,  viz.  the  Eating  or  Drink- 
ing to  that  degree  as  to  injure  his  Underftanding  or  Health  j  and  let 
him  alfo  be  never  fo  much  convinc'd  of  the  Obligation  to  avoid  it ; 
yet  it  is  a  very  pertinent  Queftion  in  him  to  afk  you,  How  {^^11  ,1 
know  when  I  am  guilty  of  Intemperance?  .<   t,-, 

And  if  we  examine  this  thoroughly,  we  {hall  find  that  every  little 
difference  in  the  Definition  of  a  mix'd  Mode  will  require  a  difl:*e- 
rent  Criterion,  e.  g.  If  Murder  is  defined  the  wilful  taking  away 
the  Life  of  another,  it  is  evident,  that  to  enquire  after  the  Criteri- 
on of  Murder,  is  to  enquire  how  we  fliall  know  when  the  Life  of 
another  is  taken  away  w/^«//y ;  i.  e.  when  one  who  takes  away  the  Life 
of  another  docs  it  with  that  malicious  Defign  which  is  implied  by 
JVilfulnefs.  But  if  Murder  be  defined  the  Guilty  taking  away  the 
Life  of  another,  then  to  enquire  after  the  Criterion  of  Murdet,  is  to 
enquire  how  it  fhall  be  known  when  Guilt  is  contrad:ed  in  the  ta- 
king away  the  Life  of  another.  So  that  the  Criterion  of  Murder, 
according  to  one  or  other  of  thefe  Definitions,  will  be  different. 
For  Wilfulnefs  perhaps  will  be  made  the  Criterion  of  Guilt,  but 
Wilfulnefs  itfelf,  if  it  want  any,  muft  have  fome  farther  Crite- 
rion, it  being  evident  that  nothing  can  be  the  Meafure  of  it- 
Telf 

If  the  Criterion  is  contain'd  in  the  Idea  itfelf,  then  it  is  merely 
7iominal^  e.  g.  If  Virtue  is  defined,  The  acting  agreeably  to  the 
Will  of  God:  To  fay  the  Will  of  God  is  the  Criterion  of  Virtue, 
is  only  to  fay,  what  is  agreeable  to  the  Will  of  God  is  c^//'d  Vir- 
tue. But  the  rt*^/ Criterion,  which  is  of  fome  ufe,  is  this.  How  fhall 
I  know  what  the  Will  of  God  is  in  this  refpect  ? 

From 


fV 


Preliminary  ^ijjertatiori.  *     -  xvii. 

From  hence  it  is  evident,  that  the  Criterion  of  a  mix'd  Mode  is 
neither  the  Definition  of  itj  nor  contain'd  in  it.  For,  as  has  beea 
(hewn,  the  general  Idea  is  neceffarily  to  be  fix'd  j  and  if  the  Par- 
ticulars comprehended  under  it  are  fix'd  or  known  alfo,  there  re- 
mains nothing  to  be  meafured,  becaufe  we  meafure  only  thii^gs  un- 
known. The  general  Idea  then  being  fix'd,  the  Criterion  which  is 
to  meafure  or  determine  Inferiors,  muft  be  found  out  and  proved 
to  be  a  proper  Rule  or  Meafure,  by  comparing  it  with  the  gene- 
ral Idea  only,  independent  of  the  inferior  things  to  which  it  is  to 
be  apply'd.  For  the  truth  of  the  Meafure  muft  be  proved  inde- 
pendently of  the  Particular  to  be  meafured,  otherwife  we  fhall  prove 
in  a  Circle. 

To  apply  what  has  been  faid  in  general  to  the  Cafe  in  hand. 
Gteat  Enquiry  is  made  after  the  Criterion  of  Virtue -,  but  it  is  to 
be  fear'd  that  few  know  diftindlly  what  it  is  they  are  enquiring 
after ;  and  therefore  this  muft  be  clearly  ftafed.  And  in  Order  to 
this,  we  muft  (as  has  been  ihewn)  firft  fix  our  Idea  of  Virtue,  and 
that  exadly;  and  then  our  Enquiry  will  be,  how  we  fliall  know 
this  or  that  lefs  general  or  particular  Adion  to  be  comprehended  under 
Virtue.  For  unlefs  our  Idea  of  Virtue  is  fix'd,  we  enquire  after  the 
Criterion  of  we  know  not  what.  And  this  our  Idea  of  Virtue,  to  give 
any  Satisfacflion,  ought  to  be  fo  general  as  to  be  conformable  to  that 
which  all  or  moft  Men  are  fuppofed  to  have.  And  this  general  X-r 
dea,  I  think,  may  be  thus  exprefs'd. 

Virtue  is  the  Conformity  to  a  Rule  of  Life^  diredling  the  ABions  of 
all  rational  Creatures  with  refpeti  to  each  other's  Happinefs-y  to  which 
Conformily  every  one  in  all  Cafis  is  obliged:  and  every  one  that  does  fo 
con  form  y  is  or  ought  to  be  approved  of-  efieemed  and  loved  for  fo  doing. 
What  is  here  exprefs'd,  I  believe  every  one,  or  moft,  put  into  their 
Idea  of  Virtue. 

For  Virtue,  among  all,  or  moft,  does  imply  fome  relation  to  others :   . 
wlierc  Self  IS  Only  concern'd,  a  Man  may  be /rW^'^/  but  not  virtuous; 
and  an  A£lion  which  relates  immediately   to  Gody  is   ftiled  Religi- 
ous. 

I  think  alfo  that  all  Men,  whatever  they  make  Virtue  to  confift  iri, 
yet  always  nwkc  it  to  imply  Obligation  and  Approbation. 

c  The 


xviii.  preliminary  7)iJfertation, 

:r  The  Idea  of  Virtue  being  thus  fix'd,  to  enquire  after  the  Criterion 
of  it,  is  to  enquire  what  that  Rule  of  Life  is  to  which  we  are  obligd 
to  conform  or  how  that  Rule  is  to  be  found  out  which  is  to  diredt 
me  in  oiy  Behaviour  towards  others,  which  ought  always  to  be  pur- 
fucd,  and  which,  if  purfued,  will  or  ought  to  procure  me  Appro- 
bation, Efteem,  and  Love.  ;n -.  ji./jut// i.'fli;:>  .(Tirnioino.i  :£rh 
-;  But  before  I  can  anfwer  this  Enquiry,  Imuft  firft  fee  what  I  mean 
by  OHigation, 


S  E  C  T.     II. 

Concerning  Obligation. 

f\Bltgatton  is  the  necejjity  of  doing  or  omitting  any  ASiion  in  order  to 
^  ^  be  happy:  i.e.  when  there  is  fuch  a  relation  between  an  Agent 
and  any  Aciion  that  the  Agent  cannot  be  happy  without  doing  or  o- 
mitting  that  Action,  then  the  Agent  is  fa  id  to  be  obliged  to  do  or  o- 
mit  that  Action.  So  that  Obligation  is  evidently  founded  upon  the 
profpedl  of  Happinefs^  and  arifes  from  that  neceflary  Influence  which 
any  Adion  has  upon  prefent  or  future  Happinefs  or  Mifery.  And  no 
greater  Obligation  can  be  fuppofed  to  be  laid  upon  2iny  free  Agent 
without  an  exprefs  Contradidtion. 

This  Obligation  may  be  confider'd  four  ways,  according  to  the  four 
different  manners  in.^which  it  is  induced  :  Firft,  that  Obligation  which 
arifeth  from  perceiving  the  natural  Confequences  of  things,  /.  e.  the 
Confequences  of  things  ading  according  to  the  fix'd  Laws  of  Nature, 
may  be  call'd  Natural.  Secondly,  that  arifing  from  Merit  or  Deme- 
rit, as  producing  the  Efteem  and  Favour  of  our  Fellow-CreatureS) 
or  the  contrary,  is  ufually  ftiled  virtuous.  Thirdly,  that  arifing  from 
the  Authority  of  the  Civil  Magiftrate,  Civil.  Fourthly,  that  from  the 
Authority  of  God,  Religious, 

Now 


"^blim^ry  Dijfertattin.  rnxix, 

^-1^6^^6h\^e  Confideration  of  thefe  four  forts  of  Obligation 
■-(which  are  the  only  ones)  it  is  evident  that  a  full  and  complete  Obh- 
gation  which  will  extend  to  all  Cafes,  can  only  be  that  arifing  from  ' 
the  Authority  of  God;  becaufe  God  only  can  in  all  Cafes  make  a  Man 
happy  or  miferable :  and  therefore,  fince  w«  are  always  obliged  to 
that  conformity  call'd  Virtue,  it  is  evident  that  the  immediate  Rule  or 
'Criterion  of  it  is  the  Will  of  God.  But  is  the  whle  Will  of  God  the 
Criterion  of  Virtue  ?  No.  For  tho'  the  whole  Will  of  God  is  equal- 
ly obligatory;  yet,  fince  Virtue  was  defined  to  be  the  conformity  to 
A  Rule  directing  my  Behaviour  with  refpe£t  to  my  Fellow-Creatures^ 
the  Will  of  God  can  be  no  farther  concern'd  about  Virtue,  than  as  it 
direds  me  in  that  Behaviour. 

The  next  Enquiry  therefore  is,  what  that  Will  of  God  in  this  par- 
ticular is,  or  what  it  direds  me  to  do  ? 

Now  it  is  evident  from  the  Nature  of  God,  viz.  his  being  infmitc- 
ly  happy  in  himfelf  from  all  Eternity,  and  from  his  Goodnefs  mani- 
fefled  in  his  Works,  that  he  could  have  no  other  Defign  in  creating 
Mankind  than  their  Happinefs;  and  therefore  he  wills  their  Happi- 
nefs  -y  therefore  the  means  of  their  Happinefs :  therefore  that  my  Be- 
haviour, as  far  as  it  may  be  a  means  of  the  Happinefs  of  Mankind, 
fhould  be  fuch.  Here  then  we  are  got  one  Step  farther,  or  to  a  new 
Criterion:  not  to  a  new  Criterion  of  Virtue  immediately^  but  to  a 
Criterion  of  the  Will  of  Gcd.  For  it  is  an  Anfwer  to  the  Enquiry, 
How  fliall  I  know  what  the  Will  of  God  in  this  particular  is?  Thus 
the  Will  of  God  is  the  Immediate  Criterion  of  Virtue,  and  the  Hap- 
pinefs of  Mankind  the  Criterion  of  the  Will  of  God  ;  and  therefore 
the  Happinefs  of  Mankind  may  be  f  lid  to  be  the  Criterion  of  Virtue, 
but  once  removed. 

And  firxe  I  am  to  do  whatever  lies  in  my  Power  towards  promot- 
ing the  Happinefs  of  Mankind,  the  next  Enquiry  is,  what  is  the  Cri- 
terion of  this  Happinefs-.  i.e.  how  rtiall  I  know  what  in  my  Power 
is,  or  Is  not,  for  the  Happinefs  of  Mankind  ? 

Now  this  is  to  be  known  only  from  the  Relations  of  things,  (which 

Relations,  with  rcfpecl  to  our  prefent  Enquiry,  fome  have  call'd  their 

Fit  fiefs  and  Unftnefs.)     For  lome  Things  and  Actions  are  apt  to  pro- 

:duce  Pleafure,  others  Pain;  fome  are  convenient,  others  inconvenient 

.    r,  c  2  for 


.\>x^i 


XX,  ^Preliminary  T)ifertaUon. 

for  ft  Society  •,  fomc  are  for  the  good  of  Mankind,  bSiers  ten^  to'thc- 
detriment  of  it:  therefore  thcfe  are  to  be  chofen  which  tend  to  the 
good  of  Mankind;  the  others  to  be  avoided.  '3  l,^^'^:J'!'.r,^ 

Thus  then  we  arc  got  one  ftep  farther,  viz.  to  the  Crtteriori  of  the 
Happinefs  of  Mankind.  And. from  this  Criterion  we  deduce  al^  parti- 
cular Virtues  and  Vice^. ''^[\'^'  V  ''-! 

The  next  Enquiry  is,  Howfhall  I  know  that  there  is  tliis  Fitnefs 
and  Unfitnefs  in  things  ?  or  if  there  be,  how  fhall  I  difcover  it  in  par- 
ticular Cafes  ?  And  the  Anfwer  is,  Either  from  Ex;perience  or  Reafon. 
^r-You  either  perceive  the  Inconveniencies  of  fome  Things  and  Adlions 
when  they  happen^  or  you  forefee  them  by  contemplating  the  Nature 
of  the  Things  and  Adtions. 

-  -  Thus  the  Criterion  of  the  Fitnefs  or  Unfitnefs  of  things  may  in  general\ 
be  faid  to  ht  Reafon  :  which  Reafon,  wheneacadly  conformable  to  the 
things  exifting,  i.  e.  when  it  judges  of  things  as  they  are,  is  called" 
Right  Reafon.  And  hence  alfo  we  fometimes  talk  of  the  Reafon  of 
things,  i.  e.  properly  fpcaking,  that  Relation  which  we  fhould  find  out 
by  our  Reafon,  if  our  Reafon  was  right. 

The  expreifing  by  outward  Signs  the  Relations  of  things  as  they, 
really  are,  is  called  Truth -,  and  hence,  by  the  fame  kind  of  Meta-. 
phor,  we  are  apt  to  talk  of  the  Truth,  as  well  as  Reafon  of  things. 
Both  Expreffions  mean  the  fame :  which  has  often  made  me  wonder 
why  fome  Men  who  cry  up  Reafon  as  the  Criterion  of  Virtue, 
{Jiould  yet  diflike  Mr.  Wollafton\  Notion  of  Truth  being  its  Crite- 
rion. 

The  Truth  is,  all  thefe  juft  mention'd,  vi-z.  the  Happinefs  of  Man- 
kind y  the  Relations,  or  Fitnefs  and  Unfitnefs  of  things  j  Reafon  and 
Truth ;  may  in  fome  fenfe  be  faid  to  be  Criterions  of  Virtue ;  but 
it  muft  always  be  remember*d  that  they  are  only  remote  Criterions  of 
it,  being  gradually  fubordinate  to  its  immediate  Criterion,  the  Will 
of  God. 

And  from  hence  we  may  perceive  the  Reafon  of  what  I  fuggefted ; 
in   the  beginning  of  this  Treatife,  viz.  That   the   Difpute  betv\  een 
Moralifts  about  the  Criterion  of  Virtue,  is  more  in  Words  than  Mean- 
ing ;  and  that  this  Difference  between  them  has  been  occafion'd  by 
their  dropping  the  irurnediate,  Criterion,  and  choofing  fome  a  mora 

remote. 


'preliminary  'I)iJ[ert(f,tfon.  ^i, 

.  remote,  fome  a  lefs  remote  one.     And  from  hence  we  nay  fee  alfo  ' 
^ r'the  Inconvenience  of  defining  any  mix'd  Mode  by  its  Criterion.     For 
that  in  a  great  meafure  has  occafion'd  all  this  Confufion,  as  may  ea- 
lily  he  mads  appear  in  all  the  pretended  Criterions  of  yirtiae  ahoye- 
^    mention'd. 

Thus  thofe  who  either  exprefly  exclude,  or  don't  mention  the  Will 
.  .  of  God,  making  the  immediate  Criterion  of  Virtue  to  be  the  Good 
of  Mankind;  muft  either  allow  that  Virtue  is  not  in  all  Cafes  oMiga- 
tory  (contrary  to  the  Idea  whiph  all  or  moft  Men  have  of  it)  or  they 
mufl  fay  that  the  Good  of  Mankind  is  a  fufficient  Obligation.  But 
how  can  the  Good  of  Mankind  be  any  Obligation  to  me^  when  per- 
haps in  particular  Cafes,  fuch  as  laying  down  my  Life,  or  the  like,  it 
is  contrary  to  my  Happinefs,  *-' 

Thofe  who  drop  the  Happinefs  of  Mankind,  and  talk  of  Relations, 
the  Fitnefs  and  Unfitnefs  of  Things,  are  flill  more  remote  from  the 
ti'uc  Criterion.  For  Fitnefs  without  relation  to  fome  End^  is  fcarce 
intelligible. 

Reafon  and  Truth  comCi  pretty  near  the  Relations  of  things,  be- 
caufe  they  manifeftly  prefuppofe  them  ;  but  are  flill  one  ftep  farther 
from  the  immediate  Criterion  of  Virtue. 

What  has  been  faid  concerning  the  Criterion  of  Virtue  as  inclu- 
ding our  Obligation  to  it,  may  perhaps  be  allow'd  to  be  true,  but 
ftill  it  will  be  Org'd,  that  'tis  infufficient  to  account  for  matter  of 
Fad:,  v/2;.  that  moll:  Perfons,  who  are  either  ignorant  of,  or  never 
conlider*d  thefe  Dedudions,  do  however  purfue  Virtue  themfelves, 
and  approve  of  it  in  othets.  I  fhall  in  the  next  place  therefore  give . 
fome  account  of  our  Approbations  and  Affections. ' 


SECT. 


'Kxii.  Trclimlnary  Differtation, 


f-'?  '  -  »  ,!iv5  70  booO  n( 


ST-t     r^    T*         TTT      ^*  "!nj  b'fftiugnifiib 
li     Ka     1.        111.  f-.-vlifiomYfiych 

^l^-Concerning  Approbation   and  K^cdi\6n.\^^{^ 

MAN  is  not  only  a  fenfible  Creature,  not  only  capable  of  Plea- 
fure  and  Pain,  but  capable  alfo  6i  forefeeifig  the  Pleafure  and 
Pain  in  the  future  confequences  of  Things  and  Adions;  and  as  he 
is  capable  of  knowing,  fo  alfo  of  governing  or  directing  the  Caufes 
of  them,  and  thereby  in  a  great  meafure  enabled  to  avoid  the  one 
and  procure  the  other:  whence  the  Principle  of  all  Adiion.  And 
therefore,  as  Pleafure  and  Pain  are  not  indifferent  to  him,  nor  out 
of  his  Power,  he  purfues  the  former  and  avoids  the  latter ;  and  there- 
fore alfo  thofe  things  which  are  Caufes  of  them  are  not  indifferent, 
but  he  purfues  or  avoids  them  alfo,  according  to  their  different 
Tendency.  That  which  he  purfues  for  its  own  fake,  which  is  on- 
ly Pleafure,  is  called  an  End  j  that  which  he  apprehends  to  be  apt  to 
\  produce  Pleafure,  he  calls  Good,  and  approves  of,  /.  e.  judges  a  pro- 

V         per  means  to  attain  his  end,  and  therefore  looks  upon  it  as  an   Ob- 
\       jedt  of  choice  ;  that  which  is  pregnant  with  Mifery  he  difapproves  of 
\      and  fliles  Evil.  And  this  Good  and  Evil  are  not  only  barely  approved 
\    of,  or  the  contrary,  but  whenever  view'd  in  Imagination' (fince  Man  con- 
Uders   himfelf  as  exifting  hereafter,  and   is  concerned  for  his  Welfare 
then  as  well  as  now)  they  have  a  prefent  Pleafure  or  Pain  annex'd  to 
ihem,  proj)ortionable  to  what  is  apprehended  to  follow  them  in  real 
Exiflence }  which  Pleafure  or  Piiin  arifing  from  the  profped  of  future 

Flealure 


preliminary  Dijfcrtation. 

Pleafure  or  Pain  is  properly  call'd  PaJJion^  and  the  Defire  confequen^ 
thereupon,  AffeSiion.  ^ 

And  as  by  reflefting  upon  Pleafure  there  arifes  in  our  minds  a  D^- 
Jire  of  it ;  and  on  Pain,  an  Averjion  from  it  (which  neceffarily  follows 
from  fuppofing  us  to  be  fcnfible  Creatures,  and  is  no  more  than  fay- 
ing, that  all  things  are  not  indifferent  to  us)  fo  alfo  by  refled:ing  up- 
on Good  or  Evil,  the  fame  Defires  and  Averfions  are  excited,  and  arc 
diftinguifh'd  into  Love  and  Hatred.  And  from  Love  and  Hatred  va- 
rioufly  modify 'd,  arife  all  thofe  other  Defires  and  Averfions  which  are 
promifcuoufly  ftiled  Paffions  or  AiFedions  j  and  are  generally  thought 
to  be  implanted  in  our  Nature  originally,  like  the  Power  of  receiving 
Pleafure  or  Pain.  And  when  placed  on  inanimate  Obje^ls,  are  thefe 
following,  Hope,  Fear,  Defpair  and  its  oppofite,  for  which  we  want 
a  Name. 


Tjf'i  -'. 


S  E  C  T.     IV. 

jipprohation  and  j4ffe^ion  confider^d  with  regard 
to  Merit,  or  the  Law  of  Efteem. 


IF  a  Man  in  the  purfuit  of  Pleafure  or  Happinefs  (by  which  is  meant 
the  Sum  total  of  Pleafure)  had  to  do  only  with  inanimate  Crea- 
tures, his  Approbation  and  Affedtions  would  be  as  defcribed  in  the 
foregoing  Sedion.  But,  fince  he  is  dependent  with  refpcdl  to  his 
Happinefs,  not  only  on  thefc,  but  alfo  on  rational  Agents,  Creatures 
like  himfelf,  which  have  the  Power  of  governing  or  direding  Good 

and 


xxiv.  Preliminary  7)iJfcrtation. 

imd  Evil,  aiid  of  ading  for  an  End  j  there  will  arife  different  means 
of  Happinefs,  and  confequently  different  Purfuits,  tho'  tending  to  the 
fame  End,  Happinefs;  and  therefore  different  Approbations  and  Af- 
fedtions,  and  the  contrary ;  which  deferve  particularly  to  be  con- 
fider'd. 

That  there  w  ill  arife  different  means  of  Happinefs,  is  evident  from 
hence,  I'tz.  that  Rational  Agents,  in  being  fubfervient  to  our  Happi- 
nefs, are  not  paffive  but  voluntary.  And  therefore  iince  we  are  in 
purfuit  of  that  to  obtain  which  we  apprehend  the  concurrence  of 
their  Wills  necefl'ary,  we  cannot  but  approve  of  whatever  is  apt  to 
procure  this  Concurrence.  And  that  can  be  only  the  Pleafure  or 
Pain  expe<5ted  from  it  by  them.  And  therefore,  as  I  perceive  that 
my  Happinefs  is  dependent  on  others,  I  cannot  but  judge  whatever  I 
apprehend  to  be  proper  to  excite  them  to  endeavour  to  promote  my 
Happinefs,  to  be  a  means  of  Happinefs:  /.  e.  I  cannot  but  approve  it. 
And  fmce  the  annexing  Pleafure  to  their  Endeavours  to  promote  my 
Happinefs  is  the  only  thing  in  my  power  to  this  end,  I  cannot  but 
-approve  of  the  annexing  Pleafure  to  fuch  Adions  of  theirs  as  are  un- 
dertaken upon  my  account.  Hence  to  approve  of  a  Rational  Agent 
as  a  means  of  Happinefs,  is  different  from  the  Approbation  of  any  o- 
ther  means,  becaufe  it  implies  an  Approbation  alfo  of  an  Endeavour 
to  promote  the  Happinefs  of  that  Agent,  in  order  to  excite  him  and 
others  to  the  fame  concern  for  my  Happinefs  for  the  future. 

And  becaufe  what  we  approve  of  we  alfo  defire  (as  has  been  fhewn 
above)  hence  alfo  we  defire  the  Happinefs  of  any  Agent  that  has  done 
us  good.  And  therefore  Love  or  Hatred,  when  placed  on  a  rational 
Objedl,  has  this  difference  from  the  Love  or  Hatred  of  other  things, 
that  it  implies  a  defire  of,  and  confequently  a  pleafure  in  the  Happi- 
nefs of  the  Objedt  beloved  ;  or,  if  hated,  the  contrary. 

The  Foundation  of  this  Approbation  and  Love  (which,  as  we  have 
feen,  confifls  in  his  voluntarily  contributing  to  our  Happinefs)  is  cal- 
led the  Merit  of  the  Agent  fo  contributing,  i.  e.  that  whereby  he  is 
entitled  (upon  fuppofition  that  we  ad:  like  rational,  fociable  Crea- 
tures, like  Creatures  whofe  Happinefs  is  dependent  on  each  other's 
Behaviour)  to  our  Approbation  and  Love:  Demerit ihs,  contrary. 

And 


Preliminary  T^ijfcrtation/  ^'^ 

And  this  AfFe£l  ion  or  Quality  of  any  Adlion  which  we  call  Merit  is 
very  confident  with  a  Man's  adling  ultimately  for  his  own  private 
Happinefs.  For  any  particular  Adlion  that  is  undertaken  for  tie  fake.  » 
of  a?2otker,  is  meritorious,  i.  e.  defer ves  Efteem,  Favour,  and  Appro- 
bation from  him  for  whofe  fake  it  was  undertaken,  towards  the 
Doer  of  it.  For  the  prefumption  of  fuch'  Efteem,  &c.  was  the  only 
Motive  to  that  Adtion  j  and  if  fuch  Efteem,  &c.  does  not  follow,  or 
is  prefum'd  not  to  follow  it,  fuch  a  Perfon  is  reckon'd  unworthy  of 
any  favour,  becaufe  he  lliews  by  his  Ad:ions  that  he  is  incapable  of 
being  obliged  by  Favours. 

The  Miftake  which  fome  have  run  into,  viz.  that  Merit  is  incon- 
fiftent  with  ad:ing  upon  private  Happinefs,  as  an  ultimate  End,  feems 
to  have  arifen  from  hence,  viz.  that  they  have  not  carefully  enough 
diftinguifti'd  between  an  inferior  and  ultimate  End;  the  end  of  a  par- 
ticular A(5tion,  and  the  end  of  Action  in  general :  which  may  be  ex- 
plained thus.  Tho'  Happinefs,  private  Happinefs,  is  the  proper  or 
ultimate  End  of  all  our  Adlions  whatever,  yet  that  particular  means 
of  Happinefs  which  any  particular  Adtion  is  chiefly  adapted  to  pro-  , 
cure,  or  the  thing  chiefly  aim'd  at  by  that  Adion ;  the  thing  which, 
if  poftefs'd,  we  would  not  undertake  that  A6lion,  may  and  generally 
is  call'd  the  End  of  that  Adion.  As  therefore  Happinefs  is  the  ge- 
neral End  of  all  Adions,  fo  each  particular  Adion  may  be  faid  to 
have  its  proper  and  peculiar  End:  Thus  the  End  of  a  Beau  is  to 
pleafe  by  his  Drefs;  the  End  of  Study,  Knowledge.  But  neither 
pleafing  by  Drefs,  nor  Knowledge,  are  ultimate  Ends,  they  ftill  tend 
or  ought  to  tend  to  fomething  farther ;  as  is  evident  from  hence,  viz. 
that  a  Man  may  afk  and  expedl  a  Reafon  why  either  of  them  are 
purfued :  Now  to  aflc  the  Reafon  of  any  Adion  or  Purfuit,  is  only 
to  enquire  into  the  End  of  it :  But  to  exped  a  Reafon,  /.  e.  an  End 
to  be  aflign'd  for  an  idtimate  End,  is  abfurd.  To  afk  why  I  purfue 
Happinefs,  will  admit  of  no  other  Anfwer  than  an  Explanation  of 
the  Terms.  •- 

Why  inferior  Ends,  which  in  reality  are  only  Means,  are  too  often  ' 
look'd  upon   and  acquiefc'd  in   as  idtimate,  fliall  be  accounted  for 
hereafter,  ii'  .%t  *  ...    .- 

•  d  Whenever 


3Etvi.  preliminary  ^ijfertation. 

Whenever  therefore  the  particular  End  of  any  A(5li6n  is  the  Hap- 
pinefs  of  another  (tho'  the  Agent  clefign'd  thereby  to  procure  to  him- 
fclf  Efteem  and  Favour,  ar.d  Icok'd  upon  that  Eftcem  and  Favour 
as  a  means  of  private  Happincfs)  that  Adtion  is  meritorious.     And> 
the  fame  may  be  faid,  tho'  we  defign  to  pleafe  God  by  endeavouring 
to  promote  the  Happinefs  of  others.     But  when  an  Agent  has  a  view, 
in  any  particular  Aclion  diftinft  from  my  Happinefs,  and  that  view 
is  his  only  Motive  to  that  Adion,  tho'  that  Adtion  promote  my  Hap- 
pinefs to  never  fo  great  a  Degree    yet  that  Agent  acquires  no  Me-. 
rit -J  i.  e.  he  is  not  thereby  entitled  to  any  Favour  and  Efleem:     Be»^ 
caufe  Favour  and  Ellecm  are  due  from  me  for  any  Acftion,  no  far-  - 
ther  than  that  Adion  was   undertaken  upon  my  account.     If  there- 
fore my  Happinefs  is  only  the  pretended  End  of  that  Adion,  I  am 
impofed  on  if  I  believe  it  real,  and  thereby  think  myfelf  indebted 
to  the  Agent;  and  am  difcharg'd  from  any  Obligation  as  foon  as  I  find*^ 
out  the  Cheat. 

But  it  is  far  otherwife  when  my  Happinefs  is  the  fole  End  of  that 
particular  Adion,  i.  e.  (as  I  have  explain'd  myfelf  above)  when  the 
'  Agent  endeavours  to  promote  my  Happinefs  as  a  Means  to  procure 
my  Favour,  /.  e.  to  make  me  fubfervient  to  his  Happinefs  as  his  uI.-t^ 
timate  End:  Tho'  I  know  he  aims  at  my  Happinefs  only  as  a  means 
of  liis  own,  yet  this  lelTens  not  the  Obligation. 

There  is  one  thing,  I  confefs,  which  makes  a  great  alteration  in . 
this  Cafe,  and  that  is,  whether  he  aims   at  my  Favour  i?i  general^ , 
ox  only  for  fome  particular  End.     Becaufe,  if  he  aim  at  my  Hap- 
pinefs only  to  ferve  himfelf  in  fome  particular  thing,  the  Value  of 
my  Favour   will    perhaps   end  with  his  obtaining   that  particular: 
thing :     And  therefore  I  am  under  lefs  Obligation  (ceteris  paribus). 
the  more  particular  his  Expeftat ions  from  me  are  j  but  under  Obli- 
gation I  am. 

.  Now  from  the  various  Combinations  of  this  which  we  call  Me- 
rit, and  its  contrary,  arife.  all  thofe  various  Approbations  and  A- 
verfions ;  all  thoJfe  Likings  and  Diflikings  which  we  call.  Mo- 
ral 

As  therefore,    from    confidering  thofe   Beings  which  are  the  in- 
^luntary  means  of  our  Happinefs  or  Mifery,    there  were  produced 

•  i« . 


--■'7X 


.TT 


ifius'tlie  Paflions  or  Affedions  of  Love,  Hatred,  Hope,  Fear,  De- 
fpair,  and  its  contrary:  So  from  coniidering  thofe  Beings  which 
'voluntarily  contribute  to  our  Happinefs  or  Mifery,  there  arife  thefe 
following.  Love  and  Hatred,  (which  are  different  from  that  Love 
or  Hatred  placed  on  involuntary  Beings ;  that  placed  on  involuntary 
Beings  being  only -a  Delire  to  polTefs  or  avoid  the  thing  beloved  or 
hated  J  but  this  on  voluntary  Agents  being  a  Defire  to  give  Pleafurc 
or  Pain  to  the  Agent  beloved  or  hated)  Gratitude,  Anger,  (fome- 
times  call'd  by  one  common  Name,  Refentment)  Generofity,  Attl- 
bition,  Honour,  Shame,  Envy,  Benevolence :  and  if  there  be  any  o- 
ther,  they're  only,  as  thefe  are,  different  Modifications  of  Love  and 
Hatred. 

Love  2J\6.  Hatred,  and  the  Foundation  of  them,  (viz.  the  Agent 
beloved  or  hated  being  apprehended  to  be  inftrumental  to  our  Hap- 
pinefs) I  have  explain'd  above.  Gratitude  is  that  Defire  of  promot- 
ing the  Happinefs  of  another  upon  account  of  fome  former  Kindnefs 
receiv'd.  Anger,  that  Defire  of  thwarting  the  Happinefs  of  ano- 
ther, on  account  of  Jbme  former  Diikindnefs  or  Injury  recei- 
ved. And  both  thefe  tate  place,  tho'  we  hope  for,  or  fear  no- 
thing farther  from  the  Objects  of  either  of  them,,  and  this  is 
ft  ill  confiftent  with  adiing  upon  a  Principle  of  private  Happi- 
nefs. 

For  tho*  we  neither  hope  for,  nor  fear  any  thing  farther  frbnii 
thefe  particular  Beings  j  yet  the  Difpofition  fhewn  upon  thcf.^  Oc- 
cafions  is  apprehended  to  influence  the  Behaviour  of  other  Beings 
towards  us;  /".  e.  other  Beings  will  be  moved  to  promote  our  Hap- 
pinefs or  otherwife,  as  they  obferve  how  we  refent  Favours  or  In- 
juries. 

Ambition  is  a  Defire  of  being  eft:eem'd.  Hence  a  Defire  of  being 
thought  an  Objecft  of  Effeem  ;  hence  of  being  an  Objedt  of  Efteem, 
hence  of  doing  laudable,  i.  e.  ufeful  A6Uons.  Generofity  and  Benevo- 
lence are  Species  of  it.  Ambition  in  too  great  a  Degree  is  called 
Pride,  of  which  there  are  feveral  Species.  The  Title  to  the  Efteem 
of  others,  which  arifeth  from  any  meritorious  A(5tion,  is  called  Ho- 
}LOur.  The  Pleaiure  arifing  from  Honour  being  paid  to  us,  /'.  e.  froni 
others  acknowledging  that  we  are  entitled  to  their  Efi:eem,  is  with* 

d  2  out 


x^fviiL  Treliminary  Differtation. 

oxtVtL  Nftme.     Modefty  is  the  fear  of  lofmg  Eftecm.     The  Uneafinefs 
or  PatTion  which  arilcth  from  a  Senfe  that  we  have  loft  it,  is  called 
Shame.  ^6' t\\-3i\i  Ambition^  ^tA  all  thofe  other  Paflions  and  Aftec- 
'  tions  belonging  to  it,  together  with  Shame,  arife  from  the  Eftceni 
of  others:    which  is  the  Reafon  why  this  Tribe  of  Affeftions   ope- 
rate more  ftrongly  on  us  than  any  other,  "oiz.  because  we  perceive 
^ 'that  as  our  Happinefs  is  dependent  on  the  Behaviour  of  others,  {o 
^  Vire  perceive  alfo  that  that  Behaviour  is  dependent  on  the  Efteem- 
•  which  others  have  conceiv'd  of  us;  and  confequently  that  our  acqui- 
ring or  lofing  Efteem,  is  in  efied:  acquiring  or  lofing  Happinefs,  and 
in  the  higheft  Degree.     And  the  fame  may  be  faid  concerning  all  our 
other  Aii"e<ftit)ns  and  Paffions,  to  enumerate  which,  what  for  want  of 
■^' 'Names  to  them,  and  what  by  the  confufion  of  Language  about  them, 
■"is^^almoft  impoHible.  >    .  vKvi/rv;  ;.  .• 

Ennjy  will  be  accounted  for  hereafter,  for  a  Reafon  which  will  then 
be   obvious. 

Thus  having  explain'd  what  I  mean  by  Obligation  and  Approba- 
tion ;  and  fliewn-  that-  they  are  founded  on  and  terminate  in  Happi- 
nefs: having  alfo  pointed,  out  the.  Difference  between  our  Approba- 
tions and  Affedions  as  placed  on  involuntary  and  voluntary  Means- 
of  Happinefs }  and- farther,  that  thefe  Approbations  and  Affections. 
are  not  innate  or  implanted  in  us  by  way  of  Infiin5i^  but  are  all  ac- 
quired^ being  fairly  deducible  from  fuppofing-  only  fenfible  and  ra- 
tional Creatures  dependent  on  each  other  for  their  Happinefs,  as  ex- 
plain'd above :  I  fhall  in  the  next  place  endeavour  to  anfwer  a  grand 
Objeclion  to  what  has  here  been  faid  concerning  Approbations  and; 
Affcftions  ariling  frx3m  a  profpetl  of  private  Happinefs. 

The  Objed:ion  is  this. 

The  Reafon  or  End  of  every  Adtion  is  always  known  to  the  A- 
gent;  for  nothing  can  move  a  Man  but  what  is  perceiv'd :  but  the 
generality  of  Mankind  love  and  hate,  approve  and  difapprove,  im- 
mediately, as-  foon  as  any  moral  Charadter  either  occurs  in  Life,  or 
is  propofed  to  them,  without  confidering  whether  their  private  Hap- 
pinefs- 


Preliminary  Differtatibn.  xxix. 

pinefs  is  afFeded  with  ir,  or  no:  or  if  they  do  confider  any  Moral 
Charadicr  in  relation  to  their  own  Happinefs,  and  find  themfelves,  as 
to  their  private  Happinefs,  iinconcern'd  in  it,  or  even  find  their  pri- 
vate Happinefs  lelfen'd  by  it  in  fome  particular  Inflance,  yet  they 
jftill  approve  the  Moral  Charad:er,  and  love  the  Agent ;  nay  they 
cannot  do  otherwife.  Whatever  Reafon  may  be  aff;gn'd  by  fpecii- 
lativ€  Men  why  we  fhouid  be  grateful  to  a  Benefid:or,  or  pity  the 
Dillrefied)  yet  if  the  grateful  or  compaffionate  Mind  never  thought 
of  that  Reafon,  it  is  no  Reafon  to  him.  The  Enquiry  is  not  why 
he  ought  to  be  grateful,  but  why  he  is  fo.  Thefe  after-reafons  there  - 
fore  PAiher  fliew  the  Wifdom  and  Providence  of  our  Maker  in  im- 
planting the  immediate  Powers  of  thefe  Approbations  (i.  e.  in  Mr. 
Hutchejbn's  Language,  n  Moral  Senfe)  and  ihefe  Public  Affediions  in 
us,  than  give  any  fatisfadlory  account  of  their  Origin,  And  there- 
fore thefe  Public  Aifedions,  and  this  Moral  Senfe,  are  quite  inde- 
pendent on  private  Happinefs^  and  in  reality  a6t  upon  us  as  mere 
Inft  incuts. 

Anfwer. 

The  Matter  of  Fad:  contain'd  in  this  Argument,  in  my  Opinion,  Is      / 
not  to  be  contefted ;  and  therefore  it  remains  either  that  we  make 
ihc  matter  of  Facl  confiftent  with  what  we  have  before  laid  down, 
or  give  up  the  Caufe. 

Now,  in  order  to  fhew  this  Confiftency,  I  beg  leave  to  obferve, 
that  as  in  the  purfuit  of  Truth  we  don't  always  trace  every  Propo- 
fition  whofe  Truth  we  are  examining,  to  a  firft  Principle  or  Axiom, 
but  acquiefce,  as  foon  as  we  perceive  it  deducible  from  fome  known 
or  prefumed  Truth  j  fo  in  our  Conduct  we  do  not  always  travel  to 
the  ultimate  End  of  our  Adions,  Happinefs :  but  reft  contented,  as 
foon  as  we  perceive  any  Action  fubfervient  to  a  known  or  prefumed 
Means  of  Happinefs.  And  thefe  prefumed  Truths  and  Means  of 
Happinefs,  whether  real  or  otherwife,  always  influence  us  after  the 
fame  manner  as  if  they  were  real.  The  undeniable  Confequences  of 
Prejudices  are  as  firmly  adhered  to  as  the  Confequences  of  real  tmths 

or 


J^:  '  Preliminary  Dijfertation, 

or  arguments ;  and  what  is  fubfervrent  to  a  falfe  (but  imagln'd) 
means  of  Happinefs,  is  as  induftrioully  purfued  as  what  isfubfervient 
to  a  true  one.  r        r 


Now  every  Man,  both  in  his  Purfuit  after  Triith,  atid  ih  Jfus  Con- 
duct, has  fettled  and  fixed  a  great  many  of  thefe  in  his  Mind,  which 
he  always  ads  upon,  as  upon  Principles,  without  examining.  And 
this  is  occalion'd  by  the  Narrownefs  of  our  Underllandings :  We  can 
confider  but  a  few  things  at  once  j  and  therefore,  to  run  every  thing 
to  the  Fountain-head  would  be  tedious,  thro'  a  long  Series  of  Con- 
fequences.  To  avoid  this  we  choofe  out  certain  Truths  and  means 
of  Happinefs,  which  we  look  upon  as  RESTING  PLACES,  which 
.  we  may  fafely  acquiefce  in,  in  the  Conduct  both  of  cur  Underftan- 
ding  and  Practice,  in  relation  to  the  one,  regarding  them  as  Jlxi- 
oms'y  in  the  other,  as  Ends.  And  we  are  more  eafily  inclined  to 
this  by  imagining  that  we  may  fafely  rely  upon  what  we  call  Ha- 
bitual  Knowledge,  thinking  it  needlefs  to  examine  what  we  are  al- 
ready fatisfy'd  in.  And  hence  it  is  that  Prejudices,  both  Speculative 
and  Practical,  are  difficult  to  be  rooted  out,  was.  few  will  examine 
them. 

And  thefe  RESTINO  PLACES  are  fo  often  ufed  as 
Principles,  that  at  lail:,  letting  that  flip  out  of  our  Minds  which 
iirft  inclined  us  to  embrace  them,  we  are  apt  to  imagine  them, 
not  as  they  really  are,  the  »S/^^^//«/^j  of  Pj inciples,  but  Principles 
themfel  ves.  '    "       " '    '- 

And  from  hence,  as  fome  Men  have  imagined  Innate  Ideas,  becaufc 
forgetting  how  they  came  by  them  j  fo  others  have  fet  up  almoft  as 
many  diftind  InfiinSis  as  there  are  acquired  Pri?iciples  of  acting.  And 
I  cannot  but  wonder  why  the  Pecuniary  Senfe,  a  Senfe  of  Power  and 
Party,  &c.  were  not  mention'd,  as  well  as  the  Moral,  that  of  Ho- 
miir.  Order,  and  fome  others. 

The  Cafe  is  really  this.  We  firft  perce-Ive  or  imagine  fome  real 
Qood^  Le.  fitnefs  to  promote  our  Happinefs  in  thofe  things  which 
wc  love  and  approve  of.  Hence  (as  was  above  explain'd)  we  annex 
PJeafure  to  thofe  things.  Hence  xhofe  things  and  Pleafure  are  fo 
ty'd  togetlier  and  alTociated  in  our  Minds,  that  one  cannot  prefent 

itfelf 


A 


Preliminary  T>ijjertation» 

itfelf  but  the  other  will  aJfo  accurw  And  the  Adaciationrevazm^  e- 
vcn  after  that  which  at  firft  gave  thsm  the  CQnncd:ion  is  q":ite  for- 
got, or  perhaps  dees  not  exill,.  but  the  contrary.  An  Inflarce  or 
two  may  perhaps  make  this  clear.  How  maDy  Men  are  there  in  the 
World  who  have  as  ftrong  a  tafte  for  Money  as  others  have  for  Vir- 
tue; who  count  io  much  Money,  fo  much  Happinefsj  nay,  even 
fell  their  Happinefs  for  Money  j  o*-,  to  fpeak  more  properly,  make 
the  having  Money,  without  any  Defign  or  Thought  of  uiing  it, 
their  ultimate  End?  But  was  this  Propeni'ty  to  Money  born  with 
them  ?  Or  rather,  did  not  they  at  iirft  perceive  a  great  many  Ad-; 
vantages  from  being  pofiefs'd.  of  Money,  and  from  thence  conceive 
a  Plcafure  in  having  it,  thence  deiire  it,  thence  endeavour  to  ob^ 
ttiin  it,  thence  receive  an  adual  Pleafure  in  obtaining  it,  thence  de- 
fire  to  preferve  the  FofTeflion  of  it  ?  Hence,  by  dropping  the  inter- 
mediate Means  between  Money  and  Happinefs,  they  join  Money  and 
Happinefs  immediately  together,  and  content  themfelves  with  the 
phantaftical  Pleafure  of  having  it,  and  make  that  which  was  at  firfl 
purfued  only  as  a  Means^  be  to  them  a  real  End^  and  what  their  real 
Happinefs  or  Mifer}^  confifts  in.  Thus  the  Connexion  between  Mo- 
ney and  Happinefs  remains  in  the  Mind;  tho'  it  has  long  fince  ceafed 
between  the  things  themfelves. 

The  fame  might  be  obferv'd  concerning  the  Third  after  Know- 
ledge, Fame,  &c.  the  delight  in  Reading,  Building,  Planting,  and 
moft  of  the  various  Exercifes  and  Entertainments  of  Life.  Thefe 
were  at  firfl:  enter'd  on  with  a  view  to  fome  farther  End,  but  at 
length  become  habitual  Amufements;  the  Idea  of  Pleafure  is  aflb- 
ciated  with  them,  and  leads  us  on  ftill  in  the  fame  eager  Purfuit  of 
them,  when  the  firft  Reafon  is  quite  vanifh'd,  or  at  lead  out  of  our 
Minds.  Nay,  we  find  this  Power  of  Affociotion  fo  great  as  not  only 
to  tranfport  our  Paffions  and  Affedtions  beyond  their  proper  bounds, 
both  as  to  Intenfenefs  and  Duration;  as  is  evident  from  daily  In- 
ftances  of  Avarice,  Ambition,  Love,  Revenge,  (^c.  but  alfo,  that  it 
is  able  to  transfer  them  to  improper  Objects,  and  fuch  as  are  of  a  ■ 
quite  different  Nature  from  thofe  to  which  our  Reafon  had  at  firfli. 
direded  them.     Thus  being  accuflom'd  to  rcfent  an  Injury  done  ta 

our 


XXXI. 


our  Body  by  a  Kctaliation  of  ^heiike  to  him  that  pfej'^  A^t'^fifPf® 
ap^;to  cbndeiye  Ae  fame  kind  of  Refentment,  aii^  qft^n  ^^prefiip  la  i 
tfc  fametn^nner,  upon  receiving  hurt  from  a  Stock  or  Stone,  wliere-  ;, 
by  the  hatred  which  we  are  ufed  to   place  on   voluntary  Beings,  is  ^, 
fubftituted  in  the  Room  of  that  Averfion  which  belongs  to  involunr.j 
tary  ones.     The  like  may  be  obferv'd  iu  mofl  ojf  the  ptner  PafTions  a- 
bove-mention'd.  .,  ^  ,i , 

From*hence  alfo,  viz.  from  th'B  continuance  of  this -^^r/Mm;o|'^ 
Ideas  in  our  Minds,  we  may  be  enabled  to  account  for  that  (almoft  ' , 
diaholical)  Paflion  called  £«i%  which  we  promis'd  to  confider.       ,.^ , 

Mr.  Xoc/('^  obferves,  and  I  believe  very  juflly,  that  there  are  fome  : . 
-Men   entirely   unacquainted    with    this    Paffion.     For    moll    MeOvi 
that  are  ufed    to  Refledion,    may  remember /the  very  /t)p:^<^'vi,^]|^^^^^ 
they  were  firft  under  the  dominion  of  it.  '       vvj 

Envy  is  generally  defined  to  be  that  Pain  which  arifes  in  the  Mind 
from  obferving  the  Profperity  of  others ;  not  of  all  others  indefinite- 
ly, but  only  of  fome  particular  Perfons.     Now  the  examining  wha  „ 
thofe  particular  Perfons  whom  we  are  apt  to  envy  are,  will  lead  us,, 
to  the  true  Origin  of  this  PafTion.     And  if  a  Man  will  be  at  the  Pains,..,' 
to  confult  his  Mind,  or  to  look  into  the  World,  he'U  find  that  thefe 
particular  Perfons  are  always  fuch  as  upon  fome  account  or  other  he 
has  had  a  Rival/hip  with.     For  when  two  or  more  are  Competitors 
for  the  fame  thing,  the  Succefs  of  the  one  mufl  neceffarily  tend  to 
the  Detriment  of  the  other,  or  others:  hence  the  Succefs  of  my  Rir^.^ 
val  and  Mifery  or  Pain  are  joined  together  in  my  Mind;  and  thi^  ,^ 
connedion  or  afTociation  remaining  in  my  Mind,  even  after  the  Ri^v 
valfhip  ceafes,  makes  me  always  afieded  with  Pain  whenever  I  hear 
of  his  Succefs,  tho'  in  Affairs  which  have  no  manner  of  Relation  to.., 
the  Rivalfhip,  much  more  in  thofe  that  bring  that  to  my  Rememr  . 
brance,  and  put  me  in  mind  of  what  I  might  have  enjoy 'd  had  it 
not  been  for  him.     This  may  poifibly  caft  fome  Light  upon   the 
black  Defigns  and  envious  Purpofes  of  the  fallen  Angels.     For  why 
might  not   they  have  formerly  had   fome  Competition   with  their 
Fellows  ?  and  why  may  not  fuch  AlTociations  be  as  flrong  in  them 
as  us  ? 

Thus 


Preliminary  Differtation, 


xxxnu 


Thus  alfo  we  are  apt  to  envy  thofe  Perfons  that  refufe  to  be  gui- 
ded by  our  Judgments  and  perfuaded  by  ns.  For  this  is  nothing  elfe 
than  a  Rivalfhip  about  the  Superiority  of  Judgment ;  and  we  take  a 
fecret  Pride  both  to  let  the  World  fee,  and  in  imagining  ourfelves, 
that  we  were  in  the  right. 

There  is  one  thing  more  to  be  obferv'd  in  anfwer  to  this  Objec- 
tion, and  that  is,  that  we  do  not  always  (and  perhaps  not  for  the 
moft  part)  make  this  Aflcciation  ourfelves,  but  learn  it  from  others: 
i.  e.  that  v^  e  annex  Pleafure  or  Pain  to  certain  Things  or  Adions  be- 
caufe  we  fee  others  do  it,  and  acquire  Principles  of  A<ftion  by  imta- 
ting  thofe  whom  we  admire,  or  whofe  Efteem  we  would  procure : 
Hence  the  Son  too  often  inherits  both  the  Vices  and  the  Party  of  his 
Father,  as  w^ell  as  his  Eftate :  Hence  National  Virtues  and  Vices, 
Difpofitions  and  Opinions :  And  from  hence  we  may  obferve  how 
eafy  it  is  to  account  for  what  is  generally  call'd  the  Prejudice  of  E- 
ducation ;  how  foon  we  catch  the  Temper  and  Aifeflions  of  thofe 
whom  we  daily  converfe  with^  how  almoft  infenfibly  we  are  taugljt 
to  love  admire  or  hate ;  to  be  grateful,  generous,  compaflionate  or 
cruel,  &c. 

What  I  fay  then  in  anfwer  to  the  Objedion  is  this:  "  That  it  Is 
"  necefJary  in  order  to  folve  the  principal  Aflions  of  human  Life  to 
**  fuppofe  a  Moral  Senfe  (or  what  is  fignify'd  by  that  Name)  and 
**  alio'  public  Affe£lions}  but  I  deny  that  this  Moral  Senfe,  or  thefe 
public  AfFedions  are  innate,  or  implanted  in  us :  they  are  acquired 
either  from  our  own  Obfervation  or  the  Imitation  of  others.  But 
whether  I  have  rightly  deny'd  it  or  no  muft  depend  upon  the  Argu- 
ments, and  the  Reader  is  to  judge  impartially  for  himfelf  I  think 
this  Matter  deferves  a  fair  Examination  j  and  if  what  has  been  faid 
already  put  others  upon  thinking  of  it  I  have  my  End. 


Contents 


tJtOiii 


e^^JJ* 


»*p  »tno> 


OvJ 


t'Cl-tA-^^l  flC'l'/    ■  •■  i».«.:iMO.^ii.i^t^-^^^ 


T 


A.   r.j)» 


.t  .A/. 


xxxy. 


— ¥- 


Contents  of  the  Book. 


C  H  A  p.    I. 

Containing  fome  Principks  necejfary  to  be  known  in  order  to  the  Under- 
Jianding  and  Solution  of  the  Difficulty  about  the  Origin  of  EviJ, 

S  E  C  T.    I. 

Of  the  Knowledge  of  External  Obje&s. 
Par. 

1  npHat  Senfations  reprefcnt  external  things  to  us,  or  at  leaft  difcover 

I      the  prefcnce  of  them.  Page  i 

2  That  thefe  are  confufed  and  complicated,  but  afterwards  feparatcd  and 

diftinguifh^d  by  the  Underftanding :    an   inftance  of  this  in  Burning- 
Wax,  ibid. 

3  The  firft  Diftmftion  of  our  Conceptions  into  fenfible  ^aliiies  and  Sub- 
fiance.  2 

4  How  we  know  that  there  is  any  fuch  thing  as  Matter.  3 

5  What  it  is.  4 

6  That  this  Definition  does  not  reach  the  Idea  of  Matter,   but  only  fhews 

us  the  Mark  to  diftinguiih  it  by.  ibid. 

7  How  we  come  to  the  Knowledge  of  Space.  8 

8  What  it  is-  9 

9  Thefc  three  Conceptions,  viz.  of  fenfible  Qualities  (v.  g.  Motion,  £s?f.)  of 

MoUer  aod  Sfucf.  iecra  co  ,be  the  chief  of  thoife  chax  ,?.rc  cxt^n^l.       i  o 


-J, 


Of  the  Enquiry  after  the  iFirft  Caufe.      '     '  J[\.^.    • 

^.i  An  Enquiry  concerning  Motion,  Matter,  and  Space,  whether  they  es id 
pf  themfelves.  '5 


'ssavi.  'CONTENTS. 

i  c  2  We  arc  to  form  our  Judgment  of  things  whether  they  exift  of  themfclves 
\jv^L-..  or  require  a  Caufe,  from  our  fimple  Conceptions,    wjiea   ther^  is  no 

-iniJinf::Gro«nd  to  fufped  a  Fallacy.. .:.    ■.k,.u.u:.j  lo 'ua:i  siaii^nL  .q   15 

s$  3  *Tis  proved  that  Motion  requires  a  Caufc^,  tho! it bbefup^fei Eternal, 
-n£fn  r;  and  that  Matter  is  not  the  Caufe  of  ir.  bc^  ?i  bdoV/  nfii  n-iriV  22 
^'^  4  ThiitiV/rtZ/fT requires  a  Caufe  of  its  Exiftcnce.  25 

fbfig.That  it  is  not  neceffarily  exiftenr,  as  appears  from  the  ConftiTiQn  of  thofe 
<i^         Perfons  who  fuppofe  Space  to  be  the  Image  of  Body^^/  .i^woH         26 
6  And  of  thofe  who  deny  Space  to  be  diftinguifliable  from  Matter  any  o- 
therwifc  than  as  Extenfion  in  general  is  from  a  particular  Extenfion. 

29 
Vj   7  TTiat  Space  feems  at  firft  Sight  infeparable  from  Exiftcnce.  ,  •'  '^.^ 

8  *Tis  fliewn  that  this  may  arife  from  Prejudice.  /^^^^    " '*'"?&/. 

9  fVtthout^  fuppofes  Space  -,  while  therefore  we  conceive  fomething  to  exift 
,,j'  without  us,  we  cannot  annihilate  Space  in  Thought.  3 1 
J,.  10  Things  are  conceiv*d  to  be  annihilated  by  fublUtuting  fomething  ^.[{t  in 
(^  the  room  of  tbem  -,  but  we  have  nothing  to  fubftitute  for  Space.  3  2 
V.ii  We  attempt  to  annihilate  Space  while  thofe  things  continue  which  fup- 
.-'-;'    pofe  Space,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  annihilated.  ^2 

.■^^12  God  cannot  be  conceiv'd  not  to  exift.  <  1  ft       '  3^ 

-rij  Becaufe  we  are  confcious  that  we  do  not  exift  of  ourfelves.   '  35 

^1.14  Smell,  Tafts,  Hearing,  do  not  give  us  any  notice  of  Space.  ibid. 

.*jji5  The  Mind-refleded  upon  itfclf  has  no  relation  to  Space,  nor  any  necef- 
_  ^^:        fity  for  it.  36 

j-i6  We  may  conceive  Space  to  be  annihilated  altogether,  but  not  by  Parts. 

■  17  Hence  arofe  the  Prejudice  for  its  Self-Exiftence.  41 

^i  8  We  are  certain  of  a  firft  Caufe  in  what  manner  focver  the  Difpute  about 

Space  be  determin'd.  ,  ,  ibid. 

Of  the  Firft  Caufe. 

\  ~        '^.i  Our  Reafonings  about  the  Firft  Caufe  are  like  thofe  of  a  blind  Man  about 
Light,  fince  it  is  not  anObjed  of  Senfe.  43 

2  Yet  we  know  a  great  many  things  concerning  it.  44 

3  That  all  other  xhings  proceed  from  it.  ^  ^  ibid. 

4  That  it  is 0«(f.  '^.^    .      ..  •'   P  45 
•75  Ittjimic  in  Nature  und  Power,  ,.  ,       ,  4.6 

"j  /4.'  -"^:^'^^'^''---^^'^^^  ^^•^'--  % 

fyW  ^  ^  7  That 


ZaQMT  E  N T\: ^  «wva 

s^vf^fi^Jtat  h^  \5'3.  coTifciouSj  intelligent  Being,    jh^.^^  tuo  miol  oi  sir  sW  i    51 
on  »  That  he  ads  for  2inEnd,  o  ^    ^H  .O  .    ..  r        i^f^ 

c  J  9.  That  the  end  of  Creation  was  to  exercife  the  Power,  and  to  communi- 
,Lr.--/<:ate  the  Good nefs  of  the  Deity.  52  ' 

^-10  When  the  World  is  faid  to  be  created  for  God's  Glory y  *tis  after  the  man- 
^s;  ^^  nerofMen.  -■j:^,:'^^^^^^  .?.  piiup^i  \:.v:v,V>i  iwi'i   4^  34 

"iQl^i  That  God  made  the  World  as  wcfl  as  it  couW  be  made  by  tfii'liighed 
v)i^        Power,  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs.  §^ 

^f'a^^;;?*!^fev:  CHAP.    IL 

^^fioncerning  the  Nature  and  Divijion  of  Evil,  and  the  Difficulty  of 

,,  If.i  By  Evil  we  underftand  whatever  is  incoraodious,  inconvenient,  or  trou- 

blefome.  73 

.^  Evils  are  of  three  kinds,  thofe  of  Imperfedion,  Natural,  and  MoraK 

'; ;  3  The  Difficulty  is,  how  thefe  come  into  the  Works  of  a  God  of  the  high- 

^ ;-        elt  Goodnefs  and  Power.  ibid, 

^^•^4  Some  that  were  unable  to  folve  this  Difficulty  have  deny*d  the  Exiftence 

of  a  God,  others  have  fuppofed  a  double  one.  74 

5  There  are  fome  of  Opinion  that  it  is  unanfwerable,  and  that  the  Mani- 

cbees  offtT*d  a  better  Solution  by  fuppofing  two  Principles,  than  the  Ca- 
tholics do  by  owning  only  one.  74 

6  This  Difficulty  has  cxercifed  the  Philofophers  and  Fathers  of  the  Church, 

and  fome  deny  that  it  is  anfwer'd  yet.       *  78 

7  There  is  more  Good  than  Evil  in  the  World.  ibid. 

8  *Tis  no  lefs  repugnant  to  infinite  Goodnefs  to  have  created  thofe  things 

which  he  faw  would  be  corrupted  by  another,  than  fuch  as  would  cor- 
rupt themfelves.    The  3uppofition  of  a  double  Principle  is  therefore 
of  no  Service  toward  the  Solution  of  this  Difficulty.         jPJ'-v,  '  Hfid; 
-   9  If  it  can  be  Ihewn  that  it  does  not  contradidl  infinite  Power  and  Good- 
L  >:'./  ncfs  to  permit  Evils,  or  that  thefe  neceffarily  arife  from  the  Exercife  of 
^4^      them,  then  may  this  Difficulty  be  anfwer'd.  80 

^V  .::   :^ii>od  i  d   \,<jO  3:^X4./!  i  rrx'  CHAP. 


«*^  C  0  ^T  E  NT  1^' 

,«:■  CHAP.     III.  -  vr 

•    .awo^iir  Of  the  F/uil  of  TkfeB. 

f.i  Things  can  be  no  otherwifc  than  as  God  pleafed.  8i 

2  AH  created  things  are   neceflarily  imperfedb  fince  they  do  not  cxift  of 

themielves.  •  Wtd. 

3  *Tis  to  be  determin'd  by  the  Divine  Pleafure  what  degree  of  Pcrfeftion 

every  thing  muft  have,  fihce  all  things  are  neceifarily  at  an  infinite  Di- 

ftance  from  the  higheft  Perfection.  8;^ 

\|;  All  things  could  hot  be  equally  perfcd  fince  fomc  ar£  Parts  of  others. 

"-        .  .    ■  '  .  ^5 

5  Things  are  neceflarily  of  unequal  Perfections  with  regard  to  their  At- 
tributes ;  but  it  is  agreeable  to  the  higheft  Goodnefs  to  create  thofe  which 
'-'     are  leaft  perfedt,  if  they  be  no  hindrance  to  the  Number  or  Convenience 
.*•    of  the  more  perfect  on€s.     :  ■'•/.':.'  90 

•fj  This  confirm*d  by  an  Inftance  of  Matter^  which  is  no  Impediment  to  pure 
■Spirils.  91 

•y  -Tis  lefs  agreeable  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  have  omitted,  than  to  have 
created  thefe  mofe  imperfed  Beings.  93: 

v^^fi   3rij  ikiii   host  ,oMtn.\^\^:.^  ci  jLj/  .z-^iftiqOlo  »*fi<5»  •.  ."   r 

SEC  T.    I. 

.  J  ^  .  .  :.;^Ti  M  en  till"    J* 

^ihP-  Creatore  cannoi:  compJain:^  its  pafe  010  at  b?  IqsperfcjEc  tnan  others. 

u,.,.:-  '  /  96 

2  The  Origin  of  things  from  Matter  is  the  Source  of  Natural  Evils,  as 

their  Rife  from  nothing  is -tkeCaufe  of  thpfe  of  Im|)cr|e^ion.  ibid. 

3  rvlatter  is  ufelefs  except  it  have  Motion.  97 

4  Such  Motion  was  to  be  rais'd  in  Matter  as  might  feparate  it  into  Parts. 

Hence  the  Generation  and  Corruption  of  Bodies  naturally  arifcs.         98 

5  Motion  under  certain  Laws,  tends  more  to  the  Prefcrvation  of  things, 
»'-'    than  if  it  were  left  at  random  ;  hence  God  has  diflributed,  Bodies  into 

various  Sy Items.  99 

6  It 


CONTENT  S.  xxxiir, 

6  It  appears  from  Light  and  other  Phaenomena,  that  the  Syftem  of  this 

World  is  the  very  beft  and  mofl  beautiful.  loo 

7  *Tis  rafli  to  affirm  that  Matter  might  be  diftributed  into  better  Syftems, 

fince  wc  do  not  thoro*  y  underftand  the  prcfent.  ibid, 

SECT.    II. 

i  ^;  Oonceaning  Animals  and  the  Variety  of  them, 

^.i  M0tt6r  does  not  feem  to  be  made  for  its  own  fake,  fince  it  is  not  felf- 
confcious ;  'tis  therefore  defign-'d  for  the  ufe  of  Animals.  loi 

2  'Tis  probable  that  Animals  vary  according  to  the  Variety  of  thofe  Re- 

gions which  they  are  deftin'd  to  inhabit.  Therefore  the  ^ther  and 
Air,  in  all  probability,  have  their  proper  Inhabitants  as  well  a§  the 
Earth.  >  ^^,   -^^  .^  ^  ^.  r^ ,  .ion  ri    >°^ 

3^  The  Ear3i,  as  being  the  leaft  part  of  the  Mundane  Syftem,  isWt  to  be 
chiefly  regarded,  but  yet  is  not  made  to  no  Purpofe,  or  without  Defigsi. 

4j  The  Eartff  maf  feie  coriceiv*d  as  a  Wheel  m^this  great  Automaton  of  the 
.>//i  World,  without  which  its  Motion  would  be  defective:  in  the  interim  it 
V  ,    affords  an  habitation  and  food  for  Animals.;;     ^  ,ji   :     ,-.    ..  ;.y  105 

5  The  Earth  is  made  not  for  Man  alone  but  for  theXJniverfe :  to  think  o- 
therwife  favours  of  human  Pride.  106 

.ui;;.v.    S  EC  T.    JH...aV 

nouniifpa  '\o  oipbi:>H;  bow  -  Of  DeatJx^^o  yH  ^-oi\  -t^'i  s;!*:   i  ,-     - 

-f  .1  'Tis  probable  tliat  the  So^ijcjity  of  pur  Bodies  is  the  Caufe  why  wcxanhot 

move  them  whither  we  pleafe.  109 

^.  A  Soul  united  u>  a  Portion  of  ^thcretii  Matter,  (^c.  can  move  it  whi- 

•      ther  it  will  and  prcferve  its  Union  i  fuch  a  Body  therefore  is  immortal. 

ibieL 

3  The  Body  of  %■  terreftriar  AriimaJ  is  a  kind  of  VefTel  which  may  be  bro- 

ken, the  hurpours  may  flow  out,  and  the  circular  Motion  ceafe,  fuch  Ar 
nimals  then  are  naturally  mortal.  no      ., 

4  This  Hypothefip  roconcll'd  with  facrcd  Hiftory  cosnccrning  the  Mortality 
:Of  the  iirfl  M.411.  in 

'sect 


M 


C  .0  N  T  E  NJ  S.^y. 

•j  ''SECT     Jiy;,   ^  V    >;  boo^  :»rfj  I6rt  hA£ 

/"Tq  .  Pf  ^^'^  Fajjiom,  -.^i^'^mA^ion 

IJ.!*  Our  Souls  require  Bodies  of  a  peculiar  Crafis^  when  that  is  diforderM  the^xj 
•  O^rations  of  the  Soul  are  either  hindcr*d  or  deftroy'd.  1^12 

1*  The  Soul  and  Bodyadmit  of  a  mutual  Sympathy:  hence  it.i§the  firft  care 
■  of  the  Soul  to  keep  the  Body  free  from  harm.         ^>  -  • -^    '    •  -^^^j^ 

3  The  Scnfe  of  Pain  is  neceffary  to  prefervc  Life,  as  alfo  the  dread  of  Death. 

4  The  reft  of,  the  PafTions  are  conncded  with  thefe.,^a^;„^^^'^^^:^'  v.^,v«^,;.^,xf^ 

5  The  Paflions  could  not  be  avoided  btherwifc  than  by  ordering  that  the 

Soul  fhould  not  be  affedled  with  the  Motions,  pf.C^p.  Body.     By  thiSj  ^ 
"'  V  means  Animals  would  be  very  fhort  lived.    *  H  */H^*  •'.  1  -  :^y^^^  • 

t5.  It  is  not  contrary  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  permit  thefe  Inconveniencicj,  ^ 

*  "  fince  they  aould  not  be  avoided  without  greater.  116* 
y  God  therefore  compared  the  Good  in  things  with  the  Evils  which  neceffa-  . 

rily  attend  them,  and  tolerated  thofe  Evils  w:hich  were  infeperable  from  ^ 
the  Good.  ibid. 

8  The  Axiom  about  not  doing  Evil  for  the  fake  of  Good,  does  nQt  take 
place  where  the  leaft  Evil  is  chofen.         ,~  '  r        j1^.\i,  ^*.,w  *  «.  JA*^   v 

b     b     C     T.         V.  f    r;;.<-;      ^;,     ^,;,JI 

M    .V. »..«..,.    Of  Hunger y   Thirjt  and  Labour.  .,.>■:  jii 

^.i  The  Parts  of  the  Body  fly  off,  it  ftands  in  need  therefore  of  Reparation, 

viz.  by  Food.  117 

2  Choice  mufl  be  had  in  Food,  fince  all  things  are  uot  equally  proper. 

'ibid. 
.3  The  Materials  of  Food  arc  foon  corrnptcd,  they  cannot  therefore  be  pro-  ♦  "^ 

cured  without  Labour.  ibid. 

4  Every  Animal  is  placed  by  God  where  it  may  have  its  proper  Nnurifh- 

•  0    ment,  hence  almoft  every  Herb  maintains  its  proper  In! e6l.  118 
5"  Some  Animals  are  made  for  Food  to  others,  and  would  not  have  exifled 

on  any  other  Terms.  ibid, 

6  All  Parts  of  the  Earth  cou*d  not  have  afforded  Nourilhment  and  Re-    , 

ception  for  Men,  whatever  Situation  they  had  been  placed  in.  1 20 

^  Oi  EartbqmkeSy  Lizhtrnfig^ndD^lt^es,                                  .  121 

fVj    •              ,                               /^.rhrxKlc  •i\vi;ii\\t^u'i-h:i  8  The 
at  J     '■ 


><:hy¥hm'¥'  5fi.'' 


'^'8  The  number  of  Animals  to  be  fed,  was  to  be  propomoncS  tb  did^dbd, 
and  not  the  Food  to  the  Animals.  1 23 

'9  The  hundredth  part  of  Mankind  which  might  live  upon  the  Earth  does 
not  yet  inhabit  it :  vain  therefore  is  the  Complaint  about  Seas  and  Dc- 
farts.  ^24 

10  'Tis  abfurd  for  any  one  to  defire  a  different  Station  from  that  wiiicH  is'  al- 
lotted him,  fmce  he  was  made  to  fill  that  Place,  and  would  Otherwife 
have  had  none  at  all.  ib. 

itslaa lo btaab ori^  r!?i  -'■f'^ic'T.     VI.  ^''  '*'"''■  '"*  ^'    ' 

'  Concerning  Pf  Of  agation  of  the  Species,  Child-hocd,  andOld-Agt, 

^.r  Animals  may  be  replir'd  three  Ways  :  \fi.  If  Death  were  prevented  by 
Omnipotence.     2 rf/y.  By  Creation.     3^/3/.  By  Propagation.  126 

2  This  3d  Method  is  the  beft,   becaufe  it  may  be  effected  without  doing 
-      *' Violence  to  the  Laws  of  Nature.  ihid. 

3  "The  Divine  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  admirable  in  the  Contrivance  of  it. 

'!'  .  J27 

4  Why  Men  are  tormented  with  the  continual  dread  of  Death,  while  the 

Brutesarenot  at  all  concern'dabout  it.  s^-^r.^f  ,    i^^d, 

5  This  is  a  Sign  that  the  prefent  Life  is  a  Prelude  to  a  better ^     •  •  ■  •  '    128 
'6  'Tis  expedient  for  Men  to  be  born  Sveak  and  helplefs,  hence  the  Founda- 
tion of  focial  Life,  ^f.  129 

7  The  chief  Appetites  are  thofe  of  Selfrpreferyation,  and  Propagation  of 

the  Species.  v  •Vv,.y.,   i.,   •■    ;,r;tir    i-    '/»  ;.■•/•  <^K.n.  ;  Uiua       i^O 

,ftoi3titfp>)   lo'VTM*:      '^  £  vq  ^^     yjj^ 

-■^qo.  Of  Difeafes,  Wild-Benjis,  and  Venomous  Creatures, 

'If.  I  Bodies  are  liable  to  Dillblution,  and  Huinolirs  to  Corruption.  Hence 
Pains  and  Difcafes.:  ■130 

i)'.r2  The  ftrength  of  Poifons  and  fuch  Juices  as  are  noxious  to  Animals  arifes 
i\  from  the  contrariety  of  things,  which  could  not  be  removed  without  ta- 
ih:^     king  away  Mori oiT.  ibid, 

j.tj  Of  Epidemical  Difeafes.  .>  131 

r:g|::  Rocks  and' Befansiare  not  given  to  Man,  but  Other  4^ii^^^^  '^<>t  ^^^ 
..  J.'  .Mabitationj.  '•'  vi.i  ^\.''»  !--  ,•;:;')  Tf-iHiv);;:!; '10  r.. ..••:>"  ■,^. '  .ii:  132 
<j^a^  Ancient  Hiftories  declare,  that  Wild-Beafts  and  Vefiorrtous  Creamrcs  were 

V  i    made  for  the  Punilhment  of  Mankind,  133 

f  6  'Tis 


,#.  CO  NT  E  NTS. 

[|,.d.-  >Tis  tl)€  faj^jt  pf,  .Maplund  chat  Uiefc  niulfiply :    Cqunjyip^aiw^  »^*^«  /i)y. 
War,  ^c,  to  the  difgrace  of  Man, ,  of  Tight  belong ippf,#qi^jPf)n,>i    i33 
}9fi7  W^  may.  more  eafily  avoid  Wild-Bcafts  and  Venomous  Creatvires  thai\o- 
\]       ther  Inconveniencics  of  Life,  about  wluch.^ejiever  ^^aarre^^ 

dence.,  t.^oii  arij  lol  3u.   -r.'J  ^rsjiMiCI  .JViCiT  ^itj^ru^H  .ynlimol/  ^^^^• 
(^^^  All  Animals  are  under  th?  Di^ne  Care,  to  think:  o^^ci-^ifQjfcavours  of 

.;\„j   Pride..  "      .'  '  "  i34 

•  9  ^lid-Beafls  and  Venomous  Creatures  are  of  ufe  to»jMea.^  ihiJ. 

SEC  T.    VKI. 

^^^.'^^A^'S^^^.f^mcerning  the  Errors  and  Ignorance  of  Man.  . 

f  J  Hum^n  Underftanding  is  necefTarily  ignorant  of  many  things.  135 

iz  We  are  fometimes  forced"  to  make  ufe  of  Conjectures,  therefore ,  W£  may 

not  pnly.be  ignorant,  hut.alfo.miftake,  ib. 

3  God  could  not  guard  us  always  from  ErroK,  without  Violence,  done  to 

Nature,.  1^36 

4  Man  is  not  therefore  miferable  becaufe  expofed  to  Errors.  ib, 
rti.^.  ;Tbofe  Errors  .which  we  fall  intp  without  our  Fault.are  feldom  perniciqus. 

6t  Our  Knowledge  is  adapted  to  our  State.,  ^  '•  .-^"--""  '  '  •/  '  138 
.    7  We  prefer  Life  with  all  its  Inconveniencics  before  E)€ath.  140 

.    S  Some  put  themfelves  to  Death,  not  on  account  of  Natural  but  voluntary 

Evils._ -':.;;.„;  ^'  %  V-  H-i 

.  .5  Thofe' Errors  which  we  fall  into  by  bur  own  Fault,  arc  to,  be  rcckqn'd  a- 

mong  Moral  Evils,  ibid. 

S  E  C  T.     IX.  : 

Containing  the  Sum  of  what  has  been  faid  on  Natural  Evils, 

,.--.'  '■  ■■-'.,  -^ 

<f.i  The  whole  Univerfe  one  Syflem,  of  which  every  thing  is  a  part.         142 

'1    2  If  the  whole  and  all  its  Parts,  be  taken  together,,  none  could  be  chang'd 

but  for  the  worfe.  '  1 43 

3  Hence  the  Error  of  the  Epicureans  who  knew  only  the  leaft  and  worft 

part  of  it.  144 

4. Hence  a  Re'ply  to  the  Difficulty,  Whence  comes  Evil  ?  fmce  it  arifes  from 

the  very  Nature  of  created  Beings,  and  cou*d  not  be  avoided  without  a 

CpnJt^di(^n«>.^::  /    '1'   r^irt.^'    '  "^''      -  ♦':H:t.    ;;     ;     t        145 

'^    ■  '    '  /     .--r  .    r     '^\^'s  This 


>i%  'tlifs  reconciled '  with  the  Mofaic  Hiftory,  which  does  •h(!ji^^ijti^W'''Jj!l 
ii\  kinds  of  Natural  Evil  to  the  Fall  of  the  firft  Man.  ^''^■"    -  ^    '  1 45 

^^  -The  Evils  which  do  arife  from  thence  are  permitted  for  the  Good  Of  the 
/y*    tlniye  rfe,  and  alfo  of  Man  himfdf^  147 

•'^^  Mortality,  Hunger,  Thirft,  Difcafes,  C?''^.  are  for  the  Gopd.of  the  World 
lo  ^iu|n  this  corrupt  Eftate.  ^>  •--^*-^  saiViU   ^u..    131: o^j  su  K^aintrta  i;  >  iM^ 

Of  Moral  Et)il  -^  ^ ' 

JntroduSiion  containing  the  Szibftance  of  the  Chapter, 

jt  snob  jnnaioiV'  j-.  -Concerning  the  Nature  ofEleBiom.  ~      -^^^f  ^* 

i^  View  of  their  Opinion  who  admit  of  Liberty  from  Compulfon  'onljy 
,'y.  .  but  net  from  JSfeceJJity. 

1|[.i  That  it  is  not  eafy  to  underftand  or  give  a  true  keprefentation  of  the  O- 
piriiohs  concerning  Liberty.  Some  acknowledge  a  Liberty  from  Com- 
fvlfion  only,  others  from  Necejfity  alio.  150 

2  The  Authors  of  the  former  Opinion  fuppofe  that  there  are  Appetites  im- 

planted in  us  by  Nature  j  what  is  agreeable  to  thefe  is  called  Good,  the 
contrary  Evil.  ,151 

3  Things  are  agreeable  to  the  Appetite  in  a  threefold  refpe<5t  •,  hence  three 

kinds  of  Good.  ibid. 

.  .4  That  which  is  actually  agreeable  to  the  Appetite  is  called  Pkafant.  ib. 
j;«jj  That  which  is  conhedted  with  fornething  which  is  of  itfclf  agreeable,  is 
;  f->     ^called  Profitable.  ibid. 

-> ^16,  That  which  is  judg'd  by  the  Underfl'anding  to  be  the  bdl,  allthings  con- 
,>. .  fider'd,  is  ablblutely  good,  and  called  Honejl.  ■'■-{■'  t['t.,  "  ibid. 
,.-7i  Inftances  in  Health,  Medicines,  and  fuch  things. as  aiie,  ^tdeibjq;  p,vtlie 
.,  y r V. Rational  Appetite.  .    v;     ■,'*'••; -jl;'. 152 

.  j,^  He  that  can  acfl  as  his  own  Judgment'direds,   is  free  accbrdmg.> to.,  thefe 

l'  *r  f   2  9    Bui 


-if;fl9cfl^rtl^1'  ^'TO^':^^^''^*^^''^  determin'd  to  >choofe^Ht:licr  frofh^cKi  Good- 
^^j  /;  nefs  or  DHagreeablenefs  of  Objeds  perceiv'd  by  th«  Intel IwR:  or  Senfes, 
^^^Y,^nd  th;it  dierefofewe  are  not  free  as  to  the  A(fts  of  the  Will,  but  only 
'ij\    ■  of  the  inferior  Faculties  which  are  fubjc<ft  to  the  D^eterminitipn  pi'  the 

l-jo^'      WilJir.  .-v-^ %^f  ff W>>hb:  -t>:i53)BM'  ^/i^jBuob  ni  viA6  50i^Iq  e?>k:)  3I  dibtd. ' 
^-,to  If  this  be  fo,  all  our  Aftions  are  abfolutely  necefiary.  154. , 

t  ^^  I  That  human  Avftions  are  free,  not  from  Necefjtty  but  Cbmpulfiori.      1  (^5  ■ 
V  JL2  According  to  their  Opinion  tliere  is  no  Contingency  in  things,  nor  could  a- 
s^j'     ny  thing  be  done  otherwife  than  it  is.  . -1.  c' ^:  j/.:i;  :?;nic   ^156,, 

"13  By  Evil  they  underftand  nothing  more  than  hurtfuli;:-ibriL.'!i:!f mU  ib, 

,"„  i54,,Villanics  arc  to  be  placed  to  the  Account  of  humaQ;  Miferies,  and  not. 
\    "    look.*d  upon  as  Crimes,   properly  ib  call*d.  157 

^  |r^r  AMalcfaciilor  is  .reproved,  not  becaufe  he  deferv*d  it,,  but  becaufe  R,eproof 
^^^^  m?iy  (invt  him  from  Evil.  .-.n'p  njv.  ^liiroz/ji  ..^fuUiLf'         ih, 

j,j-a^^^LJPunifhments  are  apply*d  as  Medicines  ■§)the  Sick,  nddieruaErLaws  ufe- 
'^[^  ,     '  \tk  fmce  they,  prevent  Vice.  158 

r*('^7  W^  ^^^  obliged  to  be  grateful  only  in  profped  of  a.  future  Benefit.       ibid. 
■.^'j,3  According  to  this  Opinion  human  Happinefs  is  impoflible,  fince  it  depends. 
..u,..-  ,  ^p^j^  things  which  are  not  in  our  Power.  ibid. 

'  19  Its  Confequences  arc  hard,  and  tho'  the  Argument  from,  Confequences  be. 
generally  a  b^d  one,  yet  thefe  bring  fome  Prejudice  againft  an  Opinion 
which  fecms  to  be  attended  with  them,  efpecially  if  they  be  acknowledg'd 

^59  ■- 
2Q  All.thofe  who  declare  that  the  Will  is  .paj/ive. in  its  Operation?,  will  be  e- 

fteem'd  to  be  of  the  fame  Opinion  with  the  former,  and  are  prefs'd  wirii 

,^^         the  fame  Confequences.  ibid 

br  $U  5  SEC  T.    It 

\t  ji^^Qfifii^.  is  propofed  in  general^  ^J^rting  a  Liberty  frpm  Ntg^ty  as 

^\\  well  as  Compulficn.  .    ."V^'.  ,   ' 

n' '    '  '  '"'  ' 

~^\^:i  This  agrees  with,  the  forri>cr  in  moft  Cafes,  efp<2cially  in  thofc  relating  to  , 
:,  ■       the  Appetites,  to  good,  phaf ant ^  profitable,  and  honeft  \  but  determines 
^,  this  to  be  the  difference  between  a  Man  and  Brute,  vix,  diat  the  one  ia  . 

?  determin'd  by  his  Bodily  Appetite,  the  other  by  himfelf.  161 

•     2  The  chief  Good  is  necefTarily  defired,  but  others  are  not,  becaufe  they  may.  - 
: ,,         be  reprefented  by  the  Underftanding  in  different  Lights.  162 

.-Iqtg.JTho'  therefore  the  Will  follows  fome  JiadgmenC  of  the  Underftanding, 
\Xi-.  '  y^^  ^^ ^s "Q^  necefTarily  determin'd  by  it. "*'   ■    ■  -  -  •         ■  ':V-\ .    164 


ni« 


64 

This 


2£^)C^m^  ^IS^^I^^^ 


.V 


-hoogTfiis  Gpthrori'  eftablithcrs  Lib'6rty,'b^k  l^icre'affatome  thin^^^lfc  npC  Vuf- 

,83lfi:;:  ftcicntly  explained.  '  u!-|,'>    '     '    ■  "•   '  ^  •  ? '^■i       ^5^ 


66 
^Inc5vSucliia  Liberty  as  this  feems  to  be  of  more  Prejudice  than  Benefit  to  Man* 
3H:">:-  kind.   :  ,  ,",.V'^--  ib. 

.V. V!€  It  takes  place  cto  in  doubtful  Matters,  and  then  'tis  of  ,no  ufc  01:  ampor- 
f.^1"      tance.  '■!^'^'i^'ih-7i^ii[oi<'^ii  'yii)  ^a'n^^- -i^^o^ih  ,01 'jcI  ad?  :.•   rj^g 

We  arc,  left  in  doubt  coiice  fning  the  ^^y  VifhrcK  Icatls  tb'Happmefs,  and 
can  have  no, Help  from  Liberty.  ''  ibid. 

i«?.  I'S.  Since  that  is  Good  which  is  agreeable,  and  this  is  to  be  judg'd  of  by  the 
'V^  Undcrftanding,  if  the  Will  follow  this  Judgment  it  is  not  free,  if  it  does 
icnL:"  >not,  it  ads  againll  Rcafon.  We  had  better  therefore  be  witiiput  fuch 
v.^i       Liberty.  "^'^'':^'-^:\'^^ '  '  ^i^■^;  ..  ^^9 

tcoigclf  the  Will  could  fufpend  its  A6t  cbntrary  to  the  Judgment  of  iheHCrnder- 
it         Handing,  it  would  run  dire<Sly  into  Evil ;  it  feems  therefore  neceflary  for 
-3lij  2v/iitUoa(^t  at  the  time,  and  m  the  manner  which  the  Underllending  directs. 
?    -  1 70 

.! .  10  There  are  Anfwers  offered  to  thefe  Difficulties,  but  fuch  as  are  far  from  be- 
^iiSnt;^  ing  clear.  On  this  account  many  have  gone  over  to  the  former  Opinion. 
.Viiv.t  .       ,        .  ,        ■  .;      17jI: 


f' ''       '  s^'tT' b'-^  E-^<s:^.; ite 


fiouuqO*  nk  fl 

■j^ather  Notion  of  Liberty  and  EIcBion  ts  propofed. 


j: 


%ii  The  Appetites  and  Powers  attain  their  proper  End  by  exercife,  which  is 
i       the  greateft  Perfeftion  of  them,  and  their  beft  Eftate.  172 

2  There  is  2  certain  agrecablenefs  fixt  by  Nature  between  fome  Appetites, 

and    their  Obje<5b,  whereby  they  ad:  upon  the  prefence  of  them,  and 
ceafe  from  Aftion  upon  the  Removal  of  them.  ib. 

3  Liberty  would  be  of  diiTervice  to  an  Agent  cndow*d  with  fuch  Appetites, 

l^c.  as  thefe  only.  173 

4  We  may  conceive  a  Power  between  which  and  any  particular  Objefl  there 
is  naturally  no  other  Agreeablenefs  but  v^hi^.lBay  )»rifc  ff om.  tkc  deter- 
mination of  the  Power  itfelf.  .-Jv-  '.,-•.'    '•;  /:,'.   .    i-^"         ib. 


5  Such  a  Power  as  this  cannot  be  determin*d  by  any  Goodnfjs  m  Ohjcdsy 
fmce  the  Goodnefs  of  *em  depends  upon  the  determination.  . .:  175 

6 , 'Nor  by  ^ny  Uneafinefs.  ':,i*.        ib. 

y  Not  by  the  Underjlandiui.  176 

8  Yet  fuch  an  Agent  has  need  of  Undcrftandiog^.  in  order  to  diftingyiflifpof- 
nWe  things  from  impofTible.  .  ^'n'-- r-^-'  ■'';.>]F^"  •  :  •  -  '"^  177 
i'V  "        '  '  ^ 


V, 


xlvi/  C  0  NT  E  N  T  S. 

f  If  the  Agent  be  of  infinite  Power,  he  needs  no  other -Limitatioi!.;l'i'ij 77 
i^iSi-'But  an  Agent  of  finite  Power  muft  alfo  confult  his  Abilities.  ''      w. 

fi  Such  an  Agent  cannot  be  determin*d  by  his  other  Appetites.  178 

r$  This  Power  is  fuperior  to  all  the  Appstites,  and  fubdued  by  none.  ih. 
tvf'  It  feems  to  be  given  for  this  End,  that  the  Agent  might  have  fomething 
''^'  to  delight  himJfelf  in  when  the  natural  Appetites  muft  neceffariJy  be  fru- 
o<^    ftrated. ''■''^' '1^'''"^ '^r^  t*^-'  •  t^ljrmj  oj  ^9u  jiiriu;,     //,^ 

^  This  PoWer,  by  Its'  acceflfion,  increafes  the  Pleafure  oF  thx»  other  Appe- 
'*'^     tites  ;  by  oppofition  removes,  or  at  leaft  alleviates  the  Pain.  179 

r'^-  The  reft  of  the  Appetites  are  not  to  be  baulked  unneceirarily.-?^'"32A  jg:© 
i6-  Such  an  Agent  as  this  is  Self-a<5live.  "  ' '''    ib. 

17  Is  determin'd  by  himfelf,  and  things  are  not  chofen  bccaiife  they  pleafe 
^""'  him,  but  pleafe  him  becaufe  they  are  chofen.  1 8  r 

iS'  Yet  he  is  not  determin'd  by  chance.  . ,  ci'^         ^^« 

19  Is  the  true  Caufe  of  his  Aftions.  >  ^i  3^1'  ^^I  82! 

20  Is  capable  of  Happinefe.  r  b'rj  n-i-j^b-'-f:'  f^. 
2k  An  imperfe(5l  Underftanding  is  fufBcient  for  his  Happinefs,  i^  he  Bo  but 

'^     diftinguiih  between  PofTibilrties  and  ImpofTibilities,  things  agreeable  and 
-•     difagreeable  to  the  Senfes,  and  confult  his  Abilities.  18^3 

2*2  Tho*  Liberty  would  be  a  Prejudice  to  other  Agents,  yet  it  is  a  fure  foun- 
dation of  Happinefs  to  -this,  whofe  convenience  depends  not  on  Objeds 
but  Eleftion.  1 84 

23  Thefc  things  are  clear  enough,  tho'  they  may  appear  to  be  a  little  too 
fubtle.  ib, 

S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    IV.  '"^ 

l^bat  there  is  an  Agent  wIjo  is  pleafed  with  0bje5is  only  becaufe  he 

chooj'es  them. 

':^' ''\ 

■^.i  Vod  is  fucTi  an  Agent  astltis.  18*5 

2  Becaufe  nothing  external  is  citlier  good  or  bad  -to  "^him  before  Eledion. 

3  Becaufe  his  own  Will  iy  the' Caufe  of  Goodnefs  in  the  Creatures.  ib. 
■A.  They  are  not  to  be  regarded  who  declare  that  thisGoodnefs determines  die 
;(    Will  of  God.                                                                           :'^^^-     186 

5  If  he  had  not  a  Power  of  pleafmg  himfelf  in  Eledlion,  he  coum  never 

have  made  any  thing.  187 

6  If  he  were   moved  by  the  Goodnefs  of  things  to  create  the  World,  he 
.  *would  be *a  neceffary  Agent.  -   ., .    , ,.  ,„~ ,  .-.,w. .       18S 

■  tfi.^*r    .  '  '  -7  But 


(^Q  NT  E  NTS.  j^lvii. 

Xf'JBut  tfv.ltmgS:.9re.^gQO(l^^^!eaufe-i^J^la5.clJQ^<i^^.i^p  vn^fe?  ji;|f^j^,^j^  ^jjhcde 
.^V  Work  will  be  free.,  tiufanj  oHf  iijiifn  iftV/o/U  ^mci  lo  jrv^A -nr  tl'^iIs 
88.- Externi^l  things  are  in  themfdves  abfoJutely  indifferent •49^p^  jie 

.v,j  has  a  Complacency  in  his  Choice.  „>,.,, v.  v:  -;-..\....  ;.  .usVv  eu'.'S  'V*. 
^9.  And  determine  himfelf  to  Action.  *  ,ha.K;«Hj  loii  t/ivivv  ^o  o:  •uti'^f^i  '1189, 
JiftiThe  Di0iculcy  of  conceiving  how  a  Power  can  dctem^ine  itfelf  to  Adion 
.i\  ought  not  to  hinder. our, aflent  to  the  truth  of  the  Propofition,  ,  190 
i^  'Tis.as  difficult  to. .conceive how  a  thing  can  be  moved  by  another,  as  by 
or  I "  itfelf,  we.,iire.ipreiudic9^  .l?Xi.^ing  accuftomed^tot,  ^aafcriaj^^  «'^  (?.,pafli  ve 
oRr  Agents.  ■  ■■-rf-'b:--^-':  ' '■"  "•-.•\r.  -ti>  '■^  ny  z<  •    ib, 

la  What  is  faid  about  indifference,  with  refpedl  to  the  Will  of  God,  takes 
I  .,    place  in  his  primary  Ele(51:ions.  191 

%3  God  may  have  all  things  at  once  in  his  view  which  are  connedbcd  with  the 
.  ,^;     thing  chofen,  and  either  will  or  refufe  them  by  one  fimple  Aft.  /^. 

fc4,  >Ashe  is  of  infinite^  Goodnefs,  he  .alfo  wills  the  Good  of  all  things  which  he 
;{,>.    has  determin'd  to  create,  as  far  as  poflible.  192 

15  When  the  World  therefore  is  once  made,  it  is  impofllble  that  thofe  things 

fhould  pleafe  him  which  tend  to  the  confufion,  &'c.  of  his  Work.        ;^. 
1,6  When  Man  is  made  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  requires  him  to  be  juft,  fober,, 

(ffc.  God  is  not  at  Liberty  not  to  will  thefe  things.  1 94 

VJ  This  is  no  bar  to  the  Divine  Liberty.  ib. 

t8  A  Being  endow'd  with  this  Power  is  more  perfect  than  one  that  wants  it  : 
♦;o:  yc$  .this  docs  not  imply  infinite  Perfcdion,  therefore  it  js  communicable* 
,z  .  196 

..^,  .,   ,       S  U  B.S  E  CT.    V.  '"  ' 

•     wJ       C«J      .i.  ^  ,    I     1 1  .11 

T/m(  Man^  partakes  of  this  Principle  of  pleajing  hirfifilf  by  Ele^ion,  ^ 

%^i  Some  Reafons  are  ofFer'd  to  fhew  this.  ■''*■"     .  '•*  197 

2  Firft,  Experience.  198 

3  The  Vulgar  often  judge  better  of  iiutters.of  Faft  than  Philofophers.  ib. 
'4  'Tis  proved  that  we  partake  of  this  Power,   becaufe  we  difcover  the 

Marks  and  Properties  of  it  in  ourfelves.  200 

5  In  the  firft  place,  we  impute  our  Anions  to  ourfelves,  whereby  we  own 

ourfelves  to  bft  the  true  Caufes  of  them.   Hcnc€  it  i^  that  wc  diftinguiiTj* 
Misfortunes  from  Crimes.  ib. 

6  This  is  a  maft  certain  Sign  that  we  are  confcious  of  our  Liberty.         201 

7  The  fecond  Token  of  this  Power,  that  it  can  go  againft  the  Appetites, 

l^c.  202 

B*  ^Tis  fhewn  that  we  can  do  this  in  regard  to  our  Appetites,  ib> 

''-'-  9  That 


xlnif-  C'<a'SY'E  NTS. 

^'^tfA^^M'<S&^  stlfo  in  our  Senres/and  in  a  manner  change  the  Nature 

*: '/of  things  by  an  obftinate  Eledion.  203 

16'  ^fiatwe't^att  conqufer'  hot  only  our  Appetites  and  Senfes,   but  aMb  oui- 

'•  ■  'Rcafon  by  the  force  of  Election.  204 

^li' This  appears  from  Inftances,  205 

-if ''That  the  Underftanding  admits  not  only  Evil  things  for  Good^biit  Falfi- 

'''•  ties  for  Truths,  viz.  being  under  Subjection  to  the  WilL     ••"'*•:*  -  '    j>. 

15-  'Tis  prbv'd  that  we  have  this  Power  from  a  Confideration  dfVhefellea- 

'  '  fons  which  are  fuppofed  to  determine  the.Will,  206 

14  Thefe  are  enumerated.  ^,   ;,  ib. 

15  Firft,  Errors  of  the  Underftanding  :    theic  are  ihewn  to  depend  upon  de- 

prav'd  Eledlion  rather,  than  caufe  it.  207 

16  Secondly,  Obftinacy  :  which  is  Ihewn  to  be  nothing  elfe  but  perfevering 
.:.  in.a  deprav*d  Eleftion.  it. 

ij.  Thirdly.  The  violence  of  Paflions,  "wz.Defire  of  Fame  and  Glory,   (Jc. 

T     all  which  are  prov'd  to  derive  their  inordinate  force  from  Election.     208 

li  The  fame  is  fhewn  of  Hatred,  Love,  ^c.       ,  209 

19  Of  Envy  and  Revenge.  ib. 

20  Fourthly,  Madnefs:  'tis  prov'd  on   the  contrary,  that  thefe  Men  are  in 

their  Senfes  who  choofe  abfurdly.  210 

21  All  thefe  things  cannot  be  explained  otherwife  than  by  admitting  a  Prin- 

ciple of  this  kind  inourfelves.  ik. 

22  As  much  Good  arifes  from  this  Principle,  fo  it  is  attended  with  this  Evil, 

viz.  a  Power  of  finning.  211 

23  This  miftakc,  that  the  Will  foilov/s  tl^e  .Judgment  of  the  Underftanding 

arofe  from  hence,  viz.  that  it  would  b6, imprudent  in  us  to  ad  without 
Gonfulting  the  Underftanding.,., ,\  ,l,,v    •  i,  V  .     '.-    -    •,    ^";^"*'  ^^* 

24  We  can  ad:  in  order  to  ftiew  ou^  Liiberty,   ^liich  is  prov*d  to  Be  the  fame 

as  adling  without  any  reafon  at  all.  212 

•^^  SECT.    n. 


3', 


IVhere  it  is  fiewn  that  Happinefs  confijis  in  EleBions. 


\A  The  more  free  any  Being  is,  the  lefs  he  is  expos'd  ,fq  eafferAftl.  M.9^'ons 

*   from  without,  and  meets  with  lefs  Inconvenience,  .noil  .^'^'■aJJ-^Jt?iT.'  ^'5 

:  2  Happinals  arifes  from  th€  proper  ufe  of  the  Facukie^y  &??.    l^  therefore  ^ 

Powjer  of  choofing  be  tlie  meft  noble  of  all,  the  greateft. Happinefs  will 

confift  in  the  Excrcife  of  it,  r.  e.  in  Eledions.  33    ih. 

i  Elcdion  is  the  .Cawie  why  things pleafe  us.     ^j  .;].;  !>?»  :^:r  j  a-v>S\  >a  )  ^^ 

4  He 


C  Q  NT-E  NT  S. 

g^.jWe  can  change  our  Elections  tamake  mem  conformable  to  things,  and  fo 
./ can  attain  Happin efs.  217 

S^  Care  of  the  Body,  and  the  natural  Appetites  difturb  Eledions  in  this  prefcnc 
j)    ftate,  and  hinder  our  Happinefs  from  being  perfect  ib. 

Jl^/We  have  rcafon  to  admire  the  Divine  Wifdom  which  created  an  Appetite 
.^l^hat  has  wherewith  to  pleafe  itfelf  in  ks  own  Nature,  howfocver  external 
^.;nhingsbedifpofed.  ...w  5  :.:... ...01. c:;-  ...-..:, 


xfer 


Z 


v^: 


S  E  C  T.    m. 


^^*     '^  '.  ^  '  Concerning  undue  EkBions, 


'^.i  To  fall  fhort  of  what  we  choofe  is  Mifery ;  we  choofe  amifs  tHerefbre'wh&i 
•     we  choofe  what  cannot  be  enjoy'd  -,  This  is  done  ip  when  fuch  things  are 

^^*  chofen  as  are  impofftbU.  2 19 

'^^2^/}'.  When  thofe  things  are  chofen  whidi  2iTt'inconfiftent  with  feach 'Other. 

•^  220 

'?*  3%-  I^  ^^e  things  chofen  "be  not  in  the  Power  of  the  Elcftor.  ^, 

*'4  ''4tbly.  If  ^y  choofe  that  which  is  pre-dccupy*d  by  the  lawful  Choicfe  of  o- 

1^  'thcrs.  it. 

^.  5tbly.  When  thofe  thmgs  which, tend  to  I^at^ral  Evils  are  chofen  without 

r*'"  any  Necelfity,  ^  221 

/^liHrjj!-!^?:"-' .'' 

How  it  is  poj/ible  for  us  to  fall  into  undue  El€Siio^:''<^^^ 


SECT    ifV. 


'■/-*;')  )> 


■oin/it 


jptj-v^^ »" 


222 

.  lit. 
223 


f .  I  This  is  done  five  ways. 

2  Firft,  by  Error  or  culpable  Ignorance.^ 

3  Secondly,  By  Negligence.  -t  en!  1- 

4  Thirdly,  By  giving  too  great  indulgence  to  the  exercifc  of  Eleven,  ib. 
•5  Fourthly,  By  Objiinacy,  or  a  HabiL  ih 
^  Fifthly,  By  the  importunity  of  the  natural  4?/'^^f/^j.  '  ^  ilr, 
^  Why  every  thing  ought  not  to  be  chofcn,  and  why  ElcAiohs  arc  not  eafily 

P)^   chang'd.  ^  224 

.  rj  vino  -^r.  ii-:*.iw 
'jd  .:"a»*V'r-«ii'ii  io  .  *  E  V  T. 


hlHX-  ,|4^,i3,.^;;  ::^V/j~t-.«  ;  ,< 


€ 


^■'^'O  NTE  NT  S:.^ 

If  $  .  S  E  C  T.    V. 

|JM?u;  JE>y/7  Blebfions  are  confijlent  with  the  Tower  arid  Goodnejs  of  God. 

V'   ^opofe's  the  Difficulty,  with  a.  Preparative  to.  the  Solution  of  it. 

<J.i  The  Evils  of  Free- Agents  are  not  neceffary,  and  therefore  feem  to  be 
r-     permitted  by  God  voluntarily.  226 

f)  J?  Moral  Evils  have  no  neceflary  Connexion  with  a  free  Nature,  nor  are  of 
r>^ '  any  Advantage  to  ft.  227 

-^  Here  then  lies  the  ftrefs  of  the  Difficulty,  viz.  why  did  Goc^  permit  thofe 
^       Evils  which  are  neither  neceflary  nor  ufeful  I  ib, 

^-4  We  don't  know  fo  much  of  the  Nature  of  thinking  Beings,  as  of,  material? 
ones,  and  therefore  are  lefs  pr^ared  for  an  Anfwer  to  this  Difficulty  than 
to  the  former.  tb. 

^  The  abufe  of  Free- Will  may  be  conceiv'd  to  have  been  prevented  three  . 
'" ,,  "I  ways,  which  are  confider'd  in  the  three  following  Subfedions,  22^^ 

S  U  BS  E  C  T.    li. 

Why  God  has  created  Free-Agents.  ^ 

^.j  God  might  have  prevented  Moral  Evils  if  he  had  refufed  to  create  any  free 

Being.  229  , 

-'  1  But  without  thofe  the  World  would  have  been  a  mere  Machfnc,  and  e-. 

very  thing  paflive.  ih. 

3  Obje(5tion  from  thefe  who  declare  diat  the  Underftanding  is  adlive,  tho'  it 
Z'      be  neceflary,  as  alfo  Gpd  himfelf.  .  '•"'_"  230 

■%  Atiiwrt-  to  the  fbmter  part  of  the  Objeftion.  -    -  -  ib. 

•^  Anfwer  to  the  latter.  ib. 

-€  God  has  a  Complacency  in  his  Works,  and,  if  nothing  were  free,  that  wt)a'd 

fee  wanting  in  them  which  is  mofl  agreeable  to  the  Deity.  251 

^  Neceflary  Evils  do  not  always  hinder  the  Creation  of  things,  much  lefs 

thofe  which  are  only  pofllble.  ib. 

%  Natural  Evils  are  greater  than  Moral  ones,  and  Free-Will  a  greater  Good 

than  the  Natural  Appetites.  232 

•9  Theftl^e  of  Man  wou'd  be  worfe  if  Free-Will  were  talcen  away.         233 

10  Free-  . 


co>rr£^T;^.     ^  ^ 


10  Free  Agents  are  capable  of  perfcft  Happincfs,  therefore  it  is  better  to  en- 
joy Liberty.  23;  4 
'SI  The  Benefits  of  Free- Will  cou*d  not  be  had  without  a  Power  of  fmning. 

.  235 

12  The  Will  could  not  be  determin'd  to  Good  by  Obje(5ls,  fince  the  Good- 

nefs  of  them  generally  proceeds  from  Ele(aion.  236 

^3  The  Intelled  often  finds  nothing  good  in  things,  except  that  they  help  to- 
wards the  attainment  of  an  Eledion,  the  Will  therefore  could  not  be 
determin'd  to  Good  by  the  Underftandir^.  tb, 

14  The  Goodncfs  and.Wifdom  of  God  being  equal  to  Ms  Power,  WodeTJi  him 
i    from  choofing  amifs.  ;• -^       '  i  >^nKfn^o  238 

15  But  Man  may  choofe  amifs,  fince  his  Goodnefs  and  Wifdbm' nether  Hre 

nor  can  be  adequate  to  his  Power.  239 

16  *Tis  better  to  be  fometimes  deceiv*d  with  Plcafurc,  than  to  be  always  fo- 

licitous.  240 

•17  'Tis  better  to  be  in  danger  of  finning  than  to  ceafe  from  Elcdion.         ik, 

^  u  B  s  E  c  T.  m.  ,  ; 

Why  God  doei  not  interpofe  his  Omnipotence,  and  occafiondlly  fejirain  the 
Will  from  depravd  EleSfions, 

"f  .1  More  and  greater  Evils  would  arife  from  thence  than  from  the  abufc  of 
Free- Will.  242 

2  It  would  be  as  mqch  Violence  to  prevent  the  Action  of  Free- Will,  as  the 

Motion  of  the  Sun.  ib, 

3  God,  by  interpofing  in  the  Eledions  of  his  Creatures,  would  quite  in- 

vert the  Method  of  treating  Free-Agents.  244 

4  He  would  take  away  that  which  is  the  moft  agreeable  to  us  in  Ele<^ions, 

vix.  a  Confcioufnefs  that  we  might  have  not  ch<^n.  245 

5  Free- Agents  are  placed  as  it  were  out  of  the  reach  of  Divine  Power  j  the 

Government  of  thefe  therefore  is  the  proper  Exercife  of  ,iJi^X)ivine 
Wifdom,  wherein  God  delights.  !  248 

6  It  would  therefore  be  neither  agreeable  to  God,  nor  ufeful  to  us,  that  God 

Ihould  always  hinder  bad  Eledions.  251 

'V-  '"• '-^'^  '^"-^  ■■ '  ^^.  "  S  tJ  B  S  E  C  r^'  IV.  ■■''  '  ^"^      ■  "■   ^'  ' 

Concerning  the  Efficacy  of  Prayer »  •    ^^     ;^    "^  .    '"*, 

4. 1  Devout  Men  hope  for  a  Change  in  the  Courfe  of  Nature,  through  their 
Prayers.  ••        252 

g  2  .  2  God 


\1 


IS.  CO  NT  E  NT  & 

^  God  does  not  hear  all  Prayers.  253  . 

3  God  is  obliged  to  the  Creatures  by  his  Goodnefs  and  by  Covenant:.        ih^ 

4  What  may  be  requcfted  of  the  Deity  relates  cither  to  the  Mind,  the  Body 
^      or  external  things.  ih. 
£  God  does  not  give  alliftance  to  our  Minds  at  random,  but  under  as  cer- 
tain Laws  as  thofe  of  the  natural  World.                                             254, 

^  The  Aid  of  the. //<>/);  5/'/V;V  is  not  miraculous.  .   ^        ,  ^        255 

7  Prayers  naturally  tend  to  peifed  the  Mind,  "^''^  '^■'^  ''■' ,    257 

8  And  to-fubdue  the  Affedions.  25^ 

9  The  Aftions  of  free  Beings  will  produce  a  Contingency  in  maCerial  things, 

yet  diis  does  not  offer  any  Violence  to  Nature.  26q 

I  o  There  is  a  Syftcm  of  intelleflual  as  well  as  material  Beings,  which  ad  as 

much  upon  each  other.  26  l 

I I  God  makes  ufe  of  the  Miniftry  of  Angels  in  the  Government  of  Man- 

kind,  nor  is  this  any  Violence  to  Nature.^  262^ 

12  God  is  not  obliged  to  take  away  the  abufe  of '  Free- Will,  fince  he  has  e- 

ftablifh'd  a  Method  of  aflifting  his  Worlhippers.  263 

13  The  Efficacy  of  Prayers  cannot  be  accounted  for  if  all  things  be  left  to  ne- 

ceffary  Caufes.  264. 

14  An  Intimation  that, this,  is  not  ;;epugnant  to  .the  Divine  Prefcience.       267 

'  •*"  SUBS  E  C  T;-   V^- 

ff^l)y  God-  does  not  tranjlate  Man  to  fome  other  Place^   where  nothing 
ivould  occur  that  could  tempt  him  to  choofe  amifs, , 

%.i  This  is  the  fame  as  if  it  were  a(k*d,  why  God  did  not  give  the  Earth  to 
be  inhabited  by  the  Brutes  only.  .       -  .  270   , 

2  This  is  totally  to  extirpate  Mankind-  271 

3  God  will  in  due  time  tranflatc  good  Men  to  a  better  State,  but  the  prefent 
^     is  as  necefiary  a&  Seed-time  is  Co  Harvelt  ib* 

'C'-  S  U  B  S  E  C  T.    VI. 

Concerning  the  Scarcity  of.  happy  Perfons^  and.  the  general  Corruption  of 

'Mankind. 

^. I.  Some  Objedions  propofed  concerning  the  Rarity  of  happy  Perfons.    273 
2  That-the  Power  of  Eledion  is  not  regarded.  '  ik^. 

^^.Xhacihcrc  is  an  Univerfal  Corruption.  274 

^^     "      "    "  ^   '  *        "  4Thc(e    . 


e  &  N'T  E  NT&    ^  "    HiiJ 

4,^  Thefe  are  beft  anfwerM  by  Reveal'd  Religion.  274 

,  5  Many  atc ain  to  a  moderate  Happinefs.     ' '  ■Y^^"'^  '^^^^  ■^^'»rf  3orf  »ob  ho^  ,-^,. 

»  Men  make  ufeof  this  Elective  Power  the'  they  do  lioTobfervc  it.         276 

7.  Ele«5tions  produce  the  fame  Effedi;  inthe  Moral  World  as  Motion  does  in 

■    theNatural.  .  J  CI^C  :^f  '■  /T  A-    .  -S^'''i '^^ii-)^  278 

8-  Things  are  conne6led  together,  and  a  defe^  in  one  affcdls  many  otherF.'i^. 

g  Vice  and  Wickednefs,  tho  deforni'd  iii  thcmfclves,  do  not  impair  the  Beau-. 

:;'\  ty  of  the  whole.  "  V;:  ''  ""  -'^"  '■)  ''  '^X  ^''"^'^'''^  ''-'  ^'^'  ^^^  ^;^ 

10  Ifthis-be  apply'd  to  particular  Cafes,   it  accbiiiits  for  the  UriiverfalCot- 

ruptioji.  282 

'^^  SUBS-  E  C  T.    Vil.  <     ■- 

JVherein  thf  Principles  before  laid  down  are  apply' d  to  the  Solution  of 

^     fome  Objediions. 
i''  ' 'I  'r'Lxo  ^^  ";  -i: 

%h  Moral  Evils  are'not'neceffary  in  refpeCt  of  Fr^^wUI,  but  they  are  necef- 
fary  with  regard  to  God,  fo  tbat  he  mult  either  tolerate  thefe  or  greater. 
-^nr'  s,.,i7Vji     .       iV,'  fir   jinfi  r\-  w  vi^uz.;  ..J  gj  .  288 

2  Cfcero*s  Objedlion  propofed,  which  is  taken  from  a  Phyfician  who  gives 

his  Patient  Wine  when  he  knows  that  he  will  die  of  it.   Or  a  Father  who 
leaves  his  Eftate  to  a  Prodigal  Son.  289 

3  'Tis  fhewn  that  the  Compirifon  is  ill  put  between  Reafon  and  Free-will, 

aiKl  the  giving  of  Wine  v  and  that  God,,  if  he  took  away  Liberty  for  fear 

.y    we  fhou*d  fin,  wou'd  be  like  a  Man  that  kills  his  Son  for  fcarhe ihou'd 

be  fick.  290 

4  Reafon  is  rK)  lefs  improperly  compared  to  an  Eftate.  291 

5  It  tends  to  the  Good  of  the  whole,  and  of  ourfelves  alfo,  that  we  fliould  ■ 

have  the  ufe  of  Free-will :  for  we  had  rather,  bjpjjylut  we -arc  than  in  the 
Condition  of  Brutes,  or  without  Reafon.         .  /^         '  '  ib. 

6  Cicero  has  neither  brought  oppofitc  Similes^  nor  given  good  Advice  to 

Providence,  293 

7  The  Objedlion  of  Epicurus  propofed,  which  charged  God  with  Weaknefs 

if  he  was  not  able  ;  oc  Envy  if  he  was  able  to  remove  Evils.  294 

'  %  'Tis  a  Contradi<f]tion  that  all  Evils  be  removed  from  created  Beings,  God 
is  not  impotent  therefore  becaufe  ht  does  not  remove  them.  ib* 

'9  God  always  choofes  the  leaft  of  Evils,  and  therefore  is  not  envious,    295 
10  God  cou'd  neither  be  conceiv*d  to  be  infinitely  powerful,  .if  he  were  not 
able  to  create  imperfedl  Beings,  /'.  e.  Creatures  •,  or  things  that  are  con- 
trary to  each  other,  /.  e.  Evils-,    nor  infinitely  good  if  he  had  been  con- 
tented in  himfelf,  and.  dcpy'd  Exii^enc  to  eyery  thing  clfe.  296 

1  *  Epicurus  . 


liv.  CONTENTS. 

.Vi  1 1  Epicurus  therefore  is  deceiv*d,  who  endeavours  to  attribute  Impotence  and 
Envy  to  the  Deity  •,  whereas  he  ought  to  have  infcrr'd  the  higheft -Po- 
wer and  Goodnefs.  ^     296 

Oil"     ^■ 

APPENDIX 

Concerning  the  Divine  Laws, 

S  E  C  T.    I. 

Why  Xjod  made  Laws  when  he  knew  that  they  would  not  be  obferv^d, 

^.i  The  Divine  Laws  are  either  natural  or  poficive.  298 

2  Particular  Laws  ought  to  give  place  to  more  general  ones,  fince  all  kind 

of  repugnancy  cou^d  not  be  avoided.  299 

3  The  lame  muft  be  faid  oif  liiofc  Lawi  whick  relate  to.the  Moral  Wod4 

4  Why  God  is  faid  to  be  angry  with  Sinners  fince  his  Will  is  always  done. 

300 

5  God  may  alter  or  add  to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  and  give  us  aflurance  that 

he  intends  to  do  fo  •,  hence  the  Origin  of  pofitive  Laws,   and  a  Revela- 
tion. .  ik. 

6  Laws  are  the  means  of  informing  free  Agents  of  A««hat  is  ufeful  or  pre- 

judicial to  them.  ,;..-.■;  ^'.  —  :    :. -'  ,    .  ij  i."^  ih, 

SEC  T.    H.  =5i-^r>^  --.  V 

Concerning  Divine  Rev^ards  and  Tunijhments.    .,   "}f 

f.i  Punifhment  is  a  natural  Evil  annexed  to  a  depraved  Choice.  303 

2  Evil  is  Violence  done  to  Nature  ;  but  every  natural  Action  has  Re-adion 

corrcfpondent  to  it :  therefore  he  that  does  Violence  muft  nccefTarily  fut- 

■^^^.  fer  ir,  that  no  Tranfgreflbr  may  go  unpunilh'd^  ib, 

3  Pofitive  Laws  inform  us  of  the  Punifhments  which  attend  depraved  E- 

Icdions,  from  the  Nature  of  the  thing  rather  than  inflidt  new  ones. 

-o  ....  304 

4  That  the  decreeing  ^x^  iAfji<^Ung  Punifhments.  prevents  greater  Evil. 

5  *Tis  ask*d  in  the  firft  place,  how  this  can  be  recohcITed  with  eternal  Pu- 

nilhments,  which  don't  feem  to  be  capable  either  of  reforming  the  pu- 
nifh*d,  or  of  being  a  Warning  to  others.  ib. 

6  'Tis 


VV -^ 


&0  NT  ^  i^T  S.  k 


idi^  'TIS  aik*d  In  the  2d  place,  how  Punifhments  cantre  eternal,  fince  it  16 

.  t:(ji.   agreeable  to  Goodnefs  to  have  created  all  things  in  fuch  a  manner  that 

nothing  nnight  repent  of  its  being  created.  305 

7  'Tis  ask'd  3  dly,  how  eternal  Punifhments  can  fubM  without  a  Natural 

Caufe.  3o5 

8  To  the  firft^tis  anfwer'd,  that  eternal  Punifliments  are  made  known  to  us 
*','  -     by  Revelation,  and  that  God  is  not  therefore  obliged  to  reveal  how  or 

why  they  are  fo  i  for  perhaps  the  Reafon  is  above  our  Comprehenfion. 

9  It  does  not  appear  but  that  the  Punifhments  of  the  Wicked  may  be  of  ufe 

to  the  Good.  ib* 

10  Tathe  2d  'tis  reply'd,  that  the  Matter  is  yet  in  debate  whether  is  prefe-- 
rable,  to  be  miferablc,  or  not  to  be  at  all.  The  Mifery  of  the  Dam- 
ned may  be  like  that  of  Mad-men-.  308 
I'j  The  Damned  choofe  their  miferable  State, .  as  Lovers,  angry,  ambitious, 
envious  Perfons  indulge  themfelves  in  thofe  things  which  increafe  their 
Mifery.  309 

12  Such  Punifhment  is  very  great,  and  very  well  anfwers  the  End  of  Divine 

Punifhments.  3,111 

13  God  ought  to  prefer  the  common  Salvation  to  that  of  Particulars.        ib, 

14  Anfwer  to  the  3d  Objeftion.    *Tis  probable  that  the  Mifery  of  the  Wick- 

ed arifes  from  the  very  Nature  of  Sin.  3 1 2 

15  The  Wicked  wilf,  thro*  Ignorance  and  Error,  delight  in  fuch  things  as 

they  cannot  enjoy,  and  may  not  know  how  to  take  delight  in  any  thing, 
elfe.  ^  313  , 

16  The  Wicked  are  confined  to  certain  Places  and  Companions  by  the  Laws 

of  Nature,  as  we  are  to  the  Earth.  314 

ly  The  Difpute  about  Moral  Evil  relates  to  the  Mind  and  its  Operations,  . 
and  on  that  account,  mufl  neceffarily  be  fomewhat  fubtlc.  315. 

S.  E  c  T.   m. 

concerning  th&  ^efthn^  ivhy  bad  Men  are  happy-,  and  goad  Men  mi^ 

ferable. 

%i\  This  Queflion  has  been  fo  well  treated  of  by  many,  that  there  isfcarce 
any  room  for  Scruple.  317 

2  The  matter  of  Fad:  is  often  doubtful,  for  it  is  not  good  Men  that  are  mi- 
ferable, but  rather  reform'd  by  Advcrfity.  Nor  are  bad  Men  profpe- 
rQus,  but  maile  bad  by  their  Proiperity.  .  ih^ 

3  We 


Ivi.  CONTENTS. 

'a 

3  Wc  are  partial  Judges  of  Merit,  from  the  \vSi?inct  oi  Hannibal  and  Scipio. 

4  We  are  bad  Judges  of  the  Happinefs  of  Men,  for  thofe  are  often  themoft 
miferablc  whom  we  efteem  happy  •,  and  the  contrary.  ib. 

^  The-xrhief  Happinefs  here  confifts  in  hope  ;  which  is  a  fign  that  perifedl 
Happinefs  is  referv*d  for  another  Life,  and  all  thefc  things  which  befal 
good  or  bad  Men,  are  means  to  it.  2^9 

-^  ,ConcIufion  of  the  whole.  ib. 


ir  -  .' 


I : 


: ! 


0^  iXUi.l    UO'i   i^^;:T.\  . 


.* 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 


CHAP.     L 

containing  fornc  ^rinci^Us  nccejjary  to  he  hno'wn  in  order  to 
the  Under jianding  and  Solution  of  the  difficulty  about  the 
^     Origin  of  Evil. 

:i  a  't»  o  v^. 

■ - . .  .    ..- .  .   •■  ■ . 

S  E  C  T.    I. 

Of  the  knowledge  of  External  ObjeBs^ 

I.  p/  I   \IS  allow'd  that  external  Objeds  are  made  known  to  us  That  fenfatf. 
I       from  without  by  the  Senfes;  but  we  have  entirely  forgot  °"^  ""^P^^^^^t 
JL      how  Lights  Colours^  and  other  external  Things  at  firft  af-  fhingrro  m, 
feezed  our  Senfes  and  Minds  j  nor  can  we  eafily  recolledl  of  at  leaft 
the  rife  and  progrefs  of  our  Knowledge  concerning  thefe  things.         defence  of 

However  'tis  agreed  that  the  Conceptions  which  we  have  of  thefe  them. 
either  reprcfent  to  us  the  things  themfelves,  or  at  leaft  difcover  the 
prefence  and  operations  of  them :  That  the  fenfation  of  Light y  for  in-  are^confufed 
ftance,  arifes  from  its  being  prefented  to  the  Eye  j  and  fo  in  all  other  and  compii- 
Objefts  of  the  Senfes.  J^^td,";" 

II.  But  it  is  to  be  obferv*d  that  the  Reprefentations  of  things,  which  pnratcd  and 
we  have  from  the  Senfes,  arc  by  no  means  fimple,  but  very  much  con-^'^lV'^"'^'^^ 
fufed  and  complicated;  for  Example,  the  Eye  reprefents  to  the  Mind:hnding;an 
burning  Wax,  i.  e.  a  thing  that  is  hard,  round,  capable  of  being  melted  '"ff  ""^^^^^  . 

B  iningWax. 


^  Cmcerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

in  the  Fire,  red,  and  when  foftened  by  heat,  changeable  into  any  Fi- 
gure, fufceptible  alfo  of  various  colours,  and  laflly  refolvable  inta 
Smoke.  The  Eye  exhibits  all  thefe  properties  in  the  burning  Wax  al- 
moft  at  one  glance,  but  the  underjianding  feparates  thofe  things  by 
Refledlion,  which  the  fight  had  convey'd  to  the  Mind  colledtivety; 
For  it  perceives  that  the  Wax  preferves  its  EfTence  and  Denomination, 
tho'  from  round  it  be  turn'd  into  fquarc,  from  hard  and  red,  into  foft 
and  black.  From  whence  it  appears  that  all  thefe  properties  are  ex- 
trinfecal  to  it,  but  that  which  continues  under  all  thefe  changes  is  call'd 
its  Nature  and  Subjlance. 
The  firft  di-  III.  By  Subftance  I  here  underftand  a  thing  which  the  Mind  can 
iiinftion  of  conceive  by  itfelf  as  difiinB  and  feparate  from  all  others :   For  that 

our  concep-     ,.  .       ^      ''   ^  .  ri-ii  r  7  « 

rions  into  ^^^ngj  ^n^  conception  or  which  does  not  depend  upon  another,  nor  does 
fenfibie  ^a-  include  or  fuppofe  any  other,  is  to  us  a  Subjlance \  (i)  and  according- 
^ubnlnce.      ^y  we  diftinguifh  it  by  that  name:  But  that  which  implies  dependence 

in 

N  0  t  E  S. 


(i)  Subjlance  in  general  is  a  thing  pr  being 
Tvhicb  can  Jfdji/f  by  itfelf  without  dependence 
on  any  other  thing  as  a  Subje^.  Our  Idea  of 
the  word  Subftance,  according  to  Mr.  Locke,  \s 
only  a  fuppofition  of  we  know  not  what  fub- 
Jiratum  or  jupport  of  fuch  ^alities  as  we  have 
obferved  to  exift  united  together,  and  are  ca- 
pable of  producing  fimple  ideas  in  us,  which 
qualities  are  commonly  call'd  accidents.  Now 
becaufe  we  cannot  eafily  conceiA'e  how  thefe  ac- 
cidents fhould  fubfift  alone  or  in  one  another, 
we  fuppofe  them  exifting  in,  and  fupported  by, 
fbme  unknown  common  Jubjlratum  which  in- 
heres not  in  any  thing  elfc,  and  which  we  de- 
note by  the  name  Subftance.  See  his  Effay,  B.  2. 
C.  23.  V  !•  2nd  the  Notes  annexed. 

This  is  our  ufual  manner  of  conceiving 
things  as  they  are  diftinguifh'd  into  Subjiance 
and  Accidefit:  But  what  foundation  there  is  in 
nature  for  fuch  a  diftinflion  I  kno\v  not :  In 
particular  what  this  fame  Subftance  is,  or  whe 
ther  it.  be  really  any  thing  at  all  different  from 
thefe  Accidents,  or  only  a  relative  Idea  found- 
ed on  the  modus  of  their  exiftence,  or  rather 
«n  the  manner  of  our  confidering  their  ex- 
ifteoce,    wc  ihall  not  pretend   to  determine 


/Mr.  Locke,  who  does  not  not  much  approve  of 
the  foregoing  diftindlion  between  fubftanceand 
accident,  *  feems  generally  to  take  it  for  an  un- 
known Caufe  of  the  union  of  what  we  call  Pro- 
perties or  Accidents.  The  Author  of  the  Pro- 
cedure, Extent,  and  Limits  of  H.  U.  fuppofes  it 
to  be  nothing  but  the  union  of  thefe  very  Pro- 
perties, or  all  thefe  conftituent  Properties  col- 
lefted  together.  •- —  "  As  far  as  we  direftly 
"  know  the  Bfl"ential  properties  of  any  fub- 
"  ftance  fo  far  we  have  a  diredl  knowledge 
"  of  the  Subftance  itfelf:  And  if  we  had  a  di- 
"  reft  knowledge  of  all  the  eflential  proper- 
"  ties  of  any  Subftance,  we  Ihould  have  an 
"  adequate  knowledge  of  that  Subftance  ;  for 
"  furely,  if  there  be  any  meaning  in  words, 
"  the  knowing  aay  of  the  eflential  properties 
"  of  a  thing,  is  knowing  yi  much  of  its  very 
"  Subftance  or  Eflence."  B.  i.  C.  3.  p.  80, 
81. 

Whatever  is  meant  by  the  word  Subjlancey 
Mr.  Locke  thinks  it  ought  not  to  be  apply'd  to 
God,  Spirits,  and  Body,  in  the  fame  Senfe  -f-  and 
the  Author  of  the  procedure,  &c.  would  have 
us  when  we  talk  of  Spirits  to  fubftitute  the 
word  Being  inftead  of  it  ||  and  I  muft  believat 


»  B»  2.  C.  13.  S'  »8.  19.  20.)  t  Ibid.  S.  18;  H  Pa.  77,  78. 


that 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 


5 


in  the  conception  of  it  we  call  a  Mode,  or  Accident.  For  inrtancc,  we 
can  conceive  a  certain  portion  of  matter,  fuch  as  Wax  is,  fetting  afide 
all  others,  and  alfo  without  any  particular  Figure :  But  are  not  in  like 
manner  able  to  conceive  any  particular  Figure  without  matter.  Wax 
therefore  is  a  Subfiance,  for  our  conception  reprefents  it  as  difiinSi,  di- 
vided from,  and  independent  of,  all  other  things :  Nor  is  it  neceflary^ 
to  the  knowledge  thereof,  that  we  join  the  conceptions  of  other 
things  when  we  think  of  it  j  for  the  conceptions  of  that  and  thefe, 
contribute  nothing  to,  nor  fland  in  need  of,  each  other  in  order  to  their 
being  underftood.  But  Colour,  Figure,  foftnefs  and  hardnefs  are  modes 
or  accidents,  iince  they  cannot  be  conceiv'd  without  fomething  that  is 
coloured,  Jigur'd,  foft,  or  hard  j  but  they  enter  not  into  the  Subjldnce 
©r  nature  of  Wax,  for  that  remains,  whatever  may  become  of  thefe. 

IV.  But  when  this  is  refolv'd  into  fmoke,  or  fame  it  has  no  longer  How  we 
the  name  of  Wax  given  to  it :  we  call  the  thins;  Wax,  which  is  appli-  know  that 

.^.  *'.  .  there  is  anv 

cable  to  a  certain  peculiar  ufe ;  but  when  it  is  once  refolved  into  fuch  thing  aa 
fmoke  or  flame,  it  becomes  unfit  for  that  ufe  to  which  Wax  is  fubfer-  f^iatur. 
vienti  and  therefore  changes  its  Ej'ence,  and  appellation,  and  is  no 
longer  to  be  called  Wax.  What  therefore  does  it  carry  along  with  it 
under  all  mutations  ?  *Tis  always  extended,  and  capable  of  motion  or 
ref ;  and  has  always  parts  which  are  feparable,  and  exclude  one  ano- 
ther out  of  the  fame  place;  the  Subftance  therefore  which  carries 
along  with  it  thofe  ^alities  and  Properties  is  called  Matter.  {2). 

B  2  V.  What 

NOTES, 


that  thefe  and  ihe  like  terms,'  efpecially  Sub- 
jlmtum,  are  very  apt  to  miflead  us  in  thefe  in- 
quiries and  confine  our  Imagination  to  fome 
grofs  Properties  which  belong  to  Matter  only. 
See  alfo  Watts's  Logic,  Pt.  i.  C.  2.  ^.  2  and  3, 
and  N.  13- 

(2)  This  comes  nearer  to  the  Idea  of  Body, 
according  to  Mr.  Locke,  than  that  of  Matter. 
"  Body,  fays  he  *ftands  for  a  folid,  extended, 
"  figured  Subftance,  whereof  Matter  is  but  a 
"  partial,  and  more  confufed  conception ;  it 
"  fceming  to  me  to  be  ufed  for  the  Subftance 
•*  and  folidity  of  Body,  without  taking  in  its 
••  Extenfion  and  Figure.''     Tho'  it  mull  be 


confefs'd  that  thefe  two  words  are  often  ufed 
promifcuoully.  It  may  not  be  improper  to  ob- 
fcrve  here  that  the  various  fignifications  of  thefe 
general  Terms  Body,  Matter,  E£ence,  Sec.  in 
different  Authors,  as  well  as  the  uncertainty  of 
what  thefe  Authors  intend  to  fignify  by  them, 
will  ferve  to  convince  us,  in  the  firft  place, 
that  thefe  words  don't  denote  the  manner  how^ 
things  really  cxill,  but  only  our  manner  of 
conceiving  them  ;  and  Secondly,  that  there  are 
no  real  Exiftences  ftriftly  conformable  to  this 
our  way  of  conceiving  them,  /.  e.  in  generals. 
For  if  either  thefe  general  terms  ilood  for  real 
things,  or  this  our  way  of  conceiving  things 


^  •B.  3.  C.  10.  ^."15. 


in) 


What  it  is. 


That  this 
Definition 
dees  not 
Teach  the 
Idea  of  Mat- 
ter, but  only 
ihews  us  the 
"^Urk  to  di- 
ilinguiih  it 
by. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

V.  What  is  obfervable  in  Wax,  may  alfo  be  obferv'd  in  every  other 
Subftance,  which  we  know  by  the  Senfes.  For  all  things  that  are 
pcrceiv'd  by  the  Senfes  admit  of  the  like  changes,  and  the  above  men- 
tioned properties  continue  both  under^  and  after  all  thefc  motions  and 
mutations.  Any  fenfible  Objed-,  howfoever  chang'd,  is  always  extend- 
ed, moveable^  conjijling  oi  folid^  diftindl  and  divijible  parts. 

VI.  Not  that  this  is  a  Definition,  A.  or  Idea  (4J  of  Matter,  any 

more 

»•  ■  ♦ 

NQtES. 


(in  Generals)  w.is  fix'd  by  nature,  neither  of 
them  would  be  fo  various  and  uncertain  as  we 
find  they  are.  But  as  thefe  terms  ftand  only 
for  our  conceptions,  and  our  fixing  them  to 
this  or  that  conception,  is  merely  arbitrary ; 
fhe  lame  term  may  often  be  apply'd  to  different 
conceptions,  or  feveral  terms  to  the  fame  con- 
ception. Thefe  Conceptions  alfo,  as  they  are 
not  of  nature's  forming,  mull  be  form'd  by  the 
Wind  itfelf,  and  of  confequence  are  arbitrary 
too,  and  fo  may  eafily  be  different  from  each 
other,  in  difffercnt  Men,  and  perhaps  different 
from  the  real  nature  of  things  in  all  Men.  The 
end  of  making  thefe  general  conceptions  is  to 
range  things  into  /orts,  for  the  convenience  of 
Language.  The  manner  of  acquiring  them  is 
as  follows. 

We  are  at  firft  acquainted  only  with  parti- 
cular fubftances,  but  obferving,  that  as  thefe 
particular  fubftances  differ  in  fome  Ideas,  fo 
they  agree  in  others  (/'.  e.  tho'  this  particular 
excites  in  the  Mind  fome  Idea  or  Ideas,  which 
another  does  not,  yet  there  are  fome  Ideas  ex- 
cited equally  from  both  of  them)  we  take  no 
notice  of  thoTe  Ideas  in  which  two  or  more 
particular  Subftances  differ,  but  feleft  thofe  on- 
ly in  which  they  agree,  and  conneft  them  into 
one  complex  Idea,  by  giving  them  one  name. 
Which  complex  Idea  becomes  general,  /.  e.  it 
may  be  affirm'd  of,  or  belongs  to,  or  is  found 
in,  more  than  one  particular  fubftance.  And 
the  Subftances  of  which  it  is  afiirmed,  &c.  are 
laid  to  be  contain^  under  that  generaf  Idea. 
General  Ideas  of  Subftances  are  nude  therefore 
by  leaving  out  thofe  Ideas  in  which  two  or 
more  particular  Subftances  differ,  and  retain- 
ing thofe  in  which  they  agree.  And  from  Ge- 
aeral  Ideas  ihaa  made  we  may  proceed  to  more 


general  ones,  in  the  fame  way,  viz.  by  always 
leaving  out  the  particulars  wherein  they  differ. 
Thus  by  obferving  a  certain  agreement  among 
Individuals,  and  leaving  out  the  reft,  we  form 
an  Idea  of  the  feveral  Species.  In  like  man- 
ner, by  leaving  out  the  diftinguifhing  marks  of 
each  Ipecies  we  get  the  Idea  of  Animal  in  ge- 
neral :  And  again,  by  dropping  that  by  which 
Animals  are  diftinguifh'd  from  all  other  things 
which  are  the  objeds  of  our  Senfes,  we  acquire 
the  Idea  of  Matter  or  Body:  and  fo  on. — 
When  any  of  thefe  General  Ideas  are  found  in 
a  particular  thing,  'tis  call'd  the  Effrnce  of  that 
thing ;  Ejjcnce  therefore  is  only  that  general 
abftraft  Idea  in  the  Mind  by  which  we  deter- 
mine any  thing  to  be  of  this  or  that  fort  ;  and 
which  we  fignify  by  fuch  a  general  Name  as 
Animal  or  Matter.  So  that  the  fame  Quality 
may  be  Effential  or  not  Effential  to  any  thing, 
according  as  that  thing  is  rank'd  under  a  diffe- 
rent Sort.  This  Ihews  us  both  the  abfurdity  of 
taking  thefe  general  terms  for  ligns  of  real 
Exiftcnces,  which,  we  fee,  are  ligns  of  our 
Ideas  only;  and  alfo  the  neceffity  for  diftin- 
guifhing between  a  Colleftion  or  Combination 
of  our  own  Ideas,  and  real  Qualities,  as  they 
arc  found  in  Nature  ;  between  Thoughts  and 
Things.  If  this  laft  Diftinftion  were  fufiiciently 
attended  to,  I  believe  we  Ihould  not  be  fo  rea-« 
dy  to  conclude  from  any  Ideas  which  we  may 
have  of  infinite  [pace.  Infinite  Duration,  &c.  that 
thefe  muft  needs  be  real  Properties,  or  Attributes 
of  fome  Being.  —  Of  which  hereafter;  See 
'N.5. 

A.  God  feems  to  have  endowed  us  with 
fenfes  and  underftanding  in  order  to  diftinguilh 
things  from  one  another,  and  to  perceive  the 
prefcnce  and  ufes  of  them.    It  is  not  therefore 

ncceflary 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 


NOTES. 


neceflary  that  they  (houW  be  made  known  to 
us  as  they  are  in  themfelves,  but  only  fo  far  as 
they  regard  and  can  afFeft  us:  For  it  fignifies 
nothing  to  us  what  they  are  in  themfelves,  but 
only  what  effefts  they  may  have  upon  us :  And 
the  report  of  the  fenfes  muft  be  looked  upon  as 
true,  when  they  reprefcnt  thefe  effefts  to  us 
uniformly,  /'.  e.  when  the  Obje^,  Medium  and 
Organ  continuing  in  the  fame  ftate,  they  pro- 
duce the  fame  fenfation  in  us :  For  by  this 
means  we  may  perceive  the  prefence  of  fenfi- 
ble  things,  and  the  diftindlion  of  them  from 
each  other,  which  feems  to  be  the  end  for 
which  we  had  fenfes  given  by  nature.* 

We  come  then  to  the  Knowledge  of  things 
two  ways,  by  Senfation  and  Refleftion.  We 
are  confcious  to  ourfelves  that  we  exift,  from 
thence  we  have  the  notion  of  Exijlence.  f  Nor 
do  we  feem  to  mean  any  thing  elfe  when  we 
call  a  thing  a  Being  ox  Thing,  than  that  it  is  like 
us  in  that  whereof  wre  are  felf-confcious,  viz. 
Exijience,  For  Univerfals  are,  I  think,  neither 
to  be  interpreted  by  words  alone~i  nor  by  con- 
ceptions, nor  by  the  particular  things  them- 
felves, but  ly  Avalogy,  For  Example,  w4ien 
one  affirms  that  Peter  is  a  Man,  he  obferves  the 
Idea  of  fome  particular  Man,  perhaps  of  him- 
felf,  OK  the  Neighbour  he  faw  lafl ;  -and  when 
he  affi.rms  Peter  to  be  a  Man,  he  means  nothing 
elfc  but  that  P^/^r  is  like  himfelf  or  his  Neigh- 
bour, (and  he  calls  thofe  things  alike  which 
have  the  fame  effefts  as  to  him)  After  the  fame 
manner  he  that  fays  Man  is  an  Animal,  msft  be 
fuppofed  to  have  the  Idea  of  fome  particular 
Man  and  Brute  in  his  Mind,  and  to  mean  no- 
thing more  when  he  fays,  Man  is  an  Animal, 
than  that  this  particular  Man  and  thofe  that  arc 
like  him,  are  in  fome  refpeds  alfo  like  the  par- 
ticular Brute,  the  Idea  of  which  he  had  in  his 
Mind.  Thus  we  learn  the  Analogy  of  things 
by  Refleftion,  but  are  acquainted  with  all  ex- 
ternal things  by  the  fenfations  or  Conceptions 
which  they  produce  in  us ;  and  according  to 
thefe  various  Conceptions  we  dillinguifli  them 
from  each  other,  and  divide  and  define  them 


into  various  Species.  Now  we  come  to  the 
Knowledge  of  fome  things  by  immediate  Sen« 
fation,  Proportion,  or  Connexion  with  what 
we  perceive  by  the  Senfes^  ||When  we  perceive 
any  thing  in  the  former  way,  we  are  faid  to 
know  it  by  Idea\  when  in  the  latter,  not  by 
Idea,  but  Reafop.  The  Cafe  will  be  cleat er 
perhaps  by  an  Inftance  :  I  know  a  certain  King, 
becaufe  I  have  feen  and  heard  him,  and  his 
Countenance  and  Voice  are  fixed  in  my  Mind  ; 
by  thefe  therefore  I  can  diftinguifh  him  from 
others,  and  know  him  aga^'n  when  I  fee  him; 
for  he  is  known  to  me  by  immediate  fenfation^ 
that  is,  by  Idea.  But  I  know  Cafar  only  by 
his  aftions,  /,  e.  by  Similitude  and  Connexion 
with  the  things  of  which  I  have  a  Senfation ; 
noT  fliould  I  know  him  again  if  I  met  him ; 
for  immediate  fenfation  has  not  imprefs'd  thofe 
marks  upon  me  whereby  I  might  diftinguifli 
him  from  other  Alen.  I  affirm  therefore  that  I 
have  no  Idea  of  him.  I  know  him  (as  far  as  is 
neceffary)  by  reafon  alone,  i.  e.  from  Simili' 
tude  indi  Connexion  with  thofe  things  which  I 
perceive  by  my  Senfes. 

Thus  the  Vulgar  fliew  us  fufficiently,  that 
they  diftinguifh  between  Idea  and  Reafon,  when 
they  deny  that  they  have  any  Ideas  of  God,  In- 
finite, Spirit,  and  Subftance.  And  yet  they 
don't  difovvn  all  manner  of  knowledge  of  thofe 
things;  for  they  can't  deny  "but  that  they  have 
certain  Marks  from  the  Similitude  or  Relation 
to,  or  connexion  with,  fenfible  things  where- 
by they  may  diftinguiih  Finite  from  Infinite, 
Subftance  from  Accident,  and  Soul  from  Body. 
When  therefore  they  deny  that  they  have  any 
Ideas  of  them,  they  fhew  that  they  mean  no 
more  than  that  thefe  are  not  yet  made  known 
to  them  by  immediate  fenfation.  For  they  look 
upon  fuch  a  perception  of  a  thing  as  this  only, 
to  be  the  Idea  of  it;  but  reckon  what  they  ac- 
quire by  fimilitude,  proportion  or  connexion, 
no  more  an  Idea,  than  Algebraic  [pedes  are  Ideas 
of  identity,  for  which  they  are  ufed,  and  by 
the  affiftance  of  which  we  know  feveral  things 
of  infinite  quantities  whereof  we  can  have  no 


•  Concerning  the  reality  of  our  fenfitive  Knowledge  in  general,  and  how  far  it  reaches,  fee 
iyicki,  B.  4.  ch.  2.  S-  14-  ^nd  C.  ii.  For  inftances  wherein  the  Senfes  arc  not  to  be  depended 
on,  fee  N.  6.  f  See  Ude^  ElTay,  B.  2.  C.  7.    V  7-  U  Sec  Mr.  Hutehcfot^ti 

(Effay  ont'ic  nature  and  conduft  of  the  Paffions,  ^(.  p.  3.  N  f. 

B  3  Ideas i 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 


N  O  r  E  S. 


Ideas ;  except  we  will  abufe  the  word  IJea  con- 
trary to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind. 

Neither  are  thofe  Men  excufeable  who  fpeak 
otherwife.  They  pretend  indeed  th.it  they  may 
ufe  words  in  their  own  Senfe;  but  they  have 
no  right  to  do  it;  for  wc  are  oblig'd  to  fpeak 
with  the  Vulgar,  fince  they  are  to  prefcribe 
the  Rules  of  Speech  ;  nor  muft  we  expeft  that 
Readers  fhould  change  the  Notions  which  have 
been  joined  to  Words  from  their  Childhood, 
and  approved  by  common  ufe,  at  the  pleafure 
of  every  Writer.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  farther, 
that  thefe  Men  generally  put  a  trick  upon  us, 
for  they  define  Words  in  their  own  Senfe,  but 
in  difcourfing  ufe  them  in  the  common  one  ; 
hence  proceed  quarrels  among  the  learned,  and 
among  the  half-learned,  mofl  pernicious  Er- 
rors: For  hearing  from  celebrated  Writers, 
that  all  Knowledge  is  by  Ideas,  and  taking  an  I- 
dea  with  tlie  Vulgar,  for  a  Mark  imprinted  on 
the  Mind  by  immediate  Senfation,  when  they 
find  no  fjch  Mark  imprefTed  on  their  Minds  by 
Gidy  by  Subllance,  by  lujimte,  by  the  Myjieries 
cf  Religion,  they  deny  that  we  have  any 
knowledge  at  all  of  thefe  things. 

But  we  are  to  obferve,  that  things  are  as  pro- 
perly known  by  Reafcn  as  by  Ideas ;  for  the 
Marks  which  things  imprint  on  the  Mind  by 
immediate  fenfation  are  not  the  things  them- 
felves,  but  the  effeds  of  them  upon  the  Mind 
and  Senfes;  by  thefe  then  we  only  know  what 
Effefts  a  thing  has  upon  us,  not  what  it  is  in 
itfelf.  Now  the  things  which  are  known,  by 
reafon  are  alfo  difcovered  by  their  EfFefts,,  not 
produced  in  us  by  immediate  fenfation,.  but 
in  other  things  that  are  cotmeSled. \w\ih.  what  we 
perceive  by  the  Senfes.  For.inftance;  that  is 
Lucid  which  produces  the-  fenfation  o^  Light  in 
me;  Sweet,  -which,  produces  that  oi Szoeetnefs ; 
But  it  is  the  Sun  which  emits  the  Light,  and 
Gi</ that  made  tht  Sun,  i.  c.  I  know  Light  by 
its  effeft  upon  me;  the  Sun  by  its  effeft  upon 
the  lucid  Body;  God  by  his  efFed  upon  the  Sun. 
Thus  a  Man  knows  his  Father  by  immediate 
fenfation^  or  by  Idea;  the  Man  that  begot  his 
father,  is  his  Grand  father ;  and  the  Perfon  { 
that  begot  his  Grand-Father  is  his  Great-Grand 


Father:  Thefe  then  are  known  hy  rejfcn,  an<i 
as  properly  as  the  Father  is,  tho'  never  feen  by 
him. 

When  therefore  one  asks  the  Gcn''s  of  any 
thing,  he  defircs  the  Perfon  ask'd  to  fhew  fome 
thing  or  things  which  the  Matter  enquired  af- 
ter refembles:  When  he  enquires  into  the  Dif- 
ference, he  defires  to  have  that  fenfation  ih'^wn 
him,  which  the  thing  fought,  if  prefent,  would 
produce  in  him,  and  which  would  diHinguifh 
it  from  any  thing  elfe :  And  if  this  cannot  be 
done,  that  at  lead  a  M(<rk  may  be  produced 
which  is  in  fome  manner  connefted  with  the 
fenfation.  Definitions  therefore  regard  our- 
felves,  and  the  efFecft  which  things  have  upon 
our  Senfes  and  Minds,  When  v/e  have  the 
Charailer  or  Mark  of  any  thing  whereby  the 
fenfation  or  conception  produced  in  us  by  it, 
may  be  diflinguifhed  from  the  fenfuion  or  con- 
ception of  other  things,  and  by  which  we  cer- 
tainly know  for  the  prefent  that  it  is  here,  and 
are  informed  what  to  do  or  expeft  upon  the 
prefence  of  it,  we  know  as  much  of  it,  as  our 
imperfeft  State  requires.  Nay,  fuch  Knowledge 
is  of  much  more  ufe  than  the  Philofophical 
difcovery  of  G(f»///  slTiA  Difference.  He  has  a 
far  more  ufeful  Knowledge  of  a  Man  that 
knows  his  Countenance,  Name,  Temper  and 
Condition,  than  he  that  is  acquainted  with  the 
Principle  o(  Individuation*.  Tho*  therefore  I 
:have  no  Idea  of  Subftance,  nor  can  affign  a  de- 
finition which  will  explain  the  EfTence  of  it; 
yet  if  I  can  produce  a  Mark,  whereby  I  may 
diftinguifli  it  for  the  prefent  from  every  other 
thing  that  I  meet,  I  muft  be  judged  to  know  it 
fufficiently.  Now  fuch  a  Mark  I  think  1  have 
already  given.  (3  ) 

(3.)  I  omit  the  reft  of  our  Author's  long 
Note,  fince  it  contains  only  fome  Arguments 
for  innate  Ideas  ;  which  Hypothefis  is  now 
almoft  univerfally  exploded.  We  may  obferve, 
that  moft  of  his  Reafoning  is  built  on  a  diffe- 
rent Signification  of  the  Word  Idea.  He  will 
ufe  it  in  the  old  Planoiic  meaning  for  a  Species^  " 
Phantajm,  or  Corpareal  Image,  as  it  were  painted 
on  the  Brain:  The  Application  of  the  Mind 
to  which   is  properly  cAVd  Itnagination,  and 

comes 


*  See  Locke' i  Eflay,  B.  2.  C.  27.  ^^ji 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 


N  O  t  E  S. 


comes  far  fliort  of  Knozoledge.  Whereas,  if  we 
take  the  Word  Idea  in  the  more  enlarged  mo- 
dern Senfe,  as  it  commonly  (lands  for  a  Repre- 
fentation  tf  iiny  Thing  in  the  Mind,  or  whatfo- 
ever  is  the  immediate  Objeft  of  the  Unierjiand- 
ing  when  a  Man  perceives  or  thinh  ;  we  can 
have  no  manner  oi Knou; ledge  without  both  the 
aftual  Perception  of  Ideas,  and  alfo  of  their 
connexion -w'wki,  or  repugnancy  to,  each  other. 

According  to  Mr.  Locke,  our  Apprehenfion 
of  the  Exiiience  of  any  Being  (befide  ourfelves) 
which  we  hzv&  fee n,  felt,  or  heard,  may  very 
properly  be  c^W^  fenfitive  Knrjuledge.  But  our 
Affurance  of  the  Exiftence  of  any  other  (except 
God)  which  we  do  not  fo  perceive  by  the  Sen- 
fes,  is  no  Knowledge  at  all,  but  only  Faith, 
Frefumption,  or  Probability,  iffc. 

Our  Author's  Method  of  forming  JJniverfah, 
or  (as  we  commonly  term  them)  abfiraSl  Ideas, 
by  making  the  Idea  of  one  particular  Thing 
Hand  for  all  of  the  fame  Kind,  will  appear  to 
be  wrong,  I  think,  from  this  fingle  Argument, 
viz..  that  according  to  the  foremention'd 
Scheme  JJniverfah,  fuch  as  Animal,  Genus,  ^c. 
would  have  a  real  Exiftence  in  Nature,  where- 
as they  are  evidently  the  Creatures  of  our  own 
Minds,  and  can  exift  no  where  elfe.  We  have 
therefore  nothing  at  all  to  do  with  Analogy  in 
forming  general  Ideas,  we  can  never  come  at 
them  by  fubftituting  one  Particular  for  another, 
but  muft  rather  conceive  them  to  be  made  by 
removing  all  Particularities  of  Exiftence,  and 
leaving  only  what  remains  in  common  ;  ac- 
cording to  Locke'' s  Account  o{  Abflra^ion,  B.  z. 
Cm.  ^.9.  See  alfo  Watts\  Logic,  Pt.  i. 
C.  3.  S-  3-  Of  N.  2. 

By  a  due  Attention  to  the  Nature  of  thcfe 
abftraft  Ideas,  and  our  Way  of  acquiring  them, 
we  fhall  find  that  they  are  all  mere  entiaRationis, 
or  form'd  by  the  Mind  alone,  and  of  courfe 
will  perceive  that  Duration,  Space,  Number, 
{£c.  which  evidently  are  fuch,  can  have  no 
real  Exiftence  in  Nature,  no  proper  Ideatum  or 
ObjeRive  Reality,  nor  confequently  be  a  Proof 
of  any  Thing  befide  that  Power  which  the 
Mind  has  to  form  them,  as  will  be  fhcwn  be- 
low. 


To  return :  Our  Author,  in  the  fame  Place 
alfo  doubly  mifapplies  the  Word  Reflexion,  firft, 
by  making  it  ftand  for  that  particular  Operation 
of  the  Mind  call'd  Reafoning,  wljereas  we  now 
commonly  ufe  it  for  the  internal  Senfe  or  Confci- 
aufnefs  both  of  the  Exiftence  of  the  Mind,  and 
of  all  its  Operations  f:  And,  fecondly,  by 
making  this  Reflexion  or  Reafoning  to  be  W\\}a.- 
out  Ideas;  Whereas,  accordifig  to  the  prefent 
Senfe  of  the  Word  Idea,  'tis  abfurd  to  fuppofe 
the  Mind  to  reafon,  imagine,  apprehend,  or 
think  at  all,    without  them. 

Tho'  the  Novel  ufe  of  thefe  terms  might  (as 
he  here  complains)  occafion  fome  diforder  and 
corifufion  at  their  firft  introduftion,  yet  fmce 
the  Authority  of  Mr.  Locke  has  chang'd  the  cu- 
ftom,  and  happily  determin'd  their  fignification, 
we  have  nothing  to  do  now  with  the  old  one  ; 
but  muft  tike  them  in  his  fenfe  if  we  would  be 
underftood.  And  fmce  it  is  often  impoffible 
for  an  Author  to  find  old  words  exaftly  corre- 
fpondent  to  the  Ideas  which  he  wants  to  ex- 
prefs;  and  very  difficult  to  invent  new  ones: 
Every  Man  is  certainly  at  liberty  to  fix  what 
Senfe  to  his  words  he  pleafes  and  finds  mofl: 
convenient  for  his  purpofe,  tho'  never  fo  diffe- 
rent from  the  derivation  and  original  Senfe  of 
them,  provided  he  at  firft  fufficiently  explains 
thern,  and  fticks  to  that  Explanation  :  Which 
I  think  Mr.  Locke  has  generally  done. 

He  has  alfo  put  it  paft  difpute,  in  oppofition 
to  Des-Cartes  and  others,  that  thefe  Ideas  are 
not  innate  and  pre-exiftent  in  the  Mind,  and  (o 
only  raifed  and  refrefli'd  by  the  prefence  of 
external  Objeftsj  but  that  they  are  entirely 
form'd  and  produced  de  novo  by  them ;  or  at 
Icaft,  that  thefe  Obje£4s  give  occafion  to  the 
forming  of  them ;  that  there  is  no  manner  of 
innate,  (or  as  fome  will  have  it^  ctnnate  Idea, 
no  general  Truth,  or  firft  Principle  inherent 
in  the  Soul  and  created  with  it  (aiid  the  fame  I 
think  may  be  affirm 'd  of  Paffion,  Appetite,  Af- 
feflion,  i^c.')  at  leaft  none  that  ever  appears  in 
our  prefent  State  ^  no  immediate  Objcft  of  the 
Mind  before  external  things  offer  themfclvcs 
to  it,  and  it  perceives,  or  becomes  confcioud 
of  them.  • 

Oiu: 


t  Secicfi^,  B.2.  C.I.  ^.4. 


•  See  hockey  B.  2.  C.  9.  ^.  4, 


s 


Concernlnz 


"How  we 


the  Origin  of  "Evil, 

I  more  than  the  former  was  of  Stihjlance,  but  that  hereby  we  are  ac- 
quainted with  its  prefence,  and  diftinguifli  it  from  every  other  thing  j 
-  as  we  know  a  Man  by  his  Countenance,  and  other  Circumflances: 
Nor  is  it  neceflary  that  thefe  fhould  be  applicable  to  all  Subjlance^  at 
all  times,  and  to  that  alone:  For  it  is  enough  if  for,  this  particular 
Time  and  Occafion  we  know  the  peculiar  Subjiance  we  are  talking  of 
by  them ;  and  fufficiently  diftinguifh  it  from  other  things. 

VII.  It  is  to  be  obferved  farther,  that  when  a  part  of  this  matter 
kr.OTvkVe*^  is  TCmoved  another  fucceeds  into  its  Place,   but  is  not  in   the  fame 
cf  Space.      Place  confident  with  it.     Place  therefore  fecms  to  be  fomething  be- 
yond, befide  and  diftind:  from,  the  Matter  which  it  receives.     For 
as  from  hence  that  Wax  was  fucceflively  capable  of  different  forms, 
.figures,  colours  and  changes,  it  appears  that  fomething  is  in  it  befide, 
-   .  and  different  from  all  thefe,  which  we  call  the  Matter  of  the  Wax  : 

So  in  like  manner  from  hence  that  the  fame  Place  or  Space  receives 
more  and  different  Bodies  and  Particles  of  matter  fuccefUvely,  but 
cannot  admit  more  than  one  at  the  fame  time,  it  will  appear  that  Place 
.or  Space,  is  as  diflindt  from  Matter  or  Body,  as  Wax  is  from  the  Co- 
:k)urs  fucceflively  received  j  nor  is  dependent  on  them  any  more  than 
;Wax  is  on  any  particular  Form. 

VIIL 


NOTES. 


''Our  Author's  chief  Obje£lion  againft  this  is, 
.'that  there  feems  to  be  no  manner  of  relation, 
refemblance  or  connediony  between  the  parts  and 
motions  of  external  Objects ;  and  thole  Ideas, 
which  they  are  faid  to  produce  in  the  Mind. 
But  is  there  any  more  conneAion  between  the 
raffing  and  recalling  an  old  Idea  by  thefe  moti- 
ons, than  producing  a  nezo  one  ?  Is  it  harder 
to  conceive  how  they  may  generate  frejh  Ideas, 
than  how  they  can  excite  the  latent  oneu  [See 
N.7.] 

(4J  By  the  word  Idea  the  Author  feems  here 
to  mean  immediate,  intimate,  perception,  or 
the  fame  with  intuition,  as  he  explains  himfelf 
in  his  Note,  Bi  but  this,  as  we  have  obferv'd, 
is  much  better  explain'd  by  Locke,  who  com- 
prehends all  our  Author's  Notes,  Marks,  Cha- 
ra^ers,  and  Comeptions,  as  well  as  his  Images 


and  Ideas,  under  that  general  word  Idea.  This 
was  nvuch  more  convenient  for  Mr.  Locke''s  Sy- 
llem,  and  the  liberty,  I  apprehend,  ought  to  be 
allovv'd  him  till  a  better  Syflem  be  produced 
on  fome  other  Principles.  But  his,  I  fancy,  wiTl 
yet  be  generally  embraced,  notwithftandirg 
what  the  ingenious  Author  of  the  EJfay  on  the 
Imagination,  and  fome  others,  have  of  late 
advanced  to  the  contrary.  As  for  my  part,  I 
cannot  conceive  what  occafion  we  have  to  quar- 
rel, as  fome  do,  with  the  gre:it  Author  above- 
mention'd  for  not  diflinguilhing  between  an 
Idea  and  a  "Notion,  ice.  when  one  nnd  the  fame 
word  if  we  pleafe  may  eafily  ferve  for  all. 
For  an  account  of  the  different  Opinions  of 
Philofophers  about  Ideas  and  their  Origin, 
fee  the  .word  Idea  in  Chambers'' s  Cyclopae- 
dia* 

(5)Tho' 


^iiM 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil,  ^' 

VIII.  If  therefore  we  fet  afide,  or  annihilate  Mattef\  whatfoever  what  it  is."  "' 
ftill  remains  will  all  belong  to  the  nature  of  Space ;  as  in  the  former 
cafe  when  we  had  fet  afide  the  Properties  of  Wax^  that  which  belong'd 
to  the  Matter  or  fubftance  of  it  remain'd.     If  you  ask  what  that  is  ? 
I  anfwer,  firft  Local  Mobility  is  to  be  fet  afide,  for  that  fcems  peculiar 
to  JVlatter.     Secondly,  an  adual  feparation  of  Parts,  for  what  is  im- 
moveable cannot  be  divided.     Thirdly,   Impenetrability^  or  Solidity, 
for  that  fuppofes  Motion,  and  is  neceflary  to  the  Produdion  of  it.     It 
remains  therefore  that  Space  (^as  we  conceive  it)  be  fomething  extend- 
ed, immoveable,  capable  of  receiving  or  ccntaining  Matter,  and  pene- 
trable by  it.     Tho'  therefore  we  have  not  a  Definition  or  Idea  *  of »/  ^.  jnhis 
Space,  properly  fo  call'd ;  yet  we  can  hereby  fufficiently  diftinguifli  own  Senfe 
it  from  every  other  thing,  and  may  reafon  about  it  as  much  as  we  J^et  Scl^li. 
have  occafion.  (£)  or  N.  4. 

JX.  Thefe 

•'N  0  tlE  S, 


(5)  Tho'  fo  much  nolfe  has  been  made  about 
Space,  which  Leibnitz  juftly  calls  an  Idol  of 
fome  modern  Englijh  Klen ;  and  fo  great  ufe 
has  been  made  of  it  in  demcnftrating  the  di- 
vine Attributes,  in  a  way  which  fome  ftile 
a  Vriorl ;  yet,  I'm  forc'd  to  confefs  that  I  can- 
not poffibly  frame  any  other  Notion  of  it,  than 
either,'  firft,  as  the  mere  negation  or  ahfence  of 
Matter,  or  fecondly,  as  the  ext<;nfion  of  Body, 
confider'd  abftraBly,  or  feparate  from  any  parti- 
cular Body:  As  wbitenefs  without  a  tabite 
Body,  &c.  or  thirdly,  as  a  Subject  or  SubJIta- 
tum  of  that  fame  extenfion  in  abJlraSio^  for  which 
laft  Notion,  See  N.  i6. 

Now  according  to  the  firft  Suppofition  we 
may  indeed  have  a  pojitive  Idea  of  it,  as  well  as 
of  Silence,  Darknefs,  and  many  other  Privati- 
ons ;  as  Mr.  Locke  has  fully  proved  that  we 
have,  and  (hewn  the  Reafon  of  it.  B.  2.  C.  8. 
^.  4.  But  to  argue  from  fuch  an  Idea  of  Space, 
that  Space  itfclf  is  fomething  external,  and  has 
a  real  exiftence,  fcems  altogether  as  good  Senfe 
as  to  fay,  that  becnifc  we  have  a  different  Idea 
of  Darknejs  from  that  of  Light ;  o{  jiUnce  from 
that  oi  found',  of  the  abjence  of  any  thing,  from 
that  of  its  Prcjence ;  therefore  Darknefs,  iffc. 
muft  be  fomething  pofitive  and  different  from 
Light,  t^c.  and  have  as  real  an  Exiftence  as 
Xtght  \\i,%.    And  to  deny  that  we  have  tny 


pofitive  Idea,  or,  which  is  the  very  fame,  any 
Idea  at  all,  of  the  Privations  above-mention 'a 
(For  every  Idea,  as  it  is  a  perception  of  the 
Mind,  muft  necclTarily  be  pofitive,  tho'  it  arife 
from  what  Locke  calls  a  privative  Caufe)  To  de- 
ny, I  (^y,  that  we  have  thefc  Ideas,  will  be  to 
deny  Experience  and  contradid  common  Senfe. 
There  are  therefore  Ideas  and  fimple  ones  too, 
which  have  nothing  ad  extra  correfpondent  to 
them,  no  proper  Ideatum,  Archetype,  or  ob- 
jedive  reality,  and  I  don't  fee  why  that  of  fpace 
may  not  be  reckon' d  one  of  them.  To  fay  that 
Space  muft  have  exiftence,  becaufc  it  has  fome 
properties,  for  inftance,  P met r ability,  or  a  capacity 
of  receiving  Body,  fecms  to  me  the  fame  as  to 
urge  that  darknejs  muft  be  fonuthing  becaufe  it 
has  the  po^ver  or  property  of  receiving  Light ; 
Silence  the  property  oi admitting  Sound ;  and  Ah- 
fence the  property  of  being  fupply'd  by  Prefence^ 
i.  e.  to  afTign  abfolurc  Nega'tions,  and  fuch  as 
by  the  fame  way  of  reafoning,  may  be  apply'd, 
io  nothing,  and  then  call  them  pofitive  proper- 
ties ;  and  fo  infer,  that  the  Chimera  thus  cloath- 
ed  with  them,  muft  needs  be  fomething.  Set- 
ting afide  the  names  of  its  other  pretended  pro- 
perties (which  names  alfo  are  as  merely  nega- 
tive as  the  fuppofcd  properties  to  which  they 
belong)  thofe  that  attribute  extenfion  to  fpace 
feem  not  to  attend  to  the  true  notion  of  that 
C  Property, 


lO 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 


IX.  Thefe  three  conceptions,   namely,  of  fenfible  Qualities  (viz^ 
M9tion,  &c.)  of  Matter  and  Space^  feem  to  be  the  chief  of  thofe 

which 

NOTES. 


Thcfe  three 
Concepti- 
ons, vtz.  of 
fenfible 
Qualities 
(v.  g.  Mo- 
tion, &c.)  of 

Matter  znd     Property,  v?hich,  as  the  School-men  define  it 
/acr,    eem    ^^^^  j^^  ^j^^^  ^^^  jjj.^  ^^^  ^j^j^  definition  try 

chieTof  thofe  [ir"  "/  '^""^  "  toh.vc  partes  extra parta 
,  and  as  fuch,   /.  r.   as  including  parts  (whicli 

J         '    prts,  as  they  differ  in  fituation  from  each  other, 
^  ni.i)(k  have  things  predicated  of  fome  of  them 

different  from  thofe  which  can  be  predicated  of 
others)  it  appears  plainly  inconfxflent  with  their 
own  Idea  of  fimple,  uniform,  indivifible  fpace, 
and  applicable  to  Matter  only  :  And  to  attri 
bute  Extenfion,  or  parts,  to  fpace,  according  t3 
the  firfl  notion  of  it  laid  down  by  us,  will  be 
the  fame  as  to  talk  of  the  extenlion  or  parts  of 
Abfence  ;  of  Privation,  or  6i  rmre  Nothing,  Laft 
ly,  to  ask  if  Space  under  the  fecond  Notion  of 
that  word,  i.e.  as  Extenfion  in  the  Abftraft,  be 
extended,  or  have  parts,  is  apparently  abfurd  ; 
'tis  the  fame  with  that  noted  Queftion  of  the 
Man,  who  being  told  that  to  have  Riches  was 
to  be  rich,  ask'd  if  Riches  then  themfelves  were 
Rich  ?  Well,  but  tho'  we  can't  affign  any  po- 
fitive  or  confiftent  properties  to  fpace,  yet,  fay 
they,  we  have  a  Clear  Idea  of  Dijlame  itfelf, 
and  of  different  dilhnces  one  greater  than  ano- 
ther, which  proves  that  this  is  fomething  real. 
Let  us  examine  our  Idea  of  Dijiance  a  little  far- 
tiier,  and  I  believe,  we  fliall  And  it  to  be  only 
the  Conception  of  a  mere  pojjibility  for  a  line 
of  fuch  a  czTtsXn  length,  or  a  Body  of  fuch  di- 
menfiens,  to  be  contained  between  two  other  Bo- 
dies, by  mentally  applying  a  material  meafure  of 
fo  many  inches,  feet,  ^V.  to  the  fuppofed  di- 
Jfame  between  thefe  two  bodies;  of  which  ma- 
terial  meafure,  and  of  its  increafablenefs,  we  have, 
indeed,  a  clear  Idea,  as  alfo  of  the  poffibility 
ci  its  being  placed  between  thefe  two  bodies, 
tho'  at  prefent  it  be  not  fo  placed :  And  this 
feeras  to  me  to  be  all  the  conception  or  Idea, 
that  we  can  poffibly  frame  about  it.  Well,! 
then,  according  to  the  firft  Suppofition,  Space' 
will  be  mere  non  entity,  or  nothing,  /•  <?.  no-' 
thing  can  be  affirmed,  but  every  thing  deny'd! 
of  it :  According  to  the  fecond,  it  will  be  on-| 
ly  ixk.abjlra£l  Idea  form'd  in  the  mind  from  a 


property  peculiar  to  mDtter>.  which  property- 
abftrafled  in  Idea  cannot  itfelf  admit  of  any 
other  properties,  nor  be  applicable  to  the  Di- 
vine Nature,  nor,  capable  of  pofitive  Infinity  in 
any  refpcft. 

"  li Space,  {zy%  "Dr.  Cudzoorth,  be  concluded 
"  to  be  nothing  elfe  but  t\it -Ext enjien  and  Di- 
<■*  Jla7i:e  of  body,  or  matter  confidered  in  general 
"  (without  refpe£l  to  this  or  that  particular 
"  body)  and  abftraSlly  in  order  to  the  Con- 
"  ception  oi  Motion,  and  the  mcnfuration  of 
"  things,  then  do  we  fay  that  there  appeareth 
"  no  fuffieient  grounds  for  this  pefitive  Infinity 
"  of  Space,  we  being  certain  of  no  more  than 
"  this,  that  be  the  World,  or  any  figurate  bo- 
"  dy,  never  fo  great,  it  is  not  impoffible  but 
"  that  it  might  ftill  be  greater  and  greater 
'«  without  end.  Which  Indefinite  increafab/f- 
"  nefs  of  body  and  fpace  feems  to  be  milhken 
"  for  a  pofitive  infinity  thereof.  Whereas  for^ 
"  this  very  Reafon,  becaufe  it  can  never  be  fo, 
^'  great,  but  that  more  magnitude  may  ftill  be- 
"  added  to  it,  therefore  it  can  never  be  pofi- 
"  tively  Infinite. 

"  To  conclude  therefore,  by  Space  without 
"  the  finite  World,  is  to  be  undcdtood  nothing, 
"  but  the  poffibility  of  body  farther  and  far- 
"  ther,  without  end,  yet  fo  as  never  to  reach. 
"  to  Infinity.  " 

Hence  appears  the  Weaknefs  of  that  common 
Argument  urg'd  by  GaJJendus,  Dr.  Clarke,  and. 
Raphfon,  for  the  abfohite  infinity  of  Space,  viz* 
From  the  impoffibility  of  fetting  bounds  or  //, 
w;Vjtoit;  fince  that,  fay  they,  would  be  to- 
fuppofe  Space  bounded  by  fomething  which  //- 
felf  occupies  Space,  or  elfe  by  nothing,  both: 
which  are-contradiftions. 

Which  Argument,  either  firft  of  all  fuppofes 
that  Space  is  really  fome  thing,  or  fome  pofitive 
Quality  ;  which  wants  to  be  proved  :  Or  elfc; 
improperly  applies  bounds  and  bounders  to 
mere  non-entity,  or  bare  poffibility;  which 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  Idea  of  Bounds. 


*'  Xrue  Intell,  Syfim,  £.  644  &  ^66,. 


^ 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 

which  we  have  from  without,  and  fo  natural  to  us  that  there  is  no  rea- 
fonable  Man  but  perceives  them  in  himfelf.  There  are  fome  who  deny 

C  2    .  that 

N  0  "T  E  S. 


II 


If  therefore  we  take  Space  in  the  firft  Notion 
laid  down,  then  its  unboundednefs,  will  (as 
Dr.  Cudworth  fays)  fignify  nothing  but  the 
poffibility  of  Body  farther  and  farther  with 
out  end  ;  according  to  which  Senfe,  Let  ur 
ilate  their  ufual  Quetlion  in  other  Words,  and 
the  great  fallacy  and  impropriety  of  it  will  ap- 
pe«r.  What  is  there,  fay  they,  beytnd  this 
Space?  You  muft  either  imagine  more  fuch 
Space  or  nothing.  What  is  there,  fay  we,  be- 
yond this  pojjibility  oi'Exiftence  ?  You  muft  ei- 
ther imagine  nure  iuch.  pojjibility  oi  ExiJIence  or 
m^xt  nothing,  i.e.  non  Exijlence.  What  Confe- 
quence  can  poffibly  be  drawn  from  fuch  an  odd 
kind  of  Argumentation  ? 

But  if  Space  be  taken  in  the  fecohd  Senfe, 
i.  e.  as  Extenfion  \w  ahjirailo,  then  the  meaning 
of  our  not  being  able  to  fet  bounds  to  it  will  only 
be,  that  we  have  a  power  of  enlarging  our  ab- 
.  ftradl  Idea  in  Infinitum^  or  that  we  always  find, 
in  our  felves  the  fame  ability  to  add  to,  or  re- 
peat it,  and  if  we  always  find  that  we  can  add, 
wefhall  never  find  that  we  cannot  add,  which 
(as  a  very  eminent  Writer  on  the  Subjeft  ob 
lerves)  is  all  the  Myftery  of  the  Matter,  and 
all  that  can  be  underllood  by  infinite  Space. 
But  it  is  farther  urg'd  that  there  m\ift  be  fome 
thing  more  in  the  prefent  Cafe  ;  for  we  fina 
not  only  a  Power  of  enlarging  the  Idea,  but  find  tt 
itnpojfible  to  fet  bounds  to  the  thing ;  whereas^  wc 
can  enlarge  the  Idea  of  Matter  to  infinity,  but  can 
alfo  jet  bounds  to  the  thing  it  f elf.  In  anfwer  to 
the  firft  part  of  this  Obje£lion  'tis  ask'd.  What 
thing,  1  pray  you,  but  the  thing  in  your  own 
mind,  that  is,  the  Idea  ?  Prove  it  to  be  thing; 
■and  then  we'll  enquire  whether  it  has  bounds 
or  not;  but  to  fay  the  thing  is  infinite  or 
boundlefs,  before  you  have  prov'd  it  to  exift, 
or  to  be  a  thing,  is  too  large  a  ftep  to  take. 
The  above-mention'd  excellent  Writer  folves 
the  Difficulty  arifing  from  the  fecond  part  of 
theObjeftion  by  another  parallel  Cafe.  "  When 
*'  I  confider  the  number  of  the  Stars,  I  can  go 
**  numbering  on  in  my  thoughts  ftill  more  and 
"  more  Stars  in  Infinitum,  But  I  can  alfo  fet 
**  Ijounds  to  ihcm,  can  fuppofc  their  number 


finite,  but  to  number  itfelf  I  can  fet  no 
bounds.  Yet  what  is  Number  ?  Nothing 
but  an  Atftraft  Idea,  nothing  ad  extra,  _3Hd 
to  fay  to  that  number  is  infinite,  comes  only 
to  this,  thai  we  cam  fet  no  bounds  to  our 
Faculty  of  Numbering,  it  being  always  as 
eafy  to  add  to  a  thoufand,  or  a  Million,  one 
more,  i^c.  as  to  One.  Well  then,  to  fet 
bounds  to  number  in  the  abftraft,  ia  to  fet 
bounds  to  the  Faculty  itfelf,  and  to  deny  that 
it  is  in  my  Power  to  add,  when  I  plainly 
perceive  that  I  can  ;  and  fo  is  a  direft  Coa- 
tradiftion.  But  as  to  the  Number  of  Stars, 
or  Hairs,  or  Men,  or  any  thing,  I  can  fet 
bounds  to  that,  without  any  contradiftion, 
becaufe  it  ftill  leaves  me  in  poffeflion  of  the 
power  of  numbering,  which  I  find  I  have  ; 
and  which  does  not  require  any  fubjeft  ai 
jxtrn,  but  may  go  -on  independent  of  any, 
and  indifferent  to  all.  Now  to  apply  this  to 
other  cafes :  the  Mind  finds  in  itfelf  the  far 
culty  of  enlarging  and  extending  its  Idea  of 
extenfion.  'It  can  apply  it  to  Matter,  or  can 
let  it  alone  ;  can  fuppole  Matter  itifinitely  ex- 
panded, or  can  fet  bounds  to  it :  But  to  fet 
bounds  to  all  Extenfion,  as  well  imaginary 
as  real,  is  cramping  the  Faculty,  is  denying 
it  the  power  of  enlarging,  which  is  always 
prefent  to  the  mind,  and  which  Ihe  can  ne- 
ver lofe ;  and,  in  a  word,  is  a  contradiftion. 
Any,  either  imaginary,  or  real,  Subjeft  is 
fufficient  for  the  mind  to  exercife  its  Facul- 
ties upon;  and  fo  if  you  either  fuppofe  God 
or  Matter,  or  Space  to  be  infinitely  extend- 
ed, it  is  equally  fatisfied  with  any.  All 
that  ftie  requires  is  that  ftie  may  be  able  to 
enlarge  the  Idea  of  Extenfion.  But,  if  you 
take  from  her  Extenfion  itfelf,  that  is  the 
Idea  of  it,  and  the  Power  of  adding  to  it, 
you  deprive  her  of  her  Faculty,  and  deny 
her  a  power  which  (he  finds  ihe  has.  In  a 
word,  wc  can  fet  bounds  to  any  thing  that 
ftill  leaves  the  power  of  enlajging  or  ex- 
tending infinitely,  as  we  find,  wc  always 
ftrn :  and  if  we  would  fpeak  ftriftly,  It  is 
not  number  that  is  infinite  nor  extenfion  infi- 

•'  nite. 


1 7  Concerning  the  Origin  of  RviL 

that  Space  is  any  thing  diflindl  from  Matter ,  nor.  is  it  much  to  our 

purpofc 

NOTES. 


**  nite,  wfcich  are  nothing  but  «rf/Vff/ abftradTed 
**  from  things:  But  the  mind  of  Man  is  able 
"  to  proceed  numbering  or  extending  infi- 
*'  nhtly,  that  is,  without  ever  coming  to  any 
"  Stop  or  Bounds.  For  to  fet  bounds  is  to 
**  deny  and  deftroy  the  Faculty  itfelf:  if  it 
"  could  not  always  do  it,  it  could  not  do  it  at 
"  all.  He  that  can  add  one  to  one,  as  often 
"  as  he  will,  can  never  find  an  end  of  num- 
"  bcring,  nor  he  tkit  can  double  an  Inch  as 
"  often  as  he  will,  find  an  end  of  enlarging  ; 
'  **  itisall  nothing  more  than  repeuing  one  of 
**  the  eafieft  operations  or  exercifes  of  the 
*'  mind,  and  it  will  always  be  a  contradiflion 

•'  for  any  rational  Mrnd  to  want  ir. The 

•*  Cafe  being  plainly  thus,  I  thin-k  it  fhould 
•*  not  be  ask'd,  why  a  Man  cannot  fet  bounds 
*'  to  Number  or  Extenfion,  but  how  he  comes 
*'  to  have  the  Faculty  of  Counting  and  Re 
*'  peating,  which  is  really  tantamount  to  the 
**  other,  and  vvhat  it  ultimately  refolves  into. 
"  And  then,  1  fuppofe,  the  Anfwer  is  very 
**  eafy,  and'we  need  not  go  to  the  utmoft 
**  Limits  of  the  World  to  enable  us  to  refolve 
«  the.Riddle. -.-  .       '^ 

"  I  cannot  but  foiileto  obfcrve  how  grofly 
**  we  are.impofed  upon  by  Words  ftanding  for 
**  abftraft  Ideas,  for  want  of  confidering  how, 
**  and  upon  what  Occafions,  thefe-  abftradl 
"Ideas  w'ere  invented  for  the  Help- of 'weak 
**  and  narrow  Conceptions,  and  have  been  ufed 
*'  fo  long  till  they  are  thought  to  ftand  for  real 
**-  Things.  - — —  I  forgot  to  add,  that  ,we  find 
•'much'  the  fame  Cafe  with"  reipe£l  to  the  Z)/'- 
**  vijibility  of  Extenfion,  as  in  regard  to  the 
*'•.  other..  Fpr  when  we  h»vc  mentally  divided 
**  our  imaginary  Space  into  I o,  20,  or  30 
"  parts,  we  are  not  in  the  leaft  hinder'd  from 
**  dividing  and  ■  fubdividing  every  part,  as 
**  often  and  as  long  as  we  plcafe-  For  by  this 
*'  Artifice  o^the  Mind,  Divifibility  is  brought 
"  under  Addition,  and  there  is  no  End  of  that. 
•*  We  can  always  be  adding  to  the  number  of 
*'  divifible  parts  one  way,  as  well  as  to  eh- 
"  Urged  parts  the  other.  They  are  both  bnt 
*'  the  fame  .work  of  the  Mind.  And  hence 
**  -come  many  notable  demonftrations  of  the 


'•  Dknjihility  of  Extenfitn  (and  fometimes,- 
"  Matter)  in  infinitum:  the.Englifh  of  all 
"  which  is  no  more  than  this,  that  whenever, 
"  we  begin  to  add,  we  know  not  when  to 
"  have  done„  becaufe  its  nothing  elfc  but  do- 
'*  ing  the  fame  over  and  over  again,  and  we 
"  do  not  lofe,  but  rather  improve,  our  Facul- 
"  ties  by  the  Exercife  of  them 
\  "  To  conclude  this  Point:  I  hope  it  fufH- 
"  ciently  appears  that  the  Power  the  Mindhaa^- 
"  of  adding  and  repeating  does  abundantly 
**  account  foe  our  not  being  able  to  fet  bounds 
"  to  Ideal  Extenfion^  any  more  than  to  Mw ><>.••, 
'*  in  the  abllradi,  or  to  Divifibility,  all  arifing 
"  from  one  and  |he  fame  Principle,  and  owing 
"  to  the  fime  Caufe:" 

i  This,  I  think,  is  a  folid  and  ample  confuta- 
tion of  the  Argument  drawn  from  the  Idea  of 
Space  and  its  imaginary  infinity.  We  fliall  onl/ 
add  a  Word  or  two  to  fiiew  that  Duration,  as 
well  as  Space,  Number^  and  all  ^antity ;  any 
thing  which  can  be  confidered  only  byway  of 
parts,  or  in  fucceffion  ;  is  abfolutely  repugnant. 
to,  or  incapable  of,  true  pofitive  infinity  irt, 
any  refped.  Now  by  a  pofitive,  or  Metaphy- 
fica'.  Infinite  we  al>X^ays  mean  that  which  is  ab- 
folutely PerfeU  \ti  its  kind,  which  cannot  ad- 
mit oi  Addition,  or  Imreafe.  'Tis  an  Idea  of  a 
certain  Quality  in  the  AhftraB,  which  has  no 
mixture  of  the  contrary  Quality  in  it,  no  fai- 
lure or  defied  :  and  which  therefore  is  our  Stan- 
dard to  which  we  always  refer,  and  by  which 
we  try,  all  imperfeftions,  all  mix'd  or  finite 
Qualities,  which  are  for  this  reafon  called  im- 
perfcft,  becaufe  they  fall  fhort  of  our  original 
Standard,  and  are  properly  negations  of  it : 
Confequently  our  Idea  of  Perfeiiien  muft  be  a 
pofitive  one,  and  prior  fo  that  of  ImperfeSlion  r 
as  will  appear  from  Cudzvarth  cited  in  X e, 
where  the  Reader  may  find  a  full  account  of 
this  pofitive  Infinity,  and  how  we  get  the  Idea 
of  it,  and  are  able  to  diftinguifh  it  from  that 
negative  one  explain'd  by  Mr.  Locke,  which  is 
frequently  confounded  with  it. 

To  return.  If  then  a  Metaphyfical  Infinity 
means  perfeii,  or  that  to  which  nothing  can  be, 
added,  'tis  plain  that  Duration^  Number,  anc^ 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

purpofc  whether  it  be  or  no :   yet  we  cannot  without  offering  VIo- 

C  3  lence 

NOTES. 


H 


tH  Quantity,  the  very  Nature  and  Idea  of 
which  includes  perpetual  Increafeablenefs  ox  Ad- 
diiility,  mull  be  eficntially  incapable  of  this 
abfolute  or  pofitive  Infinity,  in  like  manner  as 
Cudzvorth  has  fhevvn  of  Space  and  Body  in  the 
Paflage  referr'd  to  above.  Farther,  if  we 
attend  to  the  Notion  of  an  Infinite  Series,  and 
take  a  view  of  the  manifold  Abfurdities  which 
accompany  it,  in  any  manner  of  conception 
(from  which  abfurdities  we  draw  our  only 
Proof  of  zfirfi  Caufe,  or  God)  we  fhall  be  ne- 
ceffarily  led  to  exclude  from  Infinity  all  fuch 
things  as  exift  Seriatim,  or  mull  be  conceiv'd  as 
confilli'ig  in,  and  compofed  of,  fuccejfwe  parts, 
i.  e.  fuch  as  Duration,  Number,  Space,  Motion, 
Magnitude,  i^c.  all  which,  when  faid  to  be 
iiifinite,  are  nothing  but  fo  many  infinite  Series, 
and  therefore  liable  to  the  fame  abfurdities  ; 
as  the  abovemention'd  Author  has  demonftrated 
of  them  altogether.  Inteii.  Syfem,  p.  643,  l^c 
and  of  M<?//c»  in  particular,  p.  843.  The  fame 
is  Ihewn  of  Duration  or  Time,  by  Dr.  Bent  ley, 
Boyle'' s  Le£i.  Serm.  3.  p.  104,  105,  5th  Edit. 
Where  fpeaking  of  Infinite  Generations  of  Men 
fuppofed  to  be  already  paft  ^and  the  Argument 
is  the  very  fame  in  Years  or  Ages)  "  What- 
"  focver,  fays  he,  is  now  paft,  was  once  adlu- 
"  ally  prefent ;  fo  that  each  of  thofe  infinite 
«'  Generations,  was  once  in  its  turn  aftually 
«•  prefent,  therefore  all  except  one  Generation 
"  were  once  future  ;  and  not  in  being,  which 
•♦  deftroys  the  very  Suppofition :  For  either  that 
•*  one  Generation  muft  itfelf  have  been  infi- 
•*  nite,  which  is  nonfenfe  ;  or  it  was  the  finite 
*•  beginning  of  infinite  Generations,  between 
"  itfelf  and  us,  that  is,  infinity  terminated  at 
*♦  both  ends,  which  is  nonfenfe  as  before.  A- 
«*  gain.  Infinite  paft  Generations  of  Men  have 
'*  been  once  aftually  prefent,  there  may  be 
"  fome  one  man,  fuppofe  then,  that  was  at 
"  infinite  diftance  from  us  now,  therefore  that 
"  man's  fon  likewife,  4P  years  younger,  fup- 
'♦  pofe,  than  his  father,  was  either  at  infinite 
'*  diftance  from  us,  or  at  finite  :  if  that  Son 
"  too  was  at  infinite  diftance  from  us,  then  one 
**  infinite  is  longer  by  40  years  than  another; 
"which  isabfurd:  if  at  finite,  then  40  years 


**  added  to  finite  makes  it  infinite,  which  is  as 
"  abfurdas  the  other.  " 

Thefc  and  a  great  many  more  Arguments  of 
the  fame  kind  occur  in  Sir  M.  Hales,  Primitive 
Origination  of  Mankind,  ^  i.  c.  4.  and  Stil- 
lingfieefs  Origines  Sacrae,  B.  3.  C.  i-  prop.  7, 
8.  See  alfo  the  Confutation  of  an  Infinite  Se- 
ries offucceffive  Beings  in  the  beginning  of 
N.  1 3.  and  Xb.  ('How  this  Reafoning  is 
confiftent  with  the  Eternity  of  God,  and  what 
the  true  meaning  of  that  Attribute  is,  fee  N.  1 8. 
X.  c.  or  Dr.  Bentley''s  3d  Sermon  at  Biyle^s  Lec- 
ture, prop.  I.  or  A.  Bp  King's  Sermon  on  Pre- 
deftination,  i^()  The  like  is  Ihewn  of  iV««r^?r 
and  z\l  ^/antity,  by  the  ingenious  Author  of 
the  Imttartial  Enquiry  into  the  exiflence  and  na-- 
ture  of  God,  p.  24,  ^c.  •'  If  any  Number 
"  be  abfolutely  or  infinitely  great,  it  can  be 
"  for  no  other  reafon  than  becaufe  'tis  abfolute-. 
**  ly  or  in  its  very  nature  incapable  of  increafe 
**  without  an  abfolute  contradidlion.  But  the 
'*  very  nature  of  all  Quantity  infers  on  the 
"  contrary  a  necelTify  of  the  increafe  of  its 
"  Greatnefs  on  the  fuppofition  of  the  leaft  ad- 
"  dition  :  For  fince  no  Quantity  is  more  or. 
"  lefs  fuch,  or  poflefles  more  or  lefs  of  the 
"  nature  of  Quantity,  than  another,  it  fol- 
"  lows,  that  all  Quantities  being  of  the 
"  fame  general  Nature  muft  feverally  bear  a 
"  proportion  to  each  other.  For  example, 
"  that  can  be  no  Unit  which  by  the  addition 
**  of  an  Unit  will  not  become  two:  and  by 
"  parity  of  reafon,  that  is  no  Million  which 
"  by  the  addition  of  a  fingle  Unit  will  not 
"  increafe  to  the  greatnefs  of  a  Million  and  an 
"  Unit.  For  if  it  bcbut  a  Million  after  the 
"  Addition  of  an  Unit,  'tis  plain  it  muft  be- 
*'  fore   that    Addition  have  been   lefs  than   a 

"  Million  by  an  Unit The  like  may  be 

"  faid  of  all  other  Quantities,    p.  25.  " 

The  Learned' Dr.  C/4ri^  endeavours  to  evade 
all  thefe  Arguments  about  Parts,  ilfc.  by 
denying  that  any  Number  of  Years,  Days, 
and  Hour* ;  or  of  Miles,  Yards,  or  Feet,  6^r. 
"  can  be  confider'd  as  any  aliquot,  or  (onfii- 
"  tuent  parts  of  infinite  Time  or  Space,  or  be 
'♦  compared  at  all  with  it,  or  bear  any  kind' 

«  oft 


fif  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 

knee  to  our  Underftandings,  deny  but  that  the  conception  of  S^pace 
is  diftindt  from  the  conception  of  Matter, 

SEC  T. 

SN  0  T  E  S. 


■  **  of  proportion  to  it,  or  be  the  foundation  of 
**  any  Argument  in  any  Qucftion  concerning 
"  it.  "  Demtn/r.  of  the  Divine  Attr.  p.  37, 
38.  jth  Edit.  But  does  not  this  loolc  foroe- 
tning  like  avoiding  one  great  difficulty  by 
admitting  a  greater  ?  For  how  do  we  come 
at  our  confufed  Idea  of  infinite  Quantity  but  by 
firft  having  a  clear  Idea  of  fome  certain  part  of 
that  Quantity,  xn  Space,  For  inftance,  of  fuch 
a  flated  Length,  as  a  FmI  ;  in  Time,  of  an  Hour, 
i^c.  and  then  by  doubling,  trebling,  or  any 
way  multiplying,  'that  fame  Idea  as  long  as  we 
pleafe,  and  ftill  findin  as  much  room  for,  or 
poffibility  of,  multiplying  it  as  we  did  when 
we  began:  "After  the  utmoft  enlargement  of 
"  that  Idea  w«  can  poffibly  make,  we  find 
*'  no  more  reafon  to  flop,  nor  are  one  Jot 
*'  nearer  the  End  of  fuch  enlargement,  than 
**  we  were  when  we  firft  fet  out.  Locke  B.  2. 
c.  17.  :^  3.  ~Bat  does  this  Idea  of  Infinite 
(which  feems  to  be  the  only  one  the  Doftor 
ever  thought  of  j  when  applied  to  Timj  or  Space, 
alter  the  very  nature,  ejfence,  and  idea  of  that 
Time  and  Space  ?  Don't  we  ftill  confider  it  as 
an  infinity  of  the  fame  Time  and  Space;  or  as 
confifting  in  a  continual  addibility  oi  fuch  por- 
tions of  Time  and  Space;  or  as  a  Whole  (if 
that  word  did  not  imply  limitation)  made  up  of 
numberlefs  fuch  parts  of  time  and  fpace  as  are 
of  the  fame  kind  with  thefe  hours  and  feet  ? 
To  fay  that  infinite  Space  has  no  parts,  is  (as 
Leibnitz  urges  in  his  fourth  Letter  to  Dr.  Clarke 
N*.  1 1.  p.  99.)  "  to  fay  that  it  does  not  confift 
**  of  finite  Spaces  ;  and  that  infinite  Space 
"  might  fubfift,  tho'  all  finite  fpaces  fhould  be 
"  reduced  to  nothing.  It  is  as  if  one  fhould 
"  fay,  in  the  Cartefian  fuppolition  of  a  mate 
*•  rial,  extended.  Unlimited  World,  that 
•'  fuch  a  World  might  fubfift,  tho"  all  the  Bo- 
"  dies  of  which  it  confifts,  fhould  be  reduced 
*'  to  nothing."  'Tis  therefore  impoffible  to 
conceive,  that  hours  and  feet,  i^c.  fhould  not 
be  aliquot  parts  of  infinite  Time  and  fpace,  and 
that  thefe  parts  fhould  not  bear  fome  kind  of 
Proportion  to  this  Infinity.  Thefe  parts  in- 
deed will  never  reach  our  fofiiive  abjtlute  Infi- 


nity (i.e.  that  to  which  nothing  can  poflibly 
be  added)  becaufe  they  include  a  perpetual  ad- 
dibility, as  we  obferv'd,  which  is  call'd  their 
Infinity,  and  which  is  a  direft  contndiftion  to 
what  we  call  a  pofitive  Infinite  :  And  therefore 
pofitive  Infinity  apply'd  to  them  is  very  wrong 
apply'd,  and  a  pofitive  infinity  of  Matter,  num- 
ber, time,  fpace,  any  quantity  or  quality  that 
confifts  of  parts,  or  muft  be  confider'd  in  fuc- 
cefGon,  /.  e.  to  which  this  negative  infinite,  and 
this  only,  is  and  muft  be  apply'd,  are  all  con- 
tradidtions.  Now  inftead  of  anfwering  this 
Argument  againft  the  abfolute  Infinity  of  Time 
and  Spice,  Dr.  Clarke  firft  of  all  fufpofes  that 
time  and  fpace  are  abfolutely  infinite,  and  the« 
becaufe,  according  to  this  our  way  of  conceiv- 
ing infinity,  (w^ich  yet  is  the  only  way  we 
have  of  conceiving  it  in  thefe  things)  they 
could  not  pofCbly  be  infinite:  Reargues  that 
we  muft  not  confider  them  in  this  way,  namely 
as  if  their  parts  had  any  relation  at  all  to  their 
Infi.nity.  But  fhould  not  the  Argument  rather 
be  revers'd,  and  the  confequence  of  it  ftand 
thus  ?  This  is  our  only  way  of  conceiving  any 
infinite  applicable  to  thefe  Things,  but  this  way 
we  cannot  conceive  thefe  to  be  pcfitively  infi- 
nite (or  pofitive  Infinity  cmnot  be  apply'd  to 
thefe)  without  a  contradiftion  ;  therefore  we 
cannot  at  all  concfive  thefe  to  bt  pofitively 
Infinite  without  a  contr.^didion,  or  therefore 
thefe  are  not  pofitively  infinite. 

There  is  indeed  a  certain  ufe  of  the  term  in- 
finite among  Mathematicians,  where  this  rea- 
foning  of  Dr.  Clarke"^  might  be  admitted,  but 
that  is  only  where  they  confider  Quantities,  re- 
latively, and  not  abfolutely,  and  therefore  that 
can  have  no  place  where  we  are  confidering 
real  Exiflcnces.  Thus  when  Geometricians 
fay  that  one  Quantity  is  infinitely  lefs  than  a- 
nother,  they  mean  that  their  infinitely  fmall 
Quantity  is  no  aliquot  part  of,  bears  no  pro- 
portion to,  or  cannot  be  compared  with  the 
other  ;  but  proportion  is  (nothing  real  but) 
purely  relative,  and  therefore  the  term  infinite 
apply 'd-here  muft  be  fo  too.  Thus  for  inftance, 
the  Angle  of  Contaft  made  by  a  Curve  and  its 

Tangent 


Cancerning  the  Origin  of  Evil 


15 


S  E  C  T.     11. 

Of  the  Enquiry  after  the  Firfl  Caufe. 

I.  Suppofing  thefe  three,  'viz.  Motion ^  Matter,  and  Space,  we  are  in  An  enquiry 
the  next  place  to  examine  whether  they  be  of  theinielves,  or  of  fome-  ^""ceming 
thing  elfe?  If  of  themfelves,  the  thing  is  done,  and  we  are  to  enquire  Matter^'and 
no  farther  about  it.     For  chofe  things  that  exift  by  Nature  are  caufcs  ^P-^^^ '  ^^e- 
of  Exijience  to  themfelves,  /.  e.  do  not  (land  in  need  of  any  external  la^f  thenv^' 
caufe  i  if  they  depend  on  fomething  elfe,  there  will  be  a  queftion  about  Selves. 
that  alfo,  what  it  is,  and  wfiat  are  its  properties. 

II.  We  muft  prefume  that  all  our  conceptions  of  fknple  Obje6ts    We  are  to 
without  us  are  true,  that  is,  reprefent  the  things  as  God  would  have  ^°^  °^^ 
them  known  to  us,  except  we  elfewhere  difcover  fome  Fallacy  or  Pre^  thingTwh^- 
judice  adhering  %o  them.  (6)  For  we  can  judge  of  things  no  otherwife  f^er  they  ex- 
than  from  our  Conceptions.    Nor  are  we  to  feek  for  any  other  ^^^^o^'^^'"- 


NOTES. 


Tangent  is  infinitely  lefs  than  any  reftilincar 
Angle,  /.  e.  bears  no  proportion  to  it,  is  no 
Hicafure  of  it,  or  cannot  any  ways  be  compared 
with  it. —  If  this  were  not  the  fenfe  of  Ma- 
thematicians here,  I  cannot  fee  how  there  coald 
be  a  diiFerence  of  Infinites  amongft  them,  but 
'tis  well  known  that  they  have  infinitely  little 
quantities,  which  yet  are  infinitely  great  ones, 
i,  e.  with  refpeft  to  other  Quantities  :  And 
thus  they  may  have  an  infinite  fucceflion  of  in- 
creafing  quantities,  every  one  of  which  fhall 
be  infinitely  greater  than  the  other  that  is  low- 
er in  the  ferics:*  But  all  this  is  nothing  toab- 
folute  Metaphyfical  Infinite  which  cannot  be 
confidcr'd  in  that  manner,  and  therefore  what 
relates  to  the  former  infinites  cannot  be  the 
foundation  of  any  Argument  concerning  this. 
The  equivocal  uk  of  the  word  Infinite  in  thefe 
different  fenfes  by  jumbling  Mathematics  and 
Metaphyfics  together,  has,  I  believe,  occafion'd 
mod  of  the  Confufton  attending  Sobjcdtf  of 
this  kind. 


Fallacy. 


,  ^      felves,  or 
Criterion  require  a 

Caufe,  from 
our  fimple 

(6.)  Thus  in  Sight  we  find  the  A/^  and/z.  ^henThere"* 
of  a  vifible  objeft  are  very  much  varied  upon  jj  ^^  ground 
us  according  to  its  diftance,  and  the  fituation  of  ^^  fufneft  a 
the  place  from  whence  the  profpeft  is  taken.  -    -  ^ 
When   the  Piduie  of  Objefts   being  prick'd 
out  by  the  Pencils  of  rays  upon  the  Retina  of  the 
Eye  do  not  give  the  true  Figure  of  thofe  Ob- 
jects (as  they  not  always  do,  being  diverfely 
projefted,  as  the  Lines  proceeding  from  the  fe- 
veral  points  happen  to  fall   upon  that  concave 
fur/ace)  this,  tho'  it  might  impofe  upon  a  Being 
that  has  no  hc\x\ty  Juperior  to  fenfe,  does  not 
impofe  upon  our  Reafon,  which  knows  how  the 
appearance  is  altcr'd,  and  why.     Reafon  may  be 
apply'd  to  over-rule  and  corrcft  fenfe  in  this 
and  the  like   cafes.  ■  Wollafion  Re/.  Nat.  delin. 
p.  54,  l^c.  fee  more  impofuions  of  this  kind 
in  LQcke"^  Effay,  B.  2.  C  9.  §.  8,  9. 

(fi  )  They  who  look  for  any  other  Criterion 
of  Truth  or  Certainty  lofe  their  Labour;  they 
who  fay  that  a  Clear,  difiinSl,  or  cleKrminate  Idea 
18  the  Criterion,  are  never  the  nigher,  for  the 


Qijefti<  n.; 

*  Vid.  Ntvjttn  Princ.  Math.  L.  i.  ^.  i.  Keil  latrod.  sd  ver.  Phyf.  h-  3-  and  Hayes's  Fluxions  ad. 
}i:incip« 


li  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

Criterion  of  Truth  than  that  a  Conception  of  any  thing  offered  to  the 

Mind 

^  NOTES, 


Qucftion  returns,  viz.:  by  what  Criterion  are 
we  certain  that  this  Idea  is  clear,  diJiiaS  or  de- 
terminate, or  that  this  is  to  be  look'd  upon  as 
the  Criterion  ;  aad  fo  on  in  infinitum  :  we  muft 
therefore  ftop  fome where,  and  determine  of  the 
lirtelleSl,  as  of  the  fenfes^  that  an  Objctft  by  its 
prefence,  according  as  it  is  reprefentcd  to  the 
Mind,  whether  it  be  (Uar,  or  obfcure,  diftin£l  or 
eonfufed;  whether  it  be  determinate  ox  indeter- 
minate, efteftually  determines  thst  to  exert  the 
aft  it  fhould  exert,  and  that  there  is  no  need  of 
any  Criterion.  For  inftance,  if  any  one  would 
be  certain  whether  the  San  fhines,  whether  the 
Xiight  be  clear,  or  obfcure,  he  need  ufe  no  o- 
ther  Criterion  befide  his  Eyes,  let  him  open 
them,  and  whether  Tie  will  or  no,  he'll  per- 
ceive whether -it  Ihines -or  not,  and  alfo  what 
that  Light  is,  nor  can  he  otherwife  avoid  per- 
ceiving this,  and -being  certain  of  it,  than  by 
fliuttlng  or  turning  away  his  Eyes.  The  fame 
Method  is  to  be  obferved  in  IntelleSlitals.  Let 
him  that  wants  to  know  whether  any  Propofi- 
tion  be  true  or  falfe,  apply  it  to  his  Mind,  with 
the  Rcafons  which  prove  or  difprove  it  (if  there 
need  any  Reafons)  and  he'll  be  forc'd  whether 
he  will  or  no,  to  affent  or  dijfent,  or  (ufpend  his 
afTent,  according  as  the  Condition  of  the  ob- 
jeft  requires;  nor  can  he  avoid  pafling  his 
Judgment  but  by  diverting  his  Intelleft.  For 
iince  perception  of  Objeds  is  an  Aft  of  the. 
Mind  itlelf,  and  ckarnefs  or  obfcurity,  determi- 
fiatenefi  or  unieterminatenejs,  are  modes  or  affec- 
tions of  this  A51  of  conceiving  Objefts,  not  of  the 
Ohje£ls  themfclves,  we  can  judge  of  the  Afts  of 
our  Minds  and  their  afteftions  no  otherwife 
than  from  the  Senfe  and  Indication  of  the  Mind 
itfelf  For  as  by  a  power  of  the  Mind  we  are 
confcious  that  we  perceive  a  thing,  fo  by  the 
very  fame  power  we  are  no  lefs  confcious  whe- 
ther we  perceive  the  thing  obfcurely  or  clearly, 
detertninately  or  undeterminately. 

Nor  do  they  come  off  better  who  put  the 
Agreement  or  Dijagr cement  of  Ideas  for  a  Crite- 
rion ;  nay  worfe,  for  they  think  to  difpatch  a 
matter  of  the  greateft  Confequence  by  a  Meta- 
phor ^  which  is  unworthy  of  Philofophers.    Nor 


yet  do  they  attain  their  End  ;  for  the  Queflion 
recurs  as  before,  by  what  Criterion  are  they 
affur'd  of  the  Agreement  or  Difagreement  of 
Ideas,  or  whence  did  they  learn  the  Truth  of 
this  proportion,  vi%.  That  this  is  the  Criterion  of 
Truth?  If  they  fay,  'tis  evident  to  ths  Mind  of 
itfelfi  and  needs  no  other  Criterion,  why  are 
not  other  Truths  after  the  fame  manner  difco- 
vered  without  a  Criterion  ?  Setting  afide  Cri- 
terions  therefore,  we  muft  neceflarily  attend  to 
the  Conceptions  themft^lves,  and  in  all  things 
fellow  the  Guidance  of  our  Mind.  For  it  will 
as  certainly  embrace  Truth  duly  offer'd  to  it,  as 
Fire  will  confumc  combullible  Matter  :  And 
there's  no  more  necefllty  for  a  Criterion  for  the 
Underfianding  to  diftinguilh  Truth  from  Falfe- 
hood,  than  for  the  Fire  to  diftinguilh  between 
combuftible  and  incombuftible  Matter :  Apply 
an  Objeft,  and  the  thing  will  be  done  of  itfelf. 
A  Perfon  m^.y  reply,  that  there  is  fomething  in 
the  combuftible  Matter  which  fits  it  for  the  re- 
ception of  the  Flame,  namely  fulphur,  or  fome- 
thing of  that  nature ;  after  the  fame  manner 
alfo  there  is  fomething  in  things  whereby  they 
are  naturally  fitted  to  determine  the  Affent  of 
Underftanding,  and  this  is  the  Agrecmnit  or 
Confsrrmity  of  Ideas,  which  therefore  difcovers 
the  Truth,  and  is  the  Criterion  by  which  the 
Underftanding  is  determined.  I  anfwer,  all 
Logicians  (as  far  as  I  remember^  ufed  to  found 
Affirmation  in  the  Agreeme?it,  i^'cgation  in  the 
Difagreement  of  the  Terms  bet^veen  themfelvcs, 
and  Illation,  in  their  Agreement  in/uie  fame 
third.  But  fince  this  Conformity  or  Agree- 
ment of  the  Terms  may  be  either  real  or  appa- 
rent, here  is  the  proper  place  and  ufe  of  a  Cri- 
terion, namely  to  diftinguifli  the  apparent  from 
the  real:  For  a  verbal  affirmation  of  the  agree- 
ment between  the  Terms,  when  the  Mind  per- 
ceives none,  is  a  /)v  ;  when  'tis  only  apparent, 
an  Error ;  but  in  both  a  Falftty. 

If  any  one  can  produce  any  other  Criterion 
to  diftinguilh  this  apparent  conformity,  or  dif- 
agreement, from  the  real,  befide  thc-application 
and  attention  of  the  Mind,  he  might  he  thought 
to  have  difcover'd  fomething  truly  ufeful  to 

-Mankinti-i 


/ 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

Mind  forcibly  extorts  afTentj  as  there  is  no  other  Criterion  of  Ob- 
jects perceived  by  the  Senfes,  than  that  an  Objed:,  by  its  prefence  for- 
ces us  to  perceive  it  even  againft  our  Wills.    If  therefore  the  Concep- 
tions 

N  O  r  E  S. 


17 


Mmkind;  but  inftead  of  that  to  put  upon  us 
the  very  Agreemeit  or  difiigreement  of  Ideas, 
is  to  lay  down  the  thing  itlelf  as  done,  about 
which  the  Query  is  how  it  can  be  done  ?  For 
thit  is  what  we  enquire  after,  /.  e.  how  we  may 
be  certain  that  we  are  not  deceiv'd  in  taking 
apparent  Conformity  for  real.  I  know,  there 
is  a  certain  Art  of  propofing  Truths  to  the  Ua- 
derftanding  by  which  it  may  more  ealily  per- 
ceive and  judge  whether  they  really  agree  or 
no  ;  as  there  is  an  art  of  placing  the  Fuel  fo  as 
to  take  Fire  more  readily,  but  this  is  nothing 
to  the  Criterion  of  Truth;  nay  it  proves  that 
there  is  none  other  bcfxde  the  Mind  duel/  ap- 
ply'd. 

'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  alfo  that  the  Antients 
placed  Affirmation  in  the  Agreement  of  the 
Terms,  much  more  properly  than  the  Moderns 
do  in  the  Agreement  of  Ideas'.  For  as  we 
have  (hewn  before,  *  we  know  feveral  Truths 
of  things  whereof  we  have  properly  no  Ideas  ; 
unlefs  they  will  abufe  the  Word  Idea  contrary 
to  common  ufe,  and  the  fenfe  of  Antiquity. 
For  according  to  Plato,  who  feems  to  have  been 
the  firll  that  introduced  Ideas  into  Philofophy, 
Knowledge  hy  Ideas  is  peculiar  to  God,  who 
alone  perceives  things  immediately  by  their  Ef- 
fences :  But  we  (as  was  Ihevvn  before,  f)  by 
Marks  and  CharaBers,  which  whether  they  be 
imprefs'd  on  the  Mind  \iy  immediate  fenfation 
from  the  Things  themfelvcs,  or  colleded  from 
the  fimilitude,  proportion,  or  relation  to  the 
Things  which  are  perceived  by  the  Senfes,  can- 
not more  properly  be  calPd  the  Ideas  of  Things, 
than  the  very  VVords  can  :  For  they  are  often 
no  more  like  the  ElTences  of  things,  nor  is  it 
neceffary  that  they  fliould  ;  fince  they  fuffici- 
cntly  anfvver  the  ends  for  which  Knowledge 
was  given  us,  if  they  diftinguifh  things  from 
one  another  and  difcover  their  Ufes. 

And  in  reality  this  feems  to  be  the  only  dif- 
ference between  Words  and  thcfe  Marks^  that 

D 


we  connecl  Sounds  with  the  thvngs  by  volun- 
tary impofition,  but  the  fe/i/at ions  of  the  Mind, 
which  ari  the  Marh  whereby  the  Underftani- 
ing  dilUngaiflies  things  from  each  other,  are 
join'd  by  Nature  to  the  Prefence  of  them.  'Tis 
from  Inflitution,  for  Inftance,  that  we  call  a 
Body  from  which  Light  is  diftufed,  the  Sun  : 
But  nature  imprints  the  fenfation  of  Light,  and 
a  Globe  of  two  Foot  upon  the  prefence  of  it, 
which  are  the  marks  from  whence  the  Mind 
reafons  about  it,  and  perhaps  refemblc  its  Ef- 
fence  no  more  than  that  very  found  of  the 
Word  Sun  does. 

'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  farther,  that  thefe  Maris 
are  produced  in  us  at  various  times,  and  by 
diiFerent  Faculties,  and  fometimes  have  no 
manner  of  connexion  with  each  other.  When 
this  happens,  we  are  in  doubt  whether  they 
belong  to  the  fame  thing:  fometimes  alfo  they 
are  equivocal,  and  belong  to  more  things,  and 
then  we  enquire  whether  the  things  with 
which  they  are  connefted  be  different.  That 
we  be  not  impofed  upon  by  thefe,  there's  need 
of  Enquiry,  Attention,  ObfcrvatiomrA  Re-fearch: 
By  application  to  thefe,  the  Underflanding 
difcovers  Truth,  and  embraces  it  when  dif- 
cover'd,  without  any  Criterion,  befide  the 
Power  implanted  in  it  by  Nature,  whereby  'tis 
naturally  adapted  to  perceive  the  Truth  duly 
propofcd  (as  the  Sight  does  Colours,  the  Tafte 
favours)  and  to  diftinguifh,  by  Marks,  the  real 
from  the  apparent  Congruity  of  Things.  (7) 

(7)  Tho'  our  Author  feems  to  have  been  ar- 
guing ftrenuoully  againft  Locke  in  moft  of  this 
Note;  yet  the  whole,  I  think,  is  a  difpute  on- 
ly about  Words,  and  will  come  to  the  very 
fame  thing,  whether  we  take  his,  or  Locke's 
Account  of  it.  Our  Author  fays,  a  Concep- 
tion offer'd  to  the  Mind  forces  its  affcnt,  with- 
out any  other  Criterion  of  its  reality  or  con- 
formity to  the  Thing.  Locke  tells  us,  that 
Truth,  or  Certainty,   confills  entirely  in  the 

Con- 


•  Note  A; 


+  Note  At 


jj8  Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

tions  which  we  have  of  thefe  three  before  mention'd,  reprefent  them 
to  us  as  exifting  necejj'arily,  fo  that  they  cannot  be  feparated  from  Ex- 
igence (C.)  even  in  Thought,  we  mult  affirm  that  thefe  exift  of  them- 

f elves  y 

NOTE  S, 


Connection,  Relation  or  Agreement  of  our  I- 
deas,  of  which  connexion,  is'^-  we  have   no 
other  evidence  than  the   real   perception  of   it 
by  the  Mind.     Our  Author  affirms,    that  the 
Application  or  Attention  of  the  Mind  is  fuffi- 
cient  to  dfftinguifh  Truth  from  Falihood.  Locke 
ll-ys,  a  clear  perceptionof  the  Mind  is  all  that 
is  required  to  that' end.;    Our  Author  x.t.\\%  us, 
in  the  laft.  j'lace,  that  Truth  or  Affirmation  was 
much  jjetter  placed  in  an  agreement  of  Terms, 
Marks,  or  CharaRers,  than  of  Hens.     Locke  di- 
ftinguilhes.  Truth   into  Verbal  (which  is  the 
conformity  of  Ideas  to  the  Terms)  and  Mental 
(which  is  the  conformity  of  Ideas  to  each   o- 
ther)  and  Metaphyjical,  or  real,  (which  is  their 
conformity  to  the  real  exiftence  of  things)  of 
which   laft  kind  of  Truth  we  have  no  Criteri- 
on,   fo  that  there  feems  to  be  no  other  diffe- 
rence between  thefe  two  Authors,  than  wliat 
lies  in  the  different  ufc  of  the  Word  Idea  (as 
was  above  mentioned  in   the  Notes  3  and  4.) 
which,  according   to  the  Latitude  'tis  ufually 
taken  in  by  Mr.  Locke  and  his  Followers,  com- 
prehends all  our  Author's  Marks,  CharaBers, 
Senfatto?is,    and  Conceptions,  &c.      For  a  more 
compleat  anfwer  to  that  old  Queftion,  What  is 
the  General  Criterion  of  Truth  ?  fee  Mr.  Wattsh 
Logic,  P.  z.  c.z.  ^.7.  p.  173,  174.   2d.  Edit. 
(C.)    This  way  of   Reafoning  is   different 
from  that  of  Des  Cartes :  for  he  applies  this  Ar- 
gument to  Complex  Ideas  made  by  the  Mind 
out  of  fimple  ones,  but  this  proceeds  upon 
fimple  ones  only.    The  ground  of  the  diffe- 
rence lies  in  this,  the  Mind  may  erroneoufly 
join  fuch  things  together  as  neither  are  nor  can 
be  join'd    in   nature:   fof  example,  the  moft 
perfedl  Being  is  made  up  of  a  Colledlion  of  all 
the  Perfeftions  which  the  Mind  has  obferv'd 
difperied  all  over  Nature:  But  whether  fuch  a 
Colleftion  does  really  exift  any  where  may  well 
be  queftion'd;    (8.)  nor  can  it  be  proved  from 
that  very  colleftion  or  Idea,  which  is  a  Work 
of  the  Mind  alone.     But  the  cafe  is  different 
i^a  £miple  jLdesi  produced  by  the  Objefi  itfelf. 


For  fmce  this  comes  not  from  elfewhere,  we 
cannot  attribute  any  other  manner  of  Exiftence 
to  it  than  that  which  it  brings  along  with  it 
into  the  Mind. 

When  I  think  of  a  Man  prefent,  I  cannot 
but  believe  that  he  exifts,  /.  c.  I  attribute  ^1.7^/2/ 
Exijlence  to  him  ;  but  that  he  will  exift  for  the 
future,  I  perceive,  may  either  be  or  not  be, 
/.  e.  I  affign  him  pojjible  Exiftence  i  but  if  there 
be  any  thing,  which,  from  the  Ide.i  that  I  have 
of  it,  I  cannot  confider  otherwife  than  as  ex- 
ift ing,  lam  as  certain  that  it  does  always  exift, 
as  that  the  Man  exifts  when  I  fee  him.  For, 
the  reafon  why  I  believe  the  Man  that  is  pre- 
fent to  exift,  is,  btcaufe  I  cannot  even  in  my 
Mind  conceive  him  not  to  exift,  while  I  per- 
ceive that  he  is  prefent.  If  therefore  there  be 
any  thing  which  I  cmnot  fo  much  as  conceive 
in  my  Mind  not  to  have  exifted,  or  not  to  ex- 
ift for  the  future,  'tis  manifeft  that  I  believe  this 
to  have  exifted  always,  for  the  very  fame  rea- 
fon that  I  believe  the  Man  to  exift  who  is  now 
prefent. 

Now  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  fomething 
muft  exift  of  itfelf  and  include  necejfary  Ex- 
iftence in  its  Nature;  in  the  next  place  we  en- 
quire what  that  is;  nor  can  it  be  determined  0- 
therwife,  than  by  the  conceptions  which  we 
have  of  things:  If  any  thing  which  we  know 
to  exift,  implies  Exiftence  in  its  very  notion, 
and  cannot  mentally  be  feparated  from  it,  we 
muft  conclude,  that  this  hath  always  exifted, 
and  does  not  require  a  Caufe  diftind  from  it- 
felf. :  But  if  I  have  any  reafon  to  fufpeft  that,  I 
do  not  fee  the  prefence  of  a  Man,  but  a  Statue^ 
and  fo  may  be  miftaken  ;  I  find  this  Is  poffible, 
and  in  that  cafe  would  not  attribute  a£lual  Ex- 
iftence to  it  without  Examination.  So  if  there 
be  any  reafon  why  I  cannot  conceive  a  thing 
not  to  have  exifted,  or  not  to  exift  for  the  fu- 
ture, tho'  in  reality  it  once  did  not  exift,  and 
perhaps  does  not  now;  in  this  cafe  I  may  fufpedl 
myfelf  to  be  miftaken,  and  to  attribute  neceffary 
Exiftence  to  it  from  an  erroneous  Conception 


K: 


Concerning  the    Origin  of  Evil. 

felves^  and  require  no  Caufe  of  their  Exiflence.  But  if  we  can  conceive 
thefe  once  not  to  have  been,  to  have  begun  to  be,  or  to  be  capable  of 
Annihilation,  'tis  plain  that  NeceJJary  Exiftence  belongs  not  to  them, 
nor  are  they  of  themfelves,  they  muft  therefore  have  their  Being  from 

D  2  fome- 


*i9 


NOTES. 


It  muft  be  confeft,  this  Sufpicion  is  ftronger 
in  Complex  Ideas  form'd  by  the  Mind,  than  in 
thofe  Jimple  ones  that  are  produced  in  it  by  the 
very  Objefts  themfelves,  and  without  its  affi- 
ftance;  yet  it  may  have  place  in  both,  as  may 
be  feen  below.  Care  alio  muft  be  taken,  that 
we  do  not  rob  thiugs  of  their  exiftence  rafhly, 
and  without  Examination  ;  for  who  doubts  but 
we  may  be  miftaken  in  feparating  Exiftence 
from,  ab  well  as  attributing  it  to,  them.  But 
if,  after  due  Attentioiv,  V/e  plainly  find  that 
our  Conceptions  of  certain  things  do  not  at- 
tribute necefTary  Exiftence  to  them,  we  muft 
conclude,  that  we  are  either  miftaken  in  every 
thing,  or  not  wiftaken  here.  If  then  we  find 
that  neither  the  Idea  of  Motion,  nor  oi Matter, 
includes  Exiftence  in  itfelf,  nor  is  connefted 
with  it;  nay,  if  after  our  grcateft  diligence  and 
enquiry,  they  appear  plainly  feparable,  it  is  as 
certain  t\i-M  Matter  ■anA  Motion  do  not  exift  of 
themfelves,  as  any  thing  can  be:  For  nothing 
is  otherwife  certain  than  from  the  conceptions 
which  we  have  of  every  thing. 

It  may  be  objefted,  that  there  are  fome  who 
doubt  of,  fome  who  deny,  the  Being  of  a  God ; 
we  cannot  therefore  conclude,  becaufe  we  may. 
conceive ^mcthing  not  to  exift,  that  Exiftence 
is  not  included  in  its  nature;  For,  by  thi. 
Means,  not  only  Space  and  Matter,  but  alH) 
God  himfelf,  would  not  be  felf-exijleiit,  fine. 
we  fee  fome  bereaving  him  of  his  Exiftence,  i.e. 
conceiving  him  not  to  exift,  whereas  he  ne- 
cefTarily  muft  be  felf-exiftcnt :  'Tis  not  a  right 
Conclufidn  therefore,  that  Space,  iirV.  do  not 
exift  of  themfelves,  becaufe  we  can  in  our 
Minds  feparate  Exiftence  from  them. 

There  are,  I  own,  who  deny  the  Being  of  a 
God,  (for  what  is  there  fo'ahfurd  that  fome 
may  not  imagine?)  but  in  the  interim,  that 
thev  really  believe  him  not  to  exift,  I  very 
much  doubt.  However,  fuppofing  God  to 
have  exiftence,  there  are  none  but  do  acknow- 


/ 


ledge  that  he  exifts  neceflarily  j  nor  do  any  feek 
for  a  caufe  of  his  Exiftence:  all  fee  that  'tis  of 
fuch  a  nature  as  excludes  a  Caufe. 

But  in  Space,  Matter,  and  Motion,  'tis  quite 
another  thing  ;  almoft  all  Men  grant  that  thefe 
do  now  exift,  yet  thefe  fame  Men  own  that 
they  may  not  exift  ;  which  cannot  be  faid  of 
'God,  if  He  be  but  granted  to  exift.  Why  can 
I,  mentally  at  leart,  deprive  Space,  ^c.  which, 
are  conceiv'd  aftually  to  exi';%  of  their  Exi- 
ftence, and  confider  them  for  the  future  as 
non-exiftent,  but  cannot  feparate  the  Idea  of 
•God  from  Exiftence  even  in  thought,  if  I  once 
grant  that  he  does  exift  r  There's  certainly  no 
other  reafon,  but  that  the  Divine  Nature  in<» 
eludes  Exifte'hce  in  itfelf;  whereas  the  nature 
of  Space,  Matter  and  Mttion  does  not. 

For  '  tis  to  be  obferv'd,  that  we  are"'no  farther 
fblicitous  about  the  Caufe  of  things,  than  as 
the  nature  of  them  appears  to  be  fuch  as  muft 
require  a  Caufe;  VVe  enquire,  for  inftance, 
from  whence  the  Tide,  and  Saltnefs  of  the  Sea 
proceed,  and  fearch  for  the  caufes  of  them  : 
But  why  do  we  fufpeft  that  thefe  really  have  a 
Caufe  ?  Is  it  becaufe  ^ve  obferve  the  Sea 
fometimes  tofs'd  with  the  Tide,  or  Salt;  and 
fcmetimes  ftill,  or  fweet  ?  Nothing  like  it: 
For,  who  ever  faw  the  Sea  perfe£lly  ftill,  or 
fweet,  fo  as  from  thence  to  raife  a  doubt  abbut 
the  Caufe.''  Why  then  don't  we  reft  without 
enquiring  after  Caufes,  pcrfuaded  that  things 
have  always  been  as  they  are,  and  that  thofe 
which  are  Eternal  require  no  Caufe  ?  Whence 
is  it,  that  the  Mind  does  not  at  all  acquiefce  in 
this,  nor  is  any  one  fo  ftupid,  as  to  be  moved 
by  it  to  lay  afide  the  Search  oi  Caufes  ?  Is  it 
not  from  hence  that  the  Mind  remonftrates  a- 
gainft  it,  and  declares  to  us,  even  againft  our 
Wills,  that  the  Tide,  or  Saltnefs  of  the  Sea, 
is  not  eflential  to  it?  Nor  does  it  otherwife 
diftinguifh  whether  znJffeffion,  Mode,  or  ^a- 
i'ly,  be  extrinfical  to  the  thing,  or  require  a 

•Catift 


2o  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil 

fomething  elfe.     For,  fince  they  may  either  exift,  or  not  exift,  Exi- 
ftence  is  not  of  their  Nature,  and  if  it  be  not  of  their  Nature  they  muft 
have  it  from  without  j  and  there  wants  aCaufe  by  which  the  Indiffe- 
rence, 

NOTES. 


Caufc,  than  as  this  is  not  included  in  the  Ef- 
fcnce  of  that  thing  in  which  it  happens  to  in- 
here. This  appears  plainly  enough  from  hence, 
that  it  troubles  not  itfelf  about  the  Sea's  being 
extended,  fincc  it  fees  that  iseflential  to  it,  but 
is  in  the  interim  folicitous  why  it  is  Salt;  for 
no  other  reafon,  but  becaufe  it  can  conceive 
that  it  may  be  either  fait,  or  fwcet. 

The  fame  mufl  be  faid  o^ Mutter,  and  its^- 
/cilions  or  Modes.  If  any  things  be  contain'd  in 
the  conception  of  its  Nature,  or  have  a  necef- 
fary  conneftion  with  it,  our  Mind  enquire? 
rot  after  their  Caufe,  but  acquiex:es  as  foon  as 
ever  it  perceives  that  neceffity  or  connexion  : 
but  it  feeks  folicitoufly  after  the  Caufes  of  others, 
and  fcfts  not  till  it  has  found  them.  For  Ex- 
ample, when  it  thinks  of  the  Exiilence  or  Mo- 
bility of  Matter  it  looks  for  no  Caufes  of  them, 
for  it  perceives  that  thefe  are  included  in  the 
nature  of  it,  or  flow  necefTarily  from  it;  But 
it  demands  a  Caufe  of  its  Exiitencc,  Fluidity 
and  Motion,  for  it  judges  thefe  to  be  as  foreign 
to  Matter,  as  the  Tide  and  Saltnefs  are  to  the 
Sea. 

And  if  any  fay  thefe  have  been  ahvays  Co,  and 
therefore  require  no  Caufe,  he'll  appear  to  talk 
no  lefs  abfurdly,  than  he  that  fhould  fay  the 
lame  of  the  Tide  and  Saltnefs  of  the  Sea  ;  nor 
will  he  fatisfy  our  Thoughts  any  better:  For 
whether  the  Tide  and  Saltneis  be  fuppofed.  e- 
ternal  or  temporary,  fince  they  proceed  not 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  Sea,  they  muft  ne- 
celfarily  have  a  Caufe,  if  we  will  believe  our 
own  Minds.  After  the  fame  Manner,  whether 
the  Exiftence,  Motion  and  Fluidity  of  Matter 
be  fuppofed  eternal  ot  temporary,  fince  they 
are  not  included  in  its  Nature,  nor  flow  necef- 
farily  from  it,  any  more  than  the  Tide  and 
Saltnefs  of  the  Sea  do  from  its  Nature,  'tis  e- 
qually  neceflary  that  they  have  a  Caufe.  Either 
all  Eiiquiry  into  the  Caufes  of  things  is  entirely 
to  be  rejefted,  orto  be  admitted  in  thefe.  Either 
we  muft  imagine  that  nothing  has  any  Caufe, 
or  grant  that  thefe  require  one:  For,  'tis  un- 
jeafoiuble  to  exped  a  Caufc  in  fome  particular 


things,  and  to  pronounce  it  unneceffary  in  o- 
thers,  which  are  exaftly  alike. 

I  know,  fome  think  that  thefe  things  come 
by  Nature,  and  that  we  mull  feek  for  no  other 
Caufe  bcfide  it,  and  I  think  they  fay  true  :  All 
thefe  come  by  Nature,  but  by  the  Nature  of 
what?  Let  them  tell  us.  Not  by  their  own; 
Not  by  the  Nature  of  Space,  or  Matter;  for 
they  hi^ve  no  neceflary  connexion  v/ith  thefe, 
nor  are  included  in  them.  We  muil  therefore 
fuppofe  another  Nature  from  whence  they  pro- 
ceed and  derive  their  Origin. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  if  we  will  truft  our 
own  Thoughts,  and  follow  their  diredion,  we 
are  no  lefs  certain  of  a  Caufe  diftin<ft  from 
Matter  and  Space,  which  gave  Exiflence  and 
particular  Qualities  to  each  of  th-cm,  than  that 
the  Tide  and  Saltnefs  of  the  Sea  muft  have  a- 
nother  Caufe  befide  tlte  Sea  itfelf  Nay,  we 
muft  either  change  our  whole  Method  and 
procedure  of  inveftigating  caufes,.  or  admit  a 
Caufe  of  thefe,  which  Caufe  can  be  no  other 
than  God.  himfelf,  in  whofe  Nature  the  caufali- 
ty  of  all  things  is  contain'd.  (9.) 

(8.)  That  is,  might  be  queftion'd,  if  there 
were  no  better  proof  of  its  Exiftence  than  that 
Conception  only.  However,  this  Notion  has 
been  very  nmch  infifted  on,  both  by  the  Carie- 
ftan  and  feveral  of  our  own  Philofophcrs,  who. 
were  not  willing  to  part  with  any  one  Argu- 
ment which  feem'd  to  have  the  leaft  tendency 
towards  the  fupport  of  fo  good  a  Caufe.  The 
Sum  of  their  Argumentation  feems  to  be  this. 
We  can  have  no  Idea  of  any  thing,  but  what 
has  either  an  aUual  or  a  pojjible  Exiftence ;  but 
we  have  an  Idea  of  God,  /'.  e.  of  a  Being  of 
Infinite  Perfeftions,  which  might  poflibly  ex- 
ift  ;  therefore  he  muft  have  an  aftual  Exiftence; 
For  aftual  Exiftence  is  a  degree  of  Perfeftion, 
and  the  foremention'd  Idea,  according  to 
;he  Suppofition,  includes  all  polTible  Perfefti- 
on,  therefore  it  muft  include  that,  otherwife 
we  fhould  have  an  Idea  of  fomething  abfo- 
lutely  perfeft  without  one  poffible  Degree  of 
Perfection,  which  is  a  contradi^iou  in  terms, 

Bgyc 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

tence  or  Poflibility  of  Exigence,  or  non-exiflence,  may  be  determln'd. 
Nor  do  we  judge  a  Caufe  in  things  to  be  otherwife  neceflary  than  as 
they  are  in  their  own  Nature  indifferent^  that  is,  pajjive^  in  regard  to 
Exigence.  For,  if  our  Conceptions  reprefent  fomething  to  us  as  ne- 
ceflary in  its  own  nature,  we  enquire  no  farther  about  the  Caufe 
whereby  it   exiils. 

D  3  III.  If 

NOTES. 


ai 


But  this  is  aM  begging  the  Qaeflion.  For 
it  is  not  the  bare  poflibility  of  juppojin^  it  to 
have  all  poffible  p«rfc£lions  that  infers  its 
e£iual  exigence,  but  the  proving  it  to  have 
them.  Indeed  if  we  fuppofe  it  to  have  all  pof 
fible  perfeftions,  we  muil  at  the  fame  time  ne- 
cefTarily  fuppofe  it  to  exiil,  fince  Exillence  is 
a  poflible  perfeftion  ;  otherwife  we  Ihould  fup- 
pofe it  to  have  all  pofiible  perfeftions,  and  yet 
to  want  one,  which  is  a  Contradiftion.  But 
ftill  this  is  only  an  Exiflence,  ex  Hypetheji,  a 
true  confequence  from  doubtful  premifes,  and 
which  will  as  eafily  follow  from  the  fuppofal  of 
its  having  but  any  One  perfeftion,  fmce  that 
mud  necefTarily  imply  exiftence.  The  certainty 
then  of  fuch  adual  exiftence,  does  by  no  means 
follow  from  the  fuppofed  pojftbility  of  It,  as 
thefe  Men  would  be  underftood  :  This  Con- 
clufion  will  never  hold  good  ;  what  cannot  be 
fuppofed  without  a  Contradiftion  certainly 
does  not  exij},  therefore  what  can  be  fuppo- 
fed without  a  Contradiftion  ceitainly  does. 

Others  endeavour  to  prove  the  exiftence  of 
God  from  our  Idea  of  him  after  this  manner. 
Whatever  we  have  an  Idea  of,  that  either  is,  or 
if  it  be  not,  it  is  pojjible  for  it  to  be  i  but  we 
have  an  Idea  of  an  Eternal  and  neceffarily  Exi- 
Jient  Being  ;  therefore  fuch  a  Being  either  //,  or 
it  is  pojjible  for  it  to  be.  But  if  fuch  a  Being 
either  now  ii  not,  or  onctwas  not,  or  ever  will 
not  aSiually  be,  it  would  not  be  pojjible  for  it  to 
be  at  all  (except  it  could  make  itfelf,  or  be 
made  by  Nothing)  contrary  to  the  former  part 
of  the  Suppofition  ;  nor  would  it  be  either 
Eternal  or  neceffarily  Exiftent,  contrary  to  the 
latter.    Therefore  fuch  a  Being   now  is,   and 

always  was,  and  ever  will  be. Or,  fhorter, 

thus :  Our  Idea  of  God  is  an  Idea  of  fomething 
which  implies  do  coatradi^ion,  and  therefore 


fuch  a  Being  may  pojphly  he  t  and  therefore  he 
muji  a  flu  ally  be,  or  ^\{z  he  could  not  peffibly  be, 
which  is  contrary  to  the  Hypothefis.     Now  to 
make  this  and  the  like  Argument  of  any  force, 
it  muft  be  cle.^rly  prov'd,  that  we  have  fuch  an 
Idea  of  a  necejfartly  Exiftent  Being,  as  will  infer 
its  aftual  exiftence;  (which  may  perhaps  appear 
to  be  fomething  doubtful  from  Note  14.)  and 
alfo,  that  this  Idea    is  ftriRly  innate  ox  connate 
with  us,    and  confequently   capable    of  being 
urged  a  Priori,  for  a  Proof  of  the  Exiftence  of 
fome   Being  correfpondent   to    fuch  an   Idea 
(which  is  now  generally  given  up)   For  if  this 
Idea    be  only  gathered   a  pofterlori,    viz.  by  a 
deduftion  of  Arguments   from  our  own  Exi- 
ftence, then  it  is  only  a  Confequence  of  thefe 
Arguments,  and  cannot  of  itfelf  be  alledg'd  as 
a  diftinft  one.     For  how  can  any  Idea  confe- 
quent  upon  fome  certain  proofs  of  fomething 
a   Pofteriori,    be  an   antecedent,    independent 
proof  of  the  fame  thing  a  Priori?     Befides,  ei- 
ther thefe  arguments  are  enough  to  convince  a- 
ny  Man  of  the   Exiftence  and  Perfeftions  of 
God,  or  they  are  not;  if  they  are,  this  is  unne- 
cejfary ;  if  they  are  not,  this  is  infufficienti  nay, 
it  is  none  at  all,  fmce  'tis  a  bare  confequence  of 
thefe,  and  zntwtXy  founded  in  them,  and  there- 
fore muft  ftand  or  fall  with  them.     But  there  is 
no  occafion    for  this  or  any  fuch  ^ibbie,  a 
Priori,  in  order  to  demonftratc  the  Being  and 
Attributes   of  God,    fmce  numberlefs  irrefra- 
gable Arguments  occur,  a  pofteriori,  and  fuch 
as  are  obvious  to  all  capacities.     [  For  a  parti- 
cular DeduftioD  of  the  Divine  Attributes,  fee 
N.  1 8.    Thofe  that  have  a  Mind  to  be  farther 
acquainted  with  the  proofs  of  a  Deity  drawn 
from  the  Idea,  may  find  the  Queftion  fully  dif- 
cufsd  \T\Cudworth,  p.  721,  ^c.  or,  in  Fiddes't 
Theol,  Spt(.  B.  1.  P.  I.  C.9.  or,  in  the  impar. 

tiaJ 


^1 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evih 


•Tisprov'd  III.  If  \ve  apply  this  to  our  Conceptions  of  the  Things  in  Queftior>, 
rcqufr«  a'  ^^  ^ill  appear  whether  they  be  felf-exiftent,  or  require  a  Caufe.  In 
Caufe,  tho'it  the  firft  placc,  let  us  examine  Motion,  which  is  really  ASiion,  but  in 
^  *"T°and  ^^  Adion  it  is  neceflary,  if  we  may  truft  our  thoughts,  that  there  be 
thatMatterisan-/i^f«/  and  a  Patient,  without  thefe  we  have  no  Notion  of  Adlion, 
notthe  Caufe  i^  Motion  therefore,  fince  that  is  Adtion,  there  is  required  an  Agent 
^  ^^  and  a  Patient.    We  have  indeed  the  Patient,  namely  Matter  j  we  mufl 


in 


NOTES. 


tial  Enquiry  into  the  Exiftencc,  ^c.  of  God, 

B.  2.  P.   I.] 

(9J  What  our  Anchor  has  been  endeavou- 
ring to  prove   in  all  this  Note,  is,  That  we 
,  cannot  apprehend  either  Matter  or  Motion  (and 
he  will  Ihew  the  fame  by  and  by  of  Space)  to 
be  independent  or  felf-exiftent,  and  confequent- 
Jy  that  they  require   fome  caufe  of  their  Exi- 
ftence   diftindl  from  and  antecedent  to  them- 
■felvcs:  :  And  tho' he   frequently  makes  ufe  of 
-  that  confufed  equivocal  Term,    necejjary  Exi- 
fience,  yet  be  feems  to  apply  it  only  in  a  nega- 
tive fenfe  for  Self-ExiJIence,  or  Exijience  u-ith- 
eut  a  Caufe,  as  appears   from  the  latter  end  of 
thefecond  andfixth  paragraphs  of  this  Seftion, 
and  which   is  as  much  as  his  Argument  re- 
quires.    For,  where  aYiy  thing  appears  to  be 
an  efFed,  as  Matter  and  Motion  do,  we  muft 
.  require  a  Caufe  ;  where  no  fuch  Caufednefs  can 
be  difcovercd,  we  call  the  Thing  Self-exijlent, 
tho'  perhaps  it  really  be  not  fo,  but  did  pro- 
.  ceed  from  fomething  elfe  ;  and  where  an  abfur- 
dity  would  follow  from  fuppofing  any  Being 
not  to  have  exifted  once,  or  not  to  exift  for 
the  future,  we  fay  there's  a  neceffiiy  for  fuppo- 
fing that  it  did  and  will  always  cxifl :    or  we 
ftile  that  Being  necejfarily  Exiftent:    which  is 
perhaps  as  far  as  we  can  go.     But   as  thefe 
Words,  Necfjjfhry,  Neeeffity,  isfe.  feem  to  have 
been  taken  to  denote  fome  pcjitive,  exirinfu 
Principle  of  Exiftence;  and  which  accordingly 
is  often  ftiled  antecedent,  abplute,  original  Ne- 
teffity,  a  Neceffity  fimple,  and  uniform,  and  abfo- 
lutely  fuch  in  its  own  nature,  in  itfelf.  Sec.     It 
may   be  of  fome  ufe  to  confider  the  feveral 
Things  to  which  thefe  Terms  are  apply'd,  and 
what  Ideas  we  fix  to  them  i  which  may  per- 
haps convince  us  that  they  arc  all  merely  re- 


Neceflity  is  chiefly  and  perhaps  primarilyap- 
ply'd  to  Means:  and  when  it  i3  thus  apply'd,  it 
evidently  has  Relation  to  fome  E,"d  to  be  attain'd 
by  tho^Q  Means  oi  which  its  afiirm'd.  Thus, 
when  we  fay  fuch  a  thing  is  neceflary,  we 
mean,  that  fome  £W  cannot  be  attain'd  with- 
out the  Exiilencs  of  that  thing.  Thus  Reli- 
gion is  necejjary  to  a  Rational  Creature,  or 
more  properly,  to  the  Happinefs  of  a  Rational 
Creature,  /'.  e.  a  Rational  Creature  cannot  at- 
tain Happinefs,  its  ultimate  End,  without  Re- 
ligion. Farther,  Means  being  a  Relative  Idea, 
whatever  is  afErm'd  of  Means  as  Means,  muft 
be  Relative  alfo  ;  or  which  is  much  th^i  fmic, 
muft  be  an  AfFe^ion  of  a  Relative  Idea,  v.  g. 
When  we  fay,  any  Adlion  is  Good,  Fit,  Righty 
Reafo7table,  &c.  all  thefe  terms  are  apply'd 
to  it,  as  it  is  conceiv'd  to  be  a  Means  to  fome 
End,  and  confequently  are  relative ;  therefore 
to  call  any  Adtion  fit,  l^c.  in  itfelf,  will  be 
the  fame  as  to  affirm  any  thing  to  be  relative  in 
itfelf,  which  is  nonfenfe. 

Neceffity  is  alfo  apply'd  to  Truth,  and  then  it 
has  relation  to  fome  other  Truths,  either  ante- ' 
cedent  or  confequential,-  according  to  the  diffe- 
rent manner  in  which  that  Truth  is  prov'd  to 
be  neceffarily  true,  i.  e.  according  as  the  Proof 
is  diredt  or  indirect.  When  the  proof  is  di- 
reft,  /.  e.  when  the  truth  of  any  propofition 
is  ihewn  to  follow  by  unavoidable  Co nfequence, 
from  fome  other  truth  before  known  ;  then  the 
Neceffity  of  that  Truth  arifeth  from  the  Rela- 
tion which  that  Truth  has  to  foine  antecedent 
Truth:  When  the  proof  is  indirect,  /.  e,  when 
the  Truth  of  any  Propofition  is  fhewn,  by 
{hewing  that  the  fuppofition  6x  the  contrary  to 
that  Truth,  /'.  e.  the  Denying  that  Truth,  would 
imply  theNegation  of,  orbcjnconfiftent  with, 

fome 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 

in  the  next  place  fee  what  is  the  Agent:  'viz.  Whether  Matter  produ- 
ces Motion  in  itfelf ;  or  (to  fpeak  properly)  Whether  Motion  be  coeval 
with  it,  natural,  and  neceffarily  adhering  to  its  EfTence,  as  Figure 
is  to  Body.  But  if  we  remember  what  was  laid  down  above  -j- 
and  carefully  examine  the  Sentiments  and  Conceptions  of  our 
Mind,  it  will  appear  that  the  nature  of  Matter  (as  far  as  we  know 
©f  it)  is  indifferent  to  Motion^  or  Reft^  and  moves  not  except  it  be  mo- 
ved. 

N  O  7'  E  S. 


u 


fooieotlter  known  Truth  ;  then  the  Nr'trnJ^ty  of 
that  Truth  arifes  from  the  Relation  which  that 
Truth  has  to  fome  confequential  Truth.    Necef- 

Jity  is  alfo  apply 'd  to  Axioms  ;  and  then  it  has 
Relation  to  the  terms  themfelves,  /.  e.  it  ari- 
feth  from  the  Relation  which  is  between  the 
terms  themfelves ;  and  means,  that  fuppollng  or 
laying  down  thofe  Terms,  that  Relation  or 
Gonneftion  between  them  cannot  but  be.  Far- 
ther, the  fame  may  be  faid  oi  Truth,  as  oi  Means, 
Truth  being  relative  alfo;  confequently  fuch 
Phrafes  as  thefe,  true,  or  falfe  in  itfelf,  a  con- 
tradiHion  in  itfelf  \  or  abjolutely  fuch,  &c.  are 
very  abfurd  ones. 

Neceflity  is  alfo  apply'd  to  Exiftence,  and 
then  it  arifeth  either  from  the  relation,  which 
the  Exiftence  of  that  thing  of  which  it  is  af- 
firm'd  has  to  the  Exiftence  of  other  things;  or 
it  arifeth  from  the  relation  which  the  Exiftence 
of  that  thing,  of  which  it  is  affirm'd  has  to  the 
Manner  of  its  otan  Exiftence.  In  the  former 
Signification,  when  Neceflity  of  Exiftence  has 
Relation  to  the  Exiftence  of  other  things,  it 
denotes,  that  the  Suppofition  of  the  Non-exi- 
ftenceof  that  thing  of  which  Neceflity  is  af- 
firm'd, implies  the  non-exifience  of  things 
■which  w«  know  to  exift.  Thus  fome  Indepen- 
dent Being  does  neceffarily  Exijl.  Becaufe  to 
fuppofe  no  independent  Being  implies  that  there 
are  no  Dependent  Beings  \  the  contrary  of  which 
we  know  to  be  true,  fo  that  Neceflity  of  Exi- 
ftence, in  this  Senfe,  is  nothing  clfe  but  Ne- 
ceflity of  Truth  as  related  to  Confequential 
Truth.  And  this  fort  of  Proof  is  call'd,  De- 
monftratio  a  Pofieriori. 

^  When  the  Neceflity  of  Exiftence  arifes  from 
the  Relation  which  the  Exiftence  of  any  thing 
has  to  the  Manner  of  its  own  Exiftence;  then 


Neceflity  means,  that  that  thing  of  which  it  is 
afiirm'd  exifts  after  fuch  a  M.mner  thit  it  never 
could  have  not  exifted.  Thus  everj'  Indepen- 
dent Being,  or  every  Being  exifting  without  a 
Caufe,  is  mccffarily  exifting.  Becaufe  fuch  a 
Being,  from  the  very  manner  of  its  exifting, 
could  not  begin  to  exift,  therefore  muft  always 
have  exifted,  /.  e.  does  neceffarily  exift.  For 
to  fuppofe  a  Being  to  begin  to  exift,  is  to  fup^ 
pofe  a  Mutation,  viz,  from  Non-Entity  to  En- 
tity ;  and  to  fuppofe  a  Mutation  is  to  fuppofe  a 
Caufe ;  For  if  there's  no  Caufe,  every  thing 
muft  continue  as  it  was :  Therefore  every  Being 
which  had  no  C^a/^  of  Exiftence,  i.e.  which 
is  Independent,  cannot  begin  to  exift,  confe- 
quently cannot  be  fuppofed  not  to  exift,  i.e.  is 
neceffarily  exiftent  *.  Whether  this  is  Demon- 
firatio  a  priori  I  leave  to  be  determin'd  by  the 
learned.  I  think  it  is;  becaufe  Neceflity  of 
Exiftence  follows  from  Independency,  or  Ex- 
ifting without  a  Caufe.  No  matter  whether 
Independency  is  prov'd  a  Pqfterieri,  or  a  Pri- 
ori. 

N.  B.  Neceflity,  as  apply'd  to  Exiftence  in 
thefe  two  ways,  muft  carefully  be  diftlnguiflied.' 
For  tho'  an  Independent  Being  cannot  be  ne- 
ceflarily  exiftent  in  the  former  Senfe,  without 
being  fo  in  the  latter  alfo:  yet  it  may  be  ne- 
ceflarily  exiftent  in  the  latter  Senfe,  without 
being  fo  in  the  former.  There  may  be  two  or 
more  neceflarily  exiftent  Beings  in  the  latter 
Senfe,  though  in  the  former  there  can  be  but 
one  neceflarily  exiftent  Being  :  which  fhewsthe 
i nconclufivenefs  of  Dr.  Clarke's  feventh pro^o- 
fition.  And  upon  the  whole,  I  think  we  may  be 
convinc'd,  that  no  Ideas  can  poflibly  be  fix'd 
to  this  Propofition,  Necefftty  abfoiuti  in  itftlf, 
[  See  alfo  the  Notes  14,  and  18.  j 


f  In  the  Author's  laft  Note. 


•'See  Note  14. 


a  4-  Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

vcd.  Motion  therefore  does  not  follow  from  its  nature,  nor  is  it  con- 
tain'd  in  its  EiTence,  nor  do  we  conceive  it  to  arife  from  thence  j 
Matter  is  therefore  merely  paflive  in  regard  to  Motion,  and  an  Agent 
muft  be  fought  elfewhere.  If  you  fay  it  has  been  in  Motion  from  E- 
terniry,  you'll  be  never  the  nearer;  for  Duration  alters  not  the  nature 
of  things.  If  it  has  been  mov'd  from  Eternity,  it  has  had  an  eternal 
Caufe,  and  fince  Matter  is  only  paflive  with  refpedt  to  the  Motion 
which  is  in  it,  if  it  was  from  Eternity,  it  was  ftill,  pajive,  only,  and 
there  wanted  an  eternal  Agent  to  produce  eternal  Motion  (lo.)  in  it: 
for  eternal  Adiion  cannot  be  more  eafily  conceived,  without  an  eternal 
Agent,  than  temporary,  without  a  temporal  one.  But,  you'll  fay, 
what  is  eternal,  fmce  it  was  never  made,  requires  no  Caufe.  Does  ic 
not  fo?  Suppofe  the  Sun  to  have  fhin'd  from  Eternity,  and  the 
Earth,  nourifhed  by  its  heat,  to  have  undergone  eternal  viciflitudes  of 
Seafons;  had  thofe  viciflitudes  therefore  no  Caufe?  Would  they  be 
ever  the  lefs  dependent  on  the  Sun  as  their  Source  and  Original  ? 
Hence  it  appears  that  Eternity  of  Acftion  does  not  exclude  an  ac- 
tive Caufe ;  and  it  is  fo  far  from  truth  that  fuch  Ad:ion  was  never 
produced,  becaufe  it  is  conceiv'd  to  have  been  from  Eternity,  that 
we  mufl:  rather  fay  it  has  always  been  produced.  For,  in  the  Infl:ance 
given,  it  appears  that  the  Sun  did  always,  and  from  eternity,  caufe 
the  change  of  Seafons :  Not  that  I  think  the  Sun  really  was,  or  could 
be  eternal,  but  if  Motion  fliould  be  fuppofed  eternal  (which  is  the 
only  fubterfuge  left  to  them  that  deny  the  necefllty  of  an  Agent,  in 
order  to  the  exifl:ence  of  Motion)  the  Sun  might  equally  be  eternal 
with  its  light  and  their  effects.  And  if  this  be  granted,  it  will  plain- 
ly appear,  that  Etermfy  of  ABion  does  not  exclude  an  aBive  Caufe, 
If  then  we  follow  the  guidance  of  our  thoughts,  we  mufl:  acknow- 
ledge 

NOTES, 


(lo.)  Eternal  Motion  feemi  to  be  a  con  tra- 
dition, [  See  Infinite  Series  in  N.  5.  and 
S.  C's  Impartial  Enquiry,  cj.  and  x  b.  ]  un- 
lels  we  could  conceive  two  Eternils,  one  be- 
fore the  ether;  as  every  mover  muft,  in  the 
order  of  our  Ideas,  neceffirily  operate  before 
ihey  moved :  Thd'e  things  therefore  wiiich  im- 


ply Beginning,  Change,  Succeflion,  or  In- 
crcafe,  are  finite  as  well  as  in  Duration,  as  in 
any  other  refpeft,  and  confequently  the  Suppo- 
fitions  here  and  below  are  all  impofliblc  ones. 
Concerning  the  Equivocation  which  arifes 
from  ufmg  the  Words  M'Aion  and  Anion  promif- 
cuou%,  as  our  Author  fcems  to  do,  fee  N.  62. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evih  2^5, 

Tedge  that  there  is  fomething  befide  Matter  and  Motion^  which  muft 
be  the  Caufe  of  xVIotion. 

IV.  Secondly,  as  to  Matter  itfelf,  if  we  may  fuppofe  it  to  have  had  ^j^^^  ^^^^^^ 
a  beginning,  or  to  be  annihilated,  w^^r^^ry  Exiftence  will  manifeflly  requires  a 
not  be  imply'd  in  its  Nature,  for  that  may  be  taken  from  it,  at  leaft  Caufe  of  its- 
in  thought}   but  a  thing,  cannot  be  feparated  from  its  Nature  or  Ef-^"''^  ^"^^"^ 
fence  even  by  the  Mind :  If  therefore  Exiftence  were  ejjential  to  Mat- 
ter, it  could  not  be  divided  from  it  even  in  thought,  that  is,  we  could 
not  conceive  Matter  not  to  exift.     But  who  doubts  whether  he  can  da 
this?     Is  it  not  as  eafy  to  conceive  that  Space  which  the  Material 
World  occupies  to  hQ  empty ^  that  is,  void  of  Matter ;  2iS  full?    Can- 
not the  Underftanding  affign  to  the  Material  World  a  beginning  and 
an  end?     They  who  admit  of  Space,  or  2,  Vacuum  (11.)  cannot  deny 

but- 

NOTES, 


1 1 .  Thefe  two  Words,  Space  and  Vacuum, 
the'  they  ought  perhaps  to  have  both  the  fame 
meaning,  i.e.  neither  of  them  to  mean  any- 
real  thing  or  quality  cxifting  in  Nature,  but 
only  a  Negation  of  Matter  and  its  Qualities, 
yet  as  the  former  is  more  evidently  a  pofitivc 
term,  it  is  apt  to  convey  an  Idea  of  fomething 
pofitive,  and  thereby  leads  us  to  frame  fome 
imagination  of  that  fomething,  and  fo  at 
length  draws  into  a  Notion  quite  different 
from  that,  which  the  latter  Word  more  natu- 
rally offers,  and  which  comes  nearer  to  the 
truth  of  the  Cafe  ;  and  therefore  I  think  it  not 
quite  fo  convenient  to  ufe  thefe  two  Words 
promifcuoufly.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  our 
fubftituting  the  former  of  thefe  terms  for  the 
latter,  when  the  Ideas  ufually  fixt  to  them  have 
in  reality  nothing  to  do  with  one  another,  may 
not  have  given  rife  to  moft  of  the  Difputes  a- 

fainft  a  Vacuuniy  which  have  been  carried  on 
y  many  able  Writers.  Vacuum,  in  Natural 
Philofophy,  is  (according  to  the  true  import 
of  the  Word)  only  Empttnefi,  or  abfence  of 
Matter,  i.  e.  a  Term  that  implies  mere  Nega- 
tion ;  tho\  when  we  come  to  prove  that  Mat- 
ter cxilb  not  c\CTy  where,  or  that  there  is  real- 
]y  any  fuch  emptin^fs  or  abfence  of  Matter,  we 
ace  oi^lig'd,  Uixo*  the  defeat  of  language,  to 


make  ufe  of  pofitive  Terms  about  it,  vii:.  that 
there  is  a  Vacuum  in  this  or  that  place,  or  that 
there  is  a  real  foundation  in  Nature  for  fuppo- 
fing  it,  iffc.  Hence,  probably,  Metaphyficians, 
when  they  come  to  confider  it,  being  ufed  to 
contemplate  real  Effences,  arc  led  to  under- 
ftand  it,  as  fomething  pcfitivc  ;  which  might 
properly  be  faid  to  l>e  here  zxA  there,  i^c.  Their, 
next  ftep  is,  to  bring  it  under  the  Imaginatioriy 
and  fo  finding  the  Idea  of  Space,  or  Extenlion, 
in  fome  meafure  connefted  with  this  Emptinefs, 
they  eafily  fubilitute  one  for  the  other,  and  of- 
ten change  the  negative  Idea  into  a  pofitive 
one,  and  define  Vacuum  to  be  Extenjion  void  of 
Solidity,  or  Space  VJ  it  bout  Body*,  Whereas  the 
Ideas  of  Vacuity  and  ExtcnfiCR  have  no  real 
connexion  with  each  other,  as  was  faid  before, 
tho'  they  be  very  apt  to  go  together.  Well 
then,  thefe  two  diftinft  Ideas  being  both  in- 
cluded under  the  Word  Vacuum,  it  becomes  e- 
quivocal,  and  confequcntly  that  may  be  affirm 'd 
or  deny'd  of  it  according  to  the  one  Idea, 
which  cannot  according  to  the  other,  and.- 
here's  room  forendlefs  Juggle,  v.  g.  It  m;^r 
be  faid  that  there  is  a  real  foundation  in  Na- 
ture for  fuppofing  a  Vacuum  in  the  negative 
fenfe  of  the  Word,  /.  e.  as  fignifying  mere  em- 
ptinefs J  but  the  fame  thing  may  be  deny'd  of  it . 
E  i^* 


^ Locke,  B.  2:  C.I 3;  S'tl. 


26  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

but  Matter  is  at  leaft  mentally  feparable  Efom'Exiflence.  For  Space 
may  be  conceived  either  full  or  empty  j  that  is,  with  Matter,  or 
without  it.  The  Notion  therefore  of  the  Creation  of  Matter,  is  no 
more  repugnant  to  our  Conceptions,  than  the  Creation  of  Space. 

V.  But  whether  there  be  any  fuch  thing  as  Space  or  no,  we  are 
rijy  exiftent,  certain  that  we  have  an  Idea  of  it,  tho'  whence  we  had  it,  Philofo- 
from^^r      phers.are  not  agreed.     Thofe  that  deny  any  diftinftion  between  it  and 

Confeffion  Body, 

of  thofe  Perfons  who  fuppofc, Space  to  be  the  Image  of  the  Body. 


That  it  is 
not  neceffa 


.ZV  G  TE  S, 


!»  the  pofitive,  /.  e.  as  (landing  for  pure  exten- 
iion,  which  is  an  ahj}ra£t  IJe/J,  form'd  by  the 
mnd  itfelf,  and,  as  fuch,  has  no  foundation 
any  where  elfe.  Again,  Philofophers,  who 
take  a  Vacuum  for  Space  or  Extenfion  \\\  the 
abftraft,  ftifly  deny  that  there  is  a  Vacuum  in 
Nature,  '  which  is  true  indeed  of  abfolute 
Space,  which  exifts  only  in  the  Mind,  but  is 
not  fo  of  Vacuity  or  abfence  of  Matter,  which 
has  as  real  a  foundation  in  nature  as  Matter  it- 
felf has  :  except  we'll  argue  that  it  cannot  be 
faid  to  be  or.to  have  exijience  predicated  of  it, 
becaufe  'tis  only  a  negation  j  which  is  playing 
upon,  and  puzzling  one  another  with  words. 
To  illuftrate  what  has  been  faid  of  the  difputes 
about  a  Vacuum,  I  fhall  prefent  the  Reader 
with  Tome  Arguments  brought  againfl  it  by 
Mr.  Green  zndiBayle;  which  may  be  of  ufe  to 
us,  fo  far  as  they  overthrow  the  Reality  of  ab- 
folute, fimple  Space,  which  they  do  efFeftually, 
tho'  I  take  them  to  be  mere  quibbles  with  re- 
gard to  the  End  for  which  thefe  Authors  feem 
to  have  urged  them.  They  may  ferve  alfo  for 
another  Inllance  of  the  great  confufion  caus'd 
by  a  jumble  of  Mathematics  and  Metaphylics 
together  :  an  Example  of  which  was  given  be- 
fore in  the  Word  Infinite,  N.  5. 

**  Extenfion  into  Length,  Breadth  and 
**  Thicknefs,  or  what  is  calTd  mere  Space,  or 
"  Dillance,  is  a  Quantity  abftraded.  by  the 
*'  Mind,  as  all  other  Mathematical  Quantities 
*'  are;  as  a  Line,  or  Superficies;  andean  be 
*'  no  more  imagin'd  to  exift  in  nature  alone, 
*'  than  Length  or  Breadth  can.  A  Line  is 
"  produced  from  the  flowing  of  a  point;  a 
^  "Surface  from  the  flowing  of  a  Line ;  and  a  j 


Space  or  Mathematical  Solid  from  tlie  flow- 
'  ing  of  a  Surfice  :  But  'tis  ov/n'd  that  there 
is  no  fuch  real  point,  and  confequently  no 
fuch  Line  in  being,  therefore  no  fuch  Sur- 
face. And  what  reafon  can  there  be  affign'd 
why  we  may  not  go  one  Step  farther,  and 
from  the  fame  principles  conclude  there  is 
no  fuch  Solid.  For  how  is  it  poffible  for  a 
Superficies  which  has  not  a  being,  and  is  i- 
maginary  and  abflnfted,  to  produce  an  ef- 
fect which  is  not  equally  fo  i 
"  We  have  faid,  that  Length,  Breadth,  and 
Thicknefs,  is  the  Definition  of  Imaginary 
Space;  and  it  is  likewifc  the  Notion  we 
have  of  a  Vacuum,  as  to  the  nature  and  elTence 
of  it:  for  the  foreign  properties  of  Light, 
or  Heat,  or  Sound,  ^c.  are  not  included  in 
the  conceptions  our  Minds  have  form'd  of 
Room  to  move  in,  or  fimple  Space.  If 
therefore  the  Definition  of  Imaginary  Space 
and  a  Vacuum,  are  the  fame,  and  a  Vacuum 
is  real  Space,  it  follows,  that  real  Space  and 
imaginary  are  the  fame,  which  is  a  contra- 
didion.  Since  to  abftraft  any  thing  in  the 
Mind  from  Beings  as  they  really  exift,  is 
not  to  confider  Beings  as  they  really  ex- 
ift. 

'•  From  this  Idea  of  Space,  being  only  an 
abftradled  one,  it  is  eafy  to  give  an  account 
of  what  Place  is,  namely,  that  it  is  only  a 
portion  of  this  abftradled  Space,  we  have 
mentioned,  feparated  from  the  reft,  and  ap- 
ply'd  to  that  body  which  it  confiders  as  a 
meafureof  its  capacity.  Therefore  primary 
or  abfolute  Place  alfo,  as  well  as  Space,  is  a 
creature    of  the   mind,    and  nothing  really 

*'  exifting. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

Body,  bid  us  imagine  Matter  or  the  World  to  be  annihilated ;  and 
then,  if  w&  remember  the  things  that  did  exift,  without  confidering 
of  what  kind  they  were,  but  only  that  they  were  without  the  Mind, 
we  have,  wiiat  we  call  Space.     If  this  be  true,,  then  it  will  be  certain 

E,  2  that 


^7 


N  O  ^  E  S^. 


**  exfAing,  as  fome  Philofophers  imagine." 
Mr.  Green's  Principles  of  Natural  Pkilofjphy, 
B.  I .  C.  4.  i).  8,  1 8. 

"  Let  us  rummage  as  much  as  we  pleafe  into 
all  the  receffes  of  our  Mind,  we  fhail  never 
find  there  any  Idea  of  an  unmoveable,  indi- 
vifible,  and  penetrable  extenfion.  And  yet 
if  there  is  a  Vacuum,  there  muft  exift  an 
ELxtenfion  eflentially  endued  with  thefe  three 
Attributes.  It  is  no  fmall  difficulty  to  be 
forced  to  admit  the  exiftence  of  a  Nature,  of 
which  we  have  no  Idea,  and  is  befides  re- 
pugnant to  the  cleareft  Ideas  of  our  Mind. 
But  there  are  a  great  many  other  inconve- 
niencies  which  attend  this.  Is  this  Vacuum, 
or  immoveable,  indivifible,  and  penetrable 
Extenfion,  a  Subflance  or  a  Mode?  It  muft 
be  one  of  the  two,  for  the  adequate  Divi- 
fion  of  Being  comprehends  but  thefe  two 
Members.  If  it  be  a  Mode,  they  muft  then 
define  its  Subftance  J  but  that  is  what  they 
can  never  do.  If  it  be  a  Subftance,  I  ask 
whether  it  be  created  or  uncreated  ?  If  crea- 
ted, it  may  perifti  without  the  Matter,  from 
which  it  is  diftinfl,  ceafing  to  be.  But  it  is 
abfurd  and  contradidlory,  that  a  Vacuum, 
that  is,  a  Space  diftindi  from  Bodies,  fhould 
be  deftroy'd,  and  yet  that  Bodies  fhould  be 
diftant  from  each  other,  as  they  may  be  af- 
ter the  deflrudlion  of  the  Vatuum.  But  if 
this  Space  diftinft  from  Bodies  is  an  uncrea- 
ted Subftance,  it  will  follow  either  that  it 
is  God,  or  that  God  is  not  the  only  Sub- 
ftance which  neceJTarily  exift^.  Which  part 
foever  we  take  of  this  Alternative,  we  (hall 
fiijd  ourfelves  confounded.  The  laft  is  a 
formal,  and  the  othy,  at  leaft,  a  material 
Impiety:  for  all  extenfion  is  compofed  of 
diftinft  parts,  and  confequently  feparable 
from  each  other  ;  whence  it  refults,  that  if 
^  God  was  extended  he  would  not  be  a  iim- 


plc,  immutable,  and  properly  infinite  Be- 
ing, bat  a  Mafs  of  Beings,  Ens  per  aggrega- 
tionem,  each  of  which  would  be  finite,  tho'  ' 
all  of  them  together  WDuld  be  unlimited; 
He  would  be  like  the  Material  World,  wiilcK 
in  the  Cartefinn  Hypothefis,  is  an  infinite 
■  Extenfion.  And  as  to  thole  who  fhould 
pretend  that  God  may  be  extended  without 
being  material  or  corporeal,  and  alledge,  as 
an  Argument,  his  Simplicity,  you  will  find 
them  folidly  refuted  in  one  of  Mr.  Arnaults 
Books,  from  which  I  fhall  cite  only  thefe 
Words  :  So  far  is  the  Simplicity  of  God  frtm 
allowing  us  room  to  think  that  he  may  be  ex- 
tended, that  all  Divines  have  acknowledged^ 
after  St.  Thomas,  that  it  is  a  necejfary  confe- 
quence  of  the  Simplicit-j  ef  God,  not  to  be  ex- 
tended. Will  they  fay,  with  the  School- 
Men,  that  Space  is  at  moft  no  more  than  a 
privation  of  Body ;  that  it  hath  no  reality, 
and  that,-  properly,  fpeaking,  a  Vacuum  is 
nothing?  But  this  is  fuch  an  unreafonable 
AflTertion,  that  all  the  modem  Philofophers 
who  declare  for  a  Vacuum,  have- laid  it  afidd, 
tho'  never  fo  convenient  in  other  refpefts. 
Gajfendus  carefully  avoided' any  reliance  oil 
fu.ch.an  abfurd  Hypothefis;  but  chofe  ra- 
ther to  plunge  himfelf.into  the  moft  hideous 
abyfs  of  conjefturing,  thatall  Beings  are  not 
either  Subftances  or  Accidents,  and  that  all 
Subftances  are- not  either  Spirits  or  Bodies, 
and  of  placing  the  extenfion  of  Space  a- 
mongft  tlie  Beings,  whixrh.  are  neither  Cor- 
poreal nor  Spiritual,  neither  Subftance  nor 
Accidents. 

"  Mr.  Locke y  believing  that  he.  could  hot 
define  what  a  /^tff«*/w  is,  hath  yet  given  us 
clearly  to  undcrftand,  that  he  took  it  for  a 
pofitivc  Being.  He  had  too  clear  a  Head' 
not  to  difcern,  that  nothingncfs  cannot  be 
extended  in   length,    breadth,  and  depth. 


sptti, 
Mrj. 


28  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

that  Matter  is  not  Self-exiftent:  for  we  may  confider  it  as  annihila- 
ted, neither  can  we  attribute  any  other  nature  to  it,  than  fuch  as  an- 
fwers  to  our  Conceptions  of  it.  If  Space  therefore,  according  to 
them,  be  a  Phantafm  of  the  Body,  that  is,  an  Idea  of  Body  recall'd 
to  mind,  which  formerly  was,  but  now  is  not,  or  is  not  fuppos'd  to 
.  be,  'tis  certain,  that  Body  or  Matter,  fo  far  as  we  know  any  thing  of 


:2V  0  r  E  S, 


Mr.  Hartfoeker  hath  very  clearly  apprehended 
this  Truth.  There  is  no  Vacuity  in  mture, 
laith  he,  this  ought  to  be  acknowledged  without 
difficulty,  becaufe  itJ.s  utterly  cmtradiSlcry  to 
conceive  a  mere  non-entity,  with  all  the  proper- 
ties which  can  only  agree  to  a  real  Being.  But 
jf  it  is  contradiftory,  thatcothingnefsfhould 
be  endued  with  extenfion  or  any  other  Qua- 
lity, it  is  no  lefs  contradidory,  that  Exten- 
fion fhould  be  i  Jimple  Being,  fmce  it  con- 
tains fome  things  of  which  we  may  truly 
deny  what  we  may  truly  affirm  of  fome  o- 
thers,  which  it  includes.  The  Space  fill'd 
up  by  the  Sun  is  not  the  fame  Space  that  is 
taken  up  by  the  Moon  ;  for  if  the  Sun  and 
the  Moon  fill'd  the  fame  Space,  thofe  two 
Luminaries  would  be  in  the  fame  place,  and 
penetrated  one  with  another,  fince  two 
things  cannot  be  penetrated  with  a  third, 
without  being  penetrated  betwixt  them- 
felves.  It  is  moll  evident,  that  the  Sun  and 
Moon  are  not  in  the  lame  place.  It  may 
then  be  faid  truly  of  the  Space  of  the  Sun, 
that  it  is  penetrated  by  the  Sun  ;  and  it  may 
as  truly  be  deny'd  of  the  Space  penetrated 
by  the  Moon.  There  are  then  two  portions 
of  Space,  really  diftinft  from  one  another, 
by  reafon  that  they  receive  two  contrary  de- 
nominations of  being  penetrated  and  not  be- 
ing penetratted  by  the  Sun.     Which  fully 


"  coiifutes  thofe  who  ventwre  to  affert  tnat 
"  Space  is  nothing  but  the  immenfity  of  God: 
"  and  it  is  certain  that  the  Divine  Immenfity 
"  could  not  be  the  place  of  Bodies,  without 
"  giving  room  to  conclude  that  it  is  compofed 
"  of  as  many  real  diftindl  parts  as  there  ate 
"  Bodies  in  the  World. 

"  It  will  be  in  vain  for  you  to  alledge,  that 
"  Infinity  hath  no  parts;  this  muft  neceffarily 
"  be  falie  in  all  infinite  Numbers,  fince  Num- 
"  ber  eflentially  includes  feveral  Units.  Nor 
"  will  you  have  any  more  reafon  to  tell  us 
*'  that  incorporeal  extenfion  *  is  wholly  con- 
"  tain'd  in  its  Space,  and  alfo  wholly  contain'd 
"  in  each  part  of  its  Space  :  for  it  is  not  only 
"  what  we  have  no  Idea  of,  and  befides, 
"  thwarts  all  our  Ideas  of  Extenfion  ;  but  alio 
"  what  will  prove  thit  all  bodies  take  up  tTie 
"  fame  place,  fmce  each  could  not  take  up  its 
"  own,  if  the  Divine  Extenfion  was  entirely 
"^penetrated  by  each  Body  numerically  the 
'*  fame  with  the  Sun  and  with  the  Earth.  Y"ou 
"  will  find  in  f  Mr.  Jrnauld,  a  folid  refuta- 
"  tion  of  thofe  who  attribute  to  God  the  difFu- 
"  fing  himfelf  throughout  infinite  Space.  Crit. 
Dm.  p.  3083,  3084.  See  alfo  Epifcop.  p.  294. 
If  any  Perfon  wants  any  more  Arguments  a- 
gainft  the  Exiftcnce  of  fimplc  Extenfion,  or 
the  application  of  it  to  a  Spirit,  he  may  find 
enough  in  Bayle,  p.  2790,  3P77,  tfr. 


••  7ota  in  toto,  &  fita  tn  fingulis  partilus:  that  is,  wTiat  the  School-Men  fay  of  the  prefence  of 
the  Soul  in  a  human  Body,    and  of  the  prefence  of  Angels  in  certain  places. 

f  Arnauli,  Letter  8  and  9  to  Father  Malchranche.  See  alfo  a  Book  of  Peter  Petit,^  de  Exten- 
fione  Anima  i^  rerum  incorporearum  natura.  And  M.  de  la  Chambre^z  Anfwer  to  it,  which  he  pub-' 
Jifh'd  at  Paris,  Anno  1 666.  4/5.  with  this  Title,  Defence  de  F Extenfion  ^  de  partes  libres  de  Pamg^ 
all  the  reafons  he  alledges  to  fhew,  that  extenfion  and  Spirituality  may  bc^ggcther,  are  fo  VireaJc, 
thatihey  aj;e  only  good  to  fhew  the  falfity  of  his  AiTertion. 


a<) 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 

its  nature  is  indifferent  to  exiflence  or  non-exiftencc.  It  lias  iiot 
therefore  Exiftence  of  itfelf  j  for  that  which  exills  by  neceffity  of 
nature^  Exiflence  enters  into  its  Idea  (12.),  nor  can  it  be  conceiv'd  o- 
therwife  than  as  exilling. 

VI.  Others  deny  that  Sj>ace  is  difVinguifhable  from  Matter,  any  o- And  ofthofe 
ther  way  than  as  a  general  ^atttity  is  from  a  particular  one ;   For,  J  "^  ^"^j^g 
as  when  Individuals  are  changed,   the  Nature  of  Man  or  Animal  r^-diftinguifha- 
mains  unchang  d :  Jb  when  Body  is  changed  &r  tranjlated  into  an  other^^^^^^ 

E  3  place,  othcrwik 

than  as  Ex- 
tenfion  in  general  is  from  a  particular  Extenlion. 


NOTES. 


(12.)  We  cannot  allow  of  this  or  any  fuch 
Argument  drawn  from  this  necejfity  of  nature, 
taken  in  a  pofitive  fenfe,  for  the  reafons  which 
will  be  given  in  Note  14.  And  Ca.o' Matter  it- 
felf perhaps  cannot  ftriftly  be  prov'd  not  to  be 
Eternal,  yet  ahy  Body,  or  Syflem  of  Bodies,  for 
med  out  of  it,  as  the  ingenious  Author  of  the 
Enquiry  into  the  Evidence  of  the  Chrijlian  Reli- 
gion has  fully  prov'd  *  muft  neeejfarily  have  haa 
a  beginning ;  and  that  matter,  or  any  material 
fubjlance,  is  not  eternal,  independent, f^c.  maybe 
made  probable  from  fome  fuch  Argument  a? 
this.  We  conclude  from  the  faculties  of  our- 
mind  (viz.  thinking,  volition,  l^c.  all  which 
are  in  a  perpetual  flux,  and  as  it  were  made  up 
of  SucceflionS)  and  ccfnfequently  incapable  of 
Eternity,  by  Notes  5,  and  X.  c.)  that  it  didi 
"not  exift  from  Eternity,  therefore  it  had  its  ex 
iftence  from  fome  Caufe,  (which  Catife,  if  itfelf 
was  not  eternal  and  independent,  had  its  exi-' 
ftence  from  another,  and  that  from  another, 
and  fo  on  till  we  come  at  one  which  was)  from 
the  fame  caufe  that  it  had  its  exiflence,  it  had  alfo 
•all  its  faculties;  the  perception  or  knowledge 
of  matter  is  one  of  thefe  Faculties,  therefore  it 
liad  the  perception  of  matter  fr6m  the  above 
mention'd  caufe.  Now  it  could  not  have  the 
perception  of  Matter  from  the  forcmention'd 
caufe,  unlefs  the  caufe  itfelf  had  it,  therefore 
"that  Caufe  alfo  had  the  perception  of  matter. 
But  if  matter  was  eternal,  independent,  k^c. 
float  cjofe,  as  far  as  we  can  apprehend,  cottW 


not  have  any  piirception  of  it:  for  as  tliat  cau'e 
itfelf  was  alfo  eternal,  independent,  ^c.  it 
could  not  poffibly  be  any  ways  affedled  ah  ex- 
tra, nor  confequently  by  matter,  nor  confe- 
quently  have  zxiy  notices  or  perceptions  of  m^nerf 
unlefs  matter  proceeded  from  that  caufe  itfelf, 
and  was  created  by  it,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
Suppofition  of  its  Eternity.  But  that  caufe 
has  the  perception  of  matter,  becaufe  we  have, 
therefore  matter  muft  have  proceeded  from  that 
caufe,  or  been  cheated  by  it,  and  confequently 
was  not  eternal,  independent,  ^c.     Or  thus: 

If  Matter  were  an  eternal,  independent  prin- 
ciple, it  feems  impoffible  for  God  to  have  haH 
any  manner  of  knowledge  of  it,  becaufe  it 
could  no  ways  affe6t  him  ;  fince  he  alfo  is  in- 
dependent'. \i\x\.he  has  knowledge  of  it,  becaufe 
we  have  ;  therefore  it  is  not  an  eternal  inde- 
pendent Principle. 

'Tis  here  taken  for-gl^nted,  that  Matter,  is 
elfehtially  incapable  of /^w^^/,  nor  can  poffibly 
have  any  thinking  polity  fuper-added  to  it,  and 
confequently  that  the  firft  Caufe  cannot  be  Ma- 
terial; which  will  appear  by  the  fame  Argu- 
ment which  is  brought  to  prove  a  thinking  Be- 
ing incapable  of  Extenfion,  in  Note  n.  Be- 
fides,  from  all  the  proofs  of  a  Vacuum,  both 
external znA  inter fperfed^n  appears  that  all  Matter 
is  every  way  limited  or  defe(5live,  and  confe- 
quently requires  a  LimiterotExternal  Caufe,  and 
therefore  cannot  belong  to  the  firft  Caufe.  See 
Xf. 


'*-Sec  the  Note  X-d, 


Jo       *  Concerning  the  Origin  of  RviU 

flace^  the  Extenjion  of  the  place  which  it  occupied  remains  unchanged, 
namely  empt\\  or  filfd  with  another  Body.  I  would  not  fpend  a  Cen- 
fure  on  this  reafoning  j  but  granting  it  to  be  true,  it  would  follow, 
that  Body  or  Matter  contains  nothing  in  the  Idea  of  it,  which  might 
induce  us  to  believe,  that  it  is  of  itfelf,  or  exifts  by  the  NecefHty  of 
its  Nature  :  but  on  the  contrary,  that  it  may  be  annihilated  at  leaftin 
Conception. 

If  therefore  wc  confult  our  Ideas,  we  mufl  confefs  that  Matter 
docs   not  exift  neceflarily,  but  is  as  indifferent  to  Exigence,  or  Non- 
exiftence,  as  to  Motion  or  Reft,  i.  e.  is  in  that  refped:  merely  paffive. 
It  requires  a  Caufe  then  which  may  determine  it  to  Rxiftence  no  Icfs 
than  to  Motion.  For  that  which  is  not. of  itfelf  muft  neceffarily  be  of 
another,  nor  can  we  know  that  any  thing  is  of  itfelf,  other  wife  than, 
,  from  the  Ideas  which  we  have  of  its  nature.,  ,if  thefe  reprefent ,  the 
nature  of  any  thing  as  necejj'arily  exifling,  fo  that  we  cannot  concei^'e 
it  not  to  be,  we  enquire  na  farther  about  its  caufe;  if  not?,  we  fly 
to  a  Caufe  j  nor  is  the  Underflanding  fatisfy'd.  till  it  Jias  found  one. 
Why  are  we  inquifitive  about  the-  Original  of  .Man,-  oe  any  thing 
elfe?  but  only  becaufe  our  Conceptions  reprefent  thefe  as  indifferent 
in  themfelves  x.o  Being,  and ;  therefore,  as  requiring,  fome  Caufe  of 
their  being  diflincfl  from  themfelves.     From  the  Nature  then  of  Mat^ 
ter  as- well  as  Motim^  we„ ar^e  forc'd ..  to  admit  of  y?;zo^^^r  Principle  to 
be  the  Caufe  of  bioth.' 
That  Space        VII.  Thirdly.  As  to  aS)^^?^^,.  many  doubt  whether , its  Nature  be  di- 
feems  at  firft  ftinguifhabk  .from  Exiflence.  -  Whether  it,  can  be  -  annihilated  even 
ra^^ie  from    ^  thought,  or  ponccived  not  tq  have  been, ,  For  when  the  whole  ma- 
Exiftence.     terial  World  is  annihilated .  in  the  Mind,  the  Idea  of  Space  remains, 
as  of  a  thing  yet  exifting-,  k  obtrudes  itfelf  upon  the  Underflanding, 
and  fuffers  us  not  to^affign.  any  beginning  or  end  of  its  Exiflence.   It 
forces  us  therefore  to -confefe,' whether  we  will  or  no,  that  it  exifls  ; 
nor  does  it  feem  to  require  ^a  Caufe  why  it  exifls,  fince  it  is  of  fuch 
a  Nature  as,  being  felf-fufhcient,  mull  have  exiftence  of  itfelf.     For 
what  will  be  felf-exiflent,  if  that,  be  not,  which  cannot  even  be  con- 
ceiv'd  not  to  exifl  ? 
'Tis  fhewn,       VIII.  This  feems  to  argue  flrongly  for  the  Self-exijlence  of  Space. 
thit  this  may  Yet  a  doubt  may  arife,  whether  this  Inability  of  our  Underflanding, 
SejiX?.     ^Q  feparate  the  Nature  of  ^^ace  from  Exiilence,  proceed  from  that 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

fame  Nature  of  Space,  or  rather  from  the  imperfection  of  our  Reafon. 
For,  tho'  all  our  fimple  Conceptions  muft  for  the  molt  part  be 
look'd  upon  as  true,  as  we  faid  before  *,  yet  thefe  are  to  be  excepted 
from  this  Rule  in  which  we  find  any  grounds  of  fallacy  or  prejudice. 
And  in  this  reafoning  about  Space,  it  is  to  be  fufpedled  that  we  con- 
ne(5l  Exiftencc  with  its  Nature  merely  out  of  prejudice. 

IX.  We  may  underftand  how  this  comes  to  pafs,  if  we  confider, 
ift.  That  our  Conceptions  come  for  the  moft  part  from  without^  when 
therefore  fomething  is  prefented  to  our  minds,  we  always  conceive  it 
as  without  us :  this  Notion  therefore  of  external  and  internal  adheres 
to  all  our  Conceptions,  and  we  continually  affign  a  Flace  to  every 
thing  which  we  happen  to  think  of,  but  that  there  {hould  be  any 
thing  external,  or  which  has  a  Place^  and  no  Space ,  is  inconceivable. 
As  long  then  as  we  think  of  any  thing  external,  we  cannot  but  at 
the  fame  time  believe  that  Space  exifts,  in  which  Space  we  con- 
ceive that  thing  to  exift.  For  while  we  fuppofe  any  thing  exifting 
befidc  ourfelves,  that  neceflarily  feems  to  be  without  us;  but  ima- 
gine all  externals  removed,  and  turn  the  Mind  upon  itfelf,  and  that 
without  will  be  taken  away,  and,  together  with  it,  the  ncceflity  of 
Space  or  Place.  For,  while  we  conceive  nothing  to  exiftbefide  our- 
felves, /'.  e.  our  MindSy  we  don't  think  of  this  without,  that  is,  of 
Space,  nor  fee  any  neceffity  for  its  Exiflence  (13.). 

Ji.«  Jit 

N  O  (T  E  S. 


3' 


Wiihout,  fup- 
pofes  Space ; 
while  there- 
fore we  con- 
ceive fome- 
thing to  exift 
without  us, 
we  cannot 
annihilate 
Space  in 
Thought. 


■(t  3) 'From  hence,  I  think,  it  appears  fuffi- 
cicntly  that  Space,  were  it  granted  to  have  any 
•real  Exigence  at  all,  I  mean,  to  be  any  thing 
more  than  an  Idea  in  our  Minds,  (which  fome 
perhaps  will  not  be  very  ready  to  grant,  from 
an  attentive  confideration  of  the  Notes,  5  and 
II.)  yet  it  cannot  be  fuppofed  to  exift  ncccfia- 
rily,  in  Dr.  C/arke''s  fenfe  of  necrjpiry  Exi- 
gence. For,  according  to  him,  "  f  Whatever 
"  is  neceflarily  exifting,  there  is  need  of  its 
*'  exiftence,  in  order  to  the  fuppofal  of  the 
"  exiftence  of  any  other  thing;  to  that  nothing 
*'  can  poflibly  be  fuppos'd  to  exift,  without 
"  prefuppofing  and  including  antecedently, 
*'  the  Exiftence  of  that  which  is  neceflary. 


Therefore,  the  fappofing  any  thing  poffiMy 
to  exift  alone,  fo  as  not  neceflarily  to  in- 
clude the  prefuppofal  of  fome  other  thing, 
proves  demonftrably,  that  that  other  thing 
is  not  neceflarily  exilUng  :  bccaufc,  whatfoc- 
ver  has  necefl^uy  Exiftence,  cannot  poflibly, 
in  any  conception  whatfoever,  be  fuppofed 
away.  There  cannot  poflibly  be  any  notion 
of  the  exiftence  of  any  thing,  there  cannot 
poflibly  be  any  notion  of  exigence  at  all, 
but  what  fliall  neceflarily  preinclude  the 
notion  of  that  which  is  neceflluily  exi- 
ftent. 

Now,  if  we  cm  confider  our  own  Souls  as 
tifting  alone,,  and  without  this  Space,  with-- 

•out 


,^.  II.  paragr,  II. 


f  Artjwer  to  the  firjl  Letter,  p.  »o«. 


3» 

Th.it  things 
are  conceived 
to  be  annihi- 
lated by 
fublti  tilting 
fcmething 
elfe  in  the 
Room  of 
them  ;  but 
we  have  no- 
thin;'^  to  fub- 
ftitute  for 
•Space. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

X.  It  is  to  be  obferved  farther,  that  when  we  would  annihilate  a*, 
ny  thir-g  in  our  Mind,  we  confider  it  as  fomething  evanefcent,  and^ 
remov'd  out  of  fight  j  but  yet  we  look  upon  fome  other  thing  as 
fubflituted  in  the  room  of  that  which  difappearedj   thus  when  l^cci- 
dents  arc  removed,  we  conceive  the  Subftance  remaining ;  fetting  afide 
Matter,  we  fubfkitute  Space;  but  when  Space  is  removed,  we  have.-, 
noticing  to  fubftitute  in  its  ftead,  except  material  or  external  things;, 
but  all  thefe  fuppofe  Space,  and  cannot  be  conceiv'd  without  it;  no, 
wonder  then  that  we  cannot  annihilate  Space,   while  we  conceive 
thefe  as  exifting.     If  therefore  we  would  come  at  a  right  underllan--- 
ding  of  the  nature  of  Space,  wc  mufl  not  apply  our  Minds  to  any. 
tiling  material  or  ^^/^r;?^/,  but  attend  to  our  own  thoughts  and  fenfa- 
tions,  which  have  no  relation  to  external  things,    or  to  Quantity: 
And  when  our  Minds  are  thus  employed,  there  will  appear  to  be  no 
niore  neceflity  for  the  exillence  of  Space  than  of  Mattef. 

XL  It. 

'    NOTES- 


o\it  ^niide|-ing  it  as.  a  e^u/a  fine  qua  son,  or  in  ' 
anjf  p^h^r  rsjped't  wiihjut  prefuppojing,    or  any 
ways  im lading  it :   This  (according  to  the  Dr. 
himfelf)  will  prove  demonftrably,   that  Space 
is  not   neceffar.ly  exillent.     But   let  any  one 
il\ew  us  whit  neceffity  there  is  for  the  exillence 
c^-Space,  in  order  to  the   fuppofal  of  the  exi- 
ftence  oi  i  Spirit.     Let  him   try  whether    he 
cannot  conceive  in   immaterial,    thinking   fub- 
ftance,  without  the  Idea  of  Space  or  Extenfioni 
nay,  whether  he  can  poffibly  conceive  it  with 
them  ;  whether  thefe  Ideas  jre  atall  appiicatle 
to  an  immaterial  Being,  and  not  rather  repug- 
nant and  contradiftory  to  the  very  notion  of 
it  J  whether  they  belong  not  folely  to  matter, 
and  if  that  were  annihilated,  might  not  eafily 
bq  fuppofed  away.     Few,  I  believe,  befid?  Dr. 
Clarke,  can  apprehend  how  Space  is  (as  he  calls 
it-in  his  4th  Reply  to  L.eil/nitz,  N**.  29.  p.  141.) 
tlie  Place  of  all  Ideas.    I'm  fure.  Space  and  Spi- 
rit, and  the  diftinft  properties  of  each,   appear 
to.  me  as  diftant  and.  incompatible,  as  the  moft 
Tcmote  and  inconfiftent  things  in  nature;    and 
a^  extended  Soul  feems  juft  fuch.  another  prapo- 
iij^4^jis^  »  greeti/eujidjf^  a^^  Ssllo/  Qo^/deufiie/s, 


or  a  Cuhe  of  Virtue.  Dr.  C/^T^i/*  grants  *,  that 
Extenf.on  dcet  not  belong  to  Thought,  (as  our  Au- 
thor has  indeid  prov'd  in  many  of  its  Modes, 
in  paragr.  XIV.  and.XV-.)  and  at  the  fime  time 
endeavours  to  ftiift  off  the  confequence  by.an- 
Twering,  that  Thought  is  not  a  Being.  But 
where's  the  difference  in  this  refpeft?  Don't' 
we  frame  our  Idea  of  the  Being  from  its  effen- 
tial  Properties  ?  and  if  thefe  have  no  manner  of 
relation  to  Extenfion,  why  fliould  the  Being 
to  which  thefe  Properties  belong  have  any  ?  \ 
I'm  apt  to  think,  that  our  conceiving  Subjfancg 
by  way  of  fome  Subjiratum  (concerning  which, 
fee  Note  i.)  has  led  us  into  the  Notion,  that 
all  kind  of  Subftances  muft  be  extended;  and 
'tis  perhaps  impoffible  for  u.s  to  imagine  any 
fuch  thing  as  an  Unextended  Subftance  ;  but  yet 
reafon  convinces  us,  that  there  are  many  real 
things  of  which  we  can  form  no  imagination. 
And  that  there  are  Beings  in  nature  to  which 
no  manner  of  extenfion  can  poffibly  be  apply' d, 
we  find  fufficiently  prov'd  by  Cudwerth,  from 
p.  823  to  832,  Among  the  various  arguments 
there,  produced,  this  is  the  Subftance  of  one. 
"  If  the  Soul  be  an  extended. Su.bftance,  then  it  , 

muft 

*  Anfwer  to  the  fecond  Letter,  p.  1 6; 

'\  SeelLh'  al  the  end  of  this  Ch^fter. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Rvit. 


9? 

XL  It  proceeds  therefore  from  Prejudice,  and  an  unwary  ^)7ay  of  We  attempt 
thinking,  that  we  cou^Xq  necejity  of  Exijience  vfiih.  Space ,  neither  do  5°  ^^"'^"j^- [^ 
we  obferve,  that  for  this  very  reafon  we  cannot  conceive  Space  not  thofe  things 
to  exift,  becaufe  we  imagine  thofe  things  ftill  exifting,  which  cannot  '[^■^f^r 
exift  without  Space:  which  is  no  greater  a  Wonder  than  if  any  one  in- pore*^Spa"ce* 
tent  upon  the  Mobility  of  the  Heavenly  Bodies,  fliould  complain  that  l'"^  therefore 
he  could  not  annihilate  the  Matter  of  them,  while  the  Motion  conti-  ln"ih?btccL 
nued ;  for  material  and  external  things,  have  no  lefs  dependence  on, 
and  connection  with.  Space,  than  Mobility  has  with  Matter-,    if  then 
we  conceive  God  only  to  exift,  while  He  contemplates  himfelf  as  ex- 
ifting alone,  he  can  no  more  be  judg'd  to  ftand  in  need  of  Space,  or 


be 


N  O  t  E  S, 


muft  of  neceflity  be  either  a  Phyfical  point 


(for  a  Mathematical  point  has  no  exten/ion)  or    "  Perfons  in  every  Man.     Neither  can  there  bi 


'  minimum^  the  lead  extenfion  that  can  poffibJy 
be  ;  or  elfe  it  muft  confift  of  more  fuch  Fhy 
fical  points  join'd  together.  As  for  the  for- 
mer of  thefe,  it  is  impoffible  that  one  Jingle 
Atom,  or  Jtnall eft  point  of  extenfion  fhould  be 
able  to  perceive  diftinftly  all  the  variety  of 
things,  ;.  e.  take  notice  of  all  the  diftinii  and 
different  parts  of  an  extended  Obje£i,  and  have 
a  iefcription  or  delineation  of  the  whole  of 
them  at  once  upon  itfelf,  (for  that  would  be 
to  make  it  divilible  and  indtvifible  at  the  fame 
time)  As  for  the  latter,  if  the  Soul  be  an 
extended  Subftance  confifting  of  more  points, 
one  without  another,  all  concurring  in  tse- 
ry  fenfatian,  then  muft  every  one  of  thofe 
points  either  perceive  a  point  and  part  of  the 
Objeft  only,  or  elfe  the  vjbole  Objeft  :  Now 
if  every  point  of  the  extended  Soul  perceives 
only  a  point  of  the  0bje8,  then  is  there  no 
one  thing  in  us  that  perceives  the  whole;  or 
which  can  compare  one  part  with  another. 
But  if  every  point  of  the  extended  Soul, 
perceives  the  whole  Objeft  at  once  confifting 
of  many  parts,  then  will  the  former  abfurd-! 
ity  return:  and  alfo  there  would  be  innume-i 
rablc  Percipients  of  the  Cime  Obje£l  in  everyl 
fenfation,  as  many  as  there  are  points  in  the, 
extended  Soul :  And  from  both  thefe  fuppo-j 
fitions  it  would  alike  follow,  that  no  Man 
is  one  fingle  Percipient,  or  Pcrfon,  but  that 


there  are  innumerable  diftinft  Percipients  or 


any  other  fuppofition  made  befides  thofe 
"  three  foremention'd  :  As  tLit  the  whole  ex- 
"  tended  Soul  Ihould  perceive  b^th  the  whole 
"  f'^fible  objeiiy  and  all  its  feveral  parts,  no 
"  part  of  this  Soul  in  the  mean  time  haying  a* 
"  ny  perception  at  all  by  itfelf ;  becaufe  the 
"  whole  of  an  extended  Being  is  nothing  but 
"  all  the  parts  taken  together;  and  if  none  of 
"  thofe  parts  liave  any  life,  Jenfc,  or  perception 
"  in  them,  it  is  impoffible  that  there  Ihould  be 
"  any  in  the  whole.  But  in  very  truth>  to  fay 
"  that  the  whole  Soul  perceiveth  all,  and  no 
'•  part  of  it  any  thing,  is  to  acknowledge  it 
"  not  to  be  extended,  but  to  be  indivijtble, 
"  which  is  the  thing  wq  contend  for." 

From  hence  alfo,  that  an  indivifible  Being  or 
Subftance,  is  not  capable  of  receiving  a  Divi- 
ftble  Quality,  nor  a  Divifible  Subftance  an  indi- 
vifible Ont,  he  makes  it  fully  appear,  that  nei- 
ther Matter  can  poffibly  think,  nor  Spirit  be  ex- 
tended.   Ibid.  p.  827,  828,  829. 

Where  S.  C.  might  have  found  a  fufficient 
anfwer  to  his  Argument  for  the  Soul's  extetip- 
on,  from  its  receiving  Ideas  of  extended  Things* 
Impartial  Enquiry,  p.  2  22t  And  to  his  Maxim, 
that  like  is  known  by  like,  and  by  confequence  %. 
Subjedl  abfolutely  void  of  extenfion  could  hivc 
no  Ideas  of  extended  things,  p.  223. 

"  Nay  the  Soul  (fays  Cudwortb)   conccivas 
"  extended  things  ihemfelvcs  tmextendcdly  ^M 
f  .  indi- 


not  to  cxj.t. 


3;4.  Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviK 

""  be  G€>nrcioiis  of  it  as,  adually  cxifting,    thj^n   we  are,  wliile  we  cnrrw 
template  only  the  reflex  ads  of  the  Mind.     But  when  lie  vyiU'd  extcr- 
;,  nal  things,  he  madp  Place  or.  Space  for  tJieip  to  exiil  in  * 

God  cannot       XII.  It  may  be  objeded,  that  ive  can  feparate  Exijience  fr&m  God 
^l?."!:!!^' ^^^^^  ^.^^  ^^^^  manner  as  we  endeavour  to  remove  it  from  Space.   For,. 
the  mind  being  refleded  on  itfelf,  and  folely  intent  upou  contemplar 
ting  its  operations,  may  dqny  God  to  exifl  as  well  as  Space..    If  there- 
fore we  deny  Space  to  be  felf-exiflent,  becaufe  we  can  confider  our 
.mind  as  exiftipg  alone  in,  nature,  and.  confequently  Space  ag.  not  exir 
. filing;    vvhy  may  not  we,  by  the  fame  ^ay  of  re;afoning,  deny  that 
God  is  felf-exijient,     I  anfwer,  we  are  confcious  that  we  do  not  exifj: 
qi  ourfelves,  while  therefore  we  contemplate  ourfelves,  and  our  in- 
tellectual operations,  we  are  neceiTarily  carried  to  fome  Caufe  j  being 
qertain  that  w.e  have  Exillence  from  another,  and  not  of  ourfelves; 


we 


N  O  T  E  S, 


•**.  itidivijtl/ly ;  for  as  the  difference  of  the  whole 
**  Hemi'phere  is  cotitrafted  into  a  narrow  com- 
**■  pafs  in  the  pupil  of  the  eye,  fa  are  all  diflan- 
**  ces  yet  more  contra(£led  in-  the  Soul  itfelf, 
**  and  there  understood  indijiantly  :  for  the 
*•-  thought  o^  A  Mile  diftance,  or  10,000  Miles, 
*•  or  femi-diameters  of  the  Earth,  takes  up  no 
*•  more  room  ia  the  Soul,  not  ftrttches  it  any 
**  more  than  does  the  thought  ot^.  foot  or  inch, 
*'  or  xn^tcd  o^ &  Matjjematical  point.''''  p.  827, 
829,  fffr. 

The  foragoing  Arguments. againfl:  the  fim- 
plicity  of  ejctenfion,  as  well  as  thofe  in  N.  5 
and  II.  conclude  equally  ngainll  5.  C's  Ampli- 
tude or  ExpanJi«n.-\  Since,  if  it  he. any  thing  real, 
it  mufthave  parts  really  diftinft  from  one  ano- 
ther; which  .diftindl  parts  can,.n?V£r,  be  the 
-fubjeft  of  an  undivided  Quality^  nor  any  addi- 
tion of  them  ever  reach. a  pofitive.  Infinity. 
•But  in  truth,  ihefe  Words  Expanjion^  Ampli- 
tude, isf^.  don't  feem  to  imply,  any,  pofitive 
•thing  or  quality,  or  indeed  to  have. any  deter- 
minate meaning  at  all  ;  like  the  U6i  of  the 
School-men,  which  was  not  p/ace  but  fome- 
thing  elfe,  they  did  not  know. what,  and  muft 
belong  ta  Spirits^  tfcwpVhaw.or  why  they  could 
not  telL 


The  abovemention'd  5.  C  has  a  fecond  Af- 
gument  for  the  Amplitude  cr  Expanfion  of  the 
Divine  Nature  grounded  on  another  Maxim, 
VIZ.  Nothing  can  bejiozo  what  it  has  net  in  itfel/: 
but  God  has  created  material  expanfion,  there- 
fore he  muft  be  expanded  himfelf,  p.  223. 
Which  Argument  he  may  fee  anfwer 'd  by  our 
Author  in  the  18th  Paragn  and  Note  D.  who 
fliews  that  fuch  Expanf.on  is  a  mere  imperfeB'ton- 
as  well  as -ffZrf/tT/W/'/y,.  and  confequently  is  e- 
qually  inconfiflcnt  with, the  perfedion  of  the 
Divine  Being.     See  alfo  X  h. 

That  no  CoUeftion  or  Combination  of  Ar 
toms  can  think,  and  the  fame  reafon  holds  a- 
gainft  any  thing  which  can  be  conceiv'd  by 
.way  of  parts,  fee  proved  at  large  \nBayie^s 
•Di£l.  p.  .1924.  under  the  Article  Lei/cippus,  .^ 
Remark  E.  See,  alfo  Dr.  Clarke's  Letters  to 
Dodwell  concerning  the  immortality  of  thp 
.Soui,  ^c.  or  Religion  of  Nature,  Delin.  p.  186, 
^c.orH.  Dittcii's  appendix. to  his  Excellenx 
JDifcourfe  concerning  the  Refurreftion. 

*  We  conceive  Space  to  have  no  real  Exi,- 
ftence,  and  therefore  think  that  it  cannot  prcup 
perly  be  faid  either  to  be  made,  annihijatigdj^ 
bounded  or  meafuredj  i^c. 


\.  Impartial  Enquiry ,  i^c.  p.  a.i^. 


Concernlm  the    Origin  of  EviL  7C 

Wfe  cannot '  therefore  exert  even  one  a(5l  of  the  Under/landing  but 
it  muft  have  a  neceffary  connexion  v^'ith  fome  Caufe  diftind  from 

^. 

XIII.  We  cannot  therefore  conceive  ourfelves  as  the  only  Beings  in  Becaufc  we 
nature,  for  we  muft  admit,  along  with  us,  the  Caufe  from  which  we  th*;t''°"/dr' 
derive  Exiftence,  which  is  a  confufed  conception  of  God.     But  the  not  exift  of 
fame  cannot  be  faid  of  Space,  for  the  operations  of  our  mind  are  fo  in-  o^^^'^^^'^^' 
timately  perceivM  by  us  as  to  have  no  neceffary  conne(5lion  with  Space, 

and  we  underfland  clearly  enough  that  thefe  may  be,  tho'  there  were 
no  Space,  and  do  not  ftand  in  need  of  it  for  their  Exiftence.  If  we 
conceive  ourfelves  as  confifting  of  both  Body  and  Mifid^  *tis  certain  we 
ftand  in  need  of  Space  for  our  Exiftence,  and  during  that  concep- 
tion, 'tis  impoflible  for  us  to  conceive  Space  to  be  annihilated ;  vtz. 
becaufe  fuch  a  Conception  has  a  neceflary  connexion  with  Space. 
After  the  fame  manner,  if  we  conceive  ourfelves  to  be  Mind  only,  yet 
we  muft  own  the  Exiftence  of  God.  For  a  finite  Mind  requires  a 
Caufe  from  which  it  may  exift,  no  leis  than  a  Body  does  a  Place  in 
which  it  may  exift ;  aixl  from  hence,  in  reality,  it  is  that  we  attri- 
bute Self-exijience  to  Space,  becaufe,  whenever  we  think  of  ourfelves, 
wc  imagine  ourfelves  to  confift  of  both  Body  and  Mind.  While  there- 
fore we  are  confcious  of  our  own  Exiftence,  we  form  our  Belief  of 
Space  alfo  as  neceflarily  exifting,  infomuch  as  it  is  connedled  with  the 
conception  of  Bo^^',  i.e.  of  ourfelves. 

XIV.  Secondly.  It  is  remarkable,  that  the  Conceptions  which  we  SmelLTaftc, 
have  from  hearings  fmellingy  or  tajling^  tho'  they  be  produced  in  us  ,^j^/g,"f\fg'^ 
by  external  Obje<fts,  yet  have  no  connection  with  the  conceptions  of  my  notice  of 
Space 'y  for,  who  can  imagine  the  longitude,  latitude,  or  profundity  of^J'^s'^^^J.^g^"*^'^ 
Sounds  Smelly  or  Tajie?    If  then  we  had  only  thefe  three  Senfes,  we 

fhould  not  fo  much  as  imagine  that  there  was  any  Space.  Our  Con- 
ceptions therefore  abftra<ft  from  all  Exteniion,  nor  do  the  notions  of 
external  and  internal  adhere  fo  clofely  to  our  thoughts  but  we  may 
lay  them  alide ;  and  if  we  fet  thefe  afide,  the  Self- exiftence  of  Space 
does  not  neceflarily  obtrude  itfelf  upon  us.  Now,  as  the  common 
People  attribute  Smells,  T^fles,  Colours,  and  other  fenfible  ^lalities  to 
the  Objeds  themfelves,  and  believe  that  they  exift  in  them ;  while- 
-they  who  attend  better  to  their  thoughts,  know  that  thefe  exift  only' 
in  the  Mind,  and  are  nothing  in  the  things  by  which  they  ar6  ;produ-' 

F  2  ced. 


36 


Concerning  the.  Origin  of  EviL^ 

ced;  befides  the  peculiar  Motion  and  Texture  of  their  parts :  after  the^ 
fame  manner,  'tis  probable,  we  are  impofed  upon  in  attributing  necef- 
%y  exigence  to  Space,  becaufe  we  obfervc,  that  a  I  mod:  all  our 
Thoughts  are  produced  in  us  from  without,  and  thereby- accufloming 
ourfelves  to  join  Space  with  them,  while  we  are  confcipus  that  we- 
think  we  conceive  alfo  that  Space  exifts;  whereas,  if  we  remember- 
that  all  our  fenfations,  even  thofe  prx)duced  by  external  things,  fucli 
as  Smells,  ^c.  do  not  bring  along  with  them  the  notion  of  Space,  we 
may  eafily  lay  afide  this  prejudice,  and,  with  drawing  our  thoughts 
from  the  contemplation  of  Space,  may  conceive  it>not  to  be. 
reflcaed  ■^^'  ^"^^  ^^^^  Will  appear  3 dly.  if  by  a  reflex  ac^  we  view   the 

on.itfeif  his  Mind  ///^//'and. its  opcratiom-j  for  nothing  of  Extenfion  or  Space,  offersv 
no  relation  itfclf  in  thefej  nor  does  the  Mindj  when  employ 'd  about  them,  think.: 
aay^necsffir^^^  all  of  Space,  nor  is  it  confcious  that  it  occupies  Space;  it  withdraws, 
fqrjt.  therefore  from  the  conceptions  of  mternal  and  external,  and  may  con-, 

ceive  nothing  to, be  in  tne  world, befides  itfelf\  and  its  Cauje ;  i.  e.  can., 
imagine  Space  to  be  non-exiftent.  Thinking  Beings  then  may  exifl, 
without  Space;  it  proceeds  therefore  from  Frejudic^  that  we  joiniVd'-. 
cejfary  Exijience  with  it.  ( 14.). 

XVI; 


TKeMind 


(14.)  As  to  tha.t  neuj/fty  of  exiftence  which. 
the  learned  Dr.  Clarke  and  others  have  fo  large- 
ly infifted  on,  I  mufl  confefs  that  I  was  never 
anile  to  confider  it  in  any  ptfttive  fejife,  nor  to 
form  any  clear  argument  from  it,  which  could 
either  afFe£l  the  nature  d  Space,  Matter,  &e. 
or  help  to  demojiftrate  the  exiftence  and  attri- 
hutes  of  God  a  priori.  With  regard  to  the  iirft 
of  thefe  perhaps  too  much  has  already  been 
laid,  in  Notes  5,  11  and  13.  As  to  the  laft, 
we  gather,  indeed  a  Pojlericri  that  an  infinite,  i.e. 
in  ab/olutely  per/eSi  Being,  mud  necejarilyh^vc 
exited  always,  becaufe  it  would  have  been'al 
rfays  a  Qontradiflion  for  kjin  not  to  have  exi- 
ftcd;  namely,  he  himfelf,  and  all  the  things 
that  are,  muft  have  arofe. from  nothing.  But 
this  is  only  a  Confequential  Necieffity,  and  from 
hence  to.  infer  any  thjng  concerning  the  Man-- 
ntr  of  his  exigence  feems  to  be  building  a  great 
4cal  more  on  this  argument  than  it  will  bear, 
"l^s is  indce.da':Rf^i» by  whijch  we  find,   snd: 


for  which  we  believe,  that  he  fxufi  have  exited 
always,  but  it  is  a  reafon  to  us  only,  and  does 
not  affeft  his  nature,  or  the  caufe  of  it,  and 
when  it  is.apply'd  to  that,  I  think 'tis  ufe<i,v 
equivocally.  Conceiving  that  he  cannot  pof- 
ilbly  be  fappofed  not 'to  Exift,  is:far  from  con- 
ceiving horn  or  wiy  he  adlually.  does  exifi ;  we 
can.r eafily  fhew  a  reafon  for  the  one,  but  it 
feems  above  human  comprehenfion  to  account 
in  any  refpeft  for  the  other:  Nay,  the  attempt  > 
to  do  it  feems  altogether  as  abfurd  and  ufelefs, 
as  endeavouring  to  fhew  how  or  why  a  thing 
is  whit  it  is;  how  or  why  a  Firft  Gaufe  is  a 
Firll  Caufe  ;  How  a  Tfiangle  is  a  Triangle, 
or  why  Truth  is  Truth. 

Farther:  TKis  eternal  Being,  we  fay,  is /«- 
'dependent ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  Self- 
exijlenty'i.  e.  his  Exiftence  depends  upon  no- 
thing tejide  himfelf  ?  But  does  it  therefore  po- 
fitrvelydepend»pt?«  himfelf  ?  Will  it  follow, 
that  becaufe  he  has  no  external  C^ufe,  therefore.- 


Concerning 


ih 


e  Orio'in 

o 


of  Evil. 


37 


XVI.  Fourthly.  It  is  to  be  remark'd  that  Space,  Co  far  as  it  appears  Wc  may  con- 
to  our  Conceptions,  is  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  cannot  be  annihilated  by^'J^^a^nthi- 
Paj'fSj  for  they  are  in  fuch  a  manner  united  to,  and  dependent  upon  Kited  aUoge- 
one  another,  that  if  we  fuppofe  one  part,  it  will  imply  a  contradic-  ^^'''^j^ts'  "°^ 
tion  for  the  others  not  to  exift.  We  can  in  Thought  remove  all  Mat- 
ter out  of  a  Veflel,  or  Chamber,  and  the  Space  tnt£rjacent  between.  - 


NO  TE  S. 


he  muil  have  nn  wtErr.al  one  ?  Or,  becaufe  no 
ground  or  reafon  of  his  Exiftence  can  be 
drawn  from  any  other  Subftance,  therefore  one 
muft  be  contain 'd  in  his  own  $ubfianct  or  felf? 
This  is  ufing  the  Word  Self-exifience  in  two 
different  Sen fes,  both  as  negative  va^  pofitive, 
which  have  no  manner  of  connexion  witheach 
other,and  the  latter  of  which  will  perhaps  appear 
to  be  no  very  good  one.  It  is  not  then  appa- 
rent yet  that  there  needs  any  Phyftcal  reafon  at 
all  for  the  exiftmce  of  the  eternal,  independent 
Being.  Nor,  adly,  if  there  did,  would  this 
NeceJJity  of  Nature  ufually  affign'd  as  fuch, 
ferve  for  that  purpofe.  For,  firft,  it  is  not  the 
Snbjinnce  itfelf,  that  would  be  to  m.alce  the  fame 
thing  the  ground  o{  itfelf;  which  is  nonfenfe. 
'Tis  therefore  a  perfeSlion,  property  or  attribute 
of  that  Subftance  (  we  know  no  other  di- 
ftinftion  )  and  as  fuch.  muft,  in  the  Order  of 
our  Ideas,  be  Confcquent  upon  the  exiftence 
of  that  Subftance  in  which  it  inheres.  What- 
ever it  is,  it  has  in  fome  refpeft  or  other  a  Re- 
lation to  the  Subjeft  to  which  it  belongs.  Let 
it  then  be  ^n  Attribute,  fui  Generis,  cujus  cuntj; 
generis  (if  we  mean  any  thing  at  all  by  this 
word)  it  muft  be  predicated  of,  and  prefuppefe 
itfrSubjeft,  and  confequcntly  cannot,  according 
to  our  Ideas,  be  the  antecedent  ground  or- foun- 
dation of  it.  And  to  endeavour  to  clear  it  (as 
fome  do)  by  making  it  not  an  attribute  of  the 
Subftance,  but  of  the  attribute  of  the  Subftance  ; 
or  as  they  phrafe  it,  a  Property  of  a  Property  ;  is 
onlythrufting  it  ftill  farther  back,  and  making 
it  pofterior  in  conception  to  both  the  Subftance 
and  its  Attribute  or  Property. 

But  ^dly,  fuppofmg  this  Necefpty,  this  Ground 
or  Reafon,  could  be  confider'd  as  antecedent  to 
the  Divine  Nature,  and  inferring  its  actual /'X- 
iffeme,  we  arc  got  but  one  Step  farther  yet  j 
for,  will  there  not  be  the  fame  ncceflity  for 


demand  in  a;  a  rrafin  for  that  reafon,  a  grautii 
for  that  ground,  and  (o  on  in  inftiitum  ?  And' 
what  ftiall  we  get  by  fuch  ar>  endlefs  progreffi- 
on  ?  Why  fhould  we  not  flop  at  a  firft  Beiffg, 
as  well  as  at  diis  Grjund,  which  muft  itfelf 
want  a  foundation  if  the  other  does,  fince  there 
cannofbe  any  intuitive  knowledge  ineither;  and" 
the  fame  leafons  which  are  given  for  flopping  at 
this  ground  will  hold  equally  forftopping  be- 
fore-we  come  at  it,  and  convince  us,  that  we 
might  as  well,  or  perhaps  better,  acquiefce  in 
the  aftual  Exiftence  of  the  firft  Being.  We- 
muft  then  reft  fome  where  :  We  muft  either  ad- 
mit one  firft  caufe  of  all  Things  and  Qualities, 
itfelf  ^jc;/?/»^  without  caufc  (for  that  is  imply'd 
in  its  being  called  the  firft)  or  an  infinite  feries- 
of  Beings  exifting  without  any  original  Caufe 
at  all  ;  i.e.  cither  fome  one  thing  muft  be  with- 
out a  Caufe,  or  every  thing. 

Here  then  are  two  difficulties-  the  left  is  to 
be  chofen  ;  let  us  fee  which'  that  is.     Now,  if 
the  Manner  of  exiflence\n  all  thefe  Beings  were 
entirely  the  fame,  I  grant   it  would  be  as  cafy 
to  fuppofe  all  of  them  exifiing  without  a  Caufe, 
as  One:     But  here  I  think  lies  the  difference  : 
There  was  a  time  when  all  of  them,  except  one, 
were  indifferent  either  to  exiftence  or  non-exi- 
flence ;  were  nothing.     Therefore  for  them  that 
were   once  indifferent  to  exiflciice  or  non-exi- 
ftence,  to  be  aftuilly  determin'd  into  Exiftence,. 
to  be  brought  from  nothing  into  fomething,  op 
made  what  they  once  were  not ;  is  a  real  ch.inge,. 
an  aHion,  an  effe^,  and'  as  fuch,  muft  require- 
fome  changer,  agent,  caufe.     But  on  the  other 
hand,  all  that  wc  know  of  this  one  Being,  is, 
that  it  now  exifts,   and' /7/«"»y-f  did  fo  ;  that  it' 
never  had  a  Beginning  of  its  exiftence,  was  nt* 
\tx  changed  from  what  it  is,  never  made  or  pro- 
duced;   Here  is  no  cffe£l,  and  therefore  no  r«a^ 

f3.t 


0- 


5  8  Converning  the  Origin  of  Evil* 

the  Walls  remains  extended  in  length,  breadth,  and  depth :  But  the 
Space  cannot  be  r^movedy   fince  it  is  of  its  own   Nature  immove- 
able, 

N  O  r  E  S. 


/on,  nor  rcom,  for  a.  ground  ©r  taufe.     Nay,  to 
jsilign  one  in  any  refpeft  prior  to  its  exillcnce, 
as  it  mult  be  fuppos'd  to  be  if  confider'd   as  a 
Caufe  ;  (and  it  mull  be  confider'd  as  a  Caufe,  _ 
or  extriniic  Principle,   if  confider'd  at  all:    J 
mean,  fo  as  to  be  made  any  ufe  of  in  the  pre- 
itnt  QueJlion,  or  to  infer  anything  concer- , 
ning  aftual    Exiftence)  I  fay,    to  affign  any 
Ground /r/?r  to  xhc  exijfcnce  of  this  Being, 
would  be  to  prove  this  Being  not  eternal,    nor 
the  firjl  Cduje :  as  attempting  to  prove  a  felf- , 
tvideot  propofition   is  endeavouring   to  fhew 
that  proportion  not  to  be  fdf  evident  by  affign- 
ing  a  clearer.  , 

Now  to  lay  down  fonte  necejjity,  ground,  or 
reaj'on  of  Exiftence,  muft  either  be  to  propofe 
it  by  way  olCaufaluy,  or  to  fix  no  manner  of 
-Idea  at  all  to  tKefe  Words :  and  indeed  no 
jnanner  of  Idea  feems  poffible  to  be  fix'd  to 
ihem  (as  has  been  obferv'd  by  the  Ingenious 
Author  of  the  Enquiry  into  the  Evidence  of  the 
Cbrijlian  Religion)  w'hich  is  not  utterly  incon- 
iiftent  with  axifting  without  Caufe,  as  thit  Be- 
ing is  prov  d  to^exift.  For,  why  -do  we  con- 
fider  that  Ground  or  Reafcn  in  the  Order  of  our 
Ideas,  as  antecedevt  to  the  Exiftence  of  the  Be- 
"  ing,  otherwife  than  as  it  feems  in  the  Order  of 
Nature  antecedently  necejfary  to  the  Exiftence  of 
that  Being  ?  To  which  neverthelefs  we  allow, 
that  no  Thing,  Mode,  ^ality,  is'c.  can  be  real- 
ly antecedent.  The  Cafe  will  be  no  better,  if 
we  imagine  this  ncce&ty  co-etamous,  or  co-exi- 
Jient  with  the  Exiftence  of  the  Being  which  is 
•  fupported  by  it ;  Since  this  is  to  fuppofe  that 
aftually  exifting  already,  in  order  to  the  Exi- 
gence of  which  this  neceflity  is  introduced  : 
and  aUo  feems  much  the  fame  as  an  effcft  to- 
exijlent  with  its  Caufe.  For,  as  was  faid  be- 
fore, this  Necejjity  muft  either  be  a  Caufe,  or 
nothing  at  all  to  the  prefent  purpofe.  And  that 
it  was  piopofed,  by  the  forcmention'd  Author, 
ab  fome  fort  of  a  Caufe  (if  he  would  have  fpoke 
out)  is  I  think  pretty  plain. 
.  The  whole  Cafe  then  feems  to  ftand  thus. 
Qjx  tlie  one, hand  here  is  a  certain  alteration 


made,  a  pofitlvc  effeU  produced,  without  a 
Cauje  ;  which  is  a  clear  contradjftion.  On 
the  other  hand  there  is  a  difficulty  indeed,  but 
not  an  apparent  contradiction  :  There  is  fome- 
what  exifting  of  which  we  can  give  no  accoujtt 
(the  manner  of  whofc  Exijience  is  different  from 
that  of  any  thing  elfe)  which  will  admit  of  no 
Caufe,  the  Idea  of  which  is  entirely  repug- 
nant to  th.it  of  Caufality. 

This  may  be  hard  to  conceive,  but  cannot 
be  deny'd  without  affirming  fomething  worfe, 
namely,  an  exprefs  ccntradiftion,  as  has  been 
(hewn  above.  In  order  to  fet  this  in  as  clear  a 
light  as  is  poffiblc,  I  fhall  take  the  Liberty  to 
infert  a  pafTage  from  the  learned  Writer  cited 
in  Note  5,  ^c.  "  The  Idea  of  aSelf  Exiftcnt 
'*  Being  is  the  Idea  of  a  Being  that  always  was, 
'*  is,  and  will  le,  becaufe  he  always  was.  Is, 
"  and  will  be  infinitely  able  to  be.  If  you  a«k 
"  why  he  is  fo,  I  know  not ;  Why  I  believe 
"  fo,  I  think  I  know  ;  it  is,  becaufe  he  ha?  in 
*'  fa8  exifted  from  all  Eternity,  which  he 
"  could  not  have  done,  had  he  not  been  in- 
"  finitely  able  to  exift.  If  you  ask  after  the 
"  ground  or  foundation  of  this  infinite  Ability, 
"  it  is  the  fame  that  is  the  ground  or  founda- 
"  tion  of  all  his  other  Perfeftions,  his  Infinite 
**  Nature,  Eflence  or  Subftance,  if  you  ask  far- 
"  ther  for  the  ground  of  that^  I  muft  call  it 
"  trifling:  if  you  affign  abjelute  necejjuy,  I 
•'  muft  ask  what's  next  ?  Or  what  that  means? 
'•  or  refer  you  to  the  Indian  Philofopher's  Ele- 
"  phant  and  Tcrtoije,  as  the  beft  comment  upon 
'<  abfolute,  antecedent  Necejjity.'''' 

Neither  need  we  run  ourfelvcs  into  fuch  ab- 
furditics  as  the'.e  :  This  Independent  Being  cx- 
i/h  becaufe  it  does  exiji  ;  or,  it  exifts  by  chance. 
Since  it  is  enough  for  us  to  fay,  Ti:}ere  can  be  no 
Rcafon  why  it  does  exi/l;  or,  which  is  the  vtrf 
fame  thing  fnll,  no  CauJe,  no  Caufal  NcceCity, 
or  antecedent  Ground  of  its  Exiftence. 

But  if  we  grant  the  firft  Being  to  be  now 
exifting,  there  will  be  a  reafon  (contrary  to 
what  Dr.  C/(7;>^^aflerts  in  his  Lift  Letter)  why 
'he  fljould^.v^  to  morrow,  and  tcall  Eternity, 

fince 


Concernm<y  the  Orizi^  of  Evil, 

able,  (1-5.)  nor  can  it  be  annihilated -,  for  diftance  would  fllll  remam 
between  the  bounds  which  cannot  be  without  Exteniioii,  nor  Exten- 
lion  without  a  Subj^dtj.  but  Space,  as  far.  as.  we  can. conceive  it,  is  the 

primary 


35 


NO  TBS: 


ffnce  ccafihg  to  be  is-  an  alteration  from  Ex- 
ifrence  to  Non-exiftence,  i.  e.  a  Pofttive  Effe8, 
and  confequently  muft  require  a  Cnufe\  unlefs 
it  can  be  effected  and  not  efFeded  at  the  fame 
time.  Now,  as  the  exiftence  of  this  Being  de- 
pends upon  no  caufe,  no  caufs  can  ever  afFedl  or 
deftroy  it,  and  for  \C\xa.Xo-deJlroy  himfelf,  will 
be  the  fame- abfurdity,  as  to  fuppofe  him  to 
make  himfelf:  therefore  he  muft  always  exift, 
and  in  the  fame  manner  that  he  does  *•  The 
reft  of  the  learned  Dr's  Arguments  contained 
in  the  fame  Letter,  will  be  confidered  in  the 
Notes  to  the  3d  Sedion  of  the  firfr  Chapter  of 
this  Book  ■\.  I  fhall  only  beg  leave  to  obferve 
one  thing  more  in  this  place,  namely-,  that  all 
the  above  mentioned  reafoning  about  mcejfary 
e}ciftence  {t&vni  to  be  built  upon  that  falfe  Max- 
im which  Leibnitz  lays  down  as  the  foundation 
of  all  Philofophy,  (and  which  Dr.  Clarke  was 
very  ready  to  grant  him,  fince  it  was  the  foun- 
dation of  his  own  Book  on  the  Divine  Attri- 
butes) namely,  that  Nothing  is  without  a  reafon, 
tvhy  it  is  rather  than  not,  and  why  it  is  fo  rather 
than  otherwife.  Tho'  the  Dr.  is  foon  forced  to 
deny  this  very  Principle,  when  (in  his  way  of 
confidering  Time  and  Space)  he  propofes  the 
mere  Will  of  God,  as  the  only  reafon  why  the 
World  was  created  at  fuch  a  certain  period  of 
time,  and  in  fuch  a  particular  point  of  Space  |i. 
Of  \s\i\c\iDivine  Will,  or  of  its  determination, 
according  to  himfelf,  there  can  poffibly  be.  no 
manner  of  reafi,n,.  fince  he  fuppofes  thefe  effefts 
of  the  Divine  Will  to  be,  in  every  polCble 
Manner  of  Conception,  abfolutely  eq^ual  and 
indifferent,  and  confequently  it  would  be  ab- 
lurd  to  fuppofe  any  reafon  of  fuch  fpecial  Will, 
ox  fuch  particular  determination.  If  then  we 
may  fuppofe  two  things  in  nature  abfolutely, 
and  in  evcfy  rcipcdl,  equal,  (which  Leibnitz.,  to 


be  confiftent  with  himfelf,  and  I  believe  for 
no  fufficient  reafon  elfe,  found  it  necelfary  tO' 
deny)  the  preference  of  one  of  thefe  before  the- 
other  muft  be  abfolutely  without  a  reafon.  And" 
tho'  there  may  be  a  fufficient  reafon- for  a  per- 
^ov^zaBing  in  general,  rather,  than  not  adling.-'.t 
all,  yet  (as  Leibnitz  well  obferves  *^)  except 
there  be  one  alfo  for  his-afting  in  a  certain 
particular  manner,  which  in  the  prefent  cafe 
there  cannot  be  (according  to  Dr.  Clarke's 
concefljon -1-4-)  the  above  mentioned  principle 
is  entirely  overthrown.  See  more  of  this  in 
the  latter  end  of  Note  1 8.  and  Note  62* 

The  fame  Argument  will  hold  againftZ.w/f^'3 
Hy pot  hefts  of  Anxiety^  i  f  i  t  be  co  n  fi  dc  r'd  as  •  tha 
fole  and-  abfolute  determiner  to  all  Aftion  ||  ||, 
fince  it  can  never  determine  the  Mind  to  Will 
one  Aftion  before  another,-  -where  both  are  en- 
tirely equal;  of  which  kind  numberlefs  occur 
in  life,  as  will  be  fhawn  at  -large  in-  its  proper 
place.- 

(.15.)  That  is,  as  I- have  often  hinted,  if  we 
fuppofe  it  to  have  any  r<?4/  Nature,  or  to  Exi/f 
at  all,  it  muft,  as  our  Author  fays,  exift  every 
where,  and  cannot  be  removed  by  parts.  And 
in  this  Senfe  fhould  the  Words  of  Sir  I/'aaf 
Newton  be  underftood  j-^f.  "  The  order  0)  the 
"  parts  of  Space  is  immutable  ;  remove  thefe  fnf}> 
"  their  places,  and  you  will  remove  them,  as  I 
"  may  [ay,  from  themjelves ?''  For  to  fuppofe  it 
at  all  once  away,  fecms  fo  far  from  amounting 
to  that  abfurd  Suppofition  mention  d  by  Dr» 
C/tfr-fi- II II 11,  that  it  is  no  more  than. what  muff 
be  conceiv'd  in  every  Annihilation  of  any  things 
which  is  the  total  deftrudlian  or  taking  away  of 
its  Exiftence,  the  removal  of  it,  as -we  may* 
fay,  from  it/elf,  or. from  Being:  which  is  a- 
Suppofition  that  is  generally  thought  to'carrj^ 
no  abfurdity  along, with.  it.  '^ 


*  See  X  e.  at  the  end  ^/^Chap.  I.       f  See  the  latter  end  of  Note  \  8.        )(  3</  Reyly,  N*'.  5.  p.  8  J« 

%  ^tb  Letter,   N**.  17.  p.  169.  -1-4.  N**.  1,  2.  p.  12.  of  his  ^th  Reply. 

Ill  Su.lHois  65.  \\\  Princ  Schol.  ad'  dxi. 8.  H  ||  ||  Anjmr. to  tbe (itb  L$l.  p.  39. 


4o 


Cokcerninn 


the  Origin 


of  Evil. 


primary  Subjeft  (16.)  of  Extenfion,  therefore  it  neceflarily  continues 
with  Diilance,  nor  can  it  be  annihilated,  unlefs  we  would  have  Ex- 
tenfion without  a  Subject,  that  is  into  Lengthy  Breadth,  and  Depth, 
without  any  thing  Lo?jg,  Broad  and  Deep.  Hence  it  appears  that 
Space  cannot  be  partially  annihilated,  and  from  hence  the  Opinion 
.of  its  felf-exijience  might  arife. 

XVII.  For 

NOTES. 


.  (i6.)  Dr.  Clarke  affirms  f,  that  Space  is  not 
:  t  Subftance  j  and  yet  declares  that  it  has  real 
^alitici  ||.  Is  not  this  either  to  fuppofe  quali- 
ties or  properties  inherent  in  one  another  ?  or 
t  clfe,  with  GaJJendus,  to  imagine  fome  middle 
thing  between  Subjlance  and  Accident,  which 
is  neither  of  them,  but  partakes  of  both  ? 

The  learned  Writer  refer'd  to  in  Note  5.  is 
of  the  fame  opinion  with  our  Author  in  this 
place,  f/z.  thac  we  are  apt  to  conceive  Space 
to  be  a  fort  of  Subftance,  or  Subjiratum  of  Ex- 
tenfton,  and  fo  are  ufcd  to  attribute  that  and  o- 
:  ther  imaginary  Qualities  to  it.  "  The  Idea 
**  of  Space  is  hot  the  Idea  of  Extenfion,  but 
»♦  of  fomething  extended,  it  is  the  Subjlratum 
'*  of  Extenfion,  and  not  Extenfion  itfelf.  But 
*'  when  I  fay  it  is  the  Subfiratum,  do  not  ima- 
*♦  gine  1  make  it  to  be  any  thing  without  ;  it 
"  is  an  Ideal  Subfiratum,  and  nothing  more. 
•*  When  the  Mind  has  been  confidering  the  I- 
"  dea  of  Exteniion  abftra£ted  from  the  ex- 
♦*  tended  Bodies,  from  whence  it  firft  receiv'd 
*•  tlie  Idea,  (whether  as  they  are  caufes  or  oc- 
•'  cafions  of  it  I  coniider  not  now)  it  is  a  very 
**  eafy  Step  for  the  Mind  to  make  farther,  to 
*  frame  an  imagt7iary  Subjiratum  to  lupport  an 
**  imaginary  Extenfion.  And  this  is  the  more 
•*  eafy,  becaufe  the  Idea  we  have  of  a  real  Sub- 
*»  Jiratum  or  Subftance,  the  fupport  of  real 
*'  Qualities  is  dark  and  confufed,  an  Idea  of 
« fomewbat,  and  that's  all.  Now  it  is  but 
•'  joining  the  Idea  oi  fometvbat  with,  the  Idea 
"  of  one  Quality  only,  namely  Extenfion,  and 
**  we  have  an  imaginary  Subjhatvm  prefcntly 
•«  formed,  that  is,  an  Idea  of  Space,  or  an  I- 
^  deal  extended  fometliing.    Whether  this  be 


^*  not  the  very  Cafe,  I  muft  leave  to  any  Man 
*'  to  judge,  by  refleding  on  his  own  Ideas. 

Again:  To  this  Queftion,  Why  may  vet 
Space  be  rather  defined  Extenfion  in  the  Ahjlraily 
or  imaginary  Extenfion,  rather  than  the  imaginary 
Subfiratt/m  of  imaginary  Extenfiton?  He  an- 
fwers,  "  Extenfion  in  the  general,  or  in  the 
"  abftraft,  is  an  Idea  oi pure  Inielle8,  i.e.  is 
"  to  be  undcrftood,  but  cannot  be  imagin\i  a- 
"  ny  more  than  Whitcnefs  in  the  general :  or  a 
"  thoufand  other  the  like  abftraft  Ideas.  But 
*'  as  foon  as  imagination  comes  to  deal  with  this 
"  general  abftraft  Idea  (or  Ideas)  it  fupplies  it 
•'  with  an  imaginary  Subftratum,  and  fo  makes 
'*  the  general,  ■w\i\c\ivi^%invifible,  be  conceiv'd 
"  as  a  particular,  for  the  help  of  the  Undcrftan- 
•«  ding.  So  if  the  imagination  comes  to  con- 
'  ceive  any  certain  degree  of  VVhitenefs,  it  fup- 
"  plies  the  Mind  wiih  fome  imaginary  white 
'*  Sutface,  and  brings  down  the  general  Idea 
"  to  a  particular  Objeft.  In  like  manner, 
'*  when  it  comes  to  conceive  a  Length,  a 
*'  Breadth,  a  Thicknefs,  it  iupplics  the  Mind 
"  witha  Subftratum,  pro  hac  vice,  fuch  as  may 
**  ferve  the  purpofe,  otherwife  the  Mind  mrrft 
"reft  in  pure  intelleft  only,  as  in  numbers; 
"  and  there  is  nothing  more  tedious  or  uneafy 
**  to  the  Mind  generally  than  to  be  wholly  ab- 
"  firaEled;  which  is  the  reafon,  by  the  way, 
"  that  Arithmetical  Demonftrations,  tho'  as 
"  clear  and  certain  as  any,  are  lefs  delightful 
•<  than  Geometrical,  and  nothing  more  irkfome 
"  than  abftraft  numbers.  Now  Space  being 
"  the  Objed  of  the  /wz-'^iw/J/Zfl/?,  and  notofpure 
•*  IntelleB,  as  are  all  general,  abftraft  Ideas,  it 
"  is  properly  the  imaginary  Su^firatum  of  an  ima- 
ginary 


•f-  Anftoer  to  the  2,d  Letter,  p. -2 2.  dndtotle  \th.  p.  28. 
\  Anjtver  tt  the  6tb  Letter^  p.  38. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL  ij,*I 

XVn.  For  fince  it  is  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  muft  be  annihilated  either  Hence  arofe 
altogether,  or  not  at  all,  they  that  attempted  to  anniliilate  it  only  by  forhlTif-" 
Paris,  faw  that  it  was  impoffible  to  be  done,  the  nature  of  the  thing  exiftence. 
remonftrated  againft  a  partial  annihilation,  and  if  one  part  be  fuppo- 
fcd,  all  others  might  be  demonftrated  to  exift  by  neceflary  connexion. 
But  if  any  one  fhould  fuppofe  all  extended  things  to  be  removed  toge- 
ther and  at  once,  he  would  find  nothing  impoffible  in  that  fuppofi- 
tion :  For  one  may  imagine  nothing  to  exift  in  Nature  befide  his  own 
Soul,  and  the  caufe  on  which  it  depends  j  which,  as  a  thinking  Being, 
includes  nothing  of  Extenfion  in  it :  every  thing  that  is  extended  may 
therefore  be  feparated  from  Exiftence.  But  they  that  attempted  this 
by  parts,  when  they  found  it  impoffible,  did  not  fcruple  to  refolve  the 
Caufe  into  the  felf-exiftence  of  Space,  tho'  in  reality  it  did  not  arife 
from  thence,  but  from  this,  that  they  attempted  to  feparate  things  na- 
naturally  infcparable,  namely,  the  parts  of  Space  one  from  ano- 
ther. 

XVIII.  But  whether  there  be  any  fuch  thing  as  Space,  or  no ;  whe-  We  are  cer- 
ther  its  Extenfion  be  diftinguifh'd  from  the  Extenfion  of  Body,  or  not :  clufe^ln"^^ 
Be  it  nothing  at  all :  Be  it  mere  privation  of  Co7itra5l,  as  fome  are  what  man- 
pleas'd  to  term  it ;  be  it  mere  PoJjibHity  or  Capacity  of  exifting,  as  o-  'f ""  ^?^p^ 
thers ;  be  it,  laftly,  either  fomething  created,  or  of  it/elf  and  necef-  about'spa«; 
farily  exifiing^  yet  ftill,  as  far  as  weXnow  any  thing  of  the  nature  of  bedetermin'd 
it.  'tis  an  indolent  thing,  it  neither  aSfs^  nor  is  in  the  leaft  aSfed  up- 
on i 

N  0  T  E  S^ 


"  ginary  Extenjloyi^  or  the  general  Idea  of  Ex-' 
•*  tenfion  particulariz'd  In  an  imaginary  Subje5l', 
•**  and  hence  it  is  that  Space  is  faid  to  be  cxten- 
"  ded,  which  would  be  nonfenfe  to  fay  of  Ex- 
*'  tcnlion  ilfelf :  and  Bodies  are  (aid  to  be  in 
**  Spac€,  which  would  likewife  be  nonfenfe  to 
**  fay  o^  "Extenfion.  And  fo  it  is  conceiv'd  as 
**  immoveable,  indivifibk,  infinite.  Ijnmovea- 
"  ble,  (fff.  all  properties  of  Subllances ;  which 
"  makes  it  plain  that  it  is  conceiv'd  after  the 
•'  manner  of  Sublbnce,  and  therefore  is,  be- 
•*  caufe  it  can  be  nothing  elfe,  an  imaginary 
^  Subjhatimy   which  the  Mind  takes  to  parti - 


**  cularize,  and  thereby  render  conceivable,  it* 
"  general  Idea  of  Extenfion ;  which  could 
<•  not  otherwife  fall  within  the  Imagination, 
"  nor  be  eftimated  any  way  but  by  abllradl 
"  numbers,  fo  many  Yards,  or  fo  many  Miles, 
"  10,  20,  30  J  without  attending  to  any  thing 
"  but  the  numbers,  and  the  meaning  of  the 
"  Words,  Yards,  Miles,  ^c.  as  it  is  when  we 
"  fcckon  Ounces,  Pounds,  i^c.  of  Weight.— 
"  Thus  then  you  fee  how  we  come  by  the 
**  notion  of  Space,  and  what  it  is."  See  alfo 
Note  5. 


41  Concerning  the  Ortgin  of  Evil 

Off;  It  cannot  therefore,  as  mere  Exfenfion,  under  which  notion  onVyr 
it  appears  to  us,  be  the  Caufe  of  Matter^  or  imprefs  Motion  on  it,  (D.) 

There 

N  0  t:  E  s:. 


(D.)  There  are  Tome,  who  confidering  Space' 
as  fclf-fxijlcnt,  imagine  it  to  be  the  immenfity 
©fGod;  And  indeed,  if  we  grant  it  to  exiil 
of  itfcif,  it  mull  neceffarily  be  refer'd  to  God. 
For  wh  tever  Vi^  felf-exijience,  muft  at  the 
f:  me  time  be  believ'd  to  have  all  Perfi^ioti, 
For  what  can  limit  a  felf  exiftent  Being  ?  Self- 
exldence  is  the  greateft  perfedion,  and  no  rea- 
fon  can  be  conceiv'd  why.  all  perfeftions 
fhould  not  be  afcribed  to  him  who  has  that. 
We  mull  therefore  entirely  deny  Space  to  be 
felf-exijlent,  or  elfe  refer  it  to  God^  Thefe 
Men  urge  farther,  in  defence  of  their  Opinion, 
that  every  FamUy  which  is  in  any  degree  con- 
fcious,  is  to  be  refer'd  to  God,  and  has  him  in 
fome  refpedl  for  its  Ohjecl.  For  they  think  it 
abfurd  to  fuppole,  that  the  Creatures  fhould  be 
pcrceiv'd>.  aad  the  Author,  whofe  Workman- 
ihip  they^are,  not  perceiv'd  in  the  Ipaft.  AH 
Faculties  therefore  which  are  in  any  refpeft 
fereep'he,  perceive  God  fome  way  or  other: 
Ibme  in  a  greater  degree  and  more  clearly,  o- 
thers  lefs  and  more  obfcurely,  according  to 
their  native  Perfedlion.  Now  our  y?»/^i  being 
yery  impcrfed,  can  apprehend  nothing  in  God 
befide  \i\s  Immenjity,  and  that  very  obfcurely : 
But  our-  Underftanding  perceives  his  intelle£lual 
Attributes,  namely,  Wijdom,  GcodnefSy.  vS*^.  and 
an  Intel  left  more  perfeft  than  that  of  Man 
may  apprehend  fome  properties  as  much  un- 
known to  us  as  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  are  to 
tiic  Senfes  :  Nay,  pious  Men,  and  fuch  as  are 
cndow'd  with  the  Holy  Spirit,  efpecially  the 
infpired  Prophets,  behold  fuch  Marks  of  the 
Divine  Prefence^  as  neither  can  be  perceiv'd 
nor  believ'd  by  the  Impious. 

When  they  are  ask'd  how  Space,  to  which  no 
JSiien  can  be  attributed  (as  far  as  we  know  any 
thing  of  its  nature)  may  belong  to  God>  who 
is  entirely  and  efientially  aSlivei  they  reply, 
that  an  Objeft,  when  perceiv'd  by  different 
Faculties,  leaves  Tokens  of  itfelf,  which  have 
ao  more  connedlop  vrith  one  another,  than  if 


"they  proceeded  from  the  molt  different  Objefts, . 
and  hence  it  comes  to  pafs,  that  we  often  take 
a  thing  which  is  perceiv'd  by  many  Faculties, 
to  be  more  than  one.  A  blind  Man  that  felt 
Snow  to  be  cold,  and  when  his  eyes  were  o- 
pen'd,  perceiv'd  the  fame  under  the  appearance 
o(  white,  would  not  know  it  to  be  the  fame, 
without  a  new  Experiment.  But,  after  com- 
paring and  examining  it,  he  would  eafil^  ap- 
prehend that  the  fame  thing  feemed  co!d  to  the 
touch,  ind  tohite  to  the  Eyes,  tho'  Co/d  and" 
Whitenefs  have  no  more  conne6lion  with  each 
other  than  the  Mind  and  Space.  He  therefore 
that  apprehends  God  by  his  Senfes  as  extended,. 
by  his  Reafon  as  a  Spirit,  may  nt)t  obferve  with- 
out Examination,  that  thefe  tokens  belong  to 
the  fame  Being,  any  more  than  the  Man  that 
was  lately  blind,  but  now  fees,  can  perceive 
that  the  tangible  and  vifible  Qaalities  inhere 
in  the  fame  Subllance ;  namely,  the  Snow: 
but  upon  Examination  he  will  find,  that  this 
Space  is  felf-exijient,  and  alfo  eternal,  infinite, 
immoveable  ;  and  that  an  infinite  Mind,  fuch  as 
God  is,  has  the  very  fame  Attributes.  Since 
then  there  cannot  be  two  Infinite  and  Self-exi- 
ftent  Beings,  they  will  have  it  to  be  plain,  that 
thefe  are  partial  perceptions  of  the  fame  thing, . 
and  belong  to  the  fame  Subftance,  no  lefs  than 
Cold  and  Whitenefs  to  i\izSnoto. 
But  to  thefe  we  reply, 

\ft.  That  the  Self-exiftence  of  Space  is  not 
certain,  which  being  takea  away,  the  whole 
Reafoning  falls  to  pieces. 

zdly,^T\%  affirm 'd,  without  a  Reafon,  thaf 
every  perceptive  Faculty  has  God  in  fome  man- 
ner for  its  Objeft:  for  how  caa  they  prove - 
this  in  Hearing,  Smell,  or  Tafte,  fince  Space  is 
not  perceiv'd  by  them,  nor  any  thing  that  can 
be  refer'd  to  God? 

"i^dlf.  'TIS  true,  a  thing  may  be- apprehended 
by  different  Faculties,  under  Tokens  that  have 
no  connexion  with  one  another,  and  thereby 
we  are  often  deceiv'd,  believing  that  there  are 

different 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

There  muft  then  necefTarily  be  another  Caufs  of  Matter  and  Motion^ 
that  is,  aSiive,  felf-exijienty  and  the  Caiife  of  all  'Things  and  Ac^ 
tmSf  which,  fincc  they  are  not  of  themfelves,  require  a  Caufe, 

NO  T^E  S. 


H 


•different  Objefts  perceiv''d  by  trar  Faculties, 
when  it  is  but  one  and  the  fame.  But  tho' 
thefe  Tokens  be  difperatet  yet  they  are  not  con- 
trary and  iaconfiftent :  Whereas  Space  and  Spi- 
rit feem  entirely  inconfiftent;  fince  one  appears 
by  its  nature  equally  incapable  of  afting  or  be- 
ing afted  upon  ;  the  other  felf-aftive,  and  infe- 
parable  from  A6lion; 

\thlj.  Thofe  Objects  that  are  perceived  by 
different  Faculties,  under  Tokens  which  have 
no  connexion  with  one  anothee,  may  alfo  be 
•dtually  feparated  ;  for  inftance,  a  thing  may 
be  cold  and  not  white,  white  and  not  cold  j 
and  fince  Space  and  Spirit  are  in  the  Mind  as 


independent  as  Cold  and  White,  they  may 
be  feparated,  and  have  a  feparate  Exiftence, 
which  cannot  be  faid  of  any  Divine  Attri- 
bute. 

^thhf.  It  feems  ujekf:^  and  to  no  manner  of 
purpofe,  that  God  ihould  be  the  Objed  of  the 
Senfcs,  for  Brutes^  that  are  held  thus  to  per- 
ceive him,  worlhip  him  not,  nor  acknowledge 
him  as  the  Author  of  their  Beings,  which  mufl: 
be^fteem'd  to  be  the  only  End  of  perceiving 
the  Creator.  From  hence,  I  think,  it  ap- 
pears, that  this  Opinion  is  by  no  nveans  pra- 
bablc. 


SECT.    III. 

Of  tie  Firfi  Cauje. 

^  \  7[7^^'^  ^^^^  ^^^^"^^  Trlnclple  is  we  cannot  apprehend  other- Our  Reafo. 

V  y     wife  than  by  Reafon,  for  it  occurs  not  to  the  Senfes,  un-  "J"f  ap^^'s. 
Icfs  by  its  Effedfs,  nor  is  it  perceived  by  them  any  more  than  Light  is  Lc  like  thofe 
by  the  Ears:  our  Reafonings  therefore  about  this  Principle  will  be^f »  blind 
like  thofe  of  a  blind ^  Man  about  Light,    A  blind  Man  may  be  affur'd  J^ghtffince 
that  there  is  a  certain  thing  eall'd  Light,  which  the  Eye  can  perceive,  it  is  not  an 
as  the  Nofe  can  Smells  i  he  may  be  taught  alfo  by  them  who  fee,  to  g^jj^p^  ®^ 
underftand  many  Advantages  of  Light,  namely,  that  it  can  diredi  the 
Steps,  that  it  can  warm^  that  it  derives  ics  Origin  from  a  large  remote 

G  2  Body^ 


♦4 


ings 
cerniag  it, 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 

Body,  /.  e,  the  Sun  (17.),  that  by  the  help  of  it  very  ilijlan^  Bodies 
may  be  perceiv'd,  with  their  Forms  and  other  ^lalities  unknown  to 
him;  and  that  Fire  which  affords  only  heat  to  him,  can  give  light tA^ 
fo  to  them  who  fee:  Laftly,  that  it  arifes  from  fome  Motion  in  the 
minuteft  I^articles  of  a  Fluid  (17.). 
Vet  \W5  know  M-  From  thefe  external  Properties  he  might  dlfcourfe  of  Lights 
a  great  many  and  ia  fome  meafure  underftand  the  reafonings  of  other  Men  upoa 
things  con-  j^.  he  would  believe  it  to  be  diftin€t  {vomHeat-,  he  would  eagerly 
defirc,  and  willingly  undergo  many  hardfhips,  to  enjoy  the  benefit  of 
it;  yet  would  he  never  have  any  fuch  fenfe  of  it  as  thofe  who  fee. 
After  the  fame  manner  we  may  know  many  things  about  this  adlive 
Principle,  which  we  are  comjell'd,  by  the  force  of  Reafons^  to  be- 
lieve certainly  to  exift^,  tho'  we  are  no  lefs  ignorant  of  what  it  is  in 
iefelf,  than  the  blind  Maa  is  of  the  Senfation  which  Light  produces 
in  thofe  who  fee  *.. 

III.  For  inflance ;  In  the  firft  place  we  are  certain,  that  atf  other 
things  come  from  this  adiin^e  Principle :  For  nothing  elfe,  as  we  have 
^ocee  rom  Q^^^^  before  •f',  contains  in  itfelf  NeceJJary  Exijlence,  or  aSfive  Pmver^ 
entirely  independent  of  any  other ;  as  therefore  itfelf  is  from  none, 
fo  all  others  are  from  it.  For  from  hence  we  conclude,  that  this 
Principle  does  Exift;  becaufe,  after  confidering  the  reft  of  the  things, 
which  exift,  we  perceive  that  they  could  neither  be  nor  a^,  if  that  had 
aot  exift ed,  and  excited  Motion  in  them.. 


That  all  o- 

ther  Beings 


IV.  Se^ 


jsro  7 E  s. 


(17.)  Thefe  two  particulars  feem  neither  ne- 
"ccffary  to  be  mentioned  here  among  the  advan- 
tages that  Light  affords,  nor  will  the  latter  of 
them  be  thought  to  be  exafily  true,  M  under- 
ftood  of  the  Cartefian  Subtle  Fluid.  Tho'  per- 
haps in  effeft  t\it  Cartsjian  and  Newtonian  doc- 
trines of  ^//z^»  may  in  this  refpeft  be  confi- 
ftent.  For,  Sir  Ifaac  Newton  fuppofcs,  that 
Vijion  is  perform'd  chiefly  by  the  vibrations  of 
a  fine  Medium,  which  penetrates  all  Bodies,  ex- 


cited in  the  bottom  of  the  Eye  by.  the.  rays  of, 
Light,  and  propagated  thro'  the  CapiJlaments- 
of  the  Optic  Nerves  to  the  Senforium:  and  Des 
Cartes  maintains,  that  the  Sun  prefTing  the 
Materia  Suiti/is,  wherewith  the  World  is  fill'd 
every  way,  tha  Vibrations  or  Pulfes  of  that 
Matter  refiefted  from  Objefts  are  communica- 
ted to  the  Eye,  and  thence  to  the  Senfory.  Sa 
that  the  Adlion  or  Vibration  of  a  Medium-  ij- 
equally  fuppofed  in  both,     Chambers^ 


•  T'his  Comparifon  is  farthtr  illujirated  bj  the  Author,  g;^ //{'^  Procedure  of  Humaa  Undei-llaiVf 
ding,  in  bis  Introduftion. 
t_  ^.2,  faragr.  3, 4,  5„fe:.  and  Note  u^.  , 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL  k^f 

IV.  Secondly^  we  are  certain  that  this  Principle  is  One,  Sinailar  ^^^'rhititKOaff^ 
Uniform ;    For  Matter  is,  as  to  its  EJjence^  every  where  One  and  a- 
like ;  the  fame  mufl:  be  faid  of  Space,  if  we  grant  it  to  be  any  thing 
diftindt  from  Matter:  much  more  mufl  the  Caufe,   which  fills  Space 
with  Matter  be  One^  fimple  and  uniform  (18.). 

G3,  YrThirdly^. 

N  O  f  E  S. 


^iS".)  This  Argument,  (as  well  as  fome  o- 
thers  hereafter  mention' d)  were  the  foundation 
©f  i:  true,  can  but  be  callM  a  probable,,  pre- 
fumptive  one  at  beft :  nay,  the  contrary  will 
rather  follow  from  the  multipUdty  and  diver  City 
of  created  Subjlances.  We  Ihall  therefore  en- 
deavour to  give  a  diftinft  proof  of  the  Being 
and  Attributes  of  God,  fo  far,  at  leaft,  as  the 
knowledge  of  them  may  aiFcft  our  prefent  Sub- 

Now  thefc  feem  capable  of  a  clear  deduftion 
from  this  one  felf-evident  Principle*,  I ExiJ}. 
I  my  felf  exijl :  therefore  Jo?nething  exifts.  If 
fomcthing  exifts  now,  then  fomething  has  exifted 
etlujays,  otherwife,  that  fomething  which  now 
exifts,  muft  once  either  have  been  made  by  no- 
thing, i.  e.  been  caufed  by  no  Caufe,  which  is 
abfurd;  or  elfe  have  madexx^tM,  i»  e.  have  a^ed 
before  it  exijled,  or  been  at  once  both  Effe£l 
ind  Catfe;  which  is  alfo  abfurd  j  or,  laftly, 
(which  is  the  only  fuppofition  left)  it  muft 
have  been  produced  by  fomcthing,  which  had 
its  Exiftence  from  fomething  e/fe,  which  alfo 
depended  on  fome  ether  Caufe,  and  fo  on  in  an 
jnfnite  Series  of  Caus'd  or  Succeftive  Beings, 
without  any  eternal  or  firft  Caufe,  which  is  al- 
fo abfurd.  For  either  fome  one  part  of  this  in- 
iinite  Series  has  not  been  fuccrjjive  to  any  other, 
or  elfe  all  the  feveral  parts  of  it  have  been  fuc- 
ccflive :  \i  fome  one  part  of  it  has  not,  then 
there  was  a  firjl,  which  deftroys  the  Suppofi- 
fition  ;  '\i all  the  feveral  prarts  of  it  have  been 
fucceffive  to  each  other,  then  they  have  all 
once  been  future,  and  if  they  have  been  once 
all  future,  then  there  was  a  time  when  none  of 
them  exifted;  and  if  there  was  a  time  when 
none  of  them  cxificd,  then  either  all  the  parts 
of  this  Infinite   Series,    and  confequcntly  the 

*  Set  X  a;  at  the  end  ^f  Chap.  I. 


whole,  muft  have  arifen  from  nothing  ;  which  iff 
abfurd;  or  elfe  there  muft  be  fomething  in  the' 
whole  hc^Az  what  is  contain'd  in  all  thQ  parts  ^ 
which  is  alfo  abfurd.    This  infinite  Series  there-' 
fore  is,  in  the  whole,  and   in  every  part,  an 
exprefs  contradiftion.     Or  thus:  Since  all  the  • 
parts  of  this   infinite  Series  zie  fuuefftve  or  fu- 
ture to   one    another,    they  muft  once  either^ 
have  been   all   future,  /.  e.  non-exifient,    (and' 
then  the  fecondabfurdity  will  follow,  /.  e.  tbit" 
this  whole  Series  arofe  from  nothing)  or  elfe  iW* 
but  fome^»^,  (and  then  the  firft  will  follow,  i.e^ 
that  it  had  a  beginningf  which  one  added  to  the  * 
reft,  cither  makes  them  infinite,  which  is  ab- 
furd, or  they  are  infinite  without  that  one,  and' 
then  that  one  added  to  them  makes  one  more 
than  infinite,  which  is  alfo  abfurd '|'. 
'     Hence  we  gather  the  Eternity  ||  of  fome  one 
Thing  or  Being.     That  every  one  is  not  in  like 
man-ncr- Eternal  /7 /<7r/^  ante-,   (as  the  School- 
men improperly  fpeak)   or,  never  had  a  Begin^ 
ning%  particularly,  that  no  Body  or  material  Sy^ 
fiem  can  be  fo  (and  the  fame  reafons  hold  e- 
qually  againft  zny  finite  immaterial  Subfiance) 
is  fufficiently  prov'd  in  the  Enqtiiry  into  the  £- 
vidence^of  the  Chrifiian  Religion  \\.. 

From  Eternrty  comes  Independence  or  Self- 
Exifience.  For  that- which  never  had  a  begin- 
ning of  Exiftence,  could  not  poffibly  have  any 
Caufe  of  that  exiftence  (for  then  it  would  nof 
he  th&  firfi  Caufe,  contrary  to  what  we  have- 
pro  v'd  above)  or. could  depend  upon  no  other 
thing  for  it,  /.  e.  muft  be  independent  of  all  o- 
thers;  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  muft  exilt 
of  itfelf,  /.  e.  be  felf-exiftent  ||  ||. 

Eternity  a  parte  pft,  or  neceffary  Exifleneef 
or  an  iinpoflibility  of  ever  ceafing  to  be,  is  a 
neceffary  confequence  of  Independence.     For, 

t  Xb.       HXc.      nxd^      inix«, 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

2ijinitt  in        ^'  thirdly.  That  it  is  Infinite  both  in  Nature  and  Powef :  For  fince 
j^ature  and   ic  cxifts  of  it/elf,  there  is  nothing  that  can  bound  its  Nature  o^ 

Fower^ 

NOTES. 


46 


toxoir. 


what  depends  upon  no  Caufe  can  never  be  al- 
ter'd  or  deftroy'd  by  any,  as  was  (hewn  in 
Notes  9  and  1 4,  and  X  c. 

From  Independence  comes  alfo  Omnipotence. 
For  a  Being  that  depends  upon  no  external 
Caufe  for  his  Exiftcncc,  and  has  d£lwe  Power, 
(as  was  fliewn  at  the  fame  time  that  we  prov'd 
his  Exiftence,  and  by  the  fame  Medium)  can- 
not depend  upon  any  for  the  exertion  of  that 
power,  and  confeqaently  no  limits  or  defefl  can 
be  apply'd  to  either  his  Exiftence  or  Power. 
For  Limitation  is  an  effell  of  fome  fuperior  caufe, 
which  in  the  prefent  cafe  there  cannot  be:  con- 
Icquently  to  (uppofe  limits  where  there  can  be 
no  limiter,-  is  to  fuppofe  an  Effe£i  without  a 
Caufe  J  which  is  a.  Contradiftion  f . 

To  fuppofe  this, Being  limited  in  or  by  its 
own  Nature,  is  to  Xuppofe  fome  Nature  antece- 
dent, or  limiting  ^ahty  fuperior,  to  that  Being, 
to  the  Exiftence  of  whom,  no  Thing,  no  Qua- 
lity, is  in  any  refpeft  antecedent,  or  fuperior: 
which  is  another  Contradidi on.  And  to  fup- 
pofe that  there  is  no  fuch  thing  as  aBion  or 
power  in  a  Being  which  appears  to  be  the 
fountain  of  all  aftion  and  power,  is  (if  pof- 
fible)  the  worft  fuppofition  of  all. 

Liberty  is  alfo  included  in  the  Idea  of  Om- 
nipotence :  Ailive  Power  implies  Freedom  .  Infi- 
■  nite  Power  is  abfilute  Freedom.  What  therefore 
has  no  bounds  fet  to  its  power,  what  can  have 
no  oppofition  made  to  its  Will,  nor  reftraint 
laid  on  its  Adions,  muft  both  will  and  a<^ 
freely.  This  Attribute  is  alfo  prov'd  from  the 
beginning  of  Motion,  and  the  creation  and 
difpofition  of  indifferent  things  ||.  But  tho' 
this  Being  \s  free,  and  as  fuch,  the  Author  of 
Change  in  othcf  Beings,  yet  he  muft  himfelf  be 
Unchangeable.  For  all  changes  have  a  begin- 
ning, and  confequently  are  Effefts  of  fome 
prior  Caufes:  But  there  can  be  nothing  prior  to 
the  Exiftence  of  this  Being,  as  he  is  Eternal, 
acither  any  Caufe  of  it,  as  he  is  independent ; 


nor  conk<{ucntlY  zny  change  in  it:  except wc 
could  fuppofe  him  to  change  htmfelf,  which  is 
the  fame  abfurdity  as  to  produce  himfelf,  /.  e.  to 
be  at  the  fame  time  both  Effe5l  and  Caufe, 

Thus  we  come  to  the  Knowledge  of  an  E- 
ternal.  Independent^  Omnipotent,  Free,  and  IJn' 
changeable  Being. 

'Omr.ifcience,  as  well  as  fome  of  the  foregoing 
Attributes,  may  be  more  eafily  deduced  thus/ 
We  find  in  ourfelves  fuch  Qualities  as  Thought 
and  Intelligence,  Petver,  Freedom,  i5fc.  of  which 
we  have  intuitive  Knowledge,  as  much  as  of  our 
own  Exiftence',  and  that  to  have  thefe  is  a  per- 
feElion,  or,  better  than  to  be  without  them: 
We  find  alfo,  that  thefe  have  not  been  in  us 
from  Eternity,  confequently  they  muft  have  had 
a  Beginning,  and  confequently  fome  Caufe,  (for 
the  fame  reafon  that  a  Being,  beginning  to  exift 
in  time,  requires  a  Caufe)  which  Caufe,  as  it 
muft  be  fuperior  to  its  EffeS,  has  them  in  a  fu- 
perior Degree  f4-  ;  and  if  it  be  t\\tjir/l  Caufe,  as 
itfelf  can  depend  \y^or\  no  other,  muft  have  them 
in  perfeBion,  or  in  an  infinite  or  unlimited  jy^- 
gree  (if  thefe  Words  can  properly  be  here  ap- 
ply'd II  ||.)  Since  Bounds  or  Limitation  would  be 
without  a  Limiter  (as  has  been  fhewn)  i.  e.  an 
Effeft,  without  a  Caufe. 

The  Phantmena  of  Nature  alfo  lead  us  up  to 
one,  fuch  firft  Caufe,  which  is  fufficient  for 
their  produdlion,  and  therefore  none  elfe  are 
necef}ary  ;  and  tho'  feveral  more  independent  Be- 
ings might  poflibly  exift,  yet  would  they  be  no 
Gods  to  us ;  for  they  would  have  no  manner  of 
Relation  to  us,  nor  we  any  thing  to  do  witlt 
them  *.  Since  therefore  the  fame  reafon  holds 
for  no  more  than  One  fuch,  to  fuppofe  more 
than  one  is  at  Icaft  unreafonable, 

Thefe  feem  to  be  all  the  fimple  Attributes 
obfervable  in  the  Divine  Nature,  which,  as 
they  are  differently  combined  by  us,  come  un- 
der different  names.  Thus  the  unlimited  ex- 
ercifc  of  Gods  Knowledge  and  Power  demon- 

iftrates 


+  X  f.  y  ^ce  Note  20.  and  our  Author's  Note  F.  and  the  references.  f  j-  ^^^  '^^  ^''^^^*' 

part  o/Xk.  ii^^^Xl.  *Xs.  ■      ^^ 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

^ower,     Tis  to  be  obferv'd  farther,  that  the  number  o£ po//ilfle  things 
is  conceiv'd  by  us  to  be  infinite  at  leaft  in  Power,  but  nothing  can  be 

NOTES. 


47 


ITrates  him  Omniprefent,  i.  e.  at  all  times  and  in 
all  places  fo  prefent  with  every  Cre.iture,  as  to 
have  an  abfolute  Knozoledge  of,  and  Power  over 
it ;  always  to  fupervjfe  and  govern  it  -f. 

His  enjoying  all  conceivable  perfeflions  in 
an  encire  abfolute  manner,  denotes  him  infi- 
nite, or  abfolutely  perfect  ||j  and,  which  is  the 
feme  thing,  his  being  capable  of  no  want^  de- 
feffy  or  ujihappinefs  whatfoever,  defines  him  all 
uffcient. 

And  fince  we  can  never  fully  comprehend 
Ae  nature  of  fuch  an  infinite  or  perfeft  Being, 
nor  conceive  the  manner  of  his  Exijience,  we 
ftile  him  Incomprehenfible^  To  doubt  whether 
his  Naturty  and  manner  of  Exigence  may  be  in 
reality  thus  incomprehenfible  to  us,  is  to  doubt 
whether  the  lefs  may  not  contain  the  greater  j 
and  whether  our  Ideas  of  things  all  exilling 
with  a  Caufe,  may  not  fhew  us  the  manner  of  a 
thing's  exi ft i ng  zy/Vi'(ja/  a  Caufe,  exifting  in  a 
manner  quite  different  from  every  other  thing. 
He  that  can  doubt  of  this,  may  doubt  alfo, 
whether  twice  two  may  not  be  equal  to  twen- 
ty ;  and  whether  he  may  not  know  how  the 
Sun  fhines  by  his  being  always  in  the  Dark. 

Tht  Moral  Attributes  oi  God,  are  deducible 
after  the  fame  manner  from  his  Natural onas. 
All  of  them  (except  Goodnefs)  are  co'nfider'd 
only  as  confcquences  of  the  former,  when  ex- 
ercifed  on  fome  other  Beings,  and  feem  to  be 
riic  Perfeftions  of  his  External  Afts,  rather 
than  any  new  internal  perfeAions  of  his  Nature 
or  Eflcncc ;  and  are  very  properly  term'd,  his 
fecondary,  relative  Attributes  *. 

And  tho'  the  Exiftence  of  any  moral  Quali- 
ty or  A£tion  is  not  capable  of  ftrid  Demon- 
(iration,  becaufe  every  moral  Aftion  or  Quali- 
ty, as  fuch,  depends  upon  the  Will  of  the  A- 
gent,  which  is  abfolutely  free.  Yet,  we  have 
as  great  an  Aflurance  that  there  are  Moral  Qua- 
lities in  God,  and  that  he  will  always  Aft  ac- 
cording to  thefe  Moral  Qualities,  as  the  nature 

t  Xh.  II  ^r^Wollafton,  /•  70, 93. 

t-i-.  ^*^  Ditton  on  Moral  Evidence,  /.  1,2. 


of  the  thing  admits,  and  may  be  as  abfolutely 
certain  of  it,  as  if  we  could  demonftrate  itf4.. 

I  fhall  begin  again,  with  a  Self-Evident 
Propofition  : 

Pleafure  i^fcdiffcrent  from  Vain ;  confequent- 
ly  there'^s  zy^fference  in  things.  Pleafure  is 
jit  for,  or  agreeable  to,  the  Nature  of  a  fenfible 
Being,  or  is  a  natural  Good  ;  Pain  is  unfit,  or  \s 
a  natural  Evil:  confequently,  there's  a  natural 
fitnefs  and  unfitfiefs  of  things ;  or  (which  is  the 
very  fame,  and  what  thefe  terms  Ihould  always- 
mean)  Natural  Go:d  and  Evil. 

The  voluntary  application  of  this  fitnefs  and 
unfitnefs  to  any  Rational  Being,  or  the  Produc- 
tion II  ll  of  this  Natural  Good  and  Evil  by  a 
Rational  Being,  is  Mral  Fitnefs  and  Unfitnefsy 
or  Moral  Good  and  Evil :  confequently  there 
is  fuch  a  thing  as  Moral  Good  and  Evil*  An 
Inclination  to,  and  Approbation  of,  this  Moral 
Good,  is  implanted  in  every  rational  Creature, 
and  is  perfedive  of  its  Nature,  and  therefore  it 
muft  be  communicated  by,  and  confequently 
be  inherent  in,  the  Creator  \W. 

To  Will  and  Adl  agreeably  to  this  AfFedion 
and  Approbation,  is  alfo  a  Perfeflion;  the  con- 
trary an  imperfedlionr  confequently  the  for- 
mer, as  it  is  a  Perfedlion  found  in.  fome  degree 
in  the  Creature,  muft  belong  to,  and  be,  ia 
the  higheft  degree,  in  the  Creator,  who  has 
been  already  proved  to  exid  in  the  befl  man- 
ner pofiible,  or  to  have  all  natural  perfeftioos 
in  an  infinite  or  perfeft  Degree  ||  ||  || ;  and  there- 
fore he  muft  have  all  moral  onts  fo  too. 

As  his  Knowledge  and  Power  are  perfeil,  he 
muft  always  both  perceive  and  be  able  to  pur- 
fue  this  Moral  Good.  And  as  his  Happinefs  is 
complete,  there  can  be  no  poffibic  reafon  why 
he  fhould  ever  will  the  contrary  j  nay,  there  ia 
a  good  reafon  why  he  fliould  not,  namely,  o- 
therwife  a  perfeft  Thing  would  contradift  it- 
felf,  and  will  a  defeB  or  imperfeRion,  i.  e.  be 
be  perfeft  and  not"  pcrfea  at  the  fame  time: 

And 

•  See  linpartial  Enquiry,  /.  29,  68,  l:f<» 

mixi.      t+fxk.      iiiixi. 


^8 


concerning 


the  Origin  of  Evil, 

foffibk,  to  which  there  is  not  fome  P</wer  correfponde7tty  that  might 
a<SuaUy.,efFe<5l  it,  fince  therefore  the  things  that  are  poffible,  cannot 

be 

N  O  7'  E  S. 


"And  a  Being  infinitely  hnppy,  and  who  loves 
and  approves  himfelf,  becaufe  he  is  fo,  would 
4iAte  and  dif-ipprovc  the  very  fame  thing  in  o- 
thers,  ;.  e.  would  love  his  own^^ature,  and 
yet  hate  any  thing  that  refembleffit  ;  which  is 
•ablurd  *.  It  follows  then,  tha#  he  muft  al- 
ways inozv,  be  al>/e,  and  ivillhig  to  do,  and 
therefore  aSually  do  what  is  ablblutely  beji  to 
be  done,  /.  e.  produce  the  greateft  Sum  of 
'Happinefs,  or  be  abfolutely  and  completely 
*Goodt  This  alfo  was  inclcided  in  Benevo- 
lence, and  the,  moral  Scnfe  above  incatio- 
ned  f . 

For  if  he  has  implanted  Benevolent  AfFec- 
tions  in  us,  and  a  Senfe  which  approves  them, 
lie  muft  himfelf  have  both  the  fame  Afteflions, 
and  the  fame  Senfe  of  them  ||. 

Again:  The  Idea  of  Goj^/y^?,'} •  properly  im- 
-plies  an  inclination  of  communicating  happi-. 
«efs  to  others  ;-  if  then  this  .Being  be  Good,  he 
muft  actually  have  communicated  happinefsto 
oihers  ;  and  vice  verfa^  if  he  have  communica- 
ted happinefs  to  others,  he  muft  be  good :  But 
this  Being  has  communicated  happinefsto  o- 
thers,  therefore  he  is  Good, 

The  Idea  of  Wifdoni  implies  his  knowledge 
and  obfervance  of  the  moft  proper  methods  of 
■€fFe£ling  this,  and  is  included  in  his  Omnifci- 
efice;  it  being  nothing  but  that  very  knowledge 
confider'd,  with  relation  to  pra£lice.  It  ap- 
•pears  farther,  from  confidering  the  only  eaiifes 
of  imprudence  in  Men,  which  are  either  Igno- 
rance, Partiality,  or,  Inattention',  none  of  which 
can  have  place  in  God :  He  cannot  be  igno- 
rant of  any  thing,  ftnce  both  all  things,  and 
their  Relations  to  each  other,  proceed  from  him : 
he  cannot  be  aw'd  by  any  Power,  or  fwafd  by 
any  intereft,  fince  ^as  has  been  Ihewn^  he  is 
independent  and  all-fuffuient  i  and  he  cannot  be 
inattentive,  fince  he  always  ^tti,  every  thing  in- 
.-iuitively  and  at  oncej    and  confequently  he 


muft  always  imm  arid  do  what  is  fitteft  and  zvi^ 
J'ejl  to  be  done. 

From  v/hich  alfo  follows  his //'///f/V^  :  For 
he  that  fees  all  the  circumjiances  of  things,  and 
the  qualifications  of  pcrfons,  and'  has  ability  to  re- 
gulate thefc,  and  no  manner  of  temptation  to  do 
otherwifc,  -muft  certainly  fuit  thefe  Circum- 
ftances  to  thofe  Qualifications,  or,  provide  that 
perfons  receive  the  natural  and  proper  confe- 
qucncc  of  their  Aflions;  or  (which  is  the  fame) 
do  with. every  perfon  what  is  exactly  juft  and 
right. 

The  fame  alfo  holds  for  his  Holinefs  and  Fe- 
racily,  or  rather  Faithfulnefs.  As  to  the  former, 
he  muft  always  diflike  and  deteft  Evil,  fince  it 
can  never  become  in  the  leaft  agreeable  to  his 
■PerfeSliofis,  or  ferviceable  to  his  Vfe:  As  to  the 
latter,  he  muft  adhere  to  Truth,  as  it  is  a  Per' 
feSlion,  zxA  co-incident  with  Good,  ^c  fince 
he  can  have  no  poiable  reafon  or  motive  to  de- 
viate from  it.  "  The  reafon  why  Men  break 
"  -their  Words  (fays  Bp.  Wilkins)  is  either  be- 
"  caufe  of  their  rajhnefs  and  inconfidcratr.efs 
"in  making  Promifes,  or  t\\t\r  firgetfulnefs 
"  in  not  minding  them,  or  their  inconfiancyxn 
"  not  keeping  them,  or  their  zw/^/^w^  to  per- 
"  form  them  :  But  now  the  Divine  Nature  be- 
"  ing  infinitely  wife,  and  all-fifficient,  can  have 
"  no  temptation  to  be  otherwife  than  true  and 
"■^  faithful,  his  xn^xdic  knowledge  zniitvifdcm  {i- 
"  cures  him  from  being  dcceiv'd  himfelf,  his 
"  Omnipotence  doth  exempt  him  from  ftanding 
"  in  need  of  deceiving  others,  and  his  Goodncfs 
"  fecures  us  from  the  leaft  fufpicion  of  any  in- 
"  clination  thereto  .|-f  •' ' 

Thus  may  we  reafon  about  the  Icveral  per- 
feflions  of  the  fupreme  Being,  but  that  which 
fhould  chiefly  direft  us  in  thefe  our  Enquiries, 
is  the  Idea  of  his  Infinite  Goodnefs.  "  This 
"  (y^J-^  ^^^'  P^^  learned  Perfon  ||  \\  )  is  the  firft 
"  and  clearcft  Notion  we  have  of  him,  the 

foun- 


•  See  Scot'/  Worh,  Vol.2.  DifcXIV.  p. 303.  f  SeeXi. 

•4.+  Nat.  Rclig.  Ch.  10.  p.  142,  btb  Editj  ||  ||  Ibid.  p.  138. 


i!  Ibid. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 

be  limited,  there  mufl  alfo  be  a  Caufe  infinitely  powerful.    For  as  one 

Poffibility 

N  O  t  E  S, 


49 


"  dationof  all  our  WorlhipancI  Religion  ;  and 
"  without  which  all  his  other  Attributes 
"  would  not  afford  fufficient  grounds  for  our 
"  Love  and  JdortJtion.''''  Pozver  without  Good- 
nefs  is  attended  only  with  the  Idea  of  Terror  ; 
Jufiice,  of  Rigour  and  Severity  ;  Wifiom,  of  Ar- 
tifice and  Cunning',  and  Truth  will  be  nothing 
but  rigid  Inflexibility  in  arbitrary  Decrees*. 
So  that  there  is  no  other  Attribute,  when  con- 
f;dcr'd  feparately  from  it,  capable  of  giving  the 
Heart  any  kind  or  amiable  impreffions;  and  all 
the  other  moral  Attributes  (if  they  can  proper- 
ly be  call'd  Attributes)  are  fo  far  from  exilting 
apart  from  it,  that  they  may  be  confider'd  only 
as  fo  many  different  Fiezvs  of  the  fame  Goodneis 
in  the  Creator,  and  various  Sources  of  Happinej^ 
to  the  Creature.  Nay,  farther,  the  reft  of  the 
moral  Attributes  feem  as  it  were  fub-ordinnt&\.o, 
and  regulated  by,  this  one  principal  Perfeftion, 
and  brighteft  ray  of  the  Divinity.  Thus  we 
conceive  his  Jufiice  to  be  exerted  on  any  Being 
no  farther  than  his  Goodnefs  neceflarily  re- 
q«ires,  in  order  to  the  making  that  Being,  or 
ethers,  Jenfible  of  the  heinous  nature  and  perni- 
cious effects  oS.  Sin;  and  thereby  bringing  either 
it,  or  fome  others,  to  as  great  a  degree  of  Hap- 
pinefs,  as  their  feveral  Natures  become  capable 
off.  \{\i  Holinefs  hates  ■A.vA  abhors  iW  Wicked- 
nefs,  only  as  the  necrjfdry  Confequence  of  it  is  ab- 
folute  and  unavoidable  MZ/^ry  ;  and  his  Veracity 
or  Faithfulnefs,  fecms  to  be  no  more  concern' d 
for  Truth,  than  as  it  is  connefted  with,  and 
produftive  of,  the  Happinefs  of  all  rational 
Beings ;  to  provide  the  propereft  Means  for  at- 
taining which  great  end,  is  the  cxcrcife  of  his 
Wifilcm.  Thus,  tho'  we  are  certain,  that  all 
the  Divine  Attributes  proceed  equally  from  one 
and  the  fame  principle,  and  are  united  in  one 
TLJfieiue;  yet  when  we  confider  that  Eflence  as 
exhibited  to  us  in  diffirent  refpe&s',  we  alfo 
conceive  it  partially  under  the  di^mia  Ideas  of 
Superior,  ana  Inferior,  antecedent  and  cmjequent. 


^c.  In  which  Senfe,  Goodnefs  is  fuperior 
and  antecedent  to,  and  as  it  were,  the  root  and 
foundation  of,  all  the  Moral  Attributes. 

I  have  all  along  declined  the  Argument  a  pri- 
ori, drawn  from  the  antecedent  neceffity  of  Ext- 
flence,  as  well  for  the  reafons  given  above  in 
Note  14.  as  alfo,  becaufe  it  feeni'd  not  to  car- 
ry fome  Atttributes,  fo  far  as  they  might  be  de- 
duced a  Pofieriori,  and  to  be  fcarce  conliftent 
with  others.  That  the  Selfexificnt  Being,  for 
inftance,  is  not  a  blind,  unintelligent  Neceffity, 
but  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  an  underfianding 
and  really  a£live  Being,  cannot  be  demonftrated 
ftridlly  and  properly  a  priori,  as  Dr.  Clarke 
fays  I',  with  a  great  deal  of  reafon ;  and  how 
ahfolute  Neceffity  is  rcconcileable  with  abfolute 
freedom,  feems  hard  to  conceive.  For  why 
fhould  not  this  neceffity  extend  to  all  the  Ope- 
rations, the  Will,  the  Decrees,  as  well  as  the 
Exifience  of  the  firft  Caufe  :  and  take  away  that 
Freedom  of  determination,  that  tnt\x(t  Liberty 
of  Indifference,  which  our  Author  has  fufficient- 
ly  proved  f4-»  ^o  be  a  property  of  God  himfelf, 
as  well  SiS  Man  ?  And,  if  wo  cannot  admit  it 
in  one  cafe,  why  fhould  we  in  the  other  1  I 
don't  fay  this  Necrfftty  is  inconfiftent  with  pci»- 
feft  Freedom,  as  the  former  is  an  hipcrfcilion, 
fince  we  do  not  conceive  it  to  be  fuch,  any 
farther,  than  as  it  proceed?,  ab  extra,  from  fome 
fuperior  Caufe  itnpofing  it.  But,  this  I  fay, 
that,  be  it  what  you  pleafe,  the  very  Nature nn^ 
Idea  of  \t  fecms  repugnant  to  t\\%t  of  Frcedenf, 
i.  e.  the  power  of  determining  in  cafes  abfolute- 
ly  indifferent,  without  any  previous  rcafn,  or 
neceffity  vvhatfoever ;  and  cdrifequently  thefc 
two  can  never  be  co-exifient  in  the  fame  Caufe: 
He  that  confiders  this  attentively,  will,  I  be- 
lieve, find  it  to  be  more  than  a  mere  quibble  on 
the  Words  ||  \\. 

Lattly,  This  Necrfftty  of  Exiftcnce,  being' 
(as  Di.  Clarke  contends  *^)  Simple  and  Uiiifnn,^ 
without  anypolTible  difference  or  variety,  (hoald 

admit 


•  5<'^Tillotfon'/ 9o5<fr/«.  vol.2.  Pol. 
f^.  Chap.  5.  ^.  I.  Subj.  4.  and  elfewhere. 


p.  679.  f  X  m. 

il"  See  Nites  ia.Sc  62. 

H 


K  ncmonflr.  p.  52. 
Demyijlr.Prop.  7. 


5° 


Free. 


Concern'wg  the  Origin  of  Evil. 

Podibility  requires  a  Caufe,  fo  infinite  Poflibilitics  require  a  Cauie  in- 
finitely powerful   (19.)- 

VI.  Fourthly,  Since  Space  is  conceiv'd  as  merely  iMe  and  ifidiffe- 
rent^  with  refpecft  to  Repletion  or  Vacuity -^  fince  the  Matter  which 
fills  Space,  is  in  like  manner  merely  paflive  and  indifferent,  with  re- 
fped  to  Motion  and  Rejl-^  it  follows,  that  the  Caufe  which  fills  Space 
with  Matter,  and  produces  Motion  in  that  Matter,  is  perfectly  />w; 
fo  that  the  Creation  and  Motion  of  Matter  ^  mufl  be  Works  of  free 
Choice,  and  not  Neceffity,.  in  the  Agent.  For,  if  the  Agent  effec- 
ted thefe  by  Neceflity,  they  would  alfo  be  neceflary  Effe(5ts,  and 
could  not  be   conceiv'd    to  be.  in    themfelves   indifferent  to  Exi- 

flence 


NO  r  E  s:\ 


adnhit  of  no  <lifference  or  variety  of  aay  fort,- 
or  in  any  refped,  and  confequently  muft  ex- 
clude all  dtverfitj,  or  different  kinds  o^ferfeHion 
(is  well  as  different  Perfons)  from  the  Divine 
Nature,  which  is  fuppos'd  to  exift  thereby.  It 
mull  be  utterly  inconfiftent  with  that  Variety 
of  Attributes,  fuch  as  Knowledge  zndi  Pa^aer,&:c. 
which  we  conceive  to  be  very  dijlin^  Proper- 
ties, and  which  Dr.  Clarke,  and  every  one  elfe, 
concludes  to  be  efTentially  in  God. 

If  the  Learned  Dodcr^s  Notion  of  ab folate  Ne- 
cejfity  proves  all  this,  I  humbiy  conceive  it 
proves  too  much,  and  if  it  does  not  prove  this 
I  cannot  apprehend  how  it  proves  any  thing  at 
all.  See  S.  C's  Impartial  Enquiry,  _&c.  p. 
170. 

(19  )  I  fhall  give  the  Reader  this  Argumsnt 
as  it  is  proposed  after  another  manner  by  Pf. 
Fiddes,  and  the  Answer  to  it,  by  5.  Gv 

"  To  fay  a  thing  is  poffible,  is  to  fay,  there 
**  is  fome  thing,  fome  power  or  other  capable 
"-of  producing  it.-  For  »5/>^/'»j,,  oriwhat  has 
•'•no  power,  can  produce  no  effeSl.  The 
*.♦  power,  therefope,  which  is  to- bring  what  is 
"  poffible  into  Being,  is  necelTarily  fuppofed  al- 
♦♦-rea4y  to  exift;  othervvife  iiPerfeiiion  might 
^**-anfe  out  of  nen-entity,  or  without  a  Caufe; 


'*  and  what  we  conceive  poffible,  would'  'j6 
"  really  impoffiblc  *."  ' 

Which  the  Author  of  tlte^  Impartial  Enquiry, 
ijc.  confutes,  by  a  p.ir.illel  inftance. 

*'  If  a  perfon  having  firft  proved  the  exi- 
*'  ftence  of  a  Power  thlt  is  perfeft,  and  made 
"  it  appear^-  thlt  a  perfeft  power  cannot  but 
'*  extend-  to  whatever  is  a  capable  objefl  of 
"  power, -or  includes  not.  a  contradidticn^ 
"  fhould  proceed,  to  prove,  that  the-*^^?  of  Cre- 
"  ation  implies  no  centradiftion,  and  then  at 
" -/^fihouJd  conclude,  that  therefore  Creation 
"  is-a-poffibility  {i.e.  efFeftible  by  the  exer- 
"  cife  .of  that  perfeft  or  almighty  power,  whofe 
"  Exiftence  he  had  before  demonftrated)  I 
"conceive  there  could  be  no  reafonable  cx- 
"  ception  ag*inft  fuch  a  method  of  Arguing. 
"But  if,,  on' the.  contrary,  he  fhould  fay,  I 
"  -plainly  perceive  there's  no  contradidlion  in 
"  the  Suppofition  of  the  Creation,  or  produr 
"  dlion  of  a  thing  that  was  not,  and  Ihould 
"  from  thence  immediately  infer,  that  a  poweF 
"  capable  of  Creation  exifts,  this  would  be  a 
"  veiy  prepofterous  way  of  Demonftrating : 
"  which  yet  is  the  fame  method  with  that  pi 
"  the  prefent  Argument  |[." 


*-Theolog.  Spec.  p.  15. 
II  hnpifrtial  Enqmry,  p.  1 7.8<  . 


Concerning  the    Origin  of  Evil.  5  I 

ftence  or   Non-Exiftence,    as    proceeding  from   a  neceifary    Caufe, 

(20.) 

.  VII.  Fifthly :  Tho*  by  our  outward  Senfes,  and  the  notices  which  That  it  is « 
they  convey  to  us,  we  cannot  go  beyond  Space,  Matter,  Motioji,  fen-  "^'fi/o'^'y  '"- 
fible  ^alities,  and  this  ABive  Principle  which  we  are  fpeaking  of;  Tngflnl  om" 
yet,  if  we  infpcd:  our  own  Minds,  we  may  contemplate  a  Self-con-  nifcienu 
fcious  and  thinking  Principle  within  us,  whofe  Actions  are,  to  W//, 
refufe,  doubt,  rcafon,  afirm  and  deny,  which  carry  nothing  of  Exten- 
fion  along  with  them,  nor  necelTarily  include  it  in  them,  nor  have 
any  relation  to  Place  ov  Space;  but  are  entirely  abftra6ted  from  the 
Notions  of  external  or  internal.  That  there  is  fuch  a  Principle  in  us 
we  are  certain,  not  only  from  our  fenfes,  or  the  impulfes  of  external 
objedis,  but  alfo  from  Reflection  and  Self-Corifcioufnefs.  'Tis  to  be 
obferv'd  farther,  that  we  can  at  our  pleafufe  -move  fome  parts  of 
Matter,  and  fhake  the  Limbs  of  our  Body  by  thought  only,  that  is, 
by  Volition  *,  whence  it  appears,  that  Motion  may  be  produc'd  in 
Matter  by  thought  j  and  that  fomething  of  this  kind  is  to  be  attri- 
buted to  the  firft  Caufe,  in  order  to  put  Matter  into  Motion,  nay,  to 
bring  it  into  Being.  Cogitation  alfo.  Will  and  Confcioufnefs,  or  Fa- 
culties equivalent  to  thefe,  are  neceflary  to  a  free  Caufe,  and  on  that 
account  to  be  attributed  to  the  firfl:  Caufe,  being  (as  fhall  be  fliewn 
below)  perfectly  Free:  which  Caufe,  fince  it  is  infinite  (as  we  have 
proved)  in  its  Eflence  and  Power,  it  muft  be  fo  likewifc  in  Intelligence^ 
viz.  Omnipotent  and  Omnifcient, 

VIII.  Sixthly :   Since   this  Principle  (which  we  call  God)   is  the  That  he  afis 
Caufe  of  all  things,  and  infinite   in  Knowledge  as  well  as  Power,  it  ^^^  ^"  ^"'^ 
follows,  that  he  ads,  not  by  blind  impulfe  but,  for  an  End-,  and  has 
order'd  his  Works  by  fuch  Wifdom,  as  to  be  confident  with  them- 
felvcs,  and  not  deiftrudive  of  each  other. 

H  2  IX.  Sc- 

NOTES. 


(20.)  For  an  excellent  illuftration  of  this 
Argument,  fee  Dr.  darkens  Demonjhat.  p.  24, 
25,  26.  and  65,  66,  67.  cth  Edit.  Sec  alfo 
Cudworth,  p.  667,  i^rV.  and  the  Impartial  En- 
iuirj,  p.  31,  32,  ^f. 


*  That  Volition  ^nA.  Anion  t^tq  pcrfc^ly  di- 
ftindt,    and  mart  proceed  from  two  different. 
Powers^     Sec  Note  61.      That  A^lun  alfo   is 
two-fold.    See  Note  62. 


J  2  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 

IX.  Seventhly:  Since  God  is  perfed  in  himfelf,  fince  all  things, 
of  Creation  fubfift  by  his  Providencc,  and  ftand  in  need  of  him,  but  he  of  none; 
wrstocxer-  and,  fince  he  can  neither  be  profited  nor  incommoded  by  his  Works, 
rr^and'to^""^^  affeded  by  their  Good  or  Evilj    it  follows,  that  he  made  thefe 
communi-    things  for  no  Advantage  of  his  own,    and  that  he  neither  receives 
Goodnefs  f  ^^^  cxpccfts  any  Benefit  from  them.     For  by  creating  things  with- 
thc  Deity,    out  himfelf,  he  ncvufl  neceflarily  have  fought  either  their  Benefit  or 
his  own ;   but  what  Benefit  can  God  feek  for  himfelf,  who  poficffes 
all  Good  ?     That  certainly  which  was  wanting  to  him,  and  necefla- 
rily mufl  be  wanting,  to  a  Being  even  abfolutely  perfedt,  till  he  has 
created  fomething ;  I  mean  the  Exercife  of  his  Attributes  without  the- 
communicating   of  his  Power  and  Goodnefs:   That  therefore  only 
mull  he  be  fuppofed  to  have  fought  in  the  Creation  and  Difpofal 
of  his  Works  (21.),    Not  that  Externals  can  add  any  thing  to  GoJ,^ 

forv 

NOTE  ^... 


(21.)  Some  hive  objefled  here,  that  accor- 
ding to  this  Notion,  there  muft  have  been  a 
Time  before  the  exillence  of  ary  crested  Be- 
iags,  when  God  was  neither  infinitely  i'^/i/y. 
nor  abfolutely  Gooi  *.  But  the  one  part  of  this 
objeftion  evidently  arifcsfrom  a  mift-ike  of  our 
Author's  Notion,  who  has  often  told  U3-,  that 
he  does  not  fuppofe  any  thing  external  to  the 
Deity,  to  add  the  leaft  to  his  own- Happinefs, 
or  Eflcntial  Perfeflions ;  (and  indeed,  to  think 
othervvife,  would  be  worfe  than  to  imagine 
the  Fountain  fed  by  its  own  Streams ;  or  the 
Sun  enlighten'd  by  its  own  Rays)  but  only  to 
maKifef}  ihsm  to  us  his  Creatures,  and  encreafe 
our  happinefs  and  perfefiion,  by  o\xr  knozukdge 
and  imitation  of  them^  The  other  part  cannot 
be  of  force  againft  Creation  in  any  particuLtr 
time;  becaufe  it  will  hold  equally  againft  it 
in  all  times :  Againft  the  very  poffibility  of 
Creation  in  General,  fioce  with  God  there  is 
no  prior  and  pojierior,  no  difference  of  timeap- 
plicable  to  his  Exiftence,  as  we  have  endea- 
VQur'd  to  prove  in  X  c.  Bcfides,  is  it  not 
abfurd  to  talk  of  tims,  before  the  beginning 
of  things,  which  time  (as  we  have  fliewn  in 


the  fame  place)  can-  only  beconceiv'd   as  «- 
exijient  with,  or  rather  ccr.fequentlal  to,  the  Be- 
ing of  thefe  things  ?    'Tis  in  vain  therefore  to  ■ 
ask,    why   were  not  Beings    created   fconer  ? 
Since  no  part  of  Duration  conceivable   can  e- 
ver  be  affign'd,  when  fome  were  not  Created; 
and  every  period  of  time  has  equal  relation   to 
Eternity.     "  As  to   the   fec&nd  Senfe  of   the-' 
"  Queftion  (fays  Cudworth)  Why  the  World,. 
"  tho'  it  could  not  poffibly  be  from  Eternity, . 
"  yet  was  no  fooner,  but  fo  lately  made  ?     V/e 
"  fay,  that  this  is  an  abfurd  ^eftion,  both  be- 
"  caufe  Time   was   made   together   with  the 
"  World,  and  there  was  no  fooner  or  later  be- . 
*'  fore  Time\  and  alfo,  becaufe  whatfoever  had., 
"  a  beginning,  muft  of  neceflity  be  once  but  a 
*'  day  old.     Wherefore,  the  World  could  not. 
"  pofEbly.have  been  fo  made  by  God  in  time,. 
"  as  not  to  be  once  h-ax.  Jive  or  Jix  thoufand 
"  Years  old  and  no  more,  as  now  it  is."  p.  887  • 
Sec  the  fame  more  at  large  in  Fiddes't  Tbeolog. 
Spec.   B.  3.    Part  i.    Ch.  2.    and   in  Bentlefs 
Boyle''sLe£i.  p.  232,  235.  5th  Edit,  otjenkin^s 
Reafonablenefs  of  Chrifianity,  Vol.  2.  C.  9.  or  - 
Sir  M.Hale' %  Frim.Originat.  of  Mankind,  S.  i.  C.6. 

Whew.. 


'^•^Stee  Bp.  P.far(o»  on  the  Cre«d,  zd  £dit.  p.  6zy  ^63. 


Concernhig  the  Origin  of  Evil 

for  they  have  no  manner  of  Proportion  to  his  Power  or  Nature-,  but 
he  has  in  himfelf  the~-adequate  Exercife  of  his  Powers,  namely  in 
the  Contemplation  and  Love  of  himfelf.  Externals  therefore  can 
neither  encreafe  nor  diminifli  the  Exercife  of  his  Powers,  which  be- 
fore was  infinite  (22.)  God  is  indifferent  therefore  as  to  thefe,  nor 
does  his  Exercife  without  pleafe  him,  otherwife  than  as  he  has  chofen 
to  exercife  himfelf  thus;  as  will  be  fhewn  below*.  And  hence  it 
manifeftly  follows,  that  the  World  is  as  well  as  it  could  be  made  by 
infinite  Power  and  Goodnefs,  For  fince  the  Exercife  of  the  Divine 
Power,  and  the  Communication  of  his  Goodnefs,  are  the  Ends  for 
which  the  World  is  fram'd,  there  is  no  doubt  but  God  has  attain'd 
liiefe  Ends* 

H  3  X.  li 


55 


NOTES. 


Where  you  have  all  tKe  abfurd  Queries  of  that 
kind  folidly  and  acutely  anfwcr'd. 

(22.)  The  Powers  or  Attributes  themfelves 
were  in  fome  Senfe  Infinite, .  but  I  don't  appre- 
hend how  the  Exercife  of  them  can  properly  be 
faid  to  be  fo.  It  fecms  impoffible  to  fuppofe  a- 
ny  Divine  Attribute,  either  Natural  or  Moral, 
to  be  exerted  infinitely  on  a  finite  Subjeft,  fince 
that  Subie£l  muft  neceflarily  be  incapable  of 
receiving  it.  Whence  appears  the  abfurdity  of 
imagining  any  Manto  be  the  objedl  of  God's 
iufinite  jfujlice,  and  at  the  fame  times  of  his  in- 
finite Mercy  too,  in  an  infinite  manner,  as  fome 
love  to  fpealc;  which  with  them  raifcs  a  migh- 
ty difficulty  about  He// Torments :  Whercis,  if 
we  fhould  allow  that  the  Divine  Juftice  is  an 
Attribute  entirely  diftinft  from  Goodnefs,  and 
alfo,  that  a  perfon  may  be  at  the  fame  time  the 
objeft  of  both  ;  concerning  which  fee  X  m. 
Yet  ftill  we  can  eafily  fuppofe  thefe  two  Attri- 
butes in  fuch  a  Cafe  boundee/  and  balanc'J,  as  it 
were,  by  each  other,  without  any  defied  in  ei- 
ther; all  the  limitation  here  only  rifing  from 
the  limitation  or  finitenefs  of  the  SubjeSl  on 
which  they  are  fuppos'd  to  be  exerted;  which, 
as  'tis  finite,  manifeftly  cannot  receive  an  in- 
finite Exercife  of  an  infinite  Power. 


The  fame  Gbfervation'wlll  help  us  to  folve 
the  Difficulty  which  fome  bring  againft  the 
very  notion  of  infinite  Power  in  God,  which, 
fay  they,  implies  this  ContradidVion,  viz.  that" 
he  canjtot  do  all  that  he  can  do:  He  could  not 
rrake  the  World  ever  fo  foon,  but  that  it  was 
poffible  for  him  to  have  made  it.fooner:  he 
can  never  make  it  fo  large,  that  it  will  be  im- 
poffiblefor  him  to  make  if  larger:  which  ia 
abfurd.  To  which  we  anfwer.  If  thefe  terms, 
can  nn^  cannot,  were  applied  to  the  fame  thing, 
in  the  fame  re/pe^,  it  would  indeed  be  a  plain 
contradidiion ;  but  in  the  prefent  cafe  'tis  o- 
therwi fc.  The  former  is  apply 'd  to  the  Ob' 
je8s  of  power  in  general,  which  are  included 
in  this  Idea,  i,e.  'tis  affirm'd,  that  the  Power 
of  God  is  perfefl,  or  extends,  and  is  com- 
flienfurate,  to  all  objeds  of  Power,  or  that  he 
can  do  whatever  is  in  the  nature  of  things  pof- 
fible to  be  done.  The  latterr  is  affirm 'd  only  of 
fome  particu/ar  Subjell,  v/Viich.is  in  its  own  na- 
ture incapable- of  Pierfeftion,  or  incommenfu* 
rate  to  this  infinite  Power,  and  on  which  there- 
fore we  may  truly  fay,  that  this  infinite  Power 
cannot  be  employ'd,  or  that  this  Pcrfeftion  can* 
never  be  completely  exhibited,  or  exhaufted  iir-- 
it.     So  that  in  the  prefent  Cafe,    thefe  two- 

Worda. 


*  SeeQlA^.  5.  Vi.  Subj.  4. 


5+ 


When  the 
World  is  (aid 
to  be  created 
for  GiJ's 
(^hry^  'tis 
after  the  man- 


Corxcming  the  Origin   of  Evil. 

X.  I  know  'tis  commonly  faid,  that  the  World  was  made  for  the 
Glory  i)f  God  :  but  this  is  after  the  manner  of  Men,  For  Defire  of  Glo- 
ry is  attributed .  to  God  in  the  fame  maniier  as  Anger ^  Love^  Re^ 
vengCy  Eyes^  and  HanJs.  When  therefore  the  Scripture  teaches  us, 
that  the  World  was  created  for  the  Glcry  of  God,  'tis  to  be  under- 
ftood,  xhat  the  Divine  Attributes,  namely,  Pcwer^  Good?tefs  and  /^//^ 
dom,  {hine  forth  as  clearly  in  his  Works,  as  if  he  had  no  other  in- 
tent-in  making  them,  belide  the  Oftentation  of  the (e  Attributes  ^  nor 
codM  they  have^nfwer'd  that  End  more  fitly,  if  they  had  been  de- 
iign'd  for  Glory :  bur,  ftridtly  fpeaking,  the  Power  of  God  is  infi- 
nite, •  and  when  he  adts  for  the  Good  of  his  Creatures  according  to 
that  infinite  Power^  he  is  infinitely  Good.  Infinite  knows  no  bounds, 
nor  has  the  Goodnefs  of  God  any  other  bounds  befides  his  Wifdom 
and  Ponver^  which  are  alfo  infinite.  And  in  reality,  this  makes  moft 
for  the  Glory  of  Gody  viz.  to  have  created  a  World  with  the  greateil 
Goodnefs.  (23.) 

XL  By 

N  O  ^  E  S. 


Words  may  be  ufed,  without  any  Contradiftion ; 
and  infinite,  or  rather  perfeft.  Power  may  pro- 
perly enough  be  tcrm'd,  not  able  to  do  feveral 
things  without  fuppofing  a  defeft  in  that  pow- 
er, but  only  in  the  Subjefts  which  are  incom- 
menfurate  to  it,  oreflentially  incapable  oi  re 
ceiving  it.  Now,  that  the  Material  World, 
and  every  part  or  property  thereof  is,  in  t\z- 
ry  refpeft,  incapabk  of  this  Infinity,  has,  I 
think,  been  prov'd  in  Note  5.  and  that  no  crea- 
ted Being  whatfoever  can  be  capable  of  it,  will 
be  fhewn  in  Note  28.     . 

(23.)  "  The  reafon  why  God  made  the 
"  World  (fays  the  learned  Per/on  fo  often  cited 
"  above)  was  from  his  own  overilowing  and 
"  communicative  Goodnefs  ;  that  there  might 
**  be  other  Beings  alfo  happy  bcfide  himfelf,  and' 
"  enjoy  themfelves.''  And  afterwards,  "  God 
**  did  rot  make  the  World  merely  to  oflentate  his 
*'  Skill  and  Power,  iut  to  ccmmunicate  his  GooA- 
"  mii,  tohicb  is  {biejlj  and  properly  bit  Glory, 


"  as  the  Light  and  Sp/enJcr  of  the  Sun  is  the  Glo- 
"  ry  of  it  -{-." 

We  have  a  fine  Paragraph  or  two  to  the  fame 
purpofe  in  Mr.  Wollajhvi's  Delin.  of  the  Religion 
of  Nature,  p.  1 1  5 — 1 20. 

The  fame  Notion  is  well  ftated  in  Scctt\  Chri- 
flian  Life',  where  the  Glory  of  God  and  the 
Happinefs  of  Man  are  fliewn  to  be  co-incident  |(. 
As  this  feems  to  be  very  often  mifunderftood, 
it  may  not  be  improper  to  rnfert  a  PafTage  or 
two  from  that  excellent  Author.  "  *A  true  Sur- 
"  vey  and  Infpeftion  of  God-s  Nature,  will 
"  inltru6t  us,  that  being  infinitely  perfe£i,  as 
"  he  is,  he  mutt  be  infinitely  happy  within  him- 
"  felf ;  and  fo  can  defign  no  iclf-end  without 
"  himfelf;  and  confequently,  that  the  end  for 
"  which  he  requires  our  Service,  is  not  any 
"  advantage  he  expefts  to  reap  from  it,  or 
"  farther  addition  to  his  own  happinefs,  he  be- 
"  ing  from  all  Eternity  paft,  as  completely 
"  happy  as  he  can  be  to  all  Eternity  to,  come ; 

"  and 

t  Intell.  Spfem,  p.  886. 

il  5^^  Vol.  I.  p.  4,5. 

•  Vol.  2.  Chkp.  6.  p.  434,  435. 


Concernino'  the  Ormn  of  EviL 

XI.  By  Goody  I  here  underftand  that  which  is  convenient  and 
commodious^  that  which  is  correfpondent  to  the  Appetite  of  every  Crea- 
ture. God  therefore  created  the  World  with  as  great  convenience, 
and  fitnefs,  with  as  great  congruity  tx)  the  Appetites  of  things,  as 
could  be  effeded  by  infinite  Power ^  Wijdom^  and  Goodnefs.  If  then 
any  thing  inconvenient  or  incommodious  be  now,  or  was  from  the 
beginning  in  it,  that. certainly  could  not  be  hindered  or  removed  even 
by  infinite  Powerj  Wifdom,  and  Goodnefs  (24.). 


55 


That  Gol 
made  ths- 
World  as 
well   as  it 
coald   be 
made  by  the 
Higheft 
Power, 
Goodnefs, 
and  Wifdom; 


NO  r  R^. 


*  and  therefore,  what  other  end  can  he  be  fup- 
pos'd  to  aim  at,  than  our  Good  and  Happi- 
nefs  ?  It  is  true  indeed,  he  defigns  to  Glo- 
rify himjelf  in  our  Happinefs;  but  how  ? 
Not  to  render  himfelf  more  glorious  by  it 
than  he  is  in  himfelf,  for  that  is  impoffible; 
but  to  difpiay,  and  ft^etv  forthh.is  own  eflen- 
tial  Glory  to  all  th.it  are  capable  of  admi- 
ring and  imitating  him^  that  thereby  he 
might  invite  them  to  tranfcribe  that  Goodnefs 
of  his  into  their  Nature,  of  which  his  Glo- 
ry is  the  Shine  and  Luftre,-  and  thereby  to 
Glorify  themjelves',.  and  what  can  more  ef- 
feftually  difplay  the  Glory  of  a  Being-  who 
is  infinitely  wife,  and  powerful,  and  good, 
than  to  contrive  and  effeil  the  Happinefs  of 
his  Creatures,  and  efpecially  of  hisrational 
Creatures,  who,  of  all  others,  havethe raoft 
ample  capacity  of  Happinefs  ? 
And  again  :  "  f  But,-  doth  not  the  Scripttrre 
tell  us,  that  he  doth  all  things  for  his  own 
Glory,  and  that  he  obtains  this  end,  as  well" 
by  punifhing,  as  by  rewarding,  his  Creatures  ? 
very  true;  but  then  it  is  to  be  confideHd, 
that  the  Glory  he  aims  at,  confiftsnot  ;in 
receiving  any  Good  from  u»,  but  in  doing 
and  communicating  all  Good  to  us.  For 
infinite -Goodnefs  czn  no  otherwife  be  glori- 
fied, than  by  its  own  overflowings  and  free 
communications,  and  it  can  nootherwife  be 
glorified  in  the  puniflimem  of  its  Creatures; 
but  only  as  it  doth  good  by  it :  For,-  Ihould 
it  punifh  without  good  rcafon,  it  would  re- 
proach and  vilify  itfelf ;    but  if  it  doth  it 


"  for  good  reafon,  it  muft  be  becaufe  ft  iff- 
"  good  either  for  itfelf,  ov  others:  for  itfelf  it 
"  cannot  be  J  for  how  can  an  infinitely  happy 
"  Being,  reap  any  Good  from  another''s  Mife- 
"  ry  ?  And  therefore  it  mull  be  for  the  Good 
"  of  others,  either  to'  reduce  thofe  who-  are  pu- 
"  rrifny,  or  to  warn  others,  by  their;  Example, 
"  from  running  away  from  their  Duty  and 
"  Happinefs.  So  that  to  6.0  Good  As  the^ndof 
"  God's  Punifliment;  and  becaufe  it  is  fo,  he 
"  is  gloriffd  by  it :  and  confidering  that  he  is 
"  fo  infinitely  happy,  that  he  can  no  ways  fervC' 
"  himfelf  by  our  Miferies,  itj  is  impoffible  he 
'*  fhould  have  any  other  end  in  xoncerniiig- 
"  ^/';:;7/^//" about  us,  > but  oniy  the  "Gr^d/,  God- 
"  like  one  of  doing  us  Good,  and  making  us 
"  happy."  See  alfo  Difcou»fe  -14  in  the  fame 
Vol.  p;  302;    , 

•  To  the  fame  purpofic  is  Smith's  Excellent 
Difcourfb  of  the   Exiflence  and  Nature  of  God, 
Ch.  4and7.  ||:     AnA-D'Oylfsf^^'DiJ/ertation,' 
p.  122.  and  iJ)')W^r'8   General  Rtprefentation  of 
Reveal" d  Religion,  p.  260— —267.   and  p.  511. 
and  Bp.  Burners  Expofition  of  the  Articles,  p.  27. 
4th  Edit,  and  our  Author^  Sermon  on  Divine^ 
Predeftination,  &c.  V  33«     For  a  fufficient  An- 
fwer  ta  the  Ob^eiflioh  drawn  from  Provi  16.  4. 
fee  Tillotfen's-z  vol.  of  Sermons,  Fol,  p.  684. 

(24.)  Oav'Author  rightly  concludes  from  the 
Nature  and  ffVl  of  God,  as  difcover'd  above/ 
that  nothing  can  be  made. by  him  (by  whom  ' 
arc  all  things  made)  really  unworthy  of,  or  in- 
confiftent  vnth,  thefe  ;  however  unaccountable^ 
and  irregular  things  may  at  prefent  feem  to  us:  . 

For^i 


t  'Vol.  2;  p.  2:04.  Fol. 


U  Su  Selo£t  Difcourfcs,  p. _.  136,-31x1147. 


S6 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 


NOTES. 


For,  having  demonflratcd  the  Divine  Perfec- 
tions in  one  Senle  a  Priori,  i.e.  prior  to  the 
Examination  of  particular  Phsenonigna,  no 
feeming  difficulties  or  objeftions  vvhatfoever 
a  Pojrerior't,  i.  c.  from  thefe  Phajnomena,  ought 
to  invalidate  tlic  belief  of  them,  but  Ihould  be 
all  over-ruled  by,  and  give  way  to,  thefe  j  ex- 


cept they  amount  to  an  eqiul  degree  of  C/ctr- 
nefs  and  Certainty,  with  the  proofs  of  thefe 
themfelves;  and  alfo  cannot  poffibly  admit  of 
any  manner  of  Solritim  confiilent  with  them; 
neither  of  which  Cafes  can  ever  be  msdc  out, 
as  will,  I  hope,  appear  in  the  following 
Chapters  of  this  Book. 


REMARKS,  referr'd  to  in  Note  i8. 


^Xa.]  That  this  Proportion  muft  be  al- 
low'd  for  felf-evident ,  and  as  fuch,  incapable 
oi  proof,  appears  from  the  nbfurdities  which 
all  run  into  who  attempt  to  prove  their 
own  Exiftence  from  any  other  medium,  viz. 
from  any  of  their  ^/fr^//<7?//.  /  think,  fay  they^ 
therefore  lam,  i.e.  /,  who  am,  think;  there- 
fore, /,  who  think,  am.  I  being  fuppofed  to 
exifl,  do  thint,  therefore  this  thinking  proves 
that  Exiftence.  Is  not  this  plainly  arguing  in  a 
circle,  and  proving  %  thing  by  prefuppofing  it  ? 
And  is  it  not  full  as  clear  to  me  that  I  am,  as 
that  /  think  ?  Tho'  perhaps  I  could  not  be 
certain  of  my  Exiftence  except  I perceiv''d  fome- 
thing  :  yet  fure  the  perception  of  my  own  Ex- 
iftence muil  be  both  as  early  and  as  evident  as 
any  other  perceptions.  The  firft  Propofition 
therefore  is  felf-evident,  and  if  the  fecond  be 
not  fo  too,  'tis  however  neceflarily  conneded 
witli  one.  I  begin  with  our  own  Exiftence, 
becaufe  we  have  Intuitive  Knowledge  of  no  o- 
ther.  \- 

[Xb.  j  See  the  abfurdity  of  this  Infinite 
Series,  as  to  Generations,  Motion,  Number, 
Magnitude,  l^c.  in  the  Notes  5,  and  X  d 
All,  or  any  of  which  Arguments  demonftrate 
the  Abfurdity  of  it,  as  it  is  fairly  and  fully 
ftated  by  Dr.  Green  in  his  late  Philofophy  *■. 
"Where  you  fee.  the  true  old  Atheiftic  Series  in  a 
different  dfcfe  from  that  in  Dr.  Clarke's  2d  Pro- 
portion. 


The  fame  way  cf  reafoning  is  made  ufe  of 
in  a  Philojophical  Effaj  taviards  an  Ezidion  of  the 
Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  hy  S.  W\.  "  That 
*•  the  World  was  not  eternal,  but  created,  is 
"  demonftrable  from  things  that  are  vifible : 
"  Our  Argument  fhall  be  from  Generation. 
'*  Whatfoever  is  begotten,  was  begotten  of 
"  fome  other ;  for  nothing  can  poflibly  beget 
"  or  make  itfelf,  otherwife  it  will  follow, 
"  that  the  fame  thing  i?,  and  is  not,  both  at 
"  ore  inftant,  feeing  it  is  both  the  producer, 
"  and  the  thing  to  be  produced.  It  is  to  be 
"  produced,  and  fo  it  is  not  yet,  it  is  lijce- 
"  ^vife  a  producer,  and  th.it  fuppofeth  thst  it 
"  is  in  Being:  It  is  therefore  in  Being,  a-nd 
"  it  is  not  in  Being,  that's  a  manifeft  contra- 
*'  diftion.  Wherefore,  nothing  can  generate, 
*'  make,  or  produce  itfelf:  wherefore,  every 
"  thing  that  is  begotten,  is  begotten  of  fome 
"  other,  and  then  the  other  which  begot  it, 
"  either  was  itfelf  in  the  fame  manner  begot- 
"  ten,  or  it  was  not ;  if  it  was  not,  we  are  al- 
•**  ready  come  to  the  firft  Principle,  which 
"  was,  unbegotten,  and  fo  have  difcover'd  a 
"  God-head.  If  it  was  begotten,  either  we 
"  muft  follow  up  the  Courfe  of  fucccftive  Gc- 
"  neraticn  to  fome  firft  Production  from  a 
"  Caufe  eternal,  or  elfe  we  muft  neceflarily 
"  fay,  that  the  Courfe  of  Generations  had  no 
"  beginning,  and  confequently,  that  infinite 
"  Succeffions  are  already  pafl,  which  is  as 
"  much  as  to  acknowledge,  that  an  infinite 

Number 


B.6.  C.5.  ^.8.  p.  7634 


f   2d  Edit.  Oxford,  1655. 


Concermng  tie  Origin  of  EviL 


57 


REMARKS. 


'*'  Number  of  Succeflions,  are  pad,  and  if  pad, 
**  then  they  are  at  an  end;  So  we  have  found 
"  an  infinite  Number,  which  hath  had  an 
"  end,  that  is  another  Contradiftion.  Again  : 
**  if  any  fhall  affirm,  that  the  courfe  of  Genc- 
"  ration  had  no  beginning,  but  that  the  num- 
"  ber  of  them  hath  been  Infinite  :  let  us  put  a 
"  Cafe,  and  reafon  with  him.  We  will  ima- 
"  gine  the  Generations  of  Jbrahaniy  for  ex- 
*•  ample,  and  Jofephxht  Son  oi  Jfaac,  the  Son 
"  oi  Abraham.  I  demand  therefore,  whether 
*'  before  the  birth  oi  Abraham  there  had  paft 
"  an  infinite  Series  of  Generations,  or  not  ? 
•'  If  the  Series  was  finite,  the  Work  of  Gene- 
'•  ration  had  beginnings  which  is  the  Conclu- 
"  fion  I  contend  for :  if  the  Series  pall  was  in- 
"  finite;  then,  at  the  birth  oi  Jofephf  'tis  evi- 
**  dent,  that  more  Generations  were  paft,  fo 
"  wc  have  found  a  Number  greater  than  that 
*•  which  was  f^pos'd  to  be  Infinite  :  and  con- 
"  fequently  that  was  not  Infinite;  fo  it  was 
"  both  Infinite  and  not  Infinite,  a  manifeft 
*'  contradiftion. 

"  But  if  we  fay  that  Abraham'' s  was  Infinite, 
"  and  that  fo  was  Jo/eph^s  alfo,  then  it  will 
"  follow,  that  the  Number  oi  Abraham''&\vis 
"  equal  with  the  number  of  Jofeph^s,  but  A- 
"  braham's  was  but  a  part  oi  Jofeplfs,  where- 
■*'  fore  the  part  is  equal  to  the  whole.  Elfe  ad- 
"  mit  that  Abraham's  was  finite,  but  when  it 
"  came  to  Jofeph,  that  then  the  number  was 
**  Infinite,  it  follows  then,  that  a  finite  num- 
"  ber  added  to  a  finite,  ftiall  make  an  Infinite, 
"  which  likewjfe  is  againft  the  common  light 
"  of  reafon.  We  fee  therefore,  that  fuppofmg 
"  the  Eternity  of  the  World,  or  the  Infinity 
"  of  Generations,  doth  force  the  Mind  to  con- 
"  iradiftions,  and  confequently  the  Fiftion  is 
"  vain  and  utterly  impoffible.  And,  as  we 
"have  argued  in  the  way  of  Generation,  fo 
"  we  may  likewife  in  every  thing  where  there 
"  is  a  Motion,  or  Mutation,  that  is,  in  all  the 
"  parts  of  the  vifibJe  World.  The  Creation 
"  therefore  of  the  World,  from  the  vifible 
"  things  thereof,  is  manifeft.  C^E.  D."  p.  19. 
And  again,  p.  22.  Well,  having  concluded 
"  the  Creation  and  Beginning  of  the  World, 
"  wc  fee  it  follows,  that   thence  wc  conclude 


"  the  Eternal  Power  and  God-head ;  that  is, 
**  the  Eternity  and  Power  of  the  God-head. 
•'  As  for  Eternity,  we  have,  by  undeniable 
•*  confequence,  rcfolv'd  all  Motions  in  the 
**  World  into  the  bofom  of  a  firft  Mover,  and 
"  if  we  fuppofe  him  a  firft  Mover,  the  Suppo- 
"  fition  will  evidently  conclude,  that  he  is  E- 
"  ternal,  /'.  e.  that  he  is  without  Beginning  of 
"  Eflence,  or  without  any  term  or  limit  of 
'*  Duration.  For  if  it  had  any  beginning  of 
"  ElTence  or  Duration,  that  beginning  of  Be- 
"  ing  prefuppofeth  a  priority  of  not-being, 
•'  (that  is,  aftual  Being  is  not  of  the  Eflence  of 
*'  it)  and  fo  that  we  may,  without  anycontra- 
♦'  diftion,  fuppofe  it  not  to  be  yet  in  Being; 
'*  that  is,  we  may  bring  our  Underftandings, 
"  without  error,  to  the  apprehenfion  of  it,  as 
"  being  yet  in  the  State  of  Power  only,  or 
^  Potential-being,  fo  as  things  are  in  their 
'*  Caufes.  So  then,  let  us  conceit  it  in  this 
"  State,  and  compare  this  State  with,  the  other 
"  when  it  had  Being ;  and  it  is  evident,  that 
"  this  paflage,  or  tranfition  from  want  of  Bc- 
*'  ing  to  a  Being,  cannot  be  without  a  Mo- 
•*  tion,  nor  Motion  without  an  aftual  Mover : 
•'  but  that  which  moves  a  thing  from  not  bc- 
*'  ing  to  a  State  of  Being,  is  neceflarily  a  pre- 
*•  cedent  Mover  to  that  which  from  it  receives 
"  its  Being :  So  then  that  which  is  fuppofed 
"  to  be  the  firft  original  Mover  will  have  a 
•*  Mover,  which  Ihall  of  neceflity  have  gone 
"  before  it,  and  confequently  it  will  be  both  a 
'*  firft  and  not  a  firft  Mover,  which  is  a  plain 
•*  Contradiftion.  Inftead  of  multiplying  Ar- 
**  guments  without  -neceflity,  we  will  only  re- 
•*  turn  by  the  F-ootfteps  of  our  Analyfis,  and  fo 
"  from  the  Being  of  a  firft  Mover,  conclude 
"  the  Eternity.  If  it  be  a  firft  Mover,  thei^  it 
**  hid  no  former  Mover  ;  and  if  fo,  then  it  ne- 
**  ver  was  produced  from  Nothing  into  Being; 
*•  and  if  fo,  then  it  never  had  any  beginning  of 
"  its  Being,  then  it  is  Eternal.  Therefore, 
'*  whatfoever  is  the  firft  Mover,  it  muft  of 
"  neceflity  likewife  be  eternal:  but  from  the 
"  common  afieftions  of  things  vifible,  wc  did 
•*  before  demonftrate  an  Original  and  firft 
*♦  Mover:  Wlierefore,  the  vifible  things  of  this 

«  World, 


58 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 


REMARKS. 


•*  World,  they  likewifc  do  cvift  the  Eternity 
•«  of  the  God-head  \ 

"  And  that  God  was  a  God  of  Power,  it 
*•  was  demonftrated  then,  wlien  we  found  him 
"  to  be  the  firft  Caufe,  and  Original  Mover, 
•*  and  Creator  of  the  World  f ." 

[  X  c.  ]  The  generally  receiv'd  Notion  of 
Bternity,  as  confiding  in  a  continual  addibility 
O^  fuccejftve  Duration,  is,  I  think,  the  very  fame 
thing  as  an  infinite  Series,  and  confequently  Ha- 
"ble  to  the  fame  objeftions:  We  muft  therefore 
try  to  rcfcue  this  JDivine  Attribute  from  fuch 
an  abfurd  interpretation. 

Now,  if  we  attentively  examine  our  Idea  of 
Eternity,  I  believe  we  fhall  find  that  it  amounts 
to  thus  much:  viz.  uniform,  invariable  Exi- 
Jience:  or,  firnple  Exijlente  joinM  with  'Necef- 
fity  :  by  which  laft  Word  we  only  underftand 
an  Impoffibility  of  having  ever  begun,  or  of  ever 
(eajing.  This  I  apprehend  to  be  all  that  can 
confillently  be  affirm 'd  of  the  Divine  Exiftence 
in  this  refpccV,  and  perLnps  we  may  more  eafi- 
ly  and  fafely  determine  what  the  manner  of  it 
is  not,  than  what  it  is;,  v.  g.  that  it  continues 
not  by  time^.  or  in  place:  Indeed  local  Extenfion 
and  fuccejpve  Duration,  are  modes  of  the  Exi- 
ftence of  moft  Beings,  and  therefore  we  find  it 
very  difficult  to  confider  any  exiftence  without 
them :  But  as  we  have  endeavour'd  to  fhew  the 
jwffibility  of  removing  the  former  from  the 
Divine  Eflence,  in  Notes  5,,  ii,  &  13.  So 
here,  I  think,  it  may  be  ftiewn  alfo,  that  the 
latter  has  no  ne<:eflary  conneftion  with  it.,  but 
wther  the  contrary.  ^ 

In  order  to  do  this,  it  will  be  neceffary  to 
explain  what  we  mean  by  Time,  which  (accor- 
ding to  Mr.  Locke)  is  of  the  very  fame  hind 
with  Duration ;  and  may  properly  be  term'd  a 
part  o^  it;  This  is  very  well  defin'd  by  Leib- 
nitz, to  be  the  Order  ofSucceJfon  of  Created  Be- 
ings. We  manifeftly  get  the  Notion  of  it,  by 
reflefting  on  the  Succeffion  of  Ideas  in  our 
Minds,  which  we  are  apt  to  conceive  as  a 
^^i'/;;)?  drawn  out  in  length,  of  which  all  the 
particular  Ideas  are  confider'd  as  the  Links, 
Whereas,  hjd  we  birt  one  invar iate  perception. 


without  any  fuch  Succelfion  of  Ideas  in  our 
Minds,  we  could  have  no  fuch  notion  as  this 
of  Duration,  but  that  of  pure  Exiftence  only. 
Now  Exftence  being  evidently  a  fimple  Idea, 
(tho'  perhaps  Dtinition  be  not)-  is  confequently- 
incapable  of  a  Definition,  and  we  need,  I 
think,  only  obferve  of  it  here,  that  if  we  joiir 
our  Idea  of  Duration  to  it,  we  ftill  add  nothing 
to  the  Idea  of  it  as  it  is  in  itfelf,  but  merely  a 
rif/rf/;<7/?  to  external  things;  which  Idea  of  Du- 
ration therefore  feems  purely  accidental  to  it, 
and  no  neceffary  Ingredient  of  the  former  Idea, 
which  is  complete  without  it.  7/W  then,  or 
Duration,  is  an  Idea  entirely  refulting  from  our 
Confideration  of  the  Exiftence  of  Beings,  with 
reference  to  a  re^l  or  imaginary  Succeffion^ 
Whence  it  will  follow  in  the  firjl  place,  that 
we  cannot  poffibly  frame  any  Idea  of  this  kind 
of  Duration,  without  taking  in  Succeffion  ;  and; 
fecondly,  that  we  can^t  eafily  feparate  the  Exi- 
ftence  of  any  finite,  changeable  Beings  from  this 
kind  of  Duration. 

Our  next  Enquiry  muft  be,  whether  this- 
Idea  of  Duration  be  connedled  with  the  Exi- 
ftence of  thofe  Beings  entirely  as  they  exijl,  or- 
only  as  they  exift  in  fuch  a  particular  manner  ; 
Whether  it  belongs  to  all  Exiftence,  as  Exi- 
ftence, or  only  to  a  particular  Sortoi  Exiftence^ 
viz.  that  Exiftence  which  includes  the  fore- 
mention'd  relation  to  Succeffion.  The  latter, 
I  think,  will  appear  more  probable,  when  we 
rcfleft  that  it  is  only  from  the  variablenefs  and 
contingency  of  our  own  Exiftence,  that  all  our 
'  Succeffions  fpring  :  whereas,  were  we  entirely 
indt pendent,  we  muft  be  abfolutely  immutable, 
and  invariably  permanent ;  and  alfo,  that  we 
can  contemplate  even  this  Exiftence  of  ours 
without  any  Succeffion,  i.  e.  we  have  a  power 
of  confining  our  thoughts  and  attending  to  this 
Idea  alone  for  fome  irmW  time  (if  that  Word  be 
excufeable  here)  exclufive  of  all  other  Ideas, 
and  confequently  exclufive  of  Succeffion.  This 
Mr.  Locke  allows,  being  what  he  calls  an  /»- 
Jlant,  which,  fays  he,  "  is  that  which  takes  up 
"  the  time  only  of  one  Idea  in  our  Minds,  without 
"  the  Succeffion-of  any  other,  wherein  there- 
"  fore  we  perceive  no  Succeffion  at  all  ||." 

Succeffion 


5..251 


t  E-  34. 


\  May  on^Htman  Underftandingy  B.  2.  Ch.  14.  §.  10. 


Concerning 


the  Origin  of  EviL 


if 


■REMARK  S. 


SucceSion  tiierefore  does  not  appear  to  be 
neceflarily  join'd  with  the  Idea  of  abfolute  exi- 
ftence,  fince  we  can  confider  one  (for  how  fmall 
a  time  foever)  without,  and  independent  of,  the 
other.  Nay,  laftly,  there  is  a  certain  Exiflence 
to  which  it  cannot  pofGbly  be  in  any  fenfe  ap- 
ply'd,  and  that  is  a  Perfeil  one.  Suppofe 
this  perfect  Being  alane  in  nature,  as  we  niuft 
believe  him  once  to  have  been,  and  then  what- 
change  of  Nature,  or  SucceJJion  of  Ideas  can  be 
found  ?  What  flux  of  Moments,  what  altera- 
tion or  increafe  Qiw.  we  imagine  in  his  own  uni- 
form, invariable  EfTencc?  What  Idea  have  we 
of  Duration  as  apply'd  to  his  Exiftence,  ante- 
cedent to  his  Willing  and  Creating  External 
things?  Such  Duration  then  as  we  are  ac- 
quainted with,  can,  I  humbly  apprehend,  have 
no  manner  of  relation  to  this  immutable  Be- 
ing, while  fuppos'd  to  exift  alone :  But  as  foon 
as  he  determin'd  to  exercife  his  feveral  Attri- 
butes in  the  produdion  of  fomething  without 
himfelf,  then  we  have  reafon  to  think,  that 
Time,  SucceJJion,  and  Increafe  began.  ♦*  Tho' 
*'  the  Eternal  Being  had  no  neceflary  Succef- 
*'  fion  in  his  own  Nature,  yet  b^ing  perfeftly 
*'  Self-aSlire  and  free,  thence  it  proceeded, 
*'  that  the  exercife  of  his  freedom  in  decreeing 
**  and  producing  the  Creatures,  in  fuch  a 
•'  manner  and  order  as  was  judg'd  fit  by  his 
**  moft  perfeft  Wifdom,  became  the  Original 
"  of  whatever  real  SuccefTion  has  been  in  Na- 
*'  ture,  and  fuch  Succeffion  as  we  are  apt  to 
*'  conceive  to  liave  preceeJed,  is  ho  other  than 
*'  imaginary."     Impart.  Enq.  p.  208. 

To  the  feveral  Objedious  againft  this  No- 
tion drawn  from  God's  Eternal  Wifduvt,  Ideas, 
Decrees^  i^c.  fee  a  fufficient  Anfwer  in  the  fame 
place. 

I  fliall  tranfcribe  this  excellent  Author's 
reply  to  the  moft  common  and  confiderable  one 
about  tho  Schoolman's  punSlum  flam,  which 
we  alfo  elleem  as  indefenfiblc  an  Hypothecs  as 
the  other.  1 

"  Some  will  poflibly  objeft,  thnt  if  there 
•*  was  once  no  real  SuccefTion  in  Nature,  it 
"  will  follow,  that  the  Divine  Exiftence  was 
**  then  at  leaft  (as  'tis  ufuaJly  faid  to  be)  In- 

Iz 


^^  Jlantaneous.  But  to  this  it  maybe  reply 'd, 
"  that  Exifience  is  nothing,  if  diftinguifh'd 
**  from  the  Being  which  exifts.  Confequently, 
"  there  can  no  real  quantity  belong  to  it  as  fo 
*'  diftinguifh'd.  Wherefore  it  cannot  properly 
"  be  denominated  either _;?/f//^  or  infinite,  fnc- 
'*  cejjive  or  itifiantaneous.  For  thefe  are  Attri- 
"  butes  which  have  a  Reference  to  i^antity, 
'*  and  can  no  more  agree  to  exiftence,  which 
**  is  but  a  Mode  of  Beings,  than  they  can  to 
"  NecefHty,  or  Contingence,  which  are  Modes 
*  of  Exiftence.  To  define  Eternity  or  Ne- 
*'  cefTary  Exiftence  by  Infinity  or  the  Negation 
<*  of  Limits,  feems  to  be  no  lefs  impertinent, 
"  than  to  define  Virtue  by  the  Negation  of 
*'  Red  or  Blew.  For  Exiftence  (which  has  no 
"  Quantity  or  Dimenfions)  hath  no  more  Ana- 
«'  logy  to  Extenfion  and  Limits,  than  Virtue 
''  (which  hath  no  Colour)  hath  to  Red  or 
«*  Blew.  And,  for  the  fame  reafon,  it  is  na 
"  lefs  improper  to  define  it  to  be  infiantaneous,, 
'*  fince  even  an  Inftant  (as  likewife  an  Atom) 
"  is  conceiv'd  as  quantity,  tho'  the  minuteft  i- 
*'  maginable.  But  if  it  cannot  properly  be 
'*  denominated  inftantaneous,  much  lefs  caa 
"    it  be  fuccefllve  *." 

See  alfo  Epifcop.  Inft.  Tbeol.  L.  4.  C.9. 
To  which  give  me  leave  to  add  the  Tefti- 
mony  of  Cudworth,  True  Intell.  Sy/i.  p.  644,  i^e. 
Where,  having  confuted  the  abfurd  Notion  of 
the  World's  Eternity,  he  adds :  "  Here  will 
"  the  Atheift  think  prefently  he  has  got  a  great 
"  advantage  to  difprove  the  Exifience  of  a  God. 
"  Do  not  they  who  thus  defiroy  the  Eternity  of  the 
"  World  at  the  fame  time  alfo  defiroy  the  Eter- 
'*  nity  cf  the  Creator  ?  For,  if  Time  itfelf  were 
*•  not  Eternal,  then,  how  could  the  Deity  or  any. 
"  thing  elfe  be  fo?  The  Atheift  fecurely  ta- 
"  king  it  for  granted,  that  God  himfelf  could 
•*  not  be  otherwife  Eternal  than  by  a  fuccffiive 
*'  flux  of  infinite  Time.  But  we  fay,  that  this 
"  will  on  the  contrary  afford  us  a  plain  Dc' 
•'  monfiration  of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Daty.  For^ 
"  fince  the  World  j^nA.  Time  itfelf  were  not  /». 
"  finite  in  their  pafi  Duration,  but  had  a  Begin-; 
*•  ning,  therefore  were  they  both  certainljr 
♦«  made  together,  by  foroe  other  Being,  who 

is 


Impartial  Enquiry,  p.  2 


■<!? 


6o 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 


REMARKS, 


<•  is,  in  order  of  N/iture,  fenior  to  Time,  and  fo 
•*  without  T\mt  ie/hreTlmt:  He  being  above 
"  that  fuccelTive  Flux,  and  comprehending  in 
•*  xhsSfabi'ity  and  immutnhUPerfeHisn  of  his  own 
••  Being,  his  J^eWtfj-,  and  to  Day,  vcv^  for  ever. 
'*  Or  thus:  Something  was  of  ncceffity /V?^«//f 
•*  in  Duration,  and  without  a  Beginning',  But 
^'  neither  the  World,  nor  Mot ian,  nor  Time,  i.e. 
*•  no  SuccfJ/ive  Being  was  fuch ;  therefore  is 
•*  there  fomething  cl(e,  who "e  Being  and  Dura- 
**  tion  is  not  fucceffive  and  filing,  but  perma- 
•*  nent,  to  whom  this  Infinity  belongeth.  The 
•'  Atheifls  here  cin  only  fmile,  or  make  faces; 
*'  and  fhew  their  little  Wit  in  quibbling  upon 
*'  nunc  /lata,  or  a  /landing  Now  of  Eternity  ;  as 
••  if  this  ftanding  Eternity  of  the  Deity  (which 
•*  with  fo  much  reafon  hath  been  contended 
*'  for  by  the  antient  genuine  Theifti)  were  no- 
**  thing  but  a  pitiful  fmall  moment  of  Time  ft an- 
**  ding  ft  ill ;  and  as  if  the  Duration  of  all  Be- 
*•  ings  whatfoever  mull  needs  be  like  their 
•*  own :  whereas  the  Duration  of  every  thing 
*'  milft  of  neceffity  be  agreeable  to  its  nature: 
•'  and  therefore,  as  that  whofe  imperfeil'.  nature 
*  is  ever  flowing  like  a  River,  and  confifts  in 
*•  continual  Motion,  and  changes  one  after  ano- 
•*  ther,  muft  needs  have  accordingly  a  fuccef- 
♦*  five  and  flowing  Duration,  Aiding  perpetually 
**  from  prefent  into  pafl^^  and  always  polling 
"  on  towards  the  future,  expefting  fomething 
■*  of  itfelf  which  is  not  yet  in  Being,  but  to 
«*  come ;  lb  mull  that  whofe  perfect  Nature  is 
••  ejentially  immutable,  and  always  the  fame, 
••  and  neceffarily  exiftent,  have  a  permanent  Du- 
<*  ration  ;  never  lofing  any  thing  oi  itfelf  onct 
••  prefent,  as  Hiding  away  from  it ;  nor  yet 
**  running  forwards  to  meet  fomething  of  it- 
••  felf  before,  which  is  not  yet  in  Being,  and 
«•  it  is  as  contradiftious  for  it  ever  to  have,  be- 
••  gun,  as  ever  to  ceafe  to  be.'' 

After  all,  it  mull  be  again  confefs'd,  that  the 
Idea  of  Succeffion  (as  ^.  C  obferves)  fo  inli- 
iMiates  itfelf  into  our  Idea  of  Exillence,  and  is 
fe  clofely  connefled  with  the  exillence  of  all 
finite  Beings,  that  we  find  it  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  imagine  the  Eternal  Exiftence  of  God, 
any  otkerwife  than  as  an  EterAal  continued 
Series  or  Sacceffioo.' 


Our  conllant  convetfation  with  materid  Ob- 
'jefts,  makes  it  almoll  impoffible  for  us  to  con« 
fider  things  abllrafted  from  time  and  plaer, 
which  (as  we  obftrv'd  before)  are  Modes  of 
the  exillence  of  moll  things,  and  therefore  wc 
are  apt  ralhly  to  apply  thefe  confiderations  to- 
the  great  A^ithor  and  Preferv'cr  of  all  things. 
We  fecm  to  think,  that  as  the  moll  exalted  I- 
dea  we  can  form  of  God's  Eternity  and  Omni- 
Prefence  mull  be  infinite  DuratPjn,  and  unboun- 
ded Extenfion,  fo  thefe  are  to  be  ftridly  and' 
pofitively  attributed  to  him  ;  whence  mull  fol- 
low all  the  abfurdities  o^  pnfi,  and  future,  Ex- 
tenfion in  this  and  that  '^Iz.cc,  as  compatible 
with  the  Divine  ElTence.  Whereas  abfolute  po- 
fitive  Infinity  (fuch  as  belongs  to  God  *)  does, 
in  its  very  notion  exclude  the  conlideration  of 
Parts',  fince-no  addition  of  any  parts  whatfo-- 
ever  can  amount,  or  in  the  leall  degree  ap- 
proach to  it.  (Tho'fuch  negative  Infinity  as 
belongs  to  all  Sluantities,  cannot  polTibly  be 
confider'd  otherwife  f .)  So  that  v/hofoever  ac- 
knowledges God's  perfections  to  be  llriftly  in- 
finite, does,  by  that  confeffion,  deny  that  they 
maybe  confider'd  as  mad6  up  of  parts  :  that 
ImmenCtty  can-,  be  compofed  of  ^ny  finite  Exten- 
fions,  or  Eternity  confill  of  mukiply'd  Dura~- 
tions,  and  confequently,  that  there  can  be 
Length  or  Space,.  Diftame  or  Time,  pnft  ox  future, 
with  the  Eternal  God  ||.  When  therefore  we  fay 
that  God  always  was,  ox  ever  will  be,  we  don't- 
mean,  by  thefe  and  the  like  Words,  that  his 
Exillence  has  llri^lly  any  relation  to  times  palt 
or  future,  that  it  is  at  all  increas'd,  alter'd,  or- 
afFefted  thereby  ;  but  only  thus  much  is  inten- 
ded, viz.  that  whenever  we  fuppofe  any  other 
Beings  exilling,  or  time  and  Succeffi/an  begun, 
then  it  was,  is,  or  will  be  proper  for  thefe 
Beings  to  affirm  in  any  part  of  this  their  Time 
or  Succeffion,  that  God  alfo  exifts.  In  the  fame 
manner  as  it  may  be  affirm'd  of  fome  Propofiti- 
{  ons,  that  they  always  were  and  will  be  true, 
;  that  they  are  true  in  this  or  that,  and  every 
place:  tho'  fuch  affertions  are  exceedingly  im- 
proper, becaufe  Propofitions,  or  neceflary 
Truths,  have  no  manner  of  Relation  to  either 
time    or    place.      All  Expreffions   therefore- 

whicK 


^S€ft  Notes,  and  X  If 


t  ItU. 


II  Sti  Locke  on  H.  U,  B,  2.  C.  15.  V 


12. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 
REMARKS. 


th 


which  imply  Succeffion,  fuch  as,  was,  will  be, 
always,  when,  &ci  as  well  as  thofe  that  imply 
Locality,  fuch  as,  Ubi,  where,  &c.  *,  can  only 
be  apply 'd  to  finite  temporary  things,  which 
©xift  in  time  and  place :  with  which  things 
fo  exifting,  as  well   as   every  point   of    time 


vcllers  fucceeding  one  another.  Bat  this,  I 
think,  is  fo  evident  in  itfelf,  that  neither  Ar-* 
gument  nor  Simile  can  make  it  more  fo. 

Hence  then  appears  the  impropriety  of  thofe 
terms.  Divine  Prefcience,  Predcltination,  l^c* 
which  have  fo  long  puzled  the  World,  to  no 


and  place,  the  Deity  is  fuppos'd  to  be  i'tf- '  manner  of  pprpofe:  and  the  only  conclufion  at 
exifient,  or  commenj'urate ',  tho'  his  own  Na- j  lafrmirft  be,  that  all  things  which  ever  were, 
ture  and  EfTence-be  very  different  from  thefe,  |  or  will  be,  which,  with  refpeft  to  fome  former 
and  have  properly  no  manner  of  relation  to,  or  or  latter  times,  and  to  peribns  placed  therein, 
connexion  with  them.  If  then  we  will  attri-  ^  maybe  call'd  paji  or  future,  are  always  equally 
bute  Duration  to  him,  it  muft  he  perm.n'nt,  un-  \  and  at  once  prefent  to  the  view  of  God;   that  to 


fuccejfive  Duration,  /.  e.  Duration  of  a  quite  dif- 
ferent kind  from  what  we  meet  with  here.  But 
it  is  to  be  remember'd.  that  we  don't  pretend 
to  explain  the  feature  of  Eternity,  or  to  deter- 
mine the  manner  oi  fuch  R-viftenc«  as  excludes 
all  SuccrJJion  ;  fince  it  is  fufEcient  for  us  here  to 
fhew  the  poflibility  of  conceiving  the  thing  in- 
general,  the  certainty  of  it  having  been  dc-" 
monftrated  already,  when  we  provM  that  fome- 
thing  muft  be  Eternals,  having  alfo  fhewn,  that 
Eternity  could  not  confift  in  fucceffive  Dura- 
tion. 

If  then  the  Divine  Exiftence  cannot  include 
facceflion  of  parts,  or  our  kind  of  Duration, 
(which  perhaps  by  this  time  may  not  feem  al- 
together improbable)  neither  can  his  ejfential 
Attribute!.  His  Knowledge,  v.  g.  can  have  no 
relation  to  times  pajl  or  future,  to  fore  or  after; 
nor  can  any  objeft  be  faid  to  be  at  a  Diftance 
from  it,  or  any  imaginary  diftance  fet  bounds  to 
it. 

The  chief  reafon  why  we  don't  perceive  and 
Jcnow  any  thing  that  has  a  real  Exiftence,  is, 
becaufe  that  Exiftence  is  remov'd  from  us  by 
the  diftance  of  time  or  place :  But  this  reafon 
cannot  hold  with  God^  who  it  (tho' '  in  a 
manner  far  different  from  his  Creatures)  always 
frefent  to  all  tin>es  and  places,  and  confequent- 
ly  muft  behold  all  things  exifting  therein,  as 
well  as  we  fee  any  objeft  at  due  diftance  direft- 
K  before  us.  Thus  he  that  is  travelling  on  a 
Road  cannot  fee  thofe  who  come  behind,  or 
are  gone  far  before  him ;  but  he  who  from 
fome  Eminence  beholds  the  whole  Road,  from 
cod  to  end,  views  at  once  all  the.  diftant  tra- 


him,  ftriflly  and  abfolutely,  a  thoufand  Tears 
are  as  one  Day,  and  one  Day  as  a  thoufand  TearSi 
and  that  whatever  difficulties  feem  to  attend' 
this  conception  of  things  being  fucceffive  to 
us,  and;  not'  fo  to  him,  can  be  no  Argument 
againft  the  matter  itfelf,  which  is  dcmonftra- 
ble  ;  but  only  one  of  the  many  Inftancesof  the  " 
Weaknefs  of  Human  Underftanding  in  thingt 
pertaining  unto  God. 

Againft  the  common  Notion  of  Eternity,  fee 
x\it  SpeSlator,  N®  590.   or  Sir  M^Hale^s  Prim 
Orig.  of  Mankind,  ^.  i.  c.  6.  p.  123.   or  a  Phi" 
lofophical  Effay,  i^c.    by  Setb  Ward,  P'  23.  or  ■ 
Grew^s  Cofmologia  Sacra,  B.  i .  c.  i .  par.  9. 

Both  this  Attribute  and  Omniprefence  are 
alfo  well  treated  of  by  J.  Smith,  in  his  Dif-* 
courfe  concerning  the  Exiftence  and  Nature  of 
God,  C.  z.  S*  ^y  5  •  SeUSt  Difcsurfes,  p.  1 25, 
1 26,  i^c. 

[Xd.]  "  Here  we  find  certain  Chains  of 
"  Caufes  and  EffeSls,  and  many  parts  of  this 
**  Syftem-ovt'in^xhfAt  Exiftence,  and  the  manner 
'*  of  their  Exiftence,  to  a  proceeding  Caufe,  ■ 
*•  confequently  we  can't,  with  any  poffibility 
"  of  reafon,  affert,  that  the  whole  Syftem  ex- 
'♦  ift  without  a  Caufe ;  for  this  is  the  fame  aa 
"  to  affert,  that  the  parts  do  not  belong  to ' 
'*  the  whole.  Again,  a  material  Syftem  com-* 
«  pos'd  of  paws  that  are  changeable,  cannot  ex- 
**ifts  without  a  Caufe  diftina  from,  and  prior 
'•  to  fuch  a  Syftem.  For,  wherever  there  is  a 
"  Change,  there  muft  be  a  Caufe  of  that  Change, 
«•  otherwife  there  would  be  a  Beginning vf\Kho\xt 
'•  a  Caufe*  The  Caufe  of  this  Change  cannot 
.  3  '  b©- 


♦-Sec  Xk 


63 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 
REMARKS, 


♦  be  in  the  materia/s  of  this  Syftem  for  the  ve- 
*'  xy  fame  reafon  :  therefore  it  muft  be  in  fome- 
**  thing  diftitiB  from,  and  prior  to,  the  Syftem 
«*  itfelf.  The  fame  will  be  the  Cafe  as  to 
"  Mjtim  in  a  Material  Syftem;  there  isnoMo- 
•*  tion  but  what  is  the  efi«£t  of  a  former  Mo- 
*•  tion,  confequently  there  is  no  Motion  in 
'*  fuch  a  Syftem  which  has  been  from  Eternity, 
**  or  which  has  not  been  C^ufed,  &c.  * 

"  From  the  Imperfefiion  alfo,  or  Unhappinefs, 
•*  which  we  fee  in  this  Syftem,  in  Man  parti- 
•*  cularly ;  from  the  frame  and  conjlitution  of 
**  it,  'tis  evident  that  it  did  not  exift  without 
«'  a  Caufe. 

«  The  Queftion  then  will  be.  What  is  the 
**  Caufe  of  its  Exiftence  ?  Now  that  cannot 
^*  be  in  itfelf,  for  then  a  thing  would  be  be- 
**  fore  it  was,  w^hich  is  a  contrjdiftion.  It 
*•  follows  then,  that  fome  other  Being  is  the 
*•  Caufe  of  its  Exiftence  ;  and  the  next  Quc- 
*'  ftion  will  be,  tcbo  is  this  Being?  Now  as 
<'  whatever  began  to  exift,  muft  owe  its  Exi- 
**  ftence  to  {omt preceeding  Caufe  ;  fo  that  Caufe 
"  if  it  has  notcxifted  eternally,  muft  likewifc 
**  owe  its  Exiftence  to  fome  other  preceeding 
**  Caufe,  and  that  to  another,  and  fo  on  till  we 
♦*  afcend  to  (the  firft  Cau'e,  or  to)  a  Being  that 
•*  is  Eternal,  and  exifts  abfolutejy  without  Caufe. 
"  And'that  there  is  fuch  a  Being  is  evident, 
"  otherwife,  as  nothing  could  begin  to  exift 
•*  wrrhout  a  Caufe,  fo  nothing  that  is  not  E- 
**  tcrnal  could  ever  have  exiiled  f . 

•  [X  e.]  That  the  Idea  o^  Self  Exiffenee  can 
imply  nothing  more  than  a  Negation  of  Depen- 
dence on  any  External  Caufe;  and  that  there 
can  be  neitlicr  external  nor  internal  Caufe  of 
the  Exiftence  of  an  Eternal  Being,  neither 
antecedent  nor  cmcotnitant  Neceffity,  nor  any 
pofitive  permanent  Ground  ot  Reafon  whatfoever. 
See  Note  14- 

To  what  has  been  faid  already  on  the  head 
oiN(ceJftty,  I  fhall  add  a  Pafl"age  from  the  Pbilo- 
fiphical EJptyy  Isfe.  from  which  we  may  perceive 


what  was  formerly  und«rftood  by  that  Attri- 
bute, and  how  it  was  us'd  to  be  prov'd.  "  I 
"  fay  then  that  the  Godhead  is  a  Necejfary  Be- 
'*  ing,  that  is,  that  it  is  impoflible  it  ihould 
"  fail,  and  implies  a  Contradiflion,  that  it 
"  fhould  not  be.  That  is  it  which  Divines 
"  mean,  when  they  fay  it  is  Eternal  a  parte 
*'  pof,  as  well  as  a  parte  ante:  for  if  it  be  not 
"  a  NecefTary  Being,  that  is,  if  Neceffity  of 
♦*  Being  be  not  included  in  the  EfTence  of  the 
'•  God-head,  then  it  is  not  impoflible  that  it 
"  fhould  lofe  its  Being,  /'.  e.  it  is  in  the  power 
"  of  fomething  to  caufe  it  to  lofe  its  Being  : 
*'  But  nothing  can  pafs  from  Being  to  not  Be- 
'*  ing,  without  Change,  or  Motion;  fo  then, 
"  the  Motion  of  it  is  in  the  power  of  fome  o- 
"  ther,  and  confequently,  this  is  not  the  Ori- 
"  ginal  of  Motion,  but  that  other;  but  we 
"  fuppos'd  that  to  be  the  Original  of  Motion, 
"  confequently,  it  is  not  poflible  it  fliould  be 
"  depriv'd  of  its  Being,  that  is,  it  is  a  necef- 
<*  fary  Being  in  refpeft  of  others:  and  as  im- 
"  poflible  it  is  that  it  Ihould  lofe  its  Being  of 
"  itfelf.  Indeed  it  is  a  manifeft  Contradidlion, 
*'  that  any  thing  fliould  have  a  power  over  its 
"  own  Effence,  and  needs  no  farther  convic- 
'•  tion,  or  oppofition,  feeing  the  a<ftive  power 
"  of  any  thing  is  founded  in  the  Eftence  of  it, 
"  and  confequently  cannot  exceed  the  EiTence, 
«*  or  bring  it  not  to  be  ||." 

[X  f  ]  For  a  Being  to  be  limited,  or  def- 
cient  in  any  refpeft,  is  to  be  dependent  on  fome 
other  Being  in  that  refpe£l,  which  gave  it  juft 
fo  much  and  no  more  %;  confequently,  that 
Being  which  in  no  refpcft  depends  upon  any. 
other,  is  not  limited  or  deficient  at  all.  For 
tho'  Figure,  Divifibility,  ^c.  and  all  manner 
of  Limitation,  is  in  one  Senfe  {I'iz.  in  Beings 
ejfentially  Imperfedt)  as  Dr.  Clarke  obferves  -f^, 
properly  a  mere  Negation  or  DefeSl;  yet  in  ano- 
ther, viz.  in  a  Being  elfentially  and  abfolutely 
perfect,  Finitcnefs  muft  be  conceived  as  a  pofi- 
tive Effe£l  di  iovaz  Caufe,   reftraining   it  to  a 

certain 


*  Sec  ^.Q's  Impartuil  Enquiry,  p.  31,32,  l^-c. 

\  Enquiry,  p.  1 1,  1 2,  1  8,  ^V.     See  alfo  Dr,  BentleyV  BoyleV  Left.  Serm.  6.  p.  127,  ^r.  5//^ 
Edit,  and  the  other  Authors  refefd  to  in  Note  5. 
jl  Pbilofoph.  Effay,  p.  26,  isc         * ^  See  Scott,  in  Note  32.        f4-  Demonji.  p.  56,57,  ^tb  Edit. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 


^i 


R  E  M  J!  R  K  S. 


certain  Degree.  InallBeings  capable  of  Quantity, 
Increafe,yr.  and  confequently  uncapable  of  Per- 
feUionox  abfolute  Infinity  i  Limitation  or  DefeSly  is 
there  a  neceflary  confequence  of  Exifience,  and 
clofely  conne^ed  vfith  it,  and  is  only  a  Negation 
of  that  Perfeftion  which  is  entirely  incompatible 
with  their  £^»r^;  and  therefore  in  thefe  it 
requires  no  farther  Caufe.  But  in  a  Being  na- 
turally capable  of  Perfe^ion  or  ftrift  Infinity,  all 
ImpcrfeHion  or  Finitenefi,  as  it  does  not  necejjfi- 
rily  flow  from  the  Nature  of  it,  muft  have  fome 
ground  or  reafitn,  which  reafon  muft  therefore 
be  foreign  to  it,  and  confequently  is  an  effeft 
of  fome  other  external  Caufe,  and  confequently 
cannot  have  place  in  the  Firft  Caufe.  That 
this  Being  is  capable  of  Perfedtion,  or  abfolute 
Infinity,  appears,  I  think,  from  hence,  that  he 
is  manifeftly  the  Subjcft  of  one  Infinite  or  per- 
feft  Attribute,  viz.  Eternity,  or  abiblute  Exi- 
ftence.  His  Exiftence  has  been  fliewn  to  be 
perfeft  in  this  one  refpe£l,  and  therefore  itmay 
be  perfeft  in  every  other  alfo.  Now  that  which 
is  the  Subjefl  of  one  Infinite  Attribute  or  Per- 
fe<Sion,  and  may  have  others  fo  too,  mufi 
have  all  of  them  Infinitely  or  in  Perfeftion  : 
Since,  to  have  any  Perfeftions  in  a  finite  li- 
mited manner,  when  the  Subjeft  and  rfiefe 
Attributes  afe  both  capable  of  ftrift  Infinity, 
would  be  the  foremention'd  abfurdity  of  pofi- 
tive  Limitation  without  a  Caufe.  This  method 
of  arguing,  will  prove  anyPerfeftion  to  be  in 
the  Deity  infinite  modo,  when  we  have  once 
ihcwn  that  it  belongs  to  him  at  all :  at  leaft, 
will  fhew  that  it  is  unreafonablc  for  us  to  fup- 
pofe  it  limited,  when  we  can  find  no  manner 
of  Ground  for  any  Limitation,  which  is  per- 
haps  as  far  as  we  can  go. 

[X  g.]  That  the  Word  God  is-  relative,  fee 
JJewton  Princ  Schol.  Gen.  fub.  fin.  p.  525,  fcfr. 
3d  Edit,  or  Maxwell's  Appendix  to  Cumber- 
land, p.  106. 

To  fhew  that  there  is  only  one  Eternal  Self- 
Exiftent  Being,  which  bears  the  Relation  of 
God  to  us,  feems  to  be  going  as  far  as  either  is 


necejfTary,  or  natural  Light  will  lead  vs.  As 
Dr.  Clarke's  Demonftration  of  this  and  feveral 
other  Attributes  is  entirely  founded  on  his  Idea 
of  NeceJJity  of  Exiftence,  of  Space,  ^c.  *,  they 
muft  ftand  or  fall  together.  They  who  endea- 
vour to  deduce  it  from  Independence  or  Omnipo- 
fir»fe  evidently  pfcf'jppofe  it  in  their  definition 
of  thefe  Attributes. 

[X  h.  ]  We  cannot  include  anyfuch  Notioti- 
xviOmnipre fence,  as  makes  the  T)t\xy  prefent  in 
his  fimple  EJJciice  to  (or  co-extended  with)  every 
point  of  the  bouncilefs  Immenfity\%  Since  this  Idea 
of  Extenfion  or  Expanfion,  feems  plainly  in- 
confiftent  with  that  fimpls  Eflence  ||.  Not  that 
we  fuppofe  thefe  Attributes  of  Knowledge  and 
Power  afting  feparate  from  his  Effence,  but 
we  fuppofe  his  Effence  to  have  no  more  rela- 
tion to  the  Idea  oi Space,  Place,  where,  iffc.  thaa 
either  of  thefe  Attributes  has  *,^. 

Dr.  darkens  Query,  "  How  it  can  be  fhewn 
"  upon  any  other  Principle  than  that  of  Ne- 
'*  cefTary  exiftence,  that  his  governing  Wifdont 
"  and  Power  muft  be  pre/ent  in  thofe  boundlefs 
"  Spaces  where  we  know  of  no  Phenomena  or 
•*  EffeEls  to  prove  its  exiftencef4-?"  is  well 
anfwer'd  by  Epifcopius:  I  ihall  give  it  in  his 
own  Words.  "  Hk  (ncmpe  Deum  ejje  extra 
"  mundum)  non  modo  prorfus  eft  etKAJecAifrjoy/eJ 
"  etiam  valde  abfitrdum,  quia  totum  atque  omne 
"  illud  fpatium  quod  extra  hum  mundum  ejffe  di' 
"  citur,  nihil  omnino  reale  eft,  fed  pure  pute  i- 
"  maginarium,  ^  prorfus  nibilum;  ut  autent 
"  IXeus  ejfe  dicatur  in  pure  pute  imaginario,  iff 
"  prorfus  nibih,  per  fe  abfurdum  eft ;  quia  effe  in 
"  dicit  realem  habitudinem  aut  denominationem  ab 
"  eo  in  quo  quid  exiftit :  Realis  aut  em  habit  udo 
"  y  denominatio  a  nihilo,  five  ab  eo  quod  nihil  re- 
"  ale  eft,  accipi  nulla  modo  pot  eft.  Die  ere  Deum 
"  ibi  habere  intrinfecam  ^  abfolutam  prefentiam 
"  qua  in  feipfo  realiter  Exiftit,  eft  fingcre  pra- 
"  fentiam  fine  Relatione  aut  denominatione  ad  id^ 
'*  cui  quod  prafens  effe  dicit ur,  -quod  impli cat  con' 
"  tradi£iionem.  Intrinfica  enim  five  abfoluta  prae* 
"  fentia,  qua  quid  in  feipfo  realiter  exiftit,  non  eft: 
"  prafentia  in  nihilo;  fed mera  effentia  five  exi- 

ti/K 


*5«  Notes  5  &  1 4.        +  Tr.  ClarkeV  Dmcnft,  I'^Jifi. 
f-i-  Anfyjer  to  -jth  Letter,  F.49(> 


il  See  Note  1 1 _:       %  Ste  Note  x  ji. 


H 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evit 


R  E  M  Alt  K  ^ 


•*'  Jlentia  extra  nib  Hum.  Nihil  enim  fibi  ipfi  pra- 
*' fens  rjje  poteft  \r 

Now  to  urge  upon  us  the  old  Maxim,  that 
nothing  can  a3  where  it  is  not,  is  ftill  fuppofing 
ti  Spirit  exifting  fomezohere,  or  in  fome  Ubi,  or 
eo-cxtended,  or  co-expanded,  with  fome  part  of 
Cpace,  and  ailing  in  fome  other  part  of  fuch  i- 
maginary  Space  (which  Suppofitions  we  have 
long  ago  difcarded)  'Tis  confining  its  exi- 
itence  to  one  particular  Modus ;  and,  as  we 
conceive,  to  a  tcro7:g  one  :  concerning  the.  Mo- 
dality  of  whofe  cxiftence  we  can  only  think  and 
argue  negatively:  viz.  that  it  is  not  by  way  of 
Exten/joninzny  fenfe. 

To  the  trite  Objeftion,  that  what  has  no 
■  magnitude,  or  is  no  where,  is  therefore  Nothing, 
fee  a  fufficient  Anfvver  in  Cudworth,  p  770,  to 
778,  i^c.  How  this  agrees  with  Phild's  Para- 
dox, that  God  is  every  where  and  yet  no  where, 
{ceibid.  p.  773.  But  the  ftrongcft  confirmation 
of  this  Opinion,  which  Dr.  Moore  &.i\es  Nulli- 
bifm,  may  be  drawn  from  the  learned  Dr's  Ar- 
guments againft  it  \Vi\i\^Enebir.Metaph.  C.27. 

[  X  i.  ]  By  the  abo(ve  mentioned  pleafure  or 
,  natural  Good,  I  mean  that  pleafure  which  every 
one  feels  in  himfelf.  By  the  produSlion  of  it 
here,  I  underfland  both  the  producing  fuch  in 
himfelf,  and  alfo  in  others:  to  both  which  he 
is  equally  determin'd  by  his  Nature,  tho'  from, 
quite  different  Principles.  To  the  former  he 
k  direfted  by  Self- Love :  To  the  latter  hy  a 
certain  difinterelled  Benevolent  Inftinft  or  Af- 
feftion,  and  that  which  determines  him  to  ap 
prove  the  Affeftion  and  the  Aftions  flowing 
from  it  is  called  his  Moral  Senfe.  The  former 
of  thefe  Inftin£ts,  as  it  implies  increafe  of 
Happinefs,  is  only  applicable  to  finite,  imper- 
feft  Creatures:  the  latter  feems  to  be  common 
10  us  and  the  Deity.  Who  couW  have  been 
determin'd  to  create  us  only  hy  fuch  a  difinte 
refted  Benevolent  Affeftion,  as  this  is  fuppofed 
to  be.  This  is  always  approv'd  b/  the  Moral 
Senfe;  tho'  it  may  be  doubted  whether  that  be 
confined  entirely  to  it. 

The  Objeft  of  both  thefe  Inftinfts  is  natural 
Good ;   and,  I  think,  moral  Good  may   be  al- 


B'lnft-  Theol.  L.4.  c.  i:?..p.  294. 

*  See  Mr.  Jackfon'j  Dcl'ence  of  Human  Liberty,  p. 


low'd  to  confift  in  the  profecution  of  either,  or 
both  of  them  together,  fo  long  as  the  former  is 
in  due  fubordinatiop  to  the  latter.  As  for  my 
part,  I  cannot  extend  the  Notion  of  Virtue  fo 
far,  as  totally  to  exclude  all  manner  of  regard 
to  Self,  or  private  Good,  confider'd  as  fuch, 
and  therein  to  overlook  the  tendency  of  all 
fuch  private  Affeflions  as  the  All-wife  Author 
of  our  Being  has  thought  fit  to  implant  in  us, 
as  necefl"ary  helps  and  inducements  to  Self- 
Prefervation.  I  fee  no  reafon  why  a  particu- 
lar endeavour  in  any  Man  to  perfe^  his  Facul- 
ties both  of  Body  and  Mind,  to  improve  and 
advance  his  own  Happinefs  in  the  whole, 
(which  is  in  fome  refpedl  anfwering  the  End 
of  his  Creation  and  co-operating  with  the  Will 
of  his  Maker)  may  not  deferve  the  Name  of 
Virtue',  at  leaft  of  ^iz/y ;  the  difcharge  of  which 
will  make  a  Perfon  the  proper  Subjed  of  Re- 
ward, even  abftradledly  from  Benevolent  or 
Publick  Affeflions*.  Tho'  thefe  indeed  are 
intitled  to  it  in  a  much  higher  and  fublimer 
degree,  becaufe  they  are  productive  of  more 
univerial  Good.  Nay,  the  kind  Author  of 
Nature  has  infeparably  annex'd  fuch  a  pleafing 
Senfation,  or  agreeable  Confcioufnefs,  to  the 
Performance,  or  even  Remembrance  of  thefe 
Benevolent  Aftion?,  as  is  fcarce  diftinguifhable 
from  the  Inftinft  or  Affeftion  itfelf,  which  im- 
pels us  towards  them:  and  therefore  to  have 
;bmc  attention  to  this  Self-complacency,  this  in- 
ward Satisfadlion,  and  Delight,  which  accom- 
panies our  nobleft  Afticns  ;  to  be  in  fome  de- 
gree direfted  by  it  in  the  performance  of  them, 
docs  not  appear  to  detradl  from  their  Worth, 
and  moral  Excellency.  For  a  full  proof,  as 
well  as  a  beautiful  Eocplication  of  this  moral 
Senfe,  fee  Mr.  Huchefoti's  Enquiry  into  the  Origin 
f  our  Ideas  of  Virtue  or  Moral  Good,  together 
with  his  III ujf rat  ions. 

Th.t  all  the-Notion  wecan  poffibly  frame  of 
^^cral  Good  or  Evil,  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  i^c,  con- 
fifts  entirely  in  promoting  or  procuring  this  na- 
tural Good  or  Evil,  fee  fufiiciently  confirmed 
b/  Sherlock\.  "  Whereas,  fays  he,  we  diftin- 
"  guifh  between  Mcral  and  Natural  Good  and 
"  Evil't  the  only  difference  between  them  is 

"  this. 


2.  f  0»  Judgment,  p.  20  to  25. 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 


«5 


RE  M  AR  K  S. 


'**  this,  that  Mr/j/Giwiand  fc/Visin  the  fFiU 
*'  and  Cbiue,  Natural  Good  and  £w/ is  in  the 
•-*'  Nature  of  things  \  that  %vhich  is  good  ox  hurt - 
^^  ful  to  ourfelves  or  others,  is  naturally  Good 
**  or  Evil  ;  to  love,  to  ^i'a/i',  to  ^5  that  which  is 
*'  good  or  hurtful  to  ottrfehss  or  ethers,  is  morally 
♦♦  Good  or  Evil;  oris  the  Good  or  Evil  oi  onr 
**  Choice  or  Adions.  Ifyou  will  but  recoiled  your 
**  ftlves,  you  will  find  that  you  have  no  other 
-*'  notion  of  Good  or  Evil  but  this:  when  you 
■"  fayfucha  Man  has  done  a  very  Good  or  very 
*'  Evil A£iion,  what  do  you  mean  by  it?  Do 
^'  you  not  mean,  that  he  has  done  fomething 
**  very  good  or  very  hurtful  -to  himfelf  or  t- 
*-  thers  ?  When  you  hear  that  any  Man  lus 
*'  done  Good  or  Evily  is  not  the  next  QuelUon, 
'•  what  good  or  what  hurt  has  he  done  ?  and 
"  do  you  not  mean  by  this.  Natural  Good  or 
**  Evil  F  which  is  a  plain  Evidence,  that  you 
^  judge  of  the  Moral  Good  or  Evil  of  Aftiens, 
"  by  the  A'rf/ari7/G5<?ior£f/7,  which -they  do." 
See  more  on  this  Subjed,  deliver'd  in  the  fame 
place,  with  an  Elegance  and  Perfpicuity  pecu. 
•liar    to  ihitJuthor. 

To  the  fame  purpofe  is  Turner's  excellent 
Difcourfe  of  the  Laws  of  Nature^  and  the  reafon 
of  their  Obligation. 

This  feems  to  be  the  ultimate  Criterion  of 
that  Fitnefs,  Congruity,  Reafonabknefs  and  Rela- 
tion of  Things,  fo  often  repeated  by  fome  late 
Writers,  without  or  beyond  which  I  can  fix  no 
meaning  at  all  to  thefe  Words.  And  this  Cri- 
terion fhoald,  I  think,  have  been  more  diftinft- 
ly  fpecify'd.  For  when  you  fay  any  thing  is 
ft-,  muft  we  carry  our  cnquirys  no  farther? 
h  it  not  a  very  proper  Queftion,  to  ask,  for 
tchat  is  it  fit ?  Fit^  Congruous,  Sec  (as  well  as 
the  Word  Neceffary)  are  mere  relative  terms 
(as  we  obferv'd  in  Note  9.)  and  evidently  refer 
to  fome  End,  and  what  can  the  end  be  here  but 
Happinefs?  Thefe  Relations,  &c.  may  perhaps 
in  fome  tolerable  fenfe  be  call'd  Eternal  and 
Immutable,  becaufe,  whenever  you  fuppofe  a 
Man  in  fuch  certain  Circumftance^  fuch  Con- 


fequcBces  and  Obligations,   did,  or  will,    al 
ways  certainly  follow  *. 

What  is  good  for  me  now  rn  thefe  Circum- 
ftances  and  iRefpec^ls,  will  always  be  fo  in  the 
fime  Circumftances  and  Refpefts,  and  can  ne- 
ver be  alter'd  without  altering  the  Nature  of 
things,  or  the  prefent  Syftem :  but  we  cannot 
imagine  thefe  Relations  therefore  to  be  any  real 
Entities,  or  to  have  exifted  from  all  Eternity, 
or  to  be  antecedent  to,  or  independent  of  riie 
Will  of  God  himfelf;  as  fome  Writers  feenvto 
have  done,  if  they  had  any  determinate  mean- 
ing at  all  f .  We  cannot,  I  fay,  imagine  thent 
to  be  either  ftridlly  eternal  or  independent  of  the 
Will  of  God,  becaufe  they  muft  necefTarily 
prefuppofe  a  determination  of  that  Will,  and 
are  in  truth  only  confequences  of  the  exiftence 
of  things,  which  things  proceed  entirely  from 
that  determination  ||.  Much  lefs  can  we  ap- 
prehend how  thefe  Relations,  ^c.  "  Are  to  be 
"  chofen  for  their  own  Sakes  and  intrinfic  Worth ; 
"  or  have  a  fiill  obligatory  fmver  antecedent  to  a- 
'*  ny  reward  or  punifhment  annex' d  either  by  na- 
"  tural  Cojifequence  or  pofitive  Appointment  to  the 
"  Objervance  or  NegleSl  of  them  ^*"  Since  the 
Natural  Good  or  Happinefs,  confequent  upon, 
and  connedlcd  with,  the  obfervance  of  them, 
or  the  immediate  rational  pleafure  which  they 
produce,  is  to  us  the  grand  Criterion  of  them  ; 
the  Argument  and  Indication  of  their  Worth,  the 
Ground  of  all  their  Obligation. 

This  Notion  is  pretty  well  handled  by  Tz/r- 
ner.  "  The  Laws  of  Nature  [or,  which  is  the 
"  fame.  Natural  Right  and  WroKg'\  are  fuch 
"  Laws  and  Rules  of  Life,  as  to  the  breach  of 
"  which  there  is  a  natural  Punifhment  annexM. 
"  For  to  fay  a  thing  is  efTentially  good  otcvi!, 
"  to  call  it  by  hard  Names,  and  to  affirm  that 
*'  it  hath  a  Natural  Turpitude  ;  or,  to  pals  a 
"  Compliment  upon  it,  and  call  it  a  Moral 
"  Rcftitude,  and  fuch  like  fine  Scholaftic 
"  Terms — without  afligning  a  particular  Rea- 
"  fon  of  Intereft,  why  we  fhould  do  the  one 
"  or  avoid  the  other,  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  a 

thing 


♦  See  Locke'i  EJ/ay,  B.  4.  C.  11.  §.  14.  «r  Turner  tn  the  Lates  of  Nature,  and  their  Ob/ig^tiMt 

20.  or  N.  76. 

f  See  Hutchefon'j  lllufirat,  ^.  2.  p.  250,251, 

y  5wwr  Author,  C.  i.  ^.3.  par.9. /wiC.  5.  ^.i.  par.  23,  ^<-.  W  Notes  75, 76. 

%  Evidences  of  Nat.  and  Rev.  Religion,  prop*  i-S'l'  p.  2  x  8. 

K 


a 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 
REMARKS, 


"  thing  is  good-for  nothing)  or,  it  is  had, 
*•  but  we  know  not  why  {  or,  it  is  good  or 
*•  bad,  for  a  Woman's  Reafon,  becauie  it  is; 
*'  and  this  Reafon  will  ferve  as  well  to  prove, 
*'  tliat  Murder  or  Adultery  arc  good  things,  as 
*•  that  tliey  are  bad  cnes4-f- 

**  The  Laws  of  Nature,  therefore,  have  €- 
••  very  one  of  them  their  Sanfticn  in  t^fm- 
*-' fe/ves*,  i.e.  fome  things  naturally  tend  to 
**  -our  Happinefs,  and  others  to  our  Mifery, 
and  for  that  Reafon  they  become  nntural  Lazvs 
to  us,  or  are  R/j/^s  to  direft  our  A6lions  by  ; 
and  we  arc  c^lis^'d  to  do  the  one  and  avoid  the 
other,  ♦*  Upon  a  Principle  of  Self-happinefs, 
•'  and  Self  prefervation,  which  is  the  very  root 
**  and  fpring  of  all  Obligation  vvhatfoever  f, 

"  From  whence  we  may  difcern  the  Vanity 
*'  and  Folly  of  thofe  learned  Men,  who  are  u- 
*'  fed  to  talk  fo  loudly  of  ejfential  ReSlitudes, 
*•  and  eterr.al  Ndions,  and  I  know  not  what 
**  phantaftic.tl/d'^rt-,  in  an  afaftrafted  way;  where 
*'  as  there  is  indeed  nothing  which  is  either 
**  good  or  bad  merely  by  itfelf,  but  every  thing 
**  which  is  good,  i?'good,  that  is,  ufcful  to 
*'  fomething;  and  every  thing  which  is  bad, 
•*  is  fo  with  reference  to  fome  Nature  or  other, 
**  to  which  it  is  more  or  lefs  pernicious  and 
**  deftruftive :  from  whence  it  follows  (the 
•*  nature  of  Obligation  being  a  refuk  ariiing 
'*  from  the  ufefulnefs  or  hurtfulnefs  of  a  thing 
**  propofed  to  be  the  objeft  of  a  free  Agent's 
•*  choice,  with  refpeft  to  that  Agent  which  is 
*•  converfmt  about  it)  that  all  Obligation  muft 
•*  be  not  of  a  fimple,  but  of  a  compound,  or 
•-  concrete  nature,  and. muft  always  have  an  in- 
•*  feparable  refpect  to  the  Intereft  or  Happinefs 
•♦  c/  thofe  to  whom  that  Obligation  is  bind- 
**  ing.  And  it  is  not  only  true,  that  our  Inte- 
•*  reft  and  our  Duty  are  both.of  them  the  fame, 
*•  but  that  it  is  abfolutely  impoffible  any  thing 
'^  fhould  be  our  Duty,  which  is  not  our  Inte- 
**  reft  into  the  Bargain;  for  no  Man  can  pof- 
«*  fibly  be  obliged  to  that  which,  all  things con- 
•*  fidered,  will  be  to  hisDifadvantage  |j." 

Farther,  moft  Authors  who  treat  of  the  Pro- 
daftion  of  t\{\s^  Niitural  good  or  evil  in  fuch  a 
•Banner  as  to  conftitnce  Right- «r  Wrong,  nio- 


W  LatosefNat.  &c.  §.  i.  *  Bid.  ^,2.  f 
foundation  if  Morality,  Sec.  |||  Serm.  zdaoid  jd. 
Ht  5 •  Note  4.  aad  ^.  8. .  Note.  i,. 


ral  good  or  evil,  {if^-.  appear  either  to  equivo- 
cate in  a  double  meaning  of  (he  Words :  viz. 
as  they  imply  producing  Happinefs  cither  in 
ourfelvts  alone,  or  in  others,  (which  arc  two 
very  different  things,  and  fhould  accordingly 
be  always  diftinguifli'd)  or  elfe  to  be  deficicmt 
in  pointing  out  a  Rtde,  and  proving  an  Obliga- 
tion to  it  in  the  latter  Senfe,  viz.  with  regard 
to  others.  This  great  dtk&.  in  their  Syftems, 
feems  to  arife  from  not  fufficiently  attending  to- 
the  above  mention'd  Moral  Senfe  or  Conjcicmey 
(as  the  meaning  of  that  Word  is  well  fix'd  by 
Mr.  Butler^)  which  is  of  itfelf  both  Rule  and: 
Obligation.  As  an  InJiinSl,  it  directs  us  to  ap- 
prove fuch  Aftions  as  tend  to  produce  Happi- 
nefs in  others,  and  fo  is  a  /Jj/A"  whereby  we  de- 
termine all  fuch  Adlions  to  be  virtuous  ;  as  it 
gives  us  pain,  or  makes  us  uneafy  at  the  neglect 
of  thefe  Aflions,  or  at  the  Pr  '  ice  of  the  con- 
trary ones;  it  obliges  us  fo  purfue  them,  or 
7nakes  the  practice  of  them  abfolutely  neceflary 
to  our  Happinefs:  wliich  is  the  true  meaning-, 
ofrheWord  Oblige,  as  wsftiewn  in  the  pre*- 
iminary  DiJJertat:0'!  ;  nd  is  proved  more  at 
large  by  Cumber/an  J  ^. 

'I  hat  therefore,  and  that  only,  muH  be  faid 
to  oblige  us,  which  is  neceJJ'ary  to  our  HfippineO. 
Now,  as  the  Sum  of  our  Happinefs  depends 
upo  -  the  whole  of  our  Exillence,  that  only  can 
be  a  complete  and  indifpenfible  Obligation, 
which  is  equal  and  commenfurate  to  the  Sum 
total  of  our  Happinefs.  Or,  that  Being  only 
can,  abfolutely  and  eiFeftually,  oblige  us,  who 
has  it  in  his  Power  to  make  our  whole  Exi- 
ftence  happy  or  niiferable;  and  of  confcqnence,. 
the  D.it^,  who  alone  has  that  Power,  muft 
neceffarily  be  taken  into  all  Schemes  of  Mora- 
lity, in  order  to  fuper-induce  a  full,  adequate 
Obligation,  or  fuch  an  one  as  will  hold  at  all 
times,  and  extend  to  every  aftion  ;  and  an  en- 
deavour to  exclude  the  Confideration  of  his 
Win,  or  to  deduce  all  Obligation  from  any 
Principles  independent  of  it,  has,  I  think,  o.c- 
cafion'd  another  great  defcft  in  moit  of  our 
modern  Syftems. 

That  this  Moral  Good  is  a  PerfeBion  in  any 
Being,  i,  e.  agrecAble  to,  or  per&ftive  of,  its 

Nature, 

Ibid.  ^.6.      {|  mi.  V.  i^.  Seedfo  Mr.  ClarkeV 
^*  C>5.  4,  ?7.^^*^tfPtiffi»dorf,  B.  i.  C.  6, 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 


^^ 


REMARKS. 


Natnre,  appears  by  the  very  Terms  :  alfo,  tliat 
this  Moral  Senfe  is  the  greateft  Per^edlion  of 
Human  Nature,  and  that  there  is  fomething  ana- 
logous to  it,  in  the  Divine  Nature,  may  be 
feen  in  the  above  mentioned  Enjuiry,  and 
Ilhijlrntions  of  the  Moral  Senfe,  p.  239,  iSc. 
See  alfo  Scott''s  Chrijlian  Life,  Vol.' 2.  p.  33, 

37.  ^^• 

N.  B.  What  has  been  here  faid  about  ht- 
ftinH,  'SffeBion,  Moral  Senfe,  &c,  may  feem  to 
amply,  that  thefc  are  all  innate;  contrary  to 
what  was  proved  in  the  Preliminary  Diff'erta- 
tion:  and  indeed  this  was  drawn  up  at  firft  up- 
on the  fuppoled  Validity  of  that  Notion,  which 
many  may,  perhaps,  efteem  valid  Itill,  and 
therefore  I  let  the  Argument  ftand  in  the  old 
Terms ;  efpecially  as  it  is  not  at  all  affeded 
•by  the  Truth  or  Falfity  of  that  Notion;  fmce 
it  will  really  come  to  the  fame  thing,  with  re- 
gard to  the  Moral  Attributes  of  God,  and  the 
Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  whether  the  Deity 
lias  implanted  thefe  Paffions,  Inftinfts,  and  Af- 
feftions  in  us,  or  has  framed  and  difpofed  us 
in  fuch  a  manner;  has  given  us  fuch  Powers, 
and  placed  us  in  fuch  Circumftances,  that  we 
Ihall  neceflari  ly  rt^f v/>i?  them;  they'll  be  alike- 
natural  in  either  Senfe,  juft  as  all  moral  Ax- 
ioms, i^c.  are  equally  certain  upon  Loeie''s 
Hypothefis,  as  upon  the  old  footing  of  innate ; 
I'rinciples. 

And  tho'  r  take  implanted  Senfes,  InflinBs, 
Apfetites,  Paffions,  Affe^ions,  l^c.  to  be  a  rem- 
nant of  the  Old  Philofophy,  which  ufed  to  call 
«very  thing  Innate  that  it  could  not  account 
for  ;  and  therefore,  I  heartily  wifli  that  they 
were  all  eradicated,  (which  was  undoubtedly 
the  aim  of  that  ^xcisxAuthr  lail  mention'd  ;  as 
it  was  a  natural  Confequence  of  his  firll  Book, 
tho' he  might  not  then  think  proper  to  fpeak 
out ;  )  vet,  as  common  ufe  has  fix'd  this  No- 
tion of  Innatenefs  to  them,  I  am  oblig'd  to 
follow  my  Author,  and  treat  of  them  in  the 
common  Language.  Only  let  it  be  obfervcd 
here  once  for  all,  that  cvefy  Argument  which 
is  built  upon  thefe  P.iilions,  Senfes,  ^r.  will  be 


or  acquired.  As  to  the  prefent  point  in  parti- 
cular, 'Mx.Huchefon  has  fully  proved,  that  we 
are  led  infenfibly,  and  by  the  conflitution  and 
circumftances  of  oi\r  very  Being,  to  love  and 
approve  certain  Adtions,  which  we  call  Vir- 
tuous :  which  is  enough  for  my  purpofe.  as 
was  hinted  above.  Againft  the  Notion  of  im- 
planted InJiinSis,-  fee  Felt  buy fon  de  Princlpiis  jujii 
k^  decor i,  p.  73,  &c.  Amflel.  1651. 

[  X  k.  ]  That  God  mnft  have  the  fame 
Judgment  and  Approbation  of  this  Moral 
Good,  which  all  Rational  Beings  naturally 
have  *  ;  and  that  we  muft  judge  of  the  Nature 
and  Perfedions  of  the  Deity,  only  by  that 
Nature  and  thofe  PcrfeAions  which  we  derive 
from  him,  is,  I  think,  very  plain  :  I  mean, 
that  we  muft  not  endeavour  to  conceive  the 
fcveral  Attributes  of  God  by  fubjlituting  fome- 
thing in  him  of  ^  quite  different  kind,  and  total- 
ly diverfe  from  that  which  we  find  in  ourfelves, 
(as  the  learned  Author  of  the  Procedure  of  Hu- 
man tJnderftanding,  feem s  to  declare,  p.  138, 
and  elfewhere)  tho'  that  be  in  fome  refpefts  fi- 
milar  and  analogous  to  this:  But  we  are  to 
fuppofe  fomewhat  of  the  very  fame  kind  and 
frt,  the  fame  Qualities  or  Properties  in  gene- 
ral to  be  both  in  him  and  us,  and  then  remove 
all  manner  o^  dcfe£l  ox  imperfection  which  at- 
tends the  particular  Modus  only  of  their  Exi- 
rtence,  as  they  are  in  us.  Thus  we  afcribe  to 
God  all  kinds  and  degrees  of  apparent  Perfec- 
tion obfervable  in  his  Creatures,  except  fuch  as 
argue  at  the  fame  time  Imperfedion  (v.  g.  Mo- 
tion, which  neceffarily  implys  Limitation)  or 
are  inconfifient  with  fome  other  and  greater 
Perfcftion  (v.  g.  thcExcrcife  of  punitive  Juftice 
in  fuch  a  degree  as  would  exclude  Mercy;  or. 
Materiality,  which  excludes  Knowledge  and 
Liberty  f.)  We  alfo  remove  from  him  all 
zvant,  dependence,  alteration,  uneaftncf,  &'c.  In 
fhort,  all  that  refults  either  from  fimple  fi- 
nitcnefs,  or  from  the  mere  Union  of  two  finite 
impcrfedl  Sublhnces,  fuch  as  conftitute  Man. 
And  when  we   have  thus  apply'd  every  thing 


equally  conclulive,  whether  they  be  implanted    in  every  manner  of  exiftcncc  whicli  feems  to 

K  2  imply 

*  See  Scott'/  Chrijlian  Life,  Part  2.  C.  i.  p.  21,  22.  ift  Edit. 

+  See  ^.  5/.  Tillotfon,  Scrm.jS.  2d  Vol.  Fol.  p.  569,  ^V.  •  Dr.}  Qhxkz  on  Miral  Etfu, 
P-  95,  ^c.  and  Scott'i  Chrijl.  Life,  Part  2.  C.  6.  S-  2-  ?•  447.  ^('  '^  Edit. 


6S 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  EviL 
REMARKS, 


imply  Perfeflion,  snd  excluded  every,  thing  in 
«very  mnnner  of  fixiftcnce  which  implies  or 
includes  the  contrary,  we  have  got  our  Idea  of 
an  abfolutely  perfedl  Being,,  which  we  call 
God.  'Tis  therefore  attributing  to  God  fonue 
real  Qualities  of  a  certain  determinate  kind,. 
(v.  g.  Knowledge  or  Power,  Goodnefs  or 
Truth)  the  nature  of  whicJi  Qualities  we  do 
perceive,  are  diredlly  confcious  of,  and  know, 
which  gives  us  an  Idea  or  Conception  of  him, 
and  a  pro/>er  one  too,  (if  any-  fuch  diftinftion 
of  Ideas  are  allow'd)  and  not  imagining  fome 
others,  we  cannot  tell  of  what  fort,  totally 
different  in  nature  and  kind  from  any  that  we 
ever  did  perceive  or  know  ;  which  would  give 
us  no  Idea  or  Conception  at  all  of  him,  either 
proper  or  improper. 

In  like  manner  we  frame  a  partial  concep- 
tion of  a  Spirit  in  general  (which  we  confef- 
fedly  have)  not  by  fubftituting  fome  properties 
different  ii^.  kind  from  thofe  which  we  perceive 
in  out  own  Spirit;  but  by  fuppofing  the  very 
fame  properties,  /'.  ^.  in  kind,  (viz.  Cogitation, 
and  a  power  of  producing  Motion)  to  be,  alfo 
iaiherent  in  fome  other  immaterial  Beings 
which  we  therefore  call  by  the  fame  Names. 
Now  this  is  (as  far  as  it  goes)  true,  real  know- 
ledge, and  may  be  apply'd  and  argu'd  on  intel- 
ligibly :  but  the  other  would,  I  ftir,  take  a- 
Tfay  all  poffibility  of  arguing  from  the  feveral" 
Attributes  or  Properties  of  the  Deity,  to  thofe 
of  ourfelves,  and  vice  verfa,  all  our  reafonings 
upon  them  (as  the  learned  Author  expreffes  it, 
p^  1 34  )  would  be  precarious,  and  without  any. 
felid, foundation  in  the  Nature  of  things.  Such 
analogical  Knowledge  then;as  that,  is  (accor- 
ding to  my  Notions  of  Knowledge)  ftriftly  and 
plfcperly  none  at  all  i  and  if  the  Author  ufes 
analogy  in  that  Senfe,  'twill,  I  believe,  be 
Itjll  taken  only  for  a  fort  or  degree  of  Metaphor, 
after  all  he  has  faid  in  the  laft  Chapter  of  hi* 
fiyll  Book,  to  diftingoiili  them. 

I  would,  here  be  underftood  to  affirm  thus 
much  of  the  fimple  Nature  only,  or  Kind,  ox  our 
abfira£l  Idea  of  thefe  Qualities  tbeinfehes,  and 
not  ofthjj  manner  of  their  Exiflence  :  which 
t>vo  (tho'  this  Author  is  pleas'd  to  ufe  them 
Ifoinifcuoufly  in  p.  84,  (Jc.)  feem  yet  very  di- 
iyiti^G  C.onfideratioii5»    l*loi  we.apgrehcjiidiii:ye.- 


ral  Propertie?,,  orQuali<*«,  as  exifting  in  oyr 
own  Nature,  independent  of  any  particular 
manner ;  nay,  in  very  different  manners :  v.  g. 
Knowledge,  either  by  Senfationor  Refleftion, 
by.  Dedudlion  or  immediate  Intuition  :  Love 
attended  with  a  certain  degree  of  Pleafure  or 
Pain,  i^fc.  and  therefore  we  fuppofe  that  thefe 
Qualities  may  exill  in  the  Divine  Nature,  in  a 
manner  entirely  different  from  what  they  do  in 
us,  and  yet  be  the  very  fame  Qualities  ftill ; 
which  M«<2'w  of  the  Divine  Being,. or  ofany 
of  his  Attributes,  is  totally  unknown  to  us, 
and  we  can  only  guefs  at  it  by  fome  dir 
ftant  refemblance  or  Anahgy  ;  which  Analogy 
I  would  therefore  apply  to  this  Modus  of  Exir 
ftence,  and  to  this  onlj  ;.  which  fcems  fufficient 
for  all  the  great  Purpofes  of  Religion,  and  in- 
which  SenJe  the  Notion  may  perhaps  be  jiiil 
and  ufeful,  but  cannot,  I  think,  be  extended  to 
our  Idea  of  the  whole  Nature  and  Genus  of  the 
Attribute  itfelf.  For,  if  the  Divine  Attributes 
be,  toto  genere,  diilind  and  different  from  thofe 

;Qualities  which  we  eileem  perfedlions  in  ourr 
felves  or  others,  if  (as  the  fame  Author  urges,, 
pi  82.)  the  grea tell  perfeiSions  of  thofe  Crea- 
tures which  fall  under  our  Obfervation,  (and' 
thefe  he  will  grant  to  be  all  that  we  have  any 
Idea.,  of)  are  really  ^'^  but  fa  many  Im^erfeBiotiSy. 
-'  when  referred  or  attributed  to  the  Divine  Na- 
"  tare,  as  it  is  in  itfelf,  in  any  meaning  whatfr 
**  everi  even  with  the  moft  exalted  meaning  we 
"  can  pofjibly  annex  to  them,''''  (the  Author  un- 
derftanding,  I  fuppofe,  as  ufual,  t\\c  whole  Na- 
ture and  difiinguifiing  kind  of  thofe  Qualities  in 
themfelves.)  Then,  how  fliall  we  difcover 
which  kind  of  Qualities  God  prefers  before  the 
contrary.?  How  can  we  be  certain  that  thefe 
in  particular  are  agreeable  to  him  }  oi  how  Ihall 
we  hope  and  endeavour  to  make  ourfelves  like 
him .?  Can  we  know  the  nature  of  one  thing  by 
another,  entirely  different  from  it.""  or  can  we  i- 
mitate  what  we  don't  at  all  apprehend.  "  It 
"  is  foolifh  ffays  A:  Bp,  Tillotfon)  for  any  Man 
"  to  pretend  that  he  cannot  know  what  Jufiice^ , 

.,"  arhiGoodnefSy  and  Truth  in.God  are  ',  for,  if  we 
"  do  not  hiow  this,   "'tis  all  one  to  us  whether  God 

."  be  good  cr  not  i  mr  could  we  imitate  his  Good- 
"  nefs :  for^.  he  that  imitates f  endeavourj  to  b;Jike< 

■  *'  fometbing  that  he  knows f.  and  mufl  of  necejjity 

**  have 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil, 


69 


REMARKS: 


**'  htK'efome  Ideoof  that  7j  Z!:hich  he  aims  to  be 
"  Itke  ;  Jo  that  if  we  had  no  certain  and  fettled 
**  Notion  of  the  Jujlice  and  Goodnefs  and  Truth  of 
"God,  be  would  be  altogether  an  unintelligible 
"  Being:  and  Religion,  which  ccnji/ls  in  the  Tmi- 
"  tation  of  him,  would  be  utterly  impofftbk  *.' ' 
Which  deftroys  the  Notion  of  Analogy  (as  was 
obferv'd  long  ago  by  the  Free-thinker,  p,  50, 
l^c.)  as  it  J6  beauafuUy  delivered  by  our  Au- 
thor ia  his  Sermon  on  Divine  Tredejlination 
^r.ifhe  did  not  intend  by  thatWord  fomething 
in  God  re.illy//?ri7//^/and  equivalent  to  what  wc 
find  in  feme  of  his  Works,  and  fo  very  like  it, 
that  nothing  can  be  liker,  except  that  which 
exifts  ia  the  very, fame  manner  too,  /.  ^.  in  a 
pterfefl  one*  Vi  this  could.'  be  has  meaning, 
(yvhich  may  not  appear  improbable  from  his 
Anfwer  to  the  like  Obje<fllon,  ^»  22.  where  he 
declares,  that  thefe  Attributes  have  much  more 
Reality  ard  Perfection  in  them,  than  the  things 
by  which  we  reprefent  them,  ^^.)  then  is  he 
perfeflly  confillent  witE  the  other  great  Au- 
thor cited  above.  I  wifh  the  moft  learned  Au- 
thor of  the  Procedure,  l^c  were  fhewn  to  be  fo 
too,  who  is  fuppofed  to  havepurfued  this  No- 
tion of  Analogy  farther  than.almoft  any  will'be. 
able  or  willing  to  follow  him. 

But  this  is  no  place  for  a  full  Examination 
cither  of  that  Notion,  or  this  learned  Author's 
Application  of  it.  I  fhall  only  add  an  Obfer- 
vation,  which  perhap?  iruiy  ferve  in  fome  mea- 
fuYe  to  fhew  dircftly  (as  he  is  picas'd  to  rc- 
qnire,  IntroduSl.  p.  17.)  that  the  Foundation  up- 
on which-  he  has  placed  his  Analogy  is  falfe  and 
groundlefs :  which  Foundation  is,  as  I  appre- 
hend, the  Nature  oV the  Being,  inftead  of  the 
iWb<///j  of  its  Exillence.  To  carry  the  face  of 
an  Argument,  let  it  ftand  thus.  The  Nature 
of  the  foremen tion-'d  Qualities  is  either  wholly 
the  famejn  God  and  us,  or  wholly  different : 
if  the  former  be  main  tain' d,  then  this  analogi- 
cal Senfe  is  turn'd  into  an  Identical  ont',  if  the 
latter,  then  can  no  manner  of  Refemblance  or 
Analogy  be  drawn  between  them;  fince.one  na- 
ture (as  has  been  obferv'd)  cannot  in  the  Icaft 
help  to-repj-efent  or  explain  another  quite  diffe- 
rent from  iti.   I  mean,    in  thofe  \icY  points 


wherein  they  difFer  ;  for  that  is  to  be  different 
and  not  different,  alike  and  unlike  in  the  \try 
fame  refpcft,  at  the  fame  time  :    And  then  this 
analogical  Senfe  is  turn'd  into  a  difperate  or 
quite  oppojite  one,  /.  e.  into  no  analogy  at  all : 
Or,  lailly,  they  mull  be  pnrtly  the  fame,   and 
partly  different,  or  alike  and  unlike  in  different 
refpeils,  (which  is  the  thing  we  contend   for) 
viz.  nYike  in  Perfe^ion,  unlike  in  Defe£i,  or  im- 
perfedtion;   or  the  fame  in   Nature,  or  Efflnce^. 
and  different  in  Degree,  or  the  manner  oi  'Exx- 
ftence.     If  therefore  the   Author  founds  this. 
-Analogy  on  the  very  Nature  of  the  thing,  he 
feems  to  incur  the  foremention'd  abfurdity,   of 
Tuppofing  a   nature  contradiflory  to    itfelf;  if, 
with  us,  he  will'pleafe  to  diftinguilh  between 
'the  Nature  of  the  thing  in  general,  and  the 
particular  Modus  of  its  Exiftence,  he  muft  with 
-US  alfo  remove   this  analogy  from  the  former' 
foundation,  and'  fix  it  upon  the  latter.     Far^*- 
'ther,  no  Similitude  whatfoever,  whether  dedu- 
ced from  human  Reafon  or  Holy  Scripture,, 
can  have  force  enough  to  pcrfuade  us,  that  the 
whole  nature  of  thefe  things  is  quite  different 
from  what  we  apprehend  or  can  conceive  them 
to  be;  fmce  it  is  univerfally  jrilow'd,  that  no" 
comparifon  can  (as  we  commonly  fay)'  run  upon  ' 
all  four;  or  (whichis  the  very  foundation  and 
defign  of  this  whole  analogical    Scheme)  can  ' 
ever  conftitute  a  proper  ixA'  conclufive  Argu- 
ment, in  order  to  prove  to  us  fuch  a  paradox  :' 
and-if  fo  great  Strefs  is  to  be  laid  on  any,  v.  g, . 
that  of  a  Looking-Glafs,  ufed  in  a  fft-idl  Philofo- 
phical  manner,  (as  the  Author  of  the  Procedure  ' 
feems  to  do,  p.  112,  b^r.)  why  may  not  fome 
urge  it  flill  firther,  and  argue,  that  as  the  P 
mage  of  your  Face  fuppofed  to  be  feen  in  the- 
Glafs,  is   nothing   real,  folid,  and  fubftantia! 
contain'd  in  the  Glafs  itfelf,  but  barely  an  ap- 
pearance exhibited  in   the  B^ain;    fo  all  the' 
conceptions  which  we  pretend  to  have  of  the* 
Divine  Nature  and  Attributes,  are  nothing  at 
all  in  God  himfelf,  but  mere  Phantafhts  and: 
deluftve   Images,    exifting   only  in   our  owiv 
Mind.     This,  will  thefe  Men  lay,  muft  appear- 
abfurd   at  firll  Sight,  and   yet  may  be  drawn 
from  the  Similitude  with  as  much:  Propriety  as 

the 


**5^/..<l'5;TilIotron'i  Serm.  76.>  V0I.2.  Pot  p.  57a.  and  p.  67a 


70 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil. 


REMARKS. 


the  reft ;  confequcntly  the  whole  Scheme  of 
this^Wo^is  to  be  rejeded  as  entirely  f.ilfe, 
and  at  laft  the  true  Medium  of  all  our  Know- 
Jcdge  in  the  Nature  of  thcfe  things,  will  be 
what  we  truly  and  properly  perceive  of  them, 
in  fome  fmafl  degree  in  our/elves :  If  it  be  ob- 
je6led  here,  that  the  Nature  and  Mod/^j  of  any 
thing  muft  be  the  very  fame,  fmce  by  different 
Natures  are  only  meant  different  Manners  of 
Exiftence. 

I  anfwer :  By  the  Nature  of  any  thing,  I  un- 
derftand  its  feveral  dijiinguijbifig  Properties.  By 
the  Nature  of  any  Property,  I  underftand  fome 
certain  pofitive  Mark  or  Chara5ler  which  diflin- 
guifhes  that  property  from  any  others.  Thus, 
by  the  nature  of  Body,  I  mean  folid,  divifi- 
ble,  figur''d  and  moveable  Extcnfion.  By  the 
Nature  of  Solidity,  I  mean  Refiftence,  or  a 
power  of  excluding  other  Bodies  out  of  its 
place;  which  Mark  fufficiently  diftinguiflies  it 
from  Divifibility,  or  any  other  property  be- 
longing to  the  fame  Body,  as  well  as  all  the 
foremention'd  properties  diftinguifh  a  Body 
from  fomething  elfe  :  both  which  we  may 
therefore  property  enough  be  faid  to  perceive 
or  knrM',  tho'  perhaps  we  may  never  in  like 
manner,  know  hozv  thefe  feveral  Properties  are 
■united  together,  and  come  to  form  one  Aggre- 
gate or  Subftance  ;  nor  whence  this  Power  or 
Property  of  Refiftence  proceeds,  or  how  it  is 
(aui'dy  wnich  is  what  we  underftand  by  the 
Modus  of  each.  So  that,  knowing  or  having 
a  clear  determinate  Idea  of  a  certain  Thing  or 
Quality,  fo  as  to  be  able  to  diftinguifh  it  from 
another  Thing  or  Quality,  and  always  to  per- 
ceive it  to  be  rciWy  thus ;  is  quite  different 
from  knowing  how  the  fiid  Thing  or  Quality 
comes  to  be  thus :  How  or  Why  it  is,  are  Modes 
of  Exiftence,  and  differ  plainly  from  what  it 
is,  or  what  Idea  we  have  of  it,  which  denotes 
'n&  Nature  or  EJJence.  But  any  Man,  I  think, 
hat  has  a  mind,  may  apprehend  what  we  mean 
5y  this  diftinftion  v-fithout  any  more  Words, 
whether  he  will  approve  of  it  or  not,  is  ano- 
ther Queftion. 

Againtt  this  Notion  of  Jniilozy,  as  apply'd 
tQ  the  whole  Nature  of  the  A-ttributcs  of  God,  1 


fee  Fiddes'  s  Body  of  Divinity,  B .  I .  Part  2.  c.l  3 . 
and  his  PraBical  Difcourjh,  Fol.  p.  234,  feV, 
or,  J.  Clarke  on  Moral  Evil,  p.  95,  iSc  or 
ChubFs  trails,  p.  146,  ijc.  or,  the  prefent  State 
of  the  Republic  of  Letters  for  July  1728;  or,  ti 
(^indication  of  the  Divine  Attributes,  London 
1710. 

[X  1.  ]  By  the  Words,  Infinite  Degree,  here 
and  above,  we  don't  mean  any  indefinite  Addi- 
tion, or  encreafablenefs  of  thefe  feveral  Attri- 
butes partially  confider'd  (to  which  fuch  terms 
are  vulgarly,  tho'  not  fo  properly  apply'd)  but 
only  an  entire  abfolute  PerfeP.ion,  without  any 
kind  0^  failure  ox  deficiency  in  thefe  refpeds : 
which  we  have  intimated  in  Note  5,  and  elfe- 
where,  to  be  our  Notion  of  Infinity,  as  ap- 
ply'd to  any  of  the  Divine  Attributes.  *'  Thus 
"  Infinite  Under/landing  and  Knotv ledge,  is  no- 
*•  thing  elfe  but  perfect  Knowledge,  tliatwhich 
'*'  hath  no  dcfe£l  or  mixture  oi Ignorance  in  it,  or 
"  the  knowledge  of  whatfoever  is  knowable. 
"  Infinite  Power  is  nothing  elfe  but  pcrfefl 
"  Power,  that  which  hath  no  defeft  or  mix- 
"  ture  of  Impotency  in  it:  a  Power  of  produ- 
"  cing  and  doing  all  whatfoever  \s poj/rb'e,  i.  e. 
'*  whatfoever  is  conceivable,  and  fo  of  the 
«  reft*. 

'*  Now,  that  we  have  an  Idea  or  Concep- 
*'  tion  of  Perfieflion,  or  a  perfect  Being,  is  evi- 
*'  dent  from  the  Notion  that  we  hsve  of  Itn- 
"  perfection,  fo  familiar  to  us  :  PerfeEiion  being 
*'  the  Rule  and  Mcafure  of  Imperfehion,  and  not 
"  Imperfection  of  Per fc£iion,  as  z  firaight  Line  is 
*'  the  Rule  and  Meafure  of  a  Crocked,  and  net 
"  a  Crooked  Line  of  a  Straight.  So  thrit  Per- 
"  fedlion  is  fiv^  Conceivable  in  order  of  nature, 
'  •  before  ImpcrfeBion,  as  Light  before  Darknefs, 
"  a  pofitive  before  the  privation  or  defeH.  For 
<'  Pcrfeftion  is  not  properly  the  want  of  Im- 
•'  perfedUon,  but  Imperfedion  of  Perfec- 
"  tion. 

"  Moreover,  we  perceive  feveral  Degrees  of 
"  Perfeftion  in  the  Effences  of  things,  and 
♦*  confequcntly  a  Scale  or  Ladder  of  PerfeSions 
"  in  Nature,  one  above  another,  as  of  iviiig 
"  ^■^'ii  animate  things  above  fenfckfs  and  iiani- 

tnate. 


Cudworth,  p.  647. 


Cmcermng  the  Origin  of  EviL. 
REMARKS. 


.^1 


•*  mate,  o^ratianal  things  above  pnfiihe ;  and 
*•  that -by  rcafon  of  that  A^b/zcff  ox  Idea,  which 
*'  we  firft  have  of  that  which  is  abfolutely  per- 
*'  fc£i,  as  the  Standar<l,  by  comparing  of  things 
"  with  which,  and  me.ifuring  of  them,  we 
"  take  notice  of  their  approaching  more  or  lefs 
*'  near  thereunto.  Nor  indeed  could  thefe 
"  gradual  AficMihe  itijinite,  or  without  End, 
**  but  they  mull  come  at  laft  to  that  which  is 
*'  abfolutely  perfctfl,  as  the  top  of  them  all. 
**  Laftly,  we  could  not  perceive  Imperfeftion 
**  in  the  moft  perfccl  of  all  thofe  things  which 
**  we  ever  had  Senfe  or  Experience  of  in  our 
*'  Lives,  had  we  not  a  Noiion^ot  Idea  of  that 
*'  which  is  a'jfolutely  perfcSi,  which  fecretly 
*'  comparing  the  fame  with,  we  perceive  it  to 
"  come  fhort  thereof*. 

**  Wherefore,  fince  Infinite  is  the  fame  with 
*'  abfolutely  perfe£t,  we  having  a  Notion  or  I- 
**  dea  of  the  latter,  muft  needs  have  of  the 
"  former.  From  whence  we  learn  alfo,  that 
"  tho'  the  Word  Infinite  be  in  the  form  there- 
*'  oi Negative,  yet  is  the  Senfe  of  it,  in  thefe 
"  things  which  are  really  capable  of  the  fame, 
"  pofitive,  it  being  all  one  with  alfilutelj  per- 
"  feSi:  as  likewiie,  the  Senfe  of  the  Word 
**  Finite  is  negative,  it  being  the  fame  with 
*•  ImperftSl :  So  that  finite  is  properly  the 
**  Negation  of  Infinite,  as  that  which  in  order 
"  of  nature  is  before  it,  and  not  Infinite  the 
**  Negation  o'i Finite.  However,  in  thofe  things 
**  which  are  capable  of  no  true  Infinity,  be- 
**  caufe  they  are  cfTentially  finite,  as  Number, 
"  corporeal  Magnitude,  zn6.time  i  Infinity  being 
"  there  a  mere  imaginary  thing,  and  a  non- 
"  entity,  it  can  only  be  conceiv'd  by  the  A''^- 
**  gation  of  Finite,  as  we  alfo  conceive  Nothing 
"  by  the  Negation  of  Something,  that  is,  we 
"  can  have  no  pofitive  Conception  at  all  there- 
"  off." 

Now,  all  this,  is  not  attempting  to  make 
the  Attributes  of  God  pofitively  Infinite,  by 
foperadding  a  Negative  Idea  of  Infinity  to  them 
(as  the  Author  of  the  Procedure,  l^c.  juftly  ur- 
ges againft  Mr.  Locke,  in  B.  I.  c.  3.  p.  82. 
and* the  fa«ie  might  with  equal  Juftice  be  ob- 
jcded  fo  Dt,-C/arie,  when  he  applies  infinite 


Space  and  infinite  Duration  to  the  Deity,  and 
calls  one  his  Immenftty,  and  the  other  his  E- 
ternity.)  But  it  is  making  them  pofitively  and 
abfolurely  perfect,  by  iirfl:  proving  them  to 
have  fome  real  Extfience  in  the  Divine  Nature,- 
and  then  by  removing  from  it  all  Poflibility  of 
Want,  or  Deficiency,  Mixture,  or  Allay  ||. 

[X  m.  ]  By  the  Word  Jufiice,  as  it  relates 
to  Punifliment,  we  mean,  the  Exercife  of  a- 
Right,  or  doing  whnt  a  Perfon  has  a  Moral 
Pczser  to  do.  Mercy  implies  his  receding  from 
that  Right,  or  not  exerting  that  moral  power. 
When  we  apply  thefe  Terms  to  the  Deity,  wc 
confider  his  Eiifpenfations  in  a  partial  View, 
viz.  only  with  Relation  to  the  Perfon  offen- 
ding, and  himfelf  the  offended,  or  as  mere- 
Debtor  and  Creditor,  exclufive  of  all  other 
Beings,  who  may  be  affefted  thereby,  and 
whom  therefore  we  fhould  fuppofe  to  be  re- 
garded in  thefe  Difpenfations.  In  this  Senfe» 
thefe  two  Attributes  have  a  diftinft  Meaning, 
and  may  both  be  always  fubordinate  to  Good- 
nefs,  but  can  never  be  repugnant  to  each  o- 
ther.  Thus,  where  a  Creature  has  forfeited 
its  Right  to  a  Favour,  or  incurr'd  a  Penalty,  by 
the  breach  of  fome  Covenant,  or  the  Tranf- 
greffion  of  fome  Law,  the  Creator,  confider'd 
with  refpeft  to  that  Being  alone,  and  in  thofa 
Circum fiances,  has  always  a  Right  to  with- 
draw the  Favour;  or  to  inflift  a  Penalty  ;  and 
will  profecute  that  Right,  whenever  he  finds  ^ 
it  neceffary,  to  fome  farther  End  :  But  yet  his 
Goodnefs  may  incline  him  often  to  remit  it, 
on  fome  foreign  Motive,  viz.  on  account  of 
.the  prefent  Relation  between  the  Criminal 
and  other  Men,  in  very  different  Gircumflan- 
ces,  or  in  view  of  a  future  Alteration  in  the 
Circumflances  of  the  Criminal  himfelf.  Now 
as  thefe  Motives  belong  to,  and  are  generally 
known  by,  God  alone,  tho*  they  may  influ- 
ence his  Aftions  towards  us,  yet  they  don't  at- 
all  afFeft  his  Right  over  us,  and  therefore*, 
ought  not  to  diminilh  our  Love,  Gratitude^ 
^c.  to  him  in  any  particular  Inflance,  either 
of  Judgment  or  of"^  Mercy-  Whenever  wc  fuffer 
for  our  Crimes,  we  havt  no  Re^fon  to  com- 

phio 


*'Cudwortby.'^  648, 


•J-  Jhid,  649. 


II  See'X.ki 


73 


Concerning  the  Origin  of  Evil* 
REMARKS. 


plain  of  any  Injury,  nor  can  he,  when,  upon 
the  formention'd  Motives,  he  forgives  us,  ever 
injure  himfelf  For  Juftice,  confidcr'd  barely 
as  a  Rigbf  or  Mora/  Power,  evidently  demands 
nothing,  nor  can  properly  be  faid  to  oblige  one 
way  or  other :  and  therefore,  the  Being  pof- 
fcfs'dofit,  is  at  liberty  either  to  fufpend  or 
exert  it ;  but  he  will  never  ufe  this  Liberty, 
othcrwifc  than  as  his  Goodnefs  requires,  con- 
fequently  Juftice  and  Mercy  in  .fuch  »  Being 
can  never  claih. 


Whether  this  way  of  conceiving  thefe  Di- 
vine Attributes  be  not  attended  with  lefs  Dif- 
ficulty than  the  common  manner  of  treating 
them,  under  the  Notion  of  two  Infinites  dia- 
metrically oppofite,  muft  be  left  to  the  Judg- 
ment of  the  Reader. 

As  to  the  Nature  of  Dijirtbutwe  Juftice,  or 
the  true  Reafon  of  Rewards  and  Funijhments., 
fee S.  C's  Impartial. Enquiry,  iSc.  B.  i .  c\\, 
prop.  \zi 


t 


CHAP. 


n 


CHAR     IL 

Concerning  the  Nature  and  Divijion  of  Evil^ 
and  the  Difficulty  of  tracing  out  it/  Origin. 

I,  ^*^  OOD  and  Evtl  are  Oppofites,  and  arife  from  the  Relation  By  Evil  we 
m     —  which  things  have  to  each  other:  For,  fince  there  are  fome  ^"^criund 
VJ    things  which  profit,  and  others  which  prejudice  one  ano- •ncommo-'^ " 
therj  fince  fome  things  agree,  and  others  difagree ;  as  wedioasjncon- 
call  the  former  Good,  fo  we  ftile  the  latter  Evil.     Whatever,  there-  tro"ubkfome. 
fore,  is  incommodious  or  inconvenient  to  itfclf,  or  any  thing  elfe ;  what- 
ever becomes  ti^ublefome^    or  fruftrates  any  Appetite  implanted  by 
God ;  whatever  forces  any  Perfon  to  do  or  fuffer  what  he  would  not, 
that  is  Evil. 

II.  Now  thefe  Inconveniencies  appear  to  be  of  three  kinds,  thofe  of  E^'^s  are  of 
ImperfeSlion,  Natural  and  Moral  ones.     By  the  Evil  of  ImperfeBion,  ^^'^l  ^^^f^_ 
I  underftand  the  Abfence  of  thofe  Perfedions  or  Advantages  which  pciTcaion, 
exift  elfewhere,  or  in  other  Beings :  By  Natural  ^wW^  Pains,  Uneafi- JJ^^""! '' ''"^ 
nefles,  Inconveniencies  and  Difappointments  of  Appetites,  arifing  from' 
natural  Motions :    By  Morale  vicious   Elections,  that  is,  fuch  as  are 
hurtful  to  ourfelves,  or  others. 

III.  Thefe  Evils  muft  be  confider'd  particularly,  and  we  are  to  fhcw  The  difficul- 
how  they  may  be  reconcil'd  with  the  Government  of  an  infinitely  J^^J.^'  ^^^^ 
powerful  and  beneficent  Author  of  Nature.     For,  fince  there  is  fuch  into  the 

a  Being,  'tis  ask'd,  as  we  faid  before.  Whence  come  Evils  ?     Whence  ^''^^'^  of  i 
fo  many  Inconveniencies  in  the  Work  of  a  moll  gcod,  moft  po^verful  ^^-^^^^^^ 
God  ?     Whence  that  perpetual  War  between  the  very  Elemetits,  be-  Goodnefs 
tween  Animals^  between  Men  ?     Whence  Errors,  Mijeries  and  Vices^  ^"^  Power. 
the  conftant  Companions  of  human  Life  from  its  Infancy  ?  Whence 

L  Good 


74  Concerning  the  Mature  and  'Divipon  of  EviL 

Good  to  Evil  Men,  Evil  to  the  Good  ?    If  we  behold  any  thing  ir- 
regular in  the  Works  of  Men,  if  any  Machine  anfwers  not  the  End 
it  was  made  for ;  if  we  find  fomething  in  ir  repugnant  to  itfelf  or  o- 
thers,  we  attribute  that  to  the  Ignorance,  Impotence,  or  Malice  of 
the  Workman :  but  fince  thefe  Qualities  have  no  place  in  God,  how 
come  they  to  have  place  in  any  thing  ?     Or,  Why  does  God  fuffer  his 
Works  to  be  deform'd  by  them  ? 
Some  that         IV.  This  Queftion  has  appeared  fo  intricate  and  difficult,  that  fomc 
t^^Sivc'thh  fi"^^i^g  themfelves  unequal  to  the  Solution  of  ir,  have  deny'd,  either 
difficulty,      that  there  is  any  God  at  all,  or  at  leaft,  any  Author  or  Governor  of  the 
^h^E^^iir^^  World.     Thus  Epicurus^  and  his  Adherents:    nor  does  Lz^^rf/zr/i  bring 
of  a  God,     any  other  Reafon   for  his  denying  the  Syjlem  of  the  World  to  be  the 
others  have   Effect  of  d  Deity ^  than  that  it  is  fo  very  faulty^.     Others  judg'd  it, 
<i<Hibie*One.  ^^  ^^  more  agreeable  to  Reafon,  to  affign  a  double  Caufe  of  things, 
rather  than  none  at  all.     Since  it  is  the  greatefl  Abfurdity  in  Nature, 
to  admit  of  Adions  and  Effe6ts,  without  any  Agent,  and  Caufe.   Thefe 
then  perceiving  a  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil,  and  being  fully  perfua- 
ded,  that  fo  many  Confufions  and  Inconfiftencies  could  not  proceed 
from  a  good  Being,  fuppofed  a  malevolent  Principky  or  God,  dired:- 
ly  contrary  to  the   good  one;  and   thence  derived  Corruption  and 
Death,  Difeafes,  Griefs,   Miferies,  Frauds  and  Villanies  j    from   the 
good  Being  nothing  but  Good:   nor  did  they  imagine,  that  Contra- 
riety and  Mifchief  could  have  any  other  Origia  than  an  Evil  Prin- 
ciple.   This  Opinion  was  held  by  many  of  the  Ancients,   by  the 
Mamcheans,  FauIicianSy  and  almoA  all  the  Tribe  of  ancient  Here- 
tics, (25.). 

v.,  And 

NOTES, 


(25.)  In.  order  to  give  fome  light  into  the 
Opinions  of  the fe  Men,  concerning  the  Ori- 
gin of  Evil,  I  Ihall  tranfcribe  a  Paragraph 
JroniBay/e's  Diftionary,  in  the  Article  ManJ- 
(heesy.  Remarlc  D.  whers  he  introduces  Zoroa- 
fier  defending  the  two  oppofite  Principles  a- 
Dovcr  mention'd.  "  Zoroajier,  fays  he,  would 
•*■  go  back  to  the  time  of  the  Chaos,  which  is 
•*  a  Sutc  9S  to  his  two  Principles,  yttj  like 


*  \,x^  ¥.j8<h- 


"  that  which //i?^^/  calls  the  State  of  Nature, 
"  asd  which  he  fuppofes  to  have  preceded  the 
"  firft  Eilabiifhment  of  Societies.  In  this: 
"  State  of  Nature,  one  Man  was  a  Wolf  to  aT 
"  nother,  and  every  thing  belong'd  to  the  firlt 
"  Pofleffor;  none  was  Mailer  of  any  thing, 
•*  except  he  was  the  llrongeft.  To  get  out  of- 
*'  this  Confufion,  every  one  agreed  to  quit  his. 
♦»  Right  to  the  whole,  that  he  might  have  a 

*♦  Propertjt 


Concerning  the  Mature  and  Divipon  of  Evil,  ji 

V.  And  there  are  fome  ftill  who  think  this  Difficulty  unanfwerable.  There  are 
They  confefs,  indeed,  the  Suppofition  of  a  double  Principle  to  be  ab-  ^°r^^y]'°^'^ 

r      i  11-  I  n  1  •      1  A       1  _or  opinion, 

lurd,  and  that  it  may  be  demonftrated  that  there  is  but  one  Author  of  that  it  is  un- 
all  things,  abfolutely  perfed:  and  good  j    yet  there  is  Evil  in  things,  ^"^^'f ''^^Ij'' 
and  this   they  fee  and  feel :    but  whence,  or  how  it  comes,  they  are  Mavuhees  of- 
eatirely  ignorant;  nor  can  human  Reafon  (if  we  believe  them,  in  a- f^'d  a  better 

T  ^  ^^^  folution,  by 


N  O  r  E  S. 


"  Property  in  foircthing,  they  tranfaded  one 
•♦  \rith  another,  and  fo  the  War  cejs'd.  Thus 
*•  the  two  Principles  weiry  of  this  Ch.ios, 
**  wherein  each  confounded  and  oTerihrew 
*'  what  the  other  would  do,  came  at  laft  to  an 
*•  Agreement;  each  of  them  yielded  fomething, 
*'  each  had  a  fliare  in  the  Produftion  of  Man, 
**  and  the  Laws  of  the  Union  of  the  Soul : 
**  The  good  Principle  obtain'd  thofe  which 
**  procure  to  Man  a  thoufand  Pleafures,  and 
*'  confentcd  lo  thofe  which  expofe  him  to  a 
**  thoufand  Sorrows:  and  if  it  confented  that 
*'  Moral  Good  fiiould  be  infinitely  lefs  in 
*'  Mankind  tluti  Moral  Evil,  he  repaird  the 
**  D.im.ige  in  fome  other  kind  of  Creatures, 
*•  wherein  Vice  (hould  be  much  lefs  than  Vir- 
*'  tue.  If  many  Men  in  this  Life  have  more 
"  Mifcry  than  Happinefs,  this  is  recomf>enc'd 
*'  in  another  State  ;  what  they  have  not  under 
"  an  human  Shape,  they  (hall  recover  under  a- 
*'  nother.  By  means  of  this  Agreement,  the 
*'  Chaos  was  a  paffive  Principle,  which  was 
**  the  Field  of  Battle  between  thefe  two  ac- 
*•  live  Principles.  The  Poets  *  have  reprefen- 
*'  ted  this  difentangling  under  the  Image  of  a 
"  Quarrel  ended.  This  is  what  TLoroaJier 
**  might  alledge,  boafting  that  he  does  not  at- 
**  tribute  to  the  Good  Principle  the  produc- 
•'  tion  of  a  Creature  at  his  own  Pleafure, 
**■  which  was  to  be  fo  wretched  and  miferablc  ; 
"  but  only,  after  he  had  found  by  Experience 
*  that  he  could  do  no  better,  nor  better  oppofe 
"  the  horrible  Defigns  of  the  Evil  Principle 
*•  To  render  his  Hypothcfis  the  lefs  ofFenfive, 
"  lie  might  have  deny'd  that  there  was  a  long 
"  War  between  the  two   Principles,  and  lay 


"7  fuppofingtw© 
Principles, 
than  the  Ca- 
thoHcs  do  by 
owning  only 
"  afide  all   thofe  Fights  and   Prifoners  which  One 
'•  the  Manicheans  fpeak  of.     The  whole  might: 
"  be  reduced  to  the  certain  Knowledge  of  the 
"  two  Principles,  that  one  could   never  obtain 
"  from  the  other   but   fuch  and  fuch  Conditi- 
"  oos:  and  thus  an  Eternal  Agreement  might 
"  have  been  made  upon  this  Foot. 

For  a  farther  Explication  and  Amendment 
of  their  Hypothefis,  and  Replies  lo  feveral 
Arguments  urg'd  againfl  it,  fee  the  Words, 
Manicheans,  Mnrcionites,  Pauliciam,  Orlgen  and 
Zoroaflcr,  in  the  abovemention'd  Diftionary. 

That  there  is  no  Occnfion  for  any  Hypothefis 
of  this  kind,  will  be  fhewn  in  the  following 
Chapters.  Let  it  fuffice  in  this  place,  to  point 
out  the  abfurdities  of  the  Hypothefis  itfelf. 
And  firft,  it  may  be  obferv'd,  that  the  Suppofi- 
tion of  an  ubfolute  and  infinitely  Evil  Pri?icipU 
(if  thefe  Words  mean  fuch  a  Being  as  is  totally 
oppofite  to  the  Good  One)  is  an  exprefs  con- 
tradiftion.  For  as  this  Principle  oppofes  and 
refills  the  infinitely  Good  One,  it  alfo  muft  be 
independent  and  infinite  :  It  muft  be  infinite 
or  abfolute  in  Knowledge  and  Power.  But  the 
notion  of  a  Being  infinitely  Evil,  is  of  one  in- 
finitely Imperfedl;  its  Knowledge  and  Power 
therefore  mull  be  infinitely  Imperfedl;  /.  e.  ab- 
folute Ignorance  and  Impotence,  or  no  Know- 
ledge and  Power  at  all.  The  one  of  thefe  Be- 
ings then  is  abfolutely  perfeft,  or  enjoys  all 
manner  of  pofitive  Perfedlions,  confequently 
the  other,  as  it  isdiredly  the  Rcverfe,  muft  be 
purely  the  negation  of  it,  as  Darknefs  is  of 
Light;  i.e.  it  muft  be  an  infinite  De/eii,  or 
mere  nothing.  Thus,  this  £r'/7  Being  muft  have 
fome  Know/edge  and  Fdwer^  in  order  to  raak? 

anjr 


Ham  Deus  kt  Me/tor  Litem  Natura  diremit,    Qvidt  Met.  1. 1. 


J.i: 


yS  Concerning  the  Nature  and  Divifion  ofEviL 

ny  meafure  difcover.  Hence  they  take  Occafion  to  lament  our  Un- 
happinefs,  and  complain  of  the  hard  Fate  attending  Truth,  as  often 
as  a  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  is  attempted  unfuccefsfuUy.  The  Ma- 
nicheans  folve  the  Phaenomena  of  things  better,  a  hundred  times  bet- 
ter (as  thefe  Men  think)  with  their  moft  abiiird  Hypothefis  of  two 
Principles,   than  the  Catholics  do  with  their  mod  true  Doilrine  of 

One 

NOTES. 


:oy  opp(  fition  at  all  to  the  Good  One  ;  but  as  he 
is  direftly  oppolue  to  that  Good  or  Perfeft  One, 
he  cirnot  have  the  leaft  degree  of  Knotoledge* 
or  Pjviir,  lince  thefe  are  Ferfeiiiotis :  therefore, 
the  Suppofuion  of  fuch  aa  Exiileace  as  this, 
implies  a  contrsdiftion. 

But  fuppofing  thefe  Men  only  to  mean  (what 
any  undtrftanding  Perfon  among  them  muft 
mean)  by  this  Evil  Principle,  an  abfolutcly 
Malevolent  Being,  of  equal  Power,  and  other 
natural  Perfections  with  thofe  of  the  Go'.d 
One,  "  It  would  be  to  no  porpofe  (fays  77/- 
•*  lot/on*,)  to  fuppole  two  fuch  oppofite  Prin- 
•*  ciples. — For,  admit  that  a  Being  infinitely 
•  Mifchievous,  were  infinitely  cunning,  and 
**  infinitely  powerful,  yet  it  could  do  no  Evil, 
•*  becaufe  the  oppofite  Principle  of  infinite 
**  Goodnefs,  being  alfo  infinitely  wife  and 
**  powerful,  they  would  tye  up  one  another's 
•*  Hands  :  fo  that  upon  this  Suppofition,  the 
"  Notion  of  a  Deity  would  fignify  juft  no- 
•*  thing,  and  by  virtue  of  the  Eternal  Oppo- 
"  fition  and  Equality  of  thofe  Principles,  they 
•«  would  keep  one  another  at  a  perpetual  Bay, 
•*  and  being  an  equal  Match  ioi  one  another, 
**  inllead  of  being  two  Deities,  they  would 
**■  be  two  Idols,  able  to  do  neither  Good  nor 
••  Evil. 

I  fhall  only  produce  one  argument  more  as  to 
Moral  Evil,  out  of  Simplkius^s  Comment  on  E- 
fiffetuSf  which,,  by  the  Confeffion  of  Bayle 
bimfelf,  ftrikes  home  at  the  Doflrinc  of  Two 
Principles,  tho'  it  be  confider'd  with  the  grea- 
teft  Simplicity. 

He  fays  f,  **•  It  entirely  dejiroys  the  Liberty 
«  tf  OUT  Souls,  and  necejfitatts  them  to  ^w,  and 


**  tonfequently  implies  a  ContradiBion.  For,  fimt 
"  the  Principle  of  Evil  is  eternal  and  incorrupt i- 
"  bhy  and  fo  p'Aent  thdt  God  himfelf  cannot  con- 
**  quer  him,  tt  fillows,  that  the  Soul  of  Man  can- 
"  not  refijl  the  Impu'f,  with  which  he  moz'es  it  /» 
*^  Sin.  But  if  a  Man  be  invincibly  driven  to  it,. 
**  he  commits  po  Murder  or  Adultery,  Sec.  by  his 
"  own  Fault,  but  by  a  fuperior  eternal  Fault,  and 
"  in  that  Cafe  he  is  neither  guilty  nor  punijhable.. 
'*  Therefore,  there  is  no  fich  thing  as  Sin,  and 
"  confequently  this  Hypothefis  defrays  itfelf;  face 
'*  if  there  be  a  Principle  of  Evil,  there  is  no  long- 
'*  er  any  Evil  in  the  World.  But  if  there  be  »a 
"  Evil  in  the  World,  it  is  clear  there  is  no 
"  Principle  of  Evil;  whence  we  nay  infer,  that 
'*  thofe  who  fuppofe  fuch  a  Principle,  ciefiroy,  by 
"  a  neceffary  Confequence,  both  Evil  and  the  Prin^ 
««  ciple  of  it:' 

More  of  this  may  be  feen  in  Sayle's  Explana- 
tion concerning  the  Manichees,  at  the  End  of 
his  Diftionary,  p.  66,  l^.c.  See  alfo  Mr.  Gur- 
don'%  Boyle's  LeSlure,  Serm;  5.  or  Stilling fleefs 
Orig.  Sacra,  B.  3.  C.  3.  V  lo,  12.  See  alfo 
Sherlock  on  Judgment,   ift  Edit.  p.  173. 

Neither  does  Mr.  BayWs  amendment  of  this- 
Hypothefis  iiet  it  from  the  Difiiculty.  He 
fuppofes  the  two  Principles  to  be  fenfible  of 
the  above  mention'd  Confequence  arifing  fronv 
their  Equality  of  Power,  and  therefore,, 
would  compound  the  Matter,  by  allowing  aa 
equal  Mixture  of  Good  and  Evil  in  the 
intended  Creation.  But  if  the  Quantity  of 
•  Good  and  Evil  in  the  Creation  be  exaftly- 
equal,  neither  of  the  Principles  has  attain'd,  or 
could  expeft  to  attain,  the  End  for  which  it 
was  fuppos'd.  to  aft.    The  Good  Principle  de- 

fign'd 


•  2  Voli  of  Scan.  Fol.  p.  690k 


f  p.  »5^  Ed.  Zwjti/.  1670* 


Concerning  the  Nature  and  Divijion  of  RviL 

One  perfedl,  abfolutely  powerful  and  beneficent  Author  of  Nature. 
For  the  Maiiicheam  acquit  God  from  all  manner  of  Blame,  as  he  was 
compell'd  by  the  contrary  Principle  to  fufFer  Sin  and  Mifery  in  his 
Work,  which  in  the  mean  while  he  oppofes  with  all  his  Power. 
But,  according  to  the  Catholics,  as  their  Adverfarics  objed,  he  per- 
mits thefe  voluntarily,  nay,  is  the  Caufe  and  Author  of  them.  For 
if,  as  thefe  Men  argue,  there  be  but  one  Author  of  all  Things,  Evils 
alfo  fliould  be  refer'd  to  him  as  their  Original ;  but  it  can  neither  be 
explained  nor  conceiv'd,  how  infinite  Goodnefs  can  become  the  Ori- 
gin of  Evil.  If  God  could  not  hinder  it,  where  is  his  Power  ?  If 
he  could,  and  would  not,  where  is  his  Goodnefs  ?  If  you  fay,  that 
Evil  necefi^arily  adheres  to  fome  particular  Natures ;  fincc  God  was 
the  Author  of  them  all,  it  would  have  been  better  to  have  omitted 
thofe  with  the  concomitant  Evils,  than  to  have  debafed  his  Work- 
manfhip  with  an  Allay  of  thefe  Evils,  (26.). 

,    L  3  VI.  It 

NOTES. 


11 


fign'd  to  product  feme  abfolute  Good,  the  E- 
vil  One  fome  abfolute  Evil  ;  but  to  produce 
an  equal  Mixture  of  both,  would  be  in  cfFe£l 
producing  neither:  One  would  juft  counter- 
balance and  dellroy  the  other;  and  all  fuch 
aftion  would  be  the  very  fame  as  doing  no- 
thing at  all  :  and  that  fuch  an  exaft  Equality 
©f  Good  and  Evil  mull  be  the  Refult  of  any 
agreement  between  them  is  plain;  For,  as 
they  arc  by  Suppofition  perfeftly  equal  in  In- 
clination, as  well  as  Power,  neitlier  of  them 
could  poffibfy  concede,  and  let  its  oppofite 
prevail :  The  Creation  therefore  cannot  be 
owing  to  fuch  a  Compofition. 

But  the  beft  Confutation  of  this  Scheme  may 
be  found  in  the  Chapter  before  us;  where  our 
Author  ftiews,  that  it  does  not  at  all  anfwcr  the 
End  for  which  it  was  introduced.  Thia  com- 
pletes the  abfurdity  of  it. 

(26.)  Since  this  Objedion  contains  all  that 
can  be  faid  upon  Evil  in  general ;  and  it  ap- 
pears tome  abfolutely  ncccflary  for  every  Man 


to  do  Juftice  to  Objeftions,  who  expefls  that 
others  fhould  receive  any  Satisfadion  from  his 
anfwers,  I  (hall  infert  it,  as  it  is  propofed  in 
its  full  force,  by  CuJworth*.  "  The  fuppo- 
•*  fed  Deity  and  Maker  of  the  World,  was  ei- 
"  ther  willing  to  abolifh  all  Evils,  but  not 
"  able,  or  he  was  able  and  not  willing  :  or, 
*•  thirdly,  he  was  neither  willing  nor  able: 
**■  or,  laftly,  he  was  both  able  and  willing. 
"  This  latter  is  the  only  thing  that  anfwers 
*'  fully  to  the  Notion  of  a  God.  Now,  that 
•*  the  fuppofed  Creator  of  all  things  was  not 
"  thus  both  able  and  willing  to  abolifh  all  E- 
"  vils,  is  plain,  becaufe  then  there  would  have 
'•  been  no  Evils  at  all  left.  Wherefore,  fince 
♦•  there  is  fuch  a  Deluge  of  Evils  overflowing 
"  all,  it  muft  needs  be,  that  either  he  was 
**  willing  and  not  able  to  remove  them,  and 
**  then  he  was //»/*/(?«/ ;  or  elfe  he  was  able 
•*  and  not  willing,  and  then  he  was  envious  ;  or 
"  laftly,  he  was  neither  able  nor  willing,  and 
»•  thea  he  was  both  impotent  and  envious." 

Almoft 


f  Tme  IntelUSyJ}.  p-  78*  79' 


ny  thit  It  s  ^1^^  jI^jjj  Jj.  jg  ^^^  wholly  unanfwerable. 


Vn.  It  is  manifeO:,  that  tho'  Good  be  mix'd  with  Evil  in  this  Life, 


7,8  Concerning  the  Nature  and  T)ivifion  of  Evil. 

Thisdifficul-  Yi  jf  is  well  known,  that  this  Difficulty  has  exercifed  both  the 
ciibj  rhcPhi^n^'ient  Philofophers  and  Fathers  of  the  Church  (27.):  and  there  are 
loiiipiicrsandfome  who  dcny  that  it  is  yet  anfwer'd;  nay,  who  undertake  to  refute 
thcChuab    ^^^  ^^^^  Solutions  hitherto  offer'dj  nor  do  I  promife  a  complete  one  in 

and  fomede  everv  Rcfpeft,  tho'  I  hope  to  fliew,  in  the  following  Part  of  theTrea- 
ny  thit  it  s         "* 

anlwer'dyec 

jTiore  Good  ycf  there  is  much  more  Good  tlian  Evil  in  Nature,  and  every  Animal 
il^' w^^'l '"  provides  for  its  Prefervation  by  Inflin(fl  or  Reafon,  which  it  would  ne- 
-ver  do,  if  it  did  not  think  or  feel  its  Life,  with  all  the  Evils  annex'd, 
to  be  much  preferable  to  Non-exiftence.     This  is  a  Proof  of  the  Wif- 
dom,  Goodnefs,  and  Power  of  God,  who  could  thus  temper  a  World 
infeftfd  with  fo  many  Miferies,  that  nothing  fhould  continue  in  it 
which  was  not  in  fome  meafure  pleafed  with  its  Exiftence,  and  which 
would  not  endeavour  by  all  poffible  Means  to  preferve  it. 
repugnant  to     VJII.  Neither  does  the  Suppofition  of  an  Evil  Principle  help  any 
Infinite        thing  towards  the  Solution   of  this  Difficulty.     For  the  Aflerters  of 
-S^hav/*^     two  Principles  maintain,    that  the  great  and  good  God   tolerates  E- 
,  created  thefe  vil,  bccaufc  he  is  forccd  to  it  by  the  Evil  One,  and  that  either  from 
things  which  ^^  Agreement  between  themfelves,  or  a  perpetual  Struggle  and  Con- 
would  be    'teft  with  each  other.     For,  fince  the  Beneficent  Author  of  Nature 

corrupted  by  ^3^ 

iAAotherj 

^^  'y*'^^  would  corrupt  themfelves.     The  Suppofuion  of  a  double  Principle  is  therefore  of  no  Service 
toward     the    ^^.^^^^^  ^^  ihjs  Difficulty. 


N  o  r  E  s. 


Almoft  the  fame  occurs  in  LaSiantius  *,  and 
Is  cited,  and  fufficiently  refuted  by  our  Author 
in  C.  5.  ^.  ^.  Sul>.  the  laft  :  See  alfo  Frudentius 
\  n  Hamurtigenla,  v.  64c. 

The  Subftance  of  all  Btiy/e's  Objeilions  may 
be  feen  in  a  Book  call'd  Free  Tbou^hii  on  Re 
ligion,  tifc.  C.  5.  p.  104,  tsf-(.  See  alfo  the  fol  ' 
lowing  Note.     The  Anfwcrs  to  them  will  fol 
]ow  in  their  proper  places. 

(27.)  Any  one  that  wants  to  be  acquainted 
with  the  Antiquity  of  this  Difpute,  .or  the 
.I'erCans engaged  inir,  or  the  way  of  managing 


it,  made  ufe  of  by  the  Fathers,  may  confult  the 
beginning  of  Dr.  J.  C/arkt''s  Enquiry  into  the 
Caufe  and  Origin  of  Evil  :  and  Bay/e's  Diftio- 
nary,  in  the  Articles  Minicheans,  Remark  B. 
Miirciofiites,  Remarks  F,  and  F  A-  Paulicians, 
Remarks  K,  and  K  A.  and  Zorcajler,  Remark 
E.  Or  Cudwerth,  from  p.  213,  to  p.  224.  or 
^tillingfleef%  Origines  Sacra,  B.  3  C.  3.  ^.  8, 
9,  II,  12,  kfSc.  or  Fabruij  Biblioth.  Grac.  v-  5. 
p.  287,  i^c.  or  Deleliui  JrgumeKtorm',  t^c. 
C.  15. 


•  De  Ira  Da,  'C.  13.  p.  435»  Edit.  Cant. 


Concerning  the  Mature  and  T>ivtfion  of  Evil,  i^ 

was  hinder'd  by  the  Evil  Principle,  from  producing  all  the  Good  he 
was  willing  to  produce,  he  either  made  an  Agreement  with  it,  to  pro^ 
duce  as  much  as  he  was  allow'd,  but  with  a  Mixture  of  Evil,  accor- 
ding to  the  Agreement  between  them ;  or  elfe  there  is  a  Mixture  of 
Good  and  Evil  proportionable  to  the  Power  which  prevails  in  either. 
Hence  they  think   the  good  God  excufable,  who  confer'd  as  many 
BlefTings  on  the  World  as  his  Adverfary  permitted,  and  would  have  to- 
lerated no  manner  of  Evil,  unlefs  compell'd  to  it  by  the  adverfc  Po- 
wer.    So  that  he  mufl:  either  create  no  Good  at  all,  or  fiiffer  an  Allay 
of  Evil.     All  which  very  great  Abfurdities  have  this  farther  Inconve- 
nience, that  they  do  not  anfwer  the  End  for  which  they  were  inven- 
ted.    For  he  is  no  lefs.  culpable  who  created  any  thing  which  he  knew 
would  be  render'd  miferable  by  another,  than  if  he  had   made  that 
which  he  forefaw  would  bring  Mifery  upon  itfelf.     If  therefore  God 
might,  confidently  with  Goodnefs,  create  Things  which  he  knew  the 
Evil  Principle  could   and  would  corrupt,  as  the  Manicheam  aflerted  j 
then  he  might,  confiftently  with  the  fame  Goodnefs,   have  created 
Things  that  would  corrupt  themfelves,  or  were  to  perifli  in  a  Tra(ft 
of  Time.     If  then,  according  to  the  Defenders  of  this  Hypothefis, 
God  ought  to  have  omitted,  or  not  created  thofe  Beings,  in  whofe  Na- 
tures Evil  or  Contrariety  is  inherent,  he  ought  alfo  to  have  omitted 
thofe,  whofe  Natures  he  forefaw  the   Evil  Principle  would  corrupt. 
And  if  there  was  fo  much  Good  in  thefe,  as  made  him  think  it  better 
to  create  them,  tho'  they  were  to  be  corrupted  fome  time  or  other  by 
the  oppofite  Principle,  he  might  alfa  judge  it  preferable  to  produce 
t^ie  fame,  tho'  they  were  at  length  to  perifh  by  their  inherent  E- 
vils.    Nor  will  God  tolerate  Evil  in  his  Works,  as  forced  to  it  more,, 
according  to  the  Manicheans^  than  the  Catholics,     For,  as  he  might 
have  not  made  thofe  Beings  which  have  Evils  necefTarily  adhering  ta 
them,  fo  he  might  alfo  have  not  made  thofe  which  he  foreknew  the 
contrary  Principle  would  corrupt.     After  the  fame  manner  in  both 
Cafes  he  could  have  prevented  Evil,  and  fince  he  could,  why  did  he 
not  ?     The  Suppofition  of  two  Principles  conduces  nothing  at  all 
therefore  to  the  Solution  of  this  Difficulty. 

IX.  But 


.  '^o  Concerning  the  Nature  and  Tilvijton  of  Evil, 

If  It  can  be  IX.  But  if  We  can  point  out  a  Method  of  reconciling  thefe  Things 
fncwn,  that  ^j^j^  ^j^g  Government  of  an  abfolutely  perfedt  Agent,  and  make  them 
contradia  Hot  ouly  confiftent  with  Infinite  Wifdom,  Goodnefs  and  Power,  but 
infinite  Po-  neceffarily  Tcfulting  from  them  (fo  that  thefe  would  not  be  Infinite^ 
Goodnefs  to  ^^  thofe  did  not  or  could  not  poflibly  exift)  then  we  may  be  fuppo- 
pcrmit  Evils,  fed  to  have  at  laft  difcover'd  the  true  Origin  of  Evils,  and  anfwer'd  all 
neceffarii^^I*^  ^^^  Difficulties  and  Objedions  that  are  brought  on  this  Head,  a- 
rife  from  the  gainft  the  Goodncfs,  Wifdom,  Power,  and  Unity  of  God.  Let  us  try 
exercife  of    therefore  what  can  be  done  in  each  kind  of  Evil ;  and  firfl,  concerning: 

them,  then       i       t^     •/     /-  r    x     ^  ci-  * 

may  the  Dif-  the  Evil  of  Imperfemoji, 

ficulty  be 
jtnfwer'd. 


CHAP. 


8i 


CHAP.    IIL 

Of  the  Evil  of  Defe£i. 


A 


I,      >t     S  for  the  Evil  of  ImperfeBion^  it  is  to  be  confider'd,  that  be- 
fore the  World  was  created  God  cxifted  alone,  and  nothing 
befide  him.     All  things  therefore  are  out  of  nothing,  and 
whatfoever  exifts,  has  its  Exiftence  from  God ;  neither  can 
that  Exiftence  be  different  either  in  Kind  or  Degree  from  what  he 
gave  *. 

II.  Secondly,  God,  tho'  he  be  omnipotent,  cannot  make  any  crea- 
ted Being  abjolutely  perfeSi^  forwhatever  isabfolutely  perfe(-t,  muftne- 
celTarily  be  Self-exiftent.  But  it  is  included  in  the  very  Notion  of  a 
Creature,  as  fuch,  not  to  exift  of  itfelf,  but  from  God.  An  abfolute- 
ly  perfed:  Creature  therefore  implies  a  Contradiftion.  For  it  Ihould 
be  of  itfelf,  and  not  of  itfelf,  at  the  fame  time  (28.).  Abfolute  Per- 
fed:ion  is  therefore  peculiar  to  God,  and  if  he  would  communicate  his 
own  peculiar  Perfection  to  another,  (E.)  that  other  would  be  God. 

The 

NOTES. 


Things  can 

be  no  oiher- 
vvife  than  as 
God  pleaied. 


All  Created 
things  are 
neccflarily 
imperfcft, 
fince  they  do 
not  exift  of 
themfelves. 


(28.)  A  perfefl  Creature  is  a  contradiflion  in 
terms.  For  if  it  be  perfeil  it  is  independent ; 
and  if  it  be  independent,  it  is  no  Creature.  A- 
gain  ;  to  fuppofe  a  created  Being  infinite  in  any 
rcfpeft  is  to  fuppofc  it  equal  to  its  Creator  in  that 
rcfpeft;  and  if  it  be  equ«l  in  one  refpeft,  it 
rauft  be  fo  in  all,  fince  an  Infinite  property 
cannot  inhere  in  any  finite  Subjcft,  for  then 
the  Attribute  would  be  moreperfeft  than  its 
fubjcft,  all  which  is  abfurd.  Granting,  there- 
fore, this  one  Principle,  which  cannot  be  de- 

•  See  Scott  in  Note  32. 


ny'd,  {z'iz.  that  an  EfFefl  muft  be  inferiof  to 
its  Caufe)  it  will  appear,  that  the  Evil  of  Ihi- 
perfeftion,  fuppofing  a  Creation,  is  necefTaiy 
and  unavoidabJe;  and  confeauently,  all  other 
Evils  which  neceflarily  arife  from  that,  are  un- 
avoidable alfo.  What  our  Author  has  advan- 
ced upon  the  following  Head,  feems  perfedlly 
conclufive. 

(E.)  This  Pofition  feems  vtty  agfecAble  to 
the  Catholic  Faith,  which  teaches  that  the  Fa- 
ther did  communicate  his  Nature,  and  all  his 

Pcr- 

M  ; 


8;i  Of  the  Evil  of  Defect 

The  Evil  of  Imperfe^ ion  muft  therefore  be  tolerated  In  Creatures,  not«- 
wiihftanding  the  Divine  Omnipotence  and  Goodnefs:  for  Contradic- 
tions are  Obje(fls  of  no  Power.  God  might  indeed  have  refrain'd  from 
creating,  and  continu'd  alone,  Self-fufficient,  and  perfedl  to  all  Eter- 
nity, but  his  Infinite  Goodnefs  would,  by  no  me^ns  allow  itj  this  ob- 
lig'd  him  to  produce  external  things  j  which  things,  fince  they  could 

noc 

NOTES. 


PerfciSlions  to  the  Soft,  and  with  him  to  the 
Ho/y  Gho/l:  e.ich  of  chsm  therefore  is  very  God 
under  a  CiiScTtntSubJifienit'.  The  Divine.  Na- 
ture which  is  inherent  in  them,  may  be  con- 
ceiv'd  to  be  of  itfclf,  but  the  Modus  of  Exi- 
itence  cannot.  Now  the  Church  looks  upon 
tlie  Nature  thus  fnbiilling,  as  a  Per/on.  Not 
that  it  is  a  Perfion  in  the  fame  manner  as  the 
human  Nature  fubfifting  by  itfelf,  but  by  Rca- 
lon  of  a  certain  Similitude  and  Analogy  which 
they  have  between  them.  Since  Divine  Mat- 
ters are  notobiefts  of  the  Senfes,  they  cannot, 
as  we  faid  before  *,  be  known  by  Maiks  im- 
prefs'd  upon  us  by  5enfation;  they  are  there- 
fore concciv'd  by  a  Similitude,  Relation,  Pro- 
portion, oc  Connection  with  fenftble  things-: 
TJie  Paffions,  Affeftions  Intejleft-,. and. Will, 
arc  the  Principles  of  our  Adions,  and  therefore 
wc  attribute  thefe  to  God.  For  if  we  were  to 
do  thofe  things  which  God  performs,  thefe 
would  be  the  Principles  and  Caufes  of  them  : 
We  attribute  therefore  to  God  fomething  ana- 
logous, or  equivalent  to  thefe,  but  we  know 
that  it  is  as  diftant  as  finite  is  from  Itifinitc 
Nay,  'tis  demonftrable,  that  neither  Will,  nor 
Love,  nor  Anger,  nor  Juftice,  nor- Mercy,  are 
in  God,  after  th^  fame  manner,  as  they  exift 
in,  and  are  conceiv'd  by,  usf.  But  we  muft 
make  ufe  of  thefe.  Words,  bccaufe  we  have,  no 
better,  and  they  fofficiently  anfvver  the  End 
for  which  God  would  have  us  to  know  him. 
Now,  after  the  fame  manner  we  point  out  the 
diftinftion  declaied  in  Scripture  between  the 
Fatbery  Son,  and  Holy  Ghoft,  by  the  Word  Per- 1 
Jiitt,  becaufe  we  have  ^nothing  neater,  to  compare  | 


*  Note  A: 

f  See  Woelafton,  p.  1 1 5,  1 1 6.  and  Epifcopius 
Strmon  on  Predejiination,  &c, 
X^Slualem  autem  J)eum,  l^c.  {Cic.  de  Nat.  Devr. 


them  by;  and  the.  Repcefentation  under  thi» 
Analogy  fliews  us  very  well  what  we  may  hope- 
foT  from  each  of  them,  and  what  WorfiHp  we 
ought  to  pay  them.  Tho'at  the  fame  tinie  we 
are  certain,  that  thefe  differ  no  lefs  from  hu- 
man Perfons,  than  the  Divine  Intellect  does 
from  human,  or  the  Principles  of  Divine  Ac- 
tions from  human  Piflious  ;  for  inflance,  An- 
ger, Hatred,  and  the  like.  'Tis  ftrange  there- 
fore, that  Men  who- would  be  elteem'd  learned, 
fhould  difpute  againft  a  Plurality  of  Perfons  in 
the  Deity,  after  the  very  fame  Way  of  Rcrfoning 
with  which  Cotta  in  Ckera  argues  againft  the 
Intelligence,  Prudence,  and  Juftice  of  God  |!, 
namely,  beciufe  they  cannot  be  in  God  after 
the  fame  manner  as  we  conceive  them  to  be  in 
Men;  forgetting,  in  the  mean  time,  that  rhefe 
are  attributed  to  God  by  a  kind  of  Anahgy  and 
^Accomodation  to  our  Capacity,  and  rather  from 
the  refcmblance  of-  things  done  by  God,  to 
thofe  done  by  us,  than  of  the  Principles  from 
which  they  proceed.  But  the  Scriptures  and 
the  Church  have  fuffieiently  forewarn'd  us  to - 
"beware  of  this  erroneous  Way  of  Reafoning. 
For  when  God  is  defcribed  under  thefe  Fi- 
gures, Similitudes,  and  Analogies, .  left  we 
fhould  take  Images  of  things  for  the  things, 
themfelves,  and  fo  fall  into  abfurd  Reafonings 
about  them,  the  fanae  thing^are  deny'd  of  God 
in  one  Senfe,  that  are.  affirm'd  of  him  in  ano- 
ther. Thus  God  is  often  faid  to  repent,  and. 
in  another  place  'tis  dcny'dthat  he  repents  as  a  . 
Man.  Thus  Light  is  afcribed  to  God,  as  his 
habitation,  and  elfewherc.  Thick  Darkncfs. 
He  is  often  faid  to  be  fcen,  and  yet  is  call'd  In- 

vifible. 

Infi.Thetl  L.  4.  C.22.  p.^io.  ardour  Author" s 

V  1 5-  Ed.  Lond.  '^Seeeur  Author'' s  Serm^  §;  37. . 


Of  the  Evil  cf  1>efca, 

not  poffibly  be  perfedl,  the  Divine  Goodnefs  prefcrr'd  imperfed  ones 
to  none  at  all.  Imperfedlion  then  arofe  from  the  Infinity  of  Divine 
Goodnefs.  Had  not  God  been  infinitely  Good,  perhaps  he  might  not 
have  fuffer'd  imperfed:  Beings ;  but  have  been  content  in  himfeif,  and 
created  nothing  at  all. 

III.  Thirdly,  There  are  infinite  Degrees  of  Perfe(5lion  between  a 
Being  abjblutely  perfect  and  Nothing :  of  which,  if  Exiftence  be  con- 
ceiv'd  as  the  Firft,  every  thing  will  be  fo  many  degrees  diftant  from 
nothing,  as  there  are  Perfedlions  to  be  found  in  it  joined  with  Exi- 
flence.  In  this  Scale  then  God  will  be  the  To/,  and  Nothing  t\\t  Bot- 
tom; and  how  much  fiirther  any  thing  is  diftant  from  nothing,  it  is 
fo  much  the  more  perfedt,  and  approaches  nearer  to  God.  How  much 
any  thing  can  refemble  God  in  Perfed:ion,  or  how  nearly  approach  to 
him  (F.J   we  know  notj  but  we  are  certain  that  there  is  always  an  in- 

M  2  finite 

NOTES. 


8? 


'Tis  to  h<i 
determin'd 
by  the  Di- 
vine Pleainre 
what  Degrees 
of  Perfeftion 
every  thing  ^ 
muft  have, 
finceall 
things  are 
neceffarily  at 
an  Infinite 
diftance  from 
the  highcft 
Perfeftion. 


viftble.  The  Father  is  God  and  Lord,  and  al- 
fo  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghoft,  and  yet  it  is 
laid  there  is  but  one  God  and  Lord.  All  which 
and  more  of  the  fame  kind,  we  muft  believe  to 
be  thus  exprefs'd,  for  no  other  Reafon,  but  to 
liinderus  from  imagining  them  to  be  afcribed 
to  God  in  the  fame  manner  as  they  are  in  us, 
(29).  But  Smatterers  in  Learning;  rejeft  and 
ridicule  thefe  forms  of  Speech  as  JEn\gma.s,  be- 
ing ignorant  of  both  the  Sacred  and  Ecclefiafti- 
cal  Dialeft,  which  they  refufe  to  learn,  tho' 
we  muft  make  ufe  of  it  in  Divine  Matters,  or 
elfe  entirely  refrain  from  all  Reafoning  about 
them.  For  fince  they  are  known  no  otherwife 
than  by  limilitude  and  analogy,  they  cannot 
be  defcribed  otherwile,  as  any  one  will  find 
who  tries.  But  it  is  no  wonder  if  thefc  Men, 
while  they  take  fimilies  for  the  things  them- 
felvcs,  fhould  eafily  imagine  that  they  difcdver 
abfurdities  in  them.  If  they  do  this  on  pur- 
pofe,  cunningly,  and  with  an  ill  Intent,  they 
are  Villains  ;  but  if  thro'  Ignorance  or  Error, 
they  defervc  Pity,  if  they  did  not  fwell  with  a 


proud  conceit  of  Science,  and  exalt  themfelves 
above  the  Vulgar ;  who  yet  are  much  wifer 
than  thefe  Philofophers.  For  they  fear  the 
Anger  of  God,  love  his  Goodnefs,  embrace 
his  Mercy,  adore  his  Jufticc,  and  give  Glory 
to  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghoft,  and  yet 
believe  in  and  worfhip  one  God,  moft  perfcft, 
and  free  from  Paflions.  Whereas,  the  Smatter- 
ers in  Science  have  got  nothing  to  pl^^e  in 
the  Room  of  thefe,  which  they  themfelves, 
much  lefs  the  Vulgar,  can  underftand ;  or, 
which  can  equally  excite  the  Affcftions  of  the 
Mind,  or  promote  Piety.  . 

(F)  Suppofing  the  World  to  be  fiifinite, 
there  would  be,  as  far  as  appears  to  us.  Infi- 
nite Orders  of  Creatures  descending  gradually 
from  God  to  Nothing:  but  fince  neither  our 
Underftanding  can  comprehend,  nor  does  the 
Nature  of  Quantity  and  Motion  feem  to  admit 
of  Infinity  or  Eternity;  'tis  better  to  refer  the 
Matter  to  the  Dirine  Will.  For  if  an  Infinity 
in  Creatures  be  impoffible,  'tis  the  fame  thing 
wherever  we  ftop.     For  all  Finites  arc  equally 

diftant 


(29)  This  is  a  good  Inference  from  thefe  and  the  like  Expr,'Jfions,  but  ean  hardly  be  fuppofed  to  have 
"^een  the  principal  defign,  much  lefs  the  only  reafon,  ff  them.  For  more  injiances  of  this  kind,  fee  the 
fsremenlicn'd  Sermon,  §.23,27.  .,  ••     •. 


«4  Of  the  Evil  of  TiefcB.    ■ 

finite  difrance  between  tlicm.  It  muri:  have  been  determm'd  tberefore 
bv  the  Wili  of  God,  where  he  would  ftop,  fince  there  is  nothing  but 
his  own  Will  to  bound  his  Power.  Now  it  is  to  be  believ'd,  that  the 
prefent  Syftem  of  the  World  was  the  very  befl  that  could  be,  with  re- 
gard to  the  Mind  of  God  in  framing  it  (30.).  It  might  have  been  bet- 
ter 

NOTES, 


dJHant  from  Infinite.  If  therefore  God  had 
created  twice,  thrice,  or  a  thoufand  thoufimd 
times  as  great,  and  as  many  Beings,  and  a  thou 
iand  thoufand  Ages  fooner  thaa  he  has,  the 
fame,  objeftions  might  be  made.  Why  not  be- 
for«?  Why  not  more  ?  TTie  World  there- 
fore rauft  either  have  been  created  Infinite  and 
from  Eternity,  which  the  very  Nature  of  the 
thing  feems  not  to  allow,  or  it  is  all  one  when 
and  how  great  it  might  be,  and  not  determi- 
nable by  any  thing  befides  the  Divine  PI eafure. 
See  Chap.  5.  ^.  i.  Subf  4.  and  J^  Clarke  on 
Nat.  Evil,  p.  90,  93,  280,  ^<, 

(30.)  In  order  to  confirm  t^is  belief,  and 
come  to  a  right  Knowledge  of  the  whole  Que 
ftion  before  us,  it  is  ncceflary  to  enquire  a  lit- 
tle into  the  meaning  of  thefe  Words ;  to  confi- 
der  (with  reverence^  what  this  Mind  of  God 
might  be  in  framing  the  World,  and  wliat  was 
the  moft  proper  Method  of  anfwering  it.  Now 
it  appear'd  from  the  CoBclufiOn  of  the.  firft 
Chapter,  and  Note  23.  that  the  fole  Defign  of 
Almighty  God  in  creating  the  Univerfe,  was 
to  impart  Felicity  to  other  Beings  :  and  in  the 
beginning  of  this  Chapter  it  was  proved,  that 
any  Happinefs  thus  communicated  could  not  be 
Infinite.  His  Defign  then  is  completely  an- 
fiwer'd,  if  the  greateft  Degree  of  Happinefs  be 
imparted,  of  which  created  Beings  are  capa- 
ble, confident  with  one  another  ;  or  when  the 
utmoft  poffible  Good  is  produced  in  the  Uni- 
verfe colledlively.  This  alfo  (hews  us  what- 
we  are  to  underftand  by  the  very  beft  Syfiem,  viz. 
one  that  is  fitted  for,  and  produftive  of,  the 
greateft  ^h^oUnt  general  Good:  The  manner  of 
effedling  which  comes  next  under  confidera- 
tion.  As  to  this,  it  is  queried  in  the  firft 
place,  whether  all  Animals  ought  to  have  been 
cieated  -  equally  petfci^  or  ieveral,  indifferent 


Ranks  and  Degrees  of  Perfe£lioi»;  and  fccond- 
ly,  whether  God  may  be  fuppofed  to  hsvc  pla- 
ced any  Order  of  Beings  in  fiich  a  fix'd  unal- 
terable condition,  as  not  to  admif  of  advance-- 
ment:    to  have  made  any  Creatures  as  perfefl 
at  ficflas  the  Nature  of  a  created  Being  is  ca- 
pable of.     The  former  of  thefe  doubts  is  fully 
difcuG'd  in  this  and  the   following  Chapter, 
V  2.     The  latter  feems  notfo  eafy  to  be  deter- 
min'd.     They  who  hold  the  affirmative  argue 
from  our  notion  of  Infinite  ox  abfoluteGoodnefsy 
which  mail  excite  the  Deity  always  to  commu- 
nicate all  m-xnntr  oi Happinefs,  in  the  very  high- 
eft  Degree,  for  the  fame  reafon  that  it  prompts 
him  to  communicate  it  ever  in  any  degree.  But 
this,  fay  they,  he  has,  not  done,  except  he  at 
£rft  endow'd  fome  Creatures  with  all  the  Per- 
fedlion   a  Creature  could  poflibly  receive,  and 
gave   to   every  fubordinate  Clafs  of  Beings  *,, 
the  utmoft  Happinefs  their  feveral  Natures  were- 
capable  of     Neither  can  this  Opinion  be  con- 
futed from  Holy  Scripture,  which  declares  that 
God  made  innumerable   glorious   Orders   of 
Cherubim  znA.  Seraphim,  all  far  above  our  Com 
prehenfion,  and  fome,   for  any.  thing  that  we 
know,  in  the  very  next  Step  to  the  Top  of  the 
great  Scale  of  Beings,   and  only  Second  to  the 
Almighty.     Thofe  that  hold  thacontrary  Opi- 
nion, djftinguifli  between  Happinefs  and  Per^ 
feftion,  and  think  that  thefe  do  not  either  nc- 
I  ceflarily  imply,  or   infeparably  attend  each   o- 
j  ther.     They  deny  therefore  the  confeqaence  of 
the  former  Argument,  and  affign  this  Reafon 
I  for  it,  viz.  becaufe  a  Being  produced  in  the 
;  higheft  degree  of  natural  Perfeftion  which  a 
I  Creature  is  capable  of,  and  ftill  continued  in 
the  fame,  will  not  receive  as  much  Happinefs . 
I  in  the  main,  as  others  that  were  placed  in  a 
|mucb.iofeuctx.Sute.»Cth«  fijil.    TJus,  thoMt 


'  Cmtmit^  thefe  Clajis,  fn.  Notw-  33  and  35,:;. 


Of  the  Evil  of  DefeB. 

ttt  perhaps  in  fome  Particulars,  but  not  without  fomc  new,  and  pro- 
bably greater  Inconveniencies,  which  mufl  Iiave  fpoil'd  the  Beauty, 
either  of  the  whole,  or  of  fome  chief  Part. 

IV.  Fourthly ;  From  hence  it  appears  alib,  that  all  Beings  cannot 
Bave  equal  PerfedioQs*     For  die  World  muft  neceilarily  be  compos'd 

M  3  of 


M 


All  th'ngs 

could  not 

Se  equally 

)crfea, 

fince  fomc- 

are  Parts  of   others. 


N  O  "T  E-S. 


inay  appear  fomething  like  a  Paradox,  yet,  up- 
on farther  confideration,  will  perhaps  be  judg'd 
not  improbable.  Thus,  for  a  Creature  confci- 
ous  of  no  deficiency  of  any  thing  necefiary  to 
its  well-being,  to  meet  with  a  perpetual  accef- 
fion  of  new,  unknown  Pleafure,  to  refieft  with 
comfort  on  its  paft  Condition,  and  compare  it 
with  the  prefent,  to  enjoy  a  continued  Series 
of  frefli  Satisfaftion  and  Delight,  and  be  al- 
ways approaching  nearer  and  nearer  to  Perfec- 
tion, this  muft  certainly  advance  the  Sum  of 
its  Happi^e/j,  even  above  that  of  others,  whofe 
condition  is  fuppofed  to  have  begun  and  to 
continue  in  that  degree  of  perfeftion,  where 
this  will  end  (if  there  could  be  any  end  in  ei- 
ther) and  which  never  knew  defeft,  variety,  or 
incrcafe.  A  finite  Being  fix'd  in  the  fame 
State,  howe\'er  excellent,  muft,  according  to 
all  our  Conceptions  (if  we  be  allow'd  to  judge 
from  our  prefent  Faculties,  and  we  can  judge 
from  nothing  elfe)  contraft  a  kind  oi  Indolence 
or  Infenfibility  (i.  e.  cannot  always  be  eq^ually 
affefted  by  an  equal  degree  of  Good  in  the  Ob- 
je£l)  which  Infenfibility,  nothing  but  altera- 
tion and  variety  can  cure.  It  does  not  there- 
fere  feem  probable,  that  God'has  aftually  fix'd 
any  created  Beings  whatfocvcr  in  the  very  high- 
ell  degree  of  Perfeftion  next  to  himfelf.  Nay, 
it  is  impofiible  to  conceive  any  fuch  higheft 
Degree,  and  the  Suppofition  is  abfurd.  That 
which  admits  of  a  continual  addibilfty,  can 
admit  of  no  higheft-,  and  to  ask,  why  God 
created  not  all  Beings  with  the  very  higheft 
Perfeftion  ?  is  the  fame  abfurdity  as  to  ask, 
why  he  did  not  make  as  many  Creatures,  or  as 
many  Worlds  a*   he  could  ?    For  whkh  fee 


Note  Z2.  Since  then  the  Creation  cannot  be 
Infinite;  and  finites,  how  much  focver  ampli- 
fied, can  never  reach  Infinity  or  abfolute  Per- 
fection*, wc  can  fet  no  manner  of  bounds  to  the 
Creating  Power  of  God  :  but  muft  refer  all  to 
his  Infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs:  which  At- 
tributes we  know  can  never  be  exhaufted,  nor 
will,  we  believe,  produce  any  Beings  in  fuch 
a  State,  as  (hall  not  leave  room  enough  foe 
them  to  be  ftill  growing  in  Felicity,  and  fore- 
ver acquiring  new  Happinefs,  together  with 
new  Perfeftion. 

This  notion  of  a  growing  Happinefs  is  em- 
braced by  moft  Divines,  and  affords  the  ftrong- 
eft  Motive  for  endeavouring  to   improve  and- 
excell  in  every  Chriftian  Grace.    'Tis  beauti- 
fully touch 'd  upon   by  Mr.  Jddifon,  Speftator" 
N"*.  1 1 1 .    "  There  is  not,  in  my  Opinion,  a  more 
"  pleafing  and  triumphant  Confideration  in  Reli- 
"  gion,  than  this  of  the  perpetual  Progrefs  which 
"  the  Soul  makes  toward  the  Per/eilion  of  its  Na- 
"  tare,  without  ever  arriving  at  a  Period  in  it. 
"  To  look  upon  the  Soul  as  going  on  from  Strength  • 
**  to  Strength ;  to  confider,   that  She  is  to  ftjine 
"  for  ever  with  new  Accejftons   of  Glory,    anit 
,•*  brighten  to  all  Eternity  ;  that  She  will  be  ftilt 
"  adding  Virtue   to  Virtue,    and  Knowledge  to 
"  Knowledge,  carries  in  it  fomething  wonderfully  ' 
"  agreeable  to  that  Ambition  which  is  natural  to' 
■"  the  Mind  of  Man:     Nay,  H  muft  be  a  Projpeif 
,"  pleafing  to  God  him/elf,  to  fee  his  Creation  for 
■**  ever  beautifying  in  his  Eyes,  and  dratt/ing  nearer 
"  to  him- by  degrees  of  Refemblance.^ 
'     That  the  Happinefs  of  Saints  and  Angels  may 
be  continually  increafing,  fee  Tilloifon's  77th. 
'^trmony  Vol.  adi  Pol.  p.  578^  (jf^ 
''  From:^ 


*:^et  Note  F;  and  Dr.  Bcntley'/^/r'sI^A  Sena*  6;  p.*36,*37;  5th  Edit. 


U'  Of  the  Evii  4  Defed. 

of  various  Parts,  and  thefe  parts  of  others,  and  fo  on.  But  a  Part 
muft  needs  come  fhorc,  both  of  the  Divine  P erf eSi ion,  and  the  Per- 
fedion  of  the  ivhole.  For  it  is  nothing  with  regard  to  all  the  Perfec- 
tions which  it  has  not,  whether  thefe  be  Divine,  or  Created ;  and 
fince  one  Part  is  not  another,  nor  the  ijohQle,  'tis  plain,  that  every  part 
wants  the  Perfedtions  not  only  of  the  whole,  but  of  other  Parts  alfo. 
And  that  the  ijohole  \t  more  perfed:  than  a  part,  is  evident  from  hence, 
that  it  neceflarily  includes  the  multiplied  Perfedion  of  every  part; 

and 

NOTES. 


From  thefe  Confiderations,  and  fome  which 
follow  in  the  remainder  of  this  Note,  it  may 
perhaps  ieem  probable,  that  in  U5,  and  all  Be- 
ings of  the  like  nature,  changes  from  worfe  to 
better,  muft  be  attended  even  with  greater  de- 
grees of  Pieafurc  than  a  fettled  permanence  in 
any,  the  higheft  State  of  Glory  or  Perfedtion, 
andconfequently  become  necellary  to  the  com- 
pletion of  all  finite  Happinefs.  But  in  oppo- 
iition  to  all  this,  Jiay/e  urges,  that  encreafe  or 
alteration  is  not  in  the  leaft  requifite  to  a  la- 
fting  Felicity  even  in  ourfelves. 

^^  That  'tis  no  ways  neceffary  that  our  Soul 
"  Ihould  feel  Evil,  to  the  end  it  may  relifh 
"  what  is  Good,  and  that  it  fliould  pafs  fuc- 
*'  ceffively  from  Pleafure  to  Pain,  and  from 
*'  Pain  to  Pleafure,  that  it  maybe  able  to  dif- 
"  cern  that  Pain  is  an  Evil,  and  that  Pleafure 
*•  is  a  Good  thing.  We  know  by  Experience, 
**  that  our  Soul  cannot  feel,  at  one  and  the 
"  fame  time,  both  Pleafure  and  Pain;  it  muft 
*'  tiierefore  at  firJl  cither  have  felt  Pain  before 
■*  Pleafure,  or  Pleafure  before  Pain.  If  its 
*'  firft  Senfation  was  that  of  Pain,  it  found  that 
*•  State  to  be  uneafy,  altho'  it  was  ignorant  of 
**  Pleafure.  Suppofe  then  that  its  firft  Senfa- 
**  tion  lafted  many  Ycirs,  without  Interrup- 
•'  tion,  you  may  conceive  that  it  was  in  an 
"  eafy  Condition,  or  in  one  that  was  uneafy. 
"  And  do  not  alledge  to  me  Experience,  do 
*•  no:  tell  me  that  a  pleafure  which  lafls  a  long 
*'  time  becomes  infipid,  and  that  a  long  pain 
**  becomes  infupportable :  For  I  will  anfwer 
**  you,  that  this  proceeds  from  a  Change  in 
**  the  organ  which  makes  that  pain,  which  con- 


*'  tinues  the  fame  as  to  kind,  to  be  different  as 
*•  to  Degrees.  If  you  have  had  at  firft  a  Sen- 
'*  fation  of  fix  Degrees,  it  will  not  continue 
*'  of  Six  to  the  end  of  two  Hours,  or  to  the 
"  end  of  a  Year,  but  only  either  of  one  De- 
*'  gree,  or  of  one  Fourth  part  of  a  Degree, 
"  Thus  Cuftom  blunts  the  Edge  of  our  Senfa- 
"  tions;  their  Degrees  correfpond  to  the  Con- 
"  cufiions  of  the  parts  of  the  Brain,  and  this 
"  Concufiion  is  weaken'd  by  frequent  Repeti- 
"  tions:  from  whence  it  comes  to  pafs,  that 
•'  the  Degrees  of  Senfation  are  diminifh'd. 
"  But  if  Pain  or  Joy  were  communicated  to 
"  us  in  the  fame  Degree,  faccefTively,  for  an 
"  hundred  Years,  we  ftiould  be  as  unhappy,  or 
"  as  happy  in  the  hundredth  Year,  as  in  the 
"  firft  Day;  which  plainly  proves,  that  a 
•'  Creature  may  be  happy  with  a  continued 
«'  Good,  or  unhappy  with  a  continued  Evil, 
"  and  that  the  Alternative,  which  Lailantius 
"  fpeaks  of*,  is  a  bad  Solution  of  the  Difii- 
'*  culty.  It  is  not  founded  upon  the  nature  of 
"  Good  and  Evil,  nor  upon  the  Nature  of 
"  the  Subjeft  which  receives  them;  nor  upon 
"  the  nature  of  the  Caufe  which  produces 
'•  them.  Pleafure  and  Pain  are  no  lefs  proper 
•'  to  be  communicated  the  fecond  Moment  than 
"  the  firft,  and  the  third  Moment  than  the  fe- 
*'  fecond,  and  fo  of  all  the  reft.  Our  Soul  is 
*•  alfo  as  fufceptible  of  them  after  it  has  felt 
«•  them  one  Moment,  as  it  was  before  it  felt 
"  them,  and  God  who  gave  them,  is  no  lefs 
"  capable  of  producing  them  the  fecond  Mo- 
«  ment  than  the  firft  -f," 

As 


Note  103. 


t  ^  ^ritud  Piff,  p.  2486; 


Of  the  Evir  of  Defea: 

?.nd  befides  the  parts  when  join'd  together,  and  conne<5led,  acquire  a 
new  and  peculiar  Perfe<ftion,  whereby  they  anfwer  their  proper  Ends, 
which  they  could  not  do  afunder,  they  defend  themfelves  much  bet- 
ter, and  affift  each  other.  The  Perfedibn  of  the  whole  therefore,  is 
not  only  more  exteftfive  ihan  that  of  the  parts,  by  the  accumulation 
of  many  parts,  perhaps  equal  to  one  another  j  but  more  intenfe  alfo; 

by/ 

AT  0  r  £  5. 


87 


As   this  is  one  of  the  ftrongefl  objeflions, 
and  applicable  to   all   kinds   of   Evil,  I   have 
quoted  it  at  length  (the'  feme  parts  may  not  re- 
late immediately  to   our  prefent  purpofe)  and 
fhall  endeavour  to  give  a   full  anfwer  to  it  in 
the  following   Notes.     It   will  be    confider'd 
with   refpeft   to   Monl    Good    and   Evil,  in 
Notes  90,  106,  and.ioS.     Let  us  confine  our- 
lelvesat  prefent  to  Natural  Good,  which  may 
be  divided  into  fenfitive  and  intelledual.     As 
to  the  former,  we  perceive  that  the  Mind,  for 
the  augmentation  of  its  Happinefs,  is  endovv'd 
with  various  Senfes,  each  of  which   is  enter- 
tain'd  with   a  variety  of  Objefts ;    now,  any 
one  of  thefe  Senfes  can  convey  fo  much  Plea- 
fure  for  fome  time,., as  is   fufficient  to  fill'  our 
F>refent     narrow   Capacity,     and   engrofs   the 
whole  Soul.     She  can  be  entirelyhappj  in  the 
Satisfaftion  arifing  from  liie  Sight,  Hearing, 
l^c.  or  from  the  Memory,  or  any  other  Mode 
of  Perception  by  itfelf.    If  therefore  any  one 
o{  thefe  Organs  could  (as  Bayle  fuppofes)  con- 
tinue to  communicate  the  fame  Degree  of  Plea- 
fure  to  us  for  an  hundred  Years,  all  the  reft 
would  be  unneceffary:    but  an   All.wife  Be- 
ing, who  cannot   ad  in  vain,  has  implanted 
this  Variety  of  S6nfes  in   us;  this  then  is  a 
good  Argument,  that  none  of  thefe  particular 
Senfes  could  continue  in  its  prefent  State,  and 
always  communicate  the  fame  Degree  of  Hap- 
pinefs.     Farther,  this  Suppofition  will  appear 
to  be  impoffible,  from  confidering.the  Nature 
and  Properties  of  that  Matter  of  which   the 
fcnfitive  Organs  are  compofed      ir'there  be  (as 
iB/7j?/if  maintains)  fo  clofe  aconneftion  between 
the  Soul  and  certain  Modifications  of  Matter, 
as  that  the  Degrees  of  fenfitive  Pleafurc  are  di- 
minifh'd  by  a  Change  in  the  Organ,  by  wea- 
kening the  Concuflion  of  fome   parts  of  the 


'^mx\  b'^  frfq'ient  Wepetitions ;  then  we  fay,  'tis 
plainly  innpoffible,  that  the  fune  Degrees  fhould 
be  continued  by  this  Organ,  which,  as  it  is 
material,  is  perpetually  expofed  to  this  Change^ 
and  liable  to  Diflblution,  and  necelfarily  wea- 
ken'd  by  thefe  frequent  Conct/JJpjns,  Every  Mo- 
tion in  it  mufl  in  time  be  ftop'd  by  contrary 
ones,  as  our  Author  has  fully  fhewn  in  Chap. 
4.  §.  I. 

If  he  fuppofes  that  tlie  fame  Degree  of  Plea- 
.fure  may  ftill  be  communicated  tho'  the  Organ 
alters,  he  fuppofes  that  there  is  no  fuch  Con- 
nexion between  any  portion  or  pofition  of' 
Matter,  and  our  Spirit;  which  is  dircftly  con- 
trary to  his  former  Suppofition,  and  alfo  to 
Truth,  as  will  perhaps  appear  from  the  fol- 
lowing Chapter.  If  then  Bayk  imagines,  thaf 
the  fame,  or  different  Mittcr,  when  moved  or 
at  reft ;  or  when-  moved  in  different  Diredions, 
may  ftill  aftc£l  the  Mmd  in  the  very  fame 
manner,  he  muft  either  take  it  for  granted  that 
the  AfFeftions  of  Matter  are  no  Caufes  of  the 
Senfations  of  the  Mind,  that  is,  contradid  his 
former  Suppofition  ;  or  elfe  he  muft  fuppofe- 
the  fame  Effeft  to  proceed  from  different  Cau- 
fes;  either  of  which  will  tend  equally  to  ad- 
vance his  Syftem.  But. in  reality,  this  decreafa 
of  Pleafure  in  Familiarity  and  Cuftom,  does 
not  entirely  depend  on  any  Change  of  the  cor- 
poreal Organs,  but  on  the  original  Faculties  of 
the  Soul  itfelf,  as  may  be  gathered  from  fome 
fuch  Obfervations  as  this  which  follows.  View 
a  delightful  Landskip,  a  pleafant  Garden,  or 
any  of  thofe  Figures  which  appear  moft  beauti- 
ful, renew  the  I^ofpedl  once,  or  twice,  to  Day» 
to  Morrow,  and  at  feveral  diftant  Periods ;  it 
ftiall  afford  a  great  degree  of  Pleafurc  for  fome- 
time,  while  any  Novelty  may  be  fuppofed  to  re-, 
main ;  but  that  Pleafure  perilhcs  together  witK 


^jl  Of  the  Evil  of  "Defaa. 

by  the  Addition  of  certain  Degrees,  whereby  the  whole  muft  of  Nc- 
ceflicy  excell  the  Parts.  As  therefore  we  have  proved,  that  an  abfo- 
lutely  perfe(5t  Creature  is  an  Impoflibility,  fo  it  may  be  proved  from 
hence,  that  all  cannot  have  an  equal  Degree  of  Perfedion.  For  the 
World  confifts  of  Parts,  and  thofe  again  of  others,  perhaps  divifible 
in  itifinitum :  but  that  every  fmgle  Part  fhould  have  the  Pcrfe<5tion  of 

all, 

N  O  1*  E  S, 


this  Novelty,  tho'  the  external  Organs  of  Vi- 
fion  ftill  continue  perfcft,  and  your  Scnfations 
are  moft  evidently  the  fame  the  laft  Day  as  the 
firft.  You  are  able  to  behold  the  fame  Scenes 
over  again,  with  the  fame  eafe  and  accutenefs. 
but  not  with  the  fame  Intenfcnefs  of  Delight 
To  attempt  a  Mechanical  Solution  of  this  by 
a  fuppofed  alteration  of  fomc  imaginary  Trace. 
in  the  Brain  (which  yet,  if  they  were  allow'd, 
cannot  mend  the  matter  a  jot,  as  was  juft  now 
fhewn)  will  only  throw  us  into  ttill  greater 
difficulties,  as  any  one  that  attentively  confi- 
ders  the  whole  of  that  Chimerical  Hypothecs, 
muft  conclude,  and  of  which  Bayle,  who  foon 
percciv'd  the  Dcfedls  and  Abfurdities  of  mofl 
other  Syftcms,  was  undoubtedly  convinced.  It 
ieems  to  me  much  more  properly  refolvable 
into  a  native  Property  of  the  Soul  itfelf  Is  it 
not  probable,  thit  the  mind  of  Man  is  origi- 
nally framed  with  an  Appetite  or  Difpofition 
itit  Fanety ?  tlut  it  cannot  be  always  on  the 
{tmc  Bent,  but  as  it  is  endow'd  with  different 
Faculties  fo  tliefe  relieve  one  another  by 
turns,  and  receive  an  addicional  Pleafure  from 
the  Novelty  of  thofe  Objects  about  which  it  is 
convcrfant;  and  that  by  tliis  means  it  eqjoys  a 
greater  Sum  of  Happinefs  than  it  could  other 
ways  attain  to  ?  See  the  Spe^.itor,  N®.  6cx). 
N*.  626.  or  N®.  41 2.  or  Watts  00  the  ?a£ioiiSy 

S-  4- 

I  fhall  only  add  an  Obfervation  on  this  Head 
from  the  ingenious  Author  of  the  Vindication  rj 
Gea''s  Mural  Character,  p  21.  which  Ihcws  us 
the  neceffity  for  this  Variety  or  Increafablenefs 
of  Pcrfcftion,  in  order  to  our  htel/eSlual  Hap- 
pitiefs,  fince  moft  of  that  arifes  from  our  paft 
Defers.  •*  By  Intclleftual  Happinefs,  /  *utan 
"  the  Difcovery  and  Contemplation  of  Truth, 
"  luitb  regard  tQ  which  I  have  this  to  oi/fcrve, 
"  that  all  the  Pleajurcs  we  tajle  of  this  kind  an 


"  owing  either  to  our  preceding  Ignorance,  /*  the 
"  care  and  Pains  wc  take  in  the  Difcovery  of 
"  Truth,  or  to  the  Degree  of  our  Knowledge, 
"  when  we  attain  to  a  greater  me:  fare  than  0- 
"  ther  Men.  All  Truth,  when  covjider'd  fepa- 
"  rate  from  thefe,  is  alike  as  Truth  {tho  mt  of 
'•  the  like  Importance  to  ui)  the  Objeii  of  the  Vn- 
"  derjlandi?;g,  and  cs  fuch,  it  tnujl  afford  the 
"■^  fame  Delight.  If  we  all  could,  with  equal  eafe 
'*  and  clearneft,  fee  all  the  Relations  of  things, 
"  they  mufl  all  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  equally 
"  affeR  us.  We  fjjould  tafle  as  much  Pleafure  in 
"  kmzving  or  contemplating  that  tzvo  and  two  makes 
"  four, as  in  knowing  er  contemplating  anyP ropofition 
"  which  now  appears  the  mf  difficult,<j;/(//c'  affords 
"  the  moji  Pleafure:  or  rather,-  we  fhauld  not 
"  have  Pleafure  from  any  of  them.  Now  if  this 
"  be  the  Cafe,  then  it  is  evident,  that  //-t-'Capa- 
"  city  «;^  haz'e  for  tafling  this  kind  of  Pleafure, 
"  renders  ui  capable  f  its  contrary.  We  couli 
"  not  be  delighted  in  the  Difcovery  or  Contempt  a- 
"  tion  of  Truth,  if  we  were  not  capable  of  being 
"  ignorant,  and  of  the  Un happinefs  which  arifes 
"  from  it r' 

This  is  the  Confequence  we  would  draw 
from  all  thit  went  before  :  but  of  this  more  at 
large  under  the  head  oi  Moral  Evil. 

We  reply  then  to  Bayle,  that  this  Alternativt 
or  Variety  of  either  Good  or  Evil,  as  far  as 
concerns  the  prefent  Argument,  is  founded  on 
the  Nature  of  the  SubjeSl  which  receives  them, 
and  that  our  Soul  in  its  prefent  State,  is  not 
io  fufceptible  of  them,  after  it  has  felt  them 
two  or  three  times  as  at  firft.  What  it  might 
have  been  made  capable  of,  is  nothing  to  the 
Purpofe,  fincc  (as  it  was  obferv'd  before,  and 
muft  often  be  repeated)  we  are  to  confider  Man 
as  we  find  him  at  prefent ;  and  draw  all  our 
Arguments,    not  fr«m  fuch  Faculties  as  are 

per- 


Of  the  Evil  of  T>efe6L 

or  many,  is  impofllble;  and  we  are  not  to  arraign  the  Power  or  Good- 
nefs  of  'God  for  not  working  Contradi(ftions.  There  muft  then  be 
many,  perhaps  infinite  (31.)  Degrees  of  Perfeftion  in  the  Divine 
Works ;  for  whatever  arifes  from  Nothing  is  neceiTariiy  imperfedt  j  and 
the  lefs  it  is  removed  from  nothing  ix.2i\iing:ExiJience  for  one  Degrpc, 
as  we  faid  before)  the  more  imperfed:  it  is.  There  is  no  occafion 
therefore  for  an  Evil  Principle  to  introduce  the  Evil  of  Dcfedt,  or  an 
Inequality  of  Perfed:ions  in  the  Works  of  God:  for  the  very  nature 
of  created  Beings  neceflarily  requires  it,  and  we  may  conceive  the 
place  of  this  Malicious  .Principle  to  be  abundantly  fupplicd  from 
hence,  that  .they  derive  their  Original  ^xomNothingi{2>2). 

V.  Fifthly, 

N\Ot  E  S. 


89 


perhaps  in  otficr  Beings,  but,  froip  thcfe  .oijly 
which  we  perceive  and  experience  in  him.  If 
thefe  cannot  be  alter'd  and  improved  confi- 
ftently  with  each  other  *,  nor  ful^efted  to  any 
general  Laws  more  fuitable  to  his  prefent  cir- 
cumrtsnce':,  and -produftive  of  more  good  to 
the  whole  ^ftem  f,  then,  all.  Arguments  built 
on  th^s  Topic  againll  the  Divine  Attributes, 
muft  fill  to  the  Ground.  Thefe  and  the  like 
Suppofitions  therefore,  viz.  that  the  fame  De-, 
gree  of  Pieajure  might  be  communicated  to  us  fiiic- 
cejfwih  for  a  hundr^.i  I'fcrs;  if  underftood  of 
one  uniform  Caufe  ptoducing  it :  That  our  Pka- 
fures,  meaning  yr/f/- //-'('  ones,  trnght  not  depend 
upon  thf  Fibres  of  the  Brain,  — and,  That  thefe 
Fibres  /houid  not  wf.ir  out  .-.t  ■all  \, — or,  if  thefe' 
Fibres  did  not  wear  out,  that  the  Pkafure 
jhould  never  decay,  are  all  unreafonabie  Suppo- 
fitions :  They  ofiend  againft  the  Rule  laid 
down  above,  and  always  to  be  remember'd, 
of  taking  the  whole  of  human  Nature  as  it 
is;  of  conf.derin^  our  prefent  Body  and  Spi- 
rit, and  the  obvious  Properties  of  each,  and 
the  known  Laws  of  their  Union  together.  All 
fuch  Objedions  therefore  are  be  fide  the  Que- 
iUon  ;  and  founded  upon  the  old  abfurdity  of 
reducing  us  to  a  ditfcrent  Clafs  of  Beirkgs, 
when  (as  will  appear  prefently)  all  conceiva- 
ble Claiass  and  Orders  are  already  full.  | 


Thus  ipuch  for  one  Qnery  about  the  ^manner 
of  .Creating  things,  viz.  Whether  any  /hould 
have  been  fix'd  immutably  in  a  certain  Degree 
of  Perfection  :  Our  Author  proceeds  to  exa-; 
mine  the  other,  ciz.  Whether  all  things  could 
ind  ought  to -have  been  at  firft  created  in  the 
fame  Degree  of  Perfedion  ? 

(31.)  That  is  Indefinite,  or  greater  than  any 
afiignable  Number ;  for  neither  the  Univerie 
itfelf,  nor  any  thing  that  belongs  to  it,  can  be 
properly  and  abfolutely  Infinite,  as  our  Author 
maintains  in  his  Note  F,  and  we  have  largely 
proved  from  Cudzoerth,  i^c.  in  the  -former 
Ch.ipter. 

(32.)  It  is  fcarce  neceflary  to  obferve,  that 
this  muft  all  along  be  underftood  only  Materi- 
ally, i.  e.  that  thefe  things  were  not  produced 
t'rom  any  matter  prte-exifent,  but  were  made 
i^.  ax.  ovTuPy  and  brought  into  Being  from 
mere  Nou-Exifmre.  For  the  poflibilijy  of 
which,  and  the  Opinion  of  the  Antients  oa 
this  Subjed,  fee  Qudwfrth,  C.  5.  ^.  2.  p.  73 8, 
dffr.  The  other  Scnfes  of  the  Wofds,  viz. 
That  any  thing  can  come  from  nothing,  cai^-. 
[ally,  or  be  produced /^y  notliing,  or  byitfdK 
or  without  ■xTi  Efficient  Caufe,  arc  manifellly,  iib- 
furd,  as  is  demonftrated  at  large  ia  the  fa^Be. 
excellent  Se£tion.  For  an  Illullratiofi  of  our. 
Author'  3  Noiio n  before  us,  fee  Scott' s  Chr't^iM, 

.     .A.     .  ■'Mil'*' 


SiC  Note  42t 


•f-  5"^^  Note  37. 


N 


See  BiyWiiDi^.  P-  2487- 


JO  Of  the  Evil  of  DcfeS. 

Thintrsne-       V.  Fifthly:  'Tis  plain,  that  Creatures  are  not  only  unequally  im^ 
ccfTariiy  are  pej-fevft  in  refpcdt  of  thcir  Parts  and  Under-parts.  and  fo  on,  which 

ot  uncqaal    \  .irT,,.-/-  I.*  i»f 

Pcrfeflions  by  continual  Sub-divmon,  approach  in  a  manner  to  nothing;  but  a 
with  regard  neccflary  inequality  arifes  among  them  alfo  in  refpedt  of  their  ^Z- 
tributcs;  bui^''*^^^'?-^-  For  a  confcious  or  thinking  Subflance  is  more  perfed  than 
it  is  agrcea-  one  that  wants  Senfe  or  Underftanding.  If  it  be  ask'd,  How  is  it  a- 
Jj^jJ^Pj*''^  greeable  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  have  created  thefe  alfo  ?  I  an- 
Goodnefsto  fwcr,  If  the  Creation  of  thefe  be  no  impediment  to  the  producflion 
*^T^V^'°^^  of  the  more  perfed ;  if  neither  the  Number  nor  Happinefa  of  the 
leaft  perfea,  morc  perfed  be  diminiflied  by  the  Creation  of  thofe  that  are  lefs  per- 
iftheyarcnofe^c^^  why  will  it  be  unfit  to  create  thefe  too?  Since  God  does 
the  r[umTer°  what  is  beft  to  be  done,  nothing  more  or  greater  can  be  cxped:ed 
orconveni-  from  the  moft  benevolent  and  powerful  Author  of  Nature.  If 
encc  o^J|ij5^^  therefore  it  be  better,  cater  is  paribus^  that  thefe  more  imperfedl  Be- 
ings fliould  exift,  than  not,  it  is  agreeable  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs,. 
that  the  beft  that  could  be  fhould  be  done.  If  the  Production  of 
a  lefs  perfed:  Being  were  any  hindrance  to  a  more  perfect  one,  it 
would  appear  contrary  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  to  have  omitted  the 
more  perfect  and  created  the  lefs ;  but  fince  they  are  no  manner  of 
hiti^rance  tp  each  other,  the  more  the  better,  (3;^.). 
'  .  VL  An 

N  O  "t  E  S. 


more 
ones. 


ti/ff  Part  2.  Vol;  i.  €:  6.  V-  2.  p.  446,  447. 
ift  Edit.  "  God  is  the  Cauj'e  oi  Perfe£lion  on- 
*•  ly,  but  not  of  Defed,  which  fo  far  forth  as 
'•  it  is  natural  to  created  Beings  hath  no  Caufe 
•'  at  all,  but  is  merely. a  Negation  or  "Non-entity. 
*'  For  every  created  thing  was  a  Negation  or  Non- 
"  entity  before  ever  it  had  a  pojitive  Being,  and 
**  it  had  only  fo  much  of  its  primitive  Negation 
"  ttien  away  from  ir^  as  it  had  pofttive  Being 
"  confcrr'd  upon  it;  and  therefore,  fo  far  forth 
••  zi  it  is,  its  Being  is  to  be  attributed  to  the 
"  Soz'eraign  Caufe  that  produced  it  ;  butfo  far 
•*  forth  as  it  is  not,  its  not  being  is  to  be  at- 
**  tributed  to  the  Original  Non-entity,  out  of 
••  which  it  was  produced.  For  that  which 
ft  was  once.  Nothing,  would  Jii/l  hzyc  been 
•'  Nothing,  had  it  not  been  for  the  Caufe  that 
H  gave  Being  to  it,  and  therefore,  that  it  is  fo 
**■  jar  Nothing  fti  11,  i.e.  limited  vcA  defeilive, 
*^  i^QUly  tft  be  at^rtbate^  to  its,  oviUiprimitivi 


1  "  Nothingnefs..   As  for  inftance,  If  I  give  a 
"  poor  Man  a   Irandred   pounds,    that  he   is- 
"  worth  fo  much  Money  is  wholly  owing  to 
"  me,  but   that    he  is    not  worth  a   hundred' 
"  more,  is   owing  only  to  his   own  Poverty, 
♦'  and  juft.  fo,  that  I  have  fuch  and  fucb  Per- 
"  feSlions  of  Being  is  wholly  owing   to  God 
■"  who  produced  me   out  of  Nothing;    but 
"  that  I  have  fuch  and  fuch  DefeSls  of  being, 
*'  is  only  owing  to  that  Non-entity  out  of  which, 
"  he  produced  me." 

The  fame  Notion    is  alfo  largely   difcufs'd.. 
in   Eilhardi  Lubini  Phofphorus,  l^c.  Chap.  6,  7, 
and  17.     From  whom   it    appears,    that  moft 
of  the   ancient  Philofophers  meant  no   more^ 
than- this  by  their  Evil  Principle. 

(33)  A  good  Illuftration  of  this  occurs  in. 
Dr.  J.  Clarke"^  Difcourfe  on  Nat.  Evil,  p.  289, 
^V.    Now  from  the  Suppofition  of  a  Scale  of 

Beings 


Of  the  Evil  ofDefca.  91 

VI.  An  Inftance   will  make  this   more  clear,  Suppofe  that  God  This  con- 
made  the  World  finite ;    fuppofe    that  Spirits^   or   pure  immaterial  ^"^^'^  ^  an 
thinking  Beings,  are  the  moji  perfeB  Species  of  Subftances :    fuppofe,  Mau^r?  ° 
in  the  laft  place,  that  God  created  as  many  of  this  fort  as  were  con-  which  is  no 
venient  for  the  Syftem  he  had  made,  fo  that  if  there  were  more,  they  J^^^Jg"^^^,' 
would  incommode  one  another  j    yet  there  would  be  no  lefs  Room  rits. 
for  Matter,  than  if  there  were  none  at  all.     This  Suppofition  is  by  no 
means  abfurd  j  for  fince  thefe  may  be  conceiv'd  withou  t  local  Ex  fen- 
Jion^  and  have  no  relation  to  Space  or  Place^  as  Bodies  have  *  in  what- 
ever Number  they  were  created,  they  would  contribute  nothing  at  all 

N  2  either 


NOTES. 


Beings  gradualy  defcetiding  from  PerfeBion  to 
Non-entity,  and  compleat  in  every  intermediate 
Rank  and  Degree  (for  which  fee  Note  35  )  we 
ihall  foon  perceive  the  abfurdity  of  fuch  Que- 
ftions  as  thefe,  Why  was  not  Man  made  more 
perfed  ?  Why  are  not  his  Faculties  equal  to 
thofe  of  Angels  ?  Since  this  is  only  asking 
why  he  was  not  placed  in  a  quite  different 
Clafs  of  Being?,  when  at  the  fame  time  all  o- 
ther  Claffes  are  fuppofed  to  be  already  full. 
From  the  fame  Principle  alfo,  we  gather  the 
Intent  of  the  Creator  in  producing  thofe  fe- 
vcral  inferior  Orders  under  our  View.  They 
who  imagine  that  all  things  in  this  World 
were  made  for  the  immediate  ufe  of  Man  a- 
lone,  run  themfeJves  into  inextricable  DiiE- 
culties.  Man  indeed  is  the  Head  of  this  low- 
er part  of  the  Creation,  and  perhaps  it  was  de- 
fign'd  to  be  abfolutely  under  his  command. 
But  that  all  things  here  tend  diredlly  to  his 
own  ufe,  is,  I  think,  neither  eafy  nor  ncceffa- 
xy  to  be  proved.  Some  manifelUy  ferve  for 
the  food  and  fupport  of  other?,  whofe  Souls 
may  be  neceffary  to  prepare  and  preferve  their 
Bodies  for  that  Purpofe,  and  may  at  the  lame 
time  be  happy  in  a  Confcioufnefs  of  their  own 
Rxiftcnce.  'Tis  probable,  that  they  are  inten- 
ded to  promote  each  others  Good  reciprocal- 
ly :  Nay,  Man  hirafelf  contributes  to  the  Hap- 


pinefs,  and  betters  the  Condition  of  the  Brutes 
in  feveral  refpefts;  by  cultivating  and  impro- 
ving the  Ground,  by  watching  the  Seafons,  by 
protedling  and  providing  for  them,  when  they 
are  unable  to  proteft  and  provide  for  theni- 
felves  |)>  Others  of  a  much  lower  Clafs,  may, 
for  ought  we  know,  enjoy  themfelves  too  in 
fome  degree  or  other;  and  alfo  contribute  to 
the  Happinefs  even  of  fuperior  Beings,  by  a 
difplay  of  the  Divine  Attributes  in  different 
ways,  and  affording  ample  matter  of  Reflec- 
tion on  the  various  Ranks  and  Degrees  of  Per- 
feftion  difcoverable  in  the  animal  World  ; 
wherein  the  higheft  order  may  with  pleafurc 
contemplate  numberlefs  Species  infinitely  be- 
low them :  and  the  lower  Clafs  can  admire 
and  adore  that  Infinity  of  Divine  Wifdom  and 
Goodnefs  and  Power  which  Ihines  forth  in  fo 
many  Beings  vaflly  above  them.  They  may 
conduce  to  the  Beauty,  Order,  and  Benefit  of 
the  whole  Syftem,  the  general  Good  of  which 
was  the  aim  of  its  Creator,  and  with  regard  to 
which,  every  part  is  chiefly  to  be  efteem'd  f. 
They  may  have  Ten  ihoufand  Ufes  befide  what 
relates  to  Man,  who  is  but  a  very  fmall  part  of 
it :  Several  Inftances  might  be  given,  which 
would  make  this  very  probable  ;  at  Icaft,  the 
contrary,  I  think,  cannot  ever  be  proved.  Sec 
C.  4.  ^.  2.  Subf.  4,  5. 


•  See  Note  13. 

II  See  Chubb';  Supplement,  tsfc»  p.  12."  WZ)r.  J  Clarke,  p.  284,  285. 

t  See  Cudworth,  p.  875,  876. 


if  Or  Of  the  Evil  of  "DefeSl. 

cither  to  rhe  filling  up  of  Space,  or  excluding;  BoJies-  o\ir  of  it,  ytv 
they  would  have  a  ecrwin  SyfteM  or  Society  ■arc\ot\^  thtmfelves,  which 
micht  require  a  determinate  Number,  whicli  if  ic  were  exceeded^  they 
muil  become  troublefbme  to  one  another^  by-  roo>  great  a.  Multitude  ih> 
a'  finite  World.     Nay,,    if  the  World  were    flippofed  to  be  infinite^ 
and-  as  raai^y  f«cli  Spirits  created  as  wx^re  poffiblc,  }^et  would,  the^i  be 
no  impediment  to  Matter,  nor  Matter  to  themi  neither  would  their.^ 
Number  be  lelsj.  nor  their  Convenieneies  fewer,  becaufe  MatJter  did 
or  did  not  exift.     Since  then  material  and  immaterial  Beings  confiit 
fo  well  together,  is  it  not  agreeable  to'the  greatefl  Goodnefs  to  have 
cpcated  both?     Let  Matter  be  ftupid  and  devoid  of  Senfe,  as   it  is; 
let  it  be   the  moft  imperftct  of  all  Subftances,  and  next  to  nothing,, 
(f  nee  not  to  perceive  its  Exiftence  is-  little  different  from  Non-exi- 
flence)  'tis  better  to  be  even  fo,  than  not  at  all;  for  Eyiftence  is,  as 
we  faid,  the  Foundation,  or  firft  Degree  of  Perfection,  a^d  the  next, 
as  it  were,  to  this,  the  fecond,  is  perception  of  Exiftence.   But  you'll", 
fay.  Why  did  not  God  add  this  fecond  Degree  to  Matter  ?     I  anfwer, 
if  that  could,  it  is  probable  it  would,   have  been  done:    But  fince 
we  fee  that  Matter  is  in  itfelf  a  paffive,    inert  Subftance,  we   muff 
believe  that  its  Nature  would  not  admit  of  Senfe^  or  if  it  had  been 
capable  of  Senfe,   that,  greater  Inconveniencies  would  have   flow'd- 
from  thence,   than  if  it  had  been  made  infenfible,  as  it  is,  (34.).. 

However 

U  O  T  B  S. 


(34/)  Matter ,  as  fuch,  is  at  prefent  incapa- 
ble of,  or  has  Properties  totally  inconfiftent 
with  thoaght  and  felf-motion,  (as  is  at  large 
dcmonftratcd  by  the  Authors  referr'd  to  in 
Note  13.)  it  is  therefore  in  a  Degree  below 
Aninuls,  or  (as  our  Author  fays)  next  to  No- 
tlimg.  But  yet,  fuch  as  it  is,  'tis  firfl,  ab- 
folutely  neceflary  Xd  many  Animals,  and  fc- 
<f«ndly,r  would  not  be. fo  convenient  fo  theio- 
ufcs,  if  it  could  think.  It  is  the  Bujis  or  Sup- 
port of  Animals  in  this  our  Syftem-;  it  is,  a&we 
may  fay,  the  (afe  and  coveting  of  their  feveral 
5ouls;  it  fcTves  for  the  ckthing  of  that  Cafe, 
fcr  their  F^c/,  their  Defence ^  aind  various  ufes> 


But  were  it  all  Life,  or<onfcious  (not  to  in- 
fill on  the  Abfurdities  of  fuch  a  Suppofition  in 
itfelf)  wlwt  Mifery  and  Confufion  would  a-- 
rife?  If  aJl  were  Animals,  what  «iufl  thefe 
Animals  fubfift  on  ?  If  they  were  qf  the  fame 
Nature  with,  fuch  as  we  are  acquainted  with, 
they  mufl  alfo  be  fuftain'd  after  the  fame  man- 
ner, /".  e.  they  muft  live  by  Food^  and  confc- 
quently  live  upon,  and  continually  torment 
and  confume  one  another ;  and  confequently 
more  Happinefs  would  be  loft  than  gorby  fuch 
Life,  which  is  as  plentiful  at  prefent  *  a» 
feems  agreeable  to  the  Syftem.  If  Matter,  as 
M^ter,  \vcre..eiidow'd  with  the  Power  of  5^//^ 

MttiiTt, . 


•  Zh  Nqic  39: 


Of  the  Evil  of  7>efea^ 


95 


Hbwcfer,  xx^iH^.om  thJs,.  there  would  be  a  kind  of  Fb/i  in  rlie  TTniverfe,. 
and  fomething  vVfintiiTg  which  might  exilt:  bur  it  was  better  that 
there  fliould  be  Matter  than  norhiiig  at  all,,  and  fince  one  Side  was  to 
be  chofef^,  the  Divine  G'oodnefs  preferr'd  Matter, .  becaufe  that  was- 
the  greater  Good,  For,  fmce  it  is  no  hindrance  to^  the  multiplica- 
rlon  or  convenience  of  rhmking  Beings,  nor  diminilhes  the  number  of 
the  more  perfect,  *tis  plain  it  adds  to  the  perfection  of  the  Univerfe, 
and  whatever  it  be,  tho'  the  moft  imperfect  thing  in  Nature,  'tis 
gairt  to  the  whole.  It  was  therefore  agreeable  to  the  greaiefl  Power 
and  Goodnefs  to  have  created  this  alfo  ;  nor  need  v/c  the  Demmrgiis 
of  the  antient  Heretics  to  produce  it,  as  if  unworthy  of  the  great  and 
good  God.  The  Evils  of  Imperfection  then  muft  be  permitted  in. 
the  Nature  of  things ;  and  inequality  of  Pferfections  muil  be  permit- 
ted alfo,  fmce  it  is  impo^ible  that  all  the  Woiis  of  God  fhould  be 
endow'd  with  equal  Perfections. 

VII.  If  .yoTi  fay,  God   rrlight  have,  omitted  the  more   imperfect 'Tislefsa^ 
Beings,  I  grant  it,  and  if  that  had  been  beft  he  would  undoubtedly  fhe^X)ivinc 
have  done  it.     But  it  is  the  part  of  infinite  Goodnefs  to  choofe  the  Goodnefs  to 
very  beft  j  from,  thence  it  proceeds  therefore,  that  the  more  imperfect  J^.^'^^^^jJ'^'^ 
Beings  have  Exiftence;  for  it  was  agreeable  to  that,  not  to  omit  the  have  created,,. 
very  lead  Good  which  could  be  produced.     Finite  Goodnefs  might  f'^^'^  ^S\ 
poffibly  have  been  exhaufted  in  creating  the  greater  Beings,  but  Inji-  jn^s" '' 
nite  extends  to  all.     The  infinite  Power  and  Goodnefs  of  God  then 
were  the  Caufe  why  imperfect  Beings  had  Exiftence  together  with- 
rhe  more  perfect.     'Tis  plain  therefore  that  the  Syftem  of  the  World, 
may  be.  xhoJVork  of  a  Deity y  tho'  it  has  this.  Fault.     Nay,  that  it  was 

N'3  created. 


iSTO  r  E  s^. 


Motian,  what  ufe  could  we  put  ifto^?  Whrt 
clothing  or  Habitations  ?  What  Inftruments  or 
Utcflfils  could  we  make  of  it?  But  this,  I 
think,  needs  no  Airther  Explanation.  Matter 
ihcn,  in  its  prefcnt  State,  as  united  with,  and 
fnblcrvient  to,  fuch  Spirits  as  we  conceive 
o«rs  to  be,  is  in  general  more  cooducive  to 
the  Good  and  Happincfs  of  the  whole,  than  it 
would  be  in  any  other  conceivable  manner  of 
Exiftence.  To  ask  yet  why  foipe  certain  Pon- 
ii»oa  or  Syftcms  of  it  might  not  have  been 


made  more  perfeft,  or  why  it  was  not  farther 
fublimated,  refined,  and  fo  unaccountably  mo- 
dify'd,  as  to  be  render'd  capable  of  Thought ; 
is  the  abfurd  Queftion  above  mcntion'd,  vix. 
why  was  it  not  made  fomething  elfc,  or  remo-i 
ved  into  a  higher  Clafs?  when  at  the  fame  time 
there  appears  (o  much  reafon  for  the  Exiftence 
of  fuch  a  thing  as  this  now  is;  and  all  the  fu- 
perior  Claflcs  are  concluded  to  be  full.  What 
rcafoa  there  it  iat  this  laft  coQclufioA  nuy  be 
fccn  in  the  following  Note. 


54-  Of  the  Evil  of  "Dcfca. 

created  is  evident  for  this  very  Reafon,  becaufe  it  is  imperfeSi'^  for  if 
it  were  Self-exijienty  it  would  be  abfolutely  perfeB.  (35.) 

NOTES. 


(39.)  The  chief  Argument  of  the  foregoing 
■Chapter  is  beautifully  illuftratcd  by  Mr.  JJa'i' 
/on  in  \\it  Speclator,  N*.  51^.  As  frequent  ufe 
%vill  be  made  of  this  Obfervation  concerning 
the  Scale  of  Beings,  1  hope  the  Reader  will  ex- 
cufe  my  tranfcribing  fo  much  of  the  above  men- 
tioned Paper  as  isneceiTary  to  explain  it. 

*♦  Infinite  Goodncfs  is  of  fo  communicative 
"  a  Nature,  that  it  feems  to  delight  in  the  con- 
♦•  ferring  of  Exiftence  upon  every  Degree  of 
*'  perceptive  Being.  As  ♦^his  is  a  Speculation 
"  which  I  have  often  purfued  with  great 
*•  pleafure  to  my  felf,  I  fhall  enlarge  farther 
*'  upon  it,  by  confidering  that  part  of  the 
•*  Scale  of  Beings  which  comes  within  our 
•*  Knowledge.  There  are  foir.c  living  Crea- 
•♦  turcs  which  are  raifed  juft  above  dead  Mat- 
*•  ter.  To  mention  only  the  Species  of  iShell- 
"  Fifh,  which  are  formed  in  the  faftiion  of  a 
**  Cone,  that  grow  to  the  furface  of  feveral 
**  Rocks,  and  immediately  die  upon  their  be- 
*'  ing  fcver'd  from  the  place  where  they  grow. 
*'  There  are  many  other  Creatures,  but  one  re- 
**  move  from  thefe,  which  have  no  other  Sen- 
*'  fes  befides  that  of  feeling  and  tafte.  Others 
**  have  ftill  an  additional  one  of  Hearing .  o- 
**  thers  of  Smell,  and  others  of  Sight.  It  is 
•*  wonderful  to  obferve,  by  what  a  gradual  pro- 
**  grefs  the  World  of  Life  advances  thro'  a  pro- 
«*  digious  variety  of  Species,  before  a  Creature 
**  is  form'd  that  is  compleat  in  all  its  Senfes; 
**  -and  even  among  thefe  is  fuch  a  different  De- 
**  gree  of  Perfedion,  in  the  Senfe  which  one 
*'  Animal  enjoys  beyond  what  appears  in  ano- 
"  ther,  that  tho'  the  Senfe  in  different  Ani- 
*•  mals  be  diftinguilh'd  by  the  fame  common 
«*  denomination,  it  feems  almoft  of  a  different 
"  Nature-  If  after  this  we  look  into  the  fc- 
*•-  veral  inward  Perfeftions  of  Cunning  and 
"  Sagacity.or  what  we  generally  call  Inftinft  |j, 
**  we  find  them  riiing  after  the  fame  manner 
"  imperceptibly  one  above  another,  and  re- 
"  ceiving  additionallmprovements  according 
■"  to  the  Species  in  which  ilicy  are  implanted. 


**  This  Progrefs  in  Nature  is  fb  very  gradual, 
"  that  the  mod  perfeft  of  an  inferior  Species 
"  comes  very  near  to  the  moll  imperfeft  of  that 
"  which  is  immediately  above  it.  The  exube- 
''  rant  and  overflowing  Goodnefs  of  the  fu- 
'•  preme  Being,  whofe  Mercy  extends  to  all 
"  his  Works,  is  plainly  feen,  as  I  have  before 
^'  hinted,  from  his  having  made  fo  little  Mat- 
•'  ter,  at  leafl  what  falls  within  our  Knowledge, 
'•  that  does  not  fwarm  with  Life:  nor  is  his 
"  Goodnefs  lefs  feen  in  the  Diverfity  than  in 
'•  the  Multitude  of  living  Creatures.  Had  he 
'*  only  made  one  Species  of  Animals,  none  of 
"  the  rcfl  would  have  enjoy 'd  the  Happinefs 
"  of  Exiftence,  he  has  therefore  fpecified  in 
*'  his  Creation  every  Degree  of  Life,  every 
♦*  Capacity  of  Being.  The  whole  Chafm  in 
'•  Nature,  from  a  Plant  to  a  Man,  is  filled  up 
'*  with  diverfe  kinds  of  Creatures,  rifing  one 
"  over  another,  hy  fuch  a  gentle  and  eafy  af- 
"  cent,  that  the  little  tranfitions  and  devia- 
'*  tions  from  one  Species  to  another,  are  al- 
*'  mofl  infenfible.  This  intermediate  Space  is 
"  fo  well  husbanded  and  managed,  that  there 
"  is  fcarce  a  Degree  of  Perfeftion  which  does 
"  not  appear  in  fome  one  part  of  the  World  of 
'•  Life.  Is  tlie  Goodnefs  or  Wifdom  of  the 
"  Divine  Being  more  manifefted  in  this  his 
"  Proceeding  >  There  is  a  Confequence,  be- 
"  fides  thofe  I  have  already  mentioned,  which 
"  feems  very  naturally  deducible  from  the  fcre- 
'*  going  Confiderations.  If  the  Scale  of  Be- 
"  ings  rifes  by  fuch  a  regular  Progrefs,  fohigh 
•*  as  Man,  we  may,  by  a  parity  of  Reafon,  fup- 
"  pofe  that  it  fUll  proceeds  gradually  thro' 
'*  thofe  IBeings  which  are  of  a  fuperior  Nature 
"  to  him;  fmce  there  is  an  infinitely  greater 
»'  Space  and  Room  for  different  Degrees  of 
*♦  Perfeflion  between  the  Supreme  Being  and 
'*  Man,  than  between  Man  and  the  moft  defpi- 
"  cable  Infeft.  This  Confequence  of  fo  great 
"  a  variety  of  Beings,  which  are  fuperior  to 
"  us,  from  that  variety  wliichls  inferior  to  us, 
«*  is  made  by  Mr.  Locke,  in  a  palTage  which   I 

•'  fhall 


'jl  To  which  we  may  add.  Will  and  Liberty.     See  Bayle'.f  Dili,  p-  2609,  2610. 


Of  the  Evil  opOefed. 
NOTES. 


95 


«*  (hall  here  fet  down,  after  having  premifed, 
"  that  notwithftanding  there  is  fuch  Infinite 
*'  Room  between  Man  and  his  Maker,  for  the 
"  creative  Pov.er  to  exert  itfelf  in,  it  is  im- 
"  poffible  that  it  fhould  ever  be  filled  up,  fince 
"  there  will  be  Hill  an  Infinite  gap  or  diftance 
"  between  the  higheft  created  Being  and  the 
"  Power  which  produced  him." 

The  fine  Paffage  there  citedifrom.  Mr.  Lff^f^?, 
occurs  in  the  3d  Book  of  his   Effay,  Chap.  6. 

See  alfo  Notes  38,  39. 
From  the  foregeing  Obfervation,  that  there 
is  no  manner  oi Chajm  or  Void,  no  Link  defi- 
cient in  this  great  Chain  of  Beings,  and  the 
reafon  of  it,  it  will  appear  extremely  proba- 
ble ^Ifo,  that  every  dilUnft  Order,  every  Clafs 
or.  Species  of  them,  is  as  full  as  the  Nature  of 
it  would  admit,  and  God  faw  proper.  There 
are  (as  our  Author  fays)  perhaps  (o  many  in 
each  Clafs  as  could  exill  together  without  fome 
inam'eaience  ox  uneaftneji  to  each  other.     This 


is  eafily  conceivable  in  Mankind,  and  may  be 
in  fuperior  Beings,  tho',  for  want  of  an  exaft 
knowledge  of  their  feveral  Natures  and  Orders, 
we  cannot  apprehend  the  manner  of  it,  or  con- 
ceive how  they  afFedl  one  another  ;  only  this 
we  are  fure  of  that  neither  the  Species  nor  the 
Individuals  in  each  Species,  can  poffibly  be  In- 
finite ;  and  that  nothing  but  an  ImpoffibiTtty  in 
the  Nature  of  the  thing,  or  fome  greater  incon- 
venience, can  reftrain  the  exercife  of  the  Power 
of  God,  or  hinder  him  from  producing  ftill 
more  and  more  Beings  capable  of  Felicity. 
When  we  begin  to  enquire  into  the  Number  of 
thefe  and  the  Degrees  of  their  Perfeftion,  we 
foon  lofe  ourfelves,  and  can  only  refer  all  to 
the  Divine  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs:  from  our 
previous  Notices  of  which  Attributes,  we 
have  the  higheft  reafon  to  conclude,  that  eve- 
ry thing  is  as  perfeft  as  poffible  in  its  own 
kind,  and  that  every  Syftem  is  in  itfelf  full; 
and  complete. 


CHAP- 


96 


CHAP.    IV. 

donctrnin^  Natural  Evil. 


SECT,    f . 

Of  'Generation  and  Corruption, 

A  Creature  I.  "y  T  appears  from  the  foregoing  Obfervations,  that  created  Bc- 
piIirontT  I  ^"gs  muft  neceffarily  be  d^eStivCy  a.  e.  fome  muft  want 
Frte,  tho'it  JL  the  Perfections  which  others  have,  and  that  it  was  impoffiblc 
^lefsperfaa  f-Qj.  fjjejn  to  cnjoy  either  an  abfolute  or  equal  Perfection;  alfo, 

that  there  is  no  occafion  for  an  Evil  Principle  oppofitc  to  Infinite 
Goodnefs  and  Power.  And  from  hence  we  may  affirm,  that  God, 
tho'  infinitely  good  and  powerful,  couM  not  feparate  things  from  the 
concomitant  Evils  of  Imperfection,  and  did  not  efteem  it  unbecom- 
ing himfelf  to  create  the  .Good,  tho'  that  brought  fome  Evils  along 
with  it,  fo  long  as  thefe  Evils  are  lefs  than  the  Good  with  which 
xhey  are  connected.  Nor  can  the  Creature  juftly  complain  of  its 
Condition,  if  it  have  not  all,  or  equal  Perfection,  with  fome  others; 
fince  'twas  neceflary  that  it  fhould  fill  the  Station  wherein  it  was 
placed,  or  none  at  all.  This  we  have  (hewn  fufficiently,  I  think,  in 
the  former  kind  of  Evils,  njiz.  thofe  of  ImperfeSfion. 
The  Origin  H.  The  fame  muft  be  attempted  in  the  fecond  kind, 'u/^.  the  A7i/- 
■frornXLtter/^^^^-    Now,  as  all  cteatcd  Beings  are  made  out  of  Nothing,  and  on 

is  the  fiource  <•  *       A  that 

of    Natural      .    «-     *\.    t\    kJ» 

Evils,  as  their  rife  from  Nothing  is  the  Caufe  of  thofe  of  Imperfeaioa. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  97 

that  account  arc  necefTarily  imperfedt ;  fo  all  natural  things  have  a  re- 
lation to,  or  arife  from,  Matter,  and  on  this  account  are  neceflarily 
fubjeded  to  natural  Evils :  nor  is  the  rife  of  all  created  Beings  from 
Nothing  a  more  fruitful  and  certain  Caufe  of  the  Evils  of  Imperfec- 
tion, than  the  rife  of  all  natural  things  from  Matter  is  of  natural 
Evils,  (36.).  If  therefore  w^e  can  fhew  that  thefe  Evils  are  fo  necef- 
farily  connected  "with  this  Origin  that  they  cannot  be  feparated  from 
it,  it  follows,  that  the  Strudure  of  the  World  either  ought  not  to 
have  been  framed  at  all,  or  that  thefe  Evils  mud  have  been  tole- 
rated without  any  Imputation  on  the  Divine  Power  and  Goodnefs. 
But  k  k  better  that  they  fhould  be  as  they  are,  fince  they  could 
not  be  more  perfed:.  Let  us  examine  the  particular  Sorts  of  natural 
Evils,  and  if  there  be  nothing  in  them  which  could  be  removed 
without  greater  damage  to  Nature,  and  introducing  a  larger  train  of 
Evils,  the  Divine  Goodnefs  may  fecurely  applaud  itfelf,  lince  it  has 
omitted  no  manner  of  Good,  nor  admitted  any  Evil  which  could 
poflibly  be  prevented,  /.  e.  hath  done  in  every  thing  what  was 
beft. 

III.  God  has  accomplifh*d  this  in  the  Creation  of  Matter,  as  we  j^jatter  is 
faid  before,  nor  has  he  been  lefs  beneficent  in  what  relates  to  the  ufdefs  except 
Motion  of  Matter.     In  the  firft  place,  Matter,  tho'  in  itfelf  unadive,  'f  ^^^^  ^^0- 
is  neverthelefs  capable  of  Action,  viz.  local  Motion,  for  Motion  is  the 
Ad:ion  that  belongs  to  Matter.     But  'tis  better  that  it  fhould  adt  as 
far  as  it  is  capable,  than  be  entirely  ftill  and  fluggifh:   if  it  were 
without  Motion,  rigid  and  fix'd  in  the  fame  place,  we  cannot  con- 
ceive what  benefit  it  could  be  of  either  to  itfelf  or  any  thing  elfe : 
But  when  'tis  put  into  Motion,  it  may  be  of  ufe,  as  is  plain  from 
Experience,  tho'  not  always  without  a  Mixture  of  Evils :  But  Action 
is,  cateris  paribus,  preferable  to  Inadlivity ;  it  is  therefore  agreeable 
to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  produce  Motion  in  Matter,  if  the  Good 

arifing 

NOTE  S, 


(36.)  From  hence  it  may  be  obfcrv'd,  that 
there  was  fomc  Foundation  for  that  old  and  al- 
moll  univerfal  Notion,  that  all  natural  Evils 
arofe  (torn  Mutter  i  which  in  cffeft  they  do. 


but  not  from  it  as  an  eternal  independent 
Caufe,  or  the  Evil  Principle  of  the  Manithces^ 
as  will  be  (hewn  below.  See  Eayle\  Did. 
p.  978. 


o 


98 


Concerning  Natural  EvlL 

from  thence  do  but  over-ballanee  the  Evil,  fo  long  as  no  Evils  ar^ 
permitted  which  are  feparable  from  Motion,  nor  fuch  as  can  affed: 
Spirits,  which  are  purely  immaterial.  s\  c^  [. 

Such  Motion  IV.  Now,  if  it  be  granted  that  God  could,  confidently  with  his 
rais*d"in^fat-  Gooduifs,  both  crcdtc  Matter  and  put  it  into  Motion,  it  neceffarily 
tcr,  as  might  follows,  that  its  Motions  muft  interfere  with  one  another.  If  you 
jcparate  it     ^j^y  ^j^^^  Matter  might  move  uniformly  and  altoeether,  either  in  a 

into  Parts.         ,/     ^     ^  .  .         =>^.      ,  ,      ,  '  .  r  i,  n      -  %  , 

Hence  the  rt/r«Sf  Lffie  or  in  a  Circle,  and  the  contrariety  of  Motions  by  that 
feneration  means  be  prevented :  I  anfwer  j  The  whole  Mafs  of  Matter  would  be  no 
tionofTo-^  lefs  rigid  andufelefs  with  fuch  a  Motion  as  this,  than  if  it  were  entirely 
dies  nuur.il-  at  reft;  it  would  neither  be  more  fit  for  Animals,  nor  more  adapted  to 
ly  ariics.  ^j^^  ^^^^  wliich  it  now  anfwcrs.  Such  a  Motion  therefore  was  to  be 
excited  in  it,  as  would  fcparate  it  into  parts,  make  it  fluid,  and  ren- 
der it  an  Habitation  fit  for  Animals.  But  that  could  not  be  without 
contrariety  of  Modon,  as  any  one  that  thinks  of  it  at  all  will  perceive : 
and  if  this  be  once  admitted  in  Matter,  there  neceffarily  follows  a  Z)/- 
vijion  and  Dif parity  of  parts,  CI  a/king  and  Oppojition,  Comminution^ 
Concretion  and  Repuljion,  and  all  thofe  Evils  which  we  behold  in  Ge^ 
neration  and  Corruption.  God  could  indeed  have  removed  all  thefe 
from  Matter,  by  taking  away  its  Motion,  but  they  are  eithi^r  to  be 
tolerated,  or  Matter  muft  remain  fix'd  and  immoveable  in  the  fame 
Situation.  Some  may  aik,  why  God  would  not  produce  fuch  Motion 
in  Matter  as  migh  render  all  its  Concretions  fo  perfect  as  not  to  be 
liable  to  Dijj'olution  or  Corruption.  For,  fince  the  Power  of  God  \% 
infinite,  nothing  on  his  fide  hinders  this  from  being  done,  what  hin- 
ders therefore  on  the  fide  of  Matter }  I  anfwer ;  Its  Motion  and  £)/- 
vijibility.  For,  if  you  fuppofe  any  fort  of  Motion  in  Matter,  it 
muft  neceffarily  be  either  ufelefs,  as  we  faid  before,  or  in  oppojite  Di- 
reSlions.  The  mutual  clafhing  of  thefe  Concretions  could  therefore 
not  be  avoided,  and  as  they  ftrike  upon  one  another,  whether  we 
fuppofe  them  hard  or  foft,  a  concuffion  of  the  parts,  and  feparation 
from  each  other,  would  neceffarily  be  produced :  But  a  Separation  or  . 
Diffipation  of  the  parts  is  Corruption.  This  therefore  could  not  be^ 
avoided  without  violence  done  to  the  Laws  of  Motion  and  the  Nature 
o£  Matter.    For,  to  hinder  moveable  things  from  interfering,  and  the 

Pare?, 


Concerning  Natural  EviL  99 

Parts  which  are  feparable  in  themfelves,  from  feparatmg  fey  mutual 
repul/ions,  would  require  a  perpetual  Miracle,  {^J-)- 

V.  Secondly}  Since  it  is  proper  that  Matter  fhould  be  put  into j^^^^j^j^yj^j^^. 
Motion,' 'tis  better  that  this  {hould  be  done  according   to  fome  cer- certain  Laws 
tain  Laws,  and  in  an  orderly  Courfe,  than  at  random,  and  as  it  were  ^^"'j^  "^^""^ 
by  chance.     For  by  this  means,  the  Syftems  compofed  of  Matter  will  vation^'f '^"^^ 
have  both  more  durable  and  more  regular  Periods.     The  firft  Evil  a-  things,  than 
riiing  from  Matter  was,  we   faid,   th.^  jarring  of  Elements;   from ^^ ^a^^j^V 
whence  comes  their  Corruption  and  DifTolution,  Inftability  and  Vicif-  hence  God 
iitude.     It  may  be  furprifirig,  that  all  thefe  fhould  proceed  from   a  J'^jg^JJ^"" 
ftable,  fix'd  and  uniform  Good.     But  we  have  made  it  appear,   that  into  Tarioua 
Matter  could  not  move  at  all  without  thefe,  and  it  was  more  eligi-  Syftems. 
ble  that  the  World  fhould  be  liable  to  them,  than  deftitute  of  Ani- 
mals.    And  that  thefe  Evils  fhould  not  multiply  beyond  Neceflity, 
the  Divine  Goodnefs  has  taken  care,  by  rcflraining  its  Motion  under 
certain  Laws,  fo  as  to  make  it  fleady,  and  as  conflant  as  could  be ; 
fo  that  the  Machines  compofed  of  it  might  be  as  little  fhock'd  with 
contrary  Motions  as  pofTible,  and  endure  for  a  long  time ;  nay,  fome 
of  them  in  certain  places  and  circumflances  forever.  For  if  no  par- 
cels of  Matter  were  directed  by  any  certain  and  determinate  Rule, 
fuch  a  confufed  Motion  would  jumble  every  thing  together,  nor  could 
any  thing  lafl  for  ever  fo  fhort  a  time.    On  this  account  God  efla- 
blifh'd  certain  Laws  of  Motion,  and  perpetual  Rules ;  and  framed 

O  2  the 


N  o  r  E  S. 


(37.)  That  is,  there  could  be  no  general  pre- 
cftabiifli'd  Laws  of  Nature  but  God  muft  cont:- 
nually  interpofc,  and  cSe&.  every  thing  by  his 
own  direft  and  immediate  Power  :  The  bad 
confequenccs  of  which  are  very  obvious.  There 
could  be  no  Arts  znA  Sciences,  no  Skill  ox  Indu- 
Jlry,  no  regular  Methods  of  providing  for  our 
Bodies,  or  improving  our  Minds  in  the  Know- 
ledge of  things.  All  which  evidently  prefup- 
pofc,  and  arc  entirely  founded  on,  fome  fet- 
tled, certain  Laws  of  the  Univerfe  difcovcrable 
by  us. 

**  We  are  fo  far  acquainted  (fays  the  Author 
"  of   the  Religion  of  Nature    Delin.    p.   96.) 


"  with  the  Laws  o^  Gravitation  and  M  tlon, 
"  that  we  are  able  to  calculate  their  EiFeds, 
"  and  ferve  ourfelves  of  them,  fupplying  up- 
"  on  many  occafions  the  defeft  of  Power  in 
"  ourfelves  by  Mechanical  Powers,  which  ne- 
*'  ver  fail  to  anfwer  according  to  the  Efta- 
"  bliihmcnt,  ^f."  What  the  known  Laws  of 
Nature  are,  fee  in  Cbeyve^s  Phil.  Prin.  Keil'a 
Introd.  to  Phyf.  &c.  Concerning  the  neceflity 
of  the  prefcnt  Laws  of  Motion,  and  the  fit- 
nefe  of  them  to  attain  the  intended  Ends,  fee 
Dr.  J.  Clarke  on  Natural  Evil,  p.  92,  ^c.  and- 
150,158. 


I  oo  Concerning  Natural  EviL 

the  great  Mafs  of  Beings  into  certain  Machines  and  Syftems,  which' 
have  fuch  an  exact  correfpondencc,  as  to  contribute   their  mutual. 
Aififtance  towards  preferving  die.  Motion  and  Order  prefcribed  by  the 
Deity.     Neither  was  it  convenient  that  Matter  (hould  every  where- 
confift  of  the  fame  kind  of  parts ;  but  rather  that  it  fliould  be  in  one 
place  very  fluid,  fimilar  and  homogeneous,  fuch   as.  we  believe   the 
Mtber  to  be;  in  another,  folid  and  compact,  as  the  Earth  is,  and  per- 
haps the  Stars  j  in  another,  mix'd  with  heterogeneous  Particles,  fuch 
as  we  find  the  Air  and  Water. 

VI.  We  mufl  confefs,  that  fuch  a  Mafs  as  the  Earth  is,  feemsmotT 
f-imLi^ht  fo  beautiful,  or  fo  fit  for  Motion,  as  the  pure  fluid  ^ther,  'tis  alfo 
and  other  morc  liable  to  Corruption  and  Changes  ;  yet  it  is  mofl:  certain,  that. 
Pha-nomena,  jj^g  Earth  was  not.confliituted  in  this  manner  for  no  reafon  at  all,  or 
ftemo'fthls  unncccflarily :  perhaps  xh^  Mundane.- ^^txn  could  no  more  confifl 
World  is  the  without  thcfe  folid  Maflrs,  than,  the  human  Body  without  Bones. 
Stau'ti-'^^^o  fober  Man  doubts,  but  God  could  have  difpofed  this, Material 
luJ.             World  into  other  Syfiems ;  and  of  what  kind  foever  thefe  had  been,. 

our  Reafon  could  never  have  comprehended  the  contrivance  of  them. 
For,  flnce  our  Planetary  Syfl:em  is  incomprehenfible  to  us,  much  more 
will  the  Fabric  of  the  whole  Univerfe  be  fo  j  but,  as  far  as  we  do  un- 
dierfland  the  difpofition  of  it,  all  is  well,  elegant  and  beautiful :  and 
if,  among  all  the  Phasnomena  of  Nature,  we  were  only  acquainted . 
with  Light,  that  would  fhew  US; the  juft  and  admirable  Structure  o£, 
it.  It  is  reafonable  therefore  to  believe,  thit  this  is  the  very  beft,  and 
attended  with  the  leafl;  Inconveniencies. 

VII.  You'll  fay  that  fome  particular  things  might  have  been  bet- 
afn'mTthat"  ^J*.  But,  flncc  you  do  not  thoroughly  underfland  the  whole,  you 
VLttermjpht  have  no  right  to  afiirm  thus  much.  We  have  much  greater  Reafon 
i'nttb^ncr'^  to  prefume,  that  no  one  part; of  it. could  be  chang'd  for  the  better, . 
Syftems.fince  without  greater  detriment  to  the  refl:,  which  it  would  either  be  in- 
wedonot  confiftcnt  with,  Or  diffigure  by  its  Difproportion  *.  For  we  have 
^er{bnd"he  fhcwn  before,  that,  all  manner  of  Inconveniencies  could  not  be  a- 
prcfcni,       voided,  becaufe  of  the  Imperfection  of  Matter,  and  the  Nature  of 

Motion.    That  State  of  things  was  therefore  preferable,  which  was 

attended 'with  the  fewefl:  and  Icaft  Inconveniencies.     And' who  but  a 

very  rafh>.indifcrect  Perfon  will  affirm,  that  God  has  not  actually 

made. 
•  &f^  Not?.  42. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil,  i-oj 

made  cBoice  of  this  ?  Nay,  who  can  do  it  with  any  fhadow  of  Rea- 
fon,  unlefs  he  throughly  undcrftands  both  this  and  that  other  which 
he  would  prefer  to  it?  Whoever  pronounces  upon  them  before  this, 
gives  Sentence  before  he  has  look'd  into  the  Caufe,  and  is  at  the  fame 
time  both  a- partial  and  an  incompetent  Judge. 

It  concern'd  us  the  more  to  have  this  well  explain'd,  that  being  con- 
vinc'd  of  the  Convenience  or  Meliority  o{  the  whole  Material  Syftem, 
we  may  more  eafily  perceive  the  Origin  of  thofe  Evils  which  necelTariiy 
follow  from  the  Contrai'iety  of  Motion,  and  the  Corruption  of  things. 


S  E  C  T.    IL 

Concerning  Animals  and  the  Variety  of  them. 

\i  Qlnce  Matter  is  not  Self-confclous,  nor  able  to  enjoy  itfelf,  norca-^^*"^''  '^^'^ 
O  pable  of  receiving  any  benefit  from  itfelf,  it  follows,  that  it  be  made  fo^ 
was  not  made  for  itfelf,   but  for  fomething  elfe,  to  which  it  was  to 'ts  own  fake, 
be  fubfervient  in  Senfation,  Thought,  or  Fruition.     We  find  by  Expe-  seif  confci° 
rience,  that  Matter  can  be  thus  ferviceable  to  a  thinking  Being,  tho'ous,'tis  there- 
ftupid  and  infenfible  itfelf:  'Tis  probable  therefore  that  God  defign'd  f^'^^Jf  s^  ^ ' 
and  directed  all  Matter  ta  this  end  as  far  as  was  poflible.    Hence  of  Aaimais. 
comes  the  Union  of  fenfible  and  thinking  Beings  with  the  Particles 
of  Matter,  as  we  experience  in  ourfelves.     The  fame  may  be  faid  of 
all  its  parts,  as  far  as  the  order  and  conftitution  of  things  allow'd. 
There  is  nothing  therefore  in  vain,  nothing  idle,  nor  any  Region  with- 
out its  Animals.     For  fuppofing,  as  we  faid,  fo  many  pure  Spirits,  fe** 
parate  from  Matter,  to  be  made  as  were  convenient  j  as  thefe  occupy 
no.Place,*,  there  would  be  no  lefs  Room  for  other  thinking  fenfible- 

O  3-  Subilanees' 


loa 


'Ti  s  pro  t- able 
that  Animals 
vary  accor- 
ding to  the 
variety  of 
thoic  regions 
which  they 
are  dcftin'd 
to  inhibit : 
Therefore 
the  JEthcr 
and  Air,  in 
all  probabi- 
lity, have 
their  proper 
inhabitants, 
as  well  as  the 
Earth. 


Concerninfy  Natural  Evil 

o 
Subftances  devoid  of  Matter  to  exerciie  their  Faculties,  and  enjoy 
themfelves,  which  for  the  future  let  us  call  Souls,  (38.). 

II.  Now,  fince  the  Structure  of  this  vifible  World  confifts  of  vari- 
ous Bodies,  viz.  pure  /Ether,  Air,  Earth,  &c.  'tis  highly  probable,  as 
we  faid  before,  that  each  of  thefe  has  its  proper  Inhabitants,  viz.  by 
the  Union  of  Souls  with  the  Particles  of  Matter.  Without  fuch  an 
Union,  we  cannot  apprehend  how  there  (hould  be  either  iEthereal  or 
Aerial  Animals.  For  the  moft  fluid  Bodies,  if  not  united  to  an  im- 
material Soul,  or  compaded'fogether,  would  be  immediately  diflblv'd, 
and  every  blaft  of  Wind  would  diffipate  fuch  Animals:  either  then 
thefe  vaft  Fields  of  Air  or  JExher  mull  be  entirely  deflitute  of  Inhabi- 
tants, which  very  few  will  believe,  who  behold  every  clod  of  Earth 
ftock'd  with  Animals,  or  furnifli'd  after  fome  fuch  Manner  as  we 

con- 

N  O  r  E  S. 


(38.)  "  God,  if  he  pleafed,  could  have  made 
'*  nothing  but  immortal  Spirits:  and  he  could 
**  have  made  as  many  of  thefe  as  there  are  indi- 
*'  vidual  Creatures  of  all  forts  in  the  World  j 
*•  but  it  fecm'd  good  to  the  wife  Architeft,  to 
*•  make  feveral  Ranks  and  Orders  of  Beings, 
"  and  to  difplay  his  Power  and  Goodnefs  and 
"  Wifdom,  in  all  imaginable  variety  of  Crea- 
*•  tures ;  all  which  ftiould  be  good  in  their 
»•  kind,  tho'  far  fliort  of  the  perfeftion  of  An- 
•*  gels,  ay-d  immortal  Spirits.  He  that  will 
*•  build  a  Houfe  for  all  the  Ufes  and  Purpofes 
*'  of  v.'hich  an  Houfe  is  capable,  cannot  make 
**  it  all  Foundation,  and  great  Beams  and 
**  Pillars;  muft  not  fo  contrive  it,  as  to  make 
"  it  all  Rooms  of  State  and  Entertainment : 
**  but  there  mutt  of  neceffity  be  in  it  meaner 
**  Materials,  Rooms,  and  Offices,  for  feveral 
"  ufes  and  purpofes,  wliich,  however  inferior 
**  to  the  rell  in  Dignity  and  Degree,  do  yet 
**  contribute  to  the  beauty  and  advantage  of 
"  the  whole  :  So  in  this  great  Frame  of  the 
"  World,  it  was  fit  there  Ihould  be  variety 
"  and  different  Degrees  of  Perfeftion  in  the 
*•  feveral  parts  of  it :  and  this  is  fo  far  from 
•*  being  an  impeachment  of  the  Wifdom  and 
*'  Goodjids  of  him  that  made  it,  that  it  is  an 


"  evidence  of  both.  For,  the  meanefl:  of  all 
"  God's  Creatures  is  good,  confidering  the 
'•  Nature  and  Rank  of  it,  and  the  end  to  which 
"  it  was  defign'd;  and  we  cannot  imagine 
•*  how  it  could  have  been  order'd  and  framed 
"  better,  tho'  we  can  eafily  tell  how  it  might 
"  have  been  worle :  and  that  if  this  or  that  had 
•*  been  wanting,  or  had  been  otherwife,  it  had 
*'  not  been  fo  good  ;  and  thofe  who  have  been 
"  moft  converfant  in  the  contemplation  of  na- 
•  ture,  and  of  the  Works  of  God,  have  been 
"  moft  ready  to  make  this  acknowledgment  *, 
'*  But  then  if  we  con  fide  r  the  Creatures  of 
'*  God  with  relation  to  one  another,  aud  with 
'*  regard  to  the  whole  frame  of  Things,  they 
**  will  all  appear  to  be  very  good  ;  and  not- 
♦*  withftanding  this  or  that  kind  of  Creatures 
"  be  much  lefs  pcrfeft  than  another,  and  there 
"  be  a  very  great  diftance  between  the  Per- 
•♦  feftion  of  a  Worm,  and  of  an  Angel,  yet 
**  confidering  every  thing  in  the  fame  Order 
«*  which  it  hath  in  the  Creation,  it  is  as  good 
*'  as  could  be,  confidering  its  Nature  and 
"  Ufe,  and  the  Place  allotted  to  it  among  the 
"Creatures."  lillotfon,  Serm.  91.  p.  683. 
Vol.  2.  Fol.  See  alfo  Raj  on  the  Creafisn, 
Part  2.  p. 423.  4th  Edit. 


v.  g.  Bo^le,  WUkinsy  Cheynty  Derhamy  Grew,  Ray,  Nezcentyt,  &c. 


Concernincr  Natural  EziL 

conJ€(5lure.  (3'9.)  If  you  fay^  here's  Room  for  pure  Spirits,  I  an- 
fwer;  Since  thefe  do  not  fill  up  Place,  nor  have  any  Relation  to  it, 
*tis  the  fame  thing  wherever  they  be,  and  Material  Subftances  have 
nothing  at  all  to  do  with  them :  It  is  not  therefore  necellary  to  fup- 
pofe  fuch  large  tracts  of  Air  or  -^ther  void  of  Animals,  in  order  to 
make  Room  for  thefe,  for  which  it  would  be  no  lefs  commodious, 
if  repleniih'd  with,  than  if  deftitute  of  Animals.  If  then  this  be  gran- 
ted us,  we  muft  affirm,  that  there  is  as  great  variety  of  Souls,  as  of 
Animals,  and  that  it  is  one  Species  which  exerts  its  Operations  by  the 
help  of  i^^thercal  Matter,  and  another  which  ftands  in  need  of  Ae- 
real,  and  a  third  of  Terreflrial.  Neither  will  every  Element  be  fit 
for  every  Animal,  but  each  will  have  its  proper  Inhabitants:  Nor  caa' 
there  be  any  jufi:  caufe  of  Complaint  that  they  are  uneafy  out  of  their 
proper  Element,  that  Men  cannot  live  any  while  commodioufly  in 
JEthcVy  nor  perhaps  .Ethereal  Animals  upon  the  Eanh :  For  *tis  fuffi- 

eient 


10? 


NOTES, 


(39.)  We  have  a  beautiful  Dcfcription  of 
hat  our  Author  here  conjedures,  in  the  S/>et:- 
'or,  N°.  qig.  "  If  we  confider  thofe  parts 
of  the  Material  World  which  lye  the  ncir- 
eft  to  U-,  and  are  therefore  fubjed  to  our 
Obfervations  and  Enquiries,  it  is  amazing 
to  confider  the  Infinity  of  Animals  with 
which  it  is  ftock'd*  Every  part  of  Matter 
is  peopled;  every  green  Leaf  fwarms  with 
Inhabitants.  Therd^  is  fcarce  a  fingle  hu- 
mour in  the  Body  of  a  Man,  or  of  any  o- 
ther  Animal,  in  which  our  Glafies  do  not 
difcover  myriads  of  living  Creatures.  The 
Surface  of  Animals  is  alfo  covered  with  o- 
ther  Animals,  which  are,  in  the  fame  man- 
ner, the  Bafis  of  other  Animals  that  live  up- 
on it ;  nay,  we  find  in  the  mofV  folid  Bodies, 
as  in  Marble  itfelf,  innumenble  Cells  and 
Cavities  that  are  crowded  with  fuch  imper- 
ceptible Inhabitants,  as  are  too  little  for  the 
naked  Eye  to  difcover.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  we  look  into  the  more  bulky  parts  of 
Nature,  we  fee  the  Seas,  Lakes  and  Rivers, 
teeming  with  numberlefs  kinds  of  living 
Creatures:  we  find  every  Mountain  and 
Marlh,   Wildernefs  ahd  Wood,  pientifully 


"  ftocked  with  Birds  and  Beafts,  and  every 
"  part  of  Matter  affording  proper  neceffaries 
"  and  conveniences  for  the  Livelihood  of  Mul- 
'♦  titudes  which  inhabit  it.  The  Author  of 
"  the  Plurality  of  Worlds  draws  a  very  good 
"  Argument  from  this  Confideration,  for  the 
"  peopling  of  every  Planet ;  as  indeed  it  feems 
►«  very  probable  from  the  analogy  of  Rcafon, 
"  that  if  no  part  of  Matter  which  we  are  ac- 
"  quainted  with,  lies  wafte  and  ufelefs,  thofe 
**  great  Bodies  which  are  at  fuch  a  diftance 
"  from  us,  fhould  not  be  defart  and  unpeopled, 
"  but  rather  that  they  fhould  be  furnilhed 
"  with  Beings  adapted  to  their  refpeftive  Si- 
•'  tuations.  Exigence  is  a  Bleffing  to  thofe  Be- 
"  ings  only  which  are  endowed  with  Percep- 
"  tion,  and  is  in  a  manner  thrown  away  upon- 
"  dead  Matter,  any  farther  than  as  it  is  fubfer- 
"  vient  to  Beings  which  are  confcious  of  their 
"  Exiftencc.  Accordingly  we  find,  from  (he 
"  Bodies  which  lie  under  our  Obfervatiop,. 
"  that  Matter  is  only  made  as  the  Bafis  and.  • 
"  Support  of  Animals,  and  there  is  no  more  of 
"  the  one  than  what  is  ncceffary  for  the  Exi* 
"  ftence  of  the  other."  See  alfo  \>t.  ScoWq 
Works,  Vol.  2.  Difcourie  15^.  p.  308,  l^c*.  Foi. 


ded ;  but  yet 
is  not  made 
to  no  pur- 
-pofe.orwith. 
out  dcfign. 


d  04.  'Concerning  Matiiral  Evil. 

cient  IFn every  one  nourifhes  its  proper  Inhabitants,  according  to  the 
Nature  and  Conftitution  of  each. 
The  Eartii  ^^^'  That  is  a  foolifli  Objection  therefore  of  tlie  Epicurean  Lucre- 
as  being  the  ttus  (40.),  that  the  World  owes  not  its  Original  to  a  Divine  Power  and 
Jcaftparto}  Goodnefs,  bccaufc  Mountains,  Woods  and  Rocks,  large  Fenns,  and 
Syfiem,  is  the  Occan  cover  fo  great  a  fhare  of  it ;  that  the  burning  heat,  viz.  of 
not  to  be  x\\c  horrid  ZoneySLTid  the  eternal  Frofij\iz.  of  the  two  Frigid,  take  up 
chiefly  rc2.r-^j^^^  two  Parts  of  it;  fince  the  Sea,  the  Rocks,  Winds,  and  Moun- 
tains, are  not  entirely  ufelefs  in  tl:ieir  prefent  Situation ;  for  this  was 
requifite  for  the  good  of  the  Univerfe,  and  -the  order  of  the  Mun- 
dane Syftem.  Neither  was  the  Earth  or  its  Inhabitants  to  be  regard- 
ed in  the  firfl  place.  For,  fince  it  is  but  a  fmall  Part  of  the  whok, 
and  almofl  a  Point,  where  would  have  been  the  Wonder  if  it  had 
not  been  fit  for  any  Inhabitants  at  all }  if  it  did  but  promote  the 
good  of  the  whole,  while  itfelf  was  barren  and  empty.  If  this  had 
'been  the  Cafe,  it  would  not  have  proved  an  ufelefs  part  of  the  World, 
any  more  than  a  Nail  is  of  a  Man's  Body ;  and  it  is  as  abfurd  to  de- 
fire  that  all  parts  of  the  Univerfe  fhould  immediately  afford  Habi- 
tation to  Animals,  as  that  every  Part  and  Member  of  an  animated  Bo- 
<ly  fhould  by  itfelf  conflitute  an  Animal  j  'tis  fuiiicient  if  every  par- 
ticular Member  confpire  w^ith  the  refl,  and  exercife  its  own  proper 
Function,  and  confequently  that  the  Earth,  which  is  a  member  of  the 
Univerfe,  have  its  peculiar  ufe  in  promoting  the  Good  of  the  whole. 
If  therefore  the  whole  Earth  was  ferviceable,  not  to  preferve  Ani- 
mals, but  only  Motion,  nothing  could  be  objeded  from  thence  a- 
gainft  the  Goodnefs  of  its  Author.  Neither  would  it  appear  {grange  to 
any  that  confiders  the  Immenfity  of  the  Works  of  God,  and  how  mi- 
nute a  Portion  of  them  the  Earth  is,  if  it  were  entirely  deftitute  of 
Inhabitants:  nor  would  it  therefore  be  in  vain.  How  much  more 
then  may  we  admire  the  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom  of  God  therein,  who 
has  fjU'd.the  whole  and  every  part  of  it  with  Life. 

IV.  He 


NOTES. 


(40.)  Sec  Dr.  Bentley's  Eiglith  Scrm.  S-  10. 
p.  329.  5th  Edit,  or  Batis  on  the  Exijlcnce  of 
Gid,  &c.  Ch.  I,  2,  and  3.  or  Cidburn%  Efloy.s 


I  ft  Part,  Fff.  7.  par.  5,  ^V.  and  zd  P.-.rt,  Efr.4. 
par.  5,  y..  and  the  Authon  mentioned  in 
Note  42. 


CQncemi>^  jSlatural  EviL  105 

IV.  He  knew  beft  what  Creatures  every  part  of  it  was  fit  for,  and  The  Earth 
has  affign'd  to  each  its  proper  place,  as  is  evident  to  every  Obferver :  "^?y  j'^  ^°"" 
The  Mountains,  the  Woods,  the  Rocks,  the  Seas,  have  their  proper  wLeHn 
Inhabitants,  which  they  fupply  with  Nourifhment.     The  Syftem  of^hisAuto- 
of  the  World  required  a  Globe  of  folid  Matter  fuch  as  the  Earth  is,  wodd!^'^* 
and  we  have  reafon  to  believe  that  this  is,  as  it  were,  a  Wheel  in  the  without 
great  Automaton,  without  which  its  Motion  would  be  very  imperfe<5t.  ^^JF^  ^^ 
But  befides  this  principal  End,  the  Divine  Wifdom  faw  that  it  might  would  be  de- 
fer ve  for  Nutriment  to  feveral  kinds  of  Animals,  that  no  manner  of';^<^^Y^-'."^^* 
Good  therefore  might  be  omitted  which  was  confident  with  the  pri-  IffoJdTan 
mary  End,  he  filled  it  with  all  thofe  Animals  that  it  was  capable  of,  habitation 
nor  could  the  Earth  afford  Suftenance  to  any  fuperior  or  more  proper  ^('j^jj^^^g  ^^ 
Beings.     God  has  given  thofe  parts  to  the  Brutes  which  were  unfit  for 
Men ;  and  that  thete  might  be  nothing  ufelefs,  which  yet  could  not 
be  alter'd  without  detriment  to  the  whole,  he  has  adapted  Animals  to 
every  Part  and  Region  of  it;  and  fince  the  Habitations  could  not 
conveniently  be  converted  into  any  other  form,  he  provided  fuch  Ani- 
mals as  wanted,  and  were  agreeable  to  thefe  Habitations.     Hence 
Mountains,  Woods  and  Rocks  give  Harbour  to  wild  Beafl:s,  the  Sea 
to  Fifhes,  the  Earth  to  Infeds.    Neither  ought  we  to  complain  that 
the  whole  Earth  is  not  of  ufe  to  Man,  fince  that  was  not  the  princi- 
pal End  it  was  made  for,  but  on  the  contrary,  Man  was  for  this  rea- 
fon placed  upon  the  Earth,  becacfc  it  afforded  a  convenient  Recepta- 
cle for  him.    And  what  if  it  had  been  totally  unfit  for  Man  ?  Would 
it  therefore  have  been  in  vain  ?    By  no  means.     On  the  contrary,  we 
arc  certain  that  God  would  have  given  it  other  Inhabitants,  to  whofe 
Maintenance  it  might  have  been  fubfervient.  (41.) 

V.  Thofe 

NOTES. 


(41.)  Our  Author's  Argument  here  might  be 
carry'd  much  farther,  and  the  Infinite  Wifdom 
of  the  Creator  demonftrated,  not  only  from  his 
having  made  nothing  in  vain,  or  ufelefs  in  ji- 
ff//, but  alfo  from  the  diftinft  and  various  rela- 
tions which  every  thing  bears  to  others,  and 
its  contribution  to  the  good  of  the  whole  : 


from  the  double,  the  mAtiifold  apparent  Ufes  of 
almoft  every  thing  in  Nature. 

Thus  the  Mounuins  mention'd  in  the  Ob- 
jeftion  oi  Lucretius,  and  which  many  Moderns 
alfo  have  mifreprefented  as  deformities  of  Na- 
ture, have  not  only  their  own  peculiar  Inha- 
bitants *,  but  alfo  afford  to  other  Animals  the 

moft 
See  §.  5.  par.  7.  af  this  Chap,  or  DerhamV  PhyJicoTbeol.  B.  3.  C.  4. 

P 


ic6 


The  Earth  is 
made  not  for 
Man  alone, 
but  for  the 
Univcrfc: 
to  think  o- 
therwife  fa- 
vours of  hu- 
man pride. 


Concerning  N^atural  Evil, 

V.  Thofe  therefore  who  urge  the  Unfitnefs  of  certain  Parts  of  the 
Earth  for  the  Suftenance  of  Man,  as  a  Fault  and  Defe6t  of  the  Di- 
vine Skill  in  making  them,  are  oblig'd  to  prove  that  the  Earth  was 
made  for  the  fake  of  Mankind  only,  and  not  of  the  Univerfe,  and 
that  every  thing  in  the  World  is  ufelefs  which  does  not  immediately 
tend  to  the  Ufe  of  Man.  But  this  is  abfurd,  and  what  no  one  would 
objedl,  who  is  not  blinded  with  Pride  and  Ignorance -f-.  We  ought 
rather  to  admire  the  Power  and  Goodnefs  of  God,  who  has^  fo  lem- 
per'd  his  Works,  tho'  they  be  immenfe  and  infinitely  various,  that 
there  is  nothing  in  them  which  exifts  not  in  the  very  beft  manner 
with  refpedt  to  the  whole j  and  which  he  has  not  replenifli'd  with  its 
proper  Inhabitants.  And  fince  the  Variety  of  the  conftituent  Parts 
and  Regions  of  the  Earth  is  no  greater  than  the  Nature  of  the  whole 

Machine 

N  0  'T  E  S. 


moft  commodious  Harbour  and  Maintenance, 
the  beft  Remedies  and  Retreats.  To  them  we 
owe  the  moft  pleafant  Profpefts,  the  moft  deli- 
cious Wines,  the  moft  curious  Vegetables,  the 
richeft  and  moft  ufeful  Metals,  Minerals,  and 
other  Foffils ;  and,  what  is  more  than  all,  a 
wholfome  Air,  and  the  convenience  of  navi- 
gable Rivers  and  Fountains. 

The  Ocean,  befides  the  fupport  of  its  own 
Inhabitants  (which  are,  in  all  probability,  as 
numerous  and  various  as  thofe  of  the  Earth) 
provides  alfo  vaft  Quantities  of  Vapours,  which 
refrefh  and  fruAify  the  Earth  itfelf,  and  nou- 
rifh  and  fupport  its  Inhabitants,  producing 
Springs,  Lakes  and  Rivers.  The  lefler  Seas, 
£.enns  and  Lakes,  are  fo  admirably  well  diftri- 
butcd  throughout  the  Globe,  as  to  afford  fuffi- 
cjent  Vapours  for  Clouds  and  Rains  to  temper 
the  Cold  of  the  Northern  Air,  to  cool  and  mi- 
tigate the  Heats  of  the  Torrid  Zone,  and  re- 
frelh  the  whole  Earth  with  fertile  Showers: 
As  is  fully  proved  by  the  excellent  Author  a- 
bove  mentioned*. 

As  to  the  variety  of  Ufes  which  the  fame 
thing  is  rendered  capable  of,  and  manifeftly  de- 
fign'd  for,  by  its  All-wife  Author,  fee  the  in- 
genious S.  C's  Impartial  Enqt.iry  into  the  Exi- 
gence, &c.  ofGody  p.  80.    **  To  obtain  a  great 

f  5^^  Note  33. 

•Pbiifito  7beol.  B.  2.  C.5; 


•'  number  of  Ends  by  as  few  means  as  may  be, 
"  is  the  higheft  point  of  Wifdom.  But  nothing 
*'  can  be  imagin'd  more  admirable  in  this  re- 
"  fpefl,  than  the  prefent  frame  of  things.  Thus 
"  tho'  the  human  Body  is  compofed  of  a  great 
*'■  variety  of  Parts,  yet  how  much  more  nume- 
/♦  rous  are  their  Ufes.?  How  many  are  the  U- 
'"  fcs  of  the  Hand,  which  direfted  by  Rea' 
f'  fon  is  infteadof  all  other Jnftruments  ?  How 
"  many  Advantages  do  we  owe  to  the  Eye,  the 
»•  Ear,  and  the  Tongue  .?  And  if  we  take  a 
*•  deeper  View,  and  look  into  the  minuter  parts 
**  of  which  thefe  are  compounded,  what  can  be 
•'  more  admirable  than  the  Variety  of  Aims 
"  and  Intentions  that  may  be  obferv'd  in 
"  each  ?  The  feveral  Ufes  of  the  Strudture 
"  and  Pofition  of  each  fingle  Mufcle  have 
.,"  been  computed  by  Galen  in  his  Book  de  For- 
«  matione  Fcetus,  to  be  no  lefs  than  ten.  The 
"  like  may  be  obferv'd  with  reference  to  the 
-'*  Bones  and  other  fimi la r  Parts,  but  efpecially 
*'  with  refpeft  to  the  Members  of  fuch  as  are- 
*•  heterogeneous  or  diffimular."  p.  81. 

The  fame  is  fhewn  at  large  by  Dr.  Grew, 
Cofmologia  Sacra,  B«.i.  C.5,  par.  13,  14,  l^c. 
ox  W.  Scott  on  tbe  IVifdom  and  Goodnefs  of  God, 
Serm,  1.  p.  15,  (3f<".  or  fFi/iins  Princ,  of  Nati 
R  elig.  C.  6. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil, 

Machine  required,  nor  the  Species  of  Animals  fewer  than  the  Food 
would  fupply,  we  muft  conclude  that  there  is  nothing  deficient  or 
redundant   in    it.  (42.) 

P  2  SECT. 


io7 


NOTES. 


(42.)  Hence  I  think  we  may  fafely  conclude 
with  our  Author  in  genera],  that  there  could 
have  been  no  partial  alteration  of  this  Syftem 
bat  for  the  worfe,  as  far  as  we  know,  at  leaft 
not  for  the  better.  They  who  hold  that  there 
might  have  been  a  total  one,  that  the  whole 
Scheme  of  things  might  pofSbly  have  been  al- 
ter'd  or  revers'd,  and  that  either  the  direft 
contrary,  or  a  quite  different  One,  would  have 
been  equally,  or  more  worthy  of  God  ;  the 
Men,  I  fay,  that  hold  this,  are  oblig'd  to 
fhew  the  poffibility  of  conceiving  it,  and  to 
explain  the  manner  how  it  may  be,  before  we 
are  oblig'd  to  believe  them.  They  muft  fhew, 
(hat  the  fame  things  which  are  now  conducive 
to  our  Happinefs,  and  confequently  the  Ob- 
jcfts  of  out  Love,  might  as  eafily  have  tended 
toourMifery;  and  confequently  have  been  as 
reafonably  the  Objefts  of  our  Averfion  ;  that 
bitter  might  have  been  fweet,  and  fweet  bit- 
ter;  that  the  famePaflions,  Objedls,  Exercifes, 
and  Inclinations,  fffr.  which  now  create  Plea- 
fure  in  us,  might  have  produced  a  different,  a 
quite  contrary  efleft,  or  no  effeft  at  all.  This 
they  are  oblig'd  to  do,  and  when  they  have 
done  all  this,  and  completed  their  Syftem,  and 
made  a  total  alteration  of  things,  as  they  ima- 
gine, for  the  better,  they  are  at  laft  only  got 
to  the  above  mentioned  abfurdity  of  putting 
this  Syftem  into  a  higher  C/a/s,  whereas  all  the 
different  ClafTes  in  every  conceivable  Degree 
of  Perfeftion,  were  fuppofed  to  be  entirely  fil- 
led at  the  firft.  We  muft  therefore  take  things 
as  they  are,  and  argue  only  from  the  prefcnt 
Nature  of  them,  colleflively.  In  which  View 
we  fhall  find  no  poflible  alteration  of  any  thing 
but  what  would  produce  greater  Inconvenien- 
ces, either  in  itfelf  or  others,  to  which  it  bears 
a  llrift  Relation.  Inftances  of  this  kind  are 
every  where  to  be  met  with  :  particular  proofs 
of  it  in  the  natural  World,  occur  in  Dr.  Ben- 


tlefs  Boyle's  LeB.  particularly  with  regard  to 
the  five  Senfes  of  the  human  Body,  p.  95,  96. 
fee  alfo  Locke  on  Humane  Under/landing,  B.  2. 
C.  23.  ^.  12.  with  refpeft  to  the  figure  and 
ftature  of  it,  in  Grew''s  Coftnologia  Sacra,  B.  I.' 
C.  5.  §.  25,  ^c.  and  as  to  the  feveral  Parts  of 
it  all  over  Boyle,  Cheyne,  Derham,  Newentyty 
Ray,  Cockburn,  Edwards,  W.  Scott,  or  Felling. 

The  fame  might  eafily  be  Ihewn  in  the  im- 
material World,  and  in  the  moft  exceptionable 
Part  of  it  J  viz.  the  Soul  of  Man,  its  Know- 
ledge, Freedom,  AfFeftions  *. 

On  this  occafion  I  fhall  take  the  liberty  to 
borrow  a  Sedlion  from  Mr.  MaxweWs  general 
Remarks  on  Cumberland,  C.  5.  "  The  Nature 
"  of  things  in  the  natural  World  is  fo  exaftly 
"  fitted  to  the  natural  Faculties  and  Difpofitions 
"  of  Mankind,  that  were  any  thing  in  it  other- 
*'  wife  than  it  is,  even  in  Degree,  Mankind 
"  would  be  lefs  happy  than  they  now  are. 
•'  Thus  the  dependence  of  all  natural  EfFeds 
"  upon  a  few  Jimplc  Principles,  is  wonderfully 
"  advantageous  in  many  refpefts.  The  De- 
"  grees  of  all  the  fenfible  Pleafures  are  exaftly 
*'  fuited  to  the  ufe  of  each  :  fo  that  if  we  cn- 
"  joy 'd  any  of  them  in  a  greater  degree,  we 
"  fhould  be  lefs  happy  ;  for  our  Appetites  of 
"  thofe  Pleafures  would  by  tlut  means  be  too 
'*  ftrong  for  our  Reafon ;  and,  as  we  are  fra- 
"  mcd,  tempt  us  to  an  immoderate  enjoyment 
"  of  them,  fo  as  to  prejudice  our  Bodies.  And 
"  where  we  enjoy  fome  of  them  in  fo  high  a 
"  degree,  as  that  it  is  in  many  cafes  very  diffi- 
**  cult  for  the  ftrongeft  to  regulate  and  mode- 
'*  rate  the  Appetites  of  thofe  Pleafures,  it  is  in 
"  fuch  Inftances  where  it  v/as  neceflary  to  coun- 
*•  terpoife  fome  difadvantages,  which  are  the 
*'  confcquenccs  of  the  purfuit  of  thofe  Plea- 
•*  fures.  Thus  the  pleafmg  Ideas  which  ac- 
*•  company  the  Love  of  the  Sexes,  are  neceffa- 


*  See  Sir  M,  Hale';  Prim.  Orig.  o/Mank.  C.  2,     De  Hominty  p.  52. 


io8 


Concerning  Natural  Evil* 
N  O  t  E  S. 


**  ry  to  bc'poflefs'd  in  fo  high  a  degree,  to  bal- 
*•  lance  the  Cares  of  Matrimony,  and  alfo  the 
•*  Pains  of  Child-bearing  in  the  Female  Sex. 
**  The  fame  may  be  faid  of  our  IntelleUual 
**  Pleafures.  Thus  did  we  receive  a  greater 
**  Pleafurc  from  Benevolence,  Sloth  wrould  be 
**  encouraged  by  an  immoderate  Bounty.  And 
were  the  Pleafures  of  our  Inquiries  into  the 
Truth  greater,  we  fhould  be  too  fpeculative 
and  lefs  adlive.  It  fcems  alfo  probable,  that 
the  Degree  of  our  Intel leftual  Capacity  is 
very  well  fuited  to  our  Objefts  of  Knowledge, 
and  that  had  we  a  greater  degree  thereof,  all 
other  things  remaining  as  they  are,  we  fhould 
be  lefs  happy.  Moreover,  it  is  probablv  fo 
*■  adapted  to  the  inward  frame  of  our  Boaies, 
••  that  it  could  not  be  greater,  without  either 

*  an  alteration  in  the  Laws  of  Nature,  or  in 
••  the  Laws  of  Union  between  the  Soul  and 
•*  Body.  Farther ;  were  it  much  greater  than 
••  it  is,  our  thoughts  and  purfuits  would  be  fo 
**  fpiritual  and  refin'd,  that  we  fhould  be  taken 
»*  too  much  off  from  the  fenfible  Pleafures. 
••  We  fhould  probably  be  confcious  of  fome 
••  Dcfefts  or  Wants  in  our  Bodily  Organs,  and 

*  would  be  fenfible  that  they  were  unequal  to 
«•  fo  great  a  Capacity,  which  would  neceffarily 
•*  be  foUow'd  by  uneafinefs  of  Mind.     And 

*  this  fcems  to  hold  in  the  Brute  Creation : 
•1  For,  methinks  it  would  be  for  the  difadvan- 
**  tage  of  a  Horfe  to  be  endued  with  the  Un-r 


"  derftandingof  a  Man:  fuch  an  unequal  U- 
"  nion  muft  be  attended  with  continual  difquic- 
•*  tudes  and  difcontents.  As  for  our  Pains, 
"  they  are  all  either  Warnings  againll  Bodily 
"  Diforders,  or  are  fuch  as,  had  we  wanted 
"  them,  the  Laws  of  Nature  remaining  as  they. 
**  are,  we  fhould  either  have  wanted  fome  Ples- 
"  fures  we  now  enjoy,  or  have  pofTefs'd  them 
"  in  a  lefs  degree.  Thofe  things  in  Nature 
"  which  we  cannot  reconcile  to  the  foregoing 
"  opinion,  as  being  ignorant  of  their  Ufe, . 
"  we  have  good  reafon  from  Analogy  to  bc- 
"  lieve,  are  really  advantageous,  and  adapted 
"  to  the  Happinefs  of  Intelligent  Beings  of  the 
*'  Syflem  :  tho'  we  have  not  fo  full  and  com- 
"  plete  a  Knowledge  of  the  entire  Syftem,  as 
"  to  be  able  to  point  out  their  Particularities. 
"  From  thefe  Obfervations  we  may  conclude, 
"  that  all  th£  various  Parts  of  our  Syflem  arc 
*'  fo  admirably  fuited  to  one  another,  and  the 
"  whole  contrived  with  fuch  exquifite  Wif- 
"  dom,  that  were  any  thing,  in  any  part  there- 
"  of,  in  the  leaft  othervvife  than  it  is,  without 
*•  an  alteration  in  the  whole,  there  would  be  a 
**  lefs  Sum  of  Happinefs  in  the  Syflem  than 
"  there  now  is.'" 

See  alfo  the  Ingenious  Author  of  the  Nature 
end  ConduSl  «f  the  PaJJions,  p.  179,  201,  202. 

But  this  will  be  more  fully  confidercd  in 
the  4th  Se£Uon. 


SECT. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  109, 


s  E  C  T.     IIL 

0/  Death. 

'Ti«  probable 

I.  T  T  7E  know  by  Experience,  that  Soul's  united  to  Bodies  move  thu  the  SoU- 
VV    them  fome  way  or  otKer;  viz.  by  Thought  and  VoHtion  :  gQ^'j^/i^thg 
for  thus  we  move  our  own.     And  'tis  probable,  that  the  Gravity,  So-cauic  why 
lidity,  and  Hardnefs  of  our  Bodies,  together  with  the  Refiftence  of  ^^e  cannot 
the  adjacent  ones,  are  the  Caufes  why  we  cannot  move  them  every  way  IJi'hhherTe 
as  we  pleafe.  pieafe. 

II.  A  Soul  then  united  to  a  portion  of  ^Ethereal,  uniform,  and  per-^^^       .^■ 
feftly  fluid  Matter,  free  from  the  Impediment  of  Gravity  and  Refi-  ted  to  a  por- 
ftence,  may  in  all  probability  move  its  Body  whiiherfoever  it  pleafes.fio"j'J"^the- 
Such  a  Body  therefore  would  be  perfectly  obfequious  to  the  thought  J^^  ^.^J^^^* 
and  will  of  the  Soul  that  inhabits  it:  and  if  it  receiv'd  any  detriment jnoye  it 
from  the  neighbouring  Bodies,  it  could  repair  it  by  its  Will  alone  j  ^^1^,^^^]^^^ 
at  leaft  fo  long  as  the  Miher  continued  in  its  Fluidity  and  Purity.  Un-prcfe'rveits 
lefs  the  Animal  therefore  will'd  the  contrary,  its  Body  would  be  incor-  ^^'""  •  Aich 
ruf title ^  and  always  fit  for  Union,  /.  e.  immortal.    If  any  one  ^)^^y\\,txJ\oxt  is.  • 
that  the  Bodies  of  the  Blefled,  which  we  call  Ccelefiial^  need  no  Mo-  immortal. 
tion  or  Change  of  Condition,  fince  they  enjoy  continual  Pleafure  j  for 
no  one  moves  or  changes  his  State,  but  in  order  to  remove  fome  prefent 
Uneafinels.     I  anfwer ;  Thefe  Bodies  are  not  therefore  immortal  be- 
caufe  they  are  naturally  incorruptible  (for  that  would  be  incompatible  , 
with  the  Nature  of  that  Matter  whereof  they  are  compofed)  but  be- 
caufe  they  are  put  into  fuch  Places  and  Circumftances  by  the  Deity, , 
that  they  can,  even  with  Pleafure,  forefee  and  prevent  all  fuch  things 
as  might  tend  to  introduce  either  Corruption  or  Fain.     Neither  does 
their  Pleafure  or  Happincfs  confift  in  Reft  properly  fo  call'd,  but  in; 
Activity,  in  fuch  Adts  and  Exercifes  of  their  Faculties  as  they  choofe: 
Now,  fince  they  may  exercifethcmfelves  perpetually  according  to  their 

own 


no 


'Concernino-  Matural  EviL 

o 


own  Choice,  and  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  them,  they  may  be  perpe- 
tually happy  J  as  will  be  declared  below.  All  which  are  different  in 
folid  Bodies. 

III.  We  cannot  certainly  determine  what  Life  is  in  thefe  Animals 
atcrreiiral^  which  havc  folid  Bodies,  but  we  fufficiently  apprehend  where  \t  is, 
Animal  is  a   from  Certain  Marks  and  Tokens.     For  where  there  is  a  circular  mo- 
fci"  which    ^io^  ^^  ^^  Fluids,  there  is  Nutrition  and  Increafe,  there  is,  as  I  con- 
maybe  broke,  jedture,  fome  fort  of  Life.     Now,  'tis  evident,  that  this  circular  mo- 
*"a^fl'"w""  ^*^"  *"^y  ^^  interrupted  by  the  force  of  adjacent  Bodies :  the  folid  Bo- 
out,  and  thi  dy  of  an  Animal  is  a  kind  of  Veffel  in  which  the  humours  have  a  flux 
circular  mo-  2^nd  rcflux  thro'  Certain  dudts  and  channels  framed  by  Divine  Skill,  in 
Such  Ani-  <  the  motion  of  which  Life  conlifts.     Now  this  V^lfel  may  be  broke  in 
mais  then  are  pieccs  by  the  impulfe  of  other  Bodies,  fince  by  the  native  imperfection 
monS!^"^      of  Matter  it  is  capable  of  DifTolution ;  but  when  the  Veffel  is  broken, 
the  Fluids  therein  contain'd  mufl  neceffarily  flow  out,  the  circular  mo- 
tion muft   ceafe,  and  together  with  it  animal  Life.     Such  Animals 
.  therefore  as  have  folid  Bodies,  are  by  Nature  Mortal,  and  cannot  lafl 
for  ever,  without  violence  done  to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  of  Matter, 
and  Motion.     There  tnufl  then  have  been  either  none  at  all  created, 
-ov  fuch  as  are  naturally  Mortal.     The  imperfedion  of  Matter  could 
not  fuffer  it  to  be  otherwife.     For  the  hard  and  folid  parts  belonging 
•to  thefe  Bodies  are  of  fuch  a  frame  as  mufl  neceffarily  be  fliaken  and 
feparated  by  others  of  the  fame  bulk  and  hardnefs.     Every  thing  there- 
fore that  confifls  of  fuch  kind  of  Parts,  may  be  corrupted  and  diffol- 
•ved.  (43.)     Therefore  the  Divine  Power  and  Goodnefs  did  the  very 

beil 

N  0  r  E  S. 


(43.)  This  point  is  verj' well  illuftrated,  by 

^Dr.  y.    Clarke  on  Natural  •  Evil,  p.  245,  is^c. 

whole  Reafoning  is  entirely  built  upon  Sir   //: 

-Netvtofi's  Expcrimem^.     "Human   Bodies,  as 

**  well  as   thofe  of  all  other  Animals,  and  of 

*•  Plants,  are    compounded  of  very   different 

"  Materials,  fix'd  and  volatile,  fluid  and  folid  ; 

-"  as  appears  by  the  rcfolution  of  them  into 

**  their  conftituent  Parts;  and  they  arc  nou- 

*♦  riOi'd  in    the  fame  manner,  viz.  by  attrac- 

*'  tion.     For,  as  a  Spunge  by  Suftion  draws  in 

■*'  Water,  fo  the  Glands  in  the  Bodies  of  all 


*♦  Animals,  draw  different  Juices  out  of  the 
"  Blood,  according  to  the  particular  Nature 
"  and  conftitution  of  each  of  them :  So  long 
"  therefore  as  the  nourilhment  is  proper  to  af- 
"  fimilate  itfelf  to  tbefeveral  parts  of  the  Bo- 
*'  dy,  as  it  approaches  them  in  its  feveral  chan- 
"  nels ;  or,  fo  long  as  the  folid  particles  (fup- 
''  pofe  of  Salts,  which  are  abfolutcly  neceffary 
"  to  the  prefcrvation  of  all  Creatures)  retain 
"  their  form  and  texture;  fo  long  Life  is  pre- 
"  ferv'd  and  maintained.  And  when  the  nou- 
"  rifhraent  becomes  unfit  to  afCmilatci  or  the 

••faline 


Concerning  N^atural  Evil. 

feeft  even  in  creating  Beings  that  were  mortal:   for  an  Animal  fub- 
jedt  to  Death  is  better  than  none  at  all. 

IV.  But  God,  you'll  fay,  created  Men  at  firft  immortal,  as  we  un- 
derftand  by  iacred  Hiftory  :  Mortality  is  not  therefore  an  infeparable 
attendant  on  folid  Bodies.  I  anfwer  j  It  does  not  appear  to  us  of  what 
fort  the  Bodies  of  Mankind  were  before  the  Fall,  and  confequently  no- 
thing can  be  argued  from  thence  againft  the  necelTary  Mortality  of  all 
terreftrial  ones.  Farther,  we  fhould  remember  that  our  firft  Parents 
were  naturally  mortal,  but  that  God  covenanted  with  them  for  Im- 
mortality as  matter  of  Favour,  and  upon  particular  Conditions.  (44.) 

Noc 

NOTES.. 


Ill 


This  Hypo- 
thefis  recoKM- 
ciled  with 
facred  Hifto- 
ry, concer- 
ning the  im 
mortality  of 
the  firfl  Man.. 


"•  faline  particles  (which  towards  the  Center 
*'  are  very  denfe,  and  therefore  capable  of 
**  ftrongly  attrafting  the  Fluids  to  them)  lofe 
"  their  power  of  Attraftion,  either  by  being 
"  divided  into  lefs  particles  (as  they  may  be 
"  hy  their  watry  parts  inlinuating  themfelves 
**  into  their  Pores  with  a  gentle  heat)  or  elfe 
"  by  having  thofe  watry  Parts  violently  fepa- 
'*  rated  from  them  :  in  either  of  thefe  Cafes  all 
*•  their  Motion  will  ccafe,  and  end  in  Corrup- 
*'  tion,  Confufion  and  Death.  And  this  is  a- 
♦*  bundantly  confirm'd  by  Experience,  in  that 
♦•  every  thing  which  is  corrupted  or  putrify'd 
''  is  of  a  black  Colour;  which  Ihews,  that  the 
''  component  Particles  are  broken  to  Pieces, 
♦•  and  reduced  fo  fmall,  as  to  be  unable  even 
*'  to  refleft  the  Rays  of  Light,  Thus  we  fee, 
"  that  Dgatb,  or  the  Diflblution  of  the  Body, 
•*  is  the  neceffary  Confequence  of  thofe  Laws 
"by  which  it  is  framed  and  generated:  and 
**  therefore  is  not  in  itfelf  properly  an  Evi/,  a- 
**  ny  more  than  that  Fabric  can  be  ftiled  /'//, 
*'  the  Materials,  or  manner  of  building  of 
*'  which,  would  not  permit  it  to  laft  a  thou- 
"  fand  Years,  nor  was  originally  intended  to 
"  continue  half  fo  long.'*  See  the  latter  part 
of  Note  56. 

(44.)  See  Curcellai  Inft.  Rel.  Cbrift.  L.  3.  C. 
8.  §.  12,  13,  20,  l^c.  p.  1 10.  or  Limber cb.  The' 
olChrift:  L.  2.   C.  24:  S-  10.  p.  137, 138. 

From  hence,  I  think,  it  veill  appear,  that  all 


the  Objeftions  drawn  from  the  Hiftory  of  our 
firft  Parents  in  their  State  of  Innocence,  as 
often  urg'd  by  Mr.  Bayle  againft  the  prefent 
Queftion,  are  inconclufive :  Since  wkitever 
State  they  were  created  in,  it  was  extraordina.- 
ry,  fupernatural,  and  peculiar  to  them,  as  the 
firft  of  human  Race:  and  what,  their  Creator 
knew,  would  at  length  turn  to  the  fame  which- 
Mankind  is  in-  at  prefent.  Nay,  it  is  fcarce 
poflible  to  conceive  how  they  could  have  been 
preferv'd  and  propagated,  govern'd  and  direc- 
ted by  any  general  Laws  of  Nature  (which  yet' 
are  neceffary  to  the  whole  Syftem  *)  in  any  o- 
ther  Condition  than  they  now  are.  Not  to 
fpeak  here  of  their  moral  Part,  if  they  were- 
compofed  of  the  fame  Materials  of  which  all 
their  Pofterity  conlift,  they  muft  have  been  at 
leaft  naturally  Mortal ;  tho'  God  might,  if  he 
had  feen  it  proper,  have  interfered  in  fome 
preternatural  way,  and  thereby  alter'd  the  cir- 
cumftaiKes  of  their  Mortality  f.  And  accor- 
dingly the  Sentence  pronounced  upon  ^</rf>w, 
(Gen.  2.  17.)  In  the  Day  that  thou  eateft  thereof 
thou  Jhalt  dying  Dye,  or  Ihalt  die  a  Death,  might 
not  imply  that  he  fliould  never  have  died  at  all 
had  he  not  eaten  ;  but  that  he  fhould  die  both  a 
moxG  fpeedy  and  a  mort  painful  Death  that  other- 
wife  he  might  have  done :  as  that  emphatical' 
Phrafe  often  fignifies  in  Scripture.  See  more  of 
this  in  V  8.  par.  6.  and  N.  56,  and  at  the  end.  06 
this  Chapter. 


*■  5^/.  Note  37,, 


+  See  Sherlock  on  Death,.  Ch.  2.  ^;  i. 


1 1  a  Concerning  Natural  Evil. 

Not  that  they  (hould  have  continued  upon  Earth  for  ever;  but  tha^ 
God  promifed  to  tranflate  them  at  a  proper  time  by  his  efpecial  Fa- 
vour, and  preferve  them  in  a  place  fit  for  the  enjoyment  of  Eternity : 
as  we  believe  he  did  with  Enoch  and  Elias.  But  as  foon  as  this  Cove- 
nant with  God  was  broken  by  Sin,  Man  was  reftor'd  to  his  Native 
Mortality,  and  fubjed:ed  to  thofe  other  Inconveniencies  to  which  the 
^order  of  Nature,  and  the  chain  of  Natural  Caufes,  render'd  fuch  Bo- 
dies as  thefe  of  Mankind  obnoxious.  For  tho*  God  has  not  fo  far 
:  :tied  himfelf  up  to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  but  that  he  may  in  many  Ca- 
fes fufpend  and  fuperfede  them,  yet  this  is  not  done  frequently,  nor 
to  be  expecfted  for  the  fake  of  Sinners.  God  can  indeed  preferve 
Man  from  a^ual  Deaths  but  that  a  folid  Machine  confifting  of  hete- 
rogeneous Parts,  fuch  as  the  human  Body  is,  ihould  not  be  naturally 
Mortal  is  impoflible:  'Tis  a  Contradid:ion  therefore  that  Man,  in  th& 
prefent  State  of  things,  fhould  be  by  Nature  immortal. 


S  E  C  T.    IV. 

Of  the    Paffions. 

^c^aheB^  ^'  QUppofi^g  ^^^  Unlon  of  a  thinking  or  fenfitive  Soul  with  Matter, 
dies  of  a  pe-  O  its  Thought  and  Will  muft  neceflarily  be  afFe6l:ed  by  the  Motions 
culjar  Cr^jis,  of  that,  as  Body  muft  be  again  by  thefe.  For,  fince  the  Soul  is  of 
diforder'd  or  ^^ch  a  Nature  as  to  require  JMatter  of  a  peculiar  Crajis  and  Figure,  in 
removed,  the  order  to  difchatgc  its  Fundions,  it  follows,  that  when  this  Difpofiti- 
thrso°uTarI°'^  ^^  faulty,  or  quite  fails,  the  Operations  of  the  Soul  muft  be  im- 
eitherhin-  pedcd,  or  entirely  ceafe;  nor  can  it  poftibly  be  otherwife  while  the 
der'd  orde-  g^^j}  ^j^j  Body  are  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  they  really  are. 
'       *  II.  Since  therefore  it  is  no  diminution  of  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to 

and^  Body    havc  affign'd  fuch  a  Nature  to  them,  as  was  ihewn  before ;  we  muft 
admit  of  a    alfo  admit  of  a  mutual  Sympathy  between  them.    Now,  if  they  mu- 

wutual  '       *  ,.,^11 

'Sympathy:  ^"alJy 

Jtcnce    it  is  the  firft  care  of  the  Soul  to  keep  the  Body  free  from  hara. 


Concernins:  Natural  Evil. 


I!3 


tually  afTed  each  other,  the  confequence  will  be,  that  it  is  the  princi- 
pal bufinefs  of  the  Soul  to  prcferve  the  Body  from  harm :  In  order  to 
this,  'tis  necefTary  that  the  Soul  {hould  have  a  perception  of  what  is 
good  for,  or  prejudicial  to,  the  Body;  and  this  could  not  be  more  ef- 
fedually  procured,  than  by  providing  that  thofe  things  which  tend  to 
its  prefervation  fhould  communicate  an  agreeable  Senfation  to  the 
Soul,  and  what  is  pernicious,  a  difagreeable  one.  For,  otherwife,  the 
firft  thing  we  met  with  might  dcftroy  us,  while  we  were  not  appre- 
henlive,  or  regardl^s  of  itj  nor  fhould  we  be  folicitous  to  avoid  a  Ri-  • 
ver  or  a  Precipice.  (45.) 

III.  'Tis  necefTary  therefore  that  the  Soul  and  Body  fhould  afFedl  each  The  fcnfc  of 
otherinutually,that  the  impairing  or  DifTolution  of  the  Bodyfhould  create  Pain  is  nc- 
uneafinefs, which,  by  its  importunity,  might  recall  the  Soul  that  was  indif-  prefcrve** 
pofed  or  otherwife  engaged,  to  take  care  of  the  whole ;  nor  ought  it  to  Life,  as  alfo 
ceafe  urging,  till  what  was  hurtful  be  removed :  without  this  Impor-  Jj\j^"^  °^ 
tunity  perhaps  the  flrongefl  Animal  would  not  lafl  even  a  Day.     The 
Senfe  then  of  Pain  or  Uneafinefs  produced  in  the  Soul  upon  the  Muti- 
lation or  DifTolution  of  the  Body  is  necefTary  for  the  prefervation  of 
Life  in  the  prefent  State  of  things.     It  may  be  proved  from  the  fame 
Principles,  that  the  averfion  to,  or  dread  of.  Death  is  not  in  vain,  fince 
it  cannot  even  be  conceiv'd  how  a  frail  and  mortal  Body,  tofTed  by 
continual  Motions,  and  tumbled  among  other  hard  Bodies,  fhould  e- 

icape 

N  O  t  E  S. 


(45.)  This  Subjefl  is  very  well  handled  Isy 
Dr.  y.  Clarke,  on  Nat,  Evil,  p.  256,  k^c.  See 
alfo  A-Ir.  Huchefon  on  the  Nature  and  ConduSl  of 
the  PaJJions,  p.  5 1 ,  5  2.  or  Watts  on  the  U/e  and 
Mufe  of  them,  V  •  3»  ^c- 

1  fhall  tranfcribe  a  Paffiigc  from  the  Author 
laft  mention'd.  "  The  Paflions  are  defign'd 
"  for  the  Service  of  the  Body,  becaufe  they  a- 
•'  waken  Hot  only  all  the  animal  Powers,  but 
"  the  Thoughts  and  Contrivances  of  the  mind, 
"  to  prevent  whatfoever  is  hurtful  to  the  Bo- 
"  dy,  and  to  procure  what  ispleafant  and  ufe- 
"  ful  for  its  Support  and  Safety  ;  that  is,  in 
*•  more  compendious  Language,  io  obtain  Good, 
"  or  avoid  Evil.  While  our  Body  is  in  fuch  a 
"  feeble  Sutc,  furrounded  with  bangers,  and 


"  liable  to  fo  many  troublefome  Accidents, 
"  Diforders,  and  Death,  God  has  not  only 
"  furniflrd  us  with  the  Senfations  of  Pleafure 
"  and  Pain,  to  give  us  fpeedy  Notice  of  what 
"  hurts  or  relieves  the  Body,  but  he  has  alfo 
"  given  us  the  Paflions  of  Joy  and  Sorrow,  of 
"  Defire  and  Averfion,  to  affift  in  this  Work, 
"  that  the  Body  may  be  better  provided  with 
*♦  what  is  necefTary  to  its  Health  and  Life,  and 
"  may  be  better  guarded  againft  the  Danger  of 
"  Wounds  and  Bruifes,  Diftempers  and  Death." 
Thus  much  for  the  ufe  of  what  our  Author 
calls  the  Sympathy  between  Soul  and  Body,  the 
Pajfions,  AffeBions,  A;c.  with  rcfpeft  to  the  Boip, 
Concerning  the  ufe  and  neceffity  of  them  in 
regard  to  the  Mind,  fee  Note  47.  ^ 

o 


1 1^  Concerning  Natural  EdiK  ' 

fcape  DilToIlition,  if  the  Soul  which  moves  that  Body  were  not  fore* 
warn'd  to  itvoid  Death  by  the  natural  horroir  of  its  approach.  (46.)  '■    ■. 

IV.  Now 

NOTES. 


1-     \iVi^ 


(46.)  To*  rftiy  ia'jfe  olijeAs  •,  "  That  the 
"  Conlcquences  above  mciuion'd  might  as  rea- 
**  dily  and  certainly  be  avoided  by  the  fole 
"  attradion  of  Pleafure  cncreas'd  or  diftiinifh'd 
"  in  certain  Proportions.  Would  not  a  Fore- 
"  tafte  of  more  cxquilite  Pleafure  in  removing 
"  your  Chair  from  a  great  Fire,  make  you 
"  quit  the  vicin"rty  6f  thfs  great  Fire,  without 
**  any  ncceffity  foir  the  feeling  inconvenience? 
•*  Another  Expedient  is.  That  the  Soul,  in  the 
•<'  tei'y  lifck  of  firttf  ftiould  have  a  clear  Idea  of 
"  the  p«fil  whieh  environs  her  Machine,  that 
•'  this  Idea  be  attended  with  the  fame  Prompt- 
*'  nefs  of  the  Animal  Spirits  which  now  ac- 
'*  companies  the  Senfation  of  Pain  ;  wefhould 
**  then  be  always  as  far  from  Danger  as  was 
*.'  neceffary,  in  the  fame  manner  as  we  fly  from 
**  it  at  prefent." 

We  reply,  that  according  to  the  prefent  frame 
of  human  Nature  in  general  (which  Syftem 
^ught  always  to  be  fak'eft  together)  neither  of 
ftefe  Expedients  would  anfwet  the  end  propo- 
fcd.  As  to  the  fofraer,  this  Author  has  often 
obferv'd  in  his  Diftionary  f,  that  a  little  Pain 
K  able  to  counterballance  a  great  deal  of  Plea- 
fure ;  that  one  hour  of  Sicknefs  is  more  poig- 
nant than  feveral  Days  of  Health.  And,  p. 
1053. That  four  Afflictions,  mix'd  with  twenty 
Felicities,  would  befufficient  to  engage  a  Man 
to  wifh  an  alteration  of  his  condition. 

Whence  it  follows,  that  fuch  an  encreafe  of 
Pleafure  could  not  make  us  avoid  the  many 
Mifchiefs  incident  to  the  Body,  fo  readily  and 
certainly,  as  the  Excitements  of  Pain.  A  mo- 
derate degree  of  Pleafure  often  fatisfics  the 
whole  Man,  and  makes  him  content  to  forfeit 
a,fuperior  Happinefs,  or  regardlefs  of  underT 
going  an  infinitely  greater  Mifery  to  come  : 
But  the  fraalleft  fenfitivc  Pain  immediately  ur- 
ges him  to  defire  its  removaL  Four  degrees  of 
Mifery  therefore  will,  according  to  Bajle  him- 
i^^i  ^  move,  a  Perfqn   more   effefluall-y,  than 


twenty  degrees  of  Happinefs ;  and  confcquent- 
ly,  finca  all  kinds  of  Mifery  cannot  be  avoiied, 
the  prefent  Method  of  Providence  is  the  beft, 
as  it  avoids  the  m'ofl  and  grcateft.  As  to  the: 
fecond  Expedient,  tho'  it  were  granted,  that 
a  clear  Profpeft  of  enfuing  Mifery  would  prove, 
as  effeftual  an  Excitement  of  our  Endeavours 
to  prevent  it  as  a  prefent  Uneafinefs,  yet  the 
Mind,  in  order  to  have  a  clear  Idea  of  thefe 
Perils  which  CHviron. the  Body,  muftalfo  have  a 
completeKno\vledge  of  the  feveral  properties  andf 
efFefts  of  all  the  circumambient  Bodies,  which 
'I  believe,  will  be  efteem'd  fomething  too  much, 
for  a  Soul  placed  in  this  inferior  Clafs  of  com- 
pound Beings.  And,  laftly,  in  anfwer  to  wha^ 
he  frequently  uYges,  that  there  will  be  no  need 
of  fuch  a  Method  of  preventing  Death  and 
•Mifery  in  the  future  State  of  the  Blefled,  where 
we  expect  pure  unmix'd  Felicity ;  nnd  confe- 
qirtntly  there  was  no  abfulote  Neceffity  for 
them  here;  we  need  only  refer  the  Reader  to. 
the  Obfervations  in  Notes  30  and  35.  viz.  that 
there  are  feveral  different  Syftems-  of  rational- 
Beings,  one  above  another,  which  we  believe 
to  be  gradually  growing  up,  and  afcending  af- 
ter each  ether,  and  acquiring  new  Degrees  of 
Happinefs  and  Perfeftion  to  all  Eternity:  and 
therefore,  when  we  fpeak  of  the  future  State  of 
the  Blefled,  we  fuppofe  them  exalted  to  a  far 
nobler  kind  of  Exiltence,  or  placed  in  a  quite 
different  Clafs,  and  confequently  endow'd  with 
different  Faculties  from  thefe  which  we  expe- 
rience here  below:  and  therefore,  to  argue 
from  one  to  the  other,  is  only  confounding 
quite  different  Orders  of  created  Beings :  and 
fuppofing  that  what  is  poffible  andagreeable  in 
one,  may  and  ought  to  be  fo  in  another,  and, 
by  the  fame  way  of  reafoning,  alike  in  all. 
This  Argument  then  drav/n  from  that  State 
of  our  Fore-Father  in  Paradife,  or  us  in  Hea- 
ven, is  always  inconclufive.  5ee  Dr.  J>  Clarke::. 
on  Natural  Evil,  p.  257,  ^r. . 


*^Itjefortfe  aux^ejiiens  d*un  Provincial,  Fol.  p-.  650.- 
\^  UjQ^er  th^  Article  Xenophanv,  particularly  at  p.  305  ^i 


Cmcerning  Matural  Evil.  s  f  g 

IV.  Now  the  reft  of  the  Paflions  are  Confequences  of  Pain,  Uneali-  The  reft  of  ■. 
■jiefs,  and  dread  of  Death;  w^.  Anger,  Love,  Hatred,  ^f.     An  Animal  the  Pafiioiu. 
in  the  prefent  State  of  things,  muft  therefore  either,  be  obnoxious  to  "^  ^ith^^ ' 
thefe,  or  quickly  perifli.     For  'tis  impoflible  that  the  Sould  fliould  thefe. 
have  a  difagreeable  Senfation,  and  not  be  angry  at  the  iC^ufe  wh\qlji 
produces  it:  and  fo  of  the  reft.        )  i. .  ^  .—..«,, .  ^      ..-,,'•  ;\.;n  ■  r  . 

V.  God  could  have  avoided  all  this    by  ordering  that  the   Soul  The  Paffions 
ihould  not  be  afteded  by  the  Motions  of  the  Body;  or  at  leaft,  that ^°^'^^5°^_^ 
every  thing  done  therein  fliould  be  agreeable :  But  hov7  dangerous  this  therwifc, 
would  be  to  Animals,  any  one  may  underftand,  who  recoUedts  how  ^^^"^  ^x  o^- 
very  fliort  their  Lives  muft  be,  if  they  died  with  the  fame  Pleafure  the'soui  ^ 
that  they  eat  or  drink  or  propagate  their  Species.     If  upon  tearing  the  Should  not  be 
Body,  the  Soul  had  either  no  Senfation  at  all,  or  a  pleafant  one,  we  the^Mot/Ins^ 
fhould  be  no  more  aware  of  Death  than  of  Sleep,  nor  would  it  be  of  the  Body: 
more  injurious  to  kill  a  Man  than  to  fcratch  him.     And  thus  Man-  ^j^gJl^^^  • 
kind  would  quickly  fail.     We  muft  then  either  have  been  arm'd  with  mais  would 
thefe  Paffions  againft  Death,  or  foon  have  perifti'd :     But  the  Divine  ^.^  ^^^  ^^^ 
Gcodnefs  chofe  that  Animals  ftiould  be  fubjed:  to  thefe,  rather  than 

the  Earth  be  entirely  deftitute  of  Inhabitants.  (47.) 

Qjs  VI.  Behold 

NOTES. 


(47.)  Bcfides  the  Health  and  Prefervation  of 
the  Body,  the  Paflions  in  general  are  ncceflary 
to  the  Happinefs  and  Well-being  of  the5«//al- 
fo :  Wherein,  befides  the  immediate  Pleafure 
which  arifes  from  the  very  Exercile  of  them, 
and  their  Power  to  alter  even  the  Nature  of 
things-,  or  at  leaft,  their  Relations  to  us,  and 
often  rente  that<afy  and  agreeable  which  would 
othcrwife  be  diftaftful  and  intolerable  :  they 
are  farther  nccclfary  to  urge  and  excite  the 
Mind  to  laudable  Entcrprifcs,  and  fo  fupport 
-it  in  ike  execution  of  .them  ;  to  fix  and  fortify 
.  it  againft  all  Difficulties  and  Dangers,  and  en- 
able it  to  proceed  and  perfevcrc  in  the  conftant 
puffuit   of  ftill   higher  Degrees  of  Happinefs 


•*  of  a  retnifs  and  fedentary  Nature,  Jlito  in  its 
"  Refohes,  and  ianguiping  in  its  Executions. 
"  Ti>e  ufe  there/ere  of  the  PaJJions  is,  te  Jlir  up 
"  and  put  it  upon  Ailion,  to  awaken  the  Under- 
"  Jianding,  to  enforce  the  Will,  and  fo  fn/\ke  the 
"  whole  Man  more  vigorous  and  attentive  in  the 
"  profecution  of-  his  Defgns.'*  See  alio  the  5/^^- 
tater'^'^.  ^0%. 

For  a  particular  Account  of  all  the  Paffions, 
and  their  final  Caufes,  and  the  Neceffity  of 
each,  fee  Mr.  Huchefon's  incomparable  EJ^ay, 
^.  2.  p.  48,50. ^f.  and  §.  6.  p.  179.  or  Watts  on. 
the  ufe  and  ab ufe  of  them,  §•  13-  or  C hamper s'% 
Cyclopedia,  under  the  Word  Pafion,  or  Scott" s 
._   .- „-^     -c.  -  .1  Chrif/an  Life,  Part  2.  C.  i.  ^.2.  par.  3.     5"^ 

and  Perfeftion.     "  The  Soul   (fays   Mr.  ^i/-   \vhat  relates   to    this  Subjefl  will  come  .more 
"  fon  *)  cenftdefd  abJiraSlly  from  its  Pajponsy  is\  properly  undc/  the  Had  of ■Mor'arEvi/.        ' 


m 


JSpea.  N«.  255. 


.-<rfj  ».;>»» 


i  i  i5  Concerning  Natural  Evil. 

It  is  not  con-  ^^'  Behold  now  how  Evils  fpring  from  and  multiply  a  pen  each  o- 
trary  to  the  thcr,  while  infinite  Goodnefs  ftill  urges  the  Deity  to  do  the  very  beft. 
nefs  tocemiit  '^^^^  nioved  him  to  give  Exiftence  to  Creatures  which  cannot  exift 
thefelncon-  without  ImperfeSiiom  and  Inequality.  This  excited  him  to  create  Mat- 
venK-ncies,  f^y.  ^^^j  ^-q  p^fit  in  Motiofi^  which  is  neceflarily  attended  with  Separation 
could  notbe  .^nd  DifTolution,  Generation  and  Corruption.  This  perfuaded  him  to 
avoided  with- couple  Souls  with  Bodies,  and  to  give  them  mutual  Affections,  whence 
greater.  pj-Qceej^ecj  Pain  and  Sorrow,  Hatred  and  Fear,  with  the  reft  of  the 
Paffions,  yet  all  of  them,  as  we  have  feen,  are  neceffary. 
for^c'^ctm  \-  ^^^-  -^^^J  ^^  created  Exijience  neceflarily  includes  the  Evil  of  Im- 
red  the  Good  perfe<ftion,  fo  evcry  Species  of  it  is  fubjed:  to  its  own  peculiar  Imper- 
*"'^h"If%  fedtions;  that  is,  to  Evils.  All  the  Species  of  Creatures  then  muft  ei- 
Kviis  which  ^^^r  have  been  omitted,  or  their  concomitant  Evils  tolefated:  theDi- 
neceiiariiy  vine  Goodnefs  therefore  put  the  Evils  in  one  Scale  and  the  Good  in 
and"tolcr!ted  ^^^^  Other :  and  fince  the  Good  preponderated,  an  infinitely  good  God 
thofe  Evils  would  not  omit  that  becaufe  of  the  concomitant  Evils ;  for  that  very 
infr^abtr  ^"^^^^^^  would  havc  been  attended  with  more  and  greater  Evils,,  and 
from  the  fo  would  have  been  lefs  agreeable  to  infinite  Goodnefs. 
Good.  VIII.  The  leaft  Evil,  you'll  fay,  ought  not  to  be  admitted  for  the 

The  Axiom  ^^^^  °^  ^^^  greateft  Good.     (For  to  affirm  that  God  does  Evil  that 
about  not     Good  may  come  of  it,  is  Blafphemy.)     Neither  does  the  Diftindion 
forthefakeof^^^^^^^'^  M?rtf/  and  Natural  Evil  help  any  thing  toward  the  Solution 
Good,  does  of  this  Difficulty  :     For  what  we  call  Moral  Evil,  as  ihall  be  fhewn 
wh  ^^''Y'^"  below,  is  that  which  is  forbidden ;  now  nothing  is  forbidden  by  God 
leaft  Evil  is  hut  generally,  at  leaft,  on  account  of  the  Inconveniencies  attending  the 
chofen.         forbidden  A<5lions :    Thefe  Inconveniendes  are  Natural  Evils,  therefore 
Moral  Evils  are  prohibited  on  account  of  the  Natural  ones,  and  for 
that  Reafon  only  are  Evils,  becaufe  they  lead  to  Natural  Evils.     But 
that  which  makes  any  thing  to  be  fuch,  is  itfelf  much  more  fucb  : 
therefore  the  Natural,  you'll  fay,  are  greater  Evils  than  the  Moral,  and 
cannot  with  lefs  Blafphemy  be  attributed  to  God.     Granting  all  this 
to  be  true,  yet  tho'  Evil  is  not  to  be  done  for  the  fake  of  Good,  yet 
the  lejs  Evil  is  to  be  chofen  before  the  greater  .•     And  fince  Evils  ne- 
ceflarily furround  you  whether  you  a£l  or  not,  you  ought  to  prefer 
that  Side  which  is  attended  with  the  leaft.     Since  therefore  Gcd  was 
eompell'd  by  the  necefl!ary  Imperfedions  of  created  Beings,  either  to 
abftain  from  creating  them  at  all,,  or  to  bear  with  the  Evils  confequent 


Concerning  Natural  Evil,  iij 

upon  them  ;  and  fince  it  is  a  lefs  Evil  to  permit  thofe,  than  to  omit 
thefe :  'tis  plain  that  God  did  not  allow  of  Natural  Evils  for  the  fake 
of  any  Good-,  but  chofe  the  leaft  out  of  feveral  Evils;  /.  e.  would  ra- 
ther have  Creatures  liable  to  Natural  Evils,  than  no  Creatures  at  all. 
The  fame  will  be  fhewn  hereafter  concerning  Moral  Evils-. 


SECT.    V. 

Of  Hunger,  Thirft,  and  Labour. 

I.     A    Terreftrial  Animal  muft,  as  we  have  faid,  neceflarilyconfift  of  The  parts  of 
jr\     mix'd  and  heterogeneous  Parts;  its  Fluids  alfo  are  in  a  perpe-  ^^^^^^P^^^  ^^. 
tual  Flux,  and  a  kind  of  Ferment.     Now  'tis  plain  that  this  cannot  fn  need  thcre^ 
be  without  the  Expence  of  thefe  Fluids,  and  Attrition  of  the  Solids ;  fore  ofRepa- 
and  hence  follows  Death  and  Dijfolutwn,  except  thefe  be  repair'd  :   a  by'rooi  ^" 
new  AccefTion  of  Matter   is  therefore  neceflary,  to  fupply  what  flies 
off  and  is  worn  away,  and  much  more  fa  for  the  Growth  of  Ani*- 
mals. 

II.  But  Animals  have  particular  Conjlitutions,  and  cannot  be  nourifh^  Choice  m\M 
ed  by  any  fort  of  Matter:  fome  Choice  therefote  muft  be  made  of  it,  pg^d,  fmce^ 
to  which  they  are  to  be  urg'd  by  an  Importunity  ftrong  enough  to  all  things  are 
excite  their  Endeavours  after  it.     Hence  Hunger  z-ndi  Thirji  come  to  "°^  equali/ 
affed:  the  Soul  j  Affections  that  are  fometimes  indeed  troublefome,  but 

yet  necefTary,  and  which  bring  more  Pleafure  than  Pain  along  with, 
them. 

III.  But  why,  fay  yon,  are  we  oblig'd  to  labour  in  queft  of  Food  ?  TheMate* 
Why  are  not  the  Elements  themfelvcs  fufficient?     I  anfwerj  they  areJ|'^*'jQ°|^^°°* 
fufficient  for  fome  Animals:  but  Mankind  required  fuch  a  difpofitionrupted:  thejr 
of  Matter  as- was  to  be  prepared  by  various  Cod;ions  and  Changes,  ^^^^fgrTbr^roT 

tliat cured  witlv- 
out  Labvux.. 


1 1 8  Concerning  Natural  Rvil. 

daily,  becaufe  'tis  foon  liable  to  Con'uption,  and  i£  kept  long,  would 
be  unfit  for  Nutriment.  Hence  Labour  becomes  neceiiaiy  to  provide 
Victuals  in  this  prefent  ftate  of  things :  neither  could  Hunger,  or 
Thirft,  or  Labour  *,  (which  are  reckon'd  among  Natural  Evils)  be 
prevented  without  greater  Inconveniencies.  The  Divine  Goodnefs 
therefore  had  the  higheft  Reafon  for  affixing  thefe  to  Animals. 

IV.  Now,  as  Animals  require  different  forts  of  Food,  as  was  fhewn, 
Kvery  Ani-  according  to  their  different  Conftitutions,  fo  God  has  placed  every  one 
•ccdbyGod  °^  them  where  it  may  find  what  is  proper  for  it:  on  which  account 
nhere  it  may  there  is  fcarcc  any  thing  in  the  Elements  but  what  may  be  Food  for 
J^J^j^^^P^'^'fome.  Every  Herb  has  its  Infedt  which  it  fupports.  The  Earth,  the 
rifhmenr.      Water,  the  very  Stones,  ferve  for  Aliment  to  living  Creatures  -f*. 

hence  almoft 

«vcry   herb    maintains  its  prr  per  Infedl, 

Some  Ani-  ^-  ^^t  fome  fland  in  need  of  more  delicate  Food  :  Now  God 
mais  are  pro- could  have  Created  an  inanimate  Machine  which  might  have  fupplied 
Foodto'o-  them  with  fuch  Food  J  but  one  that  is  animated  does  it  much  eafier 
thers,  and  and  better.  A  Being  that  has  Life  is  (cceteris  paribus)  preferable  to 
would  not  Qj^g  that  has  not:  God  therefore  animated  that  Machine  which  fur- 
on  any  other  niflics  out  .provifion  for  more  perfed:  Animals ;  which  was  both  gra- 
terms.  cioufly  and  providently  done:  for  by  this  means  he  gain'd  fo  much 

Life  to  the  World  as  there  is  in  thofe  Animals  which  are  Food  ^or  o- 
thers:  for  by  this  means  they  themfelves  enjoy  fome  kind  of  Life, 
and  are  of  Service  alfo  to  the  reft.  An  Ox,  for  inflance,  or  a  Calf, 
is  bred,  nourifhed,  and  protected  for  fome  time,  in  order  to  become 
fit  Food  for  Man.  This  certainly  is  better  and  more  eligible,  than 
if  the  Matter  of  its  Body  had  been  converted  into  an,  inanimate  Mafs, 
fuch  as  a  Pompion,  or  continued  in  the  flate  of  unform'd  Clay.  Nor 
is  it  hardly  dealt  witlial,  by  being  made  for  the  Food  of  a  more  noble 
Animal,  fince  it  was  on  this  Condition  only  that  it  had  Life  given, 
-which  it  could  not  otherwife  have  enjoy'd.  Matter  which  is  fit  for 
the  Nourifliment  of  Man,  is  alfo  capable  of  Life  j  if  therefore  God 
<had  denied  it  Life,  he  had  omitted  a  Degree  of  Good  which  might 
have  been  produced  without  any  Impediment  to  his  principal  Defign : 
which  does  not  feem  very  agreeable  to  infinite  Goodnefs.     'Tis  bet- 

•  Sie  Note  51.  ^  See  Notes  35  and  39. 


Concemin<^  Natural  EviL 

o 

ter  therefore  that  it  iliould  be  endow'd  with  Life  for  a  time,  tho'  'ti^ 
to  be  devoured  afterwards,  than  to  continue  totally  ftupid  and  llug- 
giih.  The  common  Objection  then  is  of  no  force,  viz.  That  inani- 
mate matter  might  have  been  prepared  for  this  Ufe;  for  'tis  better 
that  it  fliould  be  animated ;  efpecially  as  fuch  Animals  are  ignorant 
of  Futurity,  and  are  neither  confcious  nor  foHcitous  about  their  being 
made  for  this  Purpofe.  So  that  £o  long  as  they  live,  they  enjoy 
rhemfelves  without  anxiety ;  at  leaft  they  rejoyce  in  the  prefent  Good, 
and  are  neither  tormented  with  the  Remembrance  of  what  is  pail, 
nor  the  Fear  of  what  is  to  come  j  and  laftly,  are  kill'd  with  lefs  Pain. 
than  they  would  be  by  a  Diflemper  or  old  Age.  Let  us  not  be  fur- 
pris'd  then  at  the  Univerfal  War  as  it  were  among  Animals  ;  or  that 
^he  Stronger  devour  the  Weaker,  for  thefe  are  made  oa  purpofe  to 
afford  Aliment  to  the  others.  (48.) 

VL  As 

N  or  E  S.. 


rr9 


(48;)  Whit  Is  here  hid  down  will,  upon 
Examination,  be  found  to  be  perfedly  confi- 
Ilent  with  our  Obfervation  in  Note  34. 

As  the  Point  before  us  is  fet  in  a  very  good 
Light  by  Dr.  y.  Clarke*,  I  ihall  not  fcruple 
to  tranfcribe  the  whole  Paragraph.  '*  If  we 
**■  confiderthc  cfieft  of  Animal  Creatures  being 
*•  thus  made  Food  for  each  other,  we  fhall  find 
"  that  by  this  means  there  is  the  more  Good 
"  upon  the  whole:  For  under  the  prefent  Cir- 
**  cumftances  of  the  Creation,  Animals  living 
"  in  this  manner  one  upon  another  could  not 
*♦  have  been  prevented,  but  a  much  greater  E- 
"  vil  would  have  fsllovv*d.  For  then  there 
'•  could  not  have  been  fo  great  a  Number,  nor 
**-  fo  great  a  Variety  of  Animals  as  there  are  at 
*•  prefent,  fomc  of  which  arc  fo  very  minute, 
**  and  the  Quantity  of  them  fuch,  that,  mixing 
•*  thcmfelves  with  Herbs  and  Plants,  and  Grain, 
"  on  which  themfelves  feed,  and  with  the  Wa- 
"  ter  and  Liquids  which  they  drink,  they  mull 
"  neccfTarily  be  devour'd  by  other  larger  Ani- 
**  mals  who  live  upon  the  fame  Food,  with- 
••  out  fo  much  as  being  feen  or  any  way  per- 
*'  ceiv'd  by  them.  It  is  therefore  much  better 
**  upon  the  v/holc,  that  they  fhould  live  upon 


one  another  in  the  m»ni»er  they- now-  do, 
than  that  they  fhould  not  live  at  all.  For  if 
fuch  Animal  Life"  is  to  be  eflcem'd  fuperior 
to  not  exiftingarall,  or  to  a  vegetable  Life; 
and  the  more  there  is  of  fuch  Animal  Life, 
the  more  of  Good  there  is.  in  the  World;  ic 
is  evident  that  by  this  means  there  is  Room  ■ 
for  more  whole  Species  of  Creature.";,  at  leaft 
for  many  more  individuals  of  each  Specie.s, 
than  there  v/ould  otherwife  be ;  and  that 
the  variety  of  the  Creation  is  iiereby  much 
enlarged,  and  the  Goodnefs  of  its  Author 
difplayed.  For  the  Conllitution  of  Animal 
Bodies  is  fuch  as  requires  that  they  fhould 
be  maintain'd  by  Food  ;  Now  if  this  Food 
can  be  made  capable  of  Aniinsl  Life  alfo,  it 
i  s  a  very  great  Improvementofit.  Acertain 
Quantity  of  Food  is  necefTary  for  the  pre- 
servation of  a  determinate  Number  of  Ani- 
mals: which  Food,  were  it  mere  vegetable, 
would  perhaps  ferve  for  that  Purpofe  only: 
but  by  being  fo  form'd  as  to  become  Animal, 
tho'  it  be  in  a  lower  Degree,  and  the  enjoy- 
ment of  Life  in  fuch  Creatures  lefs,  yet  is  it 
more  per-feft  than  unform'd  Clay,  or  even 
than  the  mcft  curious  Plantt    Thus  the  A- 


Difcour/e  concerning  NAtttial  Evil,  p.  289. 


1 2io  Concerning  Natural  EviU 

All  parts  of      VJ.  As  foF  the  Difficulty  of  procuring  Food,  and  the  J^anf  of  it  in 
the  Earth      fomc  Places,  'tis  to  be  obferv'd  that  the  ftate  of  the  Earth  depends 
■have  afforded  ^P^"  ^^^  ^^g^^  ^^^  heat  of  the  Sun  ;  and  tho'  we  do  not  perfectly  un- 
Nourifhment  derftand  the  Structure  of  it,  yet  we  have  reafon   to  conjecture,   (G.) 
and  Reccp-    ^^|.  jj.  jg  carried  about  its  Axis  by  a  Diurnal^  and  about  the  Sun  by  an 
whatever  fi- '  ^mwdl  Motion  I  that  its  Figure  is  a  Sphaeroid  defcribed  by  the  Revo- 
-tuationthey  lutioii  of  a  Semi-ElHpfe  about  a  conjugate  Axisj  and  that  this  pro- 
«ed  in!**  ^  ^'  ceeds  from  the  Laws  of  Motion  and  Gravitation.     Now  in  fuch  a  Si- 
tuation, fome  Parts  of  it  muft  necelTarily  be  unfit  for  fuch  Inhabitants 
as  Men,  lince  the  Parallclifm  of  its  Axis  is  preferv'd  in  the  annual 
Motion,  and  the  Revolution  about  the  fame  Axis  in  the  diurnal.     If 
thefe  fhould  undergo  the  very  leaft  Alteration,  the  whole  Fabric  of 
cthe  Earth  would  be  diforder'd ;    the  Ocean   and  Dry  Land  would 
change  Places  to  the  detriment  of  the  Animals.     Since  therefore  nei- 
ther the  annual  nor  diurnal  Motion  of  the  Earth  could  be  alter 'd 
without  harm ;  'tis  plain,  that  fome  parts  of  the  Earth  muft  necefla- 
rily  be  lefs  convenient  for  the  habitation  of  Mankind,  namely  thofe  a- 
:bout  the  Poles  j  and  that  others  muft  require  much  Labour  to  make 
them  convenient,  as  we  find  by  Experience  in  our  own  Climate  j  but 
it  will  evidently  appear  to  any  confidering  Perfon,  that  in  what  fitu- 
ation  or  motion  foever  you  fuppofe  the  Earth  to  be,  either  thefe  or 
worfe  Evils  muft  be  admitted  j  'tis  in  vain  therefore  to  complain  of 
-thefe  Inconveniencies  which  cannot  be  avoided  without  greater.  (49.) 

Vn.  Neither 

N  0  ^  E  S. 


'«*  nimal  Part  of  the  Creation  has  its  feveral  De- 

<*»  grees  of  Life,  and  as  much  Variety  in  it  as 
•*  is  to  be  found  in  the  inanimate  and  vegeta- 
••  ble  Part.;  fo  that  in  this  rcfpeft  thete  is  fo 
•»  far  from  being  any  juft  ground  of  Complaint, 

-**  that  the  Wifdom  and  Contrivance  of  the  A- 
"  nimal  World  is  admirable,  and  plain-ly  flicws 

-•«  the  excellency  of  the  whole,  and  the  fubfer- 
♦•  viency  of  all  theParticulan,  in  order  to  ob- 
*•  tai  a  the  greateft  Good  that  they  are  capable 

*•  of." 

See    alfo  the  beginning  of    the   Speiiator, 

N**.  519- 

(G.)  What  is  faid  about  the  Motion  of  the 
£arth  fhould  be  looked  upon  as  an  Hypothefis 


onlr,  and  not  a  fundamental  Principle ;  that 
the  Argument  might  have  the  fame  Succefs, 
whether  the  Earth  ftood  ftill  or  moved;  and 
our  affurancc  of  the  Divine  Gocdnefs  may  not 
feem  to  depend  on  the  Conjeftures  of  Mathe- 
maticians. 

(49  )  Thus  if  the  Figure  of  the  Earth  were 
chang'd  into  a  perfeft  Sphere,  the  Equatorial 
Parts  njuft  all  lie  under  Water.  If  it  were  of 
a  Cubic,  Prifmatie,  or  any  other  Angular  Figure, 
it  would  neither  be  fo  capacious  for  habitation, 
nor  fo  fit  for  Motion,  nor  fo  commodious  for  the 
Reception  of  Light  and  Heat,  for  the  circula- 
tion of  the  Winds,  and  the  Dijlribution  of  the 
Waters ;  as  is  obvious  to  any  one  that  is  ac- 
quainted 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  in 

VII.  Neither  are  Earth-quakes^  Storms^  Thundery  Deluges  and  In-Oi  Earths 
undations  any  ftronger  Arguments  againft  the  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  oP^-l^'*^^^jy*^^ 
God.    Thefe  are  fometimcs  fent  by  a  juft  and  gracious  God  for  the  luges, 
Punifliment  of  Mankind  j  but  often  depend  on  other  natural  Caufes> 
which  are  necelTary,  and  could  not  be  removed  without  greater  Da- 
mage to  the  whole.    Thefe  Concuflions  of  the  Elements  are  indeed 

prejudicial, 

NOTES, 


quainted  with  the  firft  Elements  of  Natural 
Philofophy,  and  is  at  large  demonftrated  by 
Dr.  Cheyne,  Mr.  Derbam,  Ray,  &c.  If  its  Si- 
tuation were  removed,  its  Conftitution  muft  be 
alter'd  too,  or  elfe,  if  placed  confiderably  far- 
ther from  the  Sun,  it  would  be  frozen  into  Ice, 
if  nearer,  'twould  be  burnt  to  a  Coal.  If  ei- 
ther its  annual  or  diurnal  Motion  were  JlopP'J, 
retarded,  or  accelerated,  the  ufeful  and  agreeable 
\'iciflitudes  of  Summer  and  Winter,  Day  and 
Night,  would  ceafe,  or  at  leaft  ceafc  to  be  fo 
ufeful  and  agreeable  as  they  now  are.  The  im- 
moderate length  or  fhortnefs  of  the  Seafons 
would  prove  pernicious  to  the  Earth,  and  the 
Hated  times  of  Bufinefs  and  Repofe  would  be 
as  incommodious  to  its  Inhabitants:  as  difpro- 
portionateto  the  common  affairs  of  Life,  and 
the  various  Exigences  of  Mankind  f .  If,  in 
the  laft  place,  we  alter  the  Inclination  of  the 
Earth^s  Axis,  the  like  Inconveniencies  will  at- 
tend the  Pi^/tfr  Parts :  if  we  deftroy  the  Parallel- 
ijm  of  it,  befides  deftroying  at  the  fame  time 
the  ufeful  Arts  of  Navigation  and  Dialling,  we 
bring  upon  us  much  worfe  Confequences  :  A 
Defcription  of  fome  few  of  them  from  Dr.  Ben- 
tley\  Sermon  above  cited  may  perhaps  not  be 
difagreeablc.  "  We  all  know,  from  the  very 
•'  Elements  of  Aftronomy,  that  this  inclin'd 
"  pofition  of  the  Axis,  which  keeps  always  the 
"  fame  Dircftion,  and  a  conftant  Parallelifm 
"  to  itfelf  is  the  fole  Caufc  of  thefe  grateful 
"  and  needful  Vicilfitudes  of  the  four  Seafons 
*'  of  the  Year,  and  the  Variation  in  length  of 
"  Days.  If  we  take  away  the  Inclinatitn,  it 
'•  vyould  abfolutcly  undo  thefe  Northern  Na- 
"  tions,  the  Sun  would  never  come  nearer  us 


"  than  he  doth  now  on  the  xoth  oi  March,  ttx 
"  the  1 2th  of  September.  But  would  we  ra- 
"  ther  part  with  the  Parallelifm?  Let  us  fup- 
"  pofe  then  that  the  Axis  of  the  Earth  keeps 
"  always  the  fame  Inclination  towards  the  Bo- 
"  dy  of  the  Sun  :  this  indeed  would  caufe  a 
"  variety  of  Days,  and  Nights,  and  Seafons, 
**  on  the  Earth;  but  then  every  particular 
"  Country  would  have  always  the  fame  diver- 
"  fity  of  Day  and  Night,  and  the  fame  Confti- 
"  tution  of  Seafon,  without  any  alteration. 
"  Some  would  always  have  long  Nights  and 
"  fhort  Days,  others  again  perpetually  long 
"  Days  and  fhort  Nights :  One  Climate  would 
"  be  fcorch'd  and  fwelter'd  with  everlafting 
"  Dog-Days,  while  an  eternal  December  blafted 
"  another.  This  furely  is  not  quite  fo  good 
"  as  the  prefent  Order  of  Seafons.  But  fhall 
**  the  Axis  rather  obferve  no  conftant  Inclina- 
"  tion  to  any  thing,  but  vary  and  waver  ae 
**  uncertain  times  and  places  ?  This  would 
"  be  a  happy  Conftitution  indeed  !  There 
**  would  be  no  Health,  no  Life  nor  Subflftence 
"  in  fuch  an  irregular  Syftem  :  By  thofe  fur- 
••  prifing  Nods  of  the  Pole,  we  might  be  tofs'd 
"  backward  er  forward,  in  a  Moment,  from 
*•  January  to  June,  nay,  poffibly,  from  the 
**  January  oi  Greenland,  to  the  June  of  Abejft- 
**  nia.  It  is  better  therefore,  upon  all  accounts, 
**  that  the  Axis  fhould  be  continued  in  its 
"  prefent  Pofture  and  Direftion  j  fo  that  this 
"  alfo  is  a  fignal  Charaftcr  of  Divine  Wifdom 
"  and  Ooodnefs. 

See  alfo  Cbeyne'i  Phil.  Princ.  C.  3.  k  24, 
25,  26,  ^f. 


t  SeeDr.Btn\\ty's  lajl  Seman,  p.  312,  tSc-  Sth  Edition. 

R 


jl^  Concerning  Natural  Evil 

prejudicial,  but  more  Prejudice  would  arife  to  the  Univerfal  Syfleni  by 
the  abfence  of  them.  What  the  genuine'  and  immediate  Caufes  o£ 
them  are  I  dare  not  determine :  they  (t^m.  in  general  to  derive  their  O- 
rigin  from  the  unequal  heat  of  the  Sun,  from  the  Fluidity,  Mutabi- 
lity, and  Contrariety  of  things*.  To  thefe  we  may  add  the  Afperity 
and  Inequality  of  the  Earth's  Surface,  without  which,  neverthelefs  the 
whole  Earth,  or  the  greateft  Part  of  it,  would  be  uninhabitable.  For 
inftance,  we  complain  of  the  Mountains  as  Rubbiih,  as  not  only  dif- 
figuring  the  Face  of  the  Earth,  but  alfo  as  ufelefs  and  inconvenient  j 
and  yet  without  thefe,  neither  Rivers  nor  Fountains,  nor  the  Weather 
fpr  producing  and  ripening  Fruits  could  regularly  be  preferv'd  -f-.  In 
Mountainous  Countries  we  blame  Providence  for  the  Uncertainty  of  the 
Weather,  for  the  frequency  of  Showers  and  Storms,  which  yet  proceed 
from  the  very  Nature  of  the  Climate,  and  without  which  all  the  Moi- 
fture  would  glide  down  the  Declivity,  and  the  Fruits  wither  away. 
The  Earth  then  muft  either  not  be  created  at  all,  or  thefe  things  be 
permitted.  (50.) 

VIII.  The 
NOTES, 


(50.)  The  feveral  Objeflions  mention'd  in 
this  Paragraph  are  folidly  refuted  by  Dr.  y. 
Clarke  in  his  Treatife  on  Natural  Evil,  part  of 
which  I  fhall  take  the  Liberty  to  infert  as  ufual, 
and  refer  the  Reader  to  the  Book  itfelf  for  the 

Having  defcribed  the  Nature  and  Ufe  of  the 
A\T^s  ElaHicity,  and  the  acid,  nitrous,  &ndi  ful- 
flureous  Particles  with  which  it  is  impregnated, 
which  are  the  Caufe  of  Fermentation,  he  pro- 
ceeds to  accouat  for  Earthquakes,  ifff.  p.  190. 
*'  Thus  the  internal  Parts  of  the  Earth  being 
"  the  only  proper  Place  for  containing  fo  large 
"  a  Store  of  Sulphur  and  Nitre,  and  Minerals 
"  as  is  required  for  fo  many  thoufand  Years  as 
"  the  Earth  in  its  prefent  State  has,  and  may 
•*  yet  continue:  it  mull  neceffarily  be,  that 
•'  when  that  Fermentation  is  made  in  fuch  fub- 
'*  terraneous  Caverns  as  are  not  wide  enough 
"  for  the  particles  to  expand  themfelves  in,  or 
*^  have  no  open  PafFage  to  ru(h  out  at,  they 
"  will,  by  the  forementioa'd  Law,  ftiake  the 
•*•  Earth  to  a  confiderable  di fiance,  tear  thofe 
**  Caverns  to  pieces ;   and   according  ta,  the 


^'See  Note  50*. 


■\  See  Note  51. 


depth  of  fuck  Caverns,  or  Quantity  ofMl- 
terialscontjln'd  in  them, .  remove  large  pie» 
ces  of  the  Surface  of  the  Earth,  from  one 
place  to  another,  in  the  fame  manner,  tho'  to  a 
much  higher  degree  than  artificial  Explofions 
made  under  Ground;  the  effeft  of  which  is 
fenfible  to  a  great  diflance.  If  it  happens 
that  thefe  Fermentations  are  in  places  under 
the  Sea,  the  Water  mixing  with  thefe  Mate- 
rials, increafes  their  Force,  and  is  thereby 
thrown  back  with  great  violence,  fo  as  to 
feem  to  rife  up  into  the  Clouds,  and  fall 
down  again  fqmetimes  in- very  large  drops, 
and  fometimes  in  whole  Spouts,  which  are 
fufficient  to  drown  all  that  is  near  them.  If 
the  Fermentation  be  not  fo  violent,  hut  fuch 
only  as  raifes  large  Vapours  or  Steams,  which 
can  find  their  way  thro'  fmall  occult  pafTa- 
gei  of  the  Earth  ;  thefe  near  its  Surface,  by 
their  continual  Expirations,  are  at  firll  the 
Caufe  of  gentle  Winds  ;  and  thefe  afterwards 
by  their  continual  Increafe,  become  perhaps 
Storms,  and  Whirl-winds,  and  Tempefts, 
whiph  xq,any  times,  deftrpy  th«  F/uits,  tear 
■    '  ■  up 


Cancerning  Natural  Evil,  i^3 

VIII.  The  fame  mufl  be  faid  of  the  Lakes  and  tht  Ocean.    For  *tis  The  Number 
manifeft,  that  Fruits,  Vegetables,  &c.  which  are  the  Food  of  Ani-^J^J^^"^^!" 
mals,  depend  upon  Moifture,  and  that  this  is  exhaled  frqm  the  Sea,  ri(h'd,  was  to 
and  watry  places,  by  the  Sun;  and  fince  the  Showers  and  Dews  thus ^e propor- 
elevated,  are  not  more  copious  than  fuffice  for  the  Vegetation  of  ^ g"^^  a^d 
Plants,  'tis  plain  that  the  Seas  and  Lakes  do  not  exceed  what  is  necef-  not  the  Food 
fary,  and  could  not  be  diminiftied  without  detriment  to  the  whole.  Vain  ^^^^^  ^^^* 
therefore  is  the  Complaint  oi  Lucretius,  who  arraigns  all  thefe  as  y^/^/- 
ty.     Neither  was  the  Earth  too  narrow,  nor  needed  it  too  much  La- 
bour to  fuftain  its  Animals :  For  it  was  fufficient  for  thofe  Animals 
which  God  had  given  it  *.     But  when  they  multiply  above  the  pro- 
portion of  their  Food,  'tis  impoffible  that  it  fhould  be  fufficient  5  it 
would  not  be  enough  if  it  were  all  converted  into  Food.     For  a  cer- 
tain Proportion  is  to  be  obferv'd  between  the  Provifion  and  the  Eat- 
ers, which  if  the  Number  of  Animals  exceed,  they  muil  at  length  ne- 

R  2  celTarily 

N  0  r  E  S. 


**  up  the  Trees,  and  overthrow  the  Houfes: 
*'  But  if  they  be  dill  more  gentle,  there  being 
*^  always  fome  fulphureous  Exhalations,  efpc- 
"  cially  if  the  Earth  be  dry,  they  then  afcend 
*'  along  with  the  lighter  Vapours,  into  the  up- 
*'  per  Region  of  the  Air,  where,  when  a  large 
"  Quantity  of  them  is  gathered  together,  they 
•*  ferment  with  the  acid  Nitre,  and  taking 
"  Fire,  caufe  Thunder  and  Lightning,  and  o- 
**  thcr  Meteors.  This,  as  far  as  can  be  gathe- 
"  thered  from  Experience  and  Obfervation  of 
*'  the  Works  of  Nature,  is  the  Origin  and 
"  Caufe  of  thofe  Imperfections  and  Evils, 
••  which  the  prcfent  Conflitution  of  the  Air, 
"  and  the  Laws  of  Motion  obferved  by  thofe 
«•  Particles  mix'd  with  it,  unavoidibly  fubjeft 
*'  it  to.  They  are  the  natural  and  genuin  ef- 
**  fedts  of  the  Regulation  it  is  under,  and  with-, 
**  out  altering  the  primary  Laws  of  it  (that  is, 
"  making  it  fomcthing  elfe  than  what  it  is,  or 
*'  changing  it  into  another  Form  :  the  Refult 
»*  of  which  would  be  only  to  render  it  liable 
*«  to  Evils  of  another  kind,  againd  which  the 
•'  fame  Objeflions  would  equally  lie)  or  in  a 
**  fupcrnatural  manner,  hindering  it  from  pro- 


**  dncingfuch  EfFcds,  it  is  impoffible  to  pre- 
"  vent  them.  And  if  we  add  to  tl:i^,  that  thefe 
'*  Evils  are  the  feweft  that  in  the  Nature  of 
**  things  could  be,  without  hindering  a  much 
"  greater  Good:  that  they  are  in  the  moft  con- 
"  venient  Parts,  and  the  moft  guarded  againll 
**  doing  Mifchief  that  could  be;  and  that  there 
•»  are  alfo  good  Ufes  to  be  made  of  them ;  we 
"  fhall  have  no  Reafon  to  complain  of,  or  find 
"  fault  with  them.  Were  the  Quantity  of  Sul- 
**  phur  and  Nitre  much  diminilh'd,  there  would 
"  not  be  fufficient  to  fill  the  Region  of  Air 
"  for  the  purpofes  of  Vegetation  and  Life ; 
•'  but  the  Ground  would  grow  barren,  and  the 
**  Animals  would  wafte  and  die  :  And  if  there 
'*  were  a  much  greater  Quantity,  the  contrary 
*'  Effeft  would  happen,  the  Earth  would  be 
"  too  fat,  the  Plants  would  grow  too  grofs, 
'*  and  the  Animals  would  be  fuffocated  and 
"  choaked.  The  Temperature  is  therefore  as 
"  exaft  as  it  could  be,  all  Circumllances  con- 
"  fider'd ;  and  the  fmall  Inconvcnicncies  are 
"  nothing,  compared  with  the  general  Good." 
See  alfo  the  Word  Earlh  quake  in  Chamber i'^ 
Cjclojti^dia. 


•5«DcrhamV  Vh^f.  ThecU  B.  <.  C.  11; 


I2ij.  Concerning  Matural  EviL 

ceffarily  perifh  with  Hunger.  Want  of  Provifion  then  ought  not  to  be 
made  an  Objedtion:  for  if  the  Number  of  Creatures  to  be  provided  for 
be  enlarged  above  this  Proportion,  the  greateft  Plenty  would  not  fuffice ; 
if  this  Proportion  betwixt  the  Food  and  Animals  be  kept  up,  the  leaft 
would  be  fufficienr.  'Tis  our  own  fault  therefore,  not  God's,  if  Pror- 
vifions  fail ;  for  the  Number  of  Men  may  be  confined  within  the  bounds 
prefcribed  by  Nature,  as  might  eafily  be  fhewn,  if  it  were  worth  our 
\vhilc 

IX.  But  there's  no  need  of  Artifice  on  this  Occafion ;  for  by  our  fault 
dredth"i»rtof^^*ngs  are  come  to  this  Pafs,  that  even  the  hundredth  part  of  thofe 
Mankind  Eatables  which  might  be  had,  don't  meet  with  any  to  confume  them, 
jyhich  might  rpj^g  Divine  Beneficence  has  therefore  dealt  bountifully  with  Mankind 

JlVC  upon  trie  r       n        r  rt-         •  r 

Earth,  do€s  in  refpect  of  Provmons. 

not  yet 

inhabit   it :    Vain  therefore  is  the  Complaint  about  Seas  and  Defarts. 

pris  abfurd  X.  *Tis  to  be  obferv'd  in  the  laft  place,  that  Animals  are  of  fuch  a 
dcfircVdiffe°  Namrc  as  to  delight  in  Action,  or  the  Excrcife  of  their  Faculties,  nor 
rent  place  or  can  we  have  any  other  Notion  of  Happinefs  even  in  God  himfelf  *. 
tilat  whilh  i?  S^"c^  ^^^^  ^^^  Faculties  of  both  Body  and  Mind  are  to  be  exercis'd  in 
allotted  him;  Order  to  produce  Pleafure,  where's  the  wonder  if  God  deflin'd  that  Ex- 
^"*de  ?o  In  ^^^^^^  ^  P^^^  ^^^  procuring  of  Food,  and  connected  this  Pleafure  with 
that  place,    it,  (5 1.).    The  infinite  Power  of  God  was  able  to  produce  Animals  of 

and  would  o-  fijch 

therwifehave 

ludnoncat  N  Ot  E  S.. 


(51.)  Befide  the  Neceffity  there  is  for  labour, 
in  order  to  reftrain  Man  in  his  prefent  State 
from  an  Excefs  of  Folly  and  Wickednefs, 
(which  our  Author  confiders  in  the  two  laft  Pa- 
ragraphs of  this  Chapter)  the  ufe  and  advantage 
of  it  appears  alfo  from  the  manifeft  tendency  it 
has  to  preferve  and  improve  the  Faculties  of 
both  Body  and  Mind.  If  ufed  in  a  moderate 
Degree,  it  preferves  our  Health,  Vigour,  and 
Activity ;  gives  us  a  quick  Senfe  and  Relifh  of 
Pleafure,  and  prevents  a  great  many  Miferies 
which  attend  Idlenefs.  This  is  well  defcribcd 
by  the  Guardian  N**.i3i.  and  the  SpeSiator, 
W*.  115.  "I  confider  the  Body  as  a  Syftem 
■•<  of  Tubes  and  Gllands,  or,  to  ufe  a  more  ru- 


"  ftic  Phrafe,  a  bundle  ofPipes  and  Strainers, 
"  fitted  to  one  another  after  (o  wonderful  a 
"  manner,  as  to  make  a  proper  Engine  for  the 
"  Soul  to  work  with.  This  Defcription  does 
"  not  only  comprehend  the  Bowels,  Bones, 
"  Tendons,  Veins,  Nerves,  and  Arteries,  but 
"  every  Mufcle,  and  every  Ligature,  which  is 
"  a  Compofition  of  Fibres,  that  are  fo  many 
"  imperceptible  Tubes  or  Pipes  interwoven  on 
"  all  fides  with  invifible  Glands  or  Strainers. 
"  This  general  Idea  of  a  human  Body,  with- 
"  out  confxdcring  it  in  the  Niceties  of  Anato- 
"  my,  lets  us  fee  how  abfolutely  neceffary  La- 
"  bour  is  for  the  right  Prefervation  of  it.  There 
"  mull  be  frequent  Motions  and  Agitations,  to 

mixk 
•'5*f..Ch.  1.  §13.  par.  9.  and  Ch.  5.  ^.  i.  Sub,  4, 


Concerning  Natural  Evil, 

fuch  Capacities ;  and  fince  the  Creation  of  them  was  no  Inconvenience 
toother  Beings  who  might  exercife  themfelves  in  a  more  noble  Man- 
ner, may  not  the  infinite  Goodnefs  of  God  be  conceiv'd  to  have  almoft 
compelled  him  not  to  refufe  or  envy  thefc  the  Benefit  of  Life?  Some 
of  this  kind  were  to  be  created,  fince  there  was  Room  left  for  them  in 
the  Work  of  God,  after  fo  many  others  were  made  as  was  convenient. 
But  you  may  wifh  that  fome  other  Place  and  Condition  had  fallen  to 
your  Lot ;  perhaps  fo :  but  if  you  had  taken  up  another's  Place,  that  o- 
ther,  or  fome  elfe,.  muft  have  been  put  into  yours,  who,  being  alike 
ungrateful  to  the  Divine  Providence,  would  wifh  for  the  Place  which 
you  now  have  occupied.  Know  then  that  it  was  necefi^ary  that  you 
fhould  either  be  what  you  are,  or  not  at  all.  For  fince  every  other 
Place  and  State  which  the  Syflem  or  Nature  of  Things  allow'd,  was 
occupied  by  fome  others,  you  muil  of  necefilty  either  fill  that  which 
you  now  are  in,  or  be  banifh'd  out  of  Nature.  For,  do  you  cxpedt 
that  any  other  fhould  be  turn'd  out  of  his  Order,  and  you  placed  in  his 
Room?  that  is,  that  God  fhould  exhibit  a  peculiar  and  extraordinary 
Munificence  toward  you  to  the  prejudice  of  others.  You  ought  there- 
fore not  to  cenfure,  but  adore  the  Divine  Goodnefs  for  making  you 
what  you  are.  You  could  neither  have  been  made  othcrwife,  nor  in; 
a  better  Manner,  but  to  the  Difadvantage  of  fome  others,  ot  of  the 
whole. 


II 


mix,  djgcft,  and  feparatc  the  Juices  contain'd 
in  it,  as  well  as  to  clear  and  cleanfe  the  Infi- 
nitudc  of  Pipes  and  Strainers,  of  which  it  is 
compofed;  and  to  give  their  folid  Parts  a 
more  firm  and  lading  Tone.  Labour  or  Ex- 
ercife ferments  the  Humours,  cafts  them  in- 
to their  proper  Channels,  throws  off  Redun- 
dancies, and  helps  Nature  in  thofe  fecret  Di- 
ftributions,  without  which  the  Body  cannot 
fubfift  in  its  Vigour,  nor  the  Soul  aft  with 
Chearfulnefs.  I  might  here  mention  the 
Effefts  which  this  has  upon  all  the  Faculties 
of  the  Mind,  bv  keeping  the  Underftanding 
clear,  the  Imaguution  untroubled,  and  refi- 
ning thofe  Spirits  that  are  neccffary  for  the 
proper  Exertion  of  our  Intelleftual  Facul- 
ties, during  the  prcfest  Laws  of  Union  be* 


"  tween  Soul  and  Body.  It  is  to  a  Negleft* 
"  in  this  particular  that  we  muft  afcribe,  the 
"  Spleen  which  is  fo  frequent  in  Men  of  ftu- 
"  dious  and  fedentary  Tempers,  as  well  as  the 
"  Vapours  to  which  thofe  of  the  other  Sex  are. 
'«  fo  often  fubjeft." 

He  proceeds  to  illuftrate  both  theWifdom 
and  Goodnefs  of  God,  from  his  having  fitted^ 
and  obliged  us  to  this  Labour  and  Exercife, 
which  is  To  necelTary  to  our  well-being:  which 
Obfervation  will  help  U5  to  account  for  the  fc- 
cond  and  third  Evil  arifing  from  the  Fall,  men-, 
tioned  in  ^.9.  par.  5.    The  Fitnefs  of  a  State, 
of  Labour  for  fallen  Man,  is  fhewnat  large  by 
Sberleck   on  Jvdgment,  C.  i .  V  8"  P*  '  79»  a°<l' 
Mr.  D'Oyly  in  Kn  firjl Diftrtation,  C9.  p.  98," 
{^<.  2d  Edition. 

SECT,. 


l7(,  .Concerning  Natural  Evil. 


SECT.    VI. 

Concerning  Propagation  of  tie  Sj^ecieSy  Child- 
hood, and  Old-Age. 

Animals  may  ^*  TTRom  what  has  bccn  faid  it  appears,  chat  Animals  which  have 
be  repair' d         Jt"^    folld  Bodies  are  naturally  mortal ;  thb'  the  Earth  therefore  were 
fft"fS*th  ^^  ^^  ^^^^y  ^°^^'^  wi^^  them,  yet  their  Number  being  continually 
were  preven- diminifh'd  by  Death,  it  would  at  length  be  quite  destitute  of  Inhabi- 
ted by  Om-  tants.     There  might,  it  feems,  have  been  a  threefold  Remedy  fbr  this 
2di^['by"     Evil :  Firft,   if  God  by  his  Omnipotence  (hould  prevent  the  Natural 
Creation:     EfFcdls  of  the  mutual  Percuffion  of  folid  Bodies,  'oit,  the  Corruption 
Propagation.  ^"^  DlfTolution  of  themfclvcs,  and  the  Change  or  Effiifion  of  their 
Fluids.     For  from  thefe  the  Deftrudion  of  Animals  neceffarily  arifes, 
as  thefe  do  from  the  Compofition  of  Bodies,  and  their  ading  on  each 
other.     Secondly,  by  leaving  Nature  to  itfelf,  and  letting  it  aft  by  U- 
nivcrfal  Mechanic  Laws  j  and  when  thefe  brought  on  a  difTolution  of 
Animal  Bodies,  that  others  be  fubflituted  in  their  Room  by  Creation. 
Thirdly,  by  ordering  that  an  Animal  (hould  generate  its  like,  and  pro- 
vide another  to  fupply  its  Place  when  it  declined. 
This  third        M.  Who  does  not  fee  that  this  lafl  is  the  beft  Method  of  preferving 
Method isthe a  conftant  Number  of  Inhabitants  upon  the  Earth  ?     For  'tis  the  fame 
it  can  b?cf^  ^^^^Z^  ^^^^^^^  paribus,  with  regard  to  the  Syftem,  whether  the  Earth 
fcfted  with-  have  thefe  Inhabitants  which  it  has  at  prefent,  or  others  equal  in  Num- 
vbience^to  ^^^  ^^^  Pcrfedtlon:  but  it  is  not  the  fame  thing  whether  the  Laws  of 
the  Laws  of  Nature  be  obferv'd  or  violated  *•    In  the  former  Methods  God  muft 
Nature.       have  interfered  every  Moment  by  his  abfolute  Power,  he  muft  have 

done 

*  Set  Note  37. 


Concerning  Maturat  Evil.  ii'j 

done  infinite  vnl.cnce  to  the  Laws  of  I^'^atiure,  and  confounded  all  the 
Conilinuions  and  Orders  of  things,  and  that  wiuiout  any  Benefit  j  nay 
with  extraordinary  detriment  to  the  whole  in  the  main.  For  fince 
the  univerfal  Laws  of  Motion  are  the  beft  that  could  poflibly  be  efla- 
blifh'd,  they  would  feldiora  be.  I'evers'd  withoui  damage  to  the  whole  *. 
Neither  does  it  become  the  Wifdom  Of  God.  to  have  left  his  Work  fo: 
imperfedt  as  to,  want  continual  mending  ev.eain.  the  finallefl  Particur- 
lars.  ' Twas  better  therefore  for  it  to  be  made  in  fuch  a  manner  as  we 
^e  it  is,  viz.  thac  a  new  Offspring  fhould.  be  propagated,  out  of  the  A- 
nirnals  themffilves,,  and  by  themfelves. 

Ill;  And  herein  w«  may  admire  the  Diy.ine  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  The  Divine 
which  hath  fo  prudendy  and:  effcwlually  contrived  this  End.     For  it  p'^^^^i^jgn^ 
has  implanted  in  all  Creatures  (as  we  fee)  a  ftr-ongand  almoil  irrefifti-'idminbiein 
ble  appetite  of  propagating  their  kind,,  and'  has  rcjiderU  this  ad:  of  ^"'^  ^°"J.'^.'- 
propagation  fo  ufeful  aj)d  agreeable  to  them,  who;  perform  it,  that  Po-  ^^"" 
flerity  becomes  dearer  to  many  than.  Life,  itfelf,.  and  if  it  were  left,  to 
their  Choice,  they  would.,  rather  die  tlian  lofe  tlieir  Oifspring,  and.  the 
Rewards  of  Love:  nay  there  is  fcarce  one  that  would  not  protect  its 
Young  at  the  hazard  of  its  own.  Life.     God  has  therefore,  by  one  fingle 
Law,  and  a  fort  of  Mechanifm,  replenifli'd  the  Earth  with  living  Crea- 
tures, and  provided  that  a  fufficient  Number  fhould  n^Lver  be  wanting,, 
without  the  Intervention  of  a  Power,  which  would  be  irregular,  and     . 
an  Imputation  on  the  Skill  and  Wifdom  of  the  Archited:.  Who  would 
not  prefer  fuch  a  piece  of  Mechanifm,  where  one  Machine  generates^ 
another,  and  continually  produces^  a  new  one  in  its  turn,  without  a- 
ny  new  and  extraordinary  Intervention  of  the  Artificer,  before  one 
which  would  immediately  and  every  Day  require  his  afliftance  and  a- 
mendment  ? 

IV.  This  Method,  you'll  fay,  is  fit  enough  for  the  Brutes,  many  ofv^%  Men  are 
which  mufl  neceifarily  die,  not  only  by  the  Law  of  their  Nature,  but  ^^'[th  the^Mn- 
alfo  for  the  fake  of  others,  for  whofe  ufe  they  were  created  to  ferve  as  tinuai  dread 
Food.     But  Man  is  hardly  dealt  withal,  who  from  his  very  Infancy  is  °^,  P^^^  *  \^ 

...  iT^'i  ^  '  1         T-vi  ju     while  Bruter 

troubled  with  rear  and  Dread  more  bitter  even  than  Death  -,  and  who  arc  not  at  all 
frequently  foretafles,  and  by  ruminating,  thoroughly  digefts,  whate- concern' d  *- 
ver  bitternefs  there  is  in  Death  itfelf     Neither  does  the  Hope  or  Care  /*"'** 
of  Offspring,  nor  the  Enjoyment  of  thefe  Pleafur^s,  compenfate  for  fa 

many 

*  See  Note  37. 


128 


Concerning  Matural  EzhL 


manyMiferies  and  Evils:  The  Divine  Goodnefs  might  therefore  have 
either  conceal'd  from  Man  his  Mortality,  or  elfe  removed  that  innate 
Terror  arifing  in  our  Minds  from  the  profpe(St  of  Death,  which  is  al- 
ways dreadful.  (52.) 
This  is  a  fign      V.  'Tis  to  be  confefs'd  indeed,  that  ihefe  are  indications  that  Man 
4hat  the  pre-  has  fome  relation  to  Immortality,  and  that  the  State  in  which  he  is 
P^rciud'c^to  a*  P^^ccd  at  prcfent  is  not  entirely  natural  to  him,  otherwife  he  would 
better.         not  be  fo  uneafy  in  it,  nor  afpire  fo  eagerly  after  another.    The  pre- 
fent  Life  of  Men  is  therefore  either  affign'd  them  for  a  time,  by  way 
of  Punishment,  as  fome  think,  or  by  way  of  Prelude  to,  or  Prepara- 
tion for  a  better,  as  our  Religion  teaches,  and  our  very  Nature  per- 
fuades  us  to  hope  and  expedt.    This  is  prefumed,  you'll  fay,  and  not 
proved.    Be  it  fo.    But  if  by  the  Suppofition  of  a  future  State  this 
"Difficulty  may  be  folv'd,  and  Providence  vindicated,  when  it  is  ar- 
raign'd  as  dealing  hardly  with  Mankind,  who  is  fo  foolifh  as  to  be  wil- 
ling to  call  in  queftion  the  Power  and  Goodnefs  of  God,  rather  than 
admit  of  fo  probable  an  Hypothefis  ?     To  which  we  may  add,  and  be- 
lieved by  almoft  all  Mankind.  But  if  it  were  not  fo,  God  has  beftow'd 
other  Benefits  of  Life  upon  us,  which,  in  our  own  Judgments,  are  not 
at  all  inferior  to  the  prefervation  of  Life;  and  this  appears  from 
hence,  that  we  often  prefer  thefe  Benefits  to  Life  itfelf,  which  we 
ihould  never  do^  if  we  did  not  fometimes  efteem  them  dearer  to  us. 

To 


N  O  t  E  S. 


(52.)  A  fufficient  anfwer  to  this  Objeftion 
mav  be  found  in  the  laft  Chapter  of  Dr.  Si>er- 
icci's  admirable  Treatife  on  Death,  I  fliall  in- 
fcrt  a  little  of  it.  "  There  are  great  and  wife 
'*  Reafons  why  God  fhould  imprint  this  aver- 
**  fion  to  Death  on  human  Nature;  becaufe  it 
*'  obliges  us  to  to  take  care  of  ourfelves,  and 
**  to  avoid  every  thing  which  will  deftroy  or 
**  fliortcn  our  Lives :  this  in  many  Cafes  is  a 
"  great  Principle  of -Virtue,  as  it  preferves  us 
"  from  all  ^tal  and  dellrudive  Vices ;  it  is  a 
**  great  inftrument  of  Government,  and  makes 
"  Men  afraid  of  committing  fuch  Villanies  as 
'**  the  Laws  of-their  Country  have  made  capi- 


"  tal ;  and  therefore,  fmce  the  natural  Fear  of 
"  Death  is  of  fuch  great  advantage  to  us,  we 
"  mull  be  contented  with  it,  tho'  it  makes  the 
"  thoughts  of  Dying  a  little  uneafy;  efpecially 
"  if  we  confider,  that  when  this  natural  Fear 
"  of  Death  is  not  encreas'd  by  other  Caufes, 
"  it  may  be  conquer'd  or  allay'd  by  Reafon 
"  and  wife  Confideration."  p.  329.  4th  Edi- 
tion. 

For  a  farther  Account  of  both  the  National 
and  irrational  Fear  of  Death,  what  it  is,  and 
what  it  ought  to  be,  the  Ends  and  Ef!eds,  and 
alfo  the  Remedies  of  it,  fee  Norrk\  excellent 
Dlfcourfe  on  Heb.  2.  15.  *. 


♦  Pramcal  Difcoarfesy  vol.  4th. 


Concerning  Matural  Evil,  tij 

To  come  to  a  conclufion :  Without  an  univerfal  confufion  of  Nature, 
without  violence  ofFer'd  to  the  Laws  and  Order  of  it,  the  fame  Ani- 
mals could  not  prolong  their  Life  for  any  confiderable  time,  it  re- 
mained therefore  that  fome  fupply  the  Place  of  others  fucceffively, 
and  that  the  Species  be  perpetuated,  iince  the  Individuals  could  not,  ^ 
left  the  whol  eAnimal  kind  fhould  prove  a  thing  of  but  one  Age's  Du- 
ration. 

VL  From  hence  it  appears,  that  the  Race  of  Mortals  is  to  be  per-  'J^J '/^^^^ 
petuatcd  by  the  propagation  of  their  Species;  and  fince  every  Animal  to  be  bom 
is  in  a  perpetual  Flux,  and  may  either  increafe  or  decay,  it  was  pro-  w^^'j  ^"'^ 
per  to  proceed  from  lefs  Beginjiings  to  greater;  for  by  this  means  thehenw^the 
new  Offspring  would  be  lefs  burthenfome  to  the  Parents,  and  the  foundation 
Tcung  and  Old  agree  better  together.     I  confefs  indeed  Men  are  born  ljI"^'^^. 
defencelefs  and  unable  to  prote<5t  themfelves,  and  lefs  qualified  to  pro- 
vide for  themfelves  than  any  other  Animals :  But  God  has  aflign'dus 
Parents,  Guardians,  and  Faithful  Guides,  fo  that  we  are  never  more 
happy  than  when  under  their  Protection.     Hence  Childhood^   blefs'd 
with  the  fimple  enjoyment  of  good  things,  and  void  of  Care,  becomes 
more  pleafant  to  us  than  any  other  Age.     Hence  alfo  comes  Reverence 
and  Relief  to  the  Aged,  hence  proceeds  Comfort  to  the  Mature,  and 
Support  to  the  Decrepit.     Nay  the  Seeds  and  Principles  of  Social  Life 
are  all  laid  in  this  appetite  of  Generation.     To  this  propenfion  we  ^ 

owe  almoft  all  the  benefits  of  Society.  Nothing  therefore  could  be 
more  defirable  to  Creatures  mortal  (as  we  are  by  the  neceffary  Condi- 
tion of  terreftrial  Matter)  and  obnoxious  to  Miferies,  than  to  be  born 
after  fuch  a  manner  as  in  the  firft  Part  of  Life,  while  we  are  tender, 
unacquainted  with  things,  and  put  under  the  Guardianfhip  of  others, 
to  enjoy  the  Sweets  without  the  Care ;  in  the  middle,  to  pleafc  our- 
felves  as  much  in  taking  care  of  others  j  and  in  the  decrepit,  feeble 
Age,  to  be  affifted  in  our  turn  by  others  whom  we  have  educated. 
This  Part  of  the  Divine  OEconomy  is  fo  far  therefore  from  needing 
an  Apology,  that  it  is  rather  a  Demonjlration  of  his  Goodnefs.  The 
Race  of  Men  was  to  be  repair'd,  fince  Death  could  not  be  prevented 
without  a  greater  Evil  j  and  that  Reparation  is  order'd  in  fo  wife  and 
beneficent  a  way,  that  nothing  can  be  more  worthy  of  the  Divine 
Power  and  Goodnefs,  nothing  defervc  greater  Admiration. 

S  VIL  Now 


1 3o  Concerning  Natural  RviL 

The  chief  ^^^-  -^^^  ^^^^^  ^w°  Appetites,  viz.  of  Self-prefervation,  and  the 
AppcutcsiTc  Propagation  of  our  Species,  are  the  primary,  the  original  of  all  o- 
thofe  of  Self- thers.  From  thefc  fprine  Pleafure  and  an  agreeable  Eniovment  of 
and  propAga- t'iiogs ;  from  thele  come  almolt  every  thing  that  is  advantageous  or 
tion  ofthe  defirablc  in  Life.  But  all  thefe  are  mingled  with  fome  Evils,  which 
^^*^^"'       could  not  be  avoided  without  greater. 


SECT.    VII. 

Of   Difcafes,     Wild-Beafts,     and   Venomous 

Creatures. 


i^^irtnii^-  \^7^  ^"^  obferve  (as  before  *)  that  our  Bodies  coniift  of  fo- 
foimion,  and  VV  lid  and  fluid  Parts,  and  that  thefe  folid  Members  may  be 
tumours  to  either  cut  or  broken  to  Pieces,  disjointed,  or  other  wife  rendcr'd  unfit 
feen^e^p^ns  ^^^  Motion:  whcncc  Weaknefsy  Languijhing  and  Torments',  that  the 
*nd  Difeafes.  Fluids  alfo  are  liable,  not  only  to  Confumption,  but  Corruption  too, 

to  Ebullition,  by  too  intenfe  Heat,  or  Stagnation  by  Cold :  whence 

proceed  various  Maladies  and  Difeafes. 

II.  Now  there  are  certain  Juices  in  the  Earth  which  we  inhabit. 
The  flrength  from  a  mixture  of  which  arife  Changes  and  Coagulations.  There  are 
ancffudTjui- other  Bodics  alfo  which  flyafunder  with  greater  violence  when  mix'd. 
ces  as  are  Thus  Milk,  by  the  infufion  of  a  little  Acid,  turns  to  Cheefe  and 
AdmaYs/a-  Whey:  thus  Spirits  of  Wine  and  Gun-powder, when  touched  by  the 
xifes  from  the  Fire,  run  into  Flame;  and  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  the  fame  from 
%£ngTwi^ch^^Q"^^"g  ^^  P^^s  ia  the  Blood  and  Humours  of  a  human  Body.    Now 

could  not  be  thOlC 

aemoved,  without  taking  away  Motion. 

•  ScO.  ij. 


Concerning  Natural  EviU  1 5  i 

thofe  things  which,  by  being  mix'd  wirh  them,  refolve,  coagulate,  or 
render  them  unfit  for  Circulation,  we  call  Poifonous.  And  if  we 
confider  thofe  contraries  by  which  we  are  nourifh'd,  and  in  the  Sri  g- 
gle  or  Oppolicion  of  which  Nature  confifts,  'tis  fcarce  conceivable  how 
thefe  (houid  not  often  happen.  Nor  can  all  contrariety  be  taken  a- 
way,  except  Motion  be  taken  away  too,  as  we  have  fhewn ;  nor  could 
all  thefe  things  that  are  contrary  to  our  Conftitution  be  removed,  ex- 
cept fome  Species  of  Creatures  were  extind,  or  never  created  i  that 
is,  our  Security  muft  have  been  purchafed  at  too  dear  a  Rate.  For 
if  every  thing  that  is  in  any  refpedt  repugnant  to  us  were  removed, 
it  would  coft  either  the  whole  Syilem,  or  ourfelves,  more  Evil  than 
we  receive  from  it  at  prefent,  as  will  fufficiendy  appear  to  any  one 
that  enumerates  the  Particulars. 

III.  'Tis  to  be  obferv*d,  that  the  Parts  of  this  mundane  Syftcm  ^^    . , 
which  are  contiguous  to  us,  liiz.  the  Air,  Waters,  and  the  Earth  it-micaiDif- 
felf,  are  liable  to  Changes;  nor  could  it  poffibly  be  otherwife,  if  the^a    le 
whole  Machine,  of  which  thefe  are  but  fmall  Parts,  be  thoro'ly  con- 
fider'd :  nor  could  thefe  Changes,  efpecially  the  fudden  ones,  always 
agree  with  the  Temperature  of  the  Humours  of  human  Body.     For 
they  enter  into  the  very  conftitution  of  the  Body,  and  infedl  its  Fluids 
according  to  the  Laws  of  Nature:  whence  it  is  that  the  due  Crafisof 
the  Blood,  and  Health  of  the  Body,  depend  upon  the  temperature  of 
the  Air  and  Weather.     Hence  arife  peflilential  and  epidemical  Difeales; 
nor  could  they  be  avoided,  unlefs  the  Animals  had  been  made  of  a 
quite  different  Frame  and  Conftitution.     Nay,  whatever  State  they  had 
been  placed  in,  they  would  have  been  fubjeft  either  to  thefe,  or  o- 
thers  no  lefs  pernicious.    For  Marble,  and  the  very  hardeft  of  Bodies, 
are  difTolv'd  by  the  viciftltude  of  heat  and  cold,  moift  and  dry,  and  the 
other  Changes  which  we  are  infenfible  of  j   how  much  more  the  hu- 
mours and  animal  Spirits  of  Man,  on  a  right  temperature  of  which 
Life  depends.     God  might  indeed,  by  a  favour  peculiar  to  us,  have  ex- 
pell'd  all  the  contagions  arifing  from  thefe  alterations,  or  provided 
that  they  fhould  not  hurt    us.    But  what  reafon  have  fuch  Sinners 
as  we  now  are,    to  expedt    it.    'Tis   more  agreeable   to   the   Ju« 
ftice  of  God,   to  leave  the  Elements  to  themfelvesi   to  be  carried 

S  2  according 


igi 


Concern'ifi<y  Natural  EviL 


according  to  the  Laws  of  Motion,  for  our  Puniiliment,  (^2-)-    Neither 
ought  we  to  wonder  that  God  denies  the  Guilty  a  Favour,  which  even 
the  Innocent  have  no  Right  to  :   nay,  we  ought  to  think  that  he  has 
inflidled  a  very  hght  Penahy  on  rcbelHousMan;   for  fince  the  Natu- 
ral Evils  we  are  forc'd  to  ftruggle  with,  are  for  the  moll  partof  fuch 
a  nature  as  could  not  be  warded  off,  but  by  the  particular  extraordi- 
nary favour  of  the  Deity,  God  fliould  feeni  rather  to  have  refumed  a 
free  Gift,    than  inflided  a  Punilhment,  when  he  is  pleas'd  to  permit 
them. 
Rocks  and        ^^'  ^^  ^^^  Earth  had  been  made  for  the  ufe  of  Man  alone,  we 
Deiarts  are    might  havc  cxpcdcd  that  there  fhould  be  nothing  in  ic  that  was  pre- 
gncn  not  to  •  ^j^-jjl  ^^  yfelefs  to  him;  but  fince  it  was  made,  as  we  have   obfer- 

Man  but  O-      J  ^       r  i-r»  r  AiTT-  i-TV/T  -I 

ther  Animals  vcd  *,  lor  the  Bencnt  ot  the  Univerle,  Man  is  placed  therein,  not 
i^V^^**^  W*"  becaufe  it  was  created  for  him  only,  but  becaufe  it  could  afford  him 
a  convenient  Habitation ;  for  God  muff  be  fuppofed  in  this  cafe  not 
to  have  adapted  the  Place  to  the  Inhabitants,  but  the  Inhabitants  to 
the  Place.  If  therefore  Man  can  dwell  commodioufly  enough  in  thefe 
Regions  of  the  Earth  which  are  fit  for  his  Purpofe,  he  muff  allow 
God  in  his  Goodnefs  to  give  the  Earth  as  many  other  Inhabitants  as 
it  can  fuftain  confiftently  with  the  Good  of  Men.  Neither  is  he  to 
repine,  that  the  Rocks  and  Defarts,  which  are  of  no  ufe  to  Men,  fup- 
ply  the  Serpents  and  Wild-Beajis  with  Coverts.  But  thefe,  you'll  fay, 
fometimes  invade  the  Countries  which  are  moff  delightful,  and  befl 
ftored  with  conveniencies  for  human  Life,  deftroy  the  fruits  and  culti- 
vated 

NOTES. 


(:J3.)  Our  Ainhor*s  Argamcnt  here  feems  to 
be  framed  raihcr  in  compliance  with  the  com- 
mon forms  of  fpeaking,  than  in  flrift  ccjnfor- 
mty  to  his  own  Scheme  of  the  to  C'iKTiov^  or 
abfolute  Meliority  in  things:  which  Syftem 
maintains  that  God  is  Hill  infinitely  benefi- 
cent, or  as  kind  as  poflible  to  all,  ordifpenfes 
every  thing  for  the  very  bcft  in  the  main.  Tho" 
what  is  here  introduced  by  way  of  Punilhment, 
may,  if  rightly  underftood,  be  defended  as  an 
inftance  of  thegreateft  poflible  Kindncfs;  fince 
the  only  end  of  all  the  Divine  Judgments  is 
cither  the  Correftion  and  Amendment  of  the 


Offenders  themfelves,  or  admonition  to  others, 
or  both  :  and  confequently  is  a  means  of  the 
greateil  Good  to  Mankind  in  general,  and  the 
very  beft  dirpeniation  towards  them  in  this  de- 
generate corrupt  Eftate,  and  the  moft  proper 
method  of  fitting  them  for,  or  di reding  and 
drawing  them  to  a  better.  And  if  all  this 
can  be  effefted  by  the  fame  general  Laws  of 
Nature,  which  alfo  bring  Plenty,  Health  and 
Happinefs  to  the  World,  here  is  a  double  de- 
monftration  of  the  abfolute  Wifdo-Ta  and  Good 
nefsof  its  Author.  • 


Civap.  3.  Not€  33. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  i  5  0 

vated  Fields,  and  kill  the  Men  thcnifelves  by  Bites  and  Poifons.  I  grant 
it;  but  it  may  be  qneflion'd  whether  it  has  been  always  fo. 

V.  For  in  the  firft  Place,  this  Evil  might  have  had  its  Origin  from  ^^»;'ent  Ht- 
Man  himlelf;  'uiz.  Rage  might  be  given  to  the  Lion,  and  Venom  tOchr'e"ihnt 
the  Serpent,  for  the  Punifhment  of  Mankind,  and  this  antient  Hifto-  vviidB^aiu 
lies  both  facred  and  prophane  declare.     But  fince  this  Queftion  was^"^^J7;r' 
firft  agitated  by  fuch  as  either  denied  reveal'd  Religion,  or  at  leaft  were  tures  were 
io-norantof  it,  I  would  not  call  that  in  to  our  afiillance,  nor  make  a- "^•''^>"  ^°'  ^''- 

irr*^i  iTTir-  punifhraent 

ny  other  ule  or  it  tnan  as  a  bare  Hypotheiis.  of  Mankind. 

VI.  We  may  affirm  then  in  the  fecoiid  Place,  that  thefe  things  hap-  ^ 

pen  thro'  the  fault  of  Men,  who,  by  Wars  and  Difcord,  make  fruit-  of  Mant-fnd  ^ 
ful  and  rich  Countries  void  of  Inhabitants  to  till  them,  and  leave  them  that  thefe 
to  the  poffeflion  of  Wild-Beafts  and  venomous  Infedts :    Since  there-  ^,"^^'P^y  - 
fore  they  neither  cultivate  them  themfelves,  nor  allow  other  Perfons  la-d  walie  by 
to  do  it,  what  wonder  is  it,  if  God,  for  the  reproach  of  Men,  give  ^^''^^'^^-  ^° 
them  up  to  be  inhabited  by  Brutes,  Wild-Beafts  and  Infedls?     Thofc  of\|a|" f^ 
Parts  which  we  have  deferted  belong  by  right  to  them,  nor  do  they  right  belong 
otherwife  multiply  more  than  is  proper.  totiem. 

VII.  Thirdly:  'Tis  no  more  repugnant  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  towemaymote 
have  made  an  Animal,  by  the  bite  of  which  a  Man  might  be  deftroy'd,  "^[^  ']J'"'^ 
than  a  Precipice.     There's  nothing  in  the  whole  Earth  but  what  may  and  veno- 
hurt  or  kill  a  Man,  if  it  be  not  ufed  with  caution:    Meat,  Drink,  "^""^  Crea- 
Water;  Fire.     Muft  thefe  then  not  be  created  becaufe  they  may  hurt  other  in^cmi- 
a  Man  ?     Nor  is  it  more  difficult  to  be  aware  of  Poifons  and  Wild-  vcniences  of 
Beafts  than  of  thefe :    Nay,  fcarce  one  is  killed  by  Poifon,  or  torn  by  ^^jjfch^'^^"' 
Wild-Beafls,  of  a  thoufand  that  die  by  the  Sword  j  and  yet  we  don't  never  quarrel 
at  all  blame  the  Divine  Goodnefs  for  this.     It  may  be  faid,  that  Iron,  ^^''^  ^'°^'^- 
Earth,  Water,  Meats  and  Drinks,  are  neceflary,  and  on  that  account 

the  Evils  attending  them  may  be  tolerated.  And  who  will  undertake 
to  affure  us  that  venomous  AAimals  and  Wild-Beafts  are  not  necefla- 
ry *  ?  Muft  we  reckon  them  entirely  ufelefs  becaufe  we  do  not  know 
the  ufe  of  them  ?  Mull  we  fay  that  every  Wheel  in  a  Clock  is  made 
for  no  manner  of  Purpofe,  which  a  Ruftic  underftands  not  the  defign 
of?  But  fuppofe  we  grant  that  thefe  are  of  no  Service  to  us,  yet  do 
they  not  pleafe  and  enjoy  themfelves  +  ? 

VIII.  You 

•  See  Note  54.  -f  Su  Note  33.. 


'3+ 


Concernim  Natural  Evil. 


divine  Care 
to  think  o- 
therwife  fa- 
vours of 
Pride. 


Wild-Beafts 
and  veno- 


Aii  Animals  VIII.  You  may  urge  that  thefe  arc  not  worth  the  Notice  of  the 
arc  under  the  Divine  Providence.  Thus  indeed  proud  Mortals,  admirers  of  them- 
felves  alone,  defpife  the  Works  of  God :  But  "tis  not  fo  w^ith  the 
Divine  Goodnefs,  which  chofe  that  fome  Inconvenience  fhould  be- 
fal  Mankind,  rather  than  a  whole  Species  be  wanting  to  Na- 
ture. 

IX.  If  you  infift  that  a  Lion  might  have  been  made  without  Teeth 
or  Claws,  a  Viper  without  Venom:  I  grant  it,  as  a  Knife  without  an 
mous  Crea-  Edge;  but  then  they  would  have  been  of  quite  another  Species,  and 
ufc^^*M°^  have  had  neither  the  nature,  nor  ufe,  nor  genius,  which  they  now 
enjoy.  In  fhort,  I  fay,  once  for  all,  they  are  not  in  vain.  The  very 
Serpents,  tho'  a  Race  hateful  to  us,  have  their  ufesj  among  the  reft, 
they  gather  the  Poifon  out  of  the  Earth,  (54.).  Nor  is  the  Country 
lefs  habitable  where  they  are  than  where  they  are  not.  Now,  cceterh 
paribus^  Animals  ought  to  multiply  -,  for  Life  is  a  Perfe<5tion,  and  fince 
it  is  as  noble  a  one  as  Matter  will  admit  of,  'tis  preferable  to  none  at 
all.  *Tis  therefore  the  Work  and  Gift  of  God,  wherever  he  has  be- 
ftow'd  it,  and  does  not  ftand  in  need  of  an  Evil  Principle  for  its 
Author. 

NOTES. 


(54.)  For  an  account  of  the  various  ends  and 
ufes  of  thefe  noxious  Animals,  poifonous  Plants, 
Minerals,  (^e.  fee  Derbarri's  Anfvver  to  the  a- 
bove  mcntion'd  Objedlion,  in  his  P^yf.  Theol. 


B.  2.  Ch.  6.  with  the  References,  and  Ray  on 
the  Creation,  Part  2.  p.  43 2,  ^c.  4th  Edition, 
or  Chamberi'%  Cytlopcedia^  under  the  Word 
Poifin. 


SECT. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  i  3  5 


SECT.    VIII. 

Concerning  the  Errors  and  Ignorance  of  Man. 


I.  ^Ince  Man  (nay  every  created  Being)  is  neccfTarily  of  a  limited  Human  Un- 
i.  1  Nature  *    'tis  plain  that  he  cannot  know  every  thine.     The  !^^''^*"^'"?, 
molt  perfect  Creatures  therefore  are  ignorant  of  many  thmgs :    Nor  ignorant  of 
can  they  attain  to  any  other   Knowledge  than  what  is  agreeable  to  "^»"y  tWn^o. 
their  Nature  and  Condition :    innumerable  Truths  therefore  lie  hid 
from  every  created  Underftanding.     For  perfect  and  infinite  Know- 
ledge belongs  to  God  alone ;  and  it  muft  be  determin'd  by  his  Plea- 
fure,  what  degree  every  one  is  to  be  endow'd  with :  for  he  only  knows 
the  nature  and  necelTity  of  each,  and  has  given  what  is  agreeable  there- 
to.    Ignorance  is  therefore  an  Evil  of  Defeat,  and  no  more  to  be  a- 
voided  than  the  other  kind  of  ImperfeBion ;  for  an  imperfe<5t  Nature 
(as  that  of  all  Creatures  is)  underftands  alfo  imperfeftly. 

II.  As  to  human  Knowledge,  'tis  confefs'd  that  we  acquire  it  by  ^^  ^^  ^°^^' 

titncs  rorccci 

the  Senfes,  and  that  certain  Characters  denote,  not  fo  much  the  Na-  to  make  ufc 
tures^  as  the  Ufes  and  Differences  of  things  -f*.     Now,  fince  things  very  o^conj^c- 
difFerent  internally,  have  fometimes  the  fame  external  Marks,  wemuftfor'^^e^^y 
of  neceflity  be  often  doubtful,  and  fometimes  dcceiv'd  by  the  Simili-  not  only  be 
tude  of  the  Marks.     ^  _  ilSte"^ 

Neither  is  it  fufficient  to  the  avoiding  of  Error,  that  we  fufpend 
our  aflent  in  doubtful  Cafes,  for  'tis  often  neccfTary  for  us  (efpccially 
if  we  have  to  do  with  other  Perfons)  to  adt  upon  conje(5hire,  and  re- 
folve  upon  adtion,  before  we  have  thoro'ly  difcufs'd  the  Point,  or  dif- 
fover'd  the  Truth :  on  which  account  it  is  impoflible  that  w«  (hould 

totall/ 

*   See  Note  28. 
f  Fcr  a  right  IJnderJlanaing  of  this  Seilion,  review  our  Jut  for'' j  Note  A» 


1^6  Concerning  Matural  Rvil. 

totally  avoid  Errors.     God  mufl  therefore  either  have  made  no  fuch 
Animal  as  Man  is,  or  one  that  is  liable  to  Errors.     As  Contrariety  re- 
fults  from  Motion,    which  is  as  it  were  the  a<5lion  of  Matter,  To  a 
poiTibility  of  Error  is  confequent  upon  the  Action  of  a  finite  Under- 
flanding. 
God  could        IM.  If  any  one  reply,  that  God  can  immediately  reveal  the  Truth 
rot  guard  us  to  US  in  fuch  Cafcs :  I  anfwer,  he  may  fo,  nor   can  it   be  denied  that 
Errors  u'idi-  ^^  ^^^  done,  and  will  do  it  fometimes :  but  that  this  fhould  be  done  al- 
out  violence  ways,  would  be  a  violence  repugnant  to  the  Nature  and  Condition  of 
.done  to        Man,  and  could  not  poflibly  be  done  without  more  and  greater  Evils 
arifing  from  an  interruption  of  the  courfe  of  Nature.     Now  we  muft 
diftinguifh  between  thofe  Errors  which  we  fall  into  after  our  utmoll: 
diligence  and  application,  and  fuch  as  we  are  led  into  by  carelefnefs, 
negligence,  and  a  depraved  Will.     Errors  of  the  former  kind  are  to 
be  reckon'd  among  Natural  Evils,  and  not  imputable  to  us :  for  they 
arife  from  the  very  State  and  Condition  of  the  Mind  of  Man,  and  are 
not  to  be  avoided,  unlefs  God  would  change  the  Species  of  Beings, 
and  order  that  different  things  fhould  not  affed:  the  Senfes  in  the  fame 
manner,  that  is,  that  there  fhould  be  no  more  Species  nor  Individu- 
als, than  there  are  Senfaiions  in  us:  for  if  the  Number  of  thefe  ex- 
ceed the  Defcrimination  or  Combination  of  our  Senfations,  variety  of 
them  mufl  neceflarily  produce  either  the  very  fame  Senfations  in  us, 
'Or  none  at  all,  and  a  great  many  anfwer  to  the  fame  Senfation,  fo 
that  we  mult  certainly  be  fometimes  impofed  upon  by  the  fimilitude 
of  things.     Either  then  the  Diflindlions  of  our  Senfations  mufl  be 
multiplied  in  infinitum^  or  the  infinite  variety  of  fenfible  Objedls  taken 
away.     But  'tis  evident  that  neither  could  have   been  done  in  this 
prefent  State.     We  mufl  therefore  bear  the  Inconvenience,  not  only 
of  being  ignorant  of  innumerable  things,  but  alfo  of  erring  in  ma- 
ny Cafes. 
"Wan  i«  not        IV.  To  this  it  may  be  replied,   that  Error  is  a  Defect  in  that  part 
?"bf"^b  "'^  "^^  Man,  in  the  perf^dion  of  which  his  Happinefs  chiefly  confiflsj  if 
caufe  expo,   therefore  he  may  naturally  fall  into  Errors,  it  follows,   that  Man  may 
.4cd  to  Errors,  jje  naturally  miferable  without  his  fault.     But  I  anfwer:  Any  parti- 
cular  Evil  does  not  bring  Mifery  upon  us,    otherwife  every  Crea- 
,ture  would  be  miferable,    as  of  necefHty  labouring   under    the  E- 
vils  of  Imperfection,    He  only  therefore  is  to  be  denominated  mife- 

rable^ 


Concerning  Natural  Evit.  i^.^ 

raMe,  who  is  opprelTed  with  more  and  greater  Evils  than  his  Good 
can  requite  with  Happinefs.  So  that  upon  baliancing  the  Conve- 
niencies  and  Inconveniencies  of  Life,  it  were  better  for  him  not  to  be 
than  to  be. 

V.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  alfo,  that  God  has  in  his  Wifdom  and  Good- '^'^°^<=  ^"^ 
nefs  fo  temper'd  our  prefent  State,  that  we  very  feldom,  if  ever,  fall  \yeM\  into 
into  grievous  and  pernicious  Errors  without  our  own  fault.     But  if  without  our 
this  ever  come  to  pafs,  as  foon  as  the  Evil  preponderates,  Life  ista-[^j"j^j^*^^^j._ 
ken  away  together  with  the  benefits  of  Nature.     Now  'tis  to  be  e-niciou$. 
fteem'd  an  Happinefs,  and  an  Argument  of  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  that 
the  Natural  Benefits  of  Life  cannot  be  taken  from  us,  but  Life  is  ta- 
ken alfo.     Life  then  can  be  a  burden  to  none;  nor  is  it  necelTary  that 
any  one  fhould  withdraw  himfelf  from  natural  Evils,  by  voluntarily 
putting  an  end  to  his  Life.     For  if  thefe  Evils  be  fuch  as  take  away 
the  Benefits  of  Life,  they  alfo  bring  it  to  an  end.     God  produced  all  » 

things  out  of  nothing,  and  gave  us  Being  without  our  Advice,  he 
feems  therefore  obliged  in  Juilice  not  to  fuffer  us  to  be  reduced  to  a 
State  that  is  worfe  than  Non-entity,  (g^,)  When  therefore  any  State 
is  overwhelmed  with  Evils  which  outweigh  the  Good,  *tis  reafonable 
that  God  fhould  remit  us  to  our  former  State,  that  is,  let  us  return 
to  nothing.  Neither  ought  we  to  accufe  the  Divine  Power  and  Good- 
nefs which  has  beftow'd  as  many  Bleffings  and  Benefits  upon  us,  as 
either  the  whole  Univerfc  or  our  own  Nature  would  admit  of  j  and 
fince  it  was  impoflible  but  that  fome  time  or  other,  upon  the  increafe 
of  Evils,  his  Gift  {viz.  Life)  muft  become  burdenfome,  when  this 
happens  he  breaks  off  its  thread. 

VL  But 

NOTES. 


(55.)  It  would  be  fo  indeed  if  this  were  our 
only  State  :  but  as  it  is  at  prefent,  I  fear  many 
liavc  nothing  but  the  hopes  and  expcdlations  of 
another  to  fupport  them  under  almolt  complete 
Mifery;  to  comfort  and  encourage  them  to  un- 
dergo Evils  infinitely  greater  than  all  the  be- 
nefits of  Life:  Evils,  which  make  Life  itfclf 
an  Evil.and  (as  our  Author  fays)  put  them  into 
a  State  worfc  than  nothing.    Wiintft  the  loog 


and  acute  Torments  of  numerous  Martyrs,  the 
Pains  of  Confeflbrs,  the  Labours  of  common 
Galley-Slaves,  ^c.  But  the  leall  hint  of  tliis  is 
fufficient,  and  the  common  anfvvers  to  it  very 
fatisfaftory  :  as  will  perhaps  appear  from  the 
References  to  the  laft  Chapter  of  the  Appendix 
to  this  Book,  where  this  Queftion  comes  more 
prof>crly  under  confidcration. 


n^ 


Cmcernim  Natural  Evil. 


VI.  But  Man,  you'll  fay,  is  ignorant  of  thofe  things  which  it  was 

Our  Know-  *•  ^   •*  '^  '  i^r^ii  /->- 


Sutc 


Pd  ^^s^^dl  -  ^^^  greateft  Intereft  to  know,  namely,  of  Truths  that  are  neceflary 
ted  to  our  to  the  attainment  of  Felicity.  Ic  was  convenient  for  our  prefent 
State  to  underftand  thefe  j  and  who  will  affirm  that  God  has  not  be- 
ftow'd  upon  us  all  the  Knowledge  which  is  agreeable  to  our  State  ? 
We  ought  therefore  never  to  be  deceiv'd  about  fuch  Truths  as  thefe, 
while  we  apply  all  proper  diligence  to  the  Search.  I  anfwer;  If  this 
be  underflood  of  the  Happinefs  due  to  us  in  this  Life,  'tis  very  true ; 
nor  is  our  Underftanding  ever  fo  far  miftaken,  as  not  to  inform  us  of 
the  Truths  neceflary  to  this.kind  of  Happinefs,  if  proper  care  be  not 
wanting.  Bur,  fuch  Happinefs  ought  to  fuffice  us,  as  may  ferve  to 
make  Life  a  Blefling,  and  better  than  the  abfence  of  it.  A  greater 
iodeed  was  promifed  to  the  firft:  Man  by  a  gratuitous  Covenant,  {c,6) 

but 

NOTES. 


(56-)  Tlia'  the  firft  Man  might:  hnve  been 
created  more  perfeft  in  all  his  Faculries  than  a- 
ny  of  his  Pofierity  (which,  as  foroe  think,  can- 
not be  eafily  proved  from  the  account  we  have 
of  him  in  Gr/rr/J".  *)  Tho'  this  knowledgemight 
have  been  at  firll  much  clearer,  as  coming  en- 
tire and  aduit  from  the  immediate  hand  of  his 
Creator  ;  yet  it  feems  highly  probable,,  tliac 
this  could  not  have  been  propagated  in  a  natu- 
mI  way,  that  is,  by  any  general  pre-eftablifh'd 
Laws,  as  our  prefent  lacultics  are,  but  Man- 
kind, as  a  fucceffive  Body,  muft  neceffarily 
have  been  left  to  the  known  Rules  of  Propaga- 
tion, aivi  the  prefent  Meth  d  of  improving 
their  Intelleiis,  and  deriving  all  their  Notices 
from  the  common  Sources  of  Senfation  and 
Refleftion.  And  fo  our  bountiful  Creator  may. 
he  fuppo'ed  to  have  deprived  Mankind  of  no 
Bicffings  he  could,  confiflent  with  his  other 
Attribute^,  and  the  order  of  the  Creation,  pof- 
fibly  have  1  eftow'd.  Nay,  why  may  not  he  be 
thought  to  have  converted  even  this  neceflary, 
unavoidable  ImperfeftioQ  in  us,  compared  with 
the  firft  Jdam,  into  a  greater  Perfeftion  arifmg 
bpth.  fpom  ouy  nctioo*  of  his  fall,   and  the 


confcquences  of  it,  rnd  of  the  wonderful  Re- 
medy prepatcd  for  it,  and  promifed  in  the  fe- 
cond  y^Ji:;/!  ?  We  feem  to  be  made  more  high- 
ly fcnfible  of  the  infinite  Wifdom  and  Good- 
nefs  of  God,,  and  more  thankful  for  our  Con- 
dition, from  our  knowledge  of  his  jull  perniif- 
iion  of  fo  deferv'd  a  Fall  ;  and  his  gracious 
yxnAQkrv'A  Exdlt/ition  of  us  agiin  to  a  fupcrior 
State,  than  if  we  had  conceiv  d  the  Mifery  at- 
tentling  human  Nature  to  be  (as  perhips  moft 
of  it  was)  a  neceflary  confequencc  of  our  being 
created  in  this  inferior  Clafs.  But  whether  thi» 
Notion  b«  a1Iow*"J  or  not,  the  Scheme  of  Pro- 
vidence relating  to  Taradife^hz.  as  delivered  in 
Holy  Scripture,  if  taken  altogether,  can  be  no 
juft  Objeftion  againlt  the  moral  Attributes  of 
God.  He  created  Man  entirely  innocent,  and 
abfolutely  free,  which  Freedom  was  abfolutely 
necefl'ary  to  his  Happinefs  (as  will  appear  un- 
der the  head  of  Moral  Evil.)  He  gave  him 
the  Means  and  Abilities  to  complete  his  Hap- 
pinefs, and  placed  him  in  a  World  every  way 
fuited  to  his  Condition.  This  Liberty  made  u 
poflikle  for  hiiji.to  lofe  that  Innocence,  tho'  he 
•  had  but  one  finglc  opportunity  of  doing  itf, 

and 


♦  See  Bayle  under  the  Word.  Adam,  Remark  D:     Ani  Curcellaei   Injiit.  Re!.  Chrijl.  T.  3.   C.  8, 
P   108,  l^c.  And  Dijfert.  de  Pecc.  Orig.  ^.11.  crEpifcopius  Infl.  Tkeol.  1.  4.  C.  6,7.  p.358>359- 
f  See  Nichols'/  Conferente  with  a  Tbeiji,  p.  220,  221.   ill  Editioxi. 


Concernif^  Natural  Evil, 

but  when  that  was  once  broken  by  Sin,  he  and  his  Pofterity  were  re- 
manded to  thofe  imperfed:  Notices  which  could  be  had  from  an  im- 
perfedt  Underftanding,  and  the  Information  of  the  Senfes  j  which  yet 
are  not  in  the  leaft  to  be  defpifed,  neither  had  Man  a  Right,  nor  could 

T  2  he 


159 


N  O  t  E  S. 


and  it  was  highly  reafonable  and  neceffary  that 
he  fhould  have  that  ||.     This  one  Opportunity 
he  embraced,  (which  it  does  not  feem  poffible 
for  God   himfelf,  tho'  he  forcfaw  it,  to  have 
prevented,  confiftently  with  that  Freedom  he 
had  for  good  reafons  given  him,  and  determined 
thus  to  exercife}  and  fo  alter' d  his  Nature  and 
Circumftances,  and  confequently  made  it  ne- 
ceffary  for  God  alfo  to   change  his  Place  and 
Condition,  and  to  withdraw  fuch  extraordina- 
ry favours  as  his   infinite  Wifdom  and  Good- 
liefs  might  otherwife   have  thought   proper  to 
bcftovv.     Thus,  with  his  Innocence,  Man  loft 
all  Title  to  a  Continuance  in  Paradife,  and  of 
confequence   became    naturally  liable  to   the 
common  Evils  and  Calamities  of  a  tranfitory 
Life,  and   the  Pains  attending   its  Conclufion. 
Thofe   that  defcended  from  him,  and  partook 
of  the  fame  Nature,  muft  neceffarily  partake  of 
the   fame  Infirmities;  in  particular,  they  muft 
inherit  Corruptinn  and  Mortality.     Which  Evils, 
tho  we  now  lament  them  as  the  chief  Parts  of 
our  Fore-fathers  Punifhmcnt,  yet  could  not  in 
the  prefent  Circuntftances  of  things  be  preven- 
ted ;  nor  indeed,  were  fuch  a  Prevention  pof- 
fib!?,  would  it  be  in  the  main  defirablej  as 
will  appear  imrticdiatcly:  nay  the fe,  by  a  moft 
wonderful  Scheme  of  Providence,  are  infinite- 
Ijfcootweigh'd,  and  made  the  means  of  bring- 
ing us  to  moch  grciter  Happinef'f,  by  Faith  in 
him  who  was  promifed   from  the   Beginning, 
and  hath  in  thefe  latter  Days  brought  Life  and 
Jncitrupttbtiity  to  Light.     •*  51  nee  the  Fall  of 
Man  (fays  the  incomparable  Sherlock  on  Death, 
"  p.  101.)  Mortality  and  Death  is  neceflary  to 
"  the  good  Government  of  the  V/orld  :    no- 
"  thing  elfe  can  give  a  chock  to  fome  Men's 
"  Wickedneft,  but  either  the  Fear  of  Death  or 


"  the  Execution  of  it :  fome  Men  arc  fo  otit- 

"  ragioufly  wicked,    that  nothing   can  put  a 

"  ftop  to  them,  and  prevent  the  Mifchief  they 

"  do  in  the  World,  but  to  cut  them  off:  this 

"  is  the  Reafon  of  Capital  Punifhments  among 

"  Men,  to  remove  thofe  out  of  the  World 

**  who  will   be  a  Plague  to  Mankind  while 

"  they  live  in  it.     For   this   reafon  God  de- 

"  flroy'd  the  whole  Race  of  Mankind  by  a  De- 

"  luge  of  Water,  excepting  Noah  and  his  Fa- 

"  mily,  becaufe  they  were  incurably  wicked : 

"  For  this  reafon  he    fends  Plagues   and  Fa- 

"  mines,  and  Sword,  to  correft    the  exorbi- 

"  tant  Growth  of  Wickednefs,    to  lefTen  the 

"  number  of  Sinners,  and  to  lay  Reftraintson 

"  them.     And  if  the  World  be  fuch  a  Bedlam 

"  as  it  is  under  all  thefe  Reftraints,  what  would 

"  it  be  were  it  filled  with  immortal  Sinners! 

And  again,  p.  105.     "  When  Man  had  fin- 

"  ned,  it  was  neceflary  that  he  Ihould  die,  ho- 

"  caufe  he  could  never  be  completely  and  per- 

"  feflly  happy  in  this  World,  as  you  have  al- 

"  ready  heard  :    and   the  only  poffible  way  to 

**  make  him  happy,  was,  to  tranflate  him  into 

"  another  World,   and  to  bellow  a  better  Im- 

"  mortality  on  him:  This  God  has  done,  and 

"  that  in  a  very  ftupendous  way,  by  giving  his 

"  own  Son  to  die  for  us ;  and  now  v/e  have 

•*  little  reafon  te  complain  that  we  all  die  in 

"  Adam,  fmce  we  are  made  aHve  in  Chrift, 

A  great  many  more  Arguments  on  this  Sub- 
left  may  be  feen  in  the  fame  Book,  Chap.  3. 
^  2.  All  which  muft  be  obferv'd  to  relate 
chiefly  to  the  Government  of  Man  a/ier  hi» 
Fall  :  the  Fall  itfelf  will  be  accounted  for  in 
the  next  Chapter.    Sec  Note  106. 


II  S^e  Dr.  J.  Clatke  sn  Mara/  Et'iK  p.  211.  &c.  and  Limbqrch  Tbeal.  QbrJjK  L.  3.  C*  au-  ^.«^» 
rfffi/ Jenkiu'i /?^<?/'i//.«/  /^t' Ci-r//?.  iJ^//r,  vol.  2.  C.  13.  p»  Z53,  254.  5th  Edition.  •     .    ,» 


i^o  Concerning  Nutural  Evil 

he  naturally  attain  to  greater  Pcrfedion.  For  when  the  Faculties  of 
our  Souls  were  injured,  and  the  health  and  vigour  of  our  Bodies  im- 
pair'd  by  our  owii  Vices,  as  well  a^  thofe  of  our  Parents;  our  natural 
Perfedions  muft  necelTarily  be  inipaired  alfo.  For  fince  our  Know- 
ledge is  to  be  acquired  by  Care,  Induflry  and  Inftru6lion,  if  Mankind 
had  continued  innocent,  and  with  diligent  care  communicated  true 
Notions  of  things  to  their  Pofterity ;  and  had  not  infeded  their  OfF- 
fpring  by  Example,  Inflrudion,  or  any  Contagion  attending  Propa- 
gation, we  fliould  have  been  lefs  liable  to  Errors;  nay  free  from  per- 
nicious ones ;  and  have  enjoy'd  a  more  perfed:  Knowledge  of  things. 
For  our  native  intellectual  Faculty  would  have  been  ftronger,  and 
being  better  furnifh'd  both  with  the  Means  and  Principles  of  Science 
than  we  now  are,  we  fliould  more  eaiily  have  prevented  the  Occa- 
fions  of  Err^r.  All  pernicious  Errors  therefore,  at  leaft  in  Matters  of 
Neceility,  are  to  be  imputed  to  our  own  Guilt,  or  that  of  our  Pa- 
rents * 

VII.  If  any  be  fo  ungrateful  as  to  murmur  flill,  and  affirm,  that 
We  prefer  hc  would  noc  accept  of  Life  on  thefe  Conditions,  if  he  might  but 
Life,  with  all  |^       his  Choice ;  and  that  himfelf  is  the  beft  Tudse  of  his  own  Inte- 

its  mconvc-  j       d 

niencies,  be-  fcft,  and  he  no  Benefactor  that  obtrudes  a  Gift  upon  a  Man  againfl  his 
fore  Death,  v^ijl  j  jhat  confequently  he  owes  no  thanks  to  God  on  accountof  Life 
which  Life  he  would  refufe :  We  muft  reply ;  that  thus  indeed  impi- 
ous Men  and  Fools  are  ufed  to  prate,  but  this  does  not  come  from 
their  Hearts  and  Confciences.  For  none  are  more  afraid  of  Death, 
none  more  tenacious  of  Life,  than  they  that  talk  thus  idly.  A  great 
many  of  them  profefs  that  they  don't  believe  a  future  Life,  and  if  fo^ 
they  may  reduce  themfelves  to  the  wifh'd-for  ftate  of  Annihilation  as 
foon  as  they  pleafe,  and  caft  off  that  Extfience  which  is  fo  difagreeable. 
No  Perfon  therefore,  except  he  be  corrupted  in  his  Judgment,  and  in- 
dulges himfelf  in  Error,  can  ferioufly  prefer  Non-exiftence  to  the 
prefent  Life,  {j^'j), 

VIII.  But 

N  o  r  E  S. 


(57.)  "  Self-murder  is  fo  unnatural  a  Sin, 
"  that  'tis  now-a-days  thought  icafon  enough 
*'  to  prove  any  Man  diilrafted.     We  have  too 


"  many  fad  Examples  whit  a  difturbcd  Imagi- 
"  nation  will  do,  if  that  muft  pafs  for  natural 
**  Diftraftion ;  but  we  feldom  or  never  hear, 

♦•  that 


•  For  what  rekt(s  to  tbi  Deiiriru  0^  Original  Sin,  ^(.  fa  the  latter  end  of  tbe^  next  Se^tofix 
and  Note  58; 


Conccrnim  Natural  E^':l, 


14.1 


VIII.  But  if  any  one  think  fo  from  his  Heart,  he  is  not  fallen  into^f^me  nut 
this  Opinion  from  any  natural  EviJ,  but  from  others  which  he  brought  55^"^j'^'"J° 
upon  himfelf  by  vcrong  ILle^ions.     We  fee  many  Perfons  weary  of  Life,  ac  ount  of' 
but  'tis  becaufeof  their  bad  Management,  left  they  (liould  be  ridicu-')'^"''^^  but 
lous  for  mitring  of  Honour,  of  Riches,  or  fome  empty  End  which  e^vj""^^'^^ 
they  have  unreafonably  propofed  to  themfelves.     But  very  few  have 

been  excited  to  Self-murder  by  any  natural  and  abfolutely  unavoidable 
Evil  or  Error.  Life  therefore,  of  what  kind  foever  it  is,  muftbe  look'd 
upon  as  a  benefit  in  the  judgment  of  Mankind,  and  we  ought  to  pay 
our  grateful  acknowledgments  to  God,  as  the  powerful  and  beneficent 
Author  of  it.  Nor  will  it  be  any  prejudice  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  if 
one  or  two  throw  Life  away  in  defpair.  For  it  is  to  be  fuppofed,  that 
this  proceeds  not  from  the  greatnefs  of  any  natural  Evil,  but  from 
Impatience,  from  fome  depraved  Eledionj  of  which  more  hereafter. 
For  none  of  the  Brutes  which  are  deftitutc  of  Free-will,  ever  quitted 
its  Life  fpontaneoully,  thro'  the  uneafinefs  of  Grief,  or  a  Diftemper. 
If  any  Man  therefore  has  killed  himfelf  voluntarily,  we  muft  conclude 
that  he  did  this,  as  all  other  wicked  A(5tions,  by  a  depraved  Choice. 

IX.  As  to  the  fecond  fort  of  Errors,  into  which  we  are  led,  not  by  Thofe  Errors^ 
nature,  but  carelefnefs,  negligence,  curiofity,  or  a  depraved  vrUl,  the  into^byour 
number  of  thefc  is  greater,  and  their  efFeds  more  pernicious :  nay  'tis  own  fault, 
thefe  only  which  load  and  infefl:  Life  with  intolerable  Evils,  fo  as  to  J^^^^°^^j  ^^ 
make  us  wilh  that  we  had  never  been.    But  fincc  they  come  upon  us  mong  Moral 
thro'  our  own  fault,  they  are  not  to  be  reckon'd  among  Natural  Evils^  Evils. 

but  belong  to  the  third  kind,  viz.  the  Moral,  to  which  we  haften: 
But  we  muft  firft  liim  up  what  has  been  deliver'd  in  this  Chapter. 


NOTES. 


that  mere  external  Sufferings,  how  fcverc  fo- 
ever, tempt  Men  to  kill  themfelves.  The 
Stoics  themfelves,  whofe  Principle  it  was  to 
break  their  Prifon  when  thc\»  found  them- 
felves uneafy,  very  rarely  put  it  into  praftice: 
Nature  was  too  ftrong  for  their  Philofophy  . 
and  tho'  their  Philolophy  allow'd  them  to 


"  die  when  they  pleas'd,  yet  Nature  taught 
"  them  to  live  as  long  as  they  could;  and  we 
"  fee  that  they  feldom  thought  themfelves  mi- 
"  ferable  enough  to  die.  Sherlock  on  Provi- 
denctf  C.  7.  p.  249,  250.  zd  Edition.  Sec  alfo 
Note  104.  andCh.  2.  par.  7* 


SECT. 


1^1  Concerning  Natural  Evil, 


S  E  C  T.    V. 

Containing  the  Sum  of  what  has  been  /aid  on 

Natural  Evils/ 


The  whole  I-  1 N  ordcr  to  give  the  Reader  a  better  view  of  vi'hat  has  been  Taid 
Univcrfe  one  |  already,  we  muft  conceive  this  whole  World  as  one  Syftem, 
*^i?^h '  ver  whereof  all  particular  things  are  the  parts  and  Members,  and  every  one 
Sing  is  a  has  its  place  and  office,  as  the  Members  have  in  our  own  Body,  or  the 
part.  Raftera  in  a  Houfe,  the  i)oors,  Windows,  Chambers    and  Clofets  : 

Neither  is  there  any  thing  ufelefs  or  fuperfluous  in  the  whole :  and 
in  order  to  unite  all  more  clofely  together,  nothing  is  felf-fufficient, 
but  as  it  is  qualified  to  help  others,  fo  it  ftands  m  need  of  the  help  of 
others  for  its  niore  commodious  Subfiftence.  And  tho*  in  fo  immenfe 
a  Machine  we  do  not  clearly  perceive  the  connection  or  mutual  de- 
pendence of  the  parts  in  every  refpedt,  yet  we  are  certain  that  the 
thing  is  fo.  In  many  Cafes  'tis  fo  evident,  that  he  will  be  efteem'd  a 
Mad-man  who  denies  it.  Since  therefore  the  World  is  to  be  look'd 
upon  as  one  Building,  we  muft  recoiled:,  how  many  different  parts, 
and  how  various,  fo  grand,  fo  magnificent  an  Edifice  fhould  confift 
of  We  may  defign  a  Houfe,  divided  into  Halls,  Parlours  and  Clo- 
fets; but  unlefs  there  be  a  Kitchen  too,  and  places  fet  apart  for  more 
ignoble,  more  uncomely  Offices,  'twill  not  be  fit  for  Habitation.  The 
fame  may  be  aifirm'd  of  the  World  and  the  frame  of  it.  God  could 
have  filled  it  all  with  Suns:  but  who  will  engage  that  fuch  a  Syftem 
would  be  capable  of  living  Creatures,  or  proper  to  preferve  Moti- 
on. He  could  have  made  the  Earth  of  Gold,  or  Gems:  But  in  the 
iXTKJtn  while  dejiitute  of  Inhabitants.    He  that  has  lived  a  Day  or  two 

without 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  143 

without  Food,  would  prefer  a  Dunghill  to  fuch  an  Earth.  God  could 
have  created  Man  immortal^  without  Paffions,  without  a  Senfe  of  Plea- 
fure  or  Pain  j  but  he  mufl:  have  been  without  a  folid  Body  alfo,  and 
an  inhabitant  of  fome  other  Region,  not  the  Earth.  He  could  have 
made  the  whole  human  Body  an  £/^,  but  then  it  would  have  been  unfit 
for  Motion,  Nutrition,  and  all  the  other  fundlions  of  Life.  He  could 
have  taken  away  the  contrariety  of  Appetites,  but  the  contrariety  of 
Motions  (nay  Motion  itfelf )  muft  have  been  taken  away  with  it.  He 
could  have  prevented  the  fruftrating  of  Appetites,  but  that  mufl  have 
been  by  making  them  not  oppofite\  for  'tis  impoflible  that  contrary 
Appetites,  or  fuch  as  defire  what  is  at  the  fame  time  occupied  by 
others,  fliould  all  at  once  be  fatisfied.  He  could,  in  the  laft  place,  have 
framed  Man  free  from  Errors,  but  then  he  muft  not  have  made  ufe 
of  Matter  for  an  Organ  of  Senfation,  which  the  very  Nature  of  our 
Soul  requires. 

II.  In  fhort,  if  the  mundane  Syftem  be  taken  together,  if  all  the  jf  ^^g  ^j^^j^ 
Parts  and  Seafons  of  it  be  compared  with  one  another,  we  muft  be-^and  all  its 
lieve  that  it  could  not  poflibly  be  better  j  if  any  part  could  t)J pts  be  ta- ■ 
changed  for  the  better,  another  would  be  worfej  if  one  aboundeq  none  could  "^ 
with  greater  Conveniencies,  another  would  be  expofed  to  greater  E- 
vils ;  and  that  neceffarily  from  the  natural  Imperfection  of  all  Crea- 
tures. A  Creature  is  defcended  from  God,  a  moft  perfect  Father  -,  but 
from  nothing  as  its  Mother,  which  is  Imperfection  itfelf.  All  finite 
things  therefore  partake  of  nothing,  and  are  nothing  beyond  their 
Bounds.  When  therefore  we  are  come  to  the  bounds  which  nature 
has  fet,  whoever  perceives  any  thing,  muft  neceflarily  perceive  alfo 
that  he  is  deficient,  and  feek  for  fomething  without  himfelf  to  fup- 
port  him.  Hence  come  Evils,  hence  oppofition  of  things,  and,  as  it 
were,  a  mutilation  in  the  Work  of  God.  Hence,  for  the  moft  parr. 
Men  fear  and  defire,  grieve  and  rejoyce.  Hence  Errors  and  Dark- 
refs  of  the  Mind.  Hence  Troops  of  Mifcries  marching  thra'  human 
Life :  whether  thcfe  graw  for  the  punilhment  of  Mortals,  or  attend 
Life  by  the  «^^^/y  of  Nature;  that  is,  whether  they  proceed  from 
the  conftitution  of  Nature  itfelf,  or  are  external  and  acquired  by  our 
Choice.  Nor  need  we  the  bloody  Battle  of  the  Ancients,  nor  the  ma^ 
licious  God  of  the  Manichees  for  Authors  of  them.  Nor  is  it  any  Ar- 
gument againft  the  Divine  Omnipotence,  that  he  could  not  free  a 

Creature 


be  changed 
but  for  tha 
worfe. 


144  'Concerning  Natural  EvH. 

'Creature  in  its  own  Nature  neceflarily  imperfedl,  from  that  native 
Imperfediion,  and  the  Evils  confequent  upon   it.     He  might,  as  we 
have  often  faid,  have  not  created  mortal  Inhabitants,   and  fuch  as 
•were  liable  to  Fears  and  Griefs:   nor,  as  will  be   declared  below, 
fuch  as  by  their  depraved  Elections  might  deferve  Punifliments:    but 
with  regard  to  the  Syftem  of  the  whole,  'twas  neceflary  that  he  fliould 
create  thefe  or  none  at  all :  either  the  Earth  muft  be  replenifh'd  with 
thefe,  or  left  deftitute  of  Inhabitants.     Nor  could  any  of  the  forego- 
ing particulars  be  omitted,  but  that  very  OmilTion  would  bring  along 
with  it  much  greater  Evils. 
Hence  the        ^^^-  From  hence  fprang  the  Error  of  the  Epicureans^  who  preten- 
Errorofthe  dcd  that  this  Wotld  was  unworthy  of  a  good  and  powerful  God. 
who^kifew    '^^^y>  ^^^  ""'^y  believe,  knew  only  the  leaft  part,  and  as  it  were  the 
only  the      -Sink  of  the  World  viz.  our  Earth.     They  never  confidered  the  good 
uoril'"'^       and  beautiful    part   of  Nature,   but  only  contemplated  the  Griefs, 
ef^t.  Difcafes,  Death  and  Deftrudion  of  Mortals,  when  they  denied  that 

God  was  the  Author  of  fo  many  Evils :   In  the  interim  they  forgot 
■that  the  Earth  is  in  a  manner  the  Filth   and  Offscouring  of  the 
Mundane  Syjiem :  and  that  the  Workmanfhip  of  God  is  no  more  to 
be  condemn'd  for  it,   than  a  Judgment  is  to  be  form'd  of  the  beau- , 
ty  of  an  Houfe  from  the  Sink  or  Jakes.     They  were  ignorant  alfo 
that  the  Earth  was  made  in  the  manner  it  now  is,  not   for  itfelf 
alone,  but  in  order  to  be  fubfervient  to  the  Good  of  the   whole ; 
V  and  that  it  is  filled  with  fuch  Animals  as  it  is  capable  of,  with  a  due 
?  Subordination    to   the  Good  of   the  Univerfe,    and  the  Felicity  of 
j  Souls  that  inhabit  the  purer  and  brighter  Parts  of  this  Fabric,  viz, 
\  the  /Ether  and  the  Heavens.     Thefe  .are  as  it  were  the  Gardens,  Parks, 
I  and  Palaces  of  the  World  j  this  Earth,  the  Dunghill^  or  (as  fome  will 
I  have  it)  the  Work-houfe.     Nor  is  it  a  greater  wonder  that  God 
I  fhould  make  thefe,  than   the  Intejlines,  and  lefs  comely,  but  yet  ne- 
'  x:eirary  Parts  of  human  Body.     Laftly,  they  are  unmindful  that  more 
and  greater  Good  is   to  be  found  here  than  Evil,    otherwife   they 
.themfelves  would  reje<ft  Life.:    and  he  that  has  more  good  than  E- 
vil  is  not  miferable  except  he  will.     If  therefore  we  would  compare 
ihc  Good  things  with  the  Evil :   if  we  could  view  the  whole  Worlw 
-fnanfliip  of  God:  if  we  thoro'ly  underftand  the  Connedlions,  Subor- 
dinations, 


contradic- 
tion. 


Concerning  Natural  Evil.  i/t5 

dinations,  and  mutual  Relations  of  things,  the  mutual  afliflance  which 
they  afford  each  other;  and  laftly,  the  whole  feries  and  order  of  them-, 
it  would  appear  that  the  World  is  as  well  as  it  could  pofTibly  be ;  and 
that  no  Evil  in  it  could  be  avoide;d,  which  would  not  occafiona  grea- 
ter by  its  abfence. 

IV.  We  have  endeavour'd  to  clear  up  thefe  Points,  and  I  hope  effec-  pi^^tothe" 
tually,  as  to  this  kind  of  Evil.     For,  upon  the  fuppofition  of  our  Difficulty, 
Principles,  which,  by  the  way,  are  commonly  acknowledg'd,    fome  EvinssZ^ 
natural  Evils  muft  inevitably  be  admitted;  and  if  even  one  could  a- it  arifes  from 
rife  in  the  Work  of  an  infinitely  wife  and  good  God,  there's  no  occa-  jJl^/^^  "* 
fion  for  the  Bad  Principle  as  the  Origin  of  Evil,  for  Evil  might  have  created  Be- 
exifted  notwithftanding  the  Divine  Omnipotence  and  Infinite  Good- ^^SS' and 
nefs.     The  difficult  Qneftion  then.  Whence  comes  Evil?  is  not  unan- avoided '^ 
fwerable.     For  it  arifes  from  the  very  nature  and  conflitution  of  crea- without  a 
ted  Beings,  and  could  not  be  avoided  without  a  contradiction.     And 
tho*  we  be  not  able  to  apply  thefe  Principles  to  all  particular  cafes  and 
c ire um fiances,  yet  we  are  fure  enough  that  they  may  be  applied.  Nor 

fhould  we  be  concern'd,  that  we  are  at  a  lofs  to  account  for  fome  par- 
ticulars; for  this  is  common  in  the  Solution  of  almoft  all  natural 
Phaenomcna,  and  yet  we  acquiefce.  For  prefuppofing  fome  Princi- 
ples, fuch  as  Matter,  Motion,  &c.  tho'  we  are  ignorant  what  Matter 
and  Motion  are  in  any  particular  Body,  yet,  from  the  variety  of  thefe^ 
we  take  it  for  granted  that  various  Compofitions  and  Qualities  pro-^ 
ceed.  In  like  manner  alfo  we  are  perfuaded,  that  from  the  variousj 
kinds  of  Imperfection  neceffarily  inherent  in  things,  various  Species  of,  »'  - 
Evils  arife,  tho'  in  fome  the  manner  in  which  this  comes  to  pafs  does 
not  appear,  agreeable  to  what  we  experience  in  Light  and  Colours  j 
we  are  certain  that  Colours  arife  from  the  different  difpofition,  refrac- 
tion and  reflection  of  Light;  but  yet  none  can  certainly  tell  how  it  is 
reflected  or  refraCted  when  it  forms  a  blew,  a  green,  or  any  other  Co- 
lour: So  that  I  dare  aftirin,  that  the  Origin  of  natural  Evil  is  more 
eafily  afTign'd,  and  more  clearly  and  particularly  folv'd,  than  that  of 
Colours,  Tafles,  or  any  fenfible  Quality  whatfoever. 

V.  I  confefs,  that  according  to  this  Hypothefis,  Natural  Evils  pro-  ^j^.^  ^.^^^^ 
ceed  from  the  original  Condition  of  things,  and  are  ^ot  pefmittcd  by  died  with 

•,••  .\   ^         ,      ,     .  Hiftorv, 

...  ^1      ,'1  which  docs 
not  attril,u?c  aII  kinds  of  iutur4l)  K v?^}  ^Q  V^l  f^rpiW* ^^^ ^''*"' 


f4^  Of  Maml  Evil. 

(jdd,  b"Ort  in'6?(!er  to  prevent  greater,  which  foiiie  perhaps  may  thln^ 
fe^ugnant  td  facred  Hiitory,  and  the  Doctrine  of  MofeS.  F6r  they 
will  have  it,  that  the  abufe  of  Free-will  wjls  the  Ciiufe  of  all  natural 
'Evits,  and  that  when  God  created  every  thing  good  and  perfecfl  in  its 
.^,  I  kind,  it  was  afterwards  corrupted  by  Sin,  and  fubjecled  to  natural  E^ 

jvils:  but  this  is  aflerted  without  Proof.     For  the  Scripture  no  where 
Ueiches  that  there  would  hive  been  no  manner  of  natural  Evil,  if 
I  Man  had  not  finned.     God  indeed  made  all  things  good  and  perfed:  irt 
;  iheir  kind,  that  is,  he  created  and  flill  prefer ves  every  thing  in  a  ilate 
\  and  condition  fuitable  to  the  whole  Syftem  of  Beings,  and  which  it 
t  n~^ed  have  no  Reafon  to  repent  of  except  it  will.     But  neither  the 
Gdodnefs  of  God,  nor  the  Perfedion  that  belongs  to  the  Nature  of 
^r  ....  I  things,  required  thkt  all  natural  Evils  fhould  be  removed:  for  fome 
^  ?'  oP     '<  created  Beings  have  Evils  inherent  in  their  very  Natures,  •  which  God 
\^  ^^      ?  itiuift  of  neceffity  either  tolerate  cr  fto^  create  thofe  things  in  which 
^  J^        they  do  inhere.     If  therefore  the  facred  Hiftory  be  carefully  exami- 
^  hed,  it  will,  appear  that  fOme  kinds  of  Evils  are  attributed  to  the  Sin 

of  the  firft  Man,  but  others  not.  Of  the  former  kind  are,  /"r//,  the 
Mortality  of  Man,  Vvho  would  Ocherwife  have  been  immortal  by 
Grace.  Secondly y  the  BarrenneJ's  of  the  Earth,  and  growth  of  noxious 
and  unprofitable  Plants  in  the  Room  of  fuch  as  were  fit  for  Fcod^  for 
the  puriifhmerit  of  Mankind,  thirdly,  that  hard  Labour  necefiary  for 
providing  Food,  which  is  a  confequence  of  the  former.  Fourthly^ 
that  impotent  AffeBion  and  Neceflity  of  Obedience  whereby  Women  are 
made  fubjed  to  Men.  Fifthly ^  the  pains  of  Child-birth.  Sixthly ^  the 
Enmity  between  Man  and  the  Serpentine  kind.  Seventhly ^  Banifhriient 
6tft  of  Pkradife,  /.  e.  as  appears  to  me,  kn  Expulfion  out  of  the  State 
of  Grace,  in  whidh  the  Favour  of  God  had  placed  Man  above  what 
was  due  to  his  Namre.  Theie,  aftd  fome  others,  are  exprefly  enu- 
merated as  punifliments  of  the  Firfl  Fall.  (58.)     But  "befides  thefe 

there 

1^0  r  As. 


-  (5$.) 'for  an  account  of  the  Scripture  Hi- 
T^pjry  iclating  to  the  Fall  of /^^^//r,  and  fhe  c:)n- 
fequenc'es  of  it,  both  upon  himfelf  aiid'his'Po- 
^erity,  kt  IM}i''s  Bey/e^s  Le/I-   Serm.  5.  2d  Set. 


C.I.  p.  3.  Note  b,  and  C  9.  p  97,  i^i:  or 
Bp.  Taj/pr^s  Poiennctil  Difcourfes,  p.  614,  615, 
^23,  See  alfo  Limhrch^s  Theol.  Chriji.  L.  3.. 
C.  3,4,  5.  or  Epifiopiui  de  Libera  Arbitrio^  i^c. 


ILymii'i  general  Reprefentation  of  revealed  At//- '  or  Curcellai  Re/.CbriJi.  Injiit.  L.  3.  C.  14,  15, 
gton,  Parti.  C.  4.  and  'Dx.'^.  Clarke  on  Moral   16,  iii<lh\s>  Dijfert.  de  PecuQriginiu 
Jp/'/j'p. 224,  ls!(.  or D'Oylfs  four DllTcrtatioris,. j 


i  Of  Mgra(  EviU  •  147 

there  are  rnany  confequent  upon  the  ne.ce.ffity  of' Matter,  atid  concer- 
nine  which  the  S^rip^ture  has  not|ain^  to  induce  13s  to  be|ieYe  that  tney 
aroTe  frotn  Sin.  *  '  ra-rj'.    '  ——'»>.... 

VI.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  farther/  thg[t-thefe  are  not  pQrrnittedby  God  The  Evils 
to  no  purpofe,  but-for^the  good  of  the  Univerfe,'  and' at  thefarne  wl^'ch  do  a. 
time  of  ]\aan  himfelf     For  as  to  Mortahty,  it  was  by  i:\o  means  expe-  thence  arc 
dient  for  the  Syflem,  that  a  finful  Creatpre  {houldeh^oy  Immortality,  peniiiit^^^ 
which  was  not  owing  to  its  nature,  buF  granted  by  an  excraordihary[[^^§°°^,°j.^g 
favour  of  the  Deity.     Nay^  God  feems  to  have  forbidden  our  firft  Pa-  andaifo  of  ' 
rents  the  ufe  of  the  Tree  of  Life  out  of  mere  Compaffion,  left  if  their  ^^^n  ^"J^^^if"- 
Life  fhould  by  virtue  of  it  be  prolonged,  they  {hquld   live  for  ever 
miferable.     Even  this  Puni{hm.ent,  as  all  others!  contributes  to   the 
reftraint  of  bad  Elections,  and  the  preparation  of  a  new  way  to  Hap- 

pinefs.  For  when  Man  tranfgrefTed,  and  a  perverfe  abufe  of  his  Fr^e- 
Wiil  was  once  introduced,  there  would  have  been  no  end  of  Ma'dhefs 
if  the  Divine  Goodnefs  had  continued  to  preferve  Life,  underftanding 
an  eafy  Food,  and  the  other  Gifts  of  the  Prima3val  otatc,  to  the  abufei^ 
thereof,  as  well  as  to  the  Innocent.  'Tis  notorious  how  exorbitant  bad 
Elections  are  even  amongft  the  Cares  and  Labours  which  Mortals  un- 
dergo in  providing  the  NecefTariesbfLife;  and  how  pernicious  ftrength 
of  Parts  becomes,  when,  upon  a  corruption  of  the  Will,  it  degeher^t^s 
into  Cunning  :  how  much  more  intolerable  then  would  it  he  if  the 
Fear  of  Death  were  away ;  if  the  fame  facility  of  procuring  Food, 
the  fame  vigour  of  Intellect,  which  our  Firft  Parents  enjoy'd  were  con- 
tinued to  their  corrupt  Pofterity.  (59.) 

VII.  Nay,  toconfefs  the  truth,  it  could  not  poflibly  continue  i  for,  Mortality^ 
let  there  be  never  fo  great  Plenty  of  Provifion,  it  might  be  all  corrup-  xS^oif. 
ted  by  the  voluntary  Act  of  one  Man.     \Vhen  our  Firft  Parent  hadcife^.^fi-. 
therefore  once  tranfgrelTed,  what  hopes  could  he  conceive  of  his  Po-  ^^ J^p/^Jj^ 
fterity?     Or,   by  what  Right   could    they  claim   thefe  fupernatural  w^orid  in 
Gifts  of  God }  certainly  by  none.     All  then  are  made  mortal,  not  only  ^^'^  corrupt 
thro'  the  'Juftice^  but  the  Goodnefs  of  God.     For,  while  Men  are  ob- 

U  2  lig'd 

.  N  O  r  E  S. 

(59)    ^^  Shrhck  upcn   Dtnth,    C  2.  ^  i.  jlcrr'd  to  in  the   beginning  of  Note  56,  parti- 
}ur.  3,  4,  and  C  3.  ^.  3.     As  to  the  Vigour  of  Icularly  Mr.  DVy/y's  firll  Dflert.  C.  9. 
nir  Firit  Parent's  Intcllctt,  fee  the  Authors  re-  I 


I  /J.S  Concerning  Natural  Evil. 

lig'd  to  ftruggle  with  Hunger,  Thirft,  Difeafes  and  Troubles,  few  of 
them  are  at  leifure  to  run  quite  mad,  and  loap  over  all  the  bounds  of 
Nature  by  their  depraved  Elections.  'Tis  better  therefore  for  us  to 
undergo  all  thcfe  Inconveniencies,  than  to  be  left  to  ourfelves  without 
reftraint  in  this  corrupt  Eflate.  For  by  that  means  we  fliould  bring 
upon  ourfelves  flill  greater  Evils.  But  thefe  belong  to  reveal'd  Reli- 
gion, and  this  is  not  a  proper  Place  to  treat  on  them  at  large.  (60.) 

N  O  t  E  S. 


(60.)  Thus  our  Author  has,  I  think,  fufli- 
c'lently  accounted  for  all  forts  of  Natural  Evil ; 
and  demonllrated  the  to  C'ihTiov,  or  Melio- 
nty  of  things  in  the  Univerfe,  taking  the  whole 
(,i5  we  always  ought)  together :  at  leall,  he  has 
laid  down  fuch  Principles  as  may  be  eafily  and 
efFeftually  applied  to  that  excellent  End.  He 
has  clearly  proved,  and  clofely  purfued  this  one 
fingle  Propofition  thro' all  the  above  mention'd 
Particulars,  viz.  that  not  one  ofthofe  Evils  or  In- 
conveniencies in  our  Sjjiim  could  pojjibly  have  been 
prevented  without  a  greater:  which  is  an  ample 
Vindication,  an  evident  Proof  of  all  the  Di- 
vine Attributes,  in  the  original  Frame  and 
Govenunent  thereof.     And  Indeed  this  (ttvas 


to  be  the  bed  and  mod  convincing,  if  not  tlie 
only  proper  Method  of  handling  the  Argu- 
ment and  examining  the  Works  of  God,  fo  as 
to  attain  a  due  fenfe  of,  and  regard  for  the  Au- 
thor of  them.  Which  Maxim  therefore,  we 
conclude  from  the  numberlefs  inflances  of  its 
apparent  Validity,  ought  to  be  allow'd,  and 
may  be  fafely  inlifled  on,  tho'  by  reafon  of  our 
great  ignorance  of  Nature,  it  cannot  always  be 
{o  clearly  applied.  However  it  has  been  alrea- 
dy applied  fuccefsfully  to  the  Solution  of  the 
moft  material  Difficulties  in  the  prc'ent  Qiie- 
ttion,  as  may  appear  more  fully  from  the  Au- 
thors rcferr'd  to  in  the  foregoing  Chapter. 


CHAP, 


•  i'^     \y.\.j'>'i^A    ■  .t<' vo;'r';fis  j,. 


CHAP.     V. 

Of  Moral  Evil. 


it    . « • '.  1 


V-' 


Introdu3ton,  containing  the  Sub/lance  of  the  Chapter. 


HAVING  given  fome  Account  of  Natural  Evils,  the  Moral 
come  next  under  confideration :  v^^e  are  nov^r  to  trace  out  the 
Origin  of  thefe,  and  fee  of  what  kind  it  is,   v^^herher  they 
flow  from  the  fame  Source  with  the  Natural,  viz.  the  necef- 
fary  ImperJeBion  of  created  Beings  j  or  we  are  to  feek  for  fome  other 
entirely  diflferent  from  it. 

By  Moral  Evils,  as  we  faid  before,  are  underftood  thofe  Inconve- 
niencies  of  Life  and  Condition  which  befall  ourfelves  or  others  thro* 
wrong  Elections.  For  it  is  plain  that  fome  inconveniencies  happen 
without  our  knowledge,  or  againft  our  Wills,  by  the  very  Order  of 
natural  Caufes ;  whereas  others  come  upon  us  knowingly,  and  in  a 
manner  with  our  Confent  (when  we  choofe  either  thefe  themfelves,  or 
fuch  as  are  neceflarily  connected  with  them.)  The  Moral  are  to  be 
reckon'd  among  the  latter  kind  of  Inconveniencies;  and  he  muft  be 
efteem'd  the  Caufe  of  them,  who  knowingly,  and  of  his  own  accord, 
brings  them  cither  upon  himfelf  or  others  by  a  depraved  or  foolifli 
Ch«ice. 

But, 


I 


^^ 


1  Jo  Concerning  Natural  EviL 

But,  in  order  to  make  this  whole  Matter  concerning  Moral  Evils 
more  fully  undcrftood,  we  muft  confider  in  the 

I  ft  Place,  What  (be  Nature  of  EleSfiom  is. 

2dly.  ^hat  our  Happifiefs  chiefly  depends  upon  Ele5fions. 

3dly.  JVhat  kind  of  EleBions  may  be  faid  to  be  made  amifs^  or 

foolifhly. 
4thly.  How  we  come  to  fall  into  depraved  or  wicked  EleBions, 
5thly.  How  fucb  Elediions  can  be  reconciled  with  the  Power  and 

Go9dnefs  of  God,  .  , 


y 


S  E  C  T.    L 

,       4^oncermng  the  Nature  4)f  Ekciions. 

S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     ivJ/- 

jl  Vtevj  of  their  Opinion    injho  admit    of  Ltlcrty    from 
Cprti^ulftQ'/i  cinly^  hut  ppt  frprri  Necejfity. 


^jni  3f: 


That  it  is  not        ---■»-»     i  i  i 

eafytounder-I.  TF  thcr^  be  .^ny  thi^g  qbfciire  and  jjjfBcijlt  in  PJiilofophy,  '^c 
Mrifcre^re-^  1  /ip  fw ^  f o  fi^d  it  In  liiat  fart  VMc^ 'treats  of  Btoions  gnd 
fentationof  JLi^fty.  There  js  no  point  af^out  which  tlie  Lparned  are  lefs  cpi}!?- 
the  Opinions|]^^t  ^}th  the|nfelyes,  pr  inoxjc  divid^ed  from  each  9t\i'^X'  Nor  is  it  an 
Libem"."^^  eafy  Matter  tpjun(ierft§nd  thegi,  .gr  to  givje  a,cer;ain  and  trije  r.eprej 
Someac-  jC^m^apon  of  ^^qr  Opinions.  I  think  jdiey  may  be  .dfAinguiih'fi  in|o 
i!ibcrtv^iVom^wo  Sorts,  both  admitting  of  a  Liberty;  One  of  them  from  external 
Compuifion  (jgmpulfion^  and    not    from  internal  Necejity-y    but   the   other   from 

only,   othcrsj^^^ 

irom  Neccf-  '  yt     a 

ityalfo.  ^  il.  As 


II.  As  far  as  I  'cah  tlnderftand  the  Opihibn  of  the  f(imfer,  k^  is  xhk :  J/^he^formcr 
Firft,  they  obferve  that  there  are  certain  Appe'tiM  implanted  in  us  fey  Opinion 
Nature,  which  are  riot  to  be  efteem'd  ufefefs,  but  cohtributius;    to-  ^"PPo'e  that 
ward  our  Prefervation,  as  was  fliewn  before;  and  that  fome  tMhgs  Appetites 
are  nartufally  agreeable,  foi^e  contrary  to  thefe  Ap'petices :    that  the  'mp! anted  \n 
former^  wben  prefect,  j^leafe  and  im^prefs  a  deligbtful  Serife  of  thdrfi-"4a't  is\"^*' 
fclves  ;  the  latter  difple^'fe  and  create  uneafmefs.     Thefe  therefore  tlire  sree^ibie  to  ■ 
fcBled  iiicominodious,  ttoubkfome  and  Evil  j  arid  thofe  comthodious,  Jed^goo^f 

Convenient   and  'Good.  'Jie  contrary,  Evil. 

HI.  Secondly,   That  Nature  has  given  \^s  Refffin^  ti  ^ind  or  Ifitel^  Things  in  n^ 
leBy    whereby   to  diftinguifh  Conveniehci'es    from   Inconveniencies,  S""^^^^^^  ^P 
Good  from  Evil.     And  fince  thefe  may  be  confider'd  by  the  Mind  in  inathree  fold 
■a  three-fold  Refpeft,  hence  alfo  arife  three  kinds  of  Good  and  Evil  3  refpea. 
namely,  Pleafarit,  Trqfitable  and  Honeji.  .  kindsofgood - 

IV.  For   if  Good  be  confider'd  only  with  regard  to  the  Appetite, 

^hich  is  delighted  with  the  Enjoyment  of  it,  and  acquiefces  itt  it,  .^^^^^^iJjj^'^ ' 

'"tis  called  l^leajhnt.  agreeable 

to   the  Appetite  is  c.lled  Pleafant. 

V.  But  if  it  be  not  agreeable  to  the  Appetite  of  itfelf,  but  only  J^^^  which 
conneSied  with  fomething  elfe  which  is  of  itfelf  agreeable,  or  produces  whh"rome' 
Pleafure,  and  on  that  account  only  be  defirable,  then  'tis  called  Tro-  thing  which 

Jit  able.     For  tho'  the  Appetite  cannot  come  at  the  imfmediate  Enjoy-  ^^rc^eabk^' h'- 
ment  of  it,  yet  the  Mind  makes  ufe  of  it  in  order  to  procure  thole  called  proft-- 
things  which  it  can  enjoy,  and  from  thence  k  is  efteem'd  coirvenienty  ''^'^'^• 
/.  e.  Good 

VI.  But,  fince  that  which  is  agreeable  to  one  Appetite,  may  be  r6-^^^^w7iica 
pugnant  or  lefs  agreeable  to  others;  and  that  which  pleafes  now,  may  Jhi  undcr-?' 
have  fome  things  ccmnedled  with  it,  which  may  be  diipleafing  after- ftanding robe 
wards,  there  is  need  of  enquiry  and  deliberation,  in  order  to  procure 't?  ^^^'  ^^1 

1  /•  1  ^       '1       •  t  •    1         Vi    A  •  t  t^'  ^ ^  ■,      ,  »   things  conli- 

an  ablolute  Good,  /.  e.  one  which,  all  Appetites  and  Times  conuder  d,  der  d,is  abfo- 
will  afford  as  great,  as  certain  and  durable  a  Pleafure  or  Delight  as  '"'j'y  sood, 
pofTible.     For  this  end  therefore  was  the  Mind  or  Underflanding  gi-  Honeft. 
ven  us,  that  we  might  be  able  to  determine  what  appears  fittefl  to  be 
done  upon  a  view  of  all  fuch  things  as  create  pleafure  or  uneafinefs 
for  the  prefent  or  the  future.    And  what  is  thus  judg'd  by  the  Under- 
Handing  to  be   the  befl,  if  there  be  no  Error  in  the  Cafe,  mufl  be 
look'd  upon  as  Honejl,    For  that  is  honcfl  which  is  agreeable  to  a  ra- 

tiQnat 


151  Of  Moral  Evil. 

tional  Agent ;  but  it  is  agreeable  to  a  rational  Agent,  and  Reafon  itfelf 
dired:s,  that,    all   things  confider'd,   we  (hould  prefer   that  which 
brings   the    greater,    the  more   certain  and  more    durable  Advan- 
tages. 
.  inftanccs  in       VII.  The  Defenders  of  this  Opinion  reckon  thefe  three  kinds  of 
didB«,  and  Good  to  be  Moral  fo  far  as  they  refpedt  Man,  becaufe  they  fall  under 
fuch  things    the  Government  of  Reafon.     But  lince  all  things  cannot  be  always  had 
^biTto^h?    together,  a  ccmparifon  muft  be  made  between  them,  and  that  em- 
Rational       braced  which  appears  to  be  the  beft.     Now  the  kinds  may  be  com- 
Appetitc.      pared  together,  as  well  as  the  particulars  of  each  kind.     For  inftance. 
Health  is  a  thing  pleafant  in  itfelf,  and  defirable  above  all  things  that 
.  relate  to  the  Body,  but  for  the  prefervation  of  it  Medicines  muft  be 
fometimes  taken,  which  of  themfelves  are  far  from  being  agreeable  to 
the  Appetite,  but  as  they  are  means  to  an  End  which  is  in  itfelf  de- 
Jightful,  they  are  faid  to  be  profitable,  and  on  that  account  fit  to  be 
-chofen.     Now  the  Goods  of  the  Mind  are  greater,  more  certain  and 
more  durable  than  thofe  of  the  Bodyj  if  therefore  they  cannot  be  had 
without  the  Lofs  of  Health,  or  even  Life,  right  Reafon  dictates,  that 
Health,  or  even  Life  muft  be  defpifed  in  regard  to  thefe.     For  this 
appears  to  be  themoft  convenient,  all  things  confider'd,  and  on  that  ac- 
count is  honeji :  and  as  Goods  of  a  different  kind  may  be  compared  to- 
gether, fo  may  alfo  particulars  of  the  fame  kind,  as  any  one  will  find 
that  confiders  it. 
He  that  can       VIII.  As  \Q  Libert)\  the  Men  of  this  Sed:  will  have  it  to  confift  in 
aftashisovvn  t;}jis^  that  amoug  all  thofe  Goods  an  Agent  can  embrace  that  which 
di're^'^Ts     plcafes  him  beft,  and  exert  thofe  Ad:ions  which  his  own  Reafon  ap- 
freeaccor-     proves  I   For,  according  to  thefe  Men,  he  that  can  follow  his  own 
ding  to  ihcfe  y^/^^w^/z^  in  Matters  is  free.     For  example,  he  that  is  found  in  Body, 
and  has  his  Faculties  and  Limbs  entire,  if  all  external  Impediments  be 
removed,  is  at  liberty  to  walk:  for  he  can  if  he  w/7/,  and  nothing  but 
his  will  is  wanting  to  exert  that  Ad:ion. 
But  they  fup-      IX.  But  as  to  the  Adions  of  the  Will  itfetf,  namely,  to  will,  or  to 
ari^de^eJ-^"^  y^f/?*^^^  ^^^  ^^^  °^  VoHtion,  they  think  that  it  is  determin'd  to  thefe, 
min'd  to       not  bv  itfelf,  for  that  is  impofiible,  but  from  without.     If  you  afk 
?°°\t'''^^' fron^  whence.?  They  anfwer,  from  the  Pleafure  ovUneaJincfs  perceiv'd 

goodne  s  or  '  oy 

difjg:tc..b!c- 

nefsof  objedls,  perceiv'd  by  the  Intcllefl  or  Senfts ;  and  that  therefore  we  are  not  free  as  to  the  A6li  of  the 

Will,  but  only  of  the  inferior  Faculties,   which  arc  fubjcft  co  the  det.Train..tion  of  the  Will. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

by  the  Underfranding  or  the  Scnfes;  but  rather,  as  they  imagine,  from 
the  prefent  or  urgent  Uneqfinefs :  fince  therefore  thefe  are  produced  in 
us  ab  extra,  not  from  the  Will  itfelf,  and  are  not  in  its  power,  but  a- 
rife  from  the  very  things;  'tis  manifeft,  according  to  thefe  Men,  that 
we  are  not  free  to  will  or  Tiot  to  will,  at  leaft  from  Necefftty,  with  re- 
gard to  the  immediate  Acts  of  the  Will.  Some  of  them  therefore  ex- 
tprefly  deny  that  Liberty  belongs  to  Man  with  regard  to  thefe  Acts,  or 
that  an  Election  can  be  faid  to  be  free,  or  Man  himfelf  in  that  refpect: 
They  will  have  it  therefore,  that  Liberty  belongs  to  us  properly  with 
refpect  to  the  inferior  Faculties  which  are  fubject  to  the  Government 
of  the  Will,  and  difcharge  their  Functions  when  the  Man  himfelf  has 
willed:  that  is.  a  Man  is  free  to  walk  who  can  walk  if  he  pleafes; 
but  not  to  will ;  for  he  receives  the  Will  to  walk  from  elfewhere : 
neverthelefs,  he  that  can  do  what  he  wills,  according  to  them^  is  free, 
tho'  he  be  neceffarily  determin'd  to  will.  (6i.) 

X.  If 

N  0  r  E  S. 


^55 


(6i.)  The  moft  remarkable  Defenders  of  this 
Opinion,  among  the  Moderns,  feem  to  be 
Hoiis,  Locke.,  (if  he  be  confident  with  himfelf*) 
Leil^nitz,  Bay/e,  the  Authors  of  the  Philofophical 
Enquiry  concerning  human  Liberty,  and  of  C/?/o's 
Letters.  But  in  order  to  have  a  more  diftinft 
Notion  of  the  different  Schemes  of  Authors  all 
profefllng  to  treat  of  Human  Liberty,  Free-will, 
i^c.  Let  us  in  the  firft  place  recite  the  feveral 
Powers  or  Modifications  of  the  Mind,  and  ob 
ferve  to  which  of  them  Liberty  is  or  may  be 
apply'd.  Thefe  are  commonly  diftinguifh'd  in- 
to Perception,  Judgment,  Volition  and  Aclion. 
The  two  former  are  generally  neceffary,  or  at 
leaft  always  pajjive:  For  I  cannot  help  feeing  a 
Light  when  my  Eyes  are  open,  nor  avoid  judg- 
ing that  two  and  two  make  four,  whenever  I 
think  of  that  Propofition  ;  tho'  I  may  hinder 
that  Perception  by  fliutting  my  Eyes,  as  well  as 
prevent  that  Judgment  by  refufing  to  think  of 
the  Propofition.  The  Will  then  may  properly 
enough  be  faid  to  influence  or  impede  thefe -f-, 
but  this  docs  not  make  them  lefs/^i^s-f  inthcm- 


felves  J  nay,  the  more  it  does  influence  them, 
the  more  evidently  they  are  fo.  The  third 
will  appear  to  be  the  exercife  of  a  Self-moving 
Principle,  and  as  fuch,  cannot  properly  be  mo- 
ved or  influenced  by  any  thing  elfe.  The  laft 
is  the  exercife  of  the  inferior  Powers,  the  ac- 
tual produftion  of  Thought  or  Motion  :  this  is 
generally  direftedby,  and  an  immediate  confe- 
quence  of  Volition,  on  which  account  feveral 
Authors  /lave  confounded  them  together ;  but 
tho'  they  be  properly  both  Afts  of  the  Mind, 
yet  they  are  certainly  diftind  ones :  the  for- 
mer is  an  ability  of  choofing  fome  particular 
Thoughts  ot  Motions,  the  other  is  a  power  of 
producing  thefe  Thoughts  or  Motions  purfu- 
ant  to  the  aft  of  choice,  or  of  putting  that 
choice  in  execution.  A  careful  diftinftion  be- 
tween thefe  will  help  us  to  judge  of  all  fucli 
Authors  as  have  either  ufed  them  promifcuoufly 
or  been  content  to  treat  of  the  laft  only,  as 
moft  of  thofe  Perfons  have  that  are  cited  in  the 
14th  and  following  Pages  of  \.\&  Philofophical 
Enquiry, 

Thefe 


See  Note  65. 


t  Seo  Note  82. 


154  Of  Moral  Evil 

X.  If  it  be  granted  that  this  is  the  Nature  of  our  Elections,  there'^ 
![/our  Ac!"'  J^o  doubt  but  all  our  Actions  arc  really  and  truly  neceffary.  For  as  to 
the  proper  Actions  of  the  Will,  to  will  or  fufpend  the  Act  of  Voli- 
tion, the  Men  whom  we  are  fpeakingof,  give  up  Liberty  with  refpect 
to  thefe,  while  they  aflert  that  it  does  not  belong  to  them.  For  they 
arc  of  Opinion,  that  when  any  thing  is  propofed  by  the  Underftanding 

NOTES. 


tions  are 

ftbfolutely 

nccefliuy. 


Thefe  two  hft  then  being  the  only  aftive 
Powers,  or  rather  the  only  Powers  at  all,  are  the 
only  proper  fubjcdls  of  Liberty :  to  which  a- 
gain  it  is  varioufly  apply'd.  With  regard  to  the 
Will,  fome  content  themfelves  with  afiertiiig 
its  Freedom  from  external  Compulfion  only,  from 
being  forced  contrary  to  its  own  bent  and  in- 
clination ;  and  indeed  it  would  be  very  ftrange 
to  fuppofe  itotherwife:  For  to  fay  that  it  may 
fee  drawn  a  contrary  way  to  that  which  the 
Mind  prefers  and  direfts,  ii  to  fay,  that  it  may 
tend  two  contrary  ways  at  once,  that  a  Man 
may  will  a  thing  againft  his  Will,  or  be  ob- 
lig'd  to  will  what  at  the  fame  time  he  does  not 
will  :  but  then  fuch  a  Freedom  as  this  equally 
belongs  to  the  two  former  Powers,  which  can- 
not be  forced  to  perceive  or  judge  othervvife 
than  they  do  perceive  or  judge,  otherwife:than 
as  Objedts  appear,  and  their  own  Natures  re- 
quire ;  it  may  be  apply'd  to  any  thing  the  moft 
neceffary,  nay  the  more  neceflary  the  better- 
Others  therefore  have  contended  for  an  abfo- 
lute  exemption  of  the  Will  from  all  impercep- 
tible Byafs  or  Phyfical  Inclination,  from  all 
internal  neceffity,  arifing  either  from  its  own 
frame  and  conftitution,  the  impulfe  of  fuperior 
Beings,  or  the  operation  of  Objedls,  Reafons, 
Motions,  l^c.  which  appear'd  to  them  the  very 
effence  of  human  Liberty,  the  fole  Foundation 
of  Morality.  And  indeed  thefe  feem  to  be 
the  only  Perfons  that  fpeak  out,  and  to  the 
Point,  as  Ihall  be  fliewn  in  the  following 
Notes. 

Laftly,  a  great  many  will  confine  their  Idea 
of  Liberty  to  ASiion  only,  and  define  it  to  be  a 

Sower  of  cither  aftually  taking  up  or  laying 
own  a  Thought,  of  beginning  Motion  or 
flopping  it  according  to  the  preference  of  the 
l<Cnd  or.  WilJ.     Bjttt  if  this  be  all  the  Liberty 


we  have,  'tis  of  fmall  confequence,  fince  we 
are  confcious  that  in  faSi  all  fuch  Aftions,  fup- 
poftng  the  Organs  to  be  rightly  difpofed,  fol- 
low the  determination  of  the  Will  ;  and  alfo, 
that  in  reafm  they  are  no  farther  tmral,  nor  we 
accountable  for  them  than  as  they  do  fo;  we 
muft  therefore  go  up  higher  than  this  before  we 
come  at  any  valuable  Liberty,  and  the  main 
Queftion  will  be.  Whether  Man  is  free  to  think 
or  refolve  upon,  to  will  or  choofe  any  thing 
propofed,  as  well  as  to  exert  his  other  Facul- 
ties in  confequence  of  fuch  a  Refolution,  Will, 
or  Choice.  This  is  the  only  Point  worth  dil- 
puting,  and  indeed  if  Liberty  be  not  here  'tis 
no  where.  For  if  the  Mind  be  abfolutely  de- 
cermin'd  to  choofe  in  a  certain  manner  in  any 
given  Circumftances,  its  other  fubordinate  Fa- 
culties can  fcarce  be  fuppofed  to  be  undetcr- 
min'd  j  but  the  feveral  Aftions  which  depend 
thereon  will  all  follow  by  neceffary  confe- 
quence. Nay,  upon  this  Hypothefis  there  is 
properly  no  fuch  thing  as  choice  or  adlion  in 
M,n  ;  but  all  are  Paflions  propagated  in  a  chain 
of  neceffary  Caufes  and  Effefls.  And  indeed 
all  who  fuppofe  any  external  Determination  of 
the  Will  (meaning  always  a  neceffary  and  irre- 
fiflibleone)  whether  they  place  it  in  thtDeJire 
of  Goood,  Anxiety  for  the  abfence  of  it,  or  the 
I  aft  Determination  of  the  Judgment,  are  involv'd 
in  the  fame  confequence,  how  many  Steps  foe- 
ver  they  may  take  to  remove  the  Difficulty.  For 
it  is  equal  to  me,  if  what  I  call  my  Choice  or 
Adion  be  necefrary,**wherever  that  Neceffity 
be  placed.  'Tis  the  fame  thing  whether  I  be 
adled  upon  and  over-ruled  by  one  immediate 
Caufe,  or  drawn  on  by  feveral  fucceffively.  Sup- 
pofe,  v.  g.  that  I  am  neceffitated*  to  obey  the 
lafl  rcfult  of  my  own  Judgment.  From  the 
Exijiente  <f  things  follow  certain  Appearances, 

thofe 


Of  Moral  Evih 


»5S 


to  be  done,  we  either  will  it,  or  fufpend  the  Adl  of  Volition  concer- 
ning it,  according  to  the  profpcdl  of  Happinefs  ot*  importunity  of 
the  Uneafinefs  which  appears  to  the  Mind,  in  the  prefent  State  and 
Circumftances ;  by  thefe  therefore  our  Eledion,  according  to  them,  is 
determin'd. 

XI.  But  when  the  Eleftion  is  made,  if  we  can  effeft  what  we  will.  That  huma» 
then  they  fay  we  are  free,  inrefpedtof  fuch  Adtions,  not  from  necef- ^^^""^J*^^ 
iity,  but  only  from  Compulfion ;  for  it  is  plain  that  nothing  but  our  from  NeccC 
will  is  wanting,  and  fuppofing  us  to  will  them,  they  necellarily  fol-  ^^>''  ^^\^ 
low.     For  inftance,  when  nothing  hinders  a  Man  from  walking  but    °"^^"  *° 
his  own  Will,  fuppofing  this  Volition,  it   cannot   be  conceiv'd  but 
that  he  muft  walk,  nor  can  he  reft  while  this  continues.     If  there- 
fore, according  to  them,  all  ads  of  the  Will  are  neceflary  (as  being 
determin'd  from  without  itfelfj  viz.  by  the  convenience  or  inconve- 
nience of  things  or  circumftances)  the  adtions  of  the  inferior  facul- 
ties will  be  no  lefs  necefi^ary,  for  they  will  depend  on  the  fame  cir- 
cumftances and  ads  of  the  Will,  which,  as  they  arc  neceflary,  thefe 
adions  will  be  neceflary  alfo.  (62.)     Tho,  according  to  them,  there- 

X  2  fore, 

NOTES. 


thofe  Appearances  caUfc  certain  Perceptionst  i.  e. 
of  pleafure  or  pain;  thefe  Perceptions  form  a 
Judgment,  this  Judgment  determines  the  Wi//, 
this  IVill  produces  A3ion.  All  this  is  fix'd  and 
inevit.ible,  every  Linicofthe  Chain  is  equally 
neceflary,  and  'tis  all  one  to  me  on  which  my 
Determinations  hang:  'Tis  as  good  to  take 
them  from  the  firft  as  laft,  fince  the  fuppofed 
choice  or  aftion  is  as  much  out  of  my  power, 
or  as  incapable  of  being  alter'd  or  prevented  by 
me,  as  the  exillence  of  external  things.  Tis 
eafy  to  obferve  how  deftruftivc  this  and  the 
like  Schemes  muft  prove,  as  well  of  Morality  as 
Liberty,  both  which  muft  ftand  and  fill  toge- 
ther, and  can,  I  think,  only  be  fecured  effec- 
tually upon  the  Principles  laid  down  by  our 
Author  ;  of  which  in  their  proper  place. 

Sec  alfo  Mr.  Chuii's  Reflexions  on  Natural 
Liberty,  Collet  ion  of  Trails,  p,  379,  ^c  or 
Notes  65,  68,  82. 

•  Remarki  en  the  Philofophical  Enquiry,   p. 


(6jt.)  To  call  an  Aftion  necejfarj,  is  proper- 
ly fpeaking  to  affirm,  that  it  is  no  Aftion:  For 
by  the  Word  Aciion  we  mean  aii  immediate  ef- 
feft  of  what  is  metaphorically  ftiled  a  Self-tnf- 
ving  Power :  or,  the  cxercife  of  an  ability  whick 
a  Being  has  to  begin  or  determine  cither  thought 
or  Motion.  Now,  the  Idea  of  this  Power  in  a- 
ny  Being,  and  of  fuch  excroifc  of  it,  is  direftly 
repugnant  to  that  of  NeceJ^ty,  which  fuppofes 
the  Thought  or  Motion  to  be  already  begun  or 
determined,  and  to  be  obtruded  on  this  Being 
by  fomething  elfe,  and  confequently  implies  ar 
Negation  of  any  fuch  Self-moving  Power  in 
this  Being,  or  of  its  cxercife  by  this  Being  ia 
the  Cafes  above  mentioned.  "  To  be  an  A- 
"  g^'ii  (fay*  Dr-  Clarke,*)  fignifics  to  have  a 
"  Power  of  beginniug  Motion,  and  Motion  can- 
"  not  begin  necrffarily,  becaufe  Nccejfsty  ef  Mc^ 
*•  tion  fuppofes  an  Efficiency  fuperior  to,  and 
"  irrefi^ble  by  the  thing  moved,  and  confc- 

'♦  qucntly 
6. 


156  Of  Moral  EviL 

fore  there  be  no  Compul$on  of  the  Will,  yet  there  is  Necejity^  from 
which  Neceflity  nothing  in  the  World  will  be  free;  nay  a  great  many 
of  them  openly  profefs  to  believe  that  this  is  the  Cafe. 

XII.  Now,  from  this  Hypothefis,  which  they  extend  to  the  Di- 
vine as  well  as  Human  Will,  the  following  Corollaries  feem  deduci- 
ble.  Firft,  that  nothing  in  Nature  could  be  done  otherwife  than  it 
is.  For,  the  whole  Series  of  things  being  as  it  were  connected  toge- 
ther by  Fate,  there's  no  Room  for  Chance  or  Liberty,  properly  fo 
call'd :  Contingency  then  is  removed  out  of  Nature. 


According  to 

their  opinicn 

there  is  no 

fontingency 

in  things, 

nor  could 

any  thing  be 

done  othcrw  ife  than  it  is. 


By  Evil  they 


XIII.  Secondly;  That  nothing  more  can  be  underftood  by  wicked 
underibnd  *^^  wrong  made  Eledions,  than  that  they  are  prejudicial  to  the  Elec- 
noihing  more  tor  or  fomc  Others ;  which  Senfe  is  very  remote  from  the  vulgar  one; 

than  hurtful.  '     ,  ->     1  for 

N  O  "T  E  S. 


**  quently  the  beginmng  of  Motion  cannot  be  in 
*'  that  which  is  moved  neceflarily,  but  in  the 
"  fuperior  Caufe,  or  in  the  efficiency  of  feme 
*'  other  Caufe  ftill  fuperior  to  that,  till  at  length 
•'  we  arrive   at    fomc   Free  Agent?''     Where, 
tho'  the  Doflor's  Definition  of  Agency  feems 
to  be    imperfeft,  that  Word  generally  includ- 
ing the  power  of  beginning  Thought  as  well  as 
JWbf;ff»  (which  arc  two  diftinft  Species  of  Ac- 
tion, and  proceed  from  different  Powers,  tho' 
they  be  often  confounded  together,  and  com- 
prehended under  the  fame  general  term)  yet  it 
fhews  us  an  evident  contradiftion  in  thefe  two 
Words  necejfary  Agent,  in  cither  Senfe  :  Unlefs 
lie  ufes  the  Word  Agent  in  both  Senfes  toge- 
ther, and  then  his  Reafoning  will  be  faffe,  fince 
what  is  afted  on  and  determin'd  by  another  in 
regard  to  its  Thought,   Will,  &c.  and  in  that 
Senfe  mof^d  by  a  fuperior  Efficiency,    may  yet 
have  a  power  of  beginning  real  corporeal  Mo- 
tion (which  is  a  quite  different  fort  of  Aftion) 
in  confequence  of  fuch  pre-determin'd  Thought, 
Will,  l^c.  and  in  that  fenfe  be  an  Agent,  tho' 
not  a  moral  one.   But  what  ever  the  Dr.  might 
mean  by  the  Word  Agent,  his  Argument  will 
hold  in  either  of  thefe  two  Senfes  feparate,  viz. 
that  nothing  can  be  faid  to  a£l  either  in  think- 
ing or  moving,  which  does  does  not  properly! 
bigin  the  Thought  or  Motion,  but  is  put  into  i 


Thought  or  Motion  by  fomcthing  elfe  ,  and  al- 
fo,  that  every  thing  cannot  be  fo  put  either  in- 
to Thought  or  Motion  ;  and  therefore,  that 
there  mull  be  fome  firft  Caufe  of  both  Thought 
and  Motion. 

And  will  not  the  fame  Argument  hold  equal- 
ly for  fome  firft  Caufe  of  Exifence  ?  If  the 
Dr.  can  fuppofe  a  firft  Caufe  of  all  Thought 
a»d  Motion  (as  he  does  here^  and  we  think  ve- 
ry reafonably)  why  may  he  not  alfo  fuppofe  a 
firft  Caufe  of  all  Exifience ;  and  fo  entirely  ex- 
clude that  antecedent  Neceffity  which  he  has  often 
Recourfe  to  as  a  kind  of  fupport  of  the  exiftence 
of  the  firft  Caufe,  but  is  oblig'd  to  exclude 
from  its  Will  and  Adlions  ?  Is  it  harder  to 
conceive  how  an  Eternal  Independent  Being, 
or  Firft  Caufe,  may  cxift  without  any  antece- 
dent Neceffity,  than  how  it  can  will  or  ad 
without  any  ? 

But  to  return  to  the  chief  Defign  of  this 
Note.  We  fee  how  neceflary  it  is  for  us  to 
fix  theprecife  meaning  of  the  Word  Adion  in  a 
Controverfy  of  this  kind,  and  if  the  Significa- 
tion of  it  as  laid  down  above  be  allowed,  then 
neceffary  Aft  ion  is  the  fame  as  paffive  Aftion, 
or  beginning  a  thing  and  not  beginning  it  at 
the  fame  time,  and  in  the  fame  refpeft  ;  in 
which  terms  every  one  perceives  it  to  be  a  con- 
tradidioo. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


157 


for  in  that  Evil  Eledions  are  blamed,  not  for  being  hurtful,  but  for 
being  hurtful  without  Neceffity,  and  becaufe  they  are  made  otherwife 
than  they  ought  to  have  been :  In  this  Hypothefis  then  there  is  no  E- 
le6^ion  made  amifs.  (63.)  Nor  can  any  thing  be  faid  to  be  done  other- 
wife  than  it  ought  to  be:  for  what  could  not  poffibly  be  done  other- 
wife,  is  certainly  done  as  it  ought ;  fince  it  is  done  according  to  the  ex- 
igence and  neccffary  order  of  things. 

XIV.  Thirdly;   By  the  fame  Principle  all  Evil  wou'd  be  in  the Villaniesare 
ftriclelt  fenfe  Natural,  for  it  would  derive  its  Orisin  from  natural  and  ^®  be  placed 
neceflary  Caufes.     The  diftin '3  ion  then  would  be  loft  between  natural  count  of  hu- 
and  moral  Evil,  as  commonly  underftood.     There  would  be  no  Mo-'"^"^'*^^)'* 
ral  Evil  at  all.     For  that  only  is  reckon'd  Moral  by  the  common  con- fook"d  upon 
fent  of  Mankind,  of  which  the  Man  himfelf  is  properly  the  Caufe ;  -"s  crimes, 
but  no  body  looks   upon  himfelf  as  properly  the  Caufe  of  a  thing  ^J^]i-^l  ^ 
which  he  could  not  avoid,  or  to  which  he  was  neceffitated  by  natural 
Caufes,  and  fuch  as  were  antecedent  to  the  Will.     For  every  one 
blames  himfelf  only  on  this  account,  becaufe  he  was  of  himfelf  necef- 

farily  the  Caufe  of  Evil  to  himfelf  or  others.  Thofe  Inconveniences 
which  come  by  Neceffity,  he  looks  upon  as  Miferies,  as  Misfortunes, 
but  never  as  a  Crime.  Thefts  therefore,  Adulteries,  Perjuries,  nay 
the  Hatred  of  God  himfelf,  and  whatever  we  efteem  bafe  in  Villanies 
(as  well  as  the  difgrace  and  punifhment  attending  them)  muft  be  pla- 
ced to  the  account  of  human  Mifery  and  Unhappinefs,  but  by  na 
means  reckon'd  criminal,  nor  any  more  repugnant  to  the  Will  of 
God,  to  his  Juftice,  Purity  or  Goodnefs,  than  Heat  or  Cold. 

XV.  Fourthly;  When  therefore  we  blame  a  Thief,  Adulterer,  Mur-  ^  ^^1^,^^^^^^^ 
therer,  or  perjur'd  Perfon,  when  thefe  Crimes  are  arraign'd  asfcanda-isreprov'd, 
lous;  this  is  not  done  becaufe  they  have  deferv'd  it,  or  becaufe  thefe  "°','^^'^^",^ 
things  are  in  themfelves  really  (hamcful  or  culpable;  but  becaufe  thatit,  but  be- 
Infamy  may  be  a  means  of  deterring  the  guilty  Perfons  or  others  from  caufe  reproof 

1      may  drive 
tne  i,;„,  r;„r« 


NOTES. 


Irm  from 
Evil. 


(63.)  Leibnitz  declares  It  to  be  his  fettled  O- 
pinion  *,  "  That  whenever  we  refolvc  or  will 
"  contrary  to  an  evident  Reafon,  we  are  car- 
"  ricd  by  fomc  other  Reafon  ftrongcr  in  appca- 


"  ranee."  If  this  be  always  the  Cafe,  we  cer- 
tainly can  never  will  amifs  or  unreafonably, 
lince  that  Reafon  which  appears  to  be  the 
ilrongeft  ought  always  to  determine  us. 


•  Rfmarques  fttr  leLivrtde  fOrigine  ii*Mal,  p.  483. 


'5? 


Of  Moral  Evil 


Piinifliments 


the  like  Ele£lions.  And  this  is  the  only  Reafon  why  we  reproach  a 
Thief,  ^c.  and  not  a  fick  Perfon,  with  Infamy;  becaufe  Reproach 
may  cure  a  Thief,  &c.  but  can  do  no  Good  to  a  fick  Perfon. 

XVI.  Fifthly;  Malefa6lors  are  punifh'd,  not  becaufe  they  deferve 

arelpply'dasPunifhment,  but  becaufe  it  is  expedient,  and  Laws  are  made  ufe  of 

^h^'s'^'k ^*  ^®  to  reftrain  Vices,  as  Medicines  to  expel  Difeafes ;  Men  fin  therefore 

neither  are   after  the  fame  manner  as  they  die,  viz.  becaufe  an  efFe£lual  Remedy 

Laws  ufeiefs,  was  not  apply'd.     And  yet  Laws  are  not  entirely  ufelefs,  fince  they 

prevcntV^ics  Prevent  fome  Vices,  as  Medicines  protrad  the  Deaths  of  fome  difeafed 

Perfons :  and  a  Perfon  infected  with  the  Plague  may  be  as  juftly  cut 

off  by  the  Law,  as  a  Witch,  when  by  that  means  there's  hope  of  a- 

voiding  the  Contagion.  (64.) 

We  are  ob-       XVII.  Sixthly ;  We  are  oblig'd  to  repay  good  Offices,  lince  by  be- 

gn.tefd  only  i^ig  thankful  we  may  excite  the  Benefador  to  continue  or  increafe  his 

in  profpeft    Bcnevolcnce,  and  alfo  induce  others  to  do  us  Service.     And  hence  it 

comes  to  pafs,  that  we  are  oblig'd  to  be  grateful  towards  God  and 

Men,  but  not  to  the  Sun  or  a  Horfe,  namely,  becaufe  God  and  Men 

may  be  excited  by  thanks  to  fome  farther  Beneficence,  whereas  the 

Sun  or  a  Horfe  cannot.     Thus  no  regard  is  to  be  had  to  a  Benefit 

recciv'd,  but  only  to  one  that  may  be  receiv'd ;  nor  are  we  oblig'd  to 

be  grateful  towards  a  moft  generous  Benefa£lor  for  what  is  paft,  but 

only  for  the  profpeft  of  what   is  to  come.    All  fenfe  of  Gratitude 

then,  as  commonly  underftood,  isdeftroy'd,  for  the  Vulgar  reckon  him 

a  cunning,  not  a  grateful  Perfon,  who  returns  one  favour  merely  out 

of  hopes  of  another. 

XVIII.  Seventhly ;  If  this  Opinion  be  true,  we  muft  defpair  of  hu- 
man Felicity,  for  it  will  not  in  the  leaft  be  in  our  own  Power,  but 

entirely 


of  a  future 
Benefit 


According 
to  this  Opi 
nion,  hu- 
man Hap- 
pinefs  is 
impoffible. 


f  nee  it  depeofis  upon  things  whicl^  are  not  in  our;  Power. 


(64.)  Ali  thi.%  and  a  great  deal  more  to  the  fphical  Enquirjf,  ^c.  p  91,  i^t.  and  much  the 
faoifi  pur^fe,  is  cxprcfly  afierted  <(is  indeed  Ifemc  hy.Bay/t\  CcitiGal  Dictionary,  p  2609,^^. 
'tt*  a  neceflar^t  coofcqucnce  of  their  Hiypothe-  fTha  bare  recital  of  fuch  Principles  will,  Ihopc, 
lis)  by  Hiii^j  *,  by  the  Author  of  the  PhiXofo-    be  judg'd  a  fufficient  rcfutatioa  of  tlicm. 


See  his  Treat  if e  on  human  Libeny,  or  Bp,  BrwvhaU'i  Wopks,  p.  678. 


Of  Moral  EviL  \  59 

entirely  depend  on  external  Objcds.  Otir  Happinefs  (if  there  be  any) 
muft,  according  to  them,  be  conceiv'd  to  arife  from  the  perfed:  frui- 
tion of  thofe  things  which  are  agreeable  to  the  Appetites.  Where  the 
contrary  to  thefe  are  prefent,  or  the  agreeable  abfent,  we  muft  necef- 
farily  be  iineafy,  and  while  we  flruggle  with  Anxieties  we  cannot  be 
happy.  According  to  this  Hypothefis  therefore  it  follows,  that  our 
Happinefs  necelTarily  requires  fuch  an  Enjoyment  as  we  have  fpoken 
of,  and  that  this  is  at  the  fame  time  fmpoffible.  For  who  can  hope 
that  all  external  things  (with  which  he  has  to  do)  fhould  be  fb  tem- 
per'd  as  in  every  refpedt  to  anfwcr  his  Wifhes,  fo  as  never  to  want 
what  he  delires,  or  be  forced  to  endure  any  thing  contrary  to  his  na- 
tural Appetites  ?  If  Happinefs  arifes  from  the  Enjoyment  oi  thofe 
things  which  are  agreeable  to  the  Faculties  and  Appetites,  and  which, 
can  move  Defire  by  their  innate,  or  at  leaft  apparent  Goodnefsj  if  al- 
fo  the  Will  is  necelTarily  determin'd  to  thefe,  according  to  the  Judg- 
ment of  the  Underftanding,  or  Importunity  of  Appetites,  every  Man 
muft  neceffarily  want  a  great  many  things  which  he  has  chofen,  and 
bear  a  great  many  which  he  willingly  would  not,  than  which  nothing 
is  more  inconfiftent  with  Felicity.  For  we  cannot  poflibly  conceive 
any  State  of  Life  wherein  all  things  anfwer  to  the  natural  Appetites,  rfsconfe- 
In  vain  then  do  we  hope  for  Happinefs,  if  it  depend  upon  external  hard  ^Ind*^^ 

Objects.  th')'  theArgu- 

XIX.  This,  and  a  great  deal  more  that  might  be  added,  muft  feem  ""^'V  ^''°'" 

con  jCciudiccs 

hard  and  repugnant  to  the  common  Notions  of  Men,  and  cannot  be  be  generally 
believ'd  without  extraordinary  Prejudice  to  Mankind.     I  confefs  in-  ^  ^'-^^  one.yet 
deed,  that,  for  the  moft  part,  one  cannot  argue  well  againft  an  Opi-  ^^c  prej^if- 
nion  from  its  confequences,  fince  a  great  many  things  are  true  which  dice  againii 
have  confequences  hard  enough:    not  to  mention  how  cafily  we  n^i- vv"hich  "ecma 
ftake  in  deducing  confequences.     But  yet  when  thefe  are  acknowledged  to  be  attcn- 
by  the  Authors  themfelves  j  and,  if  believ'd,  would  prove  detrimental  '^^'^  ^^^^^^   . 
to  Morality,  they  bring  no  fmall  prejudice  againft  an  Opinion  which  luy^iffh^be 
is  attended  with  them,  and  recommend  us  to  fome  other  as  more^^'^"owicdg^- 
probable,  tho'  it  be  not  fupported  by  any  ftronger  Rcafons.  ^  ' 

XX.  'Tis  to  be  obferved  alfo,  that  among  the  foregoing  Authors  I  All  thofe 
reckon  thofe  who  declare  that  the  Will  is  determin'd  by  the  laft  Judg-  JJ,'j°fjfJ'''''^ 

mentwiii  ispai: 

five  in  its 
Operations  will  be  elleemed  to  be  of  the  fame  Opinion  with  the  former,  and  arc  prcITcd  with  the  fame  con- 
fequences. 


1 6o  Of  Moral  Evil 

ment  of  the  Underftanding  *,  which  has  taken  with  a  great  many 
Philofophers  j  and,  in  (hort,  all  who  maintain  that  the  Will  is  pajjive 
in  Eledions.  For  thefe  muft  be  efteem'd  to  have  the  fame  Sentiments 
of  Liberty  with  the  former,  which  way  foever  they  explain  their  O- 
pinion ;  as  may  appear  from  hence,  that  moft  of  *em  exprefly  deny 
that  Indifference  belongs  to  the  Nature  of  the  Will  -,  their  Opinion 
therefore  is  attended  with  the  fame  confequences  as  the  former.  (65.) 

SUBSECT. 

N  0  "f  E  S, 


(65.)  As  Mr.  Locke  has  particularly  laboured 
the  point  before  us,  and  feems  to  defend  by 
turns  the  feveral  Principles  which  our  Author 
attacks  here  and  in  the  following  Seftion,  we 
Ihall  examine  a  little  into  his  Method  of  treat- 
ing the  Subje£t.  Having  firft  of  all  defin'd 
Liberty  to  be  "A  power  in  any  Agent  to 
"  do  or  forbear  any  particular  Aftion,  accor- 
"  ding  to  the  Determination  or  Thought  of 
"  the  Mind,  whereby  either  of  them  ispreferr'd 
*'  to  the  other  ||.''  Hetnkcs  a  great  deal  of  pains 
to  prove,  that  fuch  Liberty  does  not  belong  to 
the  Will :  which  is  very  certain,  granting  his 
fenfe  of  Liberty  to  be  the  right  and  only  one, 
iince  by  his  Definition  it  is  evidently  fubfe- 
quent  to  the  choice  or  preference  of  the  Mind, 
and  only  relates  to  the  execution  of  fuch  choice 
by  an  inferior  faculty -f-.  But  then,  befide  this 
Idea  of  Liberty,  which  is  nothing  to  the  pre- 
fcnt  Queftion,  there  is  another  previous  and  e- 
qually  proper  one,  which  regards  the  very  de- 
termination, preference  or  direilion  of  the 
Mind  itfelf,  and  which  could  not  poffibly  be 
overlook'd ;  he  proceeds  therefore  to  ftate  the 
QuellJon  concerning  that,  which  he  would  not 
have  to  be  put,  whether  the  Will  be  fee  ?  but 
whether  the  Mind  or  Mm  be  free  to  will  ? 
both  which  I  think  amount  to  much  the  fame 
thing  with  common  Underftandings,  fince  in 
the  firft  place  we  only  ask.  Whether  this  Will 
be  properly  an  aftive  power  ?  (i.  e.  as  oppofed 
to  Mr.  Loikt'%  paflive  Power)  and  in  the  fecond, 
Whether  the  Mind  be  aclive  in  exerting  this 
Power  call'd  Will  ?  and  both  which  will  be 


equally  improper  Queftions  with  regard  to  his 
former  fenfe  of  the  Word  Tree,  i.  e.  as  only 
applicable  to  the  A<5lions  fubfequent  on  Voli- 
tion. However,  he  goes  on  in  the  fecond 
place  to  enquire,  whether  in  general  a  Man  be 
free  "  To  Will  or  not  to  Will,  when  any 
"  Aft'on  is  once  propofed  to  his  Thoughts,  as 
"  presently  to  be  done/'  In  which  refpeft  he 
determines  that  a  Man  is  not  at  liberty,  be- 
caufe  he  cannot  forbear  Willing^*  ;  which,  if 
taken  abfolutely  (not  to  mention  its  inconfi- 
ftency  with  his  notion  of  fufpenfion  4f)  tho' 
it  comprehends  (as  he  fays)  moft  Cafes  in  Life, 
yet  is  not  of  the  leaft  Importance.  For,  whvt 
does  it  fignifie  to  me  that  I  muft  neceffarily  take 
one  fide  or  the  other,  right  or  wrong,  fo  long 
as  I  can  choofe  either  of  them  indifferently  ?  If 
I  can  will  or  choofe  either  of  the  two,  here's 
full  room  for  the  exercife  of  Liberty ;  and 
whether  I  can  or  no,  ought  to  have  been  Mr. 
Locke" %  next  Queftion.  The  Anfwer  to  which 
feemsprettycafy,  tho' perhaps  not  fo  reconcila- 
ble with  his  Hypothcfis.  However,  infteadof 
meddling  with  it,  he  flips  this  abfurd  Query 
into  its  Room,  viz..  Whether  a  Man  beat  Li- 
berty to  will  which  of  the  two  he  pleafes  ?  or, 
which  is  the  fame.  Whether  he  can  Will  what 
Wills?  Sed.  25.  Ilj',  and  then,  inftead  of  telling 
us  in  which  Cafes  the  Will  is  free,  or  the  Man 
free  to  Will,  or  whether  he  be  fo  in  any  Cafe 
at  all  (as  might  have  been  expefted)  he  goes 
on  to  give  us  another  Explanation  of  the  word 
Liberty,  which  is  ftill  confined  to  Aftion,  and 
confequently  foreign  to  the  prefent  Qiieftion. 

In 


Againft  thii  Notion  fee  %t&.  5-  Subfeft.  2 
C.  Of  Power,  §.8.  f  5^/ Note  6. 


par.  13. 


See  Mr.  StruttV  Remarks  on  Locke' j  Chapter  of  Power,  p.  38,  i^c^ 


4-1  ^.56.  1.14,  ^r. 


Of  Moral  Evil 


i6t 


subsegt.il 

An  Opinion  is  frofofed  in  generaly  ajferting  Liberty  from 
Necejjity  as  well  as  Compulfion, 

I.  'nr^HIS   Opinion  determines  almoft  the  fame  with  the  former 

X     concerning  the  Goodnefs  or  agreeablencfs  of  Objedts  to  the  This  agrees] 
Appetites,  nor  is  there  much  difference  in  what  relates  to  the  diftinc-  J^j^^t  f„ 
tion  of  Good  into  Pleafant,  Profitable,  Honeft  :  Except  that  it  refers  moft  cafes, 

Honeft?^P^?'"y 

in  thofd 
relating  td 
the  Appetites  to  Good,  Pleafant,  Profitable  and  Honeft; but  determines  this  to  be  the  difference  between 
a  Man  and  Brute,  fiz.  that  the  one  isdetermin'd  by  its  bodily  Appetite,  the  other  by  himfelf. 


N  0  t  E  S. 


Tn  the  next  placft  he  defines  the  Will  over  a- 
gain  *.  "  Which  (fays  he)  is  nothing  but  a 
"  power  in  the  Mind  to  direft  the  operative 
"  Faculties  of  a  Man  to  Motion  or  Reft,  as  far 
"  as  they  depend  on  fuel*  diredion."  By 
which  Words  if  he  mean,  that  this  Power  of 
direding  the  operative  Faculties,  is  properly 
fj^lk'e  (in  the  fenfe  above  mcntion'd)  or  Pliyfi- 
cally  indifferent  to  any  particular  manner  of  di- 
reaing  them,  /.  e.  is  an  ability  to  direft  them 
cither  to  Motion  or  Reft,  without  any  natural 
Byafs  to  determine  it  (or  to  determine  the  mind 
to  determine  it)  toward  one  fide  always  rather 
than  the  other  :  If,  I  {i^y,  he  intends  to  imply 
thus  much  in  this  definition  of  Will,  then  may 
Freedom  be  juftly  predicated  of  that  fame  Will 
(orof  the  Mind  intheexercifeof  it)  not  indeed 
his  kind  of  Freedom,  /.  e.  that  oi  adlng,  which 
belongs  to  another  Faculty  ;  but  Freedom  in 
our  fenfe  of  the  Word,  /.  e.  a  certain  phyfical 
Indifference,  or  Indeterminatenefs  in  its  own 
exercife  ;  which  is  what  moft  Men  underftand 


by  Liberum  Arbitrium ;  and  whether  there  be 
fuch  a  Liberty  as  this  in  human  Nature,  would 
here  have  been  a  very  proper  Queftion.  For  if 
there  be,  then  we  have  got  an  abfolutely  felf- 
moving  Principle  which  does  not  want  any 
thing  out  of  itfelf  to  determine  it,  which  has 
no  phyfical  connexion  with,  and  of  confe- 
quence,  no  neceffary  Occafion  for  that  grand 
Determiner  ^/mt/y,  which  he  has  afterward* 
taken  {o  much  pains  to  fettle  and  explain,  and 
which  fhajl  be  confider'd  by  and  by.  But  here 
he  flies  off  again,  and  inftead  of  determining 
this,  which  is  the  main  point  of  the  controver- 
{y,  and  wherein  Liberty  muft  be  found,  or  no 
where,  as  we  obferV  d  in  Note  6i.  I  fay,  in- 
ftead of  Hating  and  determining  this  great  Que- 
ftion, Whether  the  Will,  or  the  Mind  be  abfo- 
lutely independent  upon,  and  phyfical ly  indif^ 
ferent  to  all  particular  Afts,  Objefts,  Motions, 
{S'f.  or  neccffarily  require  fome  foreign  Mover; 
he  feems  to  take  the  latter  for  granted,  and  im- 
mediately proceeds  to  the  following  Queftion, 
^  What 


V  29. 


.%l 


\ 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

Honeft  to  the  Duty  which  a  Man  owes  to  God,  himfelf  and"  other 
Men,  as  a  Member  of  Intelledlual  Society,  rather  than  to  the  na- 
tural Appetites  J  and  thinks  that  we  are  to  judge  of  the  Agreable 
nefs  of  things  from  that,  rather  than  from  thefe.  As  to  the  Elec- 
tion which  the  Will  makes  on  account  of  thefe,  it  alTerts  that 
this  proceeds  from  the  Will  itfelf,  arid  that  a  free  Agent  can- 
not be  determin'd  like  natural  Bodies  by  external  Impulfes,  or  like 
Brutes  by  Objeds.  For  this  is  the  very  difference  betwixt  Man  and 
the  Brutes,  that'thefe  are  determin'd  according  to  their  bodily  Appe- 
tites, from  whence  all  their  Actions  become  neceflary,  but  Man 
has  a  different  Principle  in  him,  and  determines  himfelf  to  Action. 
II.  This  Principle  whereby  Man  excells  the  Brutes  is  thus  explain'd 
by  the  Defenders  of  the  following  Opinion,  if  I  take  their  Meaning; 

right; 


That  the 

chief  Good 

is  neceflari- 

ly  defir'd, 

but  others 

axe  not,     becaufethey  maybe  reprcfented  by  the  Underftandirg  in  different  refpcfls 


NOTES. 


4^ 


What  determines  the  Will ?  The  Meaning  of 
tvhich,  fays  he  *,  is  this,  "  What  moves  the 
"  iMind  in  every  particular  inftance  to  deter- 
"  mine  its  general  power  of  dire<fling  to  this 
"  or  that  particular  Motion  or  Reil  ?  "  This 
IAt,  Lee ke  aWs,  for  fliortnefs  fake,  determinating 
the  Will;  and  declares,  that  what  thus  deter- 
mines it  either  firil  to  continue  in  the  fame 
ftale  or  aftion,  is  only  the  prefent  ^atisfaSlion  in 
it :  or  fecondly  to  change,  is  always  fome  JJn^ 
lafinefs  \.  By  which  Words  if  he  only  meant, 
that  thefe  Perceptions  are  the  common  M.tives, 
Inducement!,  or  Occajions  whereupon  the  Mind 
in  h£t  exerts  its  power  of  willing  in  this  or 
that  particular  Manner  ;  tho'  in  reality  it  al- 
ways can,  and  often  does  the  contrary  (as  he 
feems  to  mean  by  fpeaking  of  a  Wi/l  contra- 
ry to  DefireK,  of  raifing  Defires  by  due  Confl- 
deration  ,n*,  and  forming  Appetites  4-+;  of  a 
Power  to  mfpcnd  any  Dcfires,  to  moderate  and 
reilrain  the  Paffions,  and  hinder  either  of  them 
from  determining  the  Will  and  engaging  us  in 
Adion  II II :  Then,  as  we  faid  of  him  before, 
he  is  only  talking  of  another  Queftion,  and 
what  he  has  advanc*d  on  this  head  may  readily 


k-  29.         f  Ibid.         y  ^,  30. 


^.46 


*^  Concerning  which  Sufpenjion  fee  Note  68. 


be  granted,  at  Icnfl:  without  any  prejudice  to 
human  Liberty.  For,  in  this  fenfe  to  affirm, 
that  the  Will  or  Mind  is  determin'd  by  fome- 
thing  without  it,  is  only  faying,  that  it  gene- 
rally has  fome  Motives  horn  without,  according 
to  which  it  determines  the  above  mention'd 
Powers,  which  no  Man  in  his  Senfes  can  dif- 
pute. 

But  if  he  intended  that  thefe  Motives  {hould 
be  underl'ood  to  rule  and  direft  the  Will  abfo- 
lutely  and  irrefiilibly  in  certain  Cafes.  That 
they  have  fuch  a  neceflary  influence  on  the 
Mind,  that  it  can  never  be  determin'd  with- 
out or  againft  them  ;  in  fiiort,  that  the  Soul  of 
Man  has  not  a  phyfical  Power  of  willing,  in- 
dependent of,  and  confequently  indifferent  to 
all  Perceptions,  Reafons  and  Motives  whatfoe- 
ver;  which  the  general  drift  of  his  Difcourfe 
feems  to  aflert,  particularly  V  47j  48,  49,  50. 
where  he  confounds  the  Determination  of  the 
Underftanding  with  the  exertion  of  the  felf- 
moving  Power  throughout.  As  alfo  V  5-  where 
he  aflerts,  "  That  all  the  Liberty  we  have  or 
"  are  capable  of  lies  in  this,  that  we  can  fuf- 
"  pend  *^*  our  Defires,  and  hold  our  Wills 

"  unde- 

4-t  V.  53-         II II  §'  47'  5^.  53- 


'  Of  Moral  Evil. 

right:  In  the  firft  place,  they  declare  that  there  is  {omt  Chief  Goody 
the  Enjoyment  of  which  would  make  a  Man  completely  happy ;  this 
he  naturally  and  neceflarily  defires,  and  cannot  reject  it  when  duly  re- 
prefented  by  the  Underftanding.  That  other  things  which  offer 
themfelves  have  a  Relation  to  this  Good,  or  fome  Connexion  with  it, 
and  are  to  be  efteem'd  Good  or  Evil,  fo  far  as  they  contribute  to,  or 
hinder  our  obtaining  it  j  and  fince  there  is  nothing  in  Nature  but 
what,  in  fome  refped  or  other,  either  promotes  this  End,  or  prevents 
it ;  from  this  Indifference  they  declare,  that  we  have  an  Opportunity 
of  rejecting  or  embracing  any  thing.  For  tho'  we  can  choofe  nothing 
but  under  the  Appearance  of  Good,  i.  e.  unlefs  it  be  in  fome  man- 
ner connected  with  the  Chief  Good,  as  a  Medium  or  Appendant; 
yet  this  does  not  determine  the  Choice,   becaufe  every  Object  may 

Y  2  be 


^3 


N  O  t  E  S. 


**  undetermin'd,  till  we  have  examin'd  the 
*'  Good  and  Evil  of  what  we  defire;  what 
"  follows  after  that,  follows  in  a  Chain  of 
"  Confcquenccs  link'd  one  to  another,  all  de- 
"  pending  on  the  lall  Determination  of  the 
"  Judgment."  And  when  he  fpeafes  of  Caufes 
not  ill  our  Power,  operating  for  the  moft  part 
Jlrcibly  on  the  Will,  §.  57,  i^c. 

If  from  thefc  and  the  like  Expreffions,  I 
fay,  we  may  conclude  this  to  have  been  his  O- 
pinion,  viz,  that  all  the  Liberty  of  the  Mind 
confills  folcly  in  direfting  the  Determination  of 
the  Judgment,  after  which  Determination  all 
our  Aflions  (if  they  can  bccall'd  fuch  *)  fol- 
low nccefl'arily:  then  I  believe  it  will  app»ear, 
that  at  the  fame  time  that  he  oppofed  the  true 
Notion  of  Free- Will,  he  contradifted  common 
Scnfe  and  Experience  as  well  as  himfelf  For 
in  the  firft  place,  is  it  not  felf  evident,  tliatwe 
often  do  not  follow  our  own  Judgment,  but 
run  counter  to  the  clear  convidlion  of  our  Un- 
derllandings,  which  Aftions  accordingly  ap- 
pear vicious,  and  fill  us  immediately  with 
regret  and  the  Rings  of  Confcience.     This  he 


allows,  V  35>  38,  ^V.  to  make  Room  for  hi< 
jKxiety.  But,  upon  the  foregoing  Hypothefis, 
How  can  any  Aftion  appear  to  be  irregular  ? 
How  can  anything  that  is  confequent  upon  the 
final  Refult  of  Judgment,  be  againft  Confci- 
ence, which  is  nothing  elfe  but  that  final 
Judgment  f  ?  Nay,  upon  the  fuppofition  of 
our  being  inviolably  determined  in  willing  by 
our  Judgment  (and,  according  to  Mr.  Loike, 
our  Conftitution  puts  us  under  a  neceflity  of 
being  fo,  ^.  48.)  it  would  be  really  impoflible 
for  us  to  will  amifs,  or  immorally,  let  our 
Judgments  be  never  fo  erroneous ;  **  The 
"  Caufes  of  which  (as  he  alfo  obferves,  V  ^4-)' 
"  proceed  from  the  weak  and  narrow  confti- 
"  tution  of  our  Minds,  and  are  moft  of  them 
"  out  of  our  Power,"  Farther,  there  are  in- 
nummerable  indifferent  Aftions  which  occur 
daily,  both  with  refpcft  to  abfolute  choofing 
or  rcfufing  ;  or  to  choofing  among  things  ab- 
folutely  equal,  equal  both  in  themfelves  and  to 
the  Mind,  on  which  we  evidently  pafs  no  man- 
ner of  Judgment,  and  confequcntly  cannot  b? 
faid  to  ^Ilow  its  Determination  in  them.    To 

wiU 


*  See  Note  62. 

f  See  Limborch  Theol.  Chrijl.  L.  2.  C.  23.  V  »6.  and  for  an  Anfwtr  to  the  latter  fart  /LockcV 
4Sth  Sea.  fee  the  fame  Chjp.  ^.  laft. 


164.  Of  Moral  Evil 

be  varied,  and  reprefented  by  the  Underflanding  under  very  diiFerent 
Appearances. 

III.  Secondly,  When  therefore  any  Good  is  propofed  which  is  not 
Tho'  there-  ^^iQ  Chief,  the  Will  can  fufpend  *  the  Action,  and  command  the  Un- 

forc  the  »  •'•'■'  '  1      n        1  • 

Will  fol-  deritanding 

lows  fome 

Judgment  of  the  Ucdcrftanding,  yet  it  is  not  neceCarily  determined  by  it. 

NOTES. 


will  the  eating  or  not  eating  of  an  Egg  is  a 
Proof  of  the  former ;  to  choofe  one  out  of  two 
or  more  Eggs  apparently  alike  is  a  proverbial 
Inftance  of  the  latter:  both  which  are  demon- 
ftrations  of  an  aftive  or  felf  moving  Power; 
either  way  we  determine  and  aft  when  the 
Motives  are  entirely  equal,  which  is  the  fame 
a&  to  aft  without  any  Motive  at  all.  In  the 
former  Cafe  I  perceive  no  previous  Inclination 
to  direft  my  Will  in  general,  in  the  latter,  no 
Motive  to  influence  its  Determination  in  par- 
ticular; and  in  the  prefent  Cafe,  not  to  per- 
ceive a  Motive  is  to  have  none  (except  we 
would  be  faid  to  have  an  Idea  without  being 
confcious  of  it,  to  be  anxious  and  yet  infen- 
fible  of  that  Anxiety,  or  fway'd  by  a  Reafon 
which  we  do  not  at  all  apprehend.)  Neither 
is  it  neceflary  to  a  true  Equality  or  IndiiFerence 
here,  that  I  be  fuppofed  to  have  no  Will  to  ufe 
any  Eggs  at  all  (as  the  Author  of  the  Philofophi- 
tal  Enquiry^  &c.  abfurdly  puts  the  Cafe)  for, 
granting  in  the  firft  place,  that  I  have  not  a 
Will  to  ufe  any  Eggs  at  all,  'tis  indeed  non- 
fenfe  to  fuppofe  afterwards  that  I  fliould  choofe 
anyone;  but,  let  me  have  never  fo  great  an 
Inclination  to  eat  Eggs  in  general,  yet  that  ge- 
neral Inclination  will  not  in  the  leaft  oblige 
me  to  choofe  or  prefer  one  Egg  in  particular  f, 
which  is  the  only  point  in  queftion.  Numfeer- 
lefs  Inftances  might  eafily  be  given,  where  we 
often  apptpvc,  prefer,  defire  and  choofe,  and 
all  we  know  not  why :  where  we  either  choofe 
fuch  things  as  have  no  manner  of  Good  or  E- 
vil  in  them,  excepting  what  arifes  purely  from 
that  Choice;  or  prefer  fome  to  others,  when 
both  are  equal  Means  to  the  fame  End  :   in 


which  Cafes  the  Judgment  is  not  in  the  leaff 
concerned,  and  he  that  undertakes  to  oppofe 
the  Principle  by  which  our  Author  accounts 
for  them,  muft  either  deny  all  fuch  Equality 
and  Indifference,  or  grant  the  Queftion.  But 
one  Inftance  is  as  good  as  a  thoufand,  and  he 
that  defires  more,  may  find  them  defcrib'd  in 
the  cleareft  manner  by  Dr,  Cheyne  \\.  Now  to 
urge,  that  fuch  Eleftions  as  thefe  are  made  on 
purpofe  to  try  my  Liberty,  which  End,  fay 
fome,  becomes  the  Motive,  is  in  effeft  grant- 
ing the  vtry  thing  we  contend  for,  viz.  that 
the  Pleafure  attending  the  exercife  of  the  Will 
is  often  the  fole  reafon  of  Volition.  Befides, 
that  Motive  (if  it  can  be  call'd  fuch)  is  one 
of  the  Miiid's  own  making  ;  and  to  be  able  to 
produce  the  Motive  for  Aft  ion,  is  the  fame 
thing  with  regard  to  Liberty,  as  to  be  able  to 
aft  without  one.  If  by  trying  our  Liberty  be 
meant,  an  Experiment  to  aflure  us  that  we  real- 
ly have  fuch  a  Power ;  we  anfwer,  that  there 
can  be  no  reafon  for  trying  it  in  this  fenfe,  be- 
caufe  we  are  fufficiently  confcious  of  it  before 
any  fuch  Trial. 

"  The  Mind  (fays  the  Author  of  the  EJay  on 
"  Confcioufnefsy  p^o8.)  before  ever  it  exerts  its 
"  Will  or  Power  of  choofing,  is  confcious,  and 
"  knows  within  itfelf,  that  it  hath  a  Power  of 
"  Choice  or  Preference,  and  this  is  a  necefla- 
"  jy  Condition  of  willing  at  all,  infomuch 
'*  that  the  very  firft  time  I  had  occafion  to  ex- 
"  ert  my  Will,  or  make  ufe  of  my  eleftive 
"  Power,  I  could  not  poflibly  exercife  it,  or 
"  do  any  voluntary  Aft  without  knowing  and 
"  being  confcious  to  myfelf  [before  hand] 
"  that  I. have  fash  a  Faculty  or  Power  in  my- 

"  felf. 


*  Zee  Note  68.. 

+  See  Leibnitz' J ^/i'  Paper  to  Dr.  Clarke,  N*;!/.  and  %. 


B  PhthPrincifksy  &t; 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

derftanding  to  propofe  fome  other  thing,  or  the  fame  under  fome  o- 
ther  Appearance :  which  may  be  always  done,  fince  every  thing  ex- 
cept the  chief  Good  is  of  fuch  a  Nature,  that  the  Underflanding  may 
apprehend  fome  refpect  or  relation  wherein  it  is  incommodious.  Nbt- 
withftanding  therefore  that  the  Will  always  does  follow  fome  Judg- 
ment of  the  Underflanding,  which  is  made  about  the  fubfequent  Ac- 
tions, 

NOTES. 


i6 


"  felf.  A  thing  that  fecms  at  firft  fight  very 
"  ftrange  and  wonderful  ;  to  know  I  have  a 
**  power  of  afting  before  ever  I  have  a6led,  or 
"  had  any  trial  or  experience  of  it :  But  a 
"  little  Refleftion  will  quickly  fatisfy  any  one 
"  that  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  it  muft  be 
"  fo,  and  cannot  poffibly  be  otherwife;  and 
"  which  is  peculiar  to  this  Faculty:  For  we 
•'  know  nothing  of  our  Powers  of  Perceiving, 
*'  Underftanding,  Remembring,  isfc.  but  by 
"  experimenting  their  Afls,  it  being  neceflary 
"  firll  to  perceive,  or  think,  before  we  can 
"  know  that  we  have  a  Power  of  perceiving  or 
"  thinking.''  The  Author  proceeds  to  fhew, 
that  this  Fore-coKjaoufnefs  of  a  power  oi wi/ling 
or  choofing  does  moil  clearly  demonftrate  that 
the  Mind  in  all  its  Volitions  begins  the  Moti- 
on, or  adleth  from  itfelf\. 

To  argue  ftill  that  fome  minute  imperceptible 
Caufes,  fome  particular  Circumftances  in  our 
own  Bodies,  or  thofe  about  us,  muft  determine 
even  thefe  feemingly  indifferent  Aftions,  is 
cither  running  into  the  former  abfurdity  of 
making  us  aft  upon  Motives  which  we  don't 
apprehend  ;  or  faying,  that  we  aft  mechani- 
cally, i.e.  do  not  aft  at  all  :  and  in  the  laft 
place,  to  fay  that  we  are  determin'd  to  choofe 
any  of  thefe  trifles  juft  as  we  happen  to  fix  our 
Thoughts  upon  /'/  in  particular,  at  the  very 
inftant  ofAftion,  is  either  attributing  all  to 
the  felf-moving  Power  of  the  Mind,  which  is 
granting  the  Queftion  ;  or  elfc  referring  us  to 
the  minute  and  imperceptible  Caufes  above 
mentioned  ;  or  elfc  obtruding  upon  us  that  idle 
unmeaning  Word  Chance  inllead  of  a  Phyfical 
Gaufc,  which  is  faying  nothing  at  all.  How 
hard  muft  Men  be  prefs'd  under  an  Hypothefis  j 
when  they  fly  to  fuch  evafive  fhifts  as  thefe  ! 


How  much  eafier  and  better  would  it  be  to 
give  up  all  fuch  blind,  unknov/n,  and  unac- 
countable Impulfes,  and  own  what  both  com- 
mon Senfe  arid  Experience  diftate,  an  Inde- 
pendent, Free,  Self  moving  Principle,  the 
true,  the  obvious,  and  only  fource  ofAftion? 
With  regard  to  Mr.  Locke's  Inconfiftencies, 
I  fhall  only  add  one  Obfervation  more,  viz. 
that  he  feems  to  place  the  Caufe  (Motive,  or 
whatever  he  means  by  it)  of  his  Determination 
of  the  Will  after  the  Effeft.  The  Caufe  of 
that  Determination  is,  according  to  him.  An- 
xiety',  this  he  fometlmes  makes  concomitant, 
fometimes  confequent  upon  Defire  ;  and  ^.31. 
he  fays  the  one  is  fcarce  diftinguiftvable  from, 
the  other. 

But  this  fame  Defire  appears  to  me  to  be  the 
very  Determination  of  the  Wilf  itfelf ;   what' 
we  abfolutely  defire  we  always  will,  and  vice 
verfa,  whether  it  be  in  our  Power  to  purfue 
that  Will,  and  produce  it  into  Aft  or  no  ;  and'^^ 
indeed  Defire  feems  to  be  no  otherwife  diftin- 
guiftiable  from  Volition,  than  as  the  latter  is- 
generally  attended  with  the  Power  ofAftion^ 
which  the  former  is  confider'd  without.     This 
I  think  is  all  the  Diftinftion  that. they  art  ca- 
pable of,  which  yet  is  only  nominal  :    Nor  do 
his  Inftances  in  §.  30.  prove  that  there  is  any- 
real   Difference  between  'em.     Thus  when  I 
am  oblig'd  to   ufe  perfuafions  with    another, 
which    I  wifh  may  not  prevail  upon  him,  or 
fufFer  one  Pain  to   prevent  a  greater,  here  arr  " 
two  oppofite  Wills,  or  a  weak  imperfeft  Voli- 
tion conquer'd  by,  and  giving  way  <o  a  ftrong- 
er  :    I  will  or  defire  that  this  Man  may  not  be 
prcvail'd  upon,  but  yet  I  will  or  defire  more 
powerfully  and  effeftually  to  ufe  thefe  perfua- 
fions with  him :  Or  ratlier,  here  is  but  one 

aftua^ 


EJJay  on  Confcioufne/s,  p.  209.  t\  o» 


]66 


Of  Moral  Evil 

tions,  yet  it  is  not  neceflarily  determin'd  by  any,  for  it  can  fufpend 
its  Action,  and  order  fome  other  Judgment,  which  it  may  follovy. 
Since  therefore  it  can  either  exert  or  fufpend  its  Act,  it  is  not  only 
free  from  CompuKion,  but  alfo  indifferent  in  itfelf,  with  regard 
to  its  Actions,  and  determines  itfelf  without  neceflity. 

IV.  It  mull:  be  confefs'd,  that  this  opinion  eflablifhes  Liberty,  and 
on  that  account  is  more  agreeable  to  reafon,  experience,  and  the  com- 
mon fenfe  of  Mankind,  yet  fome  things  in  it  feem  to  be  prefum'd  and 
not  explain'd  clearly  enough. 

fufficiently  explain'd  in  it. 

Such  a  Li-  V.  For,  in  the  firft  place,  'tis  faid  that  the  Will  determines  itfelf -y 
^enfstobc^  but  wc  are  not  informed  how  that  is  poffible,  nor  what  ufe  fuch  a 
of  more  pre-  Powcr  would  be  of,  were  it  admitted :  nay,  it  feems  rather  prejudi- 
judicethm  cial  than  beneficial  to  Man.  For  that  Goodncfs  which  it  is  fuppofed 
to  purfue,  is  in  the  things  themfelves,  and  arifes  from  their  connec- 
tion with  the  chief  Good ;  it  is  not  therefore  to  be  form'd,  but  dif- 

covered 

NOTES, 


This  Opi- 
nion cfla- 
blifhes  Li- 
berty,   but 
yet  there 
are  fome 
things   rot 


benefit  to 
Xlinkind. 


aftu-il  Dcfire  or  Will  in  the  Cafe,  nnd  the  other 
is  only  Hypothetical.  Thus  I  fhould  will  to 
be  cured  of  the  Gout,  if  the  cure  would  not 
throw  me  into  greater  Pain  ;  but  in  the  pre- 
fcnt  circumftances  I  do  not  really  will  it,  nor 
exert  any  one  adl:  which  may  ferve  to  remove 
it:  nay,  in  this  Cafe,  I  will  or  defire  to  bear 
the  Gout  rather  than  a  worfe  Evil  that  would 
attend  the  removal  of  it.  His  Axiom  there- 
fore, that  wherever  there  is  pais,  there  is  ■& 
dcfirc  to  be  rid  of  it,  is  not  abfolutely  true. 

Again,  I  Ihould  refufe  a  painful  Remedy  or 
(ViiagreeabJe  Potion,  if  I  could  enjoy  perfcft 
Health  without  them  ;  but  as  I  manifeftly  can- 
not, I  choofe  the  lefs  Evil  of  the  two.  Nor 
can  I  indeed  be  properly  (aid  to  choofe  or  de- 
fire  both  in  Oie  prefent  Circumftances,  or,  to 
will  one  and  defire  the  contrary,  fince  J  know 
that  only  one  of  them  ispoflible,  which  there- 
fore I  now  certainly  will  or  defire,  iho'  I  fliould 
as  certainly  havewill'd  the  contrary  had  it  been 
equally  pofSble.  Thefe  then  and  the  like  In- 
ftances  are  not  fufficicnt  to  prove  any  oppofiti- 


on  between  Will  and  Defire,  except  the  latter 
be  only  taken  for  a  mere  paffive  Appetite  or 
Afieaion  of  the  Mind  :  in  which  fenfe  the 
Words  choofe,  prefer,  &c,  mud  then  be  very 
improperly  apply'd  to  it.  But,  in  reality,  I 
believe  Mr.  Locke  here  fets  the  Word  Deftre  to 
fignify  what  we  commonly  mean  by  Jfi//,  as 
he  does  in  V48.  where  'tis  cali'd  the  Pciver  of 
preferring:  and  puts  Volition  into  the  place  of 
AaioK',  as  feems  probable  from  his  defcription 
of  Willing  in  the  28th  and  30th  Seft.  as  alfo, 
C.  23.  §.  18.  where  he  defines  the  Will  to  be 
a  Pczvcr  cf  putting  Body  into  Motion  by  Thought. 
And  the  fame  Notion,  I  think,  runs  thro'  all 
his  Letters  to  Limborch.  To  conclude,  what- 
ever he  means  by  Defire,  he  manifeftly  poft- 
pones  it  to  Volition  in  ^.  56.  "  When  a  Man 
"  (fays  he)  has  once  chofcn  a  thing,  and  there- 
"  by  it  is  hecome  a  part  of  his  Happine fs,  it 
"  raifcs  defire,  and  that  proportionably  gives 
"  him  uneafinefs,  which  determines  his  Will, 
"  and  icts  him  at  work  in  purfuit  of  his  choice 
•*  on  all  occafions  that  offer."     If  chofcn  Hand 

here 


Of  Moral  Evil 

Covered  by  the  underftanding.  If  then  the  under/landing  performs 
its  Duty  right,  it  will  difcover  what  is  beft:  but  it  is  our  Advantage 
to  be  determined  to  that  which  is  befl  3  it  had  therefore  been  better 
for  Man,  if  Nature  had  given  him  up  abfohitely  to  the  determina- 
tion of  his  Judgment  and  Underllanding,  and  not  allow'd  that  Judg- 
ment to  be  fufpended  by  the  power  of  the  Will.  For  by  that  means 
he  would  have  obtained  his  End  with  greater  certainty  and  eafe.  I 
grant,  that  if  a  Man  were  abfolutely  determin'd  in  his  Actions  to  the 
befl:,  there  would  be  no  room  for  virtue,  properly  fo  call'd  j  for  vir- 
tue, as  it  is  commonly  underftcod,  requires  a  free  Act,  and  this  Li- 
berty is  the  very  thing  that  is  valuable  in  virtue ;  and  with  good  rea- 
fon,  if  a  free  Choice  be  the  very  thing  which  pleafcs:  (For  thus  it 
would  be  impofhble  to  attain  the  end  of  choofing,  i.  e.  to  pleafe  our- 
felves,  without  Liberty,  fince  that  very  thing  which  pleafes  in  Ac- 
tions, W^.  Liberty,  would  be  wanting.)  But  yet,  if  any  thing  which 
the  Underftanding  can  difcover,  be  the  very  befl  before  or  independent 
of  our  Choice,  it  were  proper  for  us  to  be  neceffarily  determin'd  to 
it;  for  the  fruition  of  it,  howfoever  obtain 'd,  would  make  us  happy, 
and  be  fo  much  the  more  valuable,  as  it  would  be  certain,  and  not 

dependent 

NOTES, 


167 


here  for  ivilled,  his  ufual  Method  of  explain- 
ing the  Caufe  of  Volition  is  inverted,  and  the 
Effed  comes  firfl ;  or,  if  chofen  be  made  only 
to  fignify  Heftred,  he  muft  fuppofe  defire  to 
raife  itfelf,  which  is  bad  again.  How  can 
thefe  Words  be  underftood  in  any  Senfe 
confiftent  with  ^.31  and  71.  and  with  his 
whole  Hypothefis  ?  * 

Dr.  Clarke'%  Argument  for  abfolute  Freedom, 
becaufe  all  Motives  or  Senfations  are  mere 
abllrafl  Notions,  and  have  no  phyfical  power  [j. 
fcems  not  conclulive,  or  at  leaft  not  clear.  For 
who  knows,  fay  the  Fata  lifts,  how  far  reafons, 
motives,  k^c  may  afFeft  a  Spirit  ?  Why  may 
not  one  immaterial  Subftance  determine  ano- 
ther by  means  of  thought,  as  well  as  a  material 
ene  can  move  another  by  means  of  Impulfe  ? 


Nay,  his  adherent  Mr.  Jack/on  grants  f,  "  that 
"  abftraft  Notions  will,  by  a  forcible  and  ir- 
"  refiilible  impulfe,  compel  the  Mind  to  move 
"  the  Body  whether  it  will  or  no."  Which 
impulfe,  if  it  were  conftant,  would  fufHciently 
acquit  the  Maintainors  of  Neceflity.  But  th.it 
there  can  be  no  fuch  forcible  impulfe,  will, 
I  hope,  appear  below,  where  it  will  be  fhewn 
to  be  both  agreeable  to  reafon  to  fuppofe  that 
there  are  Self-aftive  Beings,  which,  as  fuch, 
muft  have  a  phyfical  power  of  refifting  what 
we  call  the  moft  cogent  Motives  :  and  to  be 
confirm 'd  by  Experience,  that  our  own  Minds 
exert  fuch  a  Power  ;  which  is  fufficient  for  our 
purpofe.  For  an  Explanation  of  tlie  true  No- 
tion of  Liberty,  fee  the  following  Subfedions 
of  this  Chapter,  and  Note  82. 


*  See  our  Author^s  Subfcft.  3d.  par.  6. 

II  Remarki  e/» /-i'^Philofophical  Enquiry,  p.  la 

"j:  Defence  of  human  Liierty,  p.  1 98. 


68 


It  only  tnkes 
place  in 
doubtful  mat- 
ters, and  then 
'tis  of  no  ule 
or  impor- 
tance. 


We   are 
left  in 
doubt  con- 
cerning 
the  Way 
which  leads 


Of  Moral  Evil 

dependent  upon  Chance^  as  all  the  Actions  of  Free-will  are  in  a  man- 
ner fuppofed  to  be :  nor  need  we  much  regard  the  Glory  arifing  from 
a  well  made  Choice ;  fince  the  fruition  of  the  greateft  Good  would 
give  us  Happinefs  without  it  >  nay  fuch  Glory  would  be  vain  and 
defpicable  in  competition  with  the  greateft  Good.  Hence  it  appears, 
that  Free-will,  according  to  this  Hypothefis,  cannot  be  reckon'd  any 
Advantage. 

VI.  Secondly  j  If  it  be  faid,  that  the  Underftanding  is  dubious  in 
many  Cafes,  and  ignorant  of  what  is  the  beft,  and  in  thefe  Liberty 
takes  place ;  neither  does  this  clear  the  Matter.  For  if  the  things  to 
be  done  be  Good  or  Evil  in  themfelves,  but  unknown  to  the  Intel- 
le£V,  there's  no  help  in  the  Will  j  nor  does  its  Liberty  affift  us  in  dif- 
covering  or  obtaining  the  better  Side  j  if  they  be  indifferent,  it  is  no 
matter  what  we  do,  fince  the  Conveniencies  and  Inconveniencies  are 
equal  on  both  Sides.  If  then  we  admit  of  Liberty  in  thefe  Cafes,  it 
will  be  of  no  ufe  or  importance  to  Life  or  Happinefs :  Nay,  it  muft 
be  efteem'd  an  Imperfect  ion,  as  deriving  its  Origm  from  the  Imperfec- 
tion of  the  Underftanding.  For  if  the  Underftanding  could  certain- 
ly determine  what  were  beft  to  be  done,  there  would  be  no  room  for 
Liberty.  (66.) 

VII.  Thirdly ;  They  are  not  well  agreed  what  this  Chief  Good  is, 
from  the  conned  ion  with  which  the  Underftanding  muft  judge  of 
the  Goodnefs  of  other  things,  as  may  appear  from  the  various  and 
contradidory  Opinions  about  it.  (67.)    Wc  muft  necelTarily  therefore 

flutluate, 

to  Happinefs,  and  can  have  no  help  from  Liberty. 


N  O  7'  E  S. 


(66)  Thefe,  with  feme  of  the  following 
confequcnces  attending  fuch  .i  confufed  Hypo- 
thefis of  Libert/,  are  well  urg'd  by  Mr.  Loch 
(tho'  I  think  they  return  upon  himlelf  j  in  his 
Chapter  of  Power,  §.  48,49,  50.  and  in  the 
Philojlpb.  "Enquiry y  p.  63,{3rV.  and  feem  to  be 
unavoidable  in  any  other  Scheme  but  that  of 
our  Author  ;  who  fuppofcs,  th.At  in  moft  Cafes, 
all  the  Goodnefs  of  an  A£l  or  Objedl  entirely 
depends  upon,  and  is  produced  merely  by  our 
choofing  it ;  and  of  confequence  Liberty,  or  a 
power  of  choofing,  is  according  to  his  Princi- 


ples, {o  far  from  being  unnecefT.irv,  or  zn  Im- 
perfefti.on,  that  it  is  our  noblelt  Perfeftion ; 
and  conftitutes  the  greateft  part  of  our  Happi- 
nefs: For  an  Explanation  of  this,  fee  §.  2.  of 
this  Chapter. 

(67.)  This  uncertainty  about  the  Sumnum 
Butium  is  own'd  .-md  well  accounted  for  by  Mr. 
Locke,  B.  2.  C.  21.  ^.55.  "  Hence  it  was 
"  that  the  Philofophers  of  old  did  in  vain  en- 
"  quire,  whether  Summum  Bcniat  confified  in 
"  Riches  or  Bodily  Delights,  or  Virtue,  or 
"  Contemplation  ^    And  they  might  have  as 

"  reafonably 


Of  Moral  Evil  1^9 

fluduate,  and  be  folicltous,  and  rebel  againft  Nature  itfelf,  which  has 
neither  granted  us  a  certain  End,  nor  certain  Means  thereto,  but  left 
us  anxious  and  uncertain  about  the  way  which  leads  to  Happinefs ; 
neither  is  there  any  help  here  in  our  Liberty,  fince  it  is  blind,  and 
can  do  nothing  towards  bringing  us  back  into  the  right  path. 

VIII.  Fourthly,  'Tis  confefs'd  by  all,  that  Good  in  general  is  what  since  that  is 
agrees  with  every  one,  and  what  all  things  defire.     Every  Good  then  g°°^  y''h\c\\. 
anfwers  to  fome  Appetite,  and  according  to  thefe  Authors,  Objeds  ln?tMs  is^to 
are  good  on  account  of  a  natural  and  neceflary  conformity  which  they  h:  judg'd  of 
have  to  our  Appetites.     The  Underftanding  therefore  does  not  make  f^ndtjji"  -f " 
good,  but  finds  it  in  the  things  themfelves:  and  when  it  judges  any  the  will' fol- 
thing  in  Nature  to  be  agreeable,  that,  according  to  them,  muft  necef-  j"  ^  ^^'^  . 
farily  be  in  refpe<ft  of  fome  natural  Appetite.  All  the  Good  then  which  is  not  free, 
is  in  things  will  be  the  Obje<fl  of  fome  Faculty  or  Appetite,  /.  e.  of  the'/i'^^o^^n^J:* 
Underftanding,  Senfe,  i^c.     But  all  thefe  are  determin'd  by  Nature  in  reafon^^We  "^ 
regard  to  the  Appetite  or  Faculty  to  which  they  relate,  i.  e.  in  regard  had  better 
to  their  Pleafantnefs^  or  Agreeablenefs ';  and  as  to  the  relation  which  whhlut*^fuch 
they  bear  to  each  other,  i.  e.  as  to  xhidv  Profit ablenefs  znd  Honejiy^  they  Liberty, 
are  to  be  judg'd  of  by  the  Underftanding,  and  directed  when  and  in 
what  manner  they  muft  give  place  to  each  other,  or  afford  their  mu- 
tual Affiftance.     Free-will  then  appears  to  be  of  no  manner  of  ufe ;  -^ 
for  if  it  certainly  follow  the  decree  of  reafon  it  is  not  free,  at  leaft 
from  neceffity,  iince  that  very  reafon  which  it  follows  is  not  free  :  if 
it  does  not  neceftarily  follow  that,  we  had  better  be  without  it,  for  it 
perverts  every  thing,  and  difturbs  the  Order  of  Nature,  which  is  the 
very  beft  and  fitteft  to  be  follow'd,  fuch  a  Liberty  as  this  would  there- 
fore 

N  0  t  E  S. 


rcafonably  difputcd,  whether  the  beft  relifh 
were  to  be  found  in  Apples,  Plumbi,  or 
Nutts,  and  have  divided  themfelves  into 
Sedj  upon  it.  For  ai  pleafant  Taftcs  de- 
pend not  on  the  things  themfelves,  but  their 
agreeablenefs  to  this  or  that  particular Palatt, 
wherein  there  is  great  variety  ;  fo  the  gre.i 
teft  happinefs  confifts  in  the  having  thofe 
things  which  produce  the  -rreateft  Pleafure  ; 
and  in  the  abfencc  of  t  ofe  which  caufe  any 
dillurbance,  any  pain.     Now  thefe  to  diffc- 


"  rent  Men  are  very  different  things."  To 
the  fame  purpofe  are  the  3d  and  4th  obfcr- 
vations  in  the  Religion  of  'Nature  deltnealed, 
p.  33.  which  may  fer\e  to  confirm  the  Notion 
which  our  Author  propofes  in  the  next  Subfec- 
tion,  viz.  that  molt  of  the  Good  or  Agreeable- 
nefs in  things  arifes  not  from  their  own  Na- 
tures, but  ocr  choice  of  them,  or  that  Objefts 
are  not  chofen  becaufc  they  are  good,  but  are 
generally  good  only  becaufe  they  arc  chofen. ' 


lyo 


If  the  Will 
couldfufperd 
its  aft  con- 
trary to  the 
judgment  of 
the  Under- 
ftanding,  it 
would  run 
direifllyinto 
Evi],itfeems 
therefore  ne- 
ceflary  for  it 
to  aft  at  the 
time  and  in 
the  manner 
which  the 
Underftan- 
ding  dircfts. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

fore  be  prejudicial  to  Mankind ;  it  would  make  them  liable  to  do  a« 
mifs,  and  produce  no  kind  of  Good  to  compenfate  for  fo  great  an 
Evil. 

IX.  Fifthly,  It  is  fuppofed  that  the  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding 
concerning  the  Gocdnefs  of  any  thing,  is  a  condition  without  which 
the  Will  is  not  diredted  to  the  Obje(ft,  but  yet  that  it  can  either  exert 
or  fufpend  its  adl  about  any  Good  whatfocver.  Let  us  fuppofe  then 
that  the  Underflandihg  has  determin'd  it  to  be  good  to  exert  fome 
certain  Adion,  and  Evil  to  fufpend  it ;  while  this  Judgment  conti- 
nues, if  the  Will  can  fufpend  its  Ad:,  it  choofes  Evil ;  if  it  cannot, 
it  is  not  free.  You'll  fay,  it  can  command  the  Underftanding  to  change 
its  Judgment  j  let  it  be  fo.  But  it  is  evident,  that  the  Man  fufpends 
his  Adion  before  he  can  command  the  Underftanding  to  change  its 
Judgment,  /".  e.  he  fufpends  the  Adion  while  the  Judgment  deter- 
mines that  it  is  Evil  to  fufpend.  He  therefore  choofes  that  diredly 
which  his  Reafon  judges  to  be  Evil,  which  feems  to  overthrow  their 
whole  Hypothefis.  (68.) 

X.  I  confers 

NOTES. 


-4 


(68.)  Farther,  if  the  Mind  can  fufpend  the 
Satisfadion  of  any  urgent  defire  (which  Mr. 
Locke  allows  *,  and  therein  places  all  its  Li- 
berty) then  it  can  as  eafily  quite  ftop,  or  run 
counter  to  any  natural  Appetite,  fince  no  grea- 
ter Power  {ecms  to  be  requifite  for  the  one  than 
for  the  other.  If  we  can  hinder  the  Will  from 
being  determin'd  by  any  defire  of  abfent  Good 
without  any  appearance  of  greater  Good  on  the 
other  Side,  which  might  raife  an  oppofite  de- 
fire  able  to  counterballance  it,  as  our  Author 
has  fhewn  that  we  can  ;  then  we  fhall  be  equal- 
ly able  to  prevent  its  following  eveti  the  ulti 
mate  determination  of  the  Judgment,  without 
any  reafon  for  fo  doing  ;  and  confequently 
good,  whether  abfolute  or  comparative,  is  nei- 
ther the  adequate  efficient  Caufe,  nor  a  neceffa- 
ry  Means  or  Motive  to  the  determination  of 
the  Will.  This  aft  of  fufpenfion  therefore  muft 
either  be  folcly  founded  in  the  felfmoving 
Power  of  the  Mind,  and  of  confequence  be  na- 
turally indep«ndeot  on  all  Motives,  Reafons, 


tff.  and  an  inftance  of  the  Mind's  abfolute 
Freedom  from  any  external  Determination  ;. 
which  is,  I  believe,  a  contradiftion  to  Mr. 
Locke''s  general  Hypothefis;  or  elfe  itfelf  muft 
be  determin'd  by  fome  external  Caufe,  and  then 
it  will  be  difficult  to  make  it  irtt  in  any  fenfe. 
Let  us  obferve  how  Mr.  Lecke  endeavours  to  re- 
concile thefe  two  Notions  together.  Our  Li- 
berty, according  to  him,  is  founded  in  a  gene- 
ral abfolute  Inclination  of  the  Mind  to  Happi- 
rwfs,  which  obliges  us  to  fufpend  the  Gratifica- 
tion of  our  Defire  in  particular  cafes,  till  we 
fee  v/hether  it  be  not  inconfiftent  v/ith  the  ge- 
neral Good.  "  The  ftronger  Tics,  fays  he, 
"  ^.  51.  we  have  to  an  unalterable  parfuit  of 
"  Happinefs  in  general,  which  is  our  greateft 
"  Good,  and  which,  as  fuch,  our  Defires  al» 
"  ways  follow,  the  more  are  we  free  from  any 
"  neceffary  determination  of  our  Will  to  any 
"  particular  Aftion,  and  from  a  neceffary  com- 
"  pliance  with  our  Defire  fet  upon  anyparti- 
"  cular,  and  then  appearing  preferable  good, 

till: 


*  Book  2.  Q,z\.  ^47, and. 50. 


Of  Moral  Evil  iji 

X.  I  confefs,  they  offer  fome  Solutions  here,  but  fuch  as  are  fo  fub- There  are 
tk,  fo  obfcure,  and  fo  much  above  the  comprehenfions  of  the  Vulgar,  re"d^to"hefc 
that  moft  Pcrfons  have  taken  a  diftafte  to  them,  given  up  the  caufe  of  difficulties. 
Liberty  as  defperate,  and  gone  over  to  the  former  Sect:  butif  any  one^^^*^^^^^>'"*^ 
w^ill  undertake  either  to  give  a  more  clear  and  full  Explication  of  the  ing  dear. 
common  Opinion,  or  bring  Solutions  of  thofe  Difficulties  which  occur  ^"  ^^'«  ac- 
in  it,  he  will  find  me  fo  far  from  being  his  Adverfary,  that  he  may  hav^gS^nr^ 
expect  my  aflent,  encouragement  and  afliftance.     This  indeed  were  ^er  to  the 
very  much  to  be  wifh'd,  but  in  the  mean  time  I  fhall  try,  as  far  as  IJ™^'^^^'"' 
am  able,  whether  thefe  things  cannot  be  explain'd  more  clearly  in  a- 
nother  manner. 

NOTES. 


**  till  we  have  duly  examin'd  whether  it  has  a 
"  tendency  to,  or  be  inconfiftent  with  our  real 
**  happinefs."  And  again,  ^.52.  "Whatever 
■"  Neceffity  determines  to  the  purfuit  of  real 
"  Blifs,  the  fame  neceffity,  with  the  fame  force, 
*'  ellablifhes  Sufpence,  Deliberation  and  Scru- 
^'  tiny,  of  each  fucceffive  deftre,  whether  the 
"  fatisfaftion  of  it  does  not  interfere  with  our 
"  true  Happinefs,  and  miflead  us  from  it." 
If  by  the  Word  NeteJlJity  he  means  abfolutc 
phyjical  NeceJJity  (which  it  muft  be,  if  it  be  any 
at  all,  or  any  thing  to  the  prefent  purpofe)  he 
has  difcover'd  a  pretty  odd  foundation  for  his 
Liberty.  Nay,  if  this  force  which  draws  us 
towarcis  Happinefs  in  general,  be  abfolute  and 
irrefiftible,  as  his  Words  import,  it  will  draw 
us  equally  toward*  all  particular  appearances  of 
it,  and  confeguently  prove  as  bad  a  ground  for 


Sufpenfion  as  for  Liberty.  But  in  truth  this 
Sufpenfion  is  neither  founded  in  any  Neceffity 
of  purfuing  Happinefs  in  general,  nor  is  itfelf 
an  original  power  of  the  Mind  diftinft  from 
that  of  Volition,  but  only  one  particular  cxer- 
cife  or  Modification  of  it.  "  'Tis  willing  (as 
"  the  Author  of  the  Pbilofophical  Enquiry  right- 
"  ly  obferves)  to  defer  willing  about  the  mat- 
"  ter  propofed,"  and  is  no  otherwife  different 
from  the  common  cafes  of  willing  and  choofing 
except  that  it  is  the  moft  evident  demonftration 
of  the  Mind's  perfeft  Liberty  in  willing,  and 
fo  obvious  that  Mr,  Locke  could  not  get  over  it, 
and  therefore  ftiles  it  the  fource  of  all  our  Li- 
berty, l^c.  ^.  47.  tho'  he  foon  explains  it  away 
again,  by  endeavouring  to  force  it  into  his 
Syftem. 


Z2 


SUBSECT. 


-    --«t*'i    I 


s-:-::''}^ 


171  Of  Moral  Evil 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     III. 

Another  Notion  of  Lihertji  and  RleBion  is  p'o^ofcd. 

I.  TN  order  to  make  my  meaning  better  underftood,  we  muft  obferve^ 
titetand^         X  i"  the  firft  place,  that  there  are  certain  Powers,  Faculties  and 
Powers  at-     Appetites  implanted  in  us  by  Nature,  which  are  directed  to  certaim 
proper E'd 5  Actlons I  and  when  thefe  exert  their  proper  Actions  about  Objects, 
by  exerd  e,  they  ptoduce  a  grateful  and  pleafant  Senfation  in  us.     The  exercife  of 
^relteft^^r^  them  therefore  pleafesus;   and  from  hence  probably  all  our  Pleafure 
feftion  of     and  Delight  arifes  ;  confequently  our  Happinefs,    if  we  have  any, 
*h*^^'hf  r'^    feems  to  confifl  in  the  proper  exercife  of  thofe  Powers  and  Faculties- 
Eftate.         which  Nature  has  beftow'd  upon  us:  for  they  appear  to  be  implanted 
in  us  for  no  other  end,  but  that  by  the  ufe  and  exercife  of  them  thofe 
things  may  be  effected  which  are  agreeable.     Nor  can  they  be  at  reft, 
or  enjoy  themfelves,  otherwife  than  as  thofe  things  are  produced  by 
or  in  them,  for  the  production  or  reception  of  which  they  are  delign'd 
by  Nature.     Now  every  Power  or  Faculty  is  directed  to  the  profecu- 
tion  of  its  proper  Acts.     They  attain  their  End  therefore  by  Exercifc,^ 
which  mufl  be  efteem'd  the  greateft  Perfection,  and  moft  happy  State 
of  any  Being.     For  that  is  a  State  of  Happinefs,  if  any  fuch  can  be 
conceiv'd,  wherein  every  thing  is  done  which  pleafes,  and  every  thing 
abfent  which  difpleafes  j  neither  does  it  feem  poflible  to  imagine  a 
more  happy  one. 
There  is  a        H-  Secondly,  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  among  our  Appetites,  Fa- 
certain  a-      culties  and  Powers,  fome  are  determin'd  to  their  Operations  by  Ob- 
fixTby^Na-  jc<^s  peculiar  to  them.     For  upon  the  prefence  of  their  Objects  they 
tpre  be-       neceffarily  exert  their  Actions,  if  rightly  difpos'd,  and  ceafe  from  O- 
A^f^^tite^^   peration  upon  their  abfence,   and  have  no  tendency  towards  any  o- 
isfc.  and '     thcr  Objects    but   their    own.     Thas  the  Sight   perceives   nothing 
tal,  Shere-  ^^^  Light,  Colours,  &c.  and,  upoa  the  Removal  of  thefe,    its  Ac- 
hy they  aft  tion 
upon  the 
prelsAC?  of  them,   and  ceafd  from  Aftion  upon  the  Remova]  of  them. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  lyj 

tlon  (69.)  ceafes.  The  Underftanding  itfelf  diftinguiflies  thofc  Obje(n:s 

which  are  communicated  to  it  by  the  Senfes,  or  perceiv'd  by  refled:ion 

from  one  another,  difpofes  and  repofits  them  in  the  Memory  j  but  yet 

■  has  certain  bounds  which  it  cannot  exceed:  andfo  of  the  reft.  There  is 

"  therefore  a  certain  natural  Fitnefs,  a   fixt  conformity  between  thefe 

'  Powers  and  their  ObjeAs,  on  which  account  they  exert  their  Adions 

upon  the  prefence  of  the  Objects,  and  pleafe  thenifelves  in  Exercife : 

but  are  uneafy  at  the  prefence  of  thofe  things  which  hinder  it.     If 

then  there  be  any  natural  force  in  any  Objed:  to   promote  or  hinder 

the  exercife  of  any  Power  or  Faculty,  that  Objed:  is  to  be  efteeni'd 

Good  or  Evil  in  regard  to  it. 

III.  Thofe  Objeds  which  thus  promote  or  impede  the  Adion,  are  j  ....^  ^ 
fufficiently  diftinguifli'd  from  each  other  by  the  Power  or  Faculty  it-  -  .i  i'be  of 
felf ;  thofe  that  are  abfent  or  future,  are  judg'd  of  by  the  Underilian-  ^'^-=^":co  to 
ding,  and  what  the  Mind  determines  to  be  the  beft  in  them  that  wedow'd  wid?" 
are  oblig'd  to  purfue.     He  that  does  otherwife  difobeys  the  Law  of  ^^ch  Appe 
Reafon.     If  therefore  all  our  Powers  and  Faculties  were  thus  deter- [j|g^^  ^j„** 
min'd  to  their  proper  Objeds,  it  would  feem  an  Imperfedion  for  Man 
to  be  free,  and  he  would  have  been  much  more  happy  without  fuch 
a  Liberty :  for  he  receives  no  Benefit  from  it,  but  one  of  the  greateft 
Evils,  viz.  a  Power  of  doing  amifs. 

rV.  It  feems  not  impoflible  to  conceive  a  Power  of  a  quite  different 
Nature  from  thefe,  which  may  be  more  indifferent  in  refpe£l  of  the^^'".^/ 
Objeds  about  which  it  exerts  itfelf*.     To  which  no  one  thing  is  na-Powerbe* 
turally  more  agreeable  than  another,  but  that  will  be  the  fitteft  to  t^^ecn  whicR 
which  it  ihall  happen  -f  to  be  apply'd :     Between  which  and  the  Ob-  panicuL 
jed,  to  which  it  is  determin'd,  by  itfelf  or  by  fomething  elfe,  there  is  Objeft  there 
naturally  no  more  fuitablenefs  or  connedion  than  between  it  and  any '/  "^^"'■'^J- 

•'  .    J  ly  no  other 

•    .'  Other  agrecablenefs 

but  what 
may  arife  from  the  determination  of  the  Power  itfsir. 

"'Vo  "T  E  S, 

(6g.)  It  nuy  be  obferv'd  here  once  for  all,  I  thefe  fhould  ratlif  r  be  calT'd  Paflion!.)  butgene- 
that  our  Author  feldom  ufes  this  Word  ASiim  in  I  rally  takes  the  vulgar  expreflions,  when  thej» 
a iWft  PhilofophicalSenfc  (according  to  which!  will  fervc  to  explain  his  meaning. 

*  See  Seft.  5.  Subfcft.  2.  p.ir.  12  and  15. 

t  Thnt  this  JVord  is  not  tntad.d  t)  imply  what  we  commonly  mean  by  Chance,  fee  par.  1 8. 


ij^  Of  Moral  Evil 

?  other  "thing,  but  all  the  Suitablenefs  there  is,  arifes  from  t\it  j^pplkation 
or  Determination  itfelf.     For  as  the  Earth  is  no  Man's  Right  by  nature, 

)  but  belongs  to  the  prime  Occupant,  and  the  Rrght  arifes  from  that 

very  Occupation ;  fo  there  may  poflibly  be  a  Power  to  which  no  Ob- 

je6l  is  by  Nature  peculiarly  adapted,  but  any  thing  may  become  fuita- 

ble  to  it,  if  it  happen  to  be  apply'd ;  for  its  Suitablenefs  proceeds  from 

the  Application,  as  we  faid  before.     Now  it  does  not  feem  any  more 

.abfurd  for  a  Power  to  create  an  Agreeablenefs  between  itfelf  and  an 

Objed,  by  applying  itfelf  to  that  ObjeQ:,  or  that  to  itfelf,  than  for  a 

Man  to  acquire  a  Right  to  a  thing  by  occupying  it.     For,  as  in  Civil 

Laws,  fome  things  are  forbidden  becaufe  they  are  inconvenient,  others 

are  inconvenient  and  Evil  becaufe  forbidden  ;  fo  it  may  be  in  Powers, 

^Faculties  and  Appetites ;  'uiz.  fome  may  be  determin'd  by  the  natural 

Suitablenefs  of  the  Objef^s,  and  in  others,  the  Suitablenefs  to  the  Ob- 

jeds  may  arife  from  the  Determination.     For  this  Faculty  may  be  na- 

.-turally  inclin'd  to  Exercife,  and  one  Exercife  be  more  agreeable  than 

another,  not  from  any  natural  fitnefs  of  one  rather  than  the  other,  but 

from  the  Application  of  the  Faculty  itfelf:  for  another  would  often 

1  -be  no  lefs  agreeable,  if  it  had  happen'd  to  be  determin'd  to  that.  No- 

.  .thing  hinders  then  but  that  there  may  be  fuch  a  Power  or  Faculty  as 
^his,  at  lead  with  refpe6l  to  very  many  Ob}e6ls.  (70.) 

V.  Fourthly, 

iV  0  r  E  S-. 


(70.)  Our  Author's  Notion  of  Indifference 
lus  been  grofly  mifunderftood  by  all  his  Adver- 
faries,  who  have  accordingly  rais'd  terrible 
Outcries  againft  it,  as  deftroying  the  eflential, 
and  immutable  diftinflion  between  Good  and 
.Evil  J  fubverting  Appetites,  making  Reafon 
and  Judgment  ufelefs,  and  confounding  every 
thing.  We  fhall  juft  obferve  here,  that  if  it 
■be  apply'd  to  the  whale  Man,  it  cannot  poflibly 
be  extended,  nor  was  defign'd  by  our  Author 
to  inclade  all  manner  of  external  Objefts,  Ac- 
tions, and  Relations  of  things,  as  they  feem  to 
have  underftood  it.  For  every  Man  in  his 
Wits  muft  be  Sufficiently  fenfible,  that  all 
things  don't  affefthim  in  the  fame  manner,  e- 
ven  before  he  has  will'd  any  of  them.  I  can- 
not be  indifferent  to  Meat,  or  Drink,  or  Reft, 
.when  I  am  Hungiy,  Thirfty,  or  Weary.  Some 


natural  Objefls  are  agreeable,  and  produce 
pleafurc  in  me,  and  others  the  contrary,  whe- 
ther I  will  or  no ;  and  the  fame  may  be  faid 
of  the  mora!  Senfe.  Nay  our  Author  tvtry 
where  allows  their  full  force  to  what  he  calls 
the  Appetites ;  and  aflcrts  that  whatever  con- 
tradifts  them  muft  be  attended  with  Uneafi- 
nefs.  'Tis  not  an  abfolute  indifference  there- 
fore of  the  Man  or  Mind  in  general,  nor  of  the 
Senfes,  Perception  or  Judgment,  which  he  con- 
tends for;  but  it  relates  wholly  to  that  parti- 
cular Power  of  the  Mind  which  we  call  Willing, 
and  which  will  appear  to  be  in  its  own  Nature, 
or  Phyjically  indifferent  to  afting  or  not  afting, 
notwithftanding  all  thefe  different  Affeftions 
or  PafEons  of  the  Mind  rais'd  by  the  different 
Objedls.  Let  a  thing  feem  never  fo  pleafant 
and  agreeable,  never  fo  reafonable,  fit,  and  eli- 
gible 


Of  Moral  Evil 

V.  Fourthly,  If  then  we  fuppofe  fuch  a  Power  as  this,  *tis  plain, 
that  the  Agent  endow'd  with  it  cannot  be  determin'd  in  its  Operations 
by  any  praeexiftent  Goodnefs  in  the  Object ;  for  fince  the  agreeablcnefs 
between  it  and  the  Objects,  at  leaft  in  moft  of  them,  is  fuppofed  to 
arife  from  the  Determination,  the  agreeablenefs  cannot  pofTibly  be 
the  Caufe  of  that  Determination  on  which  itfelf  depends.  But  the 
congruity  of  the  Objedt  with  the  Faculty  is  all  the  Goodnefs  in  it, 
therefore  there  is  nothing  Good  in  regard  to  this  Power,  at  leaft  in 
thefe  Objeds  to  which  it  is  indifferent,  till  it  has  embrac'd  it,  nor  E- 
vil  till  it  has  rejeded  it:  Since  then  the  Determination  of  the  Power 
to  the  Objed:  is  prior  to  the  Goodnefs  and  the  Caufe  of  it,  this  Power 
cannot  be  determin'd  by  that  Goodnefs  in  its  Operations. 

VI,  Fifthly,  Such  a  Power  as  this,  if  it  be  granted  to  exift,  cannot 
be  determin'd  by  any  Ufteafinefs  ariiing  from  the  things  about  which  it 
is  converfant.     For  it  is  fuppofed  to  be  indifferent,  not  only  in  refpedl 
of  external  ObjeSs,  but  alfo  of  its  own  Operations,  and  will  pleafe  it- 
felf, 

NOTES. 


175 


Such  a 
Power  as  this 
cannot  be 
determin'd 
by  any  GaoJ- 
nefi  in  Oh- 
jeflsjfincethe 
Goodnefs  of 
*em  depends 
upon  the  de- 
termination. 


Nor  by  any 

Uneajineji. 


gibic  to  us,  yet  thereisftiila  natural  poflibili- 
ty  for  us  to  will  the  contrary,  andconfequent- 
ly  the  bare /*(5w^r  of  willing  is  in  itfelf  indiffe- 
rent to  either  Side  ;  which  is  all  the  indiffe- 
rence that  our  Author  contends  for.  Now  fuch 
an  Indifference  as  this  Mr.  Locke  allows  to  be 
in  the  operative  Powers  of  Man,  tho'  he  con- 
fines it,  I  think,  improperly,  to  them  alone*. 
"  I  have  the  ability,  fays  he,  to  move  my  hand, 
"  or  to  let  it  reft,  that  operative  Power  is  in- 
*'  different  to  move  or  not  to  move  my  hand  : 
*'  I  am  then  in  that  rcfpcfl  pcrfeftly  free.  My 
"  Will  determines  that  operative  Power  to 
"  reft,  I  am  yet  free,  becaufe  the  Indifferency 
*'  of  that  my  operative  Power  to  aft  or  not  to 
"  aft  dill  remains;  the  Power  of  moving  my 
*'  hand  is  not  at  all  impair'd  by  the  determi- 
"  nation  of  my  Will,  which  at  pre fent  orders 
"  reft,  the  Indifferency  of  that  Power  to  aft 
"  is  juft  as  it  was  before,  as  will  appear,  if 
"  the  Will  puts  it  to  the  trial,  by  ordering  the 
"  contrary."  The  fame,  I  think,  may  be  ap- 
ply'd  to  the  Will  itfelf  in  regard  to  Motives, 


l^t,  with  much  more  Juftice  than  to  thele  ope- 
rative Powers.  Nay  thefe  can  fcarce  be  call'd 
indifferent  to  Aftion  after  the  determination  of 
the  Will  J  but  follow  inftantly  (as  we  obferv'd 
in  Note  61.)  in  moft  Cafes  when  they  are  in 
their  right  State.  What  I  Will  or  Refolve  to 
do,  that  I  certainly  effeft  if  I  have  Power  to 
do  it,  and  continue  in  the  fime  Will  or  Refo- 
lution.  However,  this  Indifference  of  the  ope- 
rative Powers  is  what  can  never  coaftitute  Mo- 
rality (as  was  obferv'd  in  the  fame  place)  fince 
their  Operations  are  no  farther  moral  than  a« 
they  are  confequent  upon,  and  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Will. 

There  rauft  then  be  another  Indifference  pri- 
or to  them,  in  order  to  make  even  the  exertion 
of  them  indifferent,  or  free  in  any  fenfc. 

For  a  more  complete  View  of  this  Queftion, 
fee  Epifcop.  Injiit.  Theol.  L  4.  C  6.  anS  ^raff, 
de  Libero  Arbitrio.  There's  alfo  a  good  defence 
of  our  Author's  Notion  of  Indifference  in  P.  a 
Limbtrcb,  Tbeol.  Chrift.  L.z.  C.23.  ^20,^^. 


*  B.2.  C.  21.  Seft.  71. 


I'jk  Of  Moral  Evil. 

felf,  whether  it  accepts  the  thing  or  rejefls  It;  whether  it  exerts  this 
A£t  or  another.  Thefe  Objeds  then  will  neither  pleafe  nor  difpleafe 
till  this  Indifference  be  removed,  but  it  is  fuppos'd  to  be  removed  by 
the  Application  or  Determination  of  the  Power  itfelf  j  therefor  Anxi- 
ety does  not  produce  but  prefuppofe  its  Determination.  Let  us  fup- 
pofe  this  Power  to  be  already  determin'd  (it  matters  not  how)  to  em- 
brace a  certain  Objeft,  or  to  exert  the  proper  Anions  relating  to  it, 
Defire  manifeftly  follows  this  Determination,  and  Defire  is  follow'd 
by  an  Endeavour  to  obtain  and  enjoy  the  Obje£l  purfuant  to  the  Ap- 
plication of  the  Power.  But  if  any  thing  fliould  hinder  or  flop  this 
Endeavour^  and  prevent  the  Power  from  exerting  thofe  Operations 
which  it  undertook  to  difchargc  in  relation  to  the  Obje6l,  then  indeed 
Uneafinefs  would  arife  from  the  hindrance  of  the  Power.  Anxiety 
would  therefore  be  the  Eff'e^  of  the  Determination  of  this  Power,  but 
by  no  means  the  Cai/fe  of  it  *. 
Nor  by  the  VII.  Sixthly,  Suppoling  fuch  an  Agent  as  this  to  be  endow'd  alio 
Underjianding  y,\x}^  Under ftanding,  he  might  make  ufe  of  it  to  propofe  Matters  fit 
to  be  done,  but  not  to  determine  whether  he  fhould  do  them  or  not. 
For  the  Underftanding  or  Reafon,  if  it  fpeak  Truth,  reprefents  what  is 
in  the  Objeii  s,  and  does  not  counterfeit  what  it  finds  not  in  them : 
Since  therefore,  before  the  Determination  of  this  Power,  things  are 
iuppos'd  to  be  indifferent  to  it,  and  no  one  better  or  worfe  than  ano- 
ther ;  the  Underflanding  if  it  performs  its  Duty  right,  will  rcprefent 
this  Indifference,  and  not  pronounce  one  to  be  more  eligible  than  ano- 
ther; For  the  Underflanding  directs  a  thing  to  be  done  no  otherwife 
than  by  determining  that  ,it  is  better ;  as  therefore  the  Goodnefs  of 
things,  with  refpe6t  to  this  Power,  depends  upon  its  Determination, 
and  they  are  for  the  moft  part  good  if  it  embraces,  evil,  if  itrejecis 
them,  'tis  manifefl  that  the  Judgment  of  the  Underflanding  concer- 
ning things  depends  upon  the  fame,  and  that  it  cannot  pronounoe  up- 
on the  Goodnefs  or  Badnefs  of  them,  till  it  perceives  whether  the  Pow- 
er has  embraced  or  rejedled  them.  The  Underftanding  therefore  mufl 
wait  for  the  Determination  of  this  Power,  before  it  can  pafs  a  Judg- 
ment, inflead  of  the  Power's  waiting  for  the  Judgment  of  that  Under- 
Handing  before  it  can  be  determin'd. 

VIII.  Seventhly, 

*  How  far  this  Argument  will  afii:6l  Mr.  Luke's  Hypothefis   oi  Anxiety,  may  be  obferv'd 
•from  the  latter  pirt  of  Not.*  65. 


Of  Moral  Evil  lyy 

VIII.  Seventhly,  But  tho'  this  Power  cannot  be  detcrmin'd  in  its  '^ct  fuch  an 
Operations  by  any  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding,  yet  the   Under-  ^Id'of^un- 
ftanding  is  neceflary,  in  order  to  propofe  Matters  of  Adion,  and  todi-deriianding 
ftinguifli  poflible  ones  from  thofe  that  are  impofiible.     For  tho'  the  ^"j^'jf^yj^ 
Goodnefs  of  things  with  refpecl:  to  the  Agent,  proceeds  from  his  De-  poffibie 
termination,  yet  the  Poffibility  or  Impoflibility  is  in  the  things  them-  ?^'"g^J\°"* 
felves,  and  this  Agent  ftands  in  need  of  the  Underftanding  to  diftin-  ""^°  ' 
guifh  between  Objc(fls,  left  it  light  upon  Abfurdities,  and  fo  create 

itfelf  Uneafinefs.  Not  that  an  Objed  is  therefore  Good  becaufe  *tis 
poffibie ;  for  if  it  were  rejed:ed  it  would  be  Evil ;  nor  will  it  be  im- 
mediately difagreeable  becaufe  impoffible,  for,  attempting  an  Impof- 
fibility  may  be  pleafing  to  us,  (for  we  may  prefer  the  exercife  of  this 
Power,  which  is  the  thing  that  pleafes  us,  as  we  faid  before)  but  he 
that  makes  this  Attempt,  muft  neceflarily  be  unhappy  in  the  Event ; 
for  fince  the  thing  which  the  Power  undertakes  is  impoffible  to  be 
done,  Uneafinefs  muft  neceflarily  follow  the  hindrance  of  its  Exer- 
cife, 'and  the  final  Difappointment  of  its  End.  If  ^he  Aacnt 

IX.  This  then  muft  be  d^ffign' A  2iS  the,  Jirji  Limitation  of  fuch  a^eofinlnite 
Power,  viz.  that  it  confine  itfelf  to  Poffibilities,  and  there  needs  no  nee^^nJ^Q. 
other    if  the  Agent  be  of  infinite  Power,  in  order  to  the  obtaining  of  therLimiu- 
its  End.  ,  """• 

X.  Eighthly,  But  if  the  Agent's  Power  be  finite,  it  has  need  alfo  But  an  Agent 
to  confult  its  Abilities,  and  not  determine  itfelf  to  any  thing  which  of  finite  pow- 
may  exceed  them,  otherwife  it  will  be  as  much  difappointed  in  its  cotlfuit  his* 
Endeavour  as  if  it  had  attempted  abfolute  Impoffibilities.     And  this  is  Abilities. 
the  fecond  Limitation  of  this  Power.     It  is  impoffible,  you'll  fay,  for 

an  Appetite  to  purfue  fuch  things  as  the  Underftanding  evidently  de- 
clares not  to  be  in  the  Power  of  the  Agent.  I  anfwer,  the  Senfes  ,and 
natural  Appetites  are  gratify'd  with  their  Obje^s,  and  pleafe  thcm- 
felves,  tho'  Reafon  remonftrate  againft  them,  and  condemn  that  plea- 
fure  as  pernicious.  How  much  more  eafily  then  may  this  faSlitiom 
Appetite^  which  arifes  in  the  Agent  from  Application  only,  be  con-,  » 

ceiv'd  to  delight  in  its  Good,  tho'  the  Underftanding  oppofe  it,  and  \ 

condemn  that  Delight  as  foolifli  and  of  ftiort  Duration.  Why  Nature 
granted  fuch  a  Liberty  to  this  Power,  and  how  it  conduces  to  the  ••« 

Good  of  the  whole,  will  be  fticwn  afterwards. 

A  a  XL  Hitherto 


1 78  Of  Moral  Evil. 

Such  an  A-  ^*  ^'^^^^^^^  ^"^^  ^^^e  either  confider'd  this  Power  alone  in  the  A- 
gcnt  cannot  gci^t,  OF  as  join'd  with  the  Underftanding.  But  the  Agent  endow'd 
Mcterinin'd  with  it,  may  alfo  have  other  Powers  and  Appetites  which  are  deter- 
Appctitcs."  niin'd  to  their  Objeds  by  a  natural  Congraity ;  yet  neither  can  it  be 
decermin'd  in  its  Operations  by  thefe  Appetites.  Thefe,  when  right- 
ly difpos'd,  muft  neceflarily  exert  their  Operations  upon  the  prefence  of 
dieir  Objects 3  but  it  is  not  at  all  neceflary  that  they  fhould  delight 
and  pleafe  themfelves  in  thefe  Operations.  For  inftance,  a  bitter  and 
naufeous  favour  is  difagreeable  to  the  Tafle:  but  tho'  this  be  felt,  yet 
urgent  Hunger  makes  it  pleafant,  Importunity  of  Appetite  overcom- 
ing the  Difagreeablenefs  of  the  Savour.  This  Pleafure  indeed  is  not 
pure,,  but  mix'd  and  diluted  proportionably  to  the  Excefs  of  the  pre- 
vailing Appetite.  For,  fuppofe  that  there  are  three  Degrees  of  Unea- 
finefs  from  the  Hunger,  and  two  from  the  Bitter nefs,.  the  Agent,  to  a- 
void  three,  mufi  neceflarily  bear  two,  which  being  dedu£^  ed,  there  re- 
mains only  one  Degree  of  folid  Pfeafure  j  whereas  if  he  had  met  with, 
fuitable  and  fweet  Food,  there  would  have  been  three. 

XIL  Since  therefore  the  Pleafure  which  arifes  from  the  Satisfadion 

isfuperroT^o  ®^  t^^f'^  natural  Appetites,  may  be  overcome  by  a  ftronger  Appetite, 

aJi  the  Appc-  there's  no  Reafon  10  doubt  but  this  Power  whick  is  indifferent  to  Ob- 

fubduedl)    3^^^  "^^^  overcome  all  the  other  Powers  and  Appetites.     For  all  thefe 

«Mk^  are  limited  by  their  Objeds,  and  therefore  have  certain  Bounds  and 

Meafures  in  their  Operations  -,  but  this  Power  has  no  Bounds  *,  nor  is 

there  any  thing  wherein  it  cannot  pleafe  iifelf,  if  it  does  but  happen 

to  be  determin'd  to  it.     Now  fince  the  natural  Appetites  themfelves 

may  be  contrary  to  each  other  (as  we  have  fliewn)  and  one  of  them 

be  overcome  by  the  Excefs  of  another,  how  much,  more  eafily  may 

this  Power  beconceiv'd  to  go  againft  thefe  Appetites,  and  lince  it  is  of 

a  very  different  and  fuperior  kind,  'tis  probable  that  it  can  conquer 

aU  others,  and  be  itfelf  fubdued  by^none. 

ft  feems  to         XIII.  Nay  we  may  imagine  it  to  be  given  for  this  very  End,  that 

be  given  for  the  Agent  might  have  wherein  to  pleafe   itfelf,  when  thofe  things 

AlttheAeent  '^^^^^  ^^^  agreeable,  to  the  natural  Appetites  cannot  be  had,  as  it  very 

might   have  OlteiX 

femething  to  (i^light  himfelf»  ia  when  the  natmal  Appetites  muft  neceffarily  be  fm^azted. 

*  i.  c.  IB.  lis  Objcfts,  fee  Note.7i«. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  - 


179 


often  happens.  As  die  natural  Powers  and  Appetites  receive  Plealurc 
and  Pain  from  ObjeSs,  they  muft  ncceflarily  be  deprived  of  Pleafure, 
and  undergo  Pain,  according  to  the  Laws  of  Motion,  and  the  order 
of  external  things.  Since  then  they  are  often  frultrated,  they  mull 
render  the  Agents  pofTefs'd  of  them  liable  to  IVIifery,  as  well  as  make 
them  capable  of  Happinefs:  But  the  Agent  can  have  this  always  ^:o 
delight  itfelf  in  ^  and  'tis  an  advantage  to  it  to  be  able  to  quit  the  o- 
ther  Appetites,  and  pleafe  itfelf  in  reftraining  them,  or  ailing  contra- 
ry to  them.  For  fince  every  Faculty  Is  fatisfy'd  in  its  exercife,  the 
Strength  of  this  cannot  be  more  fignally  difplay'd  in  any  thing,  than 
in  running  counter  fometimes  to  all  the  Appetites.  For  this  muft  ei- 
ther be  fometimes  done,  or  the  Agejit  muft  be  deftitute  of  all  manner 
of  Good,  and  remain  entirely  miferable  j  namely  when,  according  to 
the  Laws  of  Nature,  fuch  things  muft  be  endured  as  are  quite  contra- 
ry to  the  Appetites  *. 

XIV".  And  from  hence  it  is  very  evident  how  deiirable  fuch  a  Power  t..  .  p^,.,^^ 
as  this  would  be :  for  if  it  happen  to  be  determin'd  to  fuch  things  as  by  its  accef- 
are  agreeable  to  the  Appetites,  it  augments,  it  multiplies  the  Enjoy-  fion.encreafes 
mentj  but  if  it  Ihould  be  determin'd  to  undergo  thofe  things  which  onL^other 
are  repugnant  to  the  Appetites,  and  which  it  muft  neceffarily  bear  Appetites; by 
fometimes,  it  might  diminifh,  nay  quite  remove  the  Uneafinefs,  or  rfn^o(!e3°"or 
convert  it  into  Pleafure.  (ji.)  at  leaft  a'lle- 

A  a   2  XV.  It  ^"^"  ^^^ 

pain. 

NOTES. 


(71.)  This  is  not  much  more  than  what  Loch 
afTerts  f  in  anfwer  to  the  Enquiry,  "  Whether 
it  be  in  a  Man's  power  to  change  the  Plea- 
fantnefs  and  Uneafinefs  that  accompanies  any 
fort  ofAftion?  And  to  that,  fays  he,  'tis 
plain  in  many  cafes  he  can.  Men  may 
and  fliould  corredl  their  Palates,  and  give 
a  relifh  to  what  either  has,  or  they  fup- 
pofc  has  none.  The  rclifh  of  the  Mind 
is  as  various  as  that  of  the  Body;  and 
Jilcc  that  too  may  be  alter'd  ;  and  'tis  a  mi- 
llakc  to  think  that   Men  cannot  change   the 


"  difpleafingnefs  or  indifference  that  is  in  Ac- 
"  tions  into  Pleafure  and  Defire,  if  they  will 
"  but  do  what  is  in  their  Power."  But  it  is 
objefted  hy  Leilfnitz,  againll  our  Authors  No- 
tion, that  if  it  could  create  Pleafure  by  an  ar- 
bitrary Determination  and  bare  Eleftion,  it 
might  for  the  fame  reafon  produce  Happinefs 
in  infinitum^,  and  then  how  could  we  be  ever 
miferable  fexcept  we  chofc  to  be  fo  ?  Which 
Argument  feems  to  be  founded  on  a  millake  of 
our  Author's  meaning,  as  if  he  had  intended  to 
affert,  that  all  the  good  and  agreeablcnefs  in 

every 


*  viz.  in  painful  Remedies^  di/ttgreeable  Potitns,  &c  y?^  Subfeft.  5.  par. 9. 
i  B.  2.  C.  21.  Seft.  69.  (I  EJfuis  deTheodiceCy  p.  466,  467. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


J  So 

The  reft  of       XV.  It  mufl:  be  confefs'd,  that  fome  kind  of  ftruggle  will  be  hereby 

are tlt^o^ excited  in  this  Agent ;  but  a  ftruggle  attended  with  fome  Pleafure,  tho' 

baikedunne  it  be  qualify'd  and  not  perfectly  pure,  is  better  than  to  be  under  abfo- 

ccffariiy.       i^g  Mjfery.     Nay,  the  confcioufnefs  of  a  Power  to  pleafc  itfelf  a- 

gainft  the  bent  and  Inclination  of  the  natural  Appetites,  may  excite  a 

greater' Pleafure  than  could  arife  from  the  fruition  of  thofe  things  which 

would,  if  prefent,  gratify  thcfe  Appetites.     Yet  this  Agent  is  oblig'dto 

have  fome  regard  to  the  Appetites,  and  not  to  difturb  them  unnecef- 

farily,  nor  reftrain  them  from  a  due  enjoyment  of  their  proper  Objects. 

He  that  does  this  will  bring  upon  himfelf  uneafinefs,  and  a  needlefs 

conteft.     Tho'  therefore  it  be  not  at  all  proper  that  fuch  a  Power 

fliould  be  abfolutely  determin'd  by  the  natural  Appetites   yet  it  is  fit 

that  they  fliould  perfuade  it,  and  that  fome  regard  be  had  to  them 

in  its  Determinations.     And  this  may  be  reckon'd  its  third  Limit a- 

tation. 

Such  an  A-       XVI.  Ninthly,  An  Agent  poflefs'd  of  fuch  a  Principle  as  this  would 

gent  as  this  is  i^e  Self-acli've^  and  capable  of  being  determin'd  in  its  Operations  by 

»^'«-     itfelf  alone.     Now  there  is  fometimes  an  abfolute  neceffity  for  it  to 

be  determined ;  for  when  any  thing  is  propos'd  to  be  done  immediate- 

ly. 
NOHES. 


CTcry  thing  or  aftion,  proceeds  abfolutely  and 
entirely  from  our  Will :  and  alfo,  that  this  will 
is  as  unlimited  in  its  Exercife  as  in  its  Objeiis, 
and  confequently  th^t  vvc  might  have  any  way, 
and  at  any  time,  as  much  Happinefs  as  we  plea- 
fed,  purely  by  williMg  it ;  all  which  Propofi 
tions  are  as  faJfe  as  they  are  foreign  to  the  In- 
tention of  our  Author,  who  infills  only  upon 
this,  that  the  aft  of  willing,  like  the  exercife 
of  all  our  other  Faculties,  is  in  itfelf  delight- 
ful to  a  certain  Degree.  Thi?,  when  apply 'd 
to  an  Objcft  which  is  in  it(elf  agreeable,  muft 
add  to  the  Pleafure  arifing  from  it ;  when  de- 
termin'd to  a  contrary  one  (both  v/Jiich  kind  of 
Objefts  he  always  fuppofes)  muft  deduft  from 
the  Pain  ;  when  to  an  indifferent  one,  it  muft 
make  that  pofitively  agreeable,  by  conferring  fo 
much  abfolute  and  folid  Happinefs. 

But  ftill  this  exercife  of  the  Will,  and  of 
conTequence  the  Pleafure  attending  it,  muft  in 
%U.£inite  Crutufes  be  eCcntially  and  nece^arily 


finite,  as  wcir as  the  exercife  of  all  their  other 
'■Powers:  and  tho'  it  has  no  bounds  as  to  the 
number  and  kind  of  its  Obje£ls,  yet  it  muft  be 
limited  as  to  its  own  Nature  and  the  degree  of 
its  exercife.  ^his  appears  to  me  eafily  concei- 
vabJe,  and  matter  of  experience.  We  find 
ourfelves  generally  able  to  turn  our  thoughts  to 
any  Objeft  indifferently,  but  does  any  Perfon 
from  hence  imagine,  that  he- can  fix  his  thoughts 
upon  any  particular  Objeft,  with  an  unlimited 
Intenfenefs,  or  think  infinitely  ?■  granting  the 
Words  Intention  and-Remiffion  to  be  applica- 
ble here  in  any  tolerable  fcnfe :  which  will 
perhaps,  upon  Examination,  appear  very  doubt- 
ful. However,  it  is  evidently  no  good  confe- 
quence  to  infer,  that  becaufe  I  can  will,  or 
choofe  a  thing  abfolutely  and  freely,  therefore 
I  can  will  it  in  infinitum.  May  I  not  as  juftly 
be  faid  to  perceive  or  underftand  a  thing  in  in- 
finitunty  becaufe  I  perceive  or  underftand  it  at 
all? 


I 


Of  Moral  Evil.  i8i 

ly,  It  muil  necefTarily  either  ad  or  fufpend  its  adllon,  one  of  them  mufl 
neceflarily  be  *  j  but  when  either  of  them  is  done,  the  Power  is  deter- 
mln'd  by  that  very  ad: ;  and  no  lefs  force  is  requifite  to  fufpend  than 
to  exert  the  ad,  as  common  fenfe  and  experience  may  inform  any 
one  "f-.  A  determination  then  about  a  thing  once  propofed  to  be  done, 
is  unavoidable;  and  fince  It  can  neither  be  determined  by  any  Good  or 
Evil  pre-exiftent  in  the  Objeds,  nor  by  the  natural  Powers  or  Appe- 
tites, nor  by  their  Objeds ;  it  mufl  of  neceffity  either  continue  unde- 
termined, or  elfe  determine  Itfelf.  But  tho'  it  be  naturally  free  from 
any  determination,  yet  the  Nature  of  the  thing  requires,  that  it  fliould 
be  determin'd  on  every  particular  occafionj  and  fince  there  is  nothing 
external  to  do  this,  it  remains  that  it  determine  itfelf.  We  fhall  call 
th's  Determination  an  EleBion;  for  as  it  is  naturally  indifferent  to  ma- 
ny things,  it  will  pleafe  itfelf  in  eleding  one  before  another. 

XVII.  Nor  is  it  a  proper  Queftion  to  afk.  What  determines  it  to  an  is  determined 
Eledion?     For  if  any  fuch  thing  were  fuppos'd,  it  would  not  be  in- ^y  ^'j^'"«'^» 
different,  /.  e.  'tis  contrary  to   the  Nature  of  this  Agent,  that  there  a!e  not"c1io- 
fhould  be  any  thing  at  all  to  determine  it.     In  relation  to  a  pajjive  *'sn  becaufe 
Power  -j-f-,  which  has  a  natural  and  neceffary  connedion  with  the  Ob-  jjj^^(  "^'^^^^ 
Jed,  the  prefence  of  which  determines  it  to  ad,  we  may  reafonably  picafe  him 
enquire  what  that  Good  is  which  may  determine  it  to  exert  any  parti-  becaufe  they 
Gular  adion;  but  it  is  not  fo  in  an  aBhe  Power,  the  very  Nature  of  ^'^^'^  °^^^ 
which  is  to  make  an  Objed  agreeable  to  itfelf,  /.  e.  good,  by  its  own 

proper  ad.     For  here  the  Goodnefs  of  the  Objed  does  not  precede  the 
ad  of  Eledion,  fo  as  to  excite  it,  but  Eledion  makes  the  Goodnefs  in 
the  Objed;  that  is,  the  thing  is  agreeable  becaufe  chofen,  and  not. 
chofen  becaufe  agreeable  :  we  cannot  therefore  j'uflly  enquire  after  any. 
other  caufe  of  Eledion  than  the  Power,  itfelf 

XVIII.  If  thefe  things  be  true,  you'll  fay,,  this  Agent  willhe  deter-       ,    . 
min'd  by  Chance,  and  not  by  Reajbn  ;  but  in  reality  here's  no  room  for  detcrmind 
Chance,  if  by  Chance  be  underflood  that  which  happens  befidc  the  in-  by  Chance. 
tention  of  the  Agent ;  for  this  very  Eledion  is  the  Intention  of  the  A^ 

gent,  and  it  is  impolfible  that  a  Man  fhould  intend  befide  his  Inten- 
tion. As  for  Reajbn,  he  that  prefers  a  lefs  Good  to  a  greater,  mufl  be 
judg'd  to  ad  unreafonably ;  but  he  that  makes  that  a  greater  Good  by 

choofing^ 

•  Set  Lock f,  B   2.  G  21.  Sea.  23,24.  t  Seel^oit-6S, 

•j.t  ^ct.LickCi  Ch.  21.  Se^   2. 


1 8^  Of  Moral  Evil 

choofiitg  it,  which,  before  his  choice,  had  either  no  Good  at  all  iri  it, 
or  a  Icfs,  he  certainly  choofes  with  reafon.  You  may  urge  that  Con- 
tingency atleafl  is  to  be  admitted;  if  by  this  you  mean,  that  this  Agent 
does  fome  things  which  are  not  at  all  neceflary,  I  readily  own  a  Con- 
tingency, for  that  is  the  very  Liberty  I  would  eflablifh. 

XIX.  Tenthly,  'Tis  evident  that  fuch  an  Agent  as  this,  if  it  be  al- 
Caufc  of  his  low'd  that  there  is  fuch  an  one,  is  the  true  Caufe  of  his  acftions,  and 
Adious.  that  whatever  he  does  may  juflly  be  imputed  to  him.  A  Power 
which  is  not  Mafter  of  itfelf,  but  determin'd  to  a6t  by  fome  other,  is 
in  reality  not  the  efficient  Caufe  of  its  actions,  but  only  the  i?ijirumen- 
till  or  occqfional  (if  we  may  ufe  the  term  of  fome  Philofophers)  for  it 
may  be  faid  that  the  thing  is  done  in  it,  or  by  it,  rather  than  that  it 
does  the  thing  itfelf.  No  Perfon  therefore  imputes  to  himfelf,  or  e- 
fteems  himfelf  the  Caufe  of  thofe  a8  ions  to  which  he  believes  him- 
felf to  be  neceffarily  determin'd:  If  then  any  inconvenience  arife  from 
them,  he  will  look  upon  it  as  a  Misfortune,  but  not  as  a  Crime  ;  and 
whatever  it  be,  he  will  refer  it  to  the  Determiner.  Nor  will  he  be  an- 
gry with  himfelf,  unlefs  he  be  confcious  that  it  was  in  his  power  not 
to  have  done  them :  but  he  cannot  be  confcious  of  thi§  (except  thro' 
ignorance  and  error)  who  is  determin'd  by  another.  For  no  others 
ought  to  be  look'd  upon  as  true  Caufes,  but  fuch  as  are  free.  For  thofe 
that  operate  neceifarily,  are  to  be  conceiv'd  as  paffve,  and  we  mufl 
recur  to  fome  other  which  impofes  that  neceffity  on  them,  till  we  a- 
rive  atone  that  is  free,  where  we  may  flop.  Since  then  the  Agent 
endowed  with  this  Power,  is  determin'd  by  himfelf  and  no  other,  and 
is  free  in  his  Operations,  we  mufl  acquiefce  in  him  as  a  real  Caufe, 
and  he  ought  to  be  efleem'd  the  Author  of  whatever  he  does,  either 
well  or  ill. 
s  cnp^b.c  of  XX.  Eleventhly,  'Tis  manifefl  that  fuch  an  Agent  as  this  is  capable 
H..ppincf5.  o{  Happinefs.  For  that  Perfon  mufl  be  happy  who  can  always  pleafe 
himfelf,  but  this  Agent  can  evidently  do  fo.  For  fince  things  are  fup- 
pofed  to  pleafe  him,  not  by  any  necefTiry  of  Nature,  but  by  mere  E- 
leflion,  and  there  is  nothing  which  can  compel  him  to  choofe  this  ra- 
ther than  another ;  'tis  plain  that  the  Agent  endow'd  with  this  Power 
may  always  choofe  fuch  things  as  it  can  enjoy,  and  refufe,  ;'.  e.  not  de- 
iire,  or  not  choofe  thofe  things  which  are  impoflible  to  be  had.  And 
from  hence  it  appears  of  how  great  Importance  it  is,  whether  that 

whereby 


Of  Moral  Evil.  i  g^ 

whereby  things  become  agreeable  to  the  Appetites,  be  eflablifli'd  by- 
Nature,  or  efed:ed  by  the  Agent  himfelf.  For  if  Good  and-  Evil  pro- 
ceed fronn  Nature,  and  be  inherent  in  Objedis,  £o  as  to  render  then>  a- 
greeable  or  difegreeabk,  antecedent  to  the  Election,  theHappinefs  of 
this  Agent  will  alfo  depend  upon  them;  and  unlefs  the  whole  Series 
of  things  be  fo'order'd;  that  nothing-  can  happen  contrary  to  his  Ap- 
petites, he  muft  fail  fhort  of  Happineis.  For  his  Appetites  will  be 
difappointed,  which  is  the  very  thing  that  wc  call  Unhappinefs.  But  if 
Objects  derive  their  agreeablenefs  or  difagreeablenefs  from  the  Choice, 
*tis  clear  that  he  who  has  his  Choice  may  always  enjoy  the  thing  cho- 
fen,  unlefs  he  choofe  impolTibilicies,  &c.  and  never  have  his  Appetite 
fruftrated,  /.  e.  be  always  happy.     Not  that  all  things  are   indifferent  ' 

with  refpe6t  to  this  Power,  for  it  admits  of  fome  Limitations,  as  was- 
obferv'd,  beyond  which  it  mult  neceflarily  deviate  from  Happinefs. 

XXP.  Twelfthly,  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  Agents,  whofe  Felicity  ^j,  ^,^pgrre(f^ 
depends  uj>on  the  agreement  of  external  Objedis  to  their  Appetites,  underaand- 
ftand  in  need  of  a  perfect  and  almoil  infinite  Knowledge,  to  compre-  J."^  fjr^his' 
hend  diftindlly  all  the  relations,  habitudes,  natures  and  conlequences  inppinefs,  if 
of  things;  if  they  come  (hort  of  it,  it  is  impoffible  but  that  they  mufl  [jf  ^"^.^^Z'" 
feften  fall  into  pernicious  Errors,  and  be  difappointed  of  their  Defires,  twcJn  poin« 
that  is  be  often  miferable:  Hence  anxiety  and  difquiet  of  Mind  muft  [^iiitic!  and 
neceflarily  arife,  and  they  would  be  agitated  with  continual  doubts  and  |i^i^°thi'n^3 
uncertainty,  left  what  they  choofe  fhould  not  prove  the  beft.     Thefeasreeabiea'nd' 
Agents  then  were  either  to  be  created  without  a  profpedt  of  Futuri-  fg^^hrfcnfes 
ty,  or  to  be  endow'd  with  a  perfed:  Underftanding ;  if  neither  were  .md  confuit ' 
d€>ne,  they  muft  of  neceffity  be  very  miferable ;  for  we  can  fcarcecon-  ^'^  Abilities. 
Gcive  a  greater  Mifery  than  to  be  held  in  fufpence  about  Happinefs, 
and  cooipell'd  to  choofe  among  Objects  not  fuificiently  known,  in 
which  neverthclefs  a  miftake  would  be  attended  with  unavoidable  Mi- 
fery.    There's  none  but  is  fufficiently  apprehenfive  how  anxious>  how 
folicitous,  how  miferable  it  muft  be  to  hang  in  fuch  a  doubt  as  this;, 
but  if  the  agreeablenels  of  things  be  fuppofed  to  depend  upon  EleBion^ 
a  very  imperfed:  underftanding  will  ferve  todired:  this  Agent,  nor  need 
he  to  comprehend  all  the  natures  and  habitudes  of  things :  for  if  he 
do  but  diftinguifti  pofTiblc  things  from  impoftible,  thofe  things  which 
are  pleafant  to  the  Senfes  from  them  that  are  unpleafam,  that  which 
is  agreeable  ta  the  Facultiea  from  what  is  difagreeable,  and  confuit 

his. 


1  8+  Of  Moral  Evil. 

his  own  Abilities,  viz.  how  far  his  power  reaches  ;  (all  which  areeafi- 
ly  dilcovered)  he  will  know  enough  to  make  him  completely  happy. 
Nor  is  there  need  of  long  deliberation,  whether  any  thing  to  be  done 
be  the  very  beft;  for  if  the  Eledion  be  but  made  within  thefe bounds, 
that  will  become  the  beft  which  is  chofen. 
Tho'  Liberty      XXII.  He  that  enjoys  this  Principle  of  pleafing  himfelf  in  his  Choice 
would  be  a    cannot  reafonably  complain  of  Nature,  tho'  he  have  but  a  very  imper- 
otherAgents,  fe6l  Undcrftanding  j  for  there  will  always  be  Objects  enough  ready  to 
vetit  jsafureofFcr  thcmfelves  wlthin  thefe  bounds,  upon  which  he  may  exercife  his 
Happi'ne"  °o  choice,  and  plcafc  himfelf  *.  that  is,  he  may  always  enjoy  Happinefs. 
this,  whoie  Tho*  Frce-will  then  be  of  no  ufe,  as  was  faid  before,  to  an  Agent  ca- 
dcMndsToT  P^^^^  of  being  determin'd  only  by  the  convenience  of  external  things, 
on  Objeas,  nay,  tho*  it  be  pernicious,  as  only  tending  to  pervert  Reafon  and  pro^ 
butEieaion  (j^ce  Sin ;  yet  to  an  Agent  whofe  convenience  does  not  depend  upon 
the  things,  but  the  choice,  it  is  of  the  greateft  Importance,  and  as  we 
have  feen,  the  fure  and  only  Foundation  of  Felicity.     And  from  hence 
it  appears  how  valuable  and  how  defirable  fuch  an  adtive  Principle  as , 
this  would  be. 
XXIII.  All  this  feems  to  be  coherent  enough,  clear  enough,  and  eafy 
Z^e  d«?e-^'  to  be  underftood,  tho'  fome  may  look  upon  it  as  a  little  too  fubtle. » 
It  remains  that  we  enquire  whether  this  be  a  mere  Hypothefis,  with- 
out any  Foundation  in  fad:,  or  there  be  really  fuch  a  Principle  to  be 
found  in  Nature.  (72.) 


nough,  tho' 
they  may  ap- 
pear to  be  a 
little  too 
fubtle. 


NOTES, 


(72.)  For  an  Explanation  of  our  Author's 
Principle  of  Indifference,  above  what  has  been 
faid  in  Note  70,  and  will  be  cnlarg'd  on  in 
Note  82.  we  (hall  only  obfervc  here,  that  mo  ft 
of  the  objeilions  brought  by  the  Author  of  the 
Fhihfophical  Enquiry,  p.  69,  l^c.  are  built  upon 
the  old  blunder  of  confounding  this  Indiffe- 
rence as  apply' d  to  the  Mind,  in  refpeft  of  its 
Self  determining  Powers  of  willing  or  a^ing 
with  another,  which  is  falfly  referr'd  to  the 
paffivc  Powers  oi. Perception  znd  Judgment,  with 


refpeft  to  the  former  Faculties  all  things  are 
phyfically  indifferent  or  alike,  that  is,  no  one 
can  properly  affcft,  incline  or  move  them  more 
than  another  ;  with  regard  to  the  latter,  moll 
things  are  not  indifferent,  but  neceffarily  pro- 
duce Pleafure  or  Pain,  are  agreeable  or  difa- 
greeable,  whether  we  choole  them  or  not : 
Our  Author  is  to  be  underftood  only  in  rela- 
tion to  the  former,  in  this  and  the  following 
Seftions,  tho*  he  often  ufcs  general  terms. 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  iS^ 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     IV. 

That  there  is  an  Agent  ^who  is  ^leas'd  "with  Objeiis  only 
becAufe  he  choofes  them. 

I.  \  If  7E  have  feen  in  the  former  Subfedion,  that  fome  things' arc  (^^^  is  Cuch 
V  V    adapted  to  the  Appetites  by  the  conftitution  of  Nature  it-  an  Agent  as 
felf,  and  on   that  account  are  good  and  agreeable  to  them;  but  that^^'^- 
we  may  conceive  a  Power  which  can  produce  Goodnefs  or  Agreeable- 
nefs  in  the  things,  by  conforming  itfelf  to  them,  or  adapting  them  to 
it :    hereupon   things  pleafe   this  Agent,  not  becaufe  they  are  good  in 
themfelves,  but  become  good  becaufe  they  are  chofcn.     We  have  de- 
monftrated  before,  how  great  a  Perfection,  and  of  what  ufe  fuch  a  Po- 
wer would  be,  and  that  there  is  fuch  a  Power  in  Nature  appears  from 
hence,  viz.  we  muft  necelTarily  beheve  that  God  is  inverted  with  it. 

II.  For  in  the  firft  place,  nothing  in  the  Creation  is  either  Good  or  Becaufe  no- 
Bad  to  him  before  his  Election,  he  has  no  Appetite  to  gratify  with  the  thing  exter- 
Enjoyment  of  things  without  him.     He  is  therefore  abfolutely  indif-  ^^^^^l^^^l 
ferent  to  all  external  things,  and  can  neither  receive  benefit  nor  harm  to  him  before 
from  any  of  them.     What  then  {hould  determine  his  Will  to  ad:?  £leaion. 
Certainly  nothing  withmt  him ;  therefore  he  determines  himfelf,  and 

creates  to  himfelf  a  kind  of  Appetite  by  choofing.  For  when  the 
Choice  is  made,  he  will  have  as  great  attention  and  regard  to  the  ef- 
fe<5tual  procuring  of  that  which  he  has  chofen,  as  if  he  was  excited 
to  this  Endeavour  by  a  natural  and  neceflary  Appetite.  And  he  will 
efteem  fuch  things  as  tend  to  accomplifh  thefeEledions,  Good;  fuch 
as  obftrud  them,  Evil. 

III.  Secondly,  the  Divine  Will  is  the  Caufe  of  Good  in  the  Crea-g 

tures,  whereon  they  depend,  as  almoft  every  one  acknowledges.     ForownWiii'is 
created  Beings  have  all  that  they  have  from  the  Will  of  God;  nor  can  ^'^e  Caufe  of 
they  be  any  thing  elfe  than  what  he  will'd.     Tis   plain  then  that  thecfeTiurl" 
all  thefe  arc  conformable  and  confonant  to  his  Will,  either  efficient  or 
permiflive,  and  that  their  original  Goodnefs  is  founded  in  this  Confo- 

B  b  nancy. 


1 86  Of  Moral  Evil 

nancy.  And  fince  all  things  proceed  from  one  and  the  fame  Will, 
which  cannot  be  contrary  to  itfelf,  as  it  is  reftrain'd  within  its  proper 
bounds  by  infinite  Wifdom,  'tis  alfo  certain  that  all  things  are  confi- 
dent with  each  other,  that  every  thing  contributes  as  much  as  poffible 
to  the  prefervation  of  itfelf  and  the  whole  Syftem  j  which  we  muft 
reckon  their  fecondary  Goodnefs,  All  the  Goodnefs  then  of  the  Crea- 
tures is  owing  to  the  Divine  Will,  and  dependent  on  it,  for  we  cannot 
apprehend  how  they  could  be  either  Good  or  Evil  in  themfelves, 
fince  they  were  nothing  at  all  antecedent  to  the  a<5l  of  the  Divine 
Will :  and  they  were  as  far  from  being  good  with  regard  to  God  him- 
felf,  till  upon  willing  their  Exiftence,  he,  by  that  ad:  of  Eledlion,  both 
conftituted  them  Good  in  relation  to  him ;  and,  by  an  unity  of  Will, 
made  them  agreeable  to  one  another.  'Tis  evident  that  the  Divine 
Will  was  accompanied  in  this,  as  in  all  other  Cafes,  by  his  Goodnefs 
and  Wifdom,  and  the  immediate  confequence  of  this  is,  that  things 
pleafe  God,  /.  e.  are  Good.  For  many  things  arc  nnt  at  all  agreeable  to 
his  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom,  becaufe  he  did  not  will  them,,  and  while- 
he  does  not  will  any  thing,  it  cannot  be  good. 

From  whence  it  appears  undeniably,  that  his  Will  could  not  be  de- 

termin'd  to  Election  by  any  Goodnefs  in  the  Creatures.     For  before 

that  Election  which  is  declared  to  be  the  Caufe  of  Goodnefs  in  created 

Beings,  nothing  could  be  either  Good  or  Bad ;  but  when  the  Eledtion 

is  made,  that  only  is  Evil  which  obftru6ts  the  execution  of  it ;    and 

that  Good  which  promotes  it.     The  Goodnefs  of  things  is  therefore  to 

be  determin'd  by  their  agreeablenefs  to  the  Divine  Will,  and  not  that 

by  the  agreeablenefs  or  goodnefs  of  things. 

They  are  not     ^^-  Thirdly,  We  muft  not  therefore  attend  to  fuch  as  declare  that 

to  be  minded  God  choofes  things  becaufe  they  are  Good,  as  if  Goodnefs  and  the 

who  declare  gj-^ater  Good,  which  he  perceives  in  Objeds,    could  determine   his 

Goodnefs     Will.  (73.)    If  the  Matter^had  flood  thus,  it  does  not  feem poflible for 

determines  jbc. 


the  Will  of 
God. 


NOTES. 

(73.) This  Notion  i?  advanc'd  by  Dr.  C/^r/?^  j  The  fame  is   infifled  on   by  heihnitt,  Gretius, 
in  his  Demorfiralion  of  the  Divine   j-lttnbutes^sMr.  Chubb,   and  many  others.     We  have   en 
Prop.  12.  and   afterwards   explain'd,  as  far  as   quired  a  little  into  it  already  in  X  i.  fee  mor« 
it  fccms  capable  of  Explanation,  in  his   i-viA  ia  Note  75,  {ifr. 
dentti  ofNainraJ  and  Reveal' d  Religion ,  Prop..  1. 1 


Of  Moral  hl/il  1*^ 

the  World  to  have  been  made  at  all.  For  they  who  acknowledge  God  to  * 
be  the  Author  of  it,  confefs  alfo,  that  he  is  abfolutely  and  completely 
happy  in  himfelf,  and  does  not  Hand  in  the  leaft  need  of  other  things. 
Now  it  is  inconceivable  how  external  things  can  be  of  ufc  to  God, 
who  comprehends  in  himfelf  all  things  which  tend  to  perfeG:  Hap- 
pinefs.  He  muft  of  neceffity  therefore  be  indifferent  to  all  external 
Objedts,  nor  can  any  reafon  be  affign'd,  with  regard  to  the  things 
themfelves,  why  he  ihould  prefer  one  to  another.  'Tis  plain  that 
things  are  made  by  God  with  Goodnefs,  that  is,  with  a  certain  con- 
gruity  to  his  own  Nature  j  but  they  are  fo  far  from  being  made  on 
account  of  any  agreeablenefs  antecedent  to  the  Divine  Will,  that,  on 
the  contrary,  they  are  necefTarily  agreeable  and  pleafant  becaufe  they 
are  made  by  his  free  Choice.  For  fince  they  are  nothing  in  them- 
felves, they  muft  of  neceffity  have  both  their  Exiftence  and  their  a- 
greeablenefs  from  that  Will,  from  which  they  folely  proceed  j  and  it 
is  impoffible  but  that  they  fhould  be  conformable  to  the  Will  which 
effedted  them.  For  God,  by  willing,  makes  thofe  things  pleafing  to 
him  which  were  before  indifferent. 

V.  Unlefs  therefore  we  attribute  to  him  fuch  a  Power  as  has  been  if  |^g  j^,^  „^ 
defcribed  (namely,  an  ability  to  pleafe  himfelf,  by  determining  himfelf -i  power  of 
to  adtion,  without  any  other  regard  had  to  the  Quality  of  the  Objed,  f^ff  fn  eS 
than  that  it  is  poffible)  it  feems  impoffible  that  ever  he  {hould  begin  tion,he could 
to  effed  any  thing  without  himfelf.    For,  as  far  as  wc  can  apprehend  ^^^^^  ^^^*=' 
there  can  be   no  reafon  affign'd  why  he  fliould   create  any  thing  at  luinff.^"'^ 
all  *,  why  a  World,  why  at  that  particular  time  when  it  was  cr^-ated,. 
why  not  before  or  after,  why  in  this  and  no  other  Form :  he  receiv'd 
no  advantage  or  difadvantage  from  thefe,  no  benefit  or  harm^   in 
fhort,  nothing  that  could  move  him  to  choofe  one  before  another.. 
Except  therefore  we  attribute  to  God  an  adtive  power  of  determining 
himfelf  in  indifferent  Matters,  upon  every  particular  Occafion,  and  of 
pleafing  himfelf  in   that  Determination  according   to  his  Choice ;, 
he  would  do  nothing  at  all,  he  would  be  for  ever  indolent  in  re- 
gard to  all  external  things,  and  the  World  could  not  poffibly  have 
been  made,  fince  no  reafon  could  be  imagin'd,  why  a  God  abfolute» 

Bb  2  ly 

*  i.  c,  ;«  re/t/fM  drawn  frm  the  f articular  Nature  of  the  thiftg  created.    See  Note  74. 


1 88  -  Of  Moral  Evil. 

ly  pcrfed  in  himfelf,  and  abfolutely  happy,  fhould  create  any  thing 
without  him. 

VI.  Fourthly,  If  we  fuppofe  that  there  was  a  reafon,  and  that  God 
If  he  were  ^^g  n^oved  by  it  to  producc  external  things,  'tis  man ifeft,  that,  ac- 
the  Goodness  cordir.g  to  this,  all  things  will  proceed  from  him  necefTarily.  For  he 
of  things  tc  that  is  detcrmin'd  a^  extra  to  do  any  thing,  ads  by  neceliity,  he  is 
WorV  he  paffive,  and  muft  neceflarily  both  do  and  fuffer,  not  what  he  himfelf, 
wouid'bc  A  but  what  the  determining  Caufe  has  effeded  in  him  :  But  this  Good- 
neceflary  A  j^^^-g  ^^vhich  is  fuppofed  to  be  in  things  antecedent  to  the  Divine  E- 

ledtion,  and  to  determine  it)  is  fomething  External,  with  regard  to 
the  Will  of  God ;  if  therefore  that  be  the  Caufe  which  determines 
the  Ele£lion,  it  follows,  that  the  a£t  of  Eledion,  and  every  thing 
which  depends  upon  it  is  neceffary* 

VII.  But  if  things  be  good  and  agreeable  to  God  for  this  only  rea- 
arcgoodbJ^fon,  bccaufc  he  has  chofen  to  make  them  fo,  he  himfelf  will  be  at 
caufe  he  has  liberty,  his  whole  Work  will  be  free.     The  World  will  be  produced, 
mat^"them    ^^^  ^7  neceffity,  but  choice  J  neither  will  it  be  impofhble  to  be  effec- 
his  whole     ted,  tho'  it  be  in  itfelf  unprofitable  to  the  Deity,  for  he  will  have  a 
Work  will    complacency  in  his  own  Choice.     And  from  hence  it  fufficiently  ap- 
pears of  how  great   importance  it  is,  that  all  the  Goodnefs  of  the 
Creatures  fhould  depend  on  the  Divine  Election,  and  not  that  upon 
the  Goodnefs  of  them,  for  we  fee  that  by  this  means  Fate  is  dcftroy'd, 
and  Liberty  eflablifh'd. 

External  vill.  Fifthly,  If  he  expeded  no  advantage,  you'll  fay,  from  the 

thenffeWes     Objects  of  his  Choicc,  why  fhould  he  choofe  them  ?     Is  it  not  more 
abfolutely     probable  that  he  fhould  do  nothing  at  all,  than  bufy  himfelf  in  things 
t6  G^d  ^"but  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^  °^  ^^  benefit  ?     It  may  be  anfwcr'd.  That  it  is  no 
he  has  a'  con  -  more  trouble  to  him  to  will  things  than  not   to  will    them ;    and 
£?h^^  '"  hence  it  comes  to  pafs,  that  when  he  wills  them,  they  exifl  j  when  he 
retradis  that  Will,  they  drop  into  nothing.     Which  reafon,  as  it  fup- 
pofes  an  indifference  of  things  in  refped:  of  God,  fo  it  afferts  his  Li- 
berty to  produce  or  not  produce  them,  and  proves,  that  that  will  be 
agreeable  to  him  which  he  fhall  choofe.     But  we  have  a  better  yet 
at  hand,  viz.  that  God  chofe  to  create  external  things,  that  there 
might  be  fomething  for  him  to  delight  in  without  himfelf     For  e- 
very  one  receives  Satisfadion  from  the  Exercife  of  his  Powers  and 

Faculties. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  i8j 

Faculties.  (74.)  Now  God  is  invefted  with  infinite  Power,  which  he 
can  exercife  innumerable  ways,  not  all  at  once  indeed  (for  all  are  not 
confiftent  with  each  other)  but  fuch  as  are  confiftent  are  for  the  mod 
part  indifferent,  nor  is  there  any  reafon  why  he  fhould  prefer  one  be- 
fore another  -f-f-,  it  muft  therefore  be  his  own  Choice  which  makes  one 
more  agreeable  than  another;  nor  is  it  otherwife  conceivable  how  a 
thing  that  is  in  itfelf  indifferent  to  the  Eledtor,  fhould  prove  mere 
plcaflng  than  any  thing  elfe. 

IX.  Neither  ought  we  to  enquire  for  any  reafon  of  the  Eletfllon, 
/.  e.  why  he  choofes  this  rather  than  that;  for  upon  fuppoficion  that    ;ne  himrelf' 
there  is  a  reafon,  the  indifference  would  be  deflroy'd,  and  the  Elec-  fo  Aaion. 

tion 

NOTES. 


(74.)  This  reafon  is  very  confiftent  with 
what  our  Author  had  deliver'd  in  C  i.  ^.  3. 
par.  9,  10.  where  he  affer ted,  that  the  end  and 
intent  of  God  in  creating  the  World,  was  to 
exercife  his  fcvenU  Attributes,  or  (which  is  the 
fame  thing)  to  communicate  his  Perfedions  to 
fome  other  Beings :  which  Exercife  or  Com- 
munication could  proceed  from  no  other  Caufe 
befide  his  own  free  Choice  ;  and  therefore  he 
muft  be  abfolutely  and  phyfically  indifferent  to 
it,  in  the  fame  refpeft  as  Man  was  {hewn  to  be 
indifferent  towards  any  Adtion  *,  only  with 
this  difparity,  that  Man,  as  a  weak  imperfeft 
Agent,  may  eafily  be  imagined  to  will  Abfur- 
dities  or  Contradiftions,  but  God  can  never  be 
fuppofed  to  will  or  a£t  either  inconfiftently 
with  his  Nature  and  Perfedlions,  or  with  any 
former  Volition  (as  our  Author  obferves  in  the 
1 2th  and  following  Paragraphs)  and  confe- 
quently  cannot  be  faid  to  be  indifferent  to  fuch 
diPngs  (as  fome  have  mifunderftood  our  Au- 
^or)  any  more  than  he  is  indifferent  towards 
being  what  he  is  f.  Leibnitz  urges  farther  ||, 
that  it  could  not  be  in  any  fenfe  indifferent  to 
God  whether  he  created  external  things  or 
not,  fince  h\sGoodnefs  was  the  Caufe  (according 
to  our  Author  himfelf  in  the  place  above  cited) 
which  detcrmin'd  him  to  the  Creation.     But 


whit  do  we  mean  by  his  Goodnefs  here?  Is  it 
any  thing  more  than  an  intent  to  exercife  his 
Attributes,  or  an  Inclination  to  communicate 
his  Happinefs  or  Petfeftion  ?  And  is  not  this 
the  very  Determination  or  Eleftion  we  are 
fpeakingof  ?  To  fay  then  that  God  is  deter- 
mined by  his  Goodnefs,  is  faying,  that  he  de- 
termines himfelf;  that  he  does  a  thing  becaufe 
he  is  inclined  to  do  it  ;  'tis  affigning  his  bare 
Will  and  Inclination  for  a  Caufe  of  his  Adion; 
which  is  all  that  we  contend  for.  Whereas 
they  that  would  oppofe  us  fhould  affign  a  Caufe 
for  that  Will  or  Inclination  itfelf,  and  (hew  a 
aaturr?/  neceSity  for  the  operation  of  the  Divine 
Attributes  (for  a  mora/  one  is  nothing  to  the 
prefent  Quellion)  a  flrift  phyfical  connexion 
between  me  Exigence  of  certain  Pcrfcftions  ia 
the  Deity,  and  their  determinate  Exercife.  If 
therefore  God  had  no  other  reafon  for  the 
creation  of  any  thing  but  his  own  Goodnefs, 
he  was  perfeftly  free  and  naturally  indifferent^ 
to  create  or  not  create  that  thing;  and  if  he 
wiird,  or  was  inclined  to  exert  his  Perfeftions 
thus  freely,  he  mull  be  as  free  and  indifferent 
ftill  in  theaftual  Exercife  of  them.  As  to  the 
particular  manner  of  his  exerting  them,  fee  the 
following  Note. 


ff  Infiances  of  this  Indifference  may  be  feen  in  our  Author's  Note  F,  and  the  ^th  precedent  P<»» 
ra^raph. 
•  5*r  Note  65,  and  70.  f  f«  Note  75.  i|  Remuritta,  F»  473- 


ijo  Of  Moral  Evil. 

)      tion  would  not  be  free.     For  if  we  fuppofe  that  there  is  fuch  a  thing 
as  better  and  worfe  in  the  Objedls  themfeives,  who  \v0uld  affirm  that 
the  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom  of  God  will  not  necelTarily  determine  him 
to  choofe  the  better?     For  who  can  honeftly  poftpone  the  better,  and 
prefer  the  worfe  ?     As  then  in  indifferent  Matters  there  can  be  no  rea- 
ibn  why  one  is  chofen  before  another,  fo  there  is  no  need  of  any :  for 
fince  the  Divine  Will  is  felf-adive,  and  mufl  neceffarily  be  determin'd 
to  one  of  the  indifferent  things,  it  is  its  own  reafon  of  A£lion,  and 
determines  itfelf  freely.  Nay  fo  great  is  the  Power  of  God,  thaf  what- 
ever he  fh.all  choofe  out  of  infinite  PofTibilities,  that  will  be  the  befl, 
it  matters  not  therefore  which  he  prefers. 
The  difficu'-     X.  Sixthly,  But  you  urge  that  you  are  flill  unfatisfy'd  how  a  Power 
ty  of  conce\  c2Ln  determhie  itfilf-,  i.e.  you  are  ignorant  oi  xho:  Modus -y  but  a  thing 
ving  how  a   j^y^  j^qj.  [^g  dcny'd  becaufe  we  do  not  know  the  manner  how  it  is 

power  can  ^.      ,.  ii-nri 

determine  it  done,  wc  are  entirely  ignorant  how  the  Rays  of  the  Sun  produce  the 

leiMo  aftion  jjg^  q£  Ljgj^^  in  the  Mind  by  moving   the  optic  Nerves  j    nor  is  it 

hmder"our    better  undcrftood  how  the  Members  of  the  Body  can  be  moved  by 

aflcnt  to  the  ^  Thought  of  the  Mind,  and  at  the  Direction  of  the  Will.     Yet  no 

propofition!  body  denys  thefc  things,  becaufe  he  knows  not  the  manner  in  which 

they  are  perform'd.     If  therefore  it  be  manifefl  that  the  Divine  Will 

does  determine  itfelf,  we  fhall  not  trouble  ourfelves  much  in  enquiring 

how  it  can  be. 

'Tisasdiffi-      XI.  But  to  confefs  the  truth,  'tis  no  lefs  difficult  to  conceive  a 

ceivehow"a  thing  to  be  movcd  or  determined  by  another  than  by  itfelf;   but  as 

thing  can  be  we  are  accuftom'd  to  material  Agents  "*,  all  which  are  paffive  in  their 

nother  ^as  by  Operations,  we  are  certain  of  the  Facfl,  and  not  at  all  folicitous  about 

itfelf,  we  aicthe  manner  of  it:  whereas,  if  we  confider  the  thing  thoroughly,  we 

P'"^!"'?'"'^    fhall  find  ourfelves  as  far  from  apprehending  how  Motion  is  commu- 

cuftomedto  nicated  from  one  Body  to  another,  as  how  the  Will  can  move  itfelf: 

material,  /.  e.  but  there  feems  to  be  nothing  wonderful  in  the  one,  becaufe  it  is  ob- 

Eents.*^         ferv'd  to  happen  at  all  times,  and  in  every  Adtion,  whereas  the  other 

is  look'd  upon  as  incredible,  fince  it  is  feldom  perform'd,  viz.  by 

the  Will  alone.     And  tho'  both  Reafon  and  Experience  prove  that  it 

is  done,  yet  we  fufped:  ourfelves  to  be    impofed  upop,  becaufe  we 

know  not  the  manner  of  it.    The  ground  of  the  miflake  is  this,  that 

fince 

*■  SeeN  tc  62  and  6  • 


Of  Moral  Evil  191 

fince  the  Will  is  the  only  adlivc  Power  which  We  are  acquainted 
with,  the  reft  being  all  paflive,  we  are  not  eafily  induced  to  believe 
it  to  be  really  fuch,  but  form  our  Judgment  of  it  from  a  Compari  - 
fon  with  other  Agents,  which  fince  they  don't  move  but  as  they  are 
moved,  we  require  a  Mover  alfo  in  the  Will  of  God :  which  is  very 
abfurd,  fince  it  is  evident,  that  if  there  were  no  aSti've  Power  in  Na^ 
ture,  there  could  not  be  a  paffive  one ;  and  if  nothing  could  move 
without  a  Mover,  there  would  have  been  no  Motion  or  Adion  at 
all  -f-.  For  we  cannot  conceive  how  it  fhould  begin.  Now  it  is 
much  harder  to  conceive  how  Motion  can  be  without  a  Beginning, 
than  how  an  Agent  can  move  itfelf.  Since  then  here  are  Difficulties 
on  both  Sides,  neither  ought  to  be  deny'd,  becaufe  the  manner  of  it 
is  above  human  Underftanding. 

XII.  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  what  we  have  faid  concerning;  thisY'^^!!^  Jl*^ 

T      y-rr-  r       \   •  •  1  ■!->•     •  ttt-ii  t  about  indlt- 

Indifierence  of  things  m   regard   to  the  Divine  Will,    takes   place  rerence,  with- 
chiefly  in  thofe  EleSions  which  we  apprehend  to  be  the  Pr/Wry/^^Pf^/"  ^^.^ 

»  1  •         ^        r  \  r  r-r  r         r>^     ^  ."ii  Will  of  God^ 

but  not  always  in  the  lublequent  ones,     ror  fuppoling  God  to  will  takes  place  ia> 
any  thing  while  that  Election  continues,  he  cannot  rejedt  either  the  his  primary 
fame,  or  any  thing  neceftarily  conneded  with  it,  for  that  would  be  to  ^^<^'-'^'°'^^- 
contradidl  himfelf.     In  order  to  apprehend  my  Meaning  the  better, 
we  muft  remember  that  the  Divine  Power  can  effedl  innumerable 
things  equal  in  Nature  and  Perfections.     For  inftance,  we  may  con- 
ceive numberlefs  Men  equal  to  one  another  in  all  refpe<Ss :  and  al- 
fo numberlefs  Species  of  rational  Beings  equiUy  perfed:,  nothing  but 
the  Will  of  God  could  determine  which  of  thefe  he  fhould  create 
firft.     But  when  it  was  determin'd  to  create  Man  fuch  as  he  now 
is,  /.  e.  with  the  Faculties,  Appetites,  and   integral  Parts  which  he 
confifts   of  at    prefent,   it   is   impoffible   that  GoJ    (hould   will   or 
choofe  any  thing  repugnant  to  human  Nature,  while  that  Election 
continues. 

XIII.  For  when  we  conceive  any  thing  propofed  to  the  Know-  |j,°g  J^f^ 
ledge  of  God  as  fit  to  be  done,  he  muft  alfo  neceflarily  have  under  things  at once. 
his  Eye,  as  it  were  at  the  fame  Glance,  all  thofe  thin'j-s  that  arene-'^'?'!^'^^'' 

y    '  ^  '  o  which  are 

cefTarily  conncdtj^d  with  it,  or  confequent  thereupon  to  all  Eternity  j  con neded 
_  and^y'/hthe 

thing  cholen, 
and  cither  will  or  refufe  them  by  one  fimple  i\i\, 

*  Sfe  Dr  Clarke';  Dm-.njlrat.  of  the  Atlrilutei,  p.  82,  87,  i^c.  or  S.  FuncourtV  EJJ^iy  concer, 
ning  Liber'.-j,  i^(.  p.  ^o,  29,  ^nd  Note  62. 


}^2  Of  Moral  Evil. 

and  muft  will  or  rejed  them  all  by  one  fimple  A61.     If  therefore  he 
determin'd  to  create  Man,   he  muft  alfo  be  fuppofed  to  will  that  he 
(hould  confift  of  a  Soul  and  Body,  that  he  fhould  be  furnifh'd  with 
Reafon  and  Senfes,  and  that  his  Body  fhould  be  fubjed:  to  the  general 
Laws  of  Matter:  for  all  thefe  things  are  evidently  included  in  the 
Choice  to  create  Man. 
As  he  is  of       XIV.  Nay  this  primary  A6t  of  Volition  muft  be  fuppofed  to  con- 
infinite        tain  not  only  thofe  things  which  have  a  neceffary  connexion  with 
Goodnefs      ^j^^    -g  chofgn    but  fuch  things  alfo  as  tend  to  promote  its  benefit 

he  alio  wills  .       -     '         ^  «         '^  ,  rn  •   i       i       i 

ti>«  good  of  and  happinefs,  as  far  as  they  can  be  made  confiltent  with  the  benefit 

='^'  '^'"S'    of  the  whole.    For  fince  God  is  infinitely  Good,  'tis  certain  that  he 

determin'd    wills  that  his  Crcaturcs  ftiould  exift  commodioufly  as  much  as  that 

to  create,      they  ftiould  cxift  at  all.     He  therefore    will'd   fuch    things    as    are 

^^ar.aspo-  gg^gg^lg  j-q  j-j^g  Natutcs,  and  tend  to  preferve  the  Conftitutions  of 

his  Creatures    in    the    fame    Elecflion   whereby  he    determin'd    to 

create  them. 

•When  the         XV.  We  have  faid  before,    that   there  is  a  double  Goodnefs   in 

fore^is  once^  things,   the   fitft  and  principal   is   that  which   renders    them   well-  . 

made,  it  is    pleafing  to  God,  as  they  are  conformable  to  his.  Will :    the  other  is 

tiuuho^fe      that  whereby  they  agree  with  one  another,  whereby  they  afford  each 

things  fhould  other  mutual  Affiftance,    whereby   they  promote    the  Convenience, 

,pleafe  him    Prefetvation  and  Perfedion  of  the  whole :   but  both   thefe  proceed 

to  the  confu-  from  the  Choice  and  Will  of  God.     For  when  the  Deity  had  once 

fion,  ^c.  of  determin'd  to  pleafe  himfelf  in  the  Creation  and  Prefervation  of  the 

World,  he  muft  be  fuppofed  at  the    fame  time  to   have  willed  all 

fuch  things  as  contribute  to  the  Benefit  and  Perfection  of  his  Work, 

Otherwife  he  would  contradid:  himfelf,   and  thereby  be  the  Caufe  of 

fruftrating  his  own  Eledlion.     For  he  is  now  fuppofed  to  have  cho- 

ien  that  there  fhould  be  a  World,  that  it  fhould  continue  as  long 

as  he   himfelf  had  determin'd,    that  every  Being  fhould   attain  the 

End  affign'd  to  it,  and  aJl  things  a^t   according  to  the  Nature  he 

had  given  them,  and  confpire  together  to  preferve  and  perfed  the 

whole.     It  is  impoffihle  therefore   that    he    fhould  will  the  reverfe 

of  all  this,  or  that  fuch  things  fhould   pleafe   him  as  tend    to  the 

.confufion,  mutilation,  or  detriment  of  his  Work.    For  'tis  impof- 

fible 


Of  Moral  Evil 

fible  to  conceive  that  he  ihovild  choofe  the  Exiilence  of  things,  and 
yet  refufe  the  means  neceflkry  thereto,  [j^) 

XVI.  When 

N  0  r  E  S. 


19? 


(75).  This  is  a  fufficicnt  Anfwer  to  Leibnitz. 
who  objeft?,  that  it  will  follow  upon  our  Au 
thor's  Principles  that  there  is  fuch  an  abfolute 
Indifference  in  the  Deity  as  muft  make  him  re- 
gardlels  whether  the  World  were  well  or  ill 
made  ;  Mankind  Happy  or  Miferable,  i^c. 
Whereas  our  Author  having  made  it  appear  that 
the  Exercile  of  his  Attributes,  or  Communi- 
cation of  his  own  Perfeftions,  is  the  fole  End 
of  his  Aftion  *,  it  follows  that  whenever  he 
does  afl,  he  mult  aft  agreeably  to  that  End;  if 
he  exercife  thefe  Attributes  at  all,  the  Effeds 
of  them  muft  be  conformable  to  the  Caufe. 
His  abfolute  Power  can  cffeft  nothing  which 
implies  a  mere  defeft  of  Power,  his  Infinite 
Goodnefs  can  produce  nothing  but  Good  or 
Happinefs  in  general,  and  his  perfeft  Wifdom 
mull  choofe  fit  and  proper  means  thereto.  All 
this  is  included  (as  our  Author  fays)  in  the  very 
firft  Aft  of  tlie  Deity,  or  rather  in  his  Will  to 
aft  at  all,  and  to  fuppofe  him  to  will  at  firft, 
or  to  aft  afterwards  in  any  refpeft  contrary  to 
this,  is  fuppofmg  him  to  will  and  aft  againft 
his  own  Nature,  and  in  contradiftion  to  him- 
felf;  or,  which  is  the  fame,  imagining  an  Ef- 
left  to  be  quite  different  from,  or  contrary  to 
Its  Caufe.  The  Moral  Pcrfcftions  of  the  Deity 
are  therefore  immediate  confequences,  or  rather 
the  genuin  Exercife  of  his  natural  ones,  and 
confequently  can  never  produce  any  thing  in 
the  main  repugnant  to  them.  And  thus,  I 
think,  it  may  be  (hewn  how  all  the  Aftions  of 
the  Deity  mull  certainly  be  Good,  Juft,  isfc. 
without  recurring  to  any  fuch  Fitn^ffei  or  ReU- 
tioBs  of  things  as  axe  by  fome  unaccountably 
fuppofcd  to  DC  antctedent  and  abfoUtely  necef- 
fary  to  the  determinatioii  of  the  Will  of  God 
himfelf 

But  don't  wc,  when  we  fpeak  of  God's  Wif- 
cjiii  choofing  fit  and  proper  means,  evidently 
fuppofe,  that  fome  things  are  in  themfelves 
g(jod  and  eligible,  and  via  verfa  even  before 


any  determination  of  the  Deity  about  them  ? 
Where  is  the  room  for  Wifdom  and  Preference 
in  God,  if  all  things  be  alike  and  indifferent 
to  him  ?  I  anfvvcr,  firft,  If  by  things  being  ia 
themfelves  Evil,^<-.  be  only  meant,  that  fome 
particular  ways  of  afting  may  be  conceiv'd, 
which  would,  if  the  Deity  could  be  fuppofed 
to  will  them,  be  ncceflarily  and  effentially 
oppofite,  and  have  a  tendency  direftly  contra- 
ry to  his  prefent  method  of  afting :  we  grant 
that  fome  fuch  things  may  be  imagin'd,  but 
then  it  will  be  an  abfurd  and  impoffible  fup- 
pofition,  that  God  Ihould  ever  will  them,  as 
he  has  already  will'd  the  contrary;  and  there- 
fore, in  regard  to  him,  they  muft  ftill  be  only 
imaginary.  Nay  they  would  be  fo  far  from 
beisg  independent  of,  or  antecedent  to  the 
Will  of  God  in  any  fenfe,  that  the  very  Ef- 
fence  and  Idea  of  thera  would  proceed  entirely 
from,  and  prcfuppofe  its  Determination  ;  fince 
we  can  only  conceive  any  Relations  or  Confe- 
quences of  things  to  be  Good  or  Evil,  fo  far 
as  they  are  confiftent  with,  or  contrary  to  the 
prefent  Syftem  pre  eftablilh'd  by  the  Will  of 
God.  I  anfwer  in  the  fecond  place,  that  the 
primary  Intent  of  the  Creator  being,  as  was 
fhewn  above,  to  communicate  his  Perfeftions 
to  various  Creatures  (to  which  coramunicatioa 
he  was  neverthelefs  abfolutdy  free  and  indiffe- 
rent, and  therefore  could  be  determin'd  to  it 
by  no  external  Caufe)  while  that  Intent  conti- 
nues, the  necellary  confequenc*  of  it  is,  that 
Creatures  be  fo  made  and  conftituted  as  to  at- 
tain that  End,  and  endow'd  with  fuch  Powers 
as  will  make  them  refemble  him  as  mucii  at 
pofliblc  in  their  feveral  States  and  Orders.  All 
this  is  only  profecuting  the  fame  Volition,  or 
continuing  to  convmunicate  himfelf  \  and  what 
we  mean  by  choofing  fit  and  proper  means  for 
this,  is  only,  that  he  is  not  a  blind  and  unin- 
telligent Agent,  but  confcious  of  his  own  Na- 
ture »nd  Operations,  aad  therefore  able  to  aft 


i» 


*  See  the  hfl  Note; 


C  c 


19+ 


When  Man 
is  made  of 
fuch  a  nature 
as  requires 
him  to  be 
juft.fober.diff 
God  is  not 
at  Liberty 
not  to  will 
thcfc  things. 


This  is  no 
^ar  to  the 
Divine  Li- 
berty. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

XVI.  When  therefore  Man  was  made  what  he  is,  by  that  very  A<51 
of  conlHtuting  him  of  fuch  a  Nature  and  Condition,  'tis  plain,  God 
alfo  willed  that  he  ihould  be  pious,  fober,  juft  and  chaft.  Thefe 
and  the  like  Laws  of  Nature  then  are  immutable,  viz.  conformable 
to  the  Will  of  God,  and  contain'd  in  the  very  firft:  Ad  of  Eledion, 
wherein  he  determin'd  to  create  Man.  Nor  is  God  at  liberty  not  to 
will  thefe  during  his  purpofe  to  continue  Man  fucli  as  he  is:  For 
by  this  means  the  fame  thing  would  pleafe  him,  as  being  agreeable 
to  his  firft  Choice  of  creating  Man,  wnich  is  fuppofed  to  ftand  yet, 
and  difpleafe  him,  as  being  repugnant  to  another,  which  rcjed:s  the 
very  fame  things  that  are  contain'd  in  the  firfl: ;  that  is,  he  would 
at  the  fame  time  will  and  not  will  the  fame  thing,  which  cannot 
be  attributed  to  God. 

XVII.  Yet  he  is  never  the  lefs  free,  becaufe  he  cannot  will  that  a 
Man  be  perjured,  a  Murtherer,  C^c.  for  he  is  no  otherwife  determin'd 
than  by  his  ovm  Choice ;  nor  does  a  thing  pleafe  or  difpleafe  him  on 
any  other  accqunt  than  becaufe  it  is  agreeable  or  contrary  to  his 
Will.  For  while  that  Eledion  of  the  Deity  which  conflitutes  me  a 
Man  (/.  e,  an  Animal  that  is  oblig'd  to  be  pious,  juft  and  fober)  re- 
mains. 


NOTES. 


in  a  certain  determinate  manner.  Now  fuch  de- 
tciininate  Aftion  muft  produce  a  regular  Sy- 
ftem,  the  fevcral  Parts  whereof  will  be  related 
to,  and  connefted  with,  each  other,  and  by  a 
mutual  dependency  rendered  fubfervient  to  the 
Good  and  Perfcflion  of  the  whole.  Tho'  this 
whole  Syftem  might  at  firft  perhaps  be  indif- 
ferent to  the  Agent  in  regard  to  feveral  other 
Syftems  equally  poffible,  and  which  might  have 
been  made  equally  perfeft  in  its  ftead.  It  is  rot 
thenasZ,f.'^w/2arguesf,the  natural  and  neceffary 
Goodnefs  of  fome  particular  things  reprefented 
by  the  Divine  Ideas  which  determines  God  to 
prefer  them  to  all  others,  if  underftood  of  his 
Jirjf  Aft  of  producing  them  ;  but  'tis  his  own 
free,  arbitrary  Choice  which,  among  many  e 
qt»al  polfibilities,  malces  fome  things  a^ually 
*feod,  and  determines  them  into  Exiftence. 
When  thefe  are  once  fuppofed  to  exift,  every 


thing  or  aftion  becomes  good  which  tends  to 
their  Happinefs  and  Prefervation.  Hence  alfo 
in  refpedt  to  us  certain  confequences  and  rela- 
tions arife,  which,  by  the  very  frame  of  our 
Nature  and  Conilitution,  or  by  certain  In- 
iHnds,  Affedions,  iffr.  we  are  direfted  to  ap- 
prove, and  obliged  to  purfue,  if  we  expeft  to 
be  happy.  Thus  all  moral  Obligation  is  ulti- 
mately referr'd  to  the  WillofGod^  which  feems 
to  be  the  only  fure  and  adequate  foundation  of 
it,  and  from  which  1  think  it  may  be  deduced 
with  much  more  cleamefs  and  confiftency  than 
from  that  Hypothetical  NeceJJity  of  the  relatioms  of 
things,  which  evidently  prefuppofes,  as  was 
obferv^d  before,  and  is  itfelf  only  founded  on 
the  Will  of  God.  See  the  Preliminary  Dijfer- 
tation,  and  Xi.  and  Note  76.  or  Puffendorf  of 
the  Law  of  Nature  and  Natiom,  B.  I.  C  i.  §.^ 
Note  7.  andB.  2.  C.  3.  V20. 


f  ]^ marques,  p.  447.. 


^   Of  Moral  Evil 

mains,  'tis  impoffible  that  He  fhould  will  me  to  be  perjur'd,  or  a  Mur- 
therer ;  nor  can  the  latter  Choice  take  place  in  God  fo  long  as  the 
former  ftands,  fince  it  is  repugnant  to  the  former.  When  therefore 
we  acknowledge  that  things  are  good,  and  affert  that  fome  AdHons 
are  grateful  to  Gcd,  and  others  odious  -,  this  is  not  becaufe  we  believe 
the  Divine  Elections  to  be  determin'd  by  them,  but  becaufe  we  fup- 
pofe  them  to  be  comprehended  in  the  very  firft  A6t  of  his  Will  of 
creating  things,  and  to  be  pleafmg  or  difpleafing  to  him,  fo  far  as 
they  are  agreeable  or  oppofite  to  that  Eletftion.  Nor  does  thij  deftroy 
the  Liberty  of  Good,  that  he  muft  neceffarily  will  thefe  while  he  does 
will  them:  For  every  thing,  while  it  is,  neceffarily  isj  but  this Ne- 
cefiity  is  confequent  iipon,  and  not  antecedent  to  the  Divine  Will. 
The  Divine  Eledion  therefore  is  not  determin'd  by  the  Goodnefs  of 
things,  but  the  Goodnefs  and  Fimefs  of  them  arifes  from  that  Elec- 
tion, and  that  is  beft  for  them  which  is  moft  agreeable  to  that 
Choice  of  the  Deity,  whereby  he  will'd  them  to  be  what  they  are. 
From  hence,  I  think,  it  appears  fufficiently,  that  God  is  fuch  an 
Agent  as  delights  in  things  merely  becaufe  they  are  chofen.  (76.) 

C  o  2  XVm.  Ye< 


i95 


NOTES. 


(76)  To  what  has  been  faid  on  this  fubjefl 
in  the  precedent  Notes,  I  fliall  only  add  here, 
^.  thar  their  Argument  fcenis  to  be  of  very  little 
Vj  force  againft  our  Author,  who  urge,  that  if  all 
■>Good  and  Evil  depended  upon  the  Arbitrr.ry 
^^//  of  God,  then  it  would  not  be  impofllble 
for  God  to  will  that  Vice  be  Virtue,  that  two 
and  two  make  five,  i^c.  For  allowing  that 
God  at  firft  made  all  thiugs  what  they  are,  and 
ilill  continues  to  them  the  fame  Exigence, 
(tho'  perhaps  no  reafon  a  priori  can  be  aflign'd 
why  he  made  them  in  this  rather  than  fome  o- 
ther  manner)  Vice  rauft  be  Vice,  fjc.  that  is, 
while  things  are  as  they  are,  the  fame  Confc,- 
quences  and  Relations  will  refult  from  them  ; 
and  to  fuppofe  the  contrary,  is  to  fuppofc  that 
things  may  be  diflerent,  or  have  different  con- 
fequencej,  while  they  continue  the  fame;  or 
that  they  may  be  what  they  are  and  what  they 
are  not  at  the  fame  time.  Thus  all  the  pre- 
fent  Relatigm  are  evidently  fubfequcnt  to  the 


Iprcfent  Order  of  Nature,  arvd   muft  continue 
with  it;  and  this  confequential  Neccffity  is  all 
I  the  Fitnefs  that  I  know  of  • 

To  ftilc  this  Eternal  and  Immutable  can  there- 
fore only  mean  thus  much,  viz..  fuppofe  things 
ro  be  at  any  time  what  they  now  arc,  and  at 
the  fame  time  the  very  fame  confequences  would 
flow   from   them   which  we   now  find.     Sup- 
pofe  a  Set  of  Beings  conflituted  like  ourfelves, 
and  framed  with  the  like  Capacities  for  Happi- 
nefs,  and  the  fame  relative  Duties  muft  be  in- 
cumbent on  them  in  order  to  attain  that  Hap- 
pinefs.     If  they  be   imperfeft  dependent  Crea- 
tures, and  perpetually  flanding  in  need  of  each 
others  affiftance  ;    if  alfo  they  have  fuch  Paf- 
fions,  Inftindls  and  Inclinations  .is  tend  to  u- 
nitc  them  to  each  other,  and  oblige  them  to 
aft  in  concert:   if  they  be  thus  framed,  I  fay, 
they  will  of  confequcnce  be  thus  related,  and 
fubjeft  t©  all  the  moral  Obligations  which  wc 
now  are.     But  lUll  this  ncceifijj^  is  only  Hy- 
pothetical, 


j^6  Of  Moral  Evil. 

A  Bdng  en-  X VIIL  Yet  it  IS  to  bc  remark'd,  that  this  felf-determining  Power 
oJi7povvcH5  is  not  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  imply  infinite  Perfect  ion  ;  for  it  may 
morcpcrfea  be  confiftent  with  an  imperfeL^  Underftanding,  and  other  Appetites, 
than  one  that  ^^  ^^  j^^^^  fhewn  bcfore  :  There  is  no  reafon  therefore  for  us  to 
yet  this  does  doubt  whether  a  Creature  may  partake  of  it  3  if  God  were  pleafed 
not  imply  in- jQ  communicatc  it,  there  fecms  to  be  no  contradici  ion  in  the  thing 
tion^herc-  for  ^  Creature  to  be  capable  of  it.  Now  that  Being  which  has  this 
gift  beflow'd  upon  it,  will  manifeflly  be  more  noble  than  the  reft,  and 
a  more  perfedl  refemblance  of  the  Deity:  fince  therefore  God  has 
created  the  lefs  perfed:  Beings,  we  may,  without  any  abfurdity,  be- 
lieve that  he  has  not  omitted  the  more  perfect.  Let  us  fee  then 
whether  there  be  any  Tokens  of  this  Power  among  the  Divine 
Works  * 

SUBSECT 

NOTE  S. 


fore  it  is 
communi- 
cable. 


pothetical,  and  like  the  neceffity  of  any  cer- 
tain Confcqucnce  refulting  from  certain  Pre- 
ftufes;  which  Prcmifcs  being  alter'd,  a  dif- 
ferent, a  quite  contrary  one  will  be  equally 
neceffary.  Thus  in  th^  former  Inftancc,  if  a- 
jiy  rational  Creatures  be  conftituted  focial  Be- 
ings, they  wi41  indeed  be  obliged  to  aft  as 
fuch ;  but  let  fome  be  made  independent  of 
each  other,  and  unfociable,  endowed  with,  or 
lb  made  as  neceflarily  to  enquire  Paffions,  In- 
flinfts  and  Inclinations,  quite  oppofite  to  the 
former,  and  their  Duties  will  be  quite  the  re- 
vttk.  The  great  Virtue  o{  Selfijbmfs  will  then 
occupy  the  place  of  Univerfal  Benevolence,  and 
that  Method  of  Life  perhaps  produce  the  grea- 
teft  Sum  of  Hnppinefs  to  each  individual,  and 
confequently  be  the  moft  eligible  to  every  one, 
which  hjs  now  the  direft  contrary  Effcft.  If 
iuch  a  fuppotition  be  conceivable,  'tis  fufficient 
to  fhew  that  thefe  Relations  arc  not  abjblutely 
neceffarj  in  themfehes,  but  only  conditionally 
ifnd  confequent'ally  to  the  prcfcnt  Order  of 
the  Creation.  Stt  Puffendorf,  Ri,  Q.  2.  ^6. 
ind  tlie  Note  2.  p.  20. 


If  thofe  Authors  who  treat  of  the  neceffary 
Relations  of  things  independent  of  the  Will  of 
God,  mean  only,  that  it  was  always  impoffible 
for  God  to  prevent  or  alter  them  whenever 
the  things  themfelves  were  fuppofcd  to  exift  ; 
this  is  a  neceffity  which  may  very  fafely  be 
granted,  but  will  ferve  little  to  their  purpofe; 
'tis  a  neceffity  which  is  applicable  (as  our  Au- 
thor obferv'd  above)  with'  equal  propriety  to 
any  thing.  'Tis  jult  as  much  as  to  affirm  that 
while  a  thing  is,,  it  neceflarily  is ;  while  the 
whole  is  the  fame,  the  parts  muft  be  fo  too. 
If  the  Ohjeftion  gr.es  yet  farther,  and  it  be 
urg'd,  that  according  to  us  it  will  not  be 
impoffible  for  God  to  change  his  primary  Will 
of  creating  thefe  things,  and  fo  to  alter  the 
whole  Syilem  together.  I  anfwer,  'tis  fcarce 
worth  difputing  whether  fuch  a  Chimerical 
Suppofition  be  poffible  or  not,  fince  however 
things  might  have  been  at  firft,  yet  as  they  are 
now  conftituted,  it  does  not  at  all  fhake  the 
foundation  of  Morality,  nor  affsft  our  prefent 
Duties  to  God,  ourielves,  0/  one  another: 
Thefe  muft  all    necelTarJly  be  what  they  now 


arc. 


^  far  the  poflibiKty  cf  futh  a  Fower,  and  tf  its-  being  communicated,  fee  Dr.  Clarke'j  De- 
nwfiratisn  if  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  Coti,  p.  82  and  85.  7th  Edit-  Fer  the  Perfiedlion  0/ 
it,  fee  ^tt  82.  and  S*  z.-^-tbii.  Chapter ^ 


0/  Moral  Evil 


137 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     V. 

That  Man   ^'ar takes  of  this  Principle    of  ^leafing  himfclf 

by  EleSlion. 


I.  T  T  appears,  I  think,  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  there  is  fuch  some  reafon* 
1  a  Principle  as  this  in  Nature,  and  that  it  is  alfo  communica-  ^^e  offtr'd  to 
ble.  We  are  now  to  enquire  whether  Nature  has  conferr'd  it  upon 
us :  If  we  confult  our  own  Minds,  we  may  poffibly  entertain  a  doubt 
whether  we  are  always  pafiive  in  our  voluntary  Adls :  namely,  whe- 
ther the  Goodncfs  of  Objetls  determines  our  Elections,  according  td 
the  Degrees  of  it,  which  are,  or  are  believed  to  be  in  them ;  or,  to 
Ipeak  more  plainly,  whether  we  always  choofe  things  becaufe  they, 
pleaie  us,  or  feem  convenient;  or  whether  they  fometimes  appear 
indifferent  in  themfelves,  or  inconvenient  before  the  Choice,  and  ac- 
quire their  Goodne/s  from  it,  and  are  for  this  reafon  only  agreeable 
becaufe  they  are  chofen.  We  have  feen  that  there  is  in  Nature  fuch 
a  Power  as  this,  which  can  produce  a  Convenience  or  Goodnefs  in 
things  by  willing  them ;  but,  whether  we  partake  of  it  or  no  is  the 
doubt.  Now,  that  we  dp  partake  of  it  may  I  think  be  evinced  from, 
the  following  Reafons.  Firft,  If  we  be  confcious  of  an  inherent  Li- 
berty. 

N  o  r  E  s. 


are,  while  this^Univerfal  Syftem  continues  as 
it  is  }  which  is  fufficient  for  our  Purpofe.  Nay, 
J  think,  we  may  go  a  ftep  farther,  and  affert, 
that  the  foremention'd  fuppofition  is  impof- 
fible.  For  God,  fuppofing  him  to  be  good  and 
wife,  by  once  choofing  this  Syftem  (whether 
the  firft  Choice  were  ncceflary  or  indifferent'' 
has  demonllrated  to  us,  that  it  was  at  leaft  e- 
gualJy  perfcd  with  any  other  which  might  pof 
fibly  have  cxifted  ;  otherwife  that  other  would 
hive  been  adually  preferr'd  to  it :  at  therefore 
liicrc  caa  b:   no  better  Syftem  placed  iu  the 


room  of  the  prefent  «ne,  there  can  be  no  resir 

fon  in  Nature  for  this  Change,  and  therefore 
there  will  be  none,  tho'  fuch  a  Phyfical  Power 
of  changing  it  were  allow'd  to  be  inherent  in 
the  Deity  :  Nor  need  we  be  fo  much  afraid 
to  allow  that  Being  to  be  in  the  ftriftell  fcnfe 
Arbitrary,  which  we  have  before  proved  to  be 
abfohtelj  perfect. 

Upon  this  Subjeft  fee  Puffendorfoi  the  Lavr 
of  hfature,  £iff.  B.  2.  C.  i-  V3-  and  C.  3^ 
^.  4,  5.  with  the  Notes. 


198 


Firft,  Expe 
riencc. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

berty.  Secondly,  If  we  experience  in  ourfelves  thole  Signs  and  Pro- 
perties which  have  been  declared  to  attend  this  Principle.  Thirdly, 
If  the  Caufes  which  are  fuppofed  to  determine  the  Will  be  evi- 
dently infufficient,  or  arife  from  Election,  inftead  of  producing  it. 

II.  As  to  the  firft  j  We  experience  in  ovirfelves  a  Principle  of  this 
kind,  /.  e.  a  free  one,  to  fuch  a  degree  of  certainty,  that  if  our  Minds 
be  confulted  we  can  hardly  doubt >of  it ;  gnd  from  hence  it  is,  that  all 
Men  of  all  Nations,  while  they  follow'd  the  Guidance  of  Nature,  and 
attended  to  the  Perceptions  of  their  own  Minds,  have  conftantly  af- 
ferted  their  Liberty,  at  leaft  in  fome  particular  Ad:ions:  nor  has  any 
one,  unlefs  he  were  forc'd  to  it,  and  as  it  were  circumvented  by  Phi- 
lofophical  Subtilties,  ever  deny'd,  either  that  he  was  free,  or  that  he 
could  pleafe  himfelf  in  choofing  one  or  other  out  of  many  Objects 
prefented  to  him,  tho'  that  which  was  preferr'd  were  no  ways  prefe- 
rable to  others  in  refped:  of  any  intrinfic  worth. 
The  vulgar  HI.  In  this  therefore,  as  in  many  other  Cafes,  the  Vulgar  feem  to 
bI«rr^of  ^^  be  much  wifer,  and  to  reafon  more  juftly  than  Philofophers.  For  the 
matters  of  Vulgar  generally  follow  the  natural  Senfe  of  the  Mind ;  and,  tho' 
Pk^  f^'h  they  be  dull  enough  in  forming  long  Dedu6tions,  yet  in  fuch  things 
as  are  the  immediate  Objerls  of  Senfe  and  Experience,  they  are  often 
more  acute  than  Philofophers  themfelves.  For  thefe  being  either 
pufF'd  up  with  the  Vanity  of  appearing  wife  above  the  Vulgar,  or 
impos'd  upon  by  their  own  Subtilty,  often  frame  Monfters  of  their 
own,  and  deny  things  that  are  the  moft  manifeft:  while  they  are 
ftriving  to  purfue  Truth  thro'  Coverts  impervious  and  inacceffible  to 
human  Wit,  they  leave  her  behind  their  Backs,  and  arc  blind  in  full 
Light.  Hence  fome  have  deny'd  Motion,  and  others  Reft,  others 
Space  -f-,  others  all  Senfe  in  Brutes,  and  x)thers  all  manner  of  Truth : 
and  on  the  fame  account,  fome  have  deny'd  Liberty,  viz.  becaufe 
they  were  not  able  to  unravel  the  Difficulties  in  which  they  them- 
felves, 

NOTES. 


+  3y  the  denyers  of  Space  our  Author  Ihould 
.X)nly  mean  fuch  as  deny  that  \ve  have  an  IJea 
of  it,  not  them  who  deny  it  to  have  a  rea/. 
'Exigence,  ofherwife  he  himfelf  will  be  one  of 
the  Philofophers  lately  mention'' d,  fince  he  has 


often  afferted  in  C.  i.  §.  2.    (and  I  think  with 
reafon)  that  we  mayeafily  conceive  it  all  away: 
whereas  it  mull  evidently  be   neceflarily  exi- 
ftent,  if  it  have  any  Exillencc  at  all. 
See  Notes  5,  11,  and  13. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

fclves,  by  their  Subtilties,  had  involv'd  it.  The  ignorant  and  un- 
learned do  much  better  in  flighting  all  fuch  Arguments,  and  judg- 
ing of  things  ingenuoufly  according  to  the  dictate  of  their  Senfes  and 
Experience;  and  if  their  Judgments  be  taken  we  have  clearly  gain'd 
the  Caufe :  for  all  thefe  declare  that  they  are  confcious  of  this  free 
Principle  within  them,  which  yet  cannot,  as  we  have  fhewn,  be  well 
explain'd  otherwife  than  we  have  done :  The  Senfe  of  our  unpreju- 
dic'd  Mind  agrees  with  thefe,  nor  is  the  common  Teftimony  of  Man- 
kind to  be  efteem'd  of  little  importance  in  a  matter  of  Fad:,  {jy.) 

IV.  Secondly, 

N  O  r  E  S. 


199 


(77.)  The  Subftance  of  what  Leibnitz  oh\c(Xi 
againll  this  Argument*,  amounts  to  thus  much, 
viz.  That  it  is  no  proof  of  the  non-exiftence 
of  a  thing  becaufe  the  Vulgar  don't  perceive  it ; 
they  are  no  Judges  of  any  thing  but  what  is 
perceiv'd  by  the  Senfes;  they  believe  the  Air 
to  be  nothing  whea  it  is  not  mov'd ;  they 
know  nothing  of  the  fubtle  Fluid  which  caufes 
Gravity,  or  of  the  magnetic  Matter,  much  lefs 
of  immaterial  Subftances:  and  therefore  the  fe- 
veral  Caufes  of  Adtion,  the  fecret  Springs,  the 
Reafons  and  Inclinations,  may  be  all  unknown 
to  them,  and  yet  we  be  abfolutely  determined 
(as  he  believes  we  always  are)  either  by  the 
conftitution  of  our  own  Bodies,  or  of  thofe  a- 
bout  us,  or  by  a  thoufand  Kttlc  things  which, 
upon  due  attention  and  refledion,  we  might  be 
able  to  difcover.— We  reply,  that  tho'  in  many 
Cafes  our  not  perceiving  a  thing  be  no  Argu- 
ment that  it  does  not  really  exili,  yet  in  fome 
Cafes,  in  this  particularly,  it  is  :  To  feel  no 
Pain,  to  be  confcious  of  no  Idea,  is  to  have 
none:  and  in  like  manner  to  perceive  no  mo- 
tive or  rcafon  of  Aftion,  is  the  fame  as  not  to 
aft  upon  any,  or  to  perceive  that  we  aft  with- 
outone.  If  any  one  (whether  Philofopher  or 
Peafant)  be  thinking  upon  a  Subjeft,  he  muft, 
at  that  inftant,  know  the  Subjeft  that  he  is 
thinking  on,  or  however,  that  he  does  think 
on  fomething:  'tis  likewife  felf-evident,  that 
every  reafonable  Man,  when  he  refolves  upon 
fome  View,  or  follows  an  Inclination,  muft  be 
confcious  of  that  View,  ot  at  leaft   be  fcnfible 


that  his  Refolution  was  form'd  upon  fome 
View  or  other.  In  thefe  Cafes  therefore,  and 
in  all  the  modifications  of  Thought,  not  to  be, 
and  not  to  be  perceived,  is  the  very  fime  thing. 
But  befide  the  abfurdity  of  being  influenc'd 
by  a  Motive  which  we  know  nothing  of;  be- 
fide the  Impoffibility  of  reconciling  thefe  im- 
perceptible Movers  with  any  kind  of  Liberty, 
(for  which  fee  Note  65.)  we  reply,  fecondly, 
that  our  Author  does  not  conclude  againft  the 
Exiftencc  of  a  thing  becaufe  the  Vulgar  do  not 
perceive  and  take  notice  of  it,  but  on  the  con- 
trary argues,  that  there  muft  be  fuch  a  thing 
as  a  Liberty  of  IndifFarence,  becaufe  they  do 
continually  perceive  and  acknowledge  it;  be- 
caufe they  clearly  perceive  and  experience  it  in 
themfelves,  or  at  leaft  imagine  that  they  do  (b; 
nay,  becaufe  they  have  as  great  Evidence  of 
fuch  a  felf-determining  Power,  as  they  have  of 
any  thing,  even  of  their  own  Exiftencc  :  and 
confequently  they  muft  either  be  deceiv'd  in  e- 
very  thing,  or  not  deceiv'd  in  this  f.  The 
prefent  Argument  is  therefore  built  on  matter 
of  Faft,  and  will  be  conclufive  here,  tho'  our 
Ignorance  be  never  fo  great  in  other  Cafes. 
Our  affurance  of  a  Truth  which  we  do  clearly 
percerve,  is  not  the  Icfs  for  there  being  a  great 
many  other  Truths  which  we  do  not  perceive  : 
and  tho' out  not  perceiving  a  thing  were  na 
Argument  that  it  does  not  exift,  yet  our  ac- 
tual perception  of  it  is  a  Demonftration  that 
it  does.  It  is  not,  therefore,  becaufe  toe  do  not 
confider  the  Caufes  that  communicate  Motion  to  the 


RemarqueSy  p.477r 


t  See  Note  82. 


^3o  Of  Meral  Evil. 

'Tis  proved       JV;  Secondly,  If  We  experience  in  ourfelves  the  Signs  a'rt'd  'ri'opef- ' 
wkcoftHs    tics  which  belong  to  this  Power,   it  cannot  be   queftion'd  but  we' 
Power,  be    havc  the  Power  itfelf :   Now  thefe  are  a  Self-confcioufnefs  that  we 
caufe  wcdii  ^^  ^^^  ^       Caufc  of  our  Adions;  an  Ability  to  adt  and  pleafe  our- 

cover  the  .  .r»«  ia  •  c<      r  \  -n       n 

Marks  and    Iclves  in  contradicting  our  natural  Appetites,  our  benfes  and  Reafon. 
Properties  of  jf  j|-  \yQ  evident  from  Experience  that  we  can  do  thefe  things,  it  will 
uinourevcsj^  too  certain  that  we  have  fuch  a  Power  as  is  able  to  pleafe  itfelf 
barely  by  EleQion. 

V.  In  the  firft  place  then,  we  have  declared  that  a  Being  endow'd 
with  this  Principle  is  the  only  true  efficient  Caufe  of  its  Actions,  and 
that  whatever  it  does  can  be  imputed  to  it  only.  Now  all  Men  im- 
pute the  Adions  of  their  own  Will  to  themfelves,  and  efleem  them 
truely  and  properly  theirs,  whether  they  be  good  or  bad ;  which  is 
a  certain  Sign  that  they  do  not  perceive  themfelves  to  be  determin'd 
the  true  Cau-  fj-Qj^  elfewhcre  to  the  Choice  or  Exertion  of  them,  otherwife  they 
Hence  it  is  would  not  look  upou  thcmfelvcs  as  the  Caufe,  but  the  Determiner, 
that  \ve  di-  It  cannot  be  otherwife  than  from  a  confcioufnefs  and  firm  perfuafion 
of  this  Truth,  that  wrong  Eledions  give  us  more  trouble  than  fuch 
things  as  proceed  from  Ignorance  and  inevitable  Error.  'Tis  on  this 
account  only  that  a  light  Evil  occafion'd  by  our  own  Choice  grieves 
and  afflids  us  more  than  a  very  great  one  from  the  Adlion  of  ano- 
ther. If  we  expofe  ourfelves  to  Poverty,  Difgrace,  or  an  untimely 
End,  by  an  A61  of  Choice,  our  Confcience  remonftrates  againft  it, 
Remembrance  flings  us,  and  we  cannot  forgive  ourfelves,  tho'  we 
were  fecure  both  from  human  Punishment  and  the  Wrath  of  God. 
But  when  the  fame  Evils  befal  us  by  external  Force  or  the  Necef- 
fity  of  Nature,  we  bewail  our  Condition  indeed,  and  complain  of 
Fortune,  but  have  none  of  that  wounding  Anxioufnefs,  and  vindic- 
ative Reproach  of  Confcience,  which  fcourges  thofe  that  become  mi- 

ferable 


In  the  firft 
place,  we 
impute  our 
Aftions  to 
ourfelves, 
whereby  we 
own  our- 
felves to  be 


lUnguilli 
Msfortunes 
from  Crimei 


NOTES, 


Soul,  or  are  not  able  to  delineate  the  precife  man- 
ner o/thi't  Qommunication,  that  we  ajjert  the  Soul 
Jo  k<  Jelf-moiive  (as  the  Author  of  the  late  Dij- 
fertation.  oh  l^iberty,  and  NeteJJity  argues,  p.  i  5.) 
But  we  afiert  that  it  is  felf-motive,  becauTe  we 
feel  it  to  be  fo,  and  have  as  great  Evidence  of 
it  as  we  could  expedl  or  conceive  OMjffclvcs  to 


have,  were  it  really  fo.  And  that  Author  un- 
reafonably  begs  the  Queftion,  in  fuppoliug 
that  there  are  fuch  Caufes  and  Communicators 
in  a  Cafe  where  he  has,  where  he  can  have, 
no  Evidence  at  all  of  them.  But  this  DiJJ'er- 
tation  is  fully  confuted  by  Mr.  Jackjln^  to  whole 
excellent  Anfwer  I  refer  the  Reader. 


Of  Moral  Evil 


lol 


ferable  by  theif  own  fault.  As  therefore  he  that  enjoys  this  Princi- 
ple muft  neceflarily  blame  himfelf  if  he  bring  any  Inconvenience  up- 
on himfelf  by  his  own  Choice;  fo  he  that  does  blame  himfelf,  de- 
monltrates  that  he  has  this  Principle.  For  as  it  is  impoffible  but 
that  he  fhould  accufe  himfelf,  who  believes  that  he  is  the  true  caufe 
of  his  own  Mifery,  fo  on  the  other  hand,  'tis  certain  that  he  who 
does  accufe  himfelf,  thinks  that  he  himfelf  is  the  true  caufe  of  his 
Mifery:  otherwife  he  would  grieve,  complain,  and  be  angry  with  the 
Perfon  that  compell'd  him  to  commit  fuch  things  as  he  finds  make 
him  uneafy,  but  would  never  condemn  himfelf  as  the  Caufe  and  Aiii 
thor  of  them,  unlefs  he  were  confcious  that  he  could  have  hinder *d 
them.  Ir  the  grief  arifing  from  a  Crime  be  diflindlfrom  that  which 
is  occafion'd  by  a  Misfortune,  'tis  plain  that  this  can  be  on  no  other 
account,  than  becaufe  the  Crime  proceeds  from  a  free  Agent,  /.  e. 
one  who  determines  himfelf  to  Adion,  but  the  Misfortune  from  a 
neceffary  one.  vj   ,;^ 

VI.  'Tis  plain  then  from  our  Confcience  of  Good  and  Evil  Adions,  '^^^^  ,,  ^ 
that  we  have  this  aciive  Principle  in  fome,refpe<ft  within  us.     For  moft  certain 
we  not  only  rejoice  in  fuch  things   as  are  done  well,  aiid  gfieve  ac^^^"  thit  we 
the  contrary,   but  alfo  impute  them  to  ourfelves,  and  either  blamcof  our  liberty 
or  applaud  ourfelves  as  the  Authors  and  true  Caufes  of  them :  which  - 
is  the  firft  and  fureft  Sign  that  our  Minds  are  fenfible  of  their  Liber-,, J 
ty,  and  that  they  could  have  pleas'd  themfelvcs   in  doing  otherwife'' 
tlian  they  have  done.  (78.)       .  ..     ,.  I 

;i-  .     \    riWr-n...  -;  :.•::  ..  VIL  thc 

NOTES. 


(73.)  'Tis  pleafant  to  Qbferve  how  the  Au- 
thor of  the  Philofophical  Enquiry  endeavours  to 
anfwer  this  Argument,  by  copfoundiMg  the 
two  Ideas  of  Sorrow  and  Self-accufation  ;  of 
a  Misfortune  and  a  Crime,  as  his  great  Prede- 
cefTor  Hthbs  had  done  before.  ••  Confcience 
"  (Uyshc)  being  a  Man'sown  Opinion  of  his 
"  Adlions,  with  relation  to  fome  rule,  he 
"  msy  at  the  time  of  doing  an  Adion  con- 
"  trary  to  that  rule,  know  that  he  creates 
"  that  Rule,  and  confequcntly  aft  with  re- 
"  iuftance,    tho'  not  fufficient  to  hinder  the 


"  A£lion.  But  after  the  Aftion  is  over,  he 
"  may  not  only  judge  his  Aftion  to  be  con- 
"  trary  to  that  rule,  but  by  the  abfence  of  the 
"  pleafurc  of  the  Sin,  and  \>y  finding  himfelf 
"  obnoxious  to  Shame,  or  by  believing  himfelf 
"  liable  to  Punifhmcot,  he  may  really  accufe 
"  himfelf  J  that  is,  he  may  condemn  himfelf 
"  for  having  done  it,  be  forry  he  has  done  it, 
"  and  wi(h  it  undone,  becaufe  of  the  confe- 
"  quenccs  that  attend  it  *."  Where,  not  to 
"  infift  upon  the  perpetual  abufe  of  the  words. 


*  PhihfophUal  Enquifj  concerning  human  Lib 'rty,  p.  105,  106. 

D  d 


The  fecond 
tolvcn  olthis 
Power,  th.  t 
it  can  go  i- 
gainil  the 

Appcutc5,{rV. 

*Ti5  fliewn 

that  we  can 
do  this  in 
regard  to  our 
Appetites. 


Of  Moral  Evit* 

VII.  The  fecond  Sign  or  Property  of  this  Power  is,  that  it  is  able 
to  oppofe  the  natural  Appetites,  Senfes  and  Rcafon,  and  can  pleafe 
itfelf  in  the  Oppofition.  If  we  experience  this  Ability  in  ourfclves^ 
wfc  may  be  cenain  that  we  partake  of  fuch  a  Power. 

VIII.  With  refpedl  to  the  natural  Appetites,  we  have  faid  before  *, 
that  this  Principle,  when  it  happens  to  be  join'd  with  natural  Appe- 
tites in  the  fame  Perfon,  often  runs  counter  to  them,  and  pleafes  it- 
felf in  reftraining  them ;  if  Wc  find  that  we  can  do  this,  'tis  a  Sign 
that  we  have  it.  But  who  has  not  experienc'd  this  in  himfelf  ?  who 
has  not  fometimes  voluntarily  fufFer'd  fuch  things  as  are  hard,  in- 
commodious, and  painful  to  the  natural  Appetites,  and  taken  delight 
in  fuch  Sufferance,  as  if  that  were  fome  kind  of  Good  fuperior  to 

the 


N  O  t  E  S. 


doy  *Bt  ^(.  which  upon  this  Hypothefis 
mult  have  a  Signification  '  direftly  oppofite 
to  that  which  they  now  commonly  bear  ; 
what  can  we  mean  by  a  Man's  accufing  or 
condemning  himfelf,  when  he  is  fenfible  that 
ke  has  done  nothing  which  he  could  have  al- 
ter'd  or  avoided  j  or  rather  done  nothing  at  all, 
but  only  fuffer'd  all  the  while  from  fome  o- 
ther?  He  may  indeed  perceive  and  judge 
himfelf  to  be  miferable,  and  be  forry  that  he 
is  fo,  and  wifh  himfelf  otherwife  ;  but  what 
is  all  this  to  a  Criminal  Shame,  Remorfe,  and 
Self-convi£lion  ?  Is  this  all  that  we  under- 
ftand  by  a  Guilty  Confcience  f  Can  he  blame, 
reproach,  or  be  angry  with  himfelf  for  being 
only  what  another  made  him,  and  what  he 
imows  he  could  not  poffibly  help  ? 

As  this  is  matter  of  Faft  and  Experience, 
wc  appeal  to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind,, 
whether  the  Ideas  of  Guilt,  Remorfe,  k^c.  be 
not  entirely  different,  and  evidently  diftingui- 
ihable  from  thefe  ?  The  fame  holds  with  re- 
gard to  our  blame  or  accufation  of  another,  as 
has  been  (hewn  at  at  large  by  Bp.  Bramball,  to 
whofc  Cafti^atioMs  of  %  Hehift  I  muft  refer  this 


♦  Subfcft.-J.  par.  II,  izl 


Author.  "  I  aslc'd  (fays  the  Bp.  +)  why  do 
*'  we  blame  free  'Agents  ?  fince  no  Man  bla- 
"  raeth  Fire  for  burning  Cities,  nor  accufeth 
'*  PoifoH  for  deftroying  Men.  Firft,  he  re- 
*'  turneth  an  Anfwer,  IVe  blame  them  bccaufe 
"  they  dt  not  pUafe  m.  Why  ?  May  a  Man 
"  blame- every  thing  that  doth  not  pleafc  his 
"  Humour  ?  Then  I  do  not  wonder  that  T, 
"  Hibbs  is  fo  apt  to  blame  others  without 
"  Caufe.  So  the  Scholar  may  blame  his  Ma* 
"  fler  for  correfting  him  defervedly  for  his 
^  Good.  So  he  who  hath  a  vitious  Stomach 
*'  may  blame  healthful  Food.  So  a  Lethargi- 
"  cal  Perfon  may  blame  his  beft  Friend  for 
"  endeavouring  to  fave  his  Life.  And  now, 
"  having  fhot  his  bolt,  he  begins  to  examine 
"  the  Cafe.  Whether  blaming  be  any  thing  mire 
"  tht^H  faying  the  thing  blamed  is  ill  or  imper- 
"  fe£l.  Yes,  moral  blame  is  much  more,  'tis 
"  an  Imputation  of  a  Fault.  If  a  Man  be  born. 
"  blind,  or  with  one  Eye,  we  do  not  blame 
"  him  for  it :  but  if  a  Man  has  loft  his  Sight 
"  by  his  Intemperance,  we  blame  him  juftly. 
"  He  enquireth,  May  wi  not  fay  a  lame  Horfe 
"  ii  lame  ?    Yes,  but  you  cannot  blame  the 

Horf^ 


Of  Moral.  Evil 

'  *-the  Gratification  of  the  Appetites.  (79.)     Nay  the-  Pain  itfelf  arifing 

«' from  the  Violence  ofFer'd  to  thefe  natural  Appetites,  if  we  do  but 
choofe  to  bear  it,  becomes  in  a  manner  agreeable,  which  would  o- 
therwife  be  very  irkfome.  From  whence  it  is  moft  apparent  that 
this  Pleafure  depends  upon  the  Choice  for  while  that  continues,  it 
continues  too ;  when  that  is  chang'd,  'tis  gone.  Now  fuch  Ele<5tions 
as  thefe  are  made  every  Day,,  and  none  can  be  fo  much  a  Stranger 
to  himfelf,  as  not  to  be  confcious  of  them.  (80.) 

IX.  It  is  to  be  obferv'd  farther,  that  we  do  not  only  embrace  with 

.  J  pleafure  fuch  things  as  the  Appetites  refufe,  and  rejeft  fuch  things 
as  they  defire,  but  alter,  as  it  were,  Nature  itfelf,  by  an  obftinate  E- 
ie<9:ion,  and  make  thefe  Appetites  purfue  what  they  naturally  avoid, 

^'  and  fly  what  by  Nature  they  defire.    And  this  takes  place  not  only 

D  d  2  '  in 

NOtES. 


^03 


That  we  can 
do  it  alfo  in 
our  Senfes, 
and  in  a  man- 
ner change 
the  nature  of 
things  by  an 
obftinate  E- 
Ie£lion. 


**  Horfe  for  it,  if  he  was  lam'd  by  another, 
**  without  his  own  Fault.  May  not  a  Man  fay 
*'  out  is  a  Fool  or  a  Knave  (faith  he)  if  be  be 
«*  /o,  tho'  he  could  not  help  it  f  If  he  made 
*'  himfelf  a  Sot,  we  may  blame  him;  tho',  if 
*'  he  be  a  ftark  Sot,  we  lofe  our  Labour.  But 
"  if  he  were  born  a  natural  Idiot,  it  were 
"  both  injurious  and  ridiculous  to  blame  him 
**  for  it.  Where  did  he  learn  that  <»  Man  may 
*'  be.  a  Knave  and  cannot  help  it  f  or,  that  Kna- 
**  very  is  impofed  inevitably  upon  aManwith- 
•*  out  his  own  fault }  If  a  Man  put  fire  to  his 
"  Neighbour's  Houfe,  it  is  the  fault  of  the 
"  Man,  not  of  the  Fire.  He  hath  confefs'd 
**  formerly,  that  a  Man  ought  not  to  be  piinijh*d 
•*  but  for  Crimes^  the  reafon  is  the  very  fame, 
"  that  he  Ihould  not  be  blamed  for  doing  that 
*•  which  he  could  not  poffibly  leave  undone  ; 
•♦  no  more  than  a  Servant  whom  his  Maftcr 
"  hath  chained  to  a.  Pillar,  ought  to  be  bl.m'd 
"  for  not  waiting  at  his  Elbow.  No  Chain 
"  is  ftronger  than  the  Chain  of  Fatal  Dejlinj  is 
•'  fuppofcd  to  be." 

See  the  fame  Author's  Definitions  of  Liber- 
ty, Neceffity,  Wr.  with  his  Defence  of  them, 
"  P'756,  («fr  and  his  Reply  to  all  T.  Hobbs't 
Evafions  (fince  tranfcrib'd  by  the  Author  of 
the  Philofophical  Enquiry^  P- 9'»  ^^O  *•*  ^' 
Vindication^  p.  679,  (it. 


(79  )  To  this  Leibnitz,  anfwers,  "  That  it  is 
"  only  oppofing  or  balbncing  one  Appetite 
"  with  another.  Wc  fometimes  bear  Incon- 
"  veniencies,  and  we  do  it  with  pleafure,  but 
"  this  is  only  by  reafon  of  fome  hope,  or 
"  fome  fatisfadion  which  is  join'd  to  the  E- 
**  vil,  and  which  furpafles  it.'*  We  reply,  if 
by  hope  be  meant  an  ezpeftation  of  fome  fii- 
ture  Good,  'tis  plain  that  we  can  oppofe  and 
refift  any  natural  Habit  without  any  fuch  Ex- 
pedition, as  may  be  experienc'd  when  we 
pleafe,  in  Hunger,  Thirft,  lie  The  profpcft 
of  the  bare  pleafure  of  willing  to  do  fo  can- 
not be  the  Good  hoped  for,  fince  that  is  a  fure 
attendant  on  every,  fuch  Volition ;  all  the  fatis- 
fa£tion,thefl  whicn  appears  to  be  join'd  with  the 
Evil,  and  to  counterbal lance  it  in  any  fuchCafes, 
can  only  be  the  pleafure  arifing  from  the  ac- 
tual Exertion  of  the  felf-moving  Power,  which 
is  the  thing  our  Author  contends  for.  See  the 
latter  part  of  Note  65. 

(80  ;  'Tis  a  common  and  juft  Obfcrratten, 
that  Men  a$  well  as  Children  heir  any  Lalv.ar 
or  Fatigue  which  they  undtrrtitc  voiimfaruy, 
with  half  the  Uncifinefs  and  Grief  n-hich  th.-i 
very  fame  thing  would  give  them,  if  they  were 
lorc'd  to  undergo  it ;  which  c.nnot,  I  thinic,  he 
accounted  for,  but  upon  our  Author's  PrlQcipIc. 


^ 


Q04-  Of  Moral  Evil. 

in  Appetites,  but  alfo  in  the  Obje6ls  of  the  Senfes.     Some  things  are 
naturally  unpleafant  to  them,  feme  things  bitter,  naufeous,  deform'd, 
yet  thefe  are  made  tolerable  by  the  force  of  Ele6tion,  and  by  a  change 
of  the  natural  Propenfity,   at    length    become  Delights*.     On  the 
contrary,  what  was  fweet,  beautiful,  &c.  being  rejeded  by  the  Will, 
becomes  at  length  difagreeable.     We  could  not  poffibly  do  this,  if 
we  had  not  a  Power  of  pleafing  ourfelves  by  other  Means,  than  the 
agreement  of  Objects  to  the  Appetites  and  Senfes.  For,  whence  comes 
it  that  fitch  things  as  are  fweet,  comely,  excellent,  commodious  j  nay, 
all  that  are  grateful  to  the  Appetites  and  Senfes  {hould  be  reje(£ted  ; 
and  when  once  rejected,  (hould  become  irkfome  and  offenfive  ?     On 
the  contrary,  whence  is  it  that  Griefs,  Pains,  Torments,  nay  Death 
icfelf  (hould  be  agreeable   when  voluntarily  undergone,  unlefs  from 
•  this  Principle  which  pleafes  itfelf  in   its  EleQion?     If  it  be  granted 
that  we   have  fuch  a  Principle,  it  may  be  eaiily  (hewn  how  the(e 
things  can  be  effected  j  foF  natural  Good  may,  by  the  Power  of  it,  be 
chang'd   into  Evil,  and  Evil  into  Good :  for  it  has  a  Good  in  itfelf 
lliperior  to  thefe,  by  the  Power  of  which  it  can  overcome  and  alter 
the  Nature  of  them:  but  that  this  cannot  admit  of  any  other  Expla- 
nation will  be  (hewn  below  f..:',  ■':"'  v />  ^hij;_ -^k*  vi..<.  ^wt^   t/v: - 
That  we  can      X.  Thefe  things  are  generally  fuppofed  to  be  done"  by  the  Power 
cniyo"  Ap-^^d  Prcfcription  of  Reajon;  and 'tis  thought,  that  the  Will  is  there- 
petitesand    by  directed  to  embrace  things  di(agreeable  to  the  natural  Appetites 
Senres,  but    ^^j^^  Senfcs:  I  confefs  this  fometimes  is,  and  aUvays  ought  to  be  done 

alio  our  Rea-  ^'■,^^^r^ 

fon  by  the    according  to  reafon  ;    for  we  have  hinted  above,  that  fome  regard 
force  ofEle-fhould  be  had  to  thefe  things  in  Eledtions  j  but  very  often  the  Cafe 
°'*'  is  far  otberwife.     We  have  fliewn  before,  that  a  Power  which  is  ca- 

pable of  pleafing  itfelf  by  Elediion,  cannot  be  determin'd  by  reafon^, 
for  the  Underftanding  depends  upon  it,  rather  than  it  upon  the  Un- 
derftanding.  'Tis  therefore  the  tbirj  Mark  and  Property  of  this  Po- 
wer, that  it  can  run  counter,  not  only  to  Appetites  and  Senfes,  but 
alfo  to  Reafon.  If  we  can  do  this,  we  muft  own  to  our  Sorrow,  that 
we  partake  of  it.  But  that  we  can,  by  the  force  of  Eledion,  con- 
quer not  only  the  Appetites  and  Senfes,  but  the  Underftanding  too, 

daily 

•  See  Mr.  LockeV  Chapter  of  Fower^  ^,69.     Tho'  all  this  maf  be  effeSled  by  the  fele  P^wer  of  £,- 
l(£lion,  and  without  the  Reafons  which  bt  there  ajpgns  for  it. 
f  kte^the  following  S0iin. 


Of  Moral  EviL  0O5 

f:-4aily  Experience  teaches,  and  we  have  reafon  to  lament  that  It  can^be 
tproy'd  by  fo  many  inftances  that  we  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Eledicns  con- 
ntrary  to  the  natural  propenlity  of  Senfes  and  Appetites,  and  at  the  fame 
-^jime  againft  the  dictate  of  Reafon. 

J[-    XI.  We  have  feen  an  Atheift  fupported  by  the  Obflinacy  of  a  per- This  appears 
'itverfe  Mind,  enduring  Torments,  Confinement,  and  Death  itfelf  ra- ^""^f"  ^■^'^-'^'^ 

ther  than  abjure  his  beloved  Impiety :  We  have  feen  a  great  many"^^* 
-Perfons  voluntarily  throwing  away  their  Fortunes,  Life  and  Soul, 
•left  they  fhould  be  difappointed  in  a  foolifh  Choice.  We  have  be- 
held not  a  few  difregarding  the  Intreaty  of  their  Friends,  the  Advice 
of  their  Relations,  the  Didlates  of  their  own  Mind,  Dangers,  Di- 
ftrefles.  Death,  the  wrath  of  God,  and  the  pains  of  Hell  i  in  fhort, 
defpiling  all  that  is  Good,  or  could  appear  to  be  fo,  when  fet  in  com- 
petition with  fuch  things  as,  cxclufive  of  the  Goodnefs  which  they 
receive  from  Ele6lion,  are  mere  Trifles,  and  worth  nothing  at  all ;. 
■-^  fuch  as  have  no  manner  of  Good,  or  pretence  of  Good  in  them. 
There  have  been  Perfons,  who  knowingly,  without  any  kind  of  hope,, 
any  kind  of  belief,  have  deftroy'd  themfelves  and  their  Relations,  and 
yet  were  in  their  right  Mind,  and  conliflent  with  themfelves,  if  a. 
right  Mind  may  be  judg'd  of  by  fober  Words,  and  a  ferious  tenor  of 
Ad:ion.  Did  thefe  Men  follow  Reafon,  or  any  other  Good  befide  the 
fruition  of  their  Choice  ?  We  have  fhewn  already  that  this  Power 
may  produce  thefe  and  greater  Abfurdities ;  for  (ince  it  is  fuppos'd  to 
be  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  can  alfo  pleafe  itfelf  in  its  Ati,  wherever  it 
can  exert  that  Ad:,  it  can  pleafe  itfelf,  even  in  oppofition  to  the 
natural  Appetites,  the  Senfes  and  Reafon.  If  then  fuch  a  Principle 
be  granted  to  be  in  us,  it  will  riot  feem  ftrange  that  we  {hould  be  ' 

able  to  do  things  that  are  repugnant  to  thefe;  if  this  be  not  al- 
low'd,  it  cannot  be  made  appear  how  fo  many  Abfurdities,  fo  many 
things  difagreeable  to  Reafon,  to  Senfe  -,  fo  many  things  contrary  to 
the  didate  of  the  Mind,  fhould  every  Day  be  committed  by  Mankind.. 

XII.  Nay,    which   may  feem  more  ftrange,  the   Will  appears  to  That  the 
have  fo  great  a  Power  over  the  Underftanding,  that  the  latter  is  fo  Underiim' 
far  fubdu'd  by  its  Choice,  as  to  take  Evil  things  for  Good,  and  forc'd^^'is^jf;^^;^,; 
to.  admit  Falfities  for  Truths,     Neither  will  this  appear  impofTible  to  things  'for 

one  ^?{^\  "^"^ 

i'ajfitics  far- 
Truths, 
-——  viz.  being  under  fubjcftion-to  the  WilK 


ao6  Of  Moral  Evil 

one  who  recolIe6ts  that  the  Senfes  are  no  lefs  natural  Faculties,  and 

*  have  by  Nature  as  quick  a  Relifh  of  their  proper  Objeds,  and  can 
^*  as  well  diftinguifh  thofc  that  arc  agreeable  from  them  that  are  difa- 

greeable,  as  the  Underflanding.  If  therefore  we  fometimes  pleafe 
* '  ourfelves  in  choofing  what  is  repugnant  to  the  Senfes,  'tis  alfo  pof- 
"'  fible  for  us  to  take  pleafure  in  embracing  what  is  diffonant  to  Rea- 
"•  fon.  The  Senfes  are  forced  to  admit  and  tolerate  fuch  things  as  are 
'''dilguftful  to  them,  which  things  they  take  for  agreeable  by  ufe,  ha- 
"  ving  as  complete  Enjoyment  of  them  as  of  thofe  that  are  adapted  to 
®  them  by  Nature  *.  The  fame  may  happen  fometimes  to  the  Under- 
"  Handing,  viz.  to  be  compell'd  by  the  Will  to  admit  Fallities  for 
'  Truths,  to  believe  them  thro'  cuftom,  and  at  laft  make  ufe  of  them 
'Terioufly  as  Truths.  Hence  comes  that  common  Saying,  that  we  ea- 
'^Jily  believe  what  we  eagerly  dejire  j  and  fome  take  a  pleafure  in  fubdu- 

*  ing  not  only  Senfe  but  Reafon  too.  I  confefs,  he  that  does  this,  adts 
'  fooliflily,  and  is  much  to  blame  j  but  from  this  very  thing,  that  we 
'  ad:  fooli(hly,  that  we  are  to  blame,  'tis  evident  that  we  not  only  can 

*  but  a<Shially  do  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Eledions,  which  are  made  con- 
/trary  to  Reafon  i  and  that  the  Judgment  of  our  Underftanding  de- 
'pends  upon  the  Will,  rather  than  that  the  Will  is  determin'd  by 
^  It.  From  hence  it  is  evident  that  all  the  Signs  and  Properties  of 
'  jfchis  Self-pleafing  Power  agree  to  us,  and  therefore  we  certainly  par- 
take of  it. 

'Tispro\'d  XIII.  The  fame  will  appear  thirdly,  from  confidering  the  Reafons 
that  we  have  which  move  US  t6  the  choice  of  thefe  Abfurdities,  according  to  the 
from^rconfi  Opinion  of  thofe  Men  who  think  that  the  Will  is  pajjive  in  Elec- 
dcration  of  tions.  Fot  if,  whilc  they  are  labouring  to  affign  Reafons  for  thefe 
*^h^*h"^°"^  and  the  like  Determinations,  they  produce  nothing  for  Reafons,  but 
fuppofcd  to  the  very  Eledtions  themfelves,  or  their  Effedts,  it  will  be  apparent  that 
fk!^w  n*^  they  are  in  a  Miftake,  and  offer  Effeds  for  Caufes;  which  will  ap- 
pear more  fully  from  an  Enumeration  of  thofe  Reafons  which  are 
.fuppofed  to  move  the  Will  in  fuch  Cafes. 

XIV.  The  Principal  of  thefe  Reafons  are  Errors  of  the  Underjian- 
numcult^'  ^^^  Obftinacy  of  the  Mind; '  the  force  of  Pafjions^  and  Madnefs-,  on 

thefe 

•  Nay  grnerally  more  fo  :     ""Tis  a  common  Obfervat'on,  that  fuch  things  as  were  at  fir  ft  the  mt'i 
Jifagreeable  of  all  to  the  Palate,  become  by  ufe  the  moft  delightful:   viz.  fVines,  Tobacco,  Oltvn, 


the  Will. 


Thefe  are  e- 


Of  Moral  Evil 


207 


thefe  are  cliarg'd  all  the  unreafonable,  ablurd,  aiid  impfous  Adions 
of  Men  ;  thefe  are  efteem'd  the  Caufes  of  all  fuch  Efediions  as  can- 
not be  allow'd  to  proceed  from  the  intrinfic  Goodnefs  of  theObje<5b 
which  are  chofen :  but  this  is  all  groundlefs. 

XV.  For  in  the  firft  place,  as  to  Errors  of  the  Underftanding^  'tisfjrd,  Errors 
certain  that  we  fometimes  choofe  hurtful  Objeds  by  miflake,  which  ^f  the  Un- 
we  often  lament,  but  never  impute  to  ourfelvcs,  except  we  be  conici-f,^Ij^''"^^'"2" 
ous  that  this  Error  was  voluntary,  /.  e.  in  fome  refpc€t  ow'd  its  Ori-  iiiewn  to  de- 
gin  to  Election.     Eledion  then  is  prior  to  all  culpable  Error,  for  that.P^"'^  "P°5l 
depends  upon  it.     *Tis  not  therefore  always  by  miftakethat  we  choofe  lealon  ra-" 
Abfurditics,  but  by  chooiing  Abfurdities  we  miftake  the  Truth.     But  '^cr  than 
to  confefs  the  Truth,  we  are  hurried  on  in  an  abfurd  Eledion,  tho'"""^**'* 
we  fee  and  know  all  that  we  are  about  to  do:  if  then  there  be  any 

Error,  'tis  only  this,  that  we  judge  it  better  to  enjoy  a  free  Eledionj 
than  to  be  exempt  from  natural  Evils.  Hence  it  is  evident,  that  there 
arifes  fo  much  Pleafure  from  Election  as  is  able  to  impofe  upon  the 
Underftanding,  and  induce  it  to  prefer  that  to  all  kinds  of  natural 
Good,  nay  to  Life  itfelf.  But  whether  this  be  done  erroneoufly  or 
wifely,  'tis  the  ftrongcfl  Argument  that  we  have  fuch  a  Self-pleafing 
Principle  as  this  within  us. 

XVI.  Secondly,  as  for  Obftinacy^  by  which  they  fuppofe  that  we^^^?."^^^»^ 
are  moved  to  choofe  abfurd  things ;  'tis  plain  that  this  is  nothing  elic  which  17 
but  the  perfeverancc  of  a  bad  Eledion:  neither  can  Obftinacy  and '^ewn  to  be 
Perverfenefs  be  explain'd  otherwife  than  by  Eledions.  If  it  be  gran-  "m  M^fevc'? 
ted  that  things  pleafe  us  bccaufe  they  are  chofen,  we  fee  clearly  e-ringinade- 
nough  what  Obftinacy  is,  viz,  an  unneceiTary  adherence  to  an  Elec-  ^^^^'^  ^'^*^" 
tion,  and  a  Self-complacency  in  it  contrary  to  the  dictate  of  Reafon, 

and  with  the  lofs  of  natural  Good.  (81.)    But  if  the  Will  be  deter- 

min'd 

N  o  r  E  S. 


(81 .)  Leibnitz  (in  hii  Remark*  frequently  ci- 
ted above)  argue*  *,  "  That  Obftinacy  is  not 
"  barely  the  continuance  of  a  bad  Eleftion, 
"  but  a  difpofition  to  pcrfeverc  in  it,  procced- 
"  ing  from  fome  Good  that  a  Man  forms  to 
"  hJmfelf,  or  from  fome  £vil  which,  one  fup- 


pofes  to  attend  the  change.  The  firft  Elec- 
tion, fays  he,  was  made  perhips  thro'  mere 
Levity,  but  the  refolution  of  adhering  to  it 
comes  from  fome  ftronger  Reasons  or  Im- 
preflions."  But  if  this  be  all  that  is  meant 
by  ObUinacy»  how  come  the  World,  to  fix  fo 

bad 


•  p.  482. 


20» 


Thirdly.The 
violence  of 
Paflions,  r/z. 
Defirc  of 
Fame  and 
Glory,  i5f(. 
all  which  are 
prov'd  to  de- 
rive iheir  in 
ordinate 
force  from 
Elcdtion. 


Of  Moral  Eviir 

min*d  from  without,  there  will  be  no  fuch  thing  as  Obftinacy.  By 
an  obflinate  Perfon  w^e  (hall  only  mean  one  that  has  continued  a  long 
time  in  a  pernicious  Error,  without  any  Motive  to  change  his  Judg- 
ment. Now  he  that  does  this  is  miferablc  indeed,  but  cannot  be 
call'd  in  the  leaft  degree  obflinate,  according  to  the  common  Notion 
of  Mankind.  •>  »  !  '!it 

XVII.  Thirdly,  fince  neither  Errors  nor  Obftinacy  are  fufficient  to 
explain  the  Nature  of  thefc  Elections,  they  fly  to  the  Power  of  the 
Paffions'y  viz.  the  Defire  of  Fame,  or  Glory;  Anger,  Hatred,  &c. 
Thefe  are  the  Caufes,  fay  they,  why  we  choofe  abfurdly,  and  by 
them  the  Choice  is  determin'd.  But  Fame,  or  Glory  have  no  man- 
ner of  Good  in  them,  efpecially  to  thofc  w^ho  believe  that  they  fhall 
not  exift  after  Death:  why  then  are  thefe  Men  content,  to  purchafe 
Glory  with  Life  ?  Certainly  from  no  other  Caufe  befide  Elediion ; 
'tis  by  Ele^lion  that  we  have  form'd  thefe  Idols  to  ourfelves,  and 
from  thence  they  derive  whatever  Good  is  in  them.  To  be  talk'd  of 
after  Death,  to  mount  upon  the  Wings  of  Fame,  to  extend  our  Name 
to  diftant  Regions  j  thefe  things  pleafe  us  on  no  other  account  but 
becaufe  we  v^^ill  them.     Obfcurity,  Oblivion,  Retirement  will  be  as 

pleafing 


bad  aNotJon  to  thatWferd  r  iFit  tiea  difpofition 
always  proceeding  from  a  pro fped  of  Good,  or 
dread  of  Evil,  and  founded  on  fecond  thought? 
and  flronger  reafons :  liow  can  it  ever  be  e- 
fteem'd  a  Crime?  Again,  if  the  jfr/?  Eieftion 
can  be  made  without  any  external  Motive, 
(which  he  fecms  to  allow  by  afGgning  Levity 
as  the  fole  Caufe  of  it)  why  rnay  not  the  per  • 
feverance  in  it  be  fo  too  ?  may  not  the  lame 
Caufe  be  fuppos'd  to  produce  the  fubfequent 
Eleftions,  as  well  as  the  firft  ?  Infhort,  Lcfb- 
7i!tz,  after  all  his  feeming  oppofition  to  dur 
Author  on  the  head  of  Liberty,  moft  evident- 
ly grants  the  Quoftion  both  here,  and  p.  480; 
where  he  affirms,  that  in  effcft  we  are  able  to 
change  the  Natures  of  things,  and  make  thefe 
transformations  above  mention'd.  "  But  this 
"  (fays  he)  is  not  as  among  the  Fairies,  hy  a 
"  iirople  Aft  of  that  Magic  Power,  butbecaufe 
*'  a  Mao  darkens  or  fupprefl'es  in  his  Mind, 
"  the  rcprefentations  of  the  good  or  ill  Qua- 


NOTES. 


'*  lities  naturally  join^'d 'to  certain  Objefls,  and 
"  becaufe  we  only  regard  thofe  which  are  a- 
"  greeable  to  our  Tafte,  or  our  PrepofTeffions; 
"  or  even  becaufe  we  join  by  force  of  thought, 
"  certain  Qualities,  which  arc  only  found  u- 
"  nited  by  accident,  or  by  our  cuftomary  way 
"  of  confidcring  them."  Now  what  is  it  to 
darken  or  fuppreCs  the  reprefenCations  of  good 
or  ill  Qualities,--to  regard  fome  only  and  nc- 
glc£l  others,--and  to  join  Qualities  to  Objefts 
by  the  force  of  thought,--but  to  exert  this  very 
Power  in  debate  ?  Which  often  choofes  the 
fruition,  or  even  the  confideration  of  fome  one 
out  of  many  equal  and  indifferent  Objefts,  and 
by  that  fimple  A£l  ma'es  it  agreeable  to  oijr 
Tafte,  and  joins  fuch  Qualities  to  it  as  could 
neither  proceed  from  Chance  nor  Cullom,  nor 
any  Affociation  of  Ideas  whatfoever.  Sec  the 
Conclufion  of  this  Subjeft  io.^he  following 
Note. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  209 

pleafing  to  the  Man  that  choofes  them,  and  have  been^fo.  Thofe 
Perfons  then  who  imagine  that  thefe  determine  Eledions,  take  Ef- 
feds  for  Caufes.  For  thefe,  which  are  nothing  in  themfelves,  (hew 
us  that  they  acquire  fo  much  Goodnefs  from  Eledlion  as  makc»  them 
overballance  all  kind  of  natural  Good. 

XVIII.  The  fame  muft  be  faid  of  Anger,  Hatred,  Love  and  De-  The  fame  is 
fpair,  whereby  many  believe  they  are  driven  into  Abfurdities.     But  ^*J"  °^  ^*" 
in  reality  all  that  is  abfurd  and  pernicious  in  thefe  Paffions  proceeds  e^!-.'    °^^' 
from  Eledtion.     Nature  has   given  us  Paflions  which  are  generally 
innocent,  while  folicited  only  by  their  proper  Objedis,  and  natural 
Opportunity,  as  we  fee  in  Brutes  j  but  they  are  compell'd  to  change 

the  natural  Objeds  by  the  Power  of  Ele.'I^ion :  thus  Anger  and  Ha- 
tred are  excited  by  the  Will,  and  apply'd  not  to  fuch  things  as  are 
naturally  hurtful :  nor  Love  and  Defire  to  fuch  as  are  naturally  de- 
firable,  but  to  others  of  a  quite  different  kind,  with  which  they  have 
no  natural  Congruity,  fuch  as  Fame  and  Glory  after  Death.  Of  this 
kind  alfo  are  mod  of  the  Inftruments  of  Luxury,  which  are  com- 
monly faid  to  pleafe,  purely  by  the  ftrength  of  Fancy,  that  is  in  rea- 
lity, by  Eledtion.  Hence  it  is  that  Men  purfue  with  fo  great  Eager- 
nefs,  and  fuch  an  impetus  of  Paffion,  things  which  are  in  themfelves 
trifling,  pernicious,  and  abfurd.  Nay  they  barter  away  Life  itfelf  for 
Trifles,  and  when  they  cannot  enjoy  them,  caft  off  that  in  defpair. 
'Tis  the  Eledion  itfelf  which  fubftitutes  thefe  things  as  fit  to  be 
profecuted  by  thefe  Paflions  infl:ead  of  their  natural  Objeds,  and 
while  they  are  hurry 'd  on,  not  according  to  the  exigence  of  Nature, 
but  the  command  of  the  Will,  they  confound  every  thing,  tranfgreis 
the  bounds  of  reafon  and  utility,  and  in  defpight  of  thefe,  rage  with- 
out limits  or  reftraint. 

XIX.  As  for  Envy  and  Revenge,  they  are  not  owing  to  Nature,  but  Of  Envy  and 
the  Will,  and  fetting  afide  Eledion,  are  mere  nothing.     For  whate-^^^^"^^' 
ver  is  pretended  to  the  contrary,  there  can  be  no  other  account  gi- 
ven why  any  one  Ihould  undergo  Labours,  Dangers,  Griefs  and  Diffi- 
culties J  why  he  fliould  lole  his  Reputation,  Family,  Country,  nay  his 

Life,  for  the  Satisfaction  of  his  Envy  or  Revenge,  but  that  he  refolv'd 
within  himfelf,  but  that  he  ckofc  to  fatisfy  them^  'Tis  evident  that 
the  mofl:  unexperienc'd  Perfon  is  fufficiently  convinc'd  of  this.  But 
thefe,  when  once  embrac'd  by  EletUon,  become  more  agreeable  than 

E  e  thofe 


Clio 


Fourthly, 
M'liifji'-  'ti 
prov'dontht 
contrary,  th.u 
.  thefc  Men 
arc  in  their 
Senfcs  who 
choo(e  ab- 
fiirdly. 


M\  thefe 
things  on- 
not  be  cx- 
p^aiofidother 
liife  than  by 


Of  Moral  Evil 

thofe  things  which  Nature  has  made  neceilliry.  Thofcabfurd  Elec- 
tions then'are  not  made  by  the  force  of  thefe  PafTions,  but  the  abfurd 
and  irregular  force  of  thefe  proceeds  from  the  Ele6tions. 

XX.  They  who  perceive  that  thefe  Caufes  are  infufficienr,  have 
recourfe  to  Madnefs  and  Phrenzy,  in  order  to  account  for  abfurd  E- 
le:iions:  but  this  is  playing  upon  Words,  and  taking  Madnefs  in  a 
different.  Senfe  from  that  whereiji  it  is  commonly  underftood.  He 
that  is  fo  far  diforder'd  in  his  Mind  as  not  to  be  able  to  deduce  one 
Idea  from  another,  nor  make  Obfervations  upon  what  he  fees,  is- 
look'd  upon  as  a  Mad-man,  but  thefe  Men  who  do  fo  many  abfurd 
things  enjoy  the  above  mention'd  Powers,  and  have  tiieir  Undcrflan- 
ding  and  Senfes  ftrong  enough  by  Nature :  what  is  it  therefore  which 
drives  them  into  Abfurdities?  The  power  and  prevalence  of  the  fu- 
pericr  Faculty,  vi-z.  the  Willj  which  has  a  Good  peculiar  to  itfelf, 
which  it  produces  byEle£\ion.  This  it  purfues  regardlefs  of  all  that; 
Reafon,  the  Body,  the  Condition,  Appetites  and  natural  Faculties  re- 
quire. For  while  it  can  provide  for  and  pleafe  itfelf,  it  is  not  at  all 
folicitous  about  any  thing  which  may  prejudice  thefe,  bur  has  a  cer- 
tain Complacency  in  its  own  Exercife,  and  endeavours  to  augment  its 
Happinefs  by  the  purfuit  of  fuch  things  as  are  repugnant  to  them. 
For  the  more  Difficulties  and  Abfurdities  it  encounters,  the  more  it 
applauds  itfelf  in  a  confcioufnefs  of  its  own  Abilities ;  which  feems 
to  be  the  very  thing  that  we  call  Vanity  and  Pride.  Hereupon  it  com- 
pels the  Senfes,  Reafon,  natural  Appetites,  to  be  fubfervient  to  its 
Eledions:  nor  can  he  be  call'd  a  Mad-man  who  ads  againfl  Reafon,, 
■thra*  the  force  of  a  fuperior  Faculty,  any  more  than  he  that  falls 
from  a  Precipice  by  the  violence  of  a  fuperior  impulfe.  For  it  is  not 
every  one  who  ads  againfl:  reafon,  that  mufl:  immediately  be  look'd 
upon  as  Mad,  but  only  he  that  ads  abfurdly  from  fome  injury 
done  to  the  underftanding  Faculty  itfelf,  or  an  Impediment  to  the 
Ufe  of  Reafon ;  he  that  could  have  follow'd  the  didate  of  Rea- 
fon, and  yet  knowingly  violated  it,  mufl:  not.be  reckon 'd  mad,  but 
wicked,  unlefs  we  will  inipofe  upon  ourfelves  by  changing  the  cuflo- 
mary  Names  of  things. 

XXI.  If  it  be  gran-ted  that  we  have  this  fuperior  Faculty,  'tis  plain 
enoug;h  that,  allr  thefe  things  may  come  to  pafs.     For  he  that  is  en- 

dow'd 

admitting  a  Principle  of  this  kind  in  ourfchs«. 


Of- Moral  EiiC  ')  #,if 

(iow'd  with  it,  will  be  able  to  pleafe  himfelf  in  the  Profec-ution  of  ^.^ 

his  Elc^lions,  even  to  the  detriment  of  both  Body  and  Mind;  to 
the  prejudice  of  Scnfes,  Appetites  and  Reafdn  j  which  we  often 
fee  done  to  our  Amazement;  but,  unlefs  we  have  this  Faculty  im- 
parted to  us,  it  does  not  feem  poffible  for  us  to  create  Good  to 
ourfelves  by  Eiedion,  and  to  prefer  what  is  thus  created  to  all  ra- 
tural  Good  whatfoever.  As  mucW 

XXII.  Thefe  thing's,  I  confefs,  ought  not  to  be  done ;  but  if  no-  p""'^  *['.'" 
thing  could   be  done  which  ought   not,  there  would  be   no  fuch  Principle,  fo 
thing  as  a  Fault.     As  therefore  much  Good  arifes  from  this   Prin-  ".'^  attended 
ciple,    fo  there  is  this  Evil  alfo,    that  by  it  Crimes  and  Follies  arevii,  c/z.^ 
committed  ;     And  it  has  this  Inconvenience,  that  it  can  do  what  it  Power  of 
ought  not.  ^'"^'"S- 

XXIII.  From  thefe  and  other  Arguments  which  might  bebroughr,  iThijmiftake, 
t^ink  it  is  evident  that  God  has  given  us  a  Principle  of  this  kind,  [.^^  '!*^  ^^^ 
and  that  our  Will  is  only  determin'd  by  itfelf.     They  are  miftaken  judgment  of 
therefore  who  affirm  that  either  the  Appetites,  Paffions,  or  Under-  the  Under^ 
ilanding,  determine  Elecftions.    What  probably  gave  occafion  lo  the  ^jrclvoni*' 
Miftake  was,  that  other  things  pleafe  or  difpleafe  us,  viz.  fuch  as  hence,  hz. 
are  agreeable  to  the  Appetites   or   Senfes,    befide  thofe  which -.we  [''^"^^^""'^ 
choofe:     Now  it  being  obferv'd  that  we  have  regard  to  thefe  in  E-inustoaa 
le(^ions,  and  do  not  choofe  any  thing  repugnant  to  them,  but  upon  )^'^h°"' *^o"' 
neceffity,  and  that   all  Men  are  of  Opinion,  that  the  Judgment  of  Undefftlot 
the  Underflanding  ought  to  be  made  ufe  of  in  choofing,    and  being  ding. 

\     accuftom'd  to  this  kind  of  Choice,  we  become  at  laft  perfuaded  that 
\     it  is  abfolutcly  neceffary,  and  that  our  Wills  are  always  determin'd 
■      by  fome  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding  :  at  leaft,  that  is  is  a  Con- 
dition requifite  in  the  Objed,  that  the  Mind  judge  the  thing  cho- 
fen  to  be  good  and  agreeable  to  the  Appetites.    Whereas  the  con- 
trary to  all  this  is  generally  true,  viz.  that  the  Mind  judges  things 
I     to  be  good  becaufe  we  have  willed  them,  becaufe  we  have  form'd 
I     an  Appetite  in  ourfelves  by  fomc  antecedent  Election,  and  thofe  things 
which  we  embrace  by  this  fa^itious  Apfetite^  as  we  may  call  it,  give 
us  equal  Pleafure  with  that  which  we  defire  by  the  Neccflity  of  Na- 
wrc. 

;:-;-.  :^-'-  ^-      -.    Ec  2      •        '       ■    •    XXIV.  Nay 


tSll 


"We  can  aa 

in  order  to 
flicw  our  Li 
bcrty,  which 
is  prov'd  to 
be  the  fame 
a^  afting 
without  any 
rcafonat  all. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

XXIV.  Nay  we  choofe  Obje<fls  which  are  contrary  to  all  the 
Appetites,  contrary  to  Reafon,  and  deftitute  of  all  Appearance  of 
Good,  perhaps  for  this  only  Reafon,  that  we  may  aflert  our  Liberty 
of  Eledtion.  'Tis  certain  that  every  one  can  do  this,  and  he  that 
does  it,  proves  by  an  Experiment  that  he  is  free,  and  has  a  Power 
of  pleafing  himfelf  in  Eledlion.  Nor  can  he  be  faid  to  be  deter- 
min'd  by  the  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding ;  for  this  reafon  is  made 
by  the  Mind  itfelf,  and  may  ferve  equally  for  every  Election,  fince 
it  is  drawn  from  the  Indifference  of  the  Will  itfelf:  and  he  who 
does  any  thing  upon  a  reafon  which  is  made  by  himfelf,  and  is  in- 
different to  either  Side,  mull  be  efteem'd  to  adt  in  the  fame  manner 
as  if  he  had  done  it  without  any  reafon  at  all.  'Tis  evident  there- 
fore that  we  have  this  Power,  and  make  ufe  of  the  Appetites  and 
Senfes  only  as  Spies  and  Informers  j  of  Reafon  as  a  Counfellor ;  but 
that  the  Will  is  Mafter  of  itfelf„  and  creates  pleafure  for  itfelf  ift 
Objeas  bv  Eledion.  (82.) 

SUBSECT., 

NOTE  S, 


(B2.)  upon  the  whole   it  appears  that   the 
true  defcpption  of  Free-will  mult  include  thus 
much.     A  Power  of  choofmg  or  not  choofing, 
or  of  choofing  either  Side  in  any  given  Cafe  ; 
naturally  independent  of  any  mediate  or  im- 
mediate, external   or  internal  force,   corapul- 
fibn,  or  necefllty;  phyfically  indetermin'd  by 
either    bodily    Senfations,  Appetites,  ^e.    or 
mental  Perceptions,  Reafon,  Judgment,     'Tis 
an  Ability  of  determining  either  among   equal 
and  indifferent  Objefts,  or  of  preferring  the 
purfuit  of  fomc  before  others  that  are  entirely 
different  from  or  contrary  to  them  :  or  laftly, 
of  preferring  the   very  confidcration   of  fome 
unknown  Objcfts  to  all  the  reft  j  of  delibe- 
ating  upon,  or  attending  to  fomc  particular  I- 
deas,  and  refolvlng  to  overlook  others,  tho'  e- 
qually  prefented  to  the  Mind,  and  fuppos*d  to 
be  of  equal  Importance. 

All  this  is  contain'd  in  the  very  Notion  of 
a  Se//-mtvixg  Power  ;  (tho'  none  perhaps  have 
given  fo  full  and  diftinft  an  Explication  of  it 
as  our  Author)  for  that  which  in  ftriflnefs 
moves  itfelf>  is  properly  and  phyfically  inde- 


pendent of,  and  indifferent  to  all  external  Mo- 
vers, as  long  as  it  continues  to  do  fo  ;  what  is 
determined  in  certain  circuraftances  by  parti- 
cular Senfations,  Motives,  ^c.  and  cannot 
poffibly  be  determin'd  cither  without  or  a- 
gainft  them,  is  fo  far,  and  in  fuch  circum- 
Ibnces,  only  moved,  afted  up>on,  and  purely 
{>afrivc.  If  then  there  be  any  fuch  thing,,  pro- 
perly fpeaking,  as  an  aftive  Principle,  it  mult 
be  endow'd  with  fuch  an  abfolutc  Indifference 
as  our  Author  fuppofes  :  and  when  \ve  fpeak  of 
the  ftrongfji  Motives,  \r€  don't  mean  fuch  aS: 
have  the  greateft  phyfical  Influence  or  Weight 
in  turning  the  ballance  of  the  Will  (fince  we 
fuppofe  none  of  them  to  have  any  at  all)  but 
only  fuch  as  tlxe  Mind  moft  commonly  deter- 
mines itfelf  upon  in  faft  ;  and  to  argue  from 
fuch  determinationj,  that  thefe  Motives  muft 
have  fiich  an  Influence  both  abfolutely  and 
comparatively,  /.  e.  whether  taken  by  them- 
felves,  or  in  oppofition  to  each  other ;  is  ma- 
nifeftly  to  beg  the  Queftion,  and  ftill  to  fup- 
pofe that  it  cannot  move  or  direft  itfelf,  not- 
withftanding  our  raoft  evident  perception  -and 

uperienoe 


Of  Moral  Evil 


ai3 


NOTES. 


eirperience  of  the  contrary.  And  that  we  have 
fuch  experience,  a  little  refleftion  on  ourfelve.' 
will  convince  us.  "  I  think  (fays  S.  C.)  I  m.iy 
*'  appeal  to  any  confidering  Man,  whether  he 
**  be  not  in  all  ordinary  Cafes  fenfible  of  «n 
"  ability  of  darting  his  thoughts  upon  any 
"  particular  Ohjeft,  even  antecedently  to  any 
"  deliberation,  and  then,  whether  after  deli- 
"  beration  about  particular  Objefts  he  cannot 
"  refume  his  deliberation,  and  fometimes  vary 
"  his  Judgment;  and  whether,  after  the  clear- 
"  eft  Judgment,  and  moft  deliberate  Choice  of 
"  particular  things  or  adions,  he  be  not  ftill 
"  confcious  of  a  power  of  fufpending  his  prac- 
"  tice,  of  refuming  the  confidcration  of  the 
"  Objefts  whenever  he  plcafes,  or  of  imme- 
*^'  diately  choofing  or  praftifing  the  contrary, 
"  without  being  determin'd  by  imprefhons 
"  from  without,  or  impediments  from  within. 
"  But  we  have  no  clearer  proofof  ourown  £xi- 
*'  Hence  than  Confcioujncfs .  and  I  conceive  we 
"  need  not  expeft  greater  Evidence  of  any 
"  thing  than  we  have  of  our  Exiftence  *.'* 

If  then  our  Mind  has  fuch  a  power  of  felec- 
ting  fome  particular  Ideas  out  of  many  per- 
ceiv'd  by  the  Underftanding,  and  attending  to 
them  only  without  any  previous  apprehenfion 
of  their  nature  and  tendency,  wnthout  any 
fpecial  Rcafon,  Motive  or  Inclination,  or  any 
Inducement  whatfoever  to  fuch  p.irticular 
Choice;  if  the  Mind,  I  fay,  does  in  fome 
Cafes  exert  fuch  a  power  as  this,  then  it  is  in 
thefe  Cafes  abfolutely  free.  It  cannot  here  be 
diredled  by  the  Judgment,  fince  it  is  fuppos'd 
to  aft  independently  of  it :  nay  it  may  be  pro- 
perly faid  fometimes  to  influence  and  direft, 
er  rather  to  obftruft  and  fubvert  the  Judgment 
itfelf,  for  as  much  as  it  confines  that  to  fome 
particular  Objcds  only,  and  of  confequcnce 
renders  it  partial,  and  precipitates  it  in  the 
Choice  of  thefe,  and  withdraws  others  from 
it,  which  were  abfolutely  neceffary  to  a  com- 
pleat  View  of  the  Subjedl,  and  an  exaft  de- 
termination about  it.  Hence  the  fpring  of  all 
Errors,  at  lead  all  criminal  ones,  hence' viti- 
ous,  abfurd  ElecEtions,  and  a  Labyrinth  of  Woe. 


From  the  fame  Power  al'b  duely  applv'd.  pro- 
ceed."! the  hippy  confcioufnefs  of  De'ert.  and 
in  it  is  entirely  founded  all  the  rcafc  n  of  Re- 
ward. Its  ufefuinefs  then,  and  nece^ty.  ap- 
pears both  for  the  cftablifhment  of  Mnr  dity, 
the  ground  of  all  rational  Happinefs  ;  and  al« 
fo,  that  we  might  always  hive  wherein  to 
pleafe  ourfelves,  which  (as  our  Author  has 
(hewn  in  the  litter  end  of  Subfeft.  4.)  other- 
wife  we  very  often  could  not.  Hence  it  ap- 
pears I  think  fufficiently,  that  this  Power  is  one 
of  our  greateft  Perfeftions,  tho'  (like  all  other 
Perfeftions  that  come  fhort  of  Infinity)  it  be 
liable  to  the  greateft  abufc,  and  {0  capable  of 
being  turn'd  into  the  worft  of  Imperfeftions. 

It  remains  to  be  enquir'd  with  our  Author, 
whether  ail  the  Happinefs  arifing  from  it 
counterballances  the  Mifery,  and  confequently, 
whether  we  and  all  other  rational  Creatures 
might  not  have  been  as  well  or  better  without 
it.     But  for  this  fee  §.  2.  and  5. 

We  (hall  here  only  add  a  Word  or  ttvo  ift 
vindication  of  this  Principle,  agaiftft  the  thre* 
principal  Oppoftrs  of  Liberty  above  mention 
ned.  In  Xht  firft  place  then,  we  don't  afl"eft 
that  by  this  Power  the  Mind  can  choofe  Evi! 
as  Evil,  or  refufe  Good  as  Godd,  i.  e.  that  th6 
former,  as  fuch  is  or  can  be  a  Matire  for 
Choice,  or  the  latter  for  Refufal :  But  we  fay 
that  it  can  choofe  the  one  and  refufe  the  othef 
without  any  particular  Motive  at  all  \  nay,  in 
oppofition  to  the  ftrongeft  Motive  (vix.  that 
Motive  which  prefents  the  greateft  Happinefs, 
and  which  it  ufually  does,  and  always  ought 
to  follow)  purely  by  (he  force  of  its  a£tive 
and  felf  moving  Power -f-: 

You'll  fay  it  does  this  to  prove  its  own 
Power,  and  the  pleafure  attending  fuch  proof 
is  the  ftrongeft  Motive  in  thefe  Cafes.  I  an- 
fwer,  that  granting  this  to  be  fo  (which  yet  is 
not  very  probable,  as  appears  from  what  was 
obferv'd  from  the£^y  on  Confcioufnefs  in  Note 
65.)  yet  this,  as  our  Author  obferves,  muft  be 
a  Motive  of  its  own  creating,  which,  withre- 
fpeft  to  Volition,  is  the  fame  as  none  at  all. 
Nay  this  is  the  very  thing  we  are  endeavour- 
ing 

•"  Impartial  Enquiry^  &c.  p.  42,  43.     Sec  alfoan  Effay  on  Confcioafnefs,  p.  205,  l^c, 
f  See  Jackfon'/  Vindicatim  of  human  Liberty,  p.  49,  ijc.  er  the  beginning  of  E.  Strutt*;  Defentt 
*f  Dr.  Clarke'/  Notion,  kc. 


SI4- 


0/  Moral  EvU 
NOTES. 


ing  to  prove,  r/'z.  that  the  Soul  has  a  power 
oi" determining  itfclf  to  will  or  to  ac"^,  and  of 
pleafing  itfclf  in  fuch  determination,  without 
any  other  Motive  or  Reafon  but  what  is  pro- 
duced by  itfelf,  and  follows  that  very  determi- 
nation; without  any  external  Caufe  whatfoevcr; 
in  which  Power  all  its  Liberty  confifts,  and 
the  grcateft  Part  of  its  Happinefs,  as  will  ap- 
peat  in  the  next  Seflion. 

Nor,  fecondly,  will  fuch  a  Power  ss  this 
only  make  us  liable  to  miftake  the  true  Good 
which  is  in  things  (as  the  Author  of  the  Pii- 
Ufopb%  Enquiry  and  Leibnitz  argue)  but  on  the 
contrary,  it  often  makes  true  Good  or  Happi- 
Refs  in  thofe  things  which  of  themfclv«s  had 
none  at  all  j  and  improves  thofe  things  which 
have,  and  alleviates  thofe  which  have  the  con- 
trary Qualities  ;  and  of  confequerce  is  not  a 
mere  ImperfeSlian,  but  a  very  valuable  and  nc- 
ceflary  Perfedion.  Our  Author  does  not  fup- 
pofc  us  left  to  an  abfolute,  blind  indifterence 
in  all  Obiefts  (as  Leibnitz  often  urges)  with- 
out  any  Guide  or  Direflion  in  the  Choice  of 
them;  which  would  indeed  be  an  Imperfec- 
tion ;  but  affirms  that  the  Mind  or  Man  is 
fenfibly  and  neceflarily  afteftcd  by  fome,  and 
informed  by  his  Underftanding  of  the  Nature 
and  Effcdls  of  others,  and  fo  is  fufiiciently  di- 
refted  to  the  Choice  of  thefe  which  are  in  them- 
felves  good  and  agreeable  to  his  Conftitution, 
znd  vice  fifrfa ',  yet  ftill  with  the  refervation  of 
a.  full  Power  of  following  or  not  following 
that  Guide,  of  neglefting  or  rcfufing  that  Di- 
reftion:  Which  Pw^r  therefore,  even  in  thefe 
Cafes,  remains  ftill  unafFefted.  In  other  Ob- 
jcfts,  he  ihews  that  the  Man  is  totally  indiffe* 


rent,  which  yet,  by  an  aibitrary  Choice,  It© 
can  make  to  be  no  lefs  conftitucnt  Parts  of  hia 
Happinefs. 

Whence,  in  the  third  place,  a  reply  niay  b« 
fonn'd  to  the  common  Queftion,  ff  bat  Ben^'Jit 
is  there  in  a  Power  of  choofing  freely  among 
things  that  are  really  indifferent,  and  exaftly 
alike  ?  We  anfwer  the  Benefit  of  enjoying  an;^ 
one  of  them ;  which  Enjoyment  a  Man  could 
not  poffibly  have  without  fuch  a  Liberty,  but 
muft  neceflarily  hang  in  perpetual  Sufpenfe, 
without  any  Choice  at  all  ?  This  Leibnitz  own$ 
to  be  an  unavoidable  confequence  of  his  Opi- 
nion ■•*,  and  to  avoid  this  Abfurdity,  is  driven 
to  a  greater,  viz.  to  deny  that  there  are  any 
fuch  indifferent  and  equal  things  in  Nature  f ; 
the  contrary  to  which  has  been  abundantly  e- 
vinc'd  already  with  refpeft  to  bothGod  and  Man. 

Laftly,  to  the  Argument  againft  the  pojjibilt' 
ty  of  fuch  a  Li  berty,  fo  frequently  repeated  by 
the  two  Authors  above  mentioned,  viz.  that 
Aftions  done  without  any  Motive,  would  be 
EfFefts  without  a  Caufe.  We  reply,  in  fhort, 
that  it  is  a  plain  Petitio  Principij,  in  fuppofing 
Motives  to  be  the  real  phyfical  efHcient  Caufes 
of  Volition  or  Aftion,  which  we  deny;  and 
yet  arc  far  from  fuppofing  thefe  Afts  to  be  ab- 
folutely  without  a  Caufe }  nay  we  affign  them 
another,  and  affirm  that  their  only  true  and 
proper  Caufe  is  this  felf-moving  Power,  and 
the  only  Caufe  of  this  is  the  Creator  who  com- 
municated  it. 

On  this  Subjefl  fee  Dr.  Clarkeh  Dtmonftrat, 
p.  136  i^e.  zd  Edit,  or  his  Remark:,  &c  p.  28, 
^c.  or  Chubb' i  farther  RefleSlions  on  Natural 
Liberty.     ColleWon  of  Trails ,  p.  388,  ^f. 


*  Effais  de  Theodice,  p.  1 61 ,  W^. 
t  See  his  4th  Letter  to  Dr.  Clarke. 


SECT, 


Of  Moral  EviL  i  j  j 


...        ,   o 


SECT.    II. 


J 


.  ij 


n  .(Mi. 
f  -      ■ , 


Where  it  is  fhewn  that  Happinefs  conJiHs  in 

Ele^ions.  .  ,^  .-...^ ,   ...  ^ 

L  |~^ROM  what  has  been  faid  above,  it  appears  that  a  Being  en-  The  more 
r    dovv'd  with  a  Power  of  choofing,  is  more  excellent  and  per-  free  any  Be- 
fect  than  one  that  is  without  it:  For  that  which  neither  adts  nor  i« he^irexpos^d 
adted  upon,  is  the  fartheil  from  Perfedlion,  fince  it  is  of  no  moreuie  w  Motions 
in  Nature  than  if  it  were  nothing  at  all ;  that  which  is  purely  paf- - '^T"''^^°"^* 

^«^  *  •  1  /*t  11*1    1        ""u  mccts 

five  in  its  Operations,  is  one  degree  more  perfed:,  but  that  which  has  with  lefs  in- 
the  Principle  of  its  Actions  within  itfelf,  fince  it  approaches,  as-  it  /convenience. 
were,  nearer  to  God,  and  is  more  independent,  is  alfo  more  sf  itfelf, 
i.e.  it  feems  to  be  made  for  its  own  fake,  and  chiefly  to  refped:  its 
future  benefit,  and  on  that  account  to  be  more  noble  and  perfe£l.; 
Nor  docs  it  feem  pofTible  for  a  greater  Perfedion  to  be  communi- 
cated than  the  fruition  of  fuch  a  Principle.     The  more  free  any  one 
16,  and  the  lefs  liable  to  external  Motions,  the   more  perfed  he  is:- 
God  has  therefore  multiply'd  this  kind  of  Creatures  as  far  as  the 
Syflem  and  Order  of  his  Work  allow'd,  and  decreed,  that  fuch  as  are 
paflive  in  their  Ope^^ations  Ihould  be  fubfervient  to  thefe. 

II.  Since  therefore  Happinefs,  according  to  the  common  Notion  of  Happinefs  a- 
it,  is  granted  to  arife  from  a  due  ufe  of  thofe  Faculties  and  Powers  "'"[°J5l'of 
which  every  one  enjoys;  and  fince  this  Power  of  determining  our- the  Faculties, 
fclves  to  Adions,  and  pleafing  ourfelves  in  them,  is  the  moft  P^f'^reaPow^ 

ICtt  of  choofing; 
be  the  moft 
BobJc  of  all,  the  greatefl  Happincfi  will  confill  in  the  Exercife  of  it,  /.  e.  in  Elcdions.-^ 


■XiV^  Of  Moral  Eviiy'' 

feft  of  all,  whereby  we  are  the  moft  confcious  of  our  Exiftence,  and 
our  Approach  towards  God,  our  chief  Happinefs  will  confift  in  the 
proper  ufc  of  it,  nor  can  any  thing  be  abfolutely  agreeable  to    us 
but  what  is  chofen.    It  is  to  be  confefs'd  that  many  external  Ob- 
jects, many  that  are  offer'd  by  the  Senfes,  pleafe  us ;  but  if  we  look 
'fcnto  the  thing  more  narrowly,  this  will  appear  to  arife  from  hence 
only,  that  thcfe  are  as  Motives  which   induce  us  to  exert  an  A<ft  of 
Eledion,  whereby  we  embrace  them  as   if  they  were  agreeable  to 
the  natural  Appetites :  for  tho'  the  Will  cannot  be  determin'd  to  E- 
le3:ion  by  any  thing  but  itfelf>  yet  it  may  be  perfuaded  to  determine 
itfilf^  in  order  to  avoid  what  is  abfurd  and  difguftful  to  the  Natural 
Appetites. 
Elcaion  is        III.  For  'tis  certain  that  we  make  ufe  of  the  Affiftance  of  the 
the  caufewhv  Undcrftanding  in  Eledlions,  and  hold  it  as  a  Light  before  us  to  di- 
us.  flinguifli  Good  from  Evil ;  but  we  ufe  it  as  a  Judge  and  a  Counfellor, 

not  as  a  Sovereign  and  Dictator :   and  to  fpeak  the  truth,   in  order 
to  avoid  foolifli  and  hurtful  things,  rather  than  to  acquire  what   is 
good  and  agreeable.     For  whatever  we  choofe  will  (as  was  fhewn  be- 
fore) be  ipfo  fa5fo  good  and  agreeable,  except   it  lead  us  into  fome- 
thing  contrary  to  the  Appetites,  or  otherwife  abfurd.     The  Under- 
ftanding  therefore  points  out  and  admonifhes  us  (as  we  faid  before) 
to  avoid  thefe  external  Evils,  or  to  embrace  the  Good :   but  till  we 
have  exerted  an  A(^  of  Ele<5tion  about  them,   thefe  do  neither  be- 
come abfolutely  agreeable,  nor  the  other  odious.     We  have  prov'd 
before  that  this  is  the  Cale,   and  it  will  be  evident  from  Experience 
to  any  one  that  confiders  it.     If  then  nothing  pleafe  us  but  what  is 
in  fome  refpe^t  chofen,   'tis  manifeft  that   our  Happinefs  muft  be 
fought  for  in  Eled:ion. 
^         IV.  We  have  (hewn  above,  that  an  intelligent  Creature,  which  is 
that hafa free  n^^^ly  P^ffive  in  its  Operations,  cannot  be  made  entirely  happy:  for 
pr^werof      as  it  is  liable  to  external  Motions,  it   muft   neceflarily  meet  with 
choofmg  can  j^      £^jj  ^^  ^^ij  ^g  ^^^^^jj  Objcas;    for  all  things  cannot   be  ufeful. 

hinjidf.  It  remains  therefore,  that  a  Creature  which  is  to  be  exempt  irom 
all  kind  of  Grief  fhould  have  the  Principle  of  his  own  Happinefs 
within  him,  and  be  able  to  delight  himfelf,  in  what  manner  foever 
external  things  be  difpos'd,  /.  e.  that  he  have  the  Government  of  his 
own  AQions,  and  may  pleafe  himfelf  by  willing  either  this  or  fome- 

iliing 


Of  Moral  Evil  i  \  7 

thing  elfe :  Such  an  Agent  as  this  h,  will  be  fatisfy*d  with  any  Ob- 
ject that  occurs ;  fince  Objcdts  are  not  chofen  by  him  becaufe  they 
pleafe  him,  but  on  the  contrary,  pleafe  him  becaufe  they  are  chofen. 
Whoever  therefore  has  free  Choice  may  make  himfelf  happy  :  viz. 
by  choofing  every  thing  which  befalls  him,  and  adapting  his  Choice 
"to  things.  -e^ 

V.  And  it  is  by  this  Means  only  that  Creatures  feem  capable  of  ^^  "" 

/  J  r  chance  our 

jbeing  made  completely  happy:   for  fince  the  things  themfelves  are Eieaions to 
neceflarily  fix'd  by  certain  Laws,  and  cannot  be   chang'd,  it  remains  '"^^^  '^^™ 
that  the  Elecl  ions  be  alter'd,  in  orde^:  to  make  them  conformable  to  ^^"ii^ngs^^anj 
things,  i.e.xo  tjie  Will  of  God:  for  rhus  free  Agents  will   have  afocanattiin 
Power  in   themfelves  of  attaining  Happinefs.     Hence  it  is  that  we  ^^PP"^^^*- 
tire  fo  frequently  admonifh'd  in  Holy  Scripture  to  be  conformable  to 
God*;  on  this  Point  our  Salvation  and  Happinefs  turn  :  And  with 
good  reafon ;  for  what  is  Happinefs  if  not  to  be  in  every  thing  as 
we  will  or  choofe  ?     But  he  who  choofes  to  conform  himfelf  in  all 
things  to  the  Divine  Will,  muft  certainly  be  always  what  he  would 
be,    and  will   never  be  dlfappointed    in   his  Choice:    however  ex- 
ternal  things  fall  out,    a  Perfon   thus  difpofed  may  enjoy  Happi- 
nefs,   nor  does  any  one  feem  to  have  been  capable  of  it  on  other 
terms.  '  ,   ^  l-f 

VI.  But  perfecl  Happinefs,  may  fome  fay,  is  not  to  be  expefted  i^areofthe 
for  thofe  Beings  which  are  united  to  terreftrial  Matter,  muft  necef-  fhe'^n't^",'} 
iarily  be  affeiied  with  the  Motions  of  it,  as  was  fiiewn  before,  and  Appetites  dl- 
cannot  bear  the  diflblution  of  the  Body,  or  the  impairing  of  its  Or-f""^^.^'^^: 
gans  (which  yet  are  unavoidable)  without  fome  Pain  and  uneafy  Sen-prefeut  ibte, 
fation.     I  confefs,  abfolute  Felicity  is  by  no  Means  to  be  hoped  for^^'^^j^^'^er 
in  the  prefent  State :     But  yet  the  more  our  Elections  are  confer-  "efs  from^be- 
mable  to  things,   the  more  happy  we  are;    if  then  our  Elections ingperfcft. 
were  perfedtly  free,  we  fliould  alfo  be  at   Liberty  to   enjoy  perfect 
Happinefs :  but  fince  the  care  of  our  Bodies,  and  the  natural  Appe- 
tites difturb  our  Elections,   and  fometimes  byafs  them  to  one  Side, 

we  cannot  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Eleflions  abfolutely,  and  without  a    , 
Mixture  of  Uneafinefs.     For  tho'  they  afford  Delight,  and  even  grea- 
ter than  the  natural  Appetites,  yet  they  do  not  remove  all  manner 

of 

•  R.m.   \z.  2.     CJ'jf.   5.  I,  2,i^c. 

F  f 


h\^  Of  Moral  Evil 

of  Uneafinefs,  nor  extinguifh  the  fenfe  of  Pain.  While  therefoi'e  wc 
arc  in  this  State,  we  muft  acquiefce  with  a  mix'd  and  imperfect 
Happlnels,  fuch  as  the  prefent  State  of  things  affords ;  and  it  is  plain 
that  this,  fuch  as  it  is,  arifes  only  from  Elections.  For  tho'  we  can- 
not by  mere  Elef\ion  always  extinguiHi  the  Pain  and  Uneafinefs 
which  arifes  from  our  being  forc'd  to  bear  fuch  things  as  are  dif- 
guflful  to  the  natural  Appetites,  yet  we  can  choole  to  bear  thefe 
things,  and  pleafe  ourfelves  in  that  Choice ;  the  Confcioufnefs  of  our 
Powers  in  bearing  thefe  furpaffing  the  Uneafinefs  of  Pain,  nay  per- 
haps augmenting  the  Pleafure  fo  far  as  that  the  Excefs  of  it  fliall  o- 
vercome  the  Pai-n  arifing  from  the  fruftrated  Appetites,  by  fo  many 
Degrees  as  could  have  been  obtain'd,  if  there  had  been  no  contra- 
riety between  them  and  the  Eledion.  For  inftance,  if  one  feel  two=- 
Degrees  of  Pain  from  a  Diftemper,  and  receive  fix  Degrees  of  Plea- 
fiire  from  an  Eledtion  to  bear  it-  with  Patience  and  Decorum  j  fub- 
ftrading  two  Degrees  of  Pain  from  thefe  fix  of  Pleafure,  he  has  four 
of  folid  Pleafure  i^emaining :  He  will  be  as  happy  therefore  as  one 
that  has  four  Degrees-  pure  and  free  from  all  Pain;  If  this  be  gran- 
ted to  be  poflible,  we  may  be  as  happy  with  the  natural  Appetites,  as^ 
if  we  had  been  without  them,  nor  fhall  we  have  any  reafon*  to  com- 
plain of  them. 

_     VII.  And  here,  by  the  Wky,  we  may  admire  the  Divine  Goodnefs 

fon  to  admire  and  Wifdom,  which  (fince  Objeds  are  generally  fix'd  and  confined- 

tkcDi»ine    under  certain  Laws)  could  create  an  Appetite  that  fhould  have  whereat 

whichTrea-  ^^^^  to  fatisfy  it  within  itfelf ;  and   might  render  any  State  agree- 

t?d  an  Appe- able,  barely  by  willing  it.     Now  Free- Will  lias  this  EfFett  by  ac- 

"  herewith  to  ^^"^"^°^^^'"S  ^^^^^^  ^^  Objefls,  when  the  Objeds  themfelves  cannot. 

picafe  itfelf   be  chang'd.     For  the  Man  will  be  no  lefs  happy  who  choofes  what- 

N '"  °  h"    ^  knows  will  come  to  pafs,  than  he  who  brings  that  to  pafs  which 

foevercxter-  he  choofcs  j  the  onc  may  be  always  done,   the  other  is  often  impof- 

nai  things  be  fjble  I    this  therefore,  or  none,  is  the  Way  to  arrive  at  Happinefs. 

tipo  ed      j'j^ig  hard'  to  comprehend  how  he  can  fail  of  Happinefs  who  has  it  in- 

his  Power  to  pleafe  himfelf     This  feems  to  have  been  the  Opinion 

of  the  ancient  Stoics^  who  had  the  fame  thoughts  of  Liberty  with 

thofe  laid  down  above,  but  did  not  explain  them  difiin£lly,  nor  com~ 

prehend  the  whole.  Series  of  the  Matter. 

However/ 

/ 


Of  Moral  Evil 

..  However,  ';is  very  plain  that  they  placed  Happlnefs  in  tlie  Ufe 
and  Election  of  fuch  things  as  are  in  our  own  Power,  which  yet 
would  be  impoffible,  if  we  were  not  able  to  pleafe  ourfelves  in 
Eledtion.  (83.) 

.'  NOTES.  ' 


^19 


■''(83.^  Out  Author's  mentioning  the  Stoia 
liere,  might  probably  give  Leibnitz  his  reafon 
to  fufpecl  him  of  maintaining  all  the  abfurd 
Confequences  which  that  Seft  are  faid  to  have 
drawn  from  the  above  mention'd  Principle. 
They  indeed  (if  they  be  not  greatly  mifrcpre- 
fented)  urg'd  it  fo  far  as  to  aflert,  that  no- 
Thing  external  could  hurt  or  incommode  us 
except  we  pleas'd  :  Tfiat  all  Good  and  Evil 
was  entirely  in  oar  Power,  and  of  our  ma- 
king, and  confequently  that  all  outward  things 
were  indifferent  and  alike  to  us,  antecedent  to 
our  own  Choice.  Which  Notions,  being  con- 
trary to  every  Day's  Experience  in  Pleafure 
and  Pain,  led  them  on  to  deny  that  the  latter 
was  properly  an  Evil,  or  rather  that  there  was 
any  difference  at  all  between  them.  This 
Doftrine  is  indeed  liable  to  Leibnitz's  Objec- 
.xions   of  confounding,  all  the  dillijiftions  of 


things, — of  contradifting  the  natural  Appe* 
tites,— making  Reafon  and  Underftanding  ufc- 
lefs, — and  fubverting  all  the  other  Faculties 
of  the  Mind. — Thefe  and  the  like  Refiedions, 
I  fay,  are  juft'ly  made  upon  the  Doftrine  of 
the  Stoics,  as  they  have  generally  cxprcfs'd 
themfelves,  and  overthrow  a  total,  abfolute  Tn- 
difftrence  of  the  Mind  to  will  in  all  Cafes; 
but  are  nothing  at  all  to  our  Author,  who  ne- 
ver contended  for  it ;  but  on  the  contrary,  in- 
fifts  upon  a  neceffary,  fix'd,  and  unalterable 
difference  in  the  Natures  of  things,  according 
to  the  prefent  Syftem ;  and  has  allow'd  their 
full  force,  both  to  Reafon  and  the  natural 
Appetites,  all  over  the  laft  Seftion,  as  well  as 
in  the  foregoing  Chapters  of  this  Book. 

But  this  has  been  explain'd  in  the  Notes  a- 
tove.  For  an  application  of  this  Seft.  fee  ^.5 
Subfeft.  2.  and  the  Notes  to  %.  5.  Subfed.  3. 


,/ 


SECT.    IIL 

Concerning  undue  Elections. 


I.  TT'ROM  hence  it  is  fufficiently  evident  what  kind  of  Eledlons  xo  fall  ihott 
17    are  to  be  called  undue  ones :  For  it  appears  that  God  has  gi-  of  what  we 
vcn  us  this  Faculty  of  choofing,  that  we  may  pleafe  ourfelves  in  the  ^1).®°!^^^^*' 
ufe  of  it,  and  be  happy  in   the  fruition  of  thofe  Objects  which  we  chooVe  amifs 
choofe.     For  it  is  Happinefs  to  obtain  the  things  chofen,  and  Mifery  ^^hcrefore 

F  f    2  t,0  choofe  what 

cmnot  be 
cnjoy'd :  This  is  done  ift.  when  fucli  things  are  chofcn  as  zKi:npoJJible. 


aQQ  Of  Mord  Evil: 

to  be  fruftrated  and  fair  fhort  of  them.  Whenfoever  therefore  we 
make  fuch  a  Choice,  as  not  to  be  able  t6  enjoy  the  things  chofen, 
'tis  plain  that  we  choofe  foolilhly  and  unduely :  for  we  bring  upon, 
ourfelves  unnecefTary  Mifery,  fince  we  could  have  chofen  otherwife 
with  equal  Pleafure.  Whoever  then  choofes.  knowingly  what  he 
cannot  obtain,  or  what  may  produce  unnecefTary  trouble  to  himfelf 
or  others,  he  mud  be  efleem'd  to  choofe  unduely.  And  this  maybe 
done,  firft.  If  any  one  choofe  Impojjibilities.  It  may  feem  ftrange. 
that  any  Perfon  (liould  choofe  a  thing  which  is  impoffible,  knowing, 
it  to  be  ib ;  but  'tis  very  probable  that  this  has  happen'd  fometimes, 
as  was  faid  before  * 
,.  If.  Secondly,  If  he  choofe  fuch  things  as  are  inconfifient  with  each 

When  thofe  Other :  he  that  does  this  contradids  himfelf,  and  evidently  cuts  off  al^ 
things  are  hopcs  of  Enjoyment.  When  we  will  any  thing,  we  mufi  take  all  its-. 
!l^e°S'4^X^'"^^^^^^y  ^^"^^^"^"^^^  together  with  it.  But  all  things  here  are  of 
vritheacho-  a  mix'd  kind,  and  nothing  is  pure  from  all  degrees  of  Bitternefs;. 
^^^'  we  often  therefore  will  that  part  in  a  certain  thing  which  is  agreea- 

ble to  the  Appetites,  and  refufe  the  reft:  but  this  is  in.  vain,  fince 
the  agreeable  Parts  cannot  be  feparated  from  the  difagreeable  ones  :.• 
we  muft  therefore  either  choofe  or  rejed:  the  whole.     He  thardoes^ 
otherwife  cannot  pofTibly  fatisfy  himfelf,  lince  he  muft  bear  with  what 
ly^t!  hewouldinot:  He  is  therefore  voluntarily,  unhappy  by  an  undue  E- 

-J:o^  ledion. 

■    *ftiirdly.  If      in.  Thirdly,  he  muft  be  efteem'dto  choofe  unduetyj  who  aims  at: 
.^  the  things    ^^^  things  as  he  knows  not  to  be  i7i  his  Power.     For  it  is  a  hazard- 
i^n^the'povveJ "whether  he  enjoys  thofe  things  that  are  not  in  his  Power;  and  it   is 
oftheElcc-  foolifti  to  commit  our  Happinefs  to  Chance;  while  therefore  it  is  in 
*®'"*  our  Powder  to  choofe  only  fuch  things  as  we  are,  certain  of  obtaining, . 

we  riik  our  Happinefs,    or  throw  it  away  when  we  purfuc  Uncer- 
tainties :  Now  we  owe  as  much  Happinefs  to  ourfelves  as  is  in  our 
Power,  and  ought  to  ufe  our  utmoft  Endeavours-  to  attain;  it ;  but  we 
lofe  this  by  defiring' thofe  things  which  we  know  to  be  out  of  our: 
Power, 
fourthly,.        IV.  Fourthly,  That  alfo  is  an  undue  Elecftion,  which  obliges  us  to^ 
choofe  that  ^^^^^  xhQ(t  things  that  are  lawfully  occupy d  by  the  Ele^ions  of  other 
which  is  Men.. 

|VC:Ocgopjr'i  by  thejawfol  Choice  of  oJtUera. . 

*  V^x.  SubfciS.  5.  gar*.iq,  •!,  12., 


v/ 


^    Of  Moral  Evil'.  .^'ZXK 

-,.f/  Men*    'I'o  be  difappointed  of  an  Eledion  is  Mifery,  as  we  faid  be- 
^n.jvfore;  to  enjoy  it,  Happinefs.     Every  one  therefore  that  is  endow'd 
r'  with  a  Power  of  choofing,  has  a  right  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  thing 
..[;  chofen,  fo  far  as  is  necelTary  to  the  Exercife  of  his  own  Faculties,  and 
'  is  no  impediment  to  the  Good  of  others.     But  he  muft  be  ejfteem'd^ 
an  impediment  to  the  Good  of  others,  who  will  appropriate  to  him- 
felf  what  is  common,  or  afTume  more  and  greater  Advantages  from  ^ 

the  common  Stock,  than  fall  to  his  Share.  Thofe  things  then  which, 
are  pre-occupy'd  by  the  Choice  of  other  Men,  belong  to  theChoofers,, 
and  cannot  juftly  be  taken  from  them:  therefore  he  that  covets  them 
would  have  what  is  not  his  due :  /'.  e.  endeavours  by  an  undue  Elec- 
tion to  rob  others  of  their  Right.  This  is  to  be  referr'd  in  an  efpe- 
cial  Manner  to  fuch  things  as  are  pre-occupy'd  by  the  Choice  of  the 
Deity V  £)r  thefe  are  to  be  efteem'd  by  all  as  facred  and  prohibited: 
nor  can  any  one  meet  with  Succefs  that  oppofcs  himfelf  to  God,  and 
choofes  what  God  dii^pproves.  For  what  God  wills  muft  necellarily 
eome  to  pafs,  but  God  wills  the  Happinefs  of  all  Men  as  far  as  it  is 
pofTible ;  therefore  he  that  offends  unnecefTarily  againft  the  Happinefs 
of  any  one,  is  fuppos'd-  to  offend  againft  God,  and  to  choofe  what  is 
not  his  due. 

.     V.  Fifthly,  On  this  account  it  is  unlawful  for  us  to  defire  thofe  p.^, 
things  which  are  hurtful  to  ourfelves  or  others.    By  hurtful  things when^thofe 
I  underftand  thofe  that  lead  to  natural  Evils,  'viz.  fuch  as  are  preju-^^^s  which 
dicial  to  the  Body  or  Mind.    It  appears  from  what  has  been  faid,  J^rar'^^b 
that  thingsr  pleafe  us  bccaufe  they  are  chofen,  but  Reafon  perfuade&are  chofen*^ 
u»  ta  abftain  from  fuch  Ele(Stions  as  may  prove  pernicious  to  our  own  ^'^''"J?^  ^">* 
Minds,  or  thofe  of  others,  or  fuch  as  defraud  the  Appetites  unnecef-     ^  '  ^' 
farily :  for  we  owe  a  Gratification  to  thefe  Appetites,  when  it  can  be 
procured  without  greater  Detriment.    Therefore  an  Election  oppo- 
ied  to  thefe  gratis^  and  without  any  reafon,  muft  be  judg-d  an  undue 
one,  becaufe  it  deprives  us  of  the  due  Enjoyment  of  our  Appetites;, 


SE  at. 


^l3  Of  Moral  Evil 


^  i-T  j«        fm  !  f .  n  T  »«  .  -  .  '■ .     t.  ^^ 


SECT.    IV. 

^J       How   it  is  pojjihle  for  us  to  faU  into  undue 
*  •  Ele Nitons  ^. 

This  is  dene  I.  *  ^  I  '^  I  S  difficult  to  comprehend,  as  was  faid  before,  how  one 
five  ways.  J^      ^^iti  fall  fhort  of  Happinefs  who  has  it  in  his  Power  to 

pleafe  himfelf,  yet  if  he  choofe  in  the  foregoing  Manner,   or  the 
'like,  he  muft  necefTarily  fail  of  his  Choice,  and  his  Appetite  be  fru- 
ilrated,  i.e.  he  mull  be  unhappy.     But  how  is  it  poffible,  you'll  fay, 
^  that  any  one  fhould  make  fuch  a  Choice  ?     I  anfwer,  This  may  pro- 

»<  ceed  firft,  from  Error  or  Ignorance.     Secondly,  from  Inadvertency  or 

*'  Negligence.     Thirdly,   from  Levity.     Fourthly,    from   a   contrad:ed 

Habit.     Fifthly,    frora  other  ^petites  implanted   in  us  by  Nature. 
Not   that  die  Will  can  be  determined  by  thefe  or   any   thing  elfe 
which  is  external;  but  that  from  hence  it  takes  an  handle  and  oc- 
cafion  of  determining  itfelf,  which  it  would  not  have  had  other- 
wife. 
Tirft,  By  Er-     H.  Firft,  As  to  the  firft  of  thefe,  we  have  prov'd  before  that  we 
ror  or  culpa-  ate  liable  to  Errors  and  Ignorance  j  and  that  this  is  to  be  reckon'd 
bkignorance  ^jy^Qj^g  ^.jjg  natural  Evils.     When  therefore  we  are  forc'd  to  choofe 
among  things  not  fufficiently  known,  our  Errors  are  not  to  be  charg'd 
wpon  us,  nor  is  it  credible  tliat  God  will  fuffer  them  to  prove  fa- 
tal to  us.     But  when  we  are  under  no  manner  of  Neceffity,  an  E^ 
leQion  often  prefents  itfelf  to  us  in  Matters  fufficiently  undcrftood, 

and 

*  5^«.Lockc'i  Chapter  of  Pozaert  §.  S7*^^* 


Of  Moral  EviL  ^  ^  ^  3 

and  then  we  hurry  on  without  a  flri£l  and  careful  Enquiry,   and 
choofe  ImpolTibilities,  &c.  and  therefore  are  not  entirely  free  from 
Fault,  fince  we  ought  to  deliberate  and  examine  things  before  E- 
.  ledtion. 
•    III.  Secondly,  Thefe  undue  Eledlions  therefore  happen  thro*  In- Secondly,  By 
advertency,  for  by  due  Care  we  might   perceive  the  Good  and  Evil  ^''S^'S'»^'^- 
which  is  in  Objects;  but  being  negligent  andfupine,  we  are  frequent- 
ly impofed  upon,  and  fuffer  for  our  Negligence,  by  falling  into  the 
fore  mcntion'd  Inconveniencies. 

IV.  As  to   the  third.  Since   the  Pleafure  of  a  free  Agent  confifts  Thirdly,  Bjr 
'  m  Eledlion,  'tis  no  wonder  that  he  gives  himfelf  as  large  a  Scope  as||.p3"^j„^^°j. 

he  can  in  the  Exercife  of  it.  Neither  will  it  be  any  thing  furpri-gence  to  the 
fing,  if  in  this  full  Exercife  of  Elcdion,  he  fometimes  tranfgrefs  the  pff^^'^*^  °^ 
Bounds  prefcribed  him  by  God  and  Nature  j  and  light  upon  fome  things 
which  are  attended  witli  no  very  profperous  IlTue  {viz.  Abfurdities 
and  Impoffibilities)  fince  he  will  attempt  every  thing.  For  he  plea^ 
fcs-  himfelf  in  the  Trial,  tho'  he  be  unfortunate  in  the  Event ;  but 
this  is  no  Excufe;  for  every  one  is  oblig'd  to  take  care  of  himfelf, 
left  he  be  too  fond  of  indulging  new  Eledions,  and  from  Levity  be- 
come unduely  offeniive  to  himfelf  or  others. 

V.  Fourthly,.  We  fee  that  frequent  Choice  creates  an  Habit;  this  Fourth 'y,  By 
feems  to  proceed  from  hence,  that  as  we  delight  in  an  Election  of- ^^^^'J^^'^'''  ^'^' 
ren  repeated,  we  are  eafily  induc'd  to  hope  that  the  fame  Pleafure 

will  always  follow  the  fame  Ad:,  whereupoa  we  grow  fupii:ie  and 
negligent,  and  difregard  the  Alterations  of  things;  and  he  that  does 
this  may  eafily  fall  into  fuch  Eledions  as  will  not  be  attended  with 
Succefs.  Befide,  'tis  difficult  for  us  to  change  thofe  EieCUons,  the 
Delight  of  which  is  fix 'd  and,  as  it  were,  riveted  in  the  Mind  by- 
frequent  Experiment:  Yet  we  are  not  excufable  for  rufhing  upon  ab- 
furd  and  impoffible  things,  in  order  to  avoid  the  Uneafmefs  attending 
the  Change  of  Eledtion.  And  if  we  fearch  into  the  Cafe  more  nar- 
rowly, we  ftiall  find  that  moft  undue  Elections  arife  from  this  unfcai- 
fonable  Perfeverance,  ail  which  come  juftly  under  the  Cenfure  of  a 
culpable  Obftinacy. 

VI.  Fifthly,  It  has  been  often  hinted,  that  we  confift  of  a  Soul  th^fnnonn- 
and  Body,,  that  thefe  are  mutually  affe<5ted  by  each  other,  and  ihatnityoi  iJe 


[clue... 


a  5  4  0/  ^ord  Evil  "^ 

from  hence  various  Appetites  arife  in  us,  fuch  as  tlie  Prefervation  of 
the  Body,  Defire  of  Offspring,  and  the  like ;  and  whatever  is  an  im- ^ 
pediment  to  thefe,  tbat  we  efleem  hurtful.     If  therefore  we  be  not 
upon  our  Guard,  we  are  hurried  on,  by  the  Importunity  of  them,  to 

V  '*  Abfurdities,  or  when  we  give  a  loofe  to  our  Elections,  we  grafp  at 

iuch  things  as  offer  an  unneceflary  Violence  to  them :  hence  arife  an 
immenfe  train  of  Uneafmefles  to  ourfelves  and  others ;  hence  comes 
Violence  and  Injury  to  our  Nature  and  the  Natural  Appetites,  to 
^vhich  we  owe  at  leafl  a  moderate  Indulgence :  hereupon  we  rafhiy 

<  and  unlawfully  feize  thofc  things   that  are   pre-occupied  by  the  E- 

ledions  or  Appetites  of  other  Men ;  nay,  are  not  fo  cautious  as  to 
refrain  from  what  is  detei'min'd  by  the  Will  of  God  himfelf :  from 
-  thefe  and  the  like  Occalions  it  happens  that  we  abufe  our  Libeny, 
and  by  undue  Elections  bring  natural  Evils  upon  ourfelves  or  others. 
For  as  we  are  endow'd  with  Liberty  in  thefe  and  the  like  Cafes,  we 
may  either  ufe  it  according  to  the  didtate  of  Reafon,  oi*  abufe  it : 
this  Power  feems  to  be  included  in  the  very  Notion  of  created  Li- 
:htity. 

VIl.  It  appears  from  hence  how  cautioufly  Eledions  ought  to  be 

'Why  every  .j^^jg     for   tho'  nothinff  olcafes  us  but  what  is  chofen.  yet  we  do 

thing  ought  I  ,        1   1.    1       .     °f^  /^  1  1  .  ..*■',        .  . 

not  to  be      not  Only  take  delight  m  choojing^  but  much  more  in  enjoying  the  things 
■aiofen,  and    chofcu,  otherwife  it  would  be  the  fame  thing  whatever  we  chofe : 
tlonsarepot  ^^  muft  take  cate  then  that  our  Eled:ions  be  made  of  fuch  things 
ocifiiychang'd  as  wc  may  always  enjoy.     For  if  they  be  of  perifhable  Objects,  or 
fuch  as    are  not  in  the  leall  anfwerable  to  the  end  of  the  Eledlor, 
',  he  that  choofes  them  muft  neceflarily  grieve  at  the  Difappointment. 
He. may  avoid  this,  will  feme  fay,  by  changing  his  Election,  when 
the  thing  chofen  perilhes  or  fails  j  but  it  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  E- 
/ledtions  are  not  chang'd  without  a  Senfe  of  Grief  and  Remorfc.  For 
we  never  think  of  altering  them  till  we  are  convinc'd  that  we  have 
chofen  amifs.     When  therefore  we  are  difappointed  of  the  Enjoy- 
ment of  that  which  we  have  chofen,  we  defpair,  become  miferable, 
penitent,  and  confcious  of  an  Evil  Choice,   and  then  at  laft  begin  to 
alter  our  Choice,  which  cannot  be  done  without  an  anxious  and  un- 
.eafy  Senfe  of  Difappointment,   and  the   more  and  longer  we  have 
i)een  intent  upon  any  Elcdion,  io  much  the  greater  Pain  it  will  cofl 
us 


Of  Moral  Evil ) 

us'-^p.-bc^  fofced  to  change  it.  Hence  proceeds  the  Difficulty  whfc/i 
we  feel  in  altering  Eledtions ;  hence  many  had  rather  perfift  in  ab- 
furd  Elections  than  undergo  the  trouble  of  altering  them:  For  things 
pleafe  us  becaufe  we  will  them,  but  to  rejed:  what  we  have  once  willed^ 
is  contradi<fling  ourfelves,  and  cannot  be  done  without  a  very  difa- 
greeable  flruggle  and  convulfion  of  the  Mind :  as  any  one  may  learn 
from  Experience.  (84.) 


'Hl 


r 


NOTES. 


(B4.)  Any  one  tlut  attentively  confiders  the 
Workings  of  his  own  Mind,  will  foon  be  fa- 
tisfy'd  of  the  truth  of  all  that  our  Author  here 
advances;  he  will  obferve  what  difficulty  and 
reluftance  he  feels  in  receding  from  what  he 
has  once  firmly  refolv'd  upon,  the  perhaps  he 
can  perceive  no  manner  of  Good  in  jt  except 
what  arifes  purely  from  that  Refolution.  To 
make  a  Vifit  at  a  certain  time  ;  to  walk  to  any 
particular  place ;  to  recreate  ourfelves  with 
this  or  that  kind  of  Diverfion  ;  may  be  Aftions 
in  themfelves  perfeftly  indifferent  and  trivial: 
but  when  once  propofed,  even  upon  mere 
whim  and  caprice,  and  refol/d  on  with  as 
little  reafon,  they  become  often  as  much  the 
Objeds  of  our  Hope  and  Defire  ;  the  thoughts 
of  profecuting  them  give  us  as  great  pleafure 
and  fatisfadion,  and  we  are  as  unwillingly 
withdrawn  from  them,  and  as  much  difap- 
poJHted  when  we  fall  fliort  of  the  fancied  en- 
joyment of  them,  as  we  fhould  be  in  Matters 
of  the  laft  Importance.  Every  Man  that  has 
taken  the  Icaft  notice  of  what  paffcs  within 
him,  is  able  to  give  numberlefs  Inlhnces  of  the 
truth  of  the  foregoing  Obfervation:    which 


may  ferve  to  convince  us  how  great  the  force 
and  power  of  Volition  is,  and  what  excellent 
ufc  it  may  be  of  in  Life.  How  it  fupplies  us 
with  courage  and  conftancy  in  the  moft  ar- 
duous Undertakings,  and  enable  us  to  furmount 
the  greatefl  Difficulties:  how  it  qualifies  and 
illeviates  ourPain,  and  augments  theSum  of  our 
Happinefs  ;  and  makes  us  run  contentedly  the 
Round  of  low  and  otherwife  tedious  purfuits, 
and  bear  with  pleafure  the  otherwife  infuppor- 
table  load  of  human  Woes.  This  fhews  the 
great  ufefulnefs  and  neceffity  of  fuch  a  Princi- 
ple, and  will  lead  us  to  confider  with  our  Au- 
thor, in  what  a  cautious  manner  it  ought  to 
be  exerted,  left  it  fall  upon  wrong  and  im- 
proper Objefts,  and  thereby,  inftead  of  lefTen- 
ing,  increafe  our  Mifery,  and  become  itfclf 
the  greateft  part  of  it.  That  this  Principle  of 
Liberty,  tho'  frequently  attended  with  thefe 
confequences,  is  yet  a  Gift  worthy  of  the  mofl: 
beneficent  Donor,  muft  appear  from  a  general 
computation  of  its  Good  and  Evil  Eflefls, 
with  regard  to  the  whole  Syftem,  which  will 
be  the  Subjeft  of  the  following  Sedions. 


7r 


.u» 


SECT. 


Gg 


^a6  Of  Moral  Evil 


j.pM..r>^  tyti  r»i^»-~>    -|.1^    llfH,^  -.^    .^.    ..».. 


SECT.    V. 

How   Evil  EleBtons  are  confiftent  wit  I?  the 
Tower  and  Coodnefs  of  God. 


'^uh 


is  U  B  S  !E  C  T.     I. 


S^ro£ofcs  the  y)ificuUj'j    "with  <i  preparative  to   the  Solu^ 

iion   of   it. 


-1  T  T  Tte  hjfvfe  ih'eWh  that  trtbral  EviBs  arife  from  undue  Election; 
Free- Agents        W      hat  Ele<fti(>ns  are  free;  and  that  it  is  not  at  all  neceflary 
arenotnecef-for  aiiy  oUt  knbXvingly  and  "tvillingly  to  purfue  the  worfe.     Moral 
therefore      fevife  cannot  therefore  be  excufed  by  heceflTty,  as  the  natural  ones, 
feem  to  be    iattd  chofc  of  Imperfc(Stion  are.     'Tis  plain  that  created  Nature  im- 
G^vokn'^  plies  Imperfeftion  In'thfe  very  terms  o^f  Its  being  created  ffince  what 
tarily.         IS  abfolutcly  perfect  is  very  God)  either  therefore  nothing  at  all  muft 
be  created,  or  fomething  imperfedt :  and  that  God,  agreeably  to  what 
infinite  Power  and  Goodnefs  required,  permitted  no  manner  of  Evil 
in  Nature,  the  abfence  whereof  would  not  have  introduced  more  or 
,%r^*er  Evil.     Since  therefore  Inconveniencies  attend  either  the  pre- 
fence  or  abfence  of  it,  God  made  that  which  was  attended  with  the 
leaft.  "^  There  are  no  Evils  then  which  could  polTibly  be  avoided,  and 
therefore  they  muft  be  look'd  upon  as  neceffary,  fince  the  Imperfec- 
tion of  a  Creature  did  not  admit  of  pure  and  abfolute  Good.     But 
this  Neceflity  does  not  appear  in  free  Agents  ;   For  the  Evils  incident 

to 


Of  Moral  Evil  2  ^j 

to  them  feem  to  proceed,  not  from  imperfection  of  Nature,  but  free 
Choice,  and  are  therefore  permitted  by  God  voluntarily,  when  nei- 
ther the  Nature  of  Things,  nor  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe  require  the 
permiffion  of  them,  that  is,  the  World  would  he  as  well  without  as 
with  thern. 

II.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd,  that  God  permitted  the  former  kind  of  E-  Moral  Evils 
vils  becaufe  they  were  infeparable  from  things;  either  therefore  the  ;\^'.^ "" '^^- 
things  muft  not  have  been  created,  or  their  inherent  Evils  tolerat£(}.  r.cailn'^wUh 
But  Evil  Eledions  have  no  necefTary  connedion  with  the  free  Ads  •  'VecNature, 
of  the  Will:  neither  does  the  Nature  of  Man  require  that  he  (hould Xantage'tY 
choofe  amifs :  nor  does  any  benefit  accrue  to  him  from  thefe  Elec-  it. 

tions  which  could  not  be  obtained  without  them,  as  it  does  in  Hun- 
ger, Thirft,  Fear,  and  the  reft  of  the  Paflions;  for  without  thefe  Af- 
fedions,  as  was  (hewn,  the  Animal  would  foon  perifli  j  but  no  Eviji 
would  befal  us  (nay  what  Good  would  not  ? )  if  we  always  attended 
to  Reafon,  and  never  chofe  amifs.  Since  therefore  Man  might  bring 
the  greateft  pleafure  to  himfelf,  and  exercife  his  faculties  by  choofing 
always  well,  how  comes  it  to  pafs  that  God  fuffers  him  to  hurt  him- 
felf and  others  unnecefTarily  by  Evil  Eledions  ?  If  it  be  faid  that  a 
Power  of  choofing  cither  Side  is  contain'd  in  the  very  Notion  of  Li- 
berty ;  this  muft  be  allow'd,  but  yet  there  feems  to  be  room  enough 
for  the  Exercife  of  Liberty,  tho'  the  Will  were  confin'd  to  the  choice 
of  what  is  lawful  and  convenient ;  what  need  is  there  then  of  fuch  a 
Power  as  may  extend  to  the  choice  of  Evil  ? 

III.  This  feems  to  be  the  main  ftrefs  of  the  Difficulty,  here  is  the  ^crc  then 
hardeft  point  in  this  Affair,    *viz.  Whence  come  Moral  Evils;  /.  ^.  lies  the  ftrefs 
thofe  that  arc  not  necefTary  ?     If  they  be  faid  to  be  neccflary,  how  are  °Jj^^  ^j®' 
they  free?     If  they  be  not  necefiary,  why  does  God  permit  them.?  why  did 
The  latter  feems  repugnant  to  the  Goodnefs  of  God,  the  former  to  the  ?°?  P^*"?!*' 

^,  r        r         '\  -  '"Oi«  Evils 

Nature  of  a  tree  Agent.  which  arc 

neither  neceffary  nor  ufefuJ  ? 

IV.  It  muft  be  confefs'd,  that  we  are  lefs  prepared  for  a  Solution  of 
this  Difficulty  than  the  forrner ;  for  the  Nature  and  Syftems  of  the  ,)^^^y °"J' 
Intelledual  World  are  lefs  known  to  us  than  thofe  of  the  purely  Ma- jnucii  of  the 

Gg  2  terial^':^'"r^°^„ 

9  thinking  Be- 

ings as  of 
jT...:erijl  ones,  and  therefore  are  lefs  prepared  for  an  Anfw-cr  to  this  DifHculty,  than  to  the  former. 


ai8  Of  Moral  Evil, 

terial  one :  Material  Objedts  furround  us,  ai:id  occupy  all  the  Inlets 
to  Knowledge,  and  are  the  only  things  that  immediately  afFed:  our 
Senfes.  They  intrude  upon  us  with  an  infinite  Variety,  and  produce 
many  and  various  Senfations  in  us.  But  of  intellectual  Beings  of 
their  Operations,  or  of  the  mutual  connedlion  between  them^  we 
have  but  very  few,  and  thofe  very  obfcure  Notions,  viz.  fuch  as  a- 
rife  only  from  the  refle(5tion  of  our  Under/landing  upon  itfelf,  or  are 
collected  by  the  ufe  of  Reafon  deducing  one  thing  from  another  : 
For,  of  all  intelled:ual  Beings,  our  own  Mind  alone  is  immediately 
perceiv'd  by  us ;  nor  can  we  (as  in  Bodies)  compare  the  Notions  a- 
rifing  from  it,  with  them  that  proceed  from  other  Sources  :  all  our 
Knowledge  therefore  of  Spirits  or  thinking  Beings  is  derived  from 
this  alone.  'Tis  no  wonder  then  if  we  be  very  much  in  the  dark  in 
our  Reafonings  about  thefe  and  their  Operations :  and  do  not  fo  clear- 
ly perceive  the  necellity  of  allowing  Free- Will  to  them,  as  contra- 
riety in  the  Motions  of  Matter ;  nor  fo  eafily  apprehend  what  Incon- 
venience would  follow  from  rcllraining  the  exercife  of  Liberty,  aswe 
fee  the  confequence  of  taking  away  the  motion  of  Matter.  We  know 
that  without  Motion  the  whole  Mafs  of  Matter  would  prove  entirely 
ufelefs,  and  that  there  would  be  no  room  for  fo  many  x^nimals  as  now 
we  find  receive  their  Origin  and  Subfiflence  from  it ;  which  is  juflly 
eftecm'd  a  greater  Evil,  and  more  intolerable  than  all  the  natural  E- 
vils  arifing  from  Matter  and  Motion:  and  we  fliould  find  the  fame 
thing  in  the  prevention  of  the  ufe  of  Free -Will,  if  we  underftood 
the  Syftem  of  the  Intelledual  as  well  as  that  of  the  Material 
World.  But  if  we  can  fhew  that  more  Evils  necelTarily  arife  from 
withdrawing  or  reftraining  the  ufe  of  Free- Will,  than  from  permit- 
ting the  abufe  of  it,  it  muft  be  evident  that  God  is  oblig'd  to  fuf- 
fer  either  thefe  or  greater  Evils.  And  fince  the  leaft  of  thefe  ne- 
cefTary  Evils  is  chofen,  even  infinite  Goodneis  could  not  poffibly  do. 
better. 

V.  Let  us  try  then  whether  the  abufe  of  Free- Will  could  be  pro- 
Tbe  abufe  of  hibited  with  lefs  detrimeat  to  the  whole  Syftem,  than  what  arifes 
^a^be^con-  ^^°"^  ^^^  pcrmifTion  of  it.  There  are  three  Ways  whereby  God  may 
ceiv'd  be  conceiv'd  able   to  have  prevented  bad   Eledionsj  firft,  If  he  had 

to  have       created  no  Free  Being  at  all.     Secondly,  If  his  Omnipotence  inter- 

becn  prcven-  °  ^  *■ 

ted  three  ^  pOle, 

•vyays,  which  .ire  ccnfidci'd  in  tKe  three  following  Sub!c6lioi)S. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  ^^q 

pofrj-F  ^>fcl  <^ccaflonally  reftrain  the  Will,  which  Is  naturally  free,  from 
any  wrong  Election.  Thirdly,  If  he  fhould  change  the  prefent  ftate 
of  things,  and  tranOate  Man  into  another,  where  the  occafions  of  Er- 
ror and  incit:  !Tents  to  Evil  being  cut  off,  he  ihould  meet  with  no- 
thing that  could  tempt  him  to  choofe  amifs. 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     11. 

'•'       Why  God   has  created    Free  Agents. 

I.     A  S  to  the  firfl:,  'Tis  certain  that  God  was  not  compell'd  by  any 

£\  neceffity  to  create  any  thing  at  all,  he  might  therefore  have  ^^°^  ™S^ 
prevented  all  Moral  Evils,    if  he  had  not  endow'd  any  Being  with  ted  Moral  E- 
Free  Choice ;    for  fo  there  would  have  been  nothing  that  could  fin,  J^'Jf'  'J!  ^^ 
But  fuch  a  monflrous  Defeat  and  Hiatus  would  have  been  left  in  Na-  to  crette^anv 
ture  by  this  means,  viz.  by  taking  away  all  Free  Agents,  as  would  free  Being, 
put  the  World  into  a  worfe  Condition  than  that  which  it  is  in  at  pre- 
fent,  with  all  the  Moral  Evils  that  attend  it,  tho'  they  were  multl- 
ply'd  to  a  much  greater  Number. 

II.  For  in   the  firft  place,  if  we  fet  afide  Free  Agents,  i.  e,  thofe  Rut  without 
which  have  the  Principle  of  Ad:ion  within  themfelves,  there  is  pro-  thefe  the 
perly  nothing  at  all  Self-ad:Ive,  for  all  other  Beings  are  merely  paf-  ii^°e'becn"l^ 
live :  there  Is  Indeed  fome  kind  of  Adlion  in  Matter,  viz.  Motion ;  but  mere  Ma- 
we  know  that  it  Is  paflive  even  with  regard  to   that;  'tis  therefore ^|^^^"^'^"^ 
the  Adion  of  God  upon  Matter,  rather  than  of  Matter  itfelf;    for  it  paflive.'"^ 
does  not  move  itfelf,  but  is  moved.     Without  Free  Agents  then  the 
whole  World  would  be  a  mere  Machine^  capable  of  being  turn'd  any 
Way  by  the  Finger  or  Will  of  God,  but  able  to  efJedt  nothing  of  it- 
felf    Nay  the  whole  Work  of  God  could  not  of  itfelf  exert  one 
fingle  Adt  or  Thought,  but  would  be  totally  brute  and  fhjpid,  as 
much  as  a  Wheel  or  a  Stone :  it  would  continue  fluggifh  and  inca- 
pable of  Adlion,  unlefs  actuated  by  external  force.     Second  Caufes 
could  therefore  effedt  nothing  which  might  be  imputed  to  them, 
but  all  would  be  done  entirely  by  the  firft.     We  need  not  fay,  how 

muclx 


a^o 


from  thefe 
who  declare 
thit  the  Un- 
dcrflanding 
isafliTc,  the' 
itisneceHiry 
as  alfo  God 
himfclf. 


Anfwer  to 
the  former 
part  of  the 
Objedion. 


'^AnAver  to 
the  Utter. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

much  a  World  thus  conftituted  would  be  inferior  to  the  prefent,  nox 
how  incommodious  and  unworthy  of  its  Divine  Author.  x37«;i(3 

III.  Man,  you'll  fay,  neceflariiy  affents  to  this  Propofition,  twice 
two  make  four ;  but  tho'  his  Mind  is  neceflarily  driven  to  this  AfTenr, 
and  confequently  is  not  free^  yet  he  is  aBhe ;  for  it  can  fcarce  be  faid 
that  a  Man  is  paflive  in  giving  his  Affent  *.  The  fame  may  be  af- 
firm'd  of  God,  w^ho,  tho'  we  fuppofe  him  to  be  abfolutely  free  in  his 
primary  Elections,  yet  when  thefe  are  once  fix'd,  he  muft  neceflarily 
execute  what  he  had  decreed  :  neverthelefs  he  is  properly  Self-active 
in  all  Cafes,  confequently  there  may  be  fomething  active  in  Nature, 
tho'  there  were  nothing  free. 

IV.  As  to  the  former  Part  of  the  Objed:ion,  'tis  not  very  clear  what 
may  be  the  Caufe  of  intellectual  Affent  5  if  the  Object,  then  the  Mind 
is  merely  paflive  in  the  A6t  of  Underflianding  :  nor  is  Affent  imputa- 
ble to  it  any  more  than  Defcent  to  a  Stone ;  but  if  the  Object  be  e- 
fteem'd  only  a  Condition  upon  which  the  Underllanding  a£^s,  we 
fliall  want  a  Caufe  to  determine  the  Underfl:anding  ;  for  that  cannot 
be  fuppofed  to  determine  itfelf,  any  more  than  the  Fire  determines 
itfelf  to  burn  combuftible  Matter  -f*.  For  no  body  judges  the  com- 
bufflble  Matter  to  be  active  when  it  is  fet  on  Fire,  or  that  the  Fire 
burns  of  itfelf  without  being  kindled  by  fomething  elfe.  The  World 
then  without  Liberty  will  be  a  piece  of  Mechanifm,  where  nothing 
mpves  itfelf,  but  every  thing  is  mov'd  by  an  external  Caufe,  and  that 
by  another,  and  fo  on  till  we  corne  at  the  firft,  namely  God ;  who 
will  be  the  only  Self-adive  3eing  and  mufl:  be  efleem'd  the  real 
Caufe  of  all  things:  neither  can  any  thing,  whether  well  or  ill  done, 
be  afcribed  to  others. 

V.  As  to  the  latter  part  of  the  Objcdion,  That  Being  mufl:  be 
denominated  Fre^,  who  is  held  by  no  other  tie  than  his  own  Ejec- 
tion :  3u.t  God  is  -HiO  othcrwife  Q^lig'd  to  execute  his  Decrees,  there- 
fore he  is  free,  if  he  did  but  make  his  De;crees  freely  5  and  is  purely 
adtive  in  every  Operation  wherein  he  executes  them.  For  he  fuffers 
nothing  by  neceffity,  nor  from  any  other  befide  him]^lf,  and  is  deter- 
min'4  to.adt  by  his  own  Laberty. 

VI.  Secondly, 

*  See'^Q.ic  61. 

jt"  ^ie  f(i.r  Auth,r\  Note  B. 


Of  Moral  Evil  2  3  r. 

VI.  Secondly,  We  believe  that  God  created  the  World  in  order  to  God  has  a 
exefcife  the  Powers  he  is  poflefs'd  of  for  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe ;  complacency 

,        t-N.'    •  t-^        ^       r       ^  r  ii'i  i  i        i'/-i/'««      m  his  Works, 

the  Divine    Goodnels   therefore  delights  and    applauds  itlelf  in  its  and  if  no-    ., 
Works,  and  the  more  any  thing  refembles  God,   and  the  more  'tis  ^.'^'"g  were  ,. 
Self-fufficient,  it  is  to  be  efteem'd  fo  much  the  more  agreeable  to  its  vvo^uid  be 
Author.     But  any  one  may  underftand  how  much  a  Work  which  wanting  in, 
moves  itfelf,  pleafes  itfelf,  and  is  capable  of  receiving  and  returning -3  ^"^iJ'l^j^^J 
2.  Favour,  is  preferable  to  one  that  does  nothing,  feels  nothing,  makes  able  to  the 
no  return,  unlefs  by  the  force  of  fome  external  Impulfe :  any  Perfon,  ^'^^r- 
1  fay,  may  apprehend  this,  who  remembers  what  a  Difference  there 
is  between  a  Child  carefling  his  Father,  and  a  Machine  turn'd. about 
by  the  hand  of  the  Artificer.     There  is  a  kind  of  Commerce  between 
God,  and  fuch  of  his  Works  as  are  endow'd  with  Freedom  j  there's 
room  for  a  Covenant  and  mutual  Love.     For  there  is  fome  fort  of 
Action  on  both   Sides,  whereby  the  Creature  may  in  fome  meafure 
return  the  benefits  of  the  Creator,  at  Icaft  make  an  acknowledgment 
for  them  j  and  if  any  thing  in  the  Divine  Works  can  be  conceiv'd  to 
te  agreeable  to  God,  this  mufi:  certainly  be  fo.     One  fuch  Action  as 
this  is  preferable  to  all  the  Sportings  of  Matter,  or  the  Labyrinths  of 
Motion ;  if  then  there  had  been  no  free  Creatures,  God  muft  have 
been  'deprived  of  this  Complacency,  which  is  almoft  the  only  one 
worthy  of  him  that  he  could  receive  from  the  Creation.     'Tis  there- 
fore as  much  agreeable  to  God  that  he  (liould  have  made  fuch  Be- 
ings, as  it  h  to  the  World  that  they  fhould  be  made :  for  if  nothing 
of  this  kind  had  been  created,  the  very  befl:  thing  among  the  Crea- 
tures, and  that  which  is  moft  agreeable  to  the  Deity,  would  have 
been  wanting.     'Tis  better  therefore  to  permit  the  abufe  of  Liber- 
ty in   fome     than  to  have  omitted  fo   much  Good.     For  the  De- 
ic&.  and  Abfence  of  fuch  Agents  is  to  be  eftcemed   a  greater   Evil 
than  all  the  Crimes  which  are  confequent  upon  the  abufe  of  Li- 
berty. 

VII.  Thirdly.  From  what  has  been  faid,  we  learn,  that  fome  Evils  Ncccfliiry 
which  neceflarily  adhere  to  things,  ijiz.  Natural  ones,  and  thofe  of  not'aiwrs 
impcrfe(5tion,  did  not  hinder  the  Divine  Goodncfs  from  creating  the  hinder  the 
Good  with  which  they  were  connedled,   fince  the  excefs   of  Good  S-^^fV"" 

'  of  things,    .. 

com-  much  lei's 
thofe  wiiich 
are  only  poflible. 


3^ 


Of  Moral  Evil 

compenfated  for  the  fewer  and  lefs  Evils  which  were  unavoidable  : 
Thus  God  chofe  fuch  Animals  as  were  Mortal,  afflkled  with  Hunger, 
Thirft,  and  other  Paflions,  rather  than  none  at  all.  If  then  rhofe  E- 
vils  which  were  necejj'ary  and  forcfeen  did  not  hinder  God  from  crea- 
ting the  Good  that  was  annext  to  them,  how  much  Icfs  {1  ould  the 
pojjible  Evils  arifing  from  the  abufe  of  Free- Will  hinder  his  Goodncfs 
from  creating  Free-Agents  ?  To  enjoy  free  Choice  is  a  greater  Good 
than  fimple  Life,  but  we  willingly  accept  this  latter  with  all  the 
train  of  Natural  Evils,  how  much  more  gratefully  fliould  we  em- 
brace the  Gift  of  Liberty,  attended  only  with  fome  Danger  of  E- 
vils,  but  not  with  the  Evils  themfelves,   as   in   the  former   Cafes, 

(85-)         . 

VIIL  Fourthly,  It  mud  be  obferv'd  that  Ele8ions  are  therefore 
^ea- efteem'd  Evil,  becaufe  they  lead  us  into  Natural  Evils.  For  if  an 
ter  than  Mo-  Election  contain  nothing  abfurd  or  prejudicial,  'tis  not  a  wrong  one. 
Free"wii?a  Hatred  of  God,  Rebellion  againfl:  his  Commands,  Murther,  Theft, 
grcuer  Gocd  Lying,  are  Sins,  becaufe  they  are  hurtful  to  ourfelves  or  others,  be- 
'''^Y^p^;' caufe  they  deprive  us  of  natural  Good,  and  lead  into  Evil.  Electi- 
ons therefore  are  wrong  and  undue  on  account  of  the  natural  Evils 
which  fometimes  attend  them  j  Natural  Evils  then  are  greater  than 
Moral  * :  For  that  which  makes  any  thing  bad  mufl  neceffarily  be 
worfe  itfelf :  But  Free-Will  is  better  than  natural  Appetites,  and  a 
Gift  more  worthy  of  the  Deity,  it  is  not  therefore  to  be  deny'd  to 
the  Creatures  on  accou-nt  of  the  concomitant  Evils,  any  more  than 
the  natural  Appetites  and  Propenfities :  both  of  them  indeed  fome- 
times 


Natural  E 
vi!s  are 


tura 
Cites. 


NOTES, 


(85.)  In  relation  to  us,  indeed,  a  Gift  which 
is  attended  only  with  the  poflibility  of  fome 
Inconveniencies,  appears  to  be  of  more  digni- 
ty and  value  than  one  that  brings  fome  degree 
of  unavoidable  Mifery  along  with  it,  and  as 
fuch  it  ought  to  be  receiv'd  with  prcportiona- 
ble  gratitude  by  us.  But  with  refpeft  to  a 
Being  who  forcfees  all  the  Abufes  of  Free- 
Will,    all    the  contingent    Evils    confequcnt 


thereupon,  are  as  certain  as  the  natural  and  ne- 
ceflary  ones,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  equally 
provided  againfl.  This  Argument  therefore  a- 
bout  t.'he  Contingency  of  Moral  Evil,  fo  fir  as 
it  relates  to  the  Deity,  need  not  be  infifled  on, 
fince  our  Author  allows  the  Divine  Prefci- 
ence,  and  confidently  with  that,  offers  reafons 
fufficient  for  the  Vindication  of  the  other  At- 
tributes of  God  in  the  prefent  Cafe, 


Set  Chap.  4.  §.  4.  par.  8.  and  X  i. 


Of  Mofdl  EviL  i^ 

times  lead  us  iiitCf  t\\t  (itht  Ei^ils,  but  with  thiS  t)ifFetenc6,  tlkt  {he 
one,  "viz.  thfe  natural  Appetite,  loads  lis  with  fevils  by  netdfflty;  but 
tlie  other,  't;/^.  Free- Will,  not  of  neceffity,  but  only  if  We  pleafc". 
't'hefe  might  h^ve  beeh  avoided  fincc  they  are  contingent,  but  thofc 
could  not,  fmce  they  force  themfelves  upon  u§  againft  our  Wills :  As 
therefore  it  became  Ood  to  create  an  Appetite  which  ^^■^s  Jdin'd  with 
neceffary  Evils ;  how  much  mote  agteeable  was  it  to  his  Goodnefs  to 
have  endow'd  us  with  Free- Will,  by  which  thefe  may  be  avoided,  dr 
at  leaft  alleviated  ?  \?  the  naturjil  Appetite  be  a  greater  Good  than 
wh^t  thefe  E<^ils  which  flow  from  it  can  overballance,  and  therefore 
wofthy  to  be  implanted  in  Animals  by  the  Deity;  how  much  mord 
excellent  a  Good  will  Free-£le6tiOn  be,  by  which  alone  we  become 
capable  of  Plappinefs,  tho'  join'd  with  the  danger  of  falling  into  E- 
vUs  by  abufe  ? 

IX.  Fifthly,  Jf  the  State  of  Mart  would  be  worfe  without  Fre^-  The  stat€  of 
Will  than  with  it,  'tis  plain  that  Liberty  diminifhes  in/lead  of  incred-  bf  woTfJ'i'f 
filig  the  Sum  of  Evils,  and  is  befto^/^'d  upon  us  for  that  end.     But  Frec-wm 
hovv  much  more  miferable  the  State  of  Man  would  be  without  Li- "'^""^  ^^'^^'^ 
-be'fty  th^n  it  is  with  it,  will  appear  to  any  one  who  confiders  What 
feft  of  Creatures  We  fliould  be  Without  Election.     For  if  Man  wete 
not  free,  he  would  be  driven  by  the  Violence  of  Matter  and  Motiott, 
and  foOner  or  later  be  quite  overwhelm'd  with  thofe  natural  Evils 
which  neceffarily  arife  from  the  Nature  and  Laws  of  Motion.     But 
it  is  better  to  ftruggle  with  fome  of  theie  with  Liberty,  than  all  of 
them  with  nec€i?ityi  the  former  is  the  Condition  of  Men,  the  latter 
of  Brutes  *.     If  by  being  deprived  of  Eledtion  We  fhould  be  ffeed 
from  all  kind  of  Evil,  we  might  complain  of  God  for  giving  it;  but 
feeing  that  Whether  we  be  free  or  bound  by  the  chaCin  of  Fate  (while 
we  have  Bodies)  we  muft  neceflarily  endure  thofe  Evils  which  are 
ton(tt[\itnt  Upon  the  aifedions  of  Bodies ;  (n^y  thofe  very  EtJls  whieb 
We  were  afraid  of  falling  into  by  a  wrong  Choice)  'tis  in  Vain  to  dcfirc 
the  itbfence  of  Libetty,"  by  relying  upon  which,  and  ufing  it  aright, 
we  may  avoid  the  mojfl  bitter  part  evefl  Of  thefe  neCe'flaty  Evils. 

X.  For 

*  duff  MfoyAi  Di^f-te,  fei  ilt  Ol/Jirvdlicrt  frcM  Bnyle  in  N<M)e  35. 

H  h 


«34- 


Free  Agents 
only  are  c.i- 
pable  of  per. 
feft  H.ippi- 
nefs,  there- 
fore it  is  bet- 
ter to  enjoy 
Liberty. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

X.  For  in  the  Sixth  place,  it  is  moft  manifeft  that  the  greateft 
Good,  and  that  whereby  Men  excel  other  Animals,  is  owing  to  Li- 
berty. By  the  affiftance  of  this  we  rife  above  Fate,  and  when  at- 
tack'd  from  without  by  adverfe  Fortune,  we  find  our  Happinefs 
within  ourfeives.  Other  Animals  have  nothing  to  oppofc  to  a  Di- 
ftemper,  Death,  or  Pain,  nothing  to  delight  themfelves  in,  except 
Sleep,  Food,  and  the  Appetite  of  propagating  their  Species.  But  a 
free  Agent,  in  the  midft  of  Pains  and  Torments,  of  Hunger  and 
Thirft,  nay  Death  itfelf,  has  wherewithal  to  pleafe  itfelf,  and  to 
blunt  the  Edge  of  all  thefe  Evils.  We  complain  of  our  Bodies,  that 
by  being  tied  to  them,  we  are  oblig'd  to  undergo  very  many  and 
great  Hardfhips ;  how  much  more  ftiU  of  Complaints  fhould  we  be 
if  we  were  entirely  fubjedte^  to  them,  and  hurried  into  Evils  with- 
out any  Remedy  or  Relief?  Is  it  not  better  for  us  to  have  our  Hap- 
pinefs in  our  own  Power,  than  to  be  oblig'd  to  feek  it  elfewhere,  nay 
rather  to  defpair  of  it  ?  Which  Happinefs  is  only  to  be  found  in  a 
Free  Choice,  as  was  {hewn  before.  From  hence  it  appears,  I  hope, 
fufficiently,  why  God  created  Free  Agents  notwithftanding  the  abufe 
which  they  were  liable  to.  For  he  chofe  a  Creature  which  w  ould 
fometimes  do  amifs,  rather  than  that  every  thing  fhould  be  drawn  on 
by  Fate,  and  a  Chain  of  Neceffity,  into  inevitable  Evils.  (86.) 

XL  But 

N  o  t:  E  S. 


(86.)  Our  Author  having  fliewn  in  ^.  2.  that 
the  greateft  part  of  our  Happinefs  conlifls  in 
this  Principle  of  Eledion,  here  points  out 
fome  of  the  many  Inconveniencies  that  would 
attend  the  lofs  of  it.  Firft,  If  there  was  no 
fuch  thing  as  a  free  Agent,  all  would  be  mere 
Mechanifm  and  neceflary  Eftefts  of  the  firft 
Caufe,  /'.  e.  the  beft  and  nobleft  part  of  Nature 
would  be  cut  off",  that  which  of  all  others  is 
moft  worthy  of  and  agreeable  to  the  Deity. 
Theie  would  be  no  Creatures  capable  of  ma- 
king any  kind  of  return,  of  paying  any  reafo- 
nable  Obedience  and  Duty  to  God ;  no  poffi- 
bility  for  him  to  difpliy  his  Wifdom,  Good- 
nefs  and  Mercy  in  the  Government  of  them, 
nor  any  means  of  bringing  them  to  the  fubli- 
meft  Degree  of  Intelleftual  Happinefs,  viz. 
that  which   arifes  from  Morality.    Secondly, 


Thofe  paffive  Beings  themfelves  would  be  in  a 
much  worfe  Condition  than  they  now  are. 
They  would  be  deprived  of  all  the  Happinefs^ 
which  they  now  enjoy  from  the  choice  of  in- 
different Objedls;  they  would  be  neceffarily  ex- 
pofed  to  all  the  natural  Evils  arifing  from  the 
general  Laws  of  Matter  and  Motion,  viz.  Di- 
ftempers  of  the  Body,  Inclemency  of  the  Sca- 
fons,  Hunger  and  Thirft,  bfc,  which  Liberty 
enables  them  frequently  to  guard  againft  and  a- 
void,  and  frequently  to  bear  with  pleafure,  and 
even  to  convert  to  their  fuperior  Good  :  nay, 
they  muft  inevitably  undergo  the  greateft  part 
of  thofe  very  Evils  which  at  prefent,  by  this 
Power,  they  have  at  moft  only  a  poffibility  of 
incurring.  Thirdly,  Without  Liberty,  the 
other  moft  exalted  Powers  of  the  Mind  would 
be  entirely  ufclcis,  and  often  aggravatiohs  of 

our 


Of  Moral  Evil  2^5 

Xl.  But,  you'll  fay,  that  you  defire  the  Pleafure  and  Advantages  a- The  benefits 
rifing  from  free  Eledions,  but  uould  not  have  the  Power  to  Sin j^'f^'^'^- will' 
i,  e.  you  would  have  a  Liberty  reftrain'd  by  Nature  within  certain  h^a^vrthoat 
bounds,  fo  as  never  to  extend  to  Evil.     But  it  may  be  juftly  doubted  Power  of 
whether  this  was  poffible  in  the  prefent  ftate  of  things:    For  Free- ^"^"'"»" 
Will  is  naturally  an  adlive  Power,  and  determines  itfelf  to  Ad:ion, 
and  requires  nothing  more  in  Objects,  than  that  they  (hould  give  oc- 
cafion  for  the  Exercife  of  Ele3ionsj  'tis  therefore  aQivc  in  its  own 
Nature.     Now  whatfoever  is  limited  by  another  admits  of  bounds, 
and  is.  therefore  paflive  with  refpetl  to  the  Limiter;  it  feems  equally 
abfurd'then  for  a  Free  Agent  to  be  thus  limited,  as  for  Matter,  which  , 
is  in  itfelf  and  of  its  own  Nature  pafTive,  to  determine  irfelf  to  Ac- 
tiovij  and  is  perhaps  no  lefs  impoffible.  (87.) 

H  h  2  XII.  Secondly, 

N  0  'T  E  S. 


our  Mife-ry.  "  A  Faculty  of  Undcrflanding 
"  (fays  Dr.  Jenkin*^  without  a  Will  to  de- 
"  termine  it,  if  left  to  itfelf,  muft  always 
*'  think  of  ihe  fame  Objcft,  or  proceed  in  a 
"  continued  fcries  and  connexion  of  thoughts 
"  without  any  Aim  or  End  ;  which  would  be 
**  a.  perpetual  Labour  in  vain,  and  tedious 
.•'  Thoughtfulnefs  to  no  purpofe:  but  if  it 
"  fhould  be  fometimcs  determin'd  by  fome 
"  thing  external  to  new  Objefts,  yet  what  ufe 
"  of  Reafon  could  there  be  in  Contemplations, 
"  which  were  merely  obtruded  and  forc'd  up- 
"  on  the  Mind  ?  "  And  to  forcfee  a  train  of 
Evils,  without  any  power  of  afting  againft 
and  oppofing  them,  muft  be  only  anticipating 
Mifery,  and  adding  the  future  to  the  prefent, 
and  a  fen fc  of  our  Inability  of  ever  helping 
ounelves  to  both.  Thefe  Confiderations  arc 
fufiicient  to  prove,  that  the  want  of  Liberty  in 
general  would  be  an  irreparable  Damage  to  any 
confcious  Syftem. 

For  a  fuller  Explication?  of  them  fee  Mr. 
y/idfon'i  Defence  cf  human  Liberty,  p.  79,  ^c. 
and  Scott^t'  ChnJIian  Life,  Part  2.  C.  4.  V  3. 
p.  31?,  l^c.  ^I'o.  or  Sherlock  on  Proz'idcncFy  C.  7. 
p.  240.  2d  Edit,  or  D''Oy/y's  Firjf  Dijertaticn, 


C.  I  o.  or  Dr.  Jenkin  in  the  Chap,  above  ci* 
ted. 

The  next  Enquiry  rouft  be,  what  Confe- 
quenccs  would  attend  either  the  Limitation  of 
this  free  Power  to  fome  particular  Objeii:,.ov 
the  Infringement  and  Sufpenfion  of  it  on  par- 
ticular Occafions. 

(87.)  If  Matter  were  made  a^iive,  it  would 
be  no  longer  Matter:  in  like  manner  if  a  felf- 
moving  or  a£live  Being  were  render'd  paffive, 
it  would  be  no  longer  what  it  is.  Hence  ap- 
pears the  abfurdity  of  fuppofing  a  Liberty,  pro- 
perly fo  call'd,  to  be  determin'd  to  fome  parti- 
cular ways  ofa£ling,'tis  the  fame  as  the  Liberty 
of  a  S^tone  to  fome  particular  Ways  of  moving^ 
i.e.  no  Liberty  at  all.  The  very  EfTence  of  Libei- 
ty  includes  an  abfolute  Phylical  Indiflerence  to- 
either  Side  in  any  given  Cafe.  Such  a  Liber- 
ty as  this  has  been  fhewn  to  belong  to  Min  in 
refpeft  of  Willing.  He  can  will  or  choofe  any 
thing  in  Nature,  he  can  alfo  cither  choofe  or 
rcfufc  any  thing,  and  therefore  to  determine 
his  Will  to  fome  Objcfts,  or  incline  it  to  one 
Side  in  any  given  Circumftanccs,  would  be  fo 
far  to  dcftroy  it.  The  Queftion  then  is  not, 
whether  a  Man  might  be  jieceflarily  inclin'J  to. 

fonve. 


Reafonablenefs  if  the  Chrlftian  Religion,  2d  vol.  C.12.  p.  238.  5th  Edit, 


S36  Of  Moral  Evil 

XII.  Secondly,  If  the  Will  were  naturally  reftrain'd  to  choofe 
^^'^'j^^'^j  be  Good  only,  it  muft  have  this  reftraint  either  from  the  Obje^  or  the 
'deiermind \oUnJirJiandiag:  But  neither  could  be  done.  If  feme  things  were  in 
P^^^y^^'themfelves  always  Good,  and  others  Evil,  it  might  be  pOiTible  in- 
theGoodntfsdeed  that  the  Will  fhouldno  more  admit  of  Evil  than  the  Sight  does 
of  them  ge-  of  Savouts*.  But  Moral  Good  and  Evil  are  very  frequently  not  abfo- 
ceeds'from  ^^^^  things,  but  merely  relative :  for  there  is  almofl  no  Adion  which 
Eleaion.      proceeds  from  Choice,  but  what  may  be  Good  or  Evil  upon  a  change 

of  Circumftances  *.  Even  Natural  Evils  themfelves  are  fometimes 
good  and  eligible.  Free-Will  then  muft  needs  be  indifferent  to  all 
external  Objedts,  and  thofe  things  which  are  now  agreeable,  become 
(hortly  difagreeable,  according  to  the  infinite  variety  of  Cireumftances 
and  the  Exigence  of  Af^irs.  The  Will  therefore  cannot  be  deter- 
min'd  to  Good  by  Obje£ls.  Nay,  to  confefs  the  Truth,  we  general- 
ly do  not  choofe  Objeds  becaufe  they  are  Good,  but  they  become 
Good  becaufe  we  choofe  them.  The  Goodnefs  of  them  therefore  is 
for  the  moft  part  determin'd  by  the  Eledion,  and  not  that  by  the 
Goodnefs.  For  we  have  fliewn  before  -f-,  that  this  is  the  Nature  of 
an  Elective  Faculty,  and  fuch  it  ought  to  be,  otherwife  we  could  not 
have  the  leaft  poffibility  of  attaining  Mappinefs  in  fo  great  a  variety 
and  uncertainty  of  outward  things  [|. 

XIII.  Thirdly,  The  Will  was  no  more  capable  of  being  determined 

perpetually  to  Good  by  the  Underfianding,  than  by  Objects.     For  the 

Under- 
good  in 

things,  except  that  they  helf  towards  the  attainment  of  an  E'eftion,  the  Will  therefore  could  not  be  de- 
termin'd to   Good  by  the  Undcrftanding. 

NOTES, 


The  Intel- 
lect often 
finds  nothing 


fbmc  particular  thing  ^  a<El,  and  yet  contioue 
to  have  Frcc-Will ;  for'hat,  I  think,  is  a.  con- 
tradi<3^ion.  But  wUether  he  fhould  have  this 
pi:efcnt  pottcr  of  willing  deflrpy'd  on  fome 
particular  Occafions,  or  whether  he  fliould  be 
fometimes  altered  and  made  what  he  povy  is 
not.  Whethet  this  Change  of  Man's  Nature 
would  in  the  main  prove  worthy  of  the  Deity, 
or  beneficial  to  the  World,  will  be  nvore  ful- 


ly examii^'d  in  the  follpwing  Subfedion  :  our 
Author  now  proceeds  to  enquire  biw  this 
determination  could  pollibly  be  effeded  in  the 
prefent  State  of  things,  and  if,  upon  Enquiry 
into  all  the  imaginable  Methods  of  eifed^ing 
it,  they  appear  to  be  either  infufficient  for  the 
End  propofed,  or  attended  with  worfe  Confe- 
quences  than  the  prefent  Ellabliihnient,  this 
mult  be  a  very  flrong  Argument  againil  them. 


*  Sfe  Turner* s  Difcourfi  of  the  Laws  of  Nature,  and  the  renftn  of  their  Obligation,  ^.  23,  24.  op 
Puff'endarf  of  the  Latos  of  ^latutiy  ^c.  R  i-  C.  2-  ^.  6. 
\  Sect.  I.  Subicit.  3.  \  $ee  par.  xd  an,i  17  /  this  Scd. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  2J7 

Underflanding  adls  ncceiTarily,  and  reprefents  nothing  as  Good  but 
what  proceeds  from  Objedts ;  if  therefore  the  Will  v\  ere  determin'd 
by  it,  it  would  neither,  be  free  nor  always  able  to  pleafc  itfelf.  For 
the  Underrtanding  often  reprefents  all  external  things  as  fad  and  un- 
profperous,  and  could  never  make  us  take  natural  Evils,  fuch  as 
Death,  Labours,  Torments,  for  real  Good,  tho'  it  might  induce  us 
to  bear  them  in  profpect  of  a  farther  End.  But  to  endure  a  thing  in  ^ 
view  of  a  farther  End,  is  to  undergo  prefent  Miferyin  hopes  of  future  " 
Happlnefs;  ;.  e.  to  weigh  a  prefent  Evil  againil  a  futu'-e  Good,  and 
of  tv\  o  Evils  to  choofe  the  lefs,  which  Reafon  indeed  perfuades  us  to 
do,  fince  it  is  neceffary  that  it  fhould  be  done:  but  this  helps  no- 
thing towards  a  Vindication  of  the  Divine  Goodnefs,  which  has  im- 
pofed  this  Neceflity  upon  us :  nor  can  he  be  happy  by  the  Judgment 
of  his  own  Underftanding,  who  muil  undergo  thefe  things.  But  if 
it  be  granted  that  things  pleafe  us,  not  becaufe  the  Under Aanding 
judges  them  to  be  eligible,  but  becaufe  we  refolve  to  exercife  our 
Free-Will  in  performing  them,  even  thefe  will  become  agreeable  by  ' 
Election,  and  the  Underftanding  will  perceive  them  to  be  made  fo, 
and  not  make  them  to  be  fo.  'Tis  not  therefore  the  Office  of  the  " 
Underftanding  to  govern  the  Will,  but  to  difcover  means  for  the  at- 
tainment of  that  which  is  chofen,  and  to  give  warning  when  it  choo- 
fes  fuch  things  as  are  abfurd  or  impolfible :  For  the  Underftanding,  as 
we  faid  before,  judges  that  to  be  good  which  is  agreeable  to  our 
Choice,  except  this  lead  us  intoAbfurdities.  In  order  therefore  to  a- 
void  Abfurdities,  we  make  ufe  of  the  Underftanding  sis  a  Monitor,* 
not  a  Mafter. 

And  from  hence,  I  think,  it  appears  how  inconvenient  it  would  be 
for  the  Choice  to  depend  in  all  cafes  upon  the  Underftanding.  For 
fince  the  Judgment  of  the  Underftanding  depends  upon  the  Objeds 
themfelves,  and  the  natural  congruity  which  they  bear  to  the  Appetites;  . 
if  the  Choice  were  to  be  determin'd  by  its  Judgment,  'tis  evident  uiat  we 
muft  neceffarily  want  a  great  many  things  which  the  Underftanding 
judges  to  be  good,  aiid  could  never  hope  for  foUd  Happinefs,  (88.) 

fince 
N  0  t  E  S. 

(88.)  That  is,  if  every  thing  which  the  Un-  I  always  unhappy,  fincc  I  could  never  attain  to 
derftanding  reprefented  as  good  in  itfelf,  made  jail  the  Good  I  f»w.  Whereas  by  this  Povkcr 
a  fjecejary  Par/ of  my  Happinefs,  I  fliould  be  I  of  willing,  I  cu^  off  ^v«ril  yf  thefe  .Tppa»en-t 

I  Got)J.% 


.2  j8  Of  Moral  Evil 

fince  Objcdts  are  fix'd,  as  we  faid  before*,  and  can  never  anfwer  to 
our  natural  Appetites  in  every  Particular.  In  order  therefore  to  the 
•attainment  of  continual  Happinefs,  it  wasneceflary  that  we  fliould  be 
able  to  pleafe  ourfelves  in  fome  refpedt,  independently  of  the  Under- 
flanding,  and  by  Eledion  to  conftitute  thofe  things  good  and  agree- 
.able  to  us,  which  the  Underftanding,  if  there  had  been  no  fuch  Elec- 
tion, would  have  pronounced  offenJive,  difagreeable  and  painful :  From 
hence  it  appears  how  fit  it  is  that  this  Power  (hould  be  freed  from 
the  Government  of  the  Underftanding ;  but  if  it  is  freed,  it  could  not 
;  be  determin'd  by  it.  .«     *;4'  . : '.  ' 

XIV.  Fourthly,  It  is  to  be  obferv'd  that  the  Divine  Power  is  Infi- 
nefs  andwir  i^i^Cj  and  that  there  are  innumerable  things  poflible  to  ir,  which  are 
dom  of  God  repugnant  to  one  another,  and  deftrudtive  of  each  other,  and  cannot 
bong  cquil  j^    any  means  be  confiflent.     If  therefore  God  fliould  adl  according; 

to  nis  lower,     ^     *    "^  -r    ~    .  -i't-»  -i  i  i*  ^  a        • 

hinders  him  to  the  Infinity  ot  his  Powcr,  Without  any  regard  to  his  other  Attri- 
fromchoofingijufgs^  he  vf ould  effed  nothing  at  all,  or  elfe  immediately  deftroy  what 
he  had  eiFeded.     His  infinite  Wifdom  and   Goodnefs   therefore   gave 
bounds  and  reiiraint  to  his  Power,  which  would  other  wife  confound 
rcvery  thing;  and  thefe  muft  of  necefiity  be  equally  Infinite  with  his 
Power,  otherwife  infinite  Evils  muft  certainly  arife  from  infinite  Po- 
wer.    But  a  Creature,  as  his  Elective  Power  nccefifarily  extends  far- 
,ther  than  his  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  is  made  naturally  liable  to  fall 
fometimes  into  Evils.     'Tis  well  known  that  Mathematicians  fome- 
-times  fuppofe  a  Line  to  be  infinite  in  which  they  may  take  a  Point 
.wherever  they  pleafe.     Now  fince  our  Ele^ion  may  be  made  as  we 

pleafe, 

NOTES. 


Goodp,  nrd  only  make  fach  to  be  confUtuent 
parts  ot'  my  Happinefs  as  I  choofe,  and  if  I 
chofe  only  fuch  as  I  could  obtain,  I  might 
be  always  Happy.  This  Propofition,  z'iz.  that 
nil  Good  does  ntt  make  an  EJJential  Part  of  our 
Happinefst  Lecaufe  we  do  not  will  it,  is  afiertcd 
by  Mr.  Locke -^^  and  well  urg'd  as  a  Reafon  why 
'the  greater  Good  does  not  abfoluicly  determine 
the  Mind :    and  tlic  fame,  I  think,  might  as 


r.  2. 


jaftly  be  afnrm'd  o^  Pain,  viz.  That  the  remo- 
val of  all  Pain  does  not  m:\ke  a  pjn  of  our 
prefent  Happinefs,  fince  we  do  not  always  ab- 
folutCiy  wi/l  or  dejlre  to  remove  it.  But  on 
the  contrary  choofe  to  bear  it,  and  by  that 
Choice,  often  produce  a  Pleafure,  which  does 
more  than  coiintcrballance  it.  See  C.  5.  ^.  2. 
par.  6.  and  Note  65. 


*  Sea.  r.  Subfeft.  $.  par.  : 
f  Chapter  (jfPoioer,  \.  43; 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


239 


pkafe,  the  Wifdom  and  Goodncfs  whereby  it  is  to  be  govern'd,  ought 
to  be  infinite :  for  if  the  Line  be  finite,  a  Point  may  be  pitch'd  upon 
beyond  it:  and  in  like  manner,  if  the  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom  be  finite, 
the  Choice  may  be  made  without  and  beyond  them,  that  is,  amifs. 
But  fince  all  created  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  muft  necelfarily  be  finite,  . 
it  follows  that  there  wants  a  fufficient  reftraint  vipon  Elections,  and  . 
that  every  free  Creature  is  necefTarily  defeStible.     As  then  all  created 
Beings  are  necefi!arily  imperfedt  in  general    fo  every  one  has  its  own  . 
peculiar  Defedt.     And  this  kind  of  Imperfecflion,  viz.  the  Power  of     \ 
binning,  is  proper  and  peculiar  to  fuch  as  enjoy  Free- Will :  nor  can  - 
they  be  conceiv'd  feparate  from  each  other,  any  more  than  Contrarie- 
ty from  Motion.  (89.) 

XV.  From  hence  it  appears  that  a  Faculty  ofpleafing  itfelf  by  Eledtion  ButManmay 
cannot  be  determin'd  to  Good  by  ObjeBs,  in  the  fame  manner  as  the^,^'^^^^^"^'^^ 
Sight  is  to  Light,  or  Taile  to  Savours,  (fince  Goodnefs  is  not  always  Qoo^jnefs 
an  abfolute  Quality  in  things,  like  Light  and  the  Objedts  of  Senfe)  and  wifdom 
nor  by  the  Underjianding,  fince  many  things  muft  be  chofen  in  which  nor^"n"e 
the  Underftanding  can  perceive  no  manner  of  Good,  except  that  they  adequate  to 
are  capable  of  being  chofen,  and  when  chofen  plcafe,  becaufe  they  ^^^  Power.  < 
exercife  the  Faculty.     And  tho*  the  Objed:s  of  Election  are  not  Infi- 
nite, yet  there  are  infinite  refped:s  in  which  Good  or  Evil  may  be 
produced  :     There's  need  then  of  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  to 
direil  the  Choice,  left  it  deviate  into  Evil.     Since  therefore  a  Creature 
endow'd  with  Wifdom  is  finite,  it  is  not  poflible  but  that  it  may  fome- 
times  do  amiis  in  choofing. 


XVL  Fifthly, 


NOTES. 


(89  )  As  Motion  without  Contrariety  would 
be  of  no  ufe,  fo  Liberty  without  a  Power  of 
doing  amifs,  if  fuch  a  thing  were  poflible, 
•would  be  of  no  value  :  it  would  net  have  the 
good  Effefts  and  Ends  for  which  Liberty  was 
given:  particularly  it  would  not  be  attended 
with  the  happy  confcioufnefs  of  De/ert,  or  the 
Idea  of  receiving  a  Benefit,  by  w^y  of  reward, 
conferr'd  upon  us  for  having  done  what  was 
right  and  good,  and  what  we  might  as  cafily 
have  not  done.     From  which  Idea,  as  inclu- 


ding Se!f-Approbatiofiy  tsfc.  we  frequently  feel  a 
far  more  exquifite  Pleafure,  than  from  the  in- 
trinfic  Value  of  the  Benefit  itfelf:  Nay,  with- 
out this  Idea,  to  be  loaded  with  Favours  would 
prove  even  an  Uneafinefs  to  a  generous  Mind. 
This  Notion  will  be  farther  explain'd  and 
vindicated  in  the  following  Subfcdion  ;  but 
for  the  Truth  of  it  we  muft  appeal  to  the  con- 
ftant  Experience  of  the  ingenuous  part  of 
Mankind. 


I 


240  Of  Moral  EuL 

XVI.  Fifthly,  If  flic  Will  was  confined  td  tlig  m^ide  6f       " 


bT'fomedme^  ^bmgs  cftly  which  thc  Und^rftandiftg  declares  to  ht  good,  of  was  f e- 
.  deceiv'dwithftrain'd  from  dicofifig  till  the  Goodn^fs  of  the  Ob^e6t«  were  apparent, 
"  Sr^to  be  ai  ^^  "^^'^  ^^  neceiTuy  hefitate  in  rttiny  things,  and  be  anxidus  and  fo- 
ways  foiici-  licitOus  in  all.     For  fince  things  are  cOnned^ed  together  by  a  long 
tous.  chain  of  CoRfequenceS,  it  is  irftpoffible  for  u$  to  form  a  right  Judg- 

ment of  the  abfbliite  Goodnefs  of  i\yem,  without  a  foreknovvkdge  of 
tliefe  Confequences :   we  muft  therefore  have  been  oblig'd  to  ufe  all 
polfible  Difquifition  before  every  Ele6tfon,  and  fufpend   the  Choice 
where  ^ny  fufpicion  of  Error  or  ground  of  Doubt  (hotild  appeafri 
But  fuch  a  Difquifition  and  continual  Solicitude  would  bg  a  greater 
Bar  to  Happinefs  than  many  Errors  and  natural  Ihconveniencies.   For 
if  the  Will  can  produce  Good  to  icfelf  by  ch06fmg,  the  Errors  and 
Iftc6nyeriiencies  to  which  it  is  ex:pos'd  by  ^  bad  Choice,  may  be  com- 
penfated  by  the  Pleafure  which  arifes  from  the  ^enfe  of  Liberty.    But 
if  we  were  oblig'd  to  dl  poffible  Enquiry,  more  meonvenience  Would 
be  feh  frort^  thit  Oligation,  th^n  ffO*ft  feme  Errors  in  Eleflion  j  nor 
W6^1d  all  of  them  be  by  this  nfif^ans  avoided ;  for  after  all  poffible  £5^- 
aininatiOfn,  a  finite  Under  landing  rnay  be  deceiv'd.     Evil  Elections  afe 
to  be  aV6ided  Oft  accotint  of  the  Uneafiftefs  confequent  upon  them,  if 
thferefote  fuch  a  Difquifition  as  k  neeeffafy  t6  difcover  tlie  Good,  and 
.a  Stifp»euff^  of  the   ^kdive  Faicxilty  till  th^t  Good  be  difcover'd, 
wmild  bring  pe^ttr  Une^finefs  thaft  fome  Wrong  Elections,  a  Man 
\v\\\  be  more  happy  with  a  Fewer  of  doing  ^mifs,  than  if  he  were 
oblig'd  to  wait  for  the  determination  of  the  Underftanding  in  every 
•Cafe.     For  it  is  better  that  fome  Perfons  fhould  fometimes  do  amifs, 
arid  f»^r  tJrteafinefs  from  the  Confcicnce  of  having  done  fo,  than 
that  all  Men  fliould  in  every  Cafe  be  always  afraid,    uncertain,   and 
folicitous,  nay  generally  ceafe  frO'm  all  rriiTnner  of  Adlion. 
'Tisbetterto     .XVII.  Such  >s  the  Nature  of  our  Will  that  it  can  pleafe  kfelf  m 
be  in  danger  Eie6!ix^n,  ^ud  by  its  own  Power  make  the  things  ct^en  aigreeable, 
than't"o"ce?;e  ^^'  ^^  ihcmfefves  difagreeab-le  to  the  Appetites.     And  tho'  this  can- 
from  Eiec     uot  fee  d<mG  at  all  times,  and  in  every  Oh]e€t,  yet  it  is  better  to  rifft 
Jim.  jj^g  hazard,  than  to  be  deprived  Of  k>  ufeful  a  Faculty,  or  to  be  re- 

ftrain'd  frO'm  Ele!3ion  till  art  impetfed:  Under ftartding,  fuch  as  that 
of  Man  nece^rrly  is^  Were  cle^i'ly  convinced  of  thjrt  Inipoffibility. 

it 


Of  Moral  Evil 

It  is  therefore  convenient  for  us  to  derive  our  peculiar  and  chief  Hap- 
pinefs  from  the  Will  itfelf  j  for  if  it  depended  on  the  Underilanding, 
it  would  come  with  Difficuhy,  Pains  and  Anxiety,  and  we  could  fel  • 
dom  enjoy  it  pure  and  unmix'd.  'Tis  better  therefore  for  us  to  be 
able  to  pleafe  ourfelves  without  a  long  Speculation  of  Antecedents  and 
Confequences,  tho'  with  a  danger  of  Sinning,  than  to  ceafe  from  E- 
le(rtion,  and  be  reftrain'd  from  the  Exercife  of  our  Faculties,  till  a 
whole  train  of  thefe  were  perfectly  apparent,-  which  if  it  could  be  at 
all,  yet  would  not  be  without  Pain  and  Anxiety,  as  any  one  will  find 
that  tries.  (90.) 

S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 


^41 


NOTES. 


quainted  with  the  Excellence  of  Virtue,  and 
made  fenfible  of  the  Infinite  Wifdom,  Power, 
and  Goodnefs  of  the  Deity,  fhcwn  in  the  Go- 
vernment and  Suppreflion  of  the  former,  and 
in  the  Produftion  and  Improvement  of  the 
latter:  Tho,  I  fay,  thefe  exalted  Beings  could 
be  fuppofed  to  have  a  thorough  Intuition  of  all 
the  Attributes  of  God  without  any  fuch  mani- 
feftation  of  them  in  his  Works;  (againft  which 
Notion  fee  D'OylfsFirJi  Di/Jertatiott,  C.  8.  and 
Cojulujion,  p.  123.)  yet  it  does  not  feem  pof- 
fible  for  fuch  imperfeft  Creaturss  as  we  are,  to 
attain  unto  this  excellent  Knowledge,  and  en- 
joy the  happy  EfFcAs  of  it  on  any  other  Terms 
than  the  prefent ;  we  could  not  fure  have  had 
fo  lively  an  Idea  oit)\t  Mercy  of  God,  if  there 
had  never  been  any  proper  Objcfts  of  it.  We 
could  not  have  been  fo  thoroughly  confcious 
of  our  Dependency  or  Danger  ;  nor  had  fo 
grateful  a  fcnfe  of  our  conftant  Support,  our 
frequent  Deliverances,  nor  confequcntly  have 
arrived  to  fo  great  a  degree  of  Happinef?,  ci- 
ther in  this  Life  or  the  next,  by  any  other  Me- 
thod, as  will  be  further  fhewn  in  Notes  103, 
and  108.  Either  then  thefe  Happy  Beings  are 
ftill  perfeftly  free,  which  Freedom  coDftitutes 
the  greatelt  part  of  their  Happinefs  j  and  let 

an/ 

*  See  bis  Anfwtr  to  the  ^er'utofa  Provivda/,  and  Crit.DiS./frtii/e  Mirch\onitc$,R/mari  F.  ^r. 
f  See  A.  Bp.  Daws'/  t^th  Setm.  p.  73, 74. 
Il  See  the  leginning  of  Note  95. 

I  i 


(90.)  All  that  B ay le  oh]t^s  to  this*,  is  ta- 
ken from  the  Nature  of  Good  Angels,  and 
Glorified  Souls,  who,  according  to  him,  are 
no  lefs  happy  in  themfelves,  nor  performs  lefs 
acceptable  Service  to  the  Deity  for  the  want  of 
it ;  and  why  therefore  might  not  we  ?— To 
what  was  obferv'd  about  the  Inconclufivenefs 
of  all  fuch  Arguments  as  are  drawn  from  Be- 
ings of  a  different  Order  in  Note  46,  we  (hall 
here  add,  firll,  that  it  is  more  than  we  arc  ob- 
llg'd  to  grant,  that  either  Angels  or  Saints  in 
Heaven  are  abfolutely  devoid  of  Liberty.  They 
mny  have  more  clear  Impreffions  of  Good  and 
Evil  on  their  Minds,  more  enlarged  Under- 
flandings,  fewer  and  lefs  Temptations,  ^c. 
without  being  lefs  freef;  nay  they  muft  be 
more  free,  the  more  they  are  fo  qualify'd  ||. 
This  way  of  reafoning  therefore  proceeds  upon 
a  falfe,  or  at  leaft  uncertain  Hypothefis. 

Secondly,  Tho'  it  fhould  be  granted  that 
thefe  glorious  Beings,  fuppofing  them  all  na- 
ceffary,  might  have  as  ample  Knowledge,  as 
ardent  Love  of  the  Divine  Perfeftions,  and 
confcquently  be  as  happy  in  the  Enjoyment  of 
God  and  themfelves,  as  if  they  were  all  free; 
tho'  they  might  have  no  occafion  to  fee  or  ex- 
perience Vice,  in  order  to  their  being  fully  ac- 


H^- 


Of  Moral  Evil 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     III. 


WTxy  God  does  not  inter^ofe    his   Omnipotence^    and   occa- 
fionally  reftrain  the  Will  from  dep-aved  EledJions. 


More  and 
greater  Evils 
vrould  ari(e 
from  thence, 
th.in  from 
the  abufe  of 
yrce-Will. 


It  would 
be  as  much 
Violence 
to  prevent 
the  Aftion 
of   Free- 
Will,  as  the 


I.  ''  I  ^I  S  evident  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  it  was  agreeable 
J  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  have  created  Free  Agents,  {qx 
without  thefe  the  Syllcm  of  Nature  would  have  been  imperfed: :  nor 
could  their  Actions  have  been  determin'd  to  Good  by  any  natural 
Propenfity  or  Limitation,  in  the  fame  manner  as  the  Senfes  are  limi- 
ted by  Objedls  :  But  yet  it  is  certain  that  they  depend  upon  God  for 
their  Actions,  and  if  he  fhould  fufpend  his  Influence,  they  would  not 
a6l  at  all.  Since  therefore  he  could  fo  eafily  hinder  the  abufe  of  Li- 
berty, why  does  he  fuffer  it?  Why  does  he  not  reftrain  Eledtions 
when  they  tend  to  Vice  and  Abfurdity  ?  We  grant  that  this  Objeo- 
tion  cannot  be  fatisfadlorily  anfwer'd,  otherwife  than  by  fhewing  that 
more  and  greater  Evils  would  befal  the  Univerfe  from  fuch  an  Inter- 
pofition,  than  from  the  abufe  of  Free-Will.  In  order  to  which  it  is 
to  be  confider'd, 

II.  In  the  firft  place,  That  this  cannot  be  effedled  without  Fio- 
knee  done  to  Nature.  'Tis  allow'd  that  Eledions  ought  to  be  free,, 
and  that  thinking  Beings  cannot  otherwife  be  happy  :  God  himfelf 
in  creating  them  has  determin'd,    as  it  were  by  a  Law,  that  they 

fhould 

Motion  of  the  Sun, 


NOTES. 


any  Man  try  to  prove  the  contrary  ;  or  at  leafi 
they  once  were  fo,  in  order  to  their  greater 
Perfeftion,  and  are  now  only  alter'd  by  being 
tranOated  into  another  State,  and  put  out  of 


farther  Tryal  ;    and  confequently  they  belong 
to  our  Author's  third  Expedient,  which  will 
be  examined  in  Subfeft.  5.  to  which  we  muft 
:  refer  the  Reader. 


Of  Moral  Evil  a ^5 

flKHild  be  free.  For  by  giving  them  a  Nature  endow'd  with  Choice, 
he  allow'd  them  to  make  ufe  of  it.  They  cannot  therefore  be  hin- 
der'd  without  Violence  done  to  the  Laws  of  the  Creation.  I  grant  that 
God  can  difpenfe  with  the  Laws  of  Nature  ;  but  who  will  require 
or  allow  this  to  be  done  frequently  ?  The  bounds  of  this  World, 
and  the  number  of  Thinking  Beings  are  unknown  to  us,  but  we 
believe  that  the  Syftem  of  Nature  will  endure  for  ever.  Now  as  all 
things  depend  upon  the  Will  of  God,  we  cannot  have  any  other  Se- 
curity of  our  Happinefs,  and  of  the  Duration  of  the  World,  than 
the  Divine  Conftancy  and  Immutability:  the  Univerfal  Laws  of  Na- 
ture are  the  AfTurances  of  this  Conftancy,  and  upon  them  does  the 
Security  and  Happinefs  of  the  whole  Work  depend.  It  is  not  there- 
fore to  be  expedied  that  Go;l  fhould  lightly  difpenfe  with  thefe 
Laws,    much  lefs  alter  them  by  his  Omnipotence  every  Moment.  '|" 

Since  then  it  is  provided  by  an  Univerfal  Law,  that  Free  Agents 
ihould  procure  to  themfelves  Happinefs  by  the  ufe  of  Election,  and 
it  is  impolTible  but  that  thefe,  being  left  to  themfelves,  fhould  fome- 
times  fall  into  depraved  Elediions,  would  it  not  be  an  Infringement 
and  a  Violation  of  this  Law,  if  God  Ihould  interpofe  and  hinder  the 
ufe  of  that  Faculty  which  by  the  Law  of  Nature  he  had  eftabli- 
fhed }  We  dont  expe(5t  that  the  Situation  of  the  Earth,  or  Courfc 
of  the  Sun,  fhould  be  alter'd  on  our  account,  becaufe  thefe  feem  to 
be  things  of  great  Importance,  and  we  apprehend  it  to  be  unreafo- 
nable,  that,  for  our  private  Advantage,  the  Order  and  Harmony  of 
things  fhould  be  chang'd,  to  the  detriment  of  fo  many  Beings.  But 
to  alter  the  Will,  to  ftop  Eledtion,  is  no  lefs  a  Violation  of  the 
Laws  of  Nature,  than  to  interrupt  the  Courfe  of  the  Sun.  For  a 
Free  Agent  is  a  more  noble  Being  than  the  Sun,  the  Laws  of  it» 
Nature  are  to  be  efleem'd  more  facred,  and  not  to  be  chang'd  with- 
out a  greater  Miracle.  There  would  then  be  a  kind  of  Shock  and 
Violence  done  to  Nature,  if  God  fhould  interfere  and  hinder  the 
A(5lions  of  Free- Will ;  and  perhaps  it  would  prove  no  lefs  pernicious 
to  the  Intellectual  Syftem,  than  the  Sun's  ftanding  ftill  would  be  to 
the  Natural.  His  Gcodnefs  therefore  docs  not  fuffer  him  to  inter- 
pofe, except  when  he  forefees  that  the  Evils  ariling  from  our  de- 
praved Eledions  are  greater  than  thofe  which  would  cnfue  upon  an 

I  i  2  Interrup- 


3+4 


God  by  in- 
terpofing  in 
the  Eleftions 
of  his  Cre> 
rures,  would 
quite  invert 
tlie  Method 
of  treating 
Prcc  Agents. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

Interruption  of  the  Courfe  of  Nature,  which  he  only  can  know  who 
knows  all  things.  (91.) 

III.  Secondly,  Such  an  Interruption  as  this  would  not  only  do  Vio- 
lence to  Nature,  but  quite  invert  the  Method  of  treating  Free  A- 
gents.  This  Method  is  to  hinder  or  excite  Eledions  by  Rewards  and 
Punifliments :  To  divert  them  from  unrcafonable  or  abfurd  things, 
and  draw  them  to  better  by  the  perfualion  of  Reafon.  But  it  is 
doubtful,  whether  the  Nature  of  the  thing  will  permit  an  Eletlion 
to  be  determin'd  by  Impulfe,  or,  as  it  were,  by  immediate  Contad:. 
For  it  feems  equally  abfurd  to  attempt  a  change  of  Eledion  by  any 
other  means  than  thofe  above  mention'd,  as  to  delire  to  flop  the 
Impetus  of  Matter  by  Intreaty,  or  offering  Rewards.  May  we  not 
with  the  fame  reafon  expert  that  Matter  lliould  l?e  moved  by  Re- 
wards and  Punifhments,  as  the  Will  influenc'd  by  Phyfical  Impulfe^ 
as  they  call  it  ?  For  it  is  by  thefe  Means  that  they  would  have  God 
to  flop  or  alter  the  Choice.  So  prepoflerous  an  Interpofal  would  con- 
found 

N  O  7'  E  S, 


(9i.)Bytlus  laft  Conceffion  our  Author  e- 
vidently  allows  that  God  may  fometinies  have 
fulScicnt  reafon  to  interpofe  in  matters  rela- 
ting to  our  Ele£lions  (tho'  perhaps  he  never 
afts  upon  the  Will  by  Phyfual  Jmpul/e,  or  ir- 
rcfillibly,  v?hich  will  be  confider'd  in  the  next 
Subfeftion)  his  Dcfign  therefore  is  only  to 
flicw  that  this  ought  not  to  be  done  frequent- 
ly, or  as  often  as  Men  choofe  amifs.  Now 
this  may  be  illuflrated  in  the  fame  manner  as 
we  treated  of  the  Laws  of  Motion,  i^c.  That 
there  arc  general  Mechanic  Laws  in  the  Na- 
tural World,  the  Eftablilhment  and  Preferva- 
tion  whereof  tends  more  to  the  Happinefs  of 
the  Creation,  and  i»  every  way  more  worthy 
of  the  Deity,  than  to  aft  always  by  particular 
Wilh^  was  fhewn  in  Note  37.  If  thefe  Laws 
were  frequently  alter'd  and  unfix'd,  they  would 
ceafe  to  be  Laws,  and  all  Aftion,  Labour, 
Contrivance  which  depends  upon  the  Stabili- 
ty, and  computes  the  future  Effefts  of  them, 
mull  ceafe,  or  at  leaft  prove  infignificant.  In 
like  manner  Liberty  has  been  proved  to  be  an 
Univerlal  Law  of  Intelleftual  Beings,  and  the 
great  Ufe  and  Excellence  of  it  evinc'd,  and 


therefore  we  have  equal  reafon  to  fuppofe  that 
it  could  not  be,  at  leaft  not  frequently,  fufpen- 
ded,  without  as  great  Inconvenience  as  would 
attend  the  Violation  of  thefe  Laws  of  Mecha- 
nifm.  If  this  were  done  in  the  Rational 
World,  all  Studies,  Enterprifes,  Arguments  ; 
in  Ihort,  all  kind  of  Reafoning  would  be  vain 
and  ufelefs,  all  rewardable  Adion,  and  its 
concomitant  Happinefs  (of  which  in  Note  89, 
and  more  below)  muft  entirely  ceafe.  Nay, 
perhaps  to  deprive  a  rational  Being  of  Free- 
will, would  be  altogether  as  abfurd  and  in- 
convenient, as  to  endow  a  Machine  with  Re- 
flexion, or  an  Edifice  with  Self-motion.  But 
our  great  Ignorance  of  the  Intelleftual  World 
muft  render  any  Argument  of  this  kind  very 
uncertain.  However,  thus  much  we  are  fore 
of,  that  fo  great  Violence  done  to  the  Will, 
would  be  direftly  contrary  to  the  general  Me- 
thod of  God's  treating  reafonable  Creatures, 
and  quite  oppofite  to  the  end  of  all  thofe  Ma- 
nifcftations  he  has  made  of  his  Nature  and 
Will;  the  very  Reverfe  of  all  thofe  Argu- 
ments, Exhortations,  Promifes  and  Threats, 
which  are  the  Subjed  of  Rcveal'd  Religion  :  a 

Man 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


245 


found  every  thing,  and  leave  nothing  certain  in  Nature.  How  fatal 
fuch  an  Experiment  would  be,  and  how  it  would  effed:  the  Minds 
of  the  Obfervers,  or  what  Sufpicions  concerning  God  and  their  own 
Security,  it  might  fuggefb  to  the  whole  Syilem  of  thinking  Beings, 
God  only  knows.  We  fee  that  human  Laws  cannot  be  difpens'd  with, 
without  very  many  Inconveniencies,  which  yet,  as  they  are  made  up- 
on an  imperfedt  Forefight,  and  can  provide  for  few  Cafes,  fecm  na- 
turally to  require  fome  Interpofal :  how  much  greater  Evils  may  we 
apprehend  from  a  Difpenfation  with  the  Divine,  the  natural  Laws ; 
on  the  Obfervance  of  which  the  Good  of  the  whole  depends  ?  This 
feems  to  be  the  reafon  why  God  makes  ufe  of  fo  much  Labour  and 
Pains,  fo  great  an  Apparatus  of  Means,  (92.)  fo  many  Precepts,  Per- 
fuafions,  and  even  Entreaties  for  the  Amendment  of  Mankind ;  which 
neverthelefs  he  could  effedt  in  a  Moment,  if  he  were  pleas'd  to  apply 
force  >  and  he  would  undoubtedly  do  it,  if  he  had  not  forefeen  more 
Inconveniencies  from  a  Change  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  and  Violence 
done  to  Ele<5lions. 

IV.  Thirdly,  That  which  gives  us  the  greateft  Pleafure  in  Ele£^ion^  He  would 
is  a  Confcioufnefs  that  we  could  have  not  chofeui  without  this  'tis  no  t^^i^c  away 
Choice  at  all  :  but  fuch  is  the  Nature  of  us  rational  Beings,  that  no-  [^"he^moii 
thing  pleafes  us  but  what  we  choofe.    In  order  therefore  to  make  any  agreeable  to 

fV»;r>/,.  "S  in  E- 
^*^^"g  \zenons,yiz. 
a  Confci* 
oufnefs  that  we  might   hive  not  choJen. 


NOTES. 


Man  that  believes  any  thiag  of  thcfe  (upon  the 
Belief  of  which  I  am  now  arguing)  can  never 
imagine  that  they  are  all  mide  ufe  of  to  no 
purpofe,  as  they  muil  be  in  a  great  meafure,  if 
the  Will  could  be  over  ruled  occafionally  with- 
out any  confidcrable  Inconvenience.  This  is 
what  our  Author  endeavours  to  prove  in  the 
following  Paragraph, 

(q2.)  The  Hiftory.fif  the  yezcijh  Nation  af- 
fords good  Inftances  of  this.  What  an  appa- 
ratus of  outward  Means  was  continually  made 
ufe  of  in  the  Government  of  that  (lifF-necked 
People?  What  frequent  Murmurings,  Rebel- 
lions and  Apoftacyj  were  permitted,  and  then 


punilh'd  ?  What  numerous  Miracles,  both  of 
the  remunerative  and  vindiftive  kind  were  ap- 
ply'd,  in  order  to  bring  them  to  fome  tolera- 
ble fenfc  of  their  dependence  on  God,  and  a 
fuitable  praftice  of  the  Duties  refulting  from 
it  ?  All  which  would  have  been  unneceiTary 
at  lead,  if  one  Miracle  exerted  on  their  Minds 
could  have  done  the  bufinefs  ;  if  their  Under' 
Handings  could  as  well  hue  been  illumina-< 
ted  and  their  Wills  refonn'd  at  once,  and  if 
their  Practice  produced  by  this  means,  and  as 
it  were,  extorted  from  them,  would  have  been 
equally  agreeable  to  the  Deity. 


1^6  Of  Moral  Evil. 

thing  agreeable  to  us,  'tis  neceffary  for  us  to  be  confcious  that  we 
choofe  it  voluntarily,  and  could  have  refufed  it  :  But  if  God  de- 
termine our  Election  extrinfically,  the  moft  agreeable  Part  of  all  is 
taken  away.  For  we  muft  either  be  confcious  that  God  determines 
our  Will  or  not;  if  we  be  confcious,  how  can  that  be  agreeable 
which  is  obtruded  on  us  by  force  ?  If  we  be  not,  we  are  deceived 
in  the  Operations^ of  our  own  Minds  j  neither  can  we  know  whether 
the  Eledions  be  our  own  or  God's.  Nay  the  force  of  Laws,  toge- 
ther with  the  EfBcacy  of  Rewards  and  Punifliments,  would  be  quite 
deflroy'd.  For  who  would  regard  Laws  or  Rewards,  when  he  was 
certain  that  Qod  would  hinder  him  from  doing  any  thing  which 
might  occafion  the  Lofs  of  Rewards,  or  make  him  incur  the  Punifh- 
ments  ?  But  however  this  be,  'tis  very  certain  that  our  greateft  Plea- 
fure,  nay  our  very  Reward,  confifts  in  being  confcious  that  we  have 
ufed  our  Choice  aright,  and  done  thofe  things  which  we  might  have 
not  done,  and  which  another  under  the  fame  Circumftances  would 
perhaps  not  have  done.  On  the  other  hand,  'tis  the  greateft  Grief 
andAffli<5tion  to  have  omitted  fuch  things  as  would  have  tended  to 
our  Happinefs,  and  were  in  ©ur  Powers  one  of  thefe  could  not  be 
had  without  the  other,  and  if  none  were  fuffer'd  to  grieve  for  a  bad 
Election,  none  would  rejoice  for  a  good  one.  But  it  is  better  that 
fome  few  fliould  grieve  for  their  own  folly,  than  that  all  fhould  be 
deprived  of  the  Rewards  of  their  good  Actions.  That  Privilege  then 
of  doing  well,  and  pleaiing  ourfelves  in  what  is  well  done,  could  not 
be  had  without  the  hazard  of  Sinning  ^  if  God  fhould  take  away  the 
one,  the  other  would  vanifli  of  jtfelf. 

But  you  would  have  the  Pleafure  which  arifes  from  Eledlion  with- 
out the  Dangers  that  is,  the  End  without  the  Means:  Neither  do 
you  obferve  that  the  greateft  Pleafure  in  this  Cafe  is,  that  you  could 
have  done  otherwile  :  and  this  arifes  from  the  very  Nature  of  Plea- 
fure, which  fcems  to  be  nothing  elfe  but  a  Senfe  of  the  Exercife  of 
thofe  Faculties  and  Powers  ivkich  ive  enjoy.  The  more  therefore  any 
Action  is  ours,  the  more  it  plcafes  usj  and  fince  a  Free  AQion  (which 
we  could  either  exert  or  omit)  is  the  moft  of  all  ours,  it  muft  necef- 
farily  pleafe  us  moft  :  But  if  die  Will  were  confined  to  one  Side,  or 
detain'd  from  the  other,  the  Adion  would  ceafe  to  be  ours,  and  the 

Pleafure 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


Pleafure  would  perifh  together  with  the  Senfe  of  Liberty.  A  Mind 
confcioiis  of  Virtue  is  the  Pleafure  and  Reward  of  good  A(5tions,  but 
unlcfs  it  were  poiTible  for  it  to  become  confcious  of  Vice,  'tis  plain 
it  cannot  be  confcious  of  Virtue.  {93.) 

You 

NOTES.  ^ 


47 


(93.)  In  oppofitlon  to  what  our  Author  ha5 
here  advanc'd,  Bay/e  *  brings  a  great  many 
Arguments  drawn  from  the  Tenets  of  Ca/vi- 
nijiiy  Spinazijls^  &c.  who  believe  that  all  their 
Av^ions  arc  neceflarily  determined,  and  yet  are 
no  leHi  pleas'd  with  them.  Nay  forae,  fays  he, 
rejoice  in  this  very  thing,  that  they  are  under 
the  abfolute  Direftion  of  the  Deity.  DiJ  me 
tuentur—  f,  and  to  be  naturally  dctermin'd  to 
the  bell  was  always  look'd  upon  as  a  peculiar 
Happincfs,  and  they  that  came  ncareft  it  were 
efteem'd  the  bell  Men,  as  the  know-n  Compli- 
ments to  Cato  and  Fabr ictus  declare.  Some  are 
as  well  pleas'd  with  what  they  have  by  Lot  or 
Inheritance,  as  what  they  get  by  their  own  La- 
bour :  Witnefs  the  Pride  of  antient  Families, 
i^c.  Gaudeant  bene  nati — is  a  common  Pro- 
verb, and  among^  the  Things — qua  vitam  fa- 
dun  t  beatkrem.  Martial  reckons  Res  non  porta 
Lahore  fed  reliSla.  And  again  :  If,  fays  he,  we 
did  .take  delight  in  choofing  things,  yet  it 
would  be  enough  for  us  if  God  conceai'd  his 
determination  from  us,  and  we  only  believ'd 
that  we  were  free  to  cboofe   and    aft.    —  — 

We  need  not,  I  think,  fpend  much  time  in 
anfwering  fuch  Arguments  as  thefe.  For  the 
Cahinijls,  l^c  notwithftanding  all  their  abfurd 
Tenets,  have  evidently  this  Confcioufnefs  of 
Choice  within  them,  which  is  the  fecret  fource 
o'i  the  Pleafure  that  attends  their  Aftions,  and 
cannot  be  cxtinguifli'd  by  any  of  their  Princi- 
ple, but  overcomes  them  all,  and  conftantly 
puts  thefe  Men  upon  fuch  Endeavours  as  are 
vain  and  ufelefs  upon  the  Suppofition,  and  in 
confillent  with  the  Belief  of  Fate  and  abfolute 
PredtiVuiation :  which  fhews  us  that  thefe  No 
tions  are  neither  afted  upon  in  Life,  nor  pur- 
fu'd  to  their  utmoft  Confequences ;    that  they 


reft  in  pure  Speculation,  and  are  generally  laid 
afidc  in  Pracflice;  in  fhort,  that  they  are  abfo- 
lutely  inconfiftcnt  with  human  Nature,  as  well 
as  human  Reafon. 

Secondly,  Some  Perfons  may  rejoice  in  be- 
ing under  the  particular  Care,  Proteftion  and 
Government  of  the  Deity  ;  but  then  their  Joy 
proceeds  not  fo  mcch  from  a  bare  Contem- 
plation of  what  the  Deity  does  for  them,  as 
from  confidering  on  zohat  acciunt  he  does  it, 
viz.  becaufe  they  are,  agreeable  to  him,  and 
proper  Obje£ls  of  his  Favour,  and  that  on  ac- 
count of  fomething  which  they  tbemfe/vcs  have 
done.  If  Horaci  meant  otherwife  by  his  Dij 
me  tuentur^  he  had  fmall  reafon  for  what  he 
adds  in  the  next  Line,  Diis  Pittas  mea  (S  Mufa 
cordi  eft.-  But  in  truth  this  and  moft  other  of 
Bayle''s  Tellimonies  are  Rhetorical  or  Poetic 
Flourifhes,  rather  than  Philofophic  Truths, 
and  confequently  not  worth  a  ferious  Exami- 
nation. To  draw  any  thing  like  an  Argument 
from  another's  Words,  we  fhould  at  leaft  be 
furc  of  his  determinate  Meaning,  of  the  prc- 
cife  number  of  his  Ideas,  as  well  as  the  juft- 
nefsof  their  Connexion  together,  which  we 
muft  never  expedl  from  fuch  kind  of  random 
Qiiotations.  It  may  not  therefore  be  improper 
to  obferve  here  once  for  all,  that  Bayle's  ufu.il 
Method  of  reafoning  from  Authorities  mull  be 
very  weak  and  unphilofophical ;  and  calculated 
rather  to  blind  Mens  Eyes,  than  to  inform  their 
Underftandings. 

Thirdly,  We  are  pleas'd  indeed  with  what 
we  call  Gojd  Fortune,  when  a  great  Sum  of  Mo- 
ney comes  to  us  by  Lot,  or  a  large  Eftate,  or 
.1  Title  by  Inheritance;  and  are  perhaps  the 
more  delighte',  the  greater  the  Change  is  in 
our  Circumftances  ;  and  ilic  Icfs  Expe<ilation 

wc 


*  Anfwer  to  the  ^erics  of  a  Provincial,  p.  665. 
f  Horace,  B.  i .  Ode  1 7. 


Pol. 


2^8  Of  Moral  Evil 

You  may  urge,  that  you  had  rather  want  this  Pleafurc  xhan  un- 
dergo the  Danger ;  that  is,  you  had  rather  be  a  Brute  than  a  Man : 
neither  could  you  by  this  means  avoid  thefe  natural  Evils  which 
you  dread  fo  much  as  foolilhly  to  wifh  yourfelf  a  Brute,  lell  you 
(hoiild  fall  into  them.  But  fuppofing  it  were  convenient  for  you 
to  be  a  Brute,  y^t  it  could  not  be  convenient  for  all  Nature :  The 
Syftem  of  the  Univerfe  required  free  Agents :  without  thefe  the 
Works  of  God  would  be  lame  and  imperfecSlj  his  Goodnefs  chofe 
the  Benefit  of  the  Univerfe  rather  than  that  of  yourfelf  j  efpecially 
when  this  is  better  for  you  too,  tho'  you  be  fo  ungrateful  as  not 
to  confefs  it. 

V.  Fourthly,  As  it  would  be  prejudicial  to  Man,  to  all  Nature, 
Free  Agents  for  God  to  hinder  bad  Eledions  by  his  abfolute  Power,  fo  nothing 
are  placed  ns         ^^  concciv'd  to  bc  morc  difagrceable  to  himfelf.     We  have  faid 

It  were  out  o 

of  the  reach  that 

of  Divine 

Pttoer,    the    Government  of  thefe  therefore  is  the  proper  Exerclfe  of  the  Divine  Wi/domt  wherein  God  de- 
lights. 

NOTES, 


we  had  of  it  f.  But  is  this  Pleafurc  compara- 
ble to  that  Intelleftual  or  Moral  Pleafure,  that 
fublimeSatisfaftionandSelf-complacency,  which 
we  feel  upon  acquiring  a  like  Sum  of  Money 
by  fome  laudable  Aft,  or  egregious  Underta- 
king, that  may  properly  be  call'd  our  own  ?  Is 
it  equal  to  that  folid  Comfort,  and  Self-appro- 
bation which  every  ingenuous  Mind  is  fenfible 
of  from  his  doing  what  deferves  an  Ellate  or 
Title,  and  receiving  thefe  as  the  proper  Re- 
compence  and  due  Tribute  of  fuch  Deeds  r 
The  Man  that  can  value  himfelf  more  upon 
his  Defcent  from  an  antient  Family,  thm  up- 
on being  by  thefe  means  the  Founder  of  a  new 
one,  is  a  difgrace  to  his  Defcent,  and  unwor- 
thy of  the  Arms  he  bears.     But  to  return: 

There  is  undoubtedly  an  agreeable  and  ex- 
alted Confcioufnefs  attending  all  the  Bleflings 
which  we  ourfelves  are  inftrumental  in  procu- 
ring, infinitely  beyond  all  the  5atisfaftion 
which  they  could  afford  us,  if  we  knew  our- 
felves to  be  unconcern'd  in  the  Attainment, 
and  unworthy  of   the  Enjoyment    of  them. 


This  is  the  great  Spur  apd  Incitement  to  ma- 
ny noble  Aftions  here,  and  will  be  part  of  the 
Crown  and  Reward  of  them  hereafter  (as  is 
illuftrated  at  large  by  Dr.  $cott  in  the  firft  Vol. 
of  his  Chriftian  Life,  and  by  Dr,  Jenkin,  in 
his  Reafonabknefs  of  Chri/lianiiy,  2d  vol.  C.  12. 
prop.  2.)  And  tho*  we  cannot  properly  merit 
any  thing  at  the  hiind  of  God,  yet  the  Con- 
fcioufnefs of  having  perform'd  fuch  Aftions 
as  are  in  themfelves  acceptable  to,  and  re- 
wardable  by  him,  and  of  receiving  Bleffings 
from  him  in  return  for  fuch  Aftions,  muft  ve- 
ry much  increafe  our  Happinefs  in  the  Enjoy- 
ment of  thefe  Bleffings,  both  in  this  Work^, 
and  the  next  (ai  is  Ihewn  in  the  fame  placesj 
Nor,  laflly,  could  we  receive  this  Pleafure 
which  now  refults  from  our  Choice  and  Ac- 
tion, if  we  were  determin'd  in  every  thing  by 
the  Deity,  fuppofing  that  Determination  con- 
ceal'd  from  us,  and  we  only  made  to  believ; 
that  we  were  really  free  to  choofe  and  aft. 
For,  as  our  Author  obferves,    this  would  be 

to 


f  See  Note  30. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

that  God  made  the  "World  in  order  to  have  fomething  wherein  to  ex- 
ercife  his  Attributes  externally.  His  Power  therefore  exerts  itfelf 
chiefly  in  one  thing,  and  his  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  in  another.  He 
exercifed  his  Power  in  creating  the  World,  and  putting  it  into  Motion ; 
his  Goodnefs  and  Wifdom  in  the  Order  and  Agreement  of  things : 
But  the  Divine  Wifdom  feems  to  have  fet  apart  the  Government  of 
Free  Agents  as  its  peculiar  Province.  Herein  it  fully  exercifes  itfelf, 
and  ad:s  up  to  its  Infinity;  for  if  it  were  finite  it  would  not  be  equal 
to  fo  great  a  Tafk.  It  does  not  feem  a  very  extraordinary  thing  for 
God  to  be  able  to  govern  and  abfolutely  diredl  fuch  Beings  as  are 
merely  paffive,  and  deprived  of  all  Motion  of  their  own,  whereby 
they  miglit  make  any  Refinance.  For  thofe  things  obey  eafily  which 
do  not  move  but  when  they  are  moved.  Neither  is  there  need  of  in- 
finite Wifdom  to  govern  them,  for  infinite  Power,  with  a  moderate  ufe 
of  Wifdom,  would  have  been  fufficient.  That  there  might  be  a  Sub- 
jed:  therefore  whereon  the  infinite  Wifdom  of  God  fhould  difplay  it- 
felf, he  created  Free  Agents;  which,  being  as  it  were  put  out  of  his 
Power  and  left  to  themfelves,  might  ad:  in  a  manner  independent  of 
his  Will.  'Tis  evident  to  any  Pcrfon  how  much  more  difficult  it  is, 
and  how  much  greater  Exercife  of  Wifdom  it  requires  to  dired:  a 
Multitude  of  thefe  to  a  certain  End,  and  make  them  confpire  to  the 

common 

NOTES. 


149 


to  arrive  at  the  End  without  the  Means,  and  to 
have  the  EfTeft  without  the  Caufe.  All  our 
Ideas  of  Merit  arife  from,  and  are  entirely 
founded  in  Fne  Choice  :  this  (as  far  as  we  can 
apprehend)  is  the  ncceflary  Medium  to  fuch 
Moral  Happinefs;  and  we  can  no  more  con- 
ceive how  one  fhould  come  without  the  other, 
than  how  we  fhould  fee  without  Eyes:  and 
for  us  to  have  this  Pleafure,  -  tho'  another 
did  the  Action,  would  be  the  fame  as  for 
ore  Man  to  be  confcious  of  his  doing 
what  fome  other  really  did,  or  for  him  to 
fee  by  fome  other's  Eyes.  Such  Suppofiti- 
ons  .IS  thefe  would  breed  endlcfs  Confufion. 
For  we  mufl  either  know  whether  another  did 
this  Adiion  or  not ;  if  we  do  know  this,  then 
how  can  we  attribute  that  to  ourfelves,  or 
pride  ourfelves  in  that  which  we  know  belongs 


to  another?  If  we  do  not  know  this,  then 
how  can  we  attribute  to  ourfelves,  or  pleafe 
ourfelves  in  anything?  Since  every  thing  in 
and  about  us  may,  for  vvhat  we  know,  be  done 
by  another,  and  fo  we  in  reality  may  never  de- 
ktvc  either  praife  or  blame.  The  natural  con- 
fequence  of^ which  is,  that  we  might  as  well 
never  aim  at  Defert,  or  flrive  to  do  any  thing 
It  all:  and  this  is  the  genuin  Produdl  of  all 
fuch  Suppofitions  as  queftion  the  Veracity  of 
our  Faculties,  and  would  make  us  fufpedl  that 
we  may  be  impofcd  upon  even  in  the  regular 
Operations  of  our  own  Minds.  The  fame 
Arguments  with  thofe  oi  Bayk,  as  well  as  tho 
like  method  of  reafoning,  are  made  ufe  of  by 
the  Author  of  the  Philofophicnl  Enquiry,  iffc. 
p.  98,  ijc.  and  p.  71,  72.     Where  he  thinks, 

«  It 

K  k 


a  50 


Of  Moral  Evil 

ccmmon  Good,  than  to  order  Brute  Beafts,  and  fuch  as  have  no  Po- 
wer of  themfelves,  in  what  manner  you  pleafe.  To  them  that  con- 
fider  the  vaft  Multitude  of  Free  Agents,  which  is  almoft  infinite,  and 
their  Independence  (fince  every  one  is,  at  leaft  in  many  Cafes,  abfo- 
lute  Mafter  of  his  own  Adtions,  and  is  permitted  by  God  to  ad:  ac- 
cording to  that  Liberty)  God  feems  to  have  given  a  Specimen  of  the 
Extent  of  his  Wifdom,  whicji  is  able  thus  certainly  and  effedxially  to 
bring  to  the  End  propofed,  fo  many  Free  Spirits,  fo  many  Agents  that 
were  in  a  manner  fet  at  Liberty  from  his  Dominion,  and  committed 
every  one  to  his  own  Government.  Here  is  the  proper  place  for 
Wifdom,  wherein  (fetting  afide,  and  in  a  manner  fufpending  the 
Exercife  of  his  Power)  he  attains  his  Ends  by  Prudence  only,  by  mere 
!Dexterity  of  ading,  and  brings  it  to  pafs,  that  fo  many  jarring 
Wills  depending  on  themlelves  alone,  and  no  more  inclined  to  either 
Side  by  the  Divine  Power,  than  if  there  were  no  fuch  thing,  fliall 
yet  confpire  together  to  promote  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe.  'Tis  im- 
poflible  that  this  Exercife  of  Wifdom  fhould  not  be  very  agreeable 
to  the  Deity,  if  any  thing  in  his  Works  may  be  cfteem'd  agreeable 
to  him.  But  if  he  were  oblig'd  to  interfere  with  his  Power,  that 
would  feem  to  argue  a  Defed:  of  Wifdom  j  for  what  occafion  is 
there  for  him  to  interpofe  and  flop  the  Liberty  of  Eledion  before  gran- 
ted, if  his  Wifdom  could  provide  fufficiently  for  the  Good  of  the 
whole,  without  altering  his  Defign  *  ? 

VL  From 


NOTES, 


"  It  may  not  be  improper  to  obferve,  that 
*'  fome  of  the  Pleafures  Man  receives  from 
*•  Objcds  are  fo  far  from  being  the  EfFeft  of 
"  Choice,  that  they  are  not  the  EflFeft  of  the 
"  leaft  Premeditation,  or  any  Aft  of  his  own, 
"  as  in  findiflg  a  Treafure  on  the  Road,  or  in 
**  receiving  a  Legacy  from  a  Pcrfon  unknown 
"  to  him.*'  But  has  a  Man  the  fame  Pleafure 
im  thefe  Ctfes  as  if  he  had  done  fomething  to 
deferve  a  Treafure  of  the  Public  ?  or  had  the 


Legacy  conferr'd  on  him  as  a  Reward  for  his 
good  Deeds  to  the  deceafed  Perfon,  his  late 
lov'd  Beneficiary,  or  his  intimate  Friend  ?  If 
this  Author  can  find  a  difference  in  thefe  two 
Cafes,  this  Obfervation  of  his  maft  be  impro- 
per :  if  he  cannot,  I  am  fare  he  has  a  different 
Senfe  of  things  from  the  reft  of  Mankind,  an«l 
of  confequence  is  not  to  be  argued  with.  And 
fo  I  take  my  leave  of  him. 


•  Ztt  Dr.  Jcnkin,  zd  Vol.  Ch.  12.  p.  X40.  i^c. 


Of  Moral  Evil,  551 

VI.  From  hence  it  feems  fufficiently  evident  why  God  would  not  it  wcuid 
interpofe  his  Power,    or  intermeddle  with  our  Eledtions,  fince  that  '*^«'^efore  be 
could  neither  be  advantageous  to  ourfclves  nor  to  the  whole  Syftem,  rreeabL  to 
nor  agreeable  to  God.     'Tis  no  wonder  then  that  abfokite  Goodnefs  ^o^'  "o»* 
permits  Evil  Eledions,  fince  for  the  moft  part  they  could  not  beJ^fGoV^' 
prevented  without   greater    Evils.     But   if  that  can  ever  be  done,  Should  ai- 
there's  no  doubt  but  God  will  take  care  that  the  very  beft  fhall  be  b^d  Eicc-" 
done.  (94.)  tions. 

Kk2  5UBSECT. 

NOTES. 


(94.)  What  has  been  urg'd  in  the  foregoing 
Subfcftion  about  the  Divine  Jnterpofition  in 
human  Eleftions  muft  be  underllood  in  a  li- 
mited Senfc,  viz.  as  relating  only  to  an  imme- 
di/Jte  Influence,  or  an  abfolute  Determination 
of  the  Will,  /.  e.  to  fuchan  intennedling  with 
Eleftions  as  would  make  them  to  be  no  Elec- 
tions at  all.  For  it  appears  from  the  foUow- 
ir.g  Subfedion,  that  our  Author  did  not  in- 
tend to  exclude  all  kind  of  Interpofition  in  the 
Government  of  Free  Agents,  but  only  that  par- 
Ucular  fort  which  would  fubvert  their  natu- 
ral Power?,  or  be  deflruftive  of  their  Free- 
dom. Tho'  God  has  eftablifh'd  general  Laws 
both  in  the  animate  and  inanimate  World,  yet 
he  has  not  left  thefe  entirely  to  themfelves,  but 
influences,  dirctfts,  and  governs  them  in  fuch 
a  manner  as  is  moft  conducive  to  the  great 
End  for  which  he  defign'd  them  ;  which  End 
could  not  be  attain'd  without  fuch  a  particu 
lar  Influence,  as  will  be  ftiewn  below.  In 
determining  iht  manner  of  this  Government 
we  muft  beware  of  the  two  Extremes  of  fup- 
pofing  either  firft,  that  the  Deity  always  in- 
fluences fecond  Caufes  or  A6ls  (as  Maldramh 
terms  it)  by  particular  f^'ills,  in  the  Natural 
or  Moral  World  ;  which  would  diflfblve  all 
Laws  of  Nature,  dcftroy  the  Liberty  of  the 
Creature,  and  reduce  every  thing  to  Fate  :  or, 
fccondly,  that  he  never  interpofes  in  the  Go- 
vcrn.aient  of  either  World,  but  lets  the  gene- 
ral Laws  of  Mechanifm   or  of  Liberty  take 


their  natural  CojirfCj  and  operate  as  it  w«rc  i,a- 
dependently  of  himfelf ;  which  would  entirely 
deltroy  a  particular  Providence^  and  render  the 
general  one  in  a  great  meafure  ufelefs.  The 
bad  Confequences  which  would  attend  the  for- 
mer of  (hefe  Schemes  have  been  touch'd  upon 
above :  The  latter  (which  is  particularly  c- 
fpous'd  hy  Leibnitz  in  his  Syftem  oi  Pre-efia- 
blijh'd  Harmony,  and  by  Mr.  Whifton  in  his 
'New  Theory  of  the  Earth)  will  be  obviated  in 
the  following  Subfeftion.  I  ftiall  here  only 
add  the  Opinion  of  S.  C.  on  the  prefent  Sub- 
jeft:  "  *  'Twas  highly  fuitable  to  the  Divine 
■'  Wifdom  in  the  Government  of  the  World, 
"  both  to  pre-ordain  fome  of  the  principal  E- 
'*  vents  with  relation  to  the  entire  human 
"  Community,  or  to  the  more  confiderable 
"  parts  of  it,  and  to  referve  to  himfelf  a  ;Right 
"  of  interpofing  and  influenc'ng  particular  A- 
*'  gents,  as  in  other  Cafes,  fo  mere  efpecially 
"  in  order  to  the  accompliftiment  of  tjiefe  E- 
"  vents.  That  he  has  aftually  done  fo  is  a- 
'*  bundantly  clear  from  Scripture-Prophecy s» 
*•  and  Hiftories.  And  that  in  fo  doing  he  has 
"  afted  in  a  manner  moft  worthy  his  Wifdom, 
"  is  no  lels  manifeft.  For  hereby  it  appears 
*'  that  the  Divine  Government  is  equally  op* 
"  pofed  to  CKance  and  Deftiny.  Had  th© 
"  Deity  taken  no  Care  of  Futurity,  but  left 
"  every  Man  to  the  Conduft  of  his  own  In- 
"  clinations,  and  natural  Effcdls  in  general  ta 
"  the  Influence  of  their  Caufes,  without  ever 

interpofing 


•  Impartial  Sti^uiry,  &c»  p.  115. 


052 


Of  Moral  Evil 


t)evont  Men 
hope  for  a 
change  inil  e 
courle  of 
Kature, 
thro'  their 
Prayers. 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     IV. 

Concerning  the  Efficacy   of  Vrayer, 

I.  O  O  M  E  may  apprehend  that  God  is  not  fo  averfe  from  interpo- 
O .  ^i"g  immediately  in  the  Affairs  of  this  World  as  is  here  aiTert- 
ed  ;  and  that  the  Laws  and  Order  of  Nature  are  not  of  fo  great  con- 
fequence  with  him,  but  that  he  may  be  ealily  and  frequently  induced 
to  difpenfe  with  them  contrary  to  what  we  have  here  advanc'd.  For 
this  feems  to  be  the  common  Opinion  of  Mankind.  Every  Suppli- 
cant that  addreffes  himfelf  to  God,  believes  that  this  is  effeded  by 
the  Deity,  on  account  of  his  Prayers :  for  if  he  perceiv'd  it  to  be 
otherwife,  he  could  hope  for  nothing  from  the  Prayers  he  oifers  to 
the  Deity.  For  if  all  came  to  pafs  according  to  the  natural  Order 
of  things,  and  the  Series  of  Caufes,  Vho  could  hope  to  be  delivered 
from  a  Diftemper  or  Calamity;  from  Evil  Affed:ions  or  Temptations, 

by 

NOTES. 


interpofing  to  dire£l  them  to  tht  attainment 
of  his  great  Defign  ;  this  would  have  been 
almoft  in  effeft  to  diveft  himfelf  of  the  Go- 
vernment of  Rational  Agents,,  and  to  fubjeft 
their  Affairs  to  Chance,  and  to  the  hazard 
of  the  utmoft  Diforder  and  Confufion.  Or 
had  he,  on  the  contrary,  abfolutely  or  fa- 
tally determined  every  Event,,  tho'  this 
would  have  been  far  enough  from  diverting 
himfelf  of  the  Government  of  the  World, 
yet  it  would  have  been  a  Government  un- 
worthy of  the  Deity,  a  Government  entire- 
ly exclufive  of  all  proper  Sin  and  Puni/h- 
ment.  Virtue  and  Rewards :  v/herein  him- 
felf would  in  efFeft  have  been  the  only  A- 
gent,  and  all  the  Creatures  ftupid  and  paflive. 
Whereas,  by  pre-ordaining  the  moft  material 
Events,  and  fufFering  the  Creatures  freely 
to  exert  their  Faculties  in  all  convenient 


"  Cafes,  he  appears  moft  wifely  to  havechofen 
"  the  middle  way,  and  thereby  to  have  equal- 
"  ly  avoided  the  Mi 'chiefs  of  both  Extremes." 
See  alfo  p.  1 16, 

All  the  Difference  between  this  ingenious 
Writer  and  our  Author  is,  that  in  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  World  he  fuppofes  the  general 
Law  of  Liberty  to  be  fometimes  fufpended,  as 
well  as  the  Laws  of  Motion,  iffc.  Whereas 
our  Author,  tho'  he  afferts  the  fame  of  the 
latter,  yet  he  denys  it  of  the  former;  at  leaft 
does  not  grant  that  fuch  an  Abridgment  of  Li- 
berty is  ncceffary  to  the  aforefaid  Government : 
How  on  this  Principle  he  accounts  for  that 
which  we  generally  mean  by  a  Particular  Pro- 
vidence, anfwering  the  Prayers,  and  thereupon 
often  influencing  and  over-ruling  the  Affairs 
of  Mankind,  will  be  fhewn  in  its  proper  place. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  25? 

by  virtue  of  a  Prayer?  Thefe  things  are  either  effcdied  by  the  imme- 
diate Interpofition  of  the  Divine  Power,  or  arc  requefted  of  God  in 
vain.  For  if  they  depend  upon  their  own  proper  Caufes,  which  may 
not  be  alter'd,  thofe  Caufes  would  produce  their  EfFedts,  as  well  up- 
on the  orniflion  as  the  offering  of  thefe  Supplications.  But  if  God 
fometimes  vouchfafes  to  fufpetid  or  change  the  Order  and  Laws  of 
Nature  to  gratify  his  Votaries  j  why  may  not  the  fame  be  done  to 
prevent  the  abufe  of  Free-Will  and  Natural  Evils  ?  Either  this  In- 
terpofition  mufl  be  admitted  in  order  to  oppofe  thefe  Evils,  or  it 
mufl  be  rejedied  with  regard  to  Prayers.  This  Difficulty  deferves- 
an  Anfwer.  We  attempt  to  folve  it  in  the  following  man- 
ner. 

II.  'Tis  to  be  obferv'd  then,  in  the  firft  place,  that  all  P^^y^^^  ^^^  Qod  docs  not 
not  heard  by  God,  nor  do  we  hope  that  all  things  fhall   be  done  heir  di 
which  are  requefted  of  him,  but  only  fuch  as  he  has  declared  to  be  a-  ^^^Y"^- 
greeable  to  his  Will,  and  has  in  fome  refpecl  promis'd  to  perform. 

Thofe  things  then  which  are  unneceffary,  trifling,  inconfiflent,  hurt- 
ful or  petitioned  for  in  an  unlawful  Manner,  are  not  to  be  exped;ed  by 
the  Petitioners,  tho'  they  be  requeued  never  fo  frequently. 

III.  Secondly,  God  may  be  under  a  two-fold  Obligation  to  his  Crea-  God  h  oh- 
ture,  firli  from  his  Goodnefs,  whereby  he  is  oblig'd  fo  to  order  all  H'^^  to  the 
external  things,  that  Exiftence  £hall  be  better  than  Non-exiftence  to  his'Goodnds 
all  who  duely  perform  their  Duty.     Secondly,  By  fome  Covenant  ora.idbyCVt- 
Agreement,  whereby  he  engaged,  under  certain    Conditions,  to  be-^"''* 
i\ow   fome  Favours  upon   Men,    notwithftanding   they   were  Sin- 
ners :    Which  Covenant,  tho'  it  may  not  be  efleem'd  a  natural  one, 

yet  it  cannot  be  judg'd  to  be  againft  Nature,  or  to  offer  Violence 
to  it. 

IV.  Thirdly,  The  things  which  are  requefted  of  God  either  belong  what  m?.)  be 
to  the  Mind,  viz.  that  the  Mind  be  found  and  vigorous,  and  able  tt)[r2'D!ifv'Je- 
govern  the  Affections,  &c.  or  to  the  Body,  that  Life  and  Strength  be  btcs  cither 
prolong'd,  &t.  or  to  external  things,  that  the  Weather  be  ferene  and  JjJj'jj^^J^J^^"^^ 
feafonable  for  the  Fruits  of  the  Earth,  &c.     Now  thefe  differ  from  externa' 
each  other,  and  ought  not  to   be  prayed  for  under  the  fame  Con- things, 
ditions. 

V.  Fourthly;, 


^54-  Of  Moral  Evil. 

V.  Fourthly,  As  to  the  Mind,  fince  the  Eledive  Power  Is  the  chief 

God  does     p^j.^  Qf  f^^^i^  ^nd  IS  fclf-motive,  'tis  fcarce  conceivable  how  it  fliould 

AiSHance  to  be  determin'd  from  without  itfelf.     For  that  which  determines  itfelf 

our  Minis  at  jg  entirely  different  from  that  which  ftands  in  need  of  another  to  move 

un^dcTIs  cer-  ^^y  ^nd  thcfc  appear  to  be  no  more  applicable  to  the  fame  thing,  than 

Min  Laws  as  a  Square  and  a  Circular  Figure  are  to  the  fame  Surface,  at  leaft,  their 

Nnuni  ^^^  Natures  muft  be  chang'd  to  make  them  compatible.     But  yet  this 

World.        Faculty,  as  well  as  others,  may  be  vitiated  by  abufe  and  a  perverfe 

manner  of  adting,  and  when   it  is  thus  vitiated,    'tis   probable  that 

<}od  only  can  reftore  it,  for  it  is  fuppos'd  to  be  fubjed:  to  him  a- 

■'lone. 

This  Affiftance  muft  be  afforded  to  Mankind  in  fuch  a  manner  that 
no  blemiih  be  thereby  caft  upon  the  Divine  Conftancy,  nor  any  Pre- 
judice dona  to  his  Wifdom  in  eftablifhing  the  Laws  and  Order  of  Na- 
ture.    Now  that  all  kind  of  Interpofition  does  not  prejudice  tliefe, 
appears  from  hence,  viz.  that  it  is  moft  worthy  of  the  Divine  Ma- 
jefty  to  have  referved  to  himfelf  a  Power  over  Nature,  efpecially 
while  the  Beings  over  whom  this  Power  is  referv'd  enjoy  their  Li- 
berty ;  it  feems  not  only  proper  that  God  fliould  be  at  Liberty  to  ad 
in  this  manner  with  them,  but  alfo  necellary,  provided  this  be  not 
done  at  random,  but  under  fome  known  and  certain  Conditions.    And 
here  the  Divine  Wifdom  has  exerted  itfelf  in  a  wonderful  manner, 
and  devifed  a  Way  to  reconcile  the  Conftancy  of  God,  and  the  San- 
ctity of  the  Laws  of  Nature,  with  that  Affiftance  which  is  occafion- 
ally  afforded  to  Mankind  upon  their  Requeft.     Man  might  prefume 
upon  fome  Method  of  effecting  this,  before  Revelation  :  but  'tis  to 
this  alone  that  we  owe  the  clear  and  undoubted  Manifeftation  of  it. 
From  hence  we  learn  that  God  will  give  his  Holy  Spirit,  under  fome 
certain  Laws  and  Conditions,  to  thoft  that  are  fitly  difpofed:  which 
would  be  as  certain  and  conftant  a  Principle  of  Spiritual  iVdions,  to 
them  that  are  endow'd  with  it,  as  Nature  itfelf  is  of  the  Natural. 
Since  therefore  this  Spirit  by  its  Grace  affifts  our  depraved  Will,  and 
in  fome  refpedl  reftores  it  to  its  Vigour,  it  cannot  be  judg'd  to  vio* 
late  the  Order  of  Nature,  any  more  than  when  its  Influence  fuftains 
.natural  Caufes.     If  it  be  afk'd  what  thofe  Laws  are,  under  which  the 
Influence  of  this  Spirit  is  promifed.     I  anfwer,  all  fuch  things  as  are 

neceffary 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


255 


necefFary  to  Salvation  are  promifed  to  them  who  make  a  right  ufe 
of  their  prefent  Abilities, — that  pray  to  God  thro*  Chrijl  for  an  In- 
creafe  of  them, — and  that  celebrate  the  Sacraments  as  the  Law  of  God 
requires.  Upon  thcfe  Conditions  this  Spirit  defcends  into  the  Minds 
of  Men,  and  by  its  holy  Infpiration  forms  them  to  Piety. 

VI.  The  giving  of  this  Spirit,    and   obtaining  it  by  Chrift,  was  a 
moil  miraculous  Work  of  Divine  Power,  but  the  Operations  of  it,  Je^/£f/','^;j?f. 
fince  they  are  now  produced  according  to  fix'd  Laws  and  a  fettled  r// is  not  mi- 
Order,  as  regularly  and  conftantly  as  the  Works  of  Nature,  cannot  f^^ulous. 
be  reckon'd  a  Miracle  any  more  than  thefe  are :    For  I  call  a  Mira- 
cle a  fenlible  Operation  of  God,  which  is  perform'd  in  a  Way  con- 
trary to  Nature ;  and  as  it  happens  beyond  all  certain  and  fix'd  Order, 
it  proves  God  to  be  the  immediate  Caufe  and  Author:  But  the  Inter-   - 
pofition  of  the  Divine  Power  exerted  about  the  Will  is  not  an  Inter- 
pofition  of  this  kind,  for  it  is  done,  as  we  faid,  according  to  a  cer- 
tain Rule  and  Order,  and  therefore  cannot  be  miraculous.     I  con- 
fefs  that  this  is  indeed  an  Exception  from  the  general  Law  of  Free 
Agents,  (95.)  but  it  is  no  lefs  regular  than  the  Law  itfelf,  nor  any 

more 

N  O  1'  E  S. 


(95.)  He  does  not  mean  that  this  is  an  Ex- 
ception from  the  Law  of  their  Liberty,  as  ap 
pears  from  what  immediately  follows;  but  from 
their  being  left  entirely  to  themfelves,  or  to 
the  cafual  Impreffions  of  thofe  external  Ob- 
jcfts  and  Agents  which  furround  them  ;  from 
their  afting  folely  upon  Prinoples  of  their 
ov/n  Formation  or  Difcovery,  and  following 
the  Guidance  of  their  natural  Underftanding, 
without  any  internal  Affiftance :  which  feems 
to  be  the  general  Law  of  this  their  prefent 
State  of  Probation.  The  Holy  Ghoft  then,  ac- 
rording  to  our  Author,  does  /lot  fubvert  and 
fuperfede,  but  rather  flrengthen,  prefcrve  and 
pcrfeil  our  natural  Freedom ;  it  repairs  the 
breaches  made  therein  by  the  Violence  of 
Temptations,  by  the  Force  of  Evil  Habits, 
fcfr.  counterballances  as  it  were  the  Influence 
of  Evil  Spirits,  and  reftores  the  Mind  to  its 
native  Equilibrium,  or  Indifference.  How 
thefe  Effcfts  may  be  fuppos'd  to  be  produced 
in  us,  and  of  what  kind  the  Influence  of  the 


Holy  Gholt,  of  Good  and  Evil  Angels  is,  will 
be  confider'd  by  and  by.  We  (hall  firft  give 
the  Opinion  of  an  Author  or  two  concerning 
what  the  Holy  Spirit's  Operations  are  not,  or 
that  they  cannot  be  in  any  refpcft  deftruftive  of 
our  natural  Powers, 

In  the  firft  place,  "  The  manner  of  the 
"  Spirit's  Operation  is  not  tnconfiftent  with 
"  the  Nature  of  Mankind,  which  (fays  Dr. 
"  Stebbing)  is  a  Truth  fo  fully  and  (0  liberal- 
"  ly  granted  by  all  Parties,  that  Bothing  needs 
"  to  be  faid  to  prove  it.  Now  Man  we  know 
"  is  an  intelligent  and  rational  Being,  able  to 
"  difcern  between  Good  and  Evil ;  he  has  al- 
"  fo  fuch  a  Freedim  or  Liberty  of  Will  as 
"  makes  him  accountable  to  God  for  his  Be- 
"  haviour  in  this  Life.  By  confequence  th« 
"  Spirit  muft  not  be  'uppofed  to  operate  in 
"  fuch  a  manner  as  not  to  make  the  leaft  ufe 
•*  of  the  Underftanding,  nor  muft  it  be  fo  far 
'♦  inconfiftent  with  Freedom  and  Liberty,  as 

"  that 


156  Of  Moral  Evil 

more  repugnant  to  their  Nature.  From  hence  it  appears  how  God- 
may  interpofe  in  Matters  relating  to  the  Will,  and  yet  not  violate  the' 
Order  of  Nature,  nor  injure  his  Conrtancy.  Not  that  God  adually 
determines  the  Will  by  an  immediate  Influx,  for  by  this  means  the 
A(5t  of  Eleftion  would  change  its  Nature,  and  be  imputed  to  God 
rather  than  to  the  Will  of  the  Creature,  but  that  in  fome  manner  he 
reflores  the  Faculty  to  its  Perfedlion,  and  makes  it,  when  thus  fitly 
difpos'd,  exert  its  proper  Adlions  according  to  the  Red:itude  of  its 
Nature,  without  any  Diminution  of  its  Liberty. 

VII.  Fifthly, 

NOTES. 


■  "  that  a  Man's  Aftions  may  not  properl}' 
♦*  be  caird  his  own  *. ''  Again,  "  fuch 
"  is  the  manner  of  the  Spirit's  Operati- 
*'  ons,  that  they  do  not  make  our  own  Care 
"  and  Diligence  after  Virtue  aud  Godlinefs 
"  unneceflary,  but  that  on  the  other  hand  iht 
*'  Operations  of  the  Spirit  will  do  us  no 
**  Good,  if  our  own  Endeavours  be  wanting. 
**  Thirdly,  He  does  not  produce  his  Efieds 
**  in  us  all  at  once,  but  in  fuch  Order,  and  by 

"  thofe  Degrees  that  fuit  with  our  Capacities 
"  and  Qualification  f.     Laftly,vHis  Motions 

-*'  are  not  difcernable  by  us  from  the  natural 
*'  Operations  of  our  Minds.  We  feel  them  na 
*'  otherwife  than  we  do  our  Thoughts  and 
"  Meditations,  we  cannot  dillinguifli  them  by 
><. the  manner  of  their  affedling   us   from   our 

-"  natural  Rcafonings,  and  the  Operations  of 
*<  Truth  upon  our  Souls,  fo  that  if  God  had 
**  only  defign'd  to  give  the  Holy  Spirit  to  us, 
"  without  making  any  mention  of  it  in  his 
*'  Word,  we  couid  never  have  known,  unlefs 
*'  it  had  been  communicated  to  us  by  fome 
"  private  Revelation,  that  our  Souls  are  mo- 
•*  ved  by  a  Divine  Power  when  we  love  God 
"  and  keep  his  Commandments  jj.'' ' 

This  is  a  Confirmation  of  v/hat  our  Author 
has  declared  above,  particularly  that  the  Holy 
Spirit's  Operations  cannot  be  call'd  tniracuUus. 
A  larger  Proof  and  Illullration  of  the  forego- 


ing Propofitions  may  be  feen  in  the  fame  Chap- 
ter. The  Confequence  refulting  from  them, 
viz.  that  the  Spirit  does  not  operate  irref.fiiblyj 
is  clearly  proved  and  defended  againft  Tureiin 
in  Chap.  8,  9,  fe'r. 

To  proceed  :  "  It  hath  been  the  antient 
"  Opinion  of  the  Church  of  God  (fays  R. 
'*  Battell**)  that  the  Will  is  not  deltroy'd  by 
"  Grace,  but  only  repair'd.  A  diflocated 
'*  Joint,  wh<yi  it  is  fet  again,  doth  not  lofe 
'*  the  Nature  of  a  Joint,  but  rather  is  reflored 
"  to  its  former  ufe  and  comelinefs,  fo  the 
"  Grace  of  God  healing  the  Will,  doth  not 
<'  take  away  the  Nature  of  the  Will,  but  only 
"  makes  it  able  to  obey  God's  Will.  So  that 
'«  when  God  co-operates  v/ith  the  Will,  Man 
"  is  left  in  the  hand  of  his  own  Council,  to 
"  turn  or  not  to  turn  to  the  Lord  :  God  fets 
"  Life  and  Death  before  him,  and  bids  him, 
"  reach  out  his  Fand  to  whether  he  will." 

And  again,  p.  77.  "  Neither  Sin  nor 
«    Grace  take  away  the  natural  Power  of  the 

Will  ;  but  only  thus  it  is,  Sin  hurts  and 
"  weakens  it,  cfpecially  ill  Habits  j  Grace 
*'  heals  and  ftrengthens  it,  and  b/ings  it  near- 
"  er  to  its  primitive  Goodnef'^,  dfrV."  This  is 
very  agreeable  to  what  our  Author  afierts  in 
the  Conclufion  of  this  Paragraph.  See  alfo 
Sat^s  Chrijlian  Life,  Part  2.  Ch.  4.  par.  5. 
p.  237.     "  God    (fays  he)    in  the  ordinary 

"  courfe 


*  Trealije  Comernitig   the  Operat'icns  of  the  Spirit,  C.  7.  p.  123.   Zvo, 
f  liid.^.  124.  II  Ibid.  p.  125,  126. 

-**  Vulgar  Errirs  in  Divinity  rcmaved,  p*  74. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


57 


VII.  Fifthly,  It  may  be  demonftrated  that  the  Prayers  themfelves^^y"^  ^^^^"^ 
have  fome  natural  Power  and  Efficacy  with  regard  to  the  Will :     For"ertea"hc^^ 
Prayers  are  certain  Endeavours  towards  the  Exercife  of  Liberty,  andMind. 
contain  in  them  Adts  of  Eledion,  tho'  perhaps  imperfecft  ones ;  and 
fuch  is  the  Nature  of  all  Powers,  that  they  acquire  Strength  by  trial 
and  exercife,  and  every  A(5t,  tho' imperfeO^,  is  a  Step  to  a  more  per- 

NOTES, 


"  coarfe  of  his  .Government  doth  as  well  leave 
*«  /reg  Agents  to  the  natural  Freedim  with 
"  which  he  firft  created  them  as  necejjary  one? 
"  to  thefe  Neceflities  which  he  firlF  imprejs'c 
*'  upon  their  Natures.  Vox  \\\^  Providence  \i 
*'  fuccedaneous  to  his  Creation,  and  did  at  firfl 
"  begin  where  that  ended,  and  doth  ftill  pro- 
*'  ceed  zs  it  began,  crderifig  and  governing  all 
"  things  according  to  the  feveral  Frames  and 
*♦  Models  in  which  he  firft  caft  and  treated  them. 
"  Nor  can  he  order  and  govern  them  otherwife 
"  without  unravelling  his  own  Creation,  and 
'*  making  things  to  be  otherwife  than  he  firft 
"  made  them.  For  how  can  he  ordinarily  ne- 
"  ceffttate  thofe  Agents  whom  he  firft  madey^-^f 
^'  WixkioxkX.  changing  their  Natures  from ^^  to 
"  necfffary,  and  making  them  a  different  kind  of 
"  Being  than  he  made  them  ?  So  that  tho'  in 
"  the  courfe  of  his  Government  God  doth 
"  powerfully  importune  and  perfuade  us,  yet 
•"  he  lays  no  Neceffity  on  our  Wills ;  but  leaves 
"  us  free  to  ehoofe  or  refufe;  and  as  the  Tempta- 
"  tions  of  Sin  incline  us  one  way,  fo  the  Grace 
^'  cf  God  inclines  Mi  another,  but  both  leave  us 
"  to  our  own  Liberty  to  go  which  way  we 
"  pleafe." 

Laftly,  what  may  be  expe£led  from  the  Spi- 
rit is  (according  to  Dr.  Rymer  *)  contain'd  in 
thefe  heads,  ijf.  Faith  in  its  feveral  Degrees. 
2dly.  Support  againft  Temptations,  ^dly.  The 
promotion  of  Virtue.  And,  ^hly.  The  Ad- 
vancement of  Piety.  All  which  are  produced 
as  he  there  fhews,  in  a  manner  perfcftly  con- 
fident with  the  free  ufe  oi  our  Faculties,  I 
fii.ill  cite  a  Paragraph  or  two  in  relation  to  the 
2d  and  3d  of  thefe  Heads.     "  As  the  Spirit 


"  never  offers  Violence  to  the  Soul,  it  may 
"  fomctitries  happen  that  the  Light  it  gives, 
"  the  Importunity  it  ufcs,  may  be  fo  far  over- 
"  come  by  fome  glaring  Vanity,  or  fome  lioify 
"  Paffion,  as  not  to  be  obferv'd:  But  general- 
"  ly  in  Minds  well  prepared  by  its  former  In- 
"  fluence,  it  oppofes  the  Delafions  of  Temp- 
"  tations  with  good  Succefs,  by  bringing  all 
"  the  Arguments  of  Religion  into  view.— 
"  And  as  the  Spirit  may  thus  difcountdnancc 
"  particular  Temptations,  it  may  likewifepre- 
"  icrve  us  from  all  vicious  Habits,  by  familiar 
"  Reprefentations  of  the  Reafon  and  Nature 
"  of  things,  and  by  many  fecret  Influences 
"  both  on  our  Minds  and  Bodies  ;  diverting 
"  dangerous  Thoughts,  and  moderating  fuch 
"  Appetites  and  AfFcdlions  as  ufually  tend  to 
"  Vice,  and  often  difpofe  us  for  it.  On  the 
"  contrary,  'tis  eafy  to  conceive  how  it  may 
'•  forward  us  in  Virtue,  by  prefenting  to  our 
"  Minds  fuch  Thoughts  as  lefTen  our  Efteem 
"  for  this  World,  and  excite  our  Zeal  for  the 
"  other.  The  Apoftle,  when  he  bids  us  not 
"  quench  the  Spirit,  reprefents  it  as  a  Flame 
"  that  both  lights  and  warms  us ;  Ihews  us 
"  ufeful  Truths,  and  gives  us  a  fuitable  Coii- 
"  cern  for  them;  and  all  this  confiftent  with 
"  the  Liberty  of  our  Minds,  p.  215,  216."' 
See  alfo  Bp.  Burnet  on  the  loth  Article  of  the 
Church  of  England,  and  A-Bp.  Tillotfoh's  1 69th 
Serm.  p.  455.  vol.  3.  or  147th  Scrm.  p.  310. 
3d  Edit.  Fol. 

If  the  foregoing  Obfervations  be  true,  it 
follows  that  the  ordinary  Operation  of  the 
S^mx.  C2innoihc  iny  Phyftcal  Influence,  ot  \m-' 
mediate  Determination  of  the  Will ;    it  muft  ' 

therefore 


*  General  Repre/tntetion  of  RcvcaPd  Religion,  C.  9.  p.  210, 211. 


258 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


Te£l  one,  till  they  have  attained  to  a  Habit  and  Facility  of  a6ling. 
The  conflant  Excrcife  of  Prayer  may  therefore  tend,  by  a  natural 
Efficacy,  to  reflore  the  proper  ufe  of  Free  Will,  and  regain  its  na- 
tive Vigour. 

VIII.  Sixthly,  The  fame  may  be  faid  concerning  the  Government 
duetheAffec-  of  the  Paffions  and  AfTedtions,  which  conftitutes  fo  great  a  Part  of 

human 


And  to  fub- 


nons. 


N  o  r  E  s. 


therefore  be  only  a  Mtf.W  Influence,  or  mediate, 
rational  Determination.  The  manner  of  ef- 
fcding  this  may  be  by  injefting  Ideas,  repre- 
fenting  Arguments,  exhibiting  Motives,  and 
affifting  the  Underftanding  in  its  apprehenfion 
of  them.  This  I  think  is  all  that  Mr.  Wolla- 
Jlon  could  mean  by  the  Words  Suggejliov,  Im- 
pulfe,  or  Jilent  Communication  of  fome  Spiritual 
Beifig  II :  and  feems  to  be  the  only  intelligible 
Notion  of  the  Influence  of  either  Good  or  Evil 
Spirits  :  in  which  fenfe  I  believe  that  we  are 
very  frequently  afted  upon  and  over-ruled  in 
order  to  promote  the  Good  of  the  whole,  and 
compleat  the  Defigns  of  a  particular  Provi- 
dence. The  Author  laft  cited  has  given  us  a 
fine  Defcription  of  the  manner  in  which  this 
Government  of  Free  Beings  may  be  exercifed 
and  apply'd  to  the  Ends  above  mentioned. 
"  It  is  not  impoflible  (fays  he  *)  that  many 
**  things  fuitable  to  feveral  Cafes  may  be 
**  brought  to  pafs  by  means  of  fecret,  and 
"  fometimes  fudden  Influences  on  our  Minds, 
"  or  the  Minds  of  other  Men  whofe  Adls  may 
*•  affcft  us.  Forinftance;  If  the  Cafe  fliould 
**  require  that  N  fhould  be  delivered  from 
"  threatning  Ruin,  or  from  fome  Misfortune 
"  which  would  certainly  befall  him,  if  he 
"  fhould  go  fuch  a  way  at  fuch  a  time  as 
"  he  intended ;  upon  this  occafion  fome 
"  new  Reafons  may  be  prefented  to  his 
**  Mind  why  he  fhould  not  go  at  all,  or  not 
*'  then,  or  not  by  that  Road ;  or  he  may  for- 
"  get  to  go  j  or  if  he  is  to  be  deliver'd  from 
"  fome  dangerous  Enemy,  either  fome  new 
"  turn  given  to  his  Thoughts,  may  divert  him 
"  from  going  where  the  Enemy  will  be  ;  or, 
"  the  Enemy  may  after  the  fame  manner  be 

\  Religion  of  Nature  delineated,  p.  io6; 


"  diverted  from  coming  where  he  fhall  be, 
"  or  his  (the  Enemy's)  Refentment  may  be 
"  qualify 'd,  or  fome  proper  Method  of  Defence 
'*  may  be  fuggelled,  or  Degree  of  Refolution 
*•  and  Vigour  excited.  After  the  fame  man- 
"  ner,  not  only  Deliverances  from  Dangers 
"  and  Troubles,  but  Advantages  and  Succeflcs 
**  may  be  conferred.  Or  on  the  other  Side, 
"  Men  may,  by  way  of  Punifhment  for  Crimes 
"  committed,  incur  Mifchiefs  and  Calamities. 
"  I  fay,  thefe  things  and  fuch  like  may  be. 
"  Far  fmce  the  Motions  and  Aftions  of  Men, 
"  which  depend  upon  their  Wills,  do  alfo 
"  depend  vipon  their  Judgments,  as  thefe 
"  again  do  upon  the  prefent  Appearan- 
"  ces  or  Non-appearances  of  things  in  their 
*'  Minds  ;  if  a  new  profpedl  of  things  can  be 
*'  any  way  produced,  the  Light  by  which  they 
*'  are  feen  alter'd,  new  forces  and  direftions 
•*  imprefs'd  upon  the  Spirits,  Palfions  exalted 
"  or  abated,  the  Power  of  judging  enliven'd 
'*  or  debiliated,  or  the  Attention  taken  ofF, 
"  without  any  Sufpenfion  or  Alteration  of  the 
'•  flanding  Laws  of  Nature ;  then  without 
"  that,  new  Volitions,  Defigns,  Meafures,  or 
**  a  cefl!ation  of  thinking  may  alfo  be  produ- 
"  ced,  and  thus  many  things  prevented  that 
**  would  otherwife  be,  and  many  brought  a- 
"  boat  that  would  not." — See  alfo  Sherltck  on 
Providence,  p.  51.  2d  Edit.  Again +,  "  That 
"  there  may  be  poffibly  fuch  Infpirations  of 
•«  new  Thoughts  and  Counfels  may  perhaps 
«'  appear  farther  from  this,  that  we  fo  frequent- 
**  ly  find  Thoughts  arifing  in  our  Heads,  into 
'*  which  we  are  led  by  no  Difcourfe,  nothing 
«  we  read,  no  clue  of  Reafoning,  but  they 
**  furprife  and  come  upon  us  from  we  know 

«  not 
*  p.  105.  f  p.  107. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

human  Felicity  :  we  have  {hewn  that  the  Eledlive  Power  is  fuperior 
to  all  others,  and  has  the  Government  of  them,  and  that  when  the 
Mind  is  corrupted  with  Vice,  the  Will  in  a  great  meafurc  falls  from 
that  Povv'cr  which  Nature  gave  it.  Yet  the  inferior  Affedions  of  the 
Mind  have  not  quite  fhakcn  off  the  Yoke,  they  ftill  obey,  tho'  with 
fome  difficulty,  but  ufe  and  exercife  are  neceflary  to  implant  an  Ha- 
bit of  Obedience  in  them.  Since  therefore  Prayers  contain  in  them- 
feltes  an  exercife  of  Ele<5tion,  they  have  a  natural  Efficacy  to  ftrength- 
en  the  Elcdive  Ads,  and  by  the  fame  means  accuftom  the  Affedions 
to  obey  :  for  a  repeated  Adt  augments  the  Power  and  overcomes 
Refiftance.  (96.) 

L  1   2  IX.  Seventhly, 


159 


N  O  7'  E  S. 


**  not  what  Quarter.  If  they  proceed  from  the 
"  Mobility  of  Spirits  flragling  out  of  Order, 
"  and  fortuitous  AfFeflions  of  the  Brain,  or 
"  were  of  the  Nature  of  Dreams,  why  are  they 
"  not  as  wild,  incoherent,  and  extravagant  as 
"  they  arc  ? "  Is  it  not  much  more  rcafonable 
to  imagine  that  they  come  by  the  Order  and 
Dircftion  of  an  all-feeing  and  all-gracious  God 
who  continually  watches  over  us,  and  difpofes  e- 
very  thing  in  and  about  us,  for  thc(?oodofour- 
fejves  or  others  ?  Not  to  fpeak  of  the  agrceable- 
Dcfs  of  this  Notion  to  the  Opinions  and  Belief 
of  the  bell  and  wifeft  Men  in  all  Ages.  The 
Confequence  Mr.  Wollafton  draws  from  the 
whole  is  perfeftly  agreeable  to  the  Scope  of 
our  Author.  "  If  this  be  the  Cafe,  as  it  feems 
*'  to  be,  that  Men's  Minds  are  fufceptivc  of 
"  fuch  Infinuations  and  Impreffions  as  fre* 
"  quently  by  ways  unknown  do  affeft  them 
"  and  give  them  an  Inclination  tov/ards  this 
"  or  that,  how  many  things  may  be  brought 
**  to  pafs  by  thcfe  means,  without  fixing  and 
"  refixing  the  Law*  of  Nature,  any  more  than 
"  they  are  unfix'd  when  one  Man  alters  the 
'*  Opinion  of  another,  by  throwing  a  Book 
"  proper  for  that  purpofe  in  his  way  } 

To   the    fame    purpofe  fee  Scotfi   Chrijlian 
Life,  Part  2.  Vol. 2,  S- 1«  P-8i,  82.     Concer- 


ning the  Operations  of  the  Spirit,  as  di/lin^ 
guifh'd  into  fuch  as  are  previcusy  concomitant, 
and  fubfequent  to  our  Converfion  and  Sanftifi- 
cation,  fee  S.  Fancourfs  Effay  concerning  Li- 
bertj,  Grace,  and  Prefcience,  Letter  2.  ^.  2.  p. 

43'  ^^• 

1  hope  the  Reader  will  cxcufe  us  for  in- 
fifting  fo  long  on  this  Point,  fince  falfe  No- 
tions concerning  it  have  produced  the  moft 
pernicious  Confequences  to  Religion  in  gena-, 
ral,  as  well  as  the  principal  Objeftions  againft 
our  Author's  Syflem. 

(96.)  Prayer  puts  us  upon  making  good  Re- 
folutions,  and  endeavouring  to  fubdue  our  vi- 
cious Inclinations  :  it  animates  our  Zeal,  and 
cnflames  our  Affeflions  ;  it  exercifes  and  im- 
proves our  Faith,  our  Hope,  and  Charity  ; 
and  therefore  is  in  itfelf  a  Means  of  ftrength- 
ning  our  Faculties,  and  removing  all  Impedi- 
ments to  a  due  Exertion  of  them.  It  alio 
makes  us  fenfible  of  our  ftri£t  Dependence  on^ 
the  Deity,  of  our  manifold  Wants,  and  the 
great  Benefit  of  his  Supplies,  and  of  confe- 
quence it  naturally  fits  us  for  them,  and  in- 
clines us  to  make  a  right  ufe  of  them  when  we> 
do  receive  them.  "  It  is  not  only  a  Means, 
"  (fays  Dr.  Barrow  •)  by  Impetration  acqui- 
'*  ring  for  us,  but  it  is  an  effedual  Inftrumcnt 

"  working 


*  Firft  Vol.  Fol.   ift  Edit.  p.  493: 


o.6o 


The  Aa  ions 
of  Free  B> 
ings  will ' 
produce  a 
contingency 
ill  material 
things,  yet 
this  does  not 
offerany  Vio- 
lence to  Na- 
ture. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

IX.  Seventlaly,  As  to  Material  Objedls,  viz.  our  own  Bodies  and 
the  Elemeri;?,  'tis  plain  that  the  intellectual  World  is  more  noble 
thi\n  the  Material,  and  confeqaeatly  that  this  latter  was  made  for  the 
fake  of  the  former,  and  is  fubfervient  to  its  ufe:  But  fince  the  Ac- 
tions of  Beings  endow'd  with  Underflanding  and  Will  are  free,  and 
on  that  account  contingent, .  they  necelfarily  produce  a  Contingency 
alfo  in  material  Subflances  which  depend  upon  them.  For  we  can 
excite  certain  Motions  in  our  own  Bodies,  and  communicate  them 
to  the  adja,cent  ones,  which  Motions-  are  not  in  this  Cale  produ- 
ced merely  according  to  Mechanic  Laws,  but  the  diredion  of 
the  Will 

Nor- 

N  O  "t  E  S, 


"  worliing  in  us  all  true  Good.  It  is  the 
"  Chaanel  by  which  Ckid  conveyeth  Spiri- 
*'  tual  Light  into  our  Minds,  and  Spiritual 
*'  Vigour  into  our  Hearts,  It  is  both  the 
"  Seed  and  the  Food  of  Spiritual  Life,  by 
"  which  all  holy  Difpenfations  of  Soul,  and 
"  all  honeit  Relblutions  of  Praftice  are  bred 
*'  and  nourilhed,  are  augmented  and  ftrength- 
*'  ned  in  us.  It  exciteth,  it  quickneth,  it 
•'  maintaineth  all  pious  Afiedions.  The  love 
**  of  God  can  no  otherwife  than  by  it  be  kin- 
"  died,  fomented  or  kept  in  Life  (without  it 
*'  we  certainly  fhall  have  an  Ellrangement  and 
*'  Averfation  from  him)  it  alone  can  maintain 
*'  a  conftant  reverence  and  awe  of  God,  keep- 
**  ing  him  in  our  Thoughts,  and  making  us 
*•  to  live  as  in  his  Prefence.  It  chiefly  enli- 
^veneth  and  cxercifeth  our  Faith  in  God  ; 
**Ht  is  that  which  begctteth  in  us  a  favoury 
"•*  Rcliih  of  Divine  things,  which  fweeteneth 
■**  and  endeareth  to  ourfelves  the  Praftice  of 
'*  Piety ;  which  only  can  enable  us  with  de- 
"  light  and  alacrity,  to  obey  God's  Com- 
"  mandments  :  It  alone  can  raife  our  Minds 
**  from  the  Cares  and  Concernments  of  this 
**  World  to  a  fenfe  and  defire  of  Heavenly 
"  things.  By  it  God  imparteth  Strength  to 
*'  fubdue  bad  Inclinations,  to  reftrain  fenfual 
**  Appetites,  to  comprefs  irregular  Paffions ; 
"•  to  evade  the  allurements  to  Evil,  and  the 
**  difcouragements    from    Good   which    this 


World  always  prefenteth  ;  to  fupport  alfo 
with  Patience  and  Equanimity,  the  many 
CrofTes  we  muft  furely  meet  with  therein. 
It  is,  in  fhort,  the  only  ftrong  bulwark  a- 
gainll  Temptation  and  Sin;  the  only  fure 
guard  of  Piety  and  a  good  Confcience." 
"  God's  End  (fays  Mr.  ChubP)  in  requiring,- 
this  Duty  of  Pnyer,  is  wholly  and  folely 
the  Good  and  Benefit  of  his  Creatures,  viz. 
that  it  may  be  a  Means  to  work  in  the  Pe- 
titioner a  fui  table  frame  and  temper  of  mind, 
and  to  dilpofe  him  to  a  fuitable  Prafticc 
and  Converfation,  and  fo  render  hira  a  fui- 
table and  proper  Objeft  of  God's  fpecial 
Care  and  Love.  For  as  Prayer  is  an  Ad- 
drefs  or  Application  of  a  dependent  Being 
to  his  fupreme  Governor  and  original  Be- 
nefiftor,  fo  when  this  Duty  is  performed 
with  ferioufnefs  and  application  of  Mind, 
it  naturally  tends  to  work  in  Men  an  awful 
fenfe  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God, 
of  our  dependence  upon  him,  and  of  the 
many  Obligations  we  are  under  to  ferve 
him.  It  tends  to  awake  in  us  a  lively 
fenfe  of  the  Sovereignty  and  Power,  of  the 
Knowledge  and  Wifdom,  of  the  Holinefs, 
Truth  and  Righteoufnefs,  of  the  Mercy  and 
Goodnefs,  and  Loving-Kindnefs  of  the 
Lord.  It  naturally  draws  forth  our  Souls 
in  filial  Fear,  in  Hope  and  Trufl:,  in  Love, 
Delight,  and  Joy  in  God,  and  creates  in  us 

"  ajuft. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

Nor  would  they  have  happen'd  at  the  time  or  in  the  manner  they 
do,  if  the  Will  had  not  by  its  own  Liberty  excited  them.  Neither 
do  we  fuppofe  that  any  Violence  or  Diforder  happens  hereby  to  the 
Laws  of  Nature;  for  Nature  itfelf  has  provided  that  the  lefs  fhould 
give  way  to  the  more  noble,  that  is,  local  Motion  to  the  Action  of 
the  Will,  as  being  the  more  excellent  of  the  two.  We  muft  believe 
the  fame  concerning  Agents  of  a  fuperior  Nature,  and  the  more  no- 
ble Order  they  are  of,  the  greater  Sphere  of  Action  is  to  be  attributed 
to  them.  Such  little  Creatures  as  we  Men  are,  can  convey  Water 
in  Canals,  drain  fuch  Parts  of  the  Earth  as  are  naturally  cover'd 
\*'ith  Water,  drown  the  Dry-Land,  and  produce  a  great  many  other 
Changes,  both  in  the  Earth,  the  Water  and  the  Air,  who  then  can 
affirm  but  that  there  may  be  other  Agents  who  could  change  almofl 
the  whole  Elements,  if  they  were  not  prohibited  by  certain  Laws  ? 
All  who  acknowledge  the  Exiftence  of  fuch  Beings,  are  agreed  that 
thefe  things  are  poffible;  now  it  muft  be  allow'd,  that  whatever  is 
perform'd  by  thefe  Beings  is  done  according  to  the  Laws  of  Nature, 
and  that  no  manner  of  Violence  is  hereby  ofFer'd  to  the  Order  of  it, 
anymore  than  by  the  Actions  of  our  own  Will. 

X.  Eighthly,  And  as  all  material  Beings  are  conne(5led  together, 
and  by  mutual  Influence  ad:  upon  each  other;  'viz.  the  Superior  upon 
the  Inferior,  the  Sun  upon  the  ^ther  and  the  Moon,  and  that  upon 
the  Air,  Water,  and  Earth;  and  perhaps,  vice  verfa^  fo  'tis  in  like 

manner 

as  much  upon  each 


261 


There  is  a 
Syftem  of 
incelledual 
as  well  as 
material 
Beings, 
which  aft 
other. 


NOTES. 


a  jull  Concert!  to  pleafe  him,  and  to  ap- 
prove ourfelves  in  his  Sight ;  and  confe- 
ancnily  to  put  on  that  Putity  and  Piety, 
Humility  and  Charity,  which  is  the  Spirit 
and  Praflice  of  true  Chriftianity.  And  as 
this  is  God's  End  in  appointing  this  Duty, 
fo  for  this  End  he  requires  the  frequent  Re- 
turns of  it,  that  the  Mind  of  the  Petitioner 
may  be  habitually  fcafoned   with  a  fenfc   of 


"  himfelf*.     Seealfo  Bp.  Patrick's  Difcourfe 
"  concerning  Prayer,  Ch.  8  and  9. 

Thefe  Effcfts  and  Ufcs  of  Prjyer,  nioft  of 
which  are  difcoverable  by  natural  Reafonjprove 
(ufliciently,  I  think,  that  Prayer  is  a  natural 
Duty.  Concerning  the  Efficacy  of  it,  and  the 
manner  whereby  Providence  may  be  fuppofed 
to  anfwer  our  particular  Rc^ucfts,  fee  the  fol- 
lowing Notes  to  this  Subfeftion. 


ChubFi  Traffsy  p.  1 80,  ^c. 


i6i  Of  Moral  Evil 

manner  probable  that  there  is  a  certain  Order  and  Syflem  of  int^- 
ledual  Beings  conftituted,  who  are  no  lefs  fubordinate  to  one  another, 
and  operate  upon  each  other  by  a  mutual  Influence,  according  to  the 
Laws  eftablifli'd  by  Nature. 
God  makes        XI.  Ninthly,  There  feems  to  be  no  reafon  why  God  fliould  not 
ufe  of  the     make  ufe  of  the  Miniftry  of  thofe  Beings  in  the  Government  of  this 
Aneeb'in    ^orld  *  whenever  it  may  be  expedient.     This  we  fee  is  done  in  fome 
the  Govern-  meafurc  upon  our  Earthly  Globe.     For  he  makes  ufe  of  Men  to  go- 
SJ/"\.^^j      vcrn  other  Animals,  and  fome  Men  are  fet  as  Guardians  over  others. 
noristhisa-  And  as  the  Attendants  of  Princes  and   Judges  perform  their  Office, 
ny  Violence  not  as  they  themfelves  pleafe,  but  according  to  the  Appointment  of 
their  Mafters,  or  the  Laws  j  fo  in  like  manner  we  are  to  believe  that 
Agents  more  excellent  than  us  (which  we  flile  miniftring  Angels)  dif- 
charge  their  Office  according  to  the  Laws  prefcribed  by  God.     Sup- 
-pofc  therefore  this  about  affifting  fuch  as  regularly  apply  to  God,  to 
:be  one  of  thefe  Laws  j  let  them  be  commanded  to  relieve  thofe  who 
.make  their  humble  Addrefles  to  him,  and  let  the  manner  of  invok- 
ing him  be  prefcribed  by  Nature,  or  fome  pofitive  Law :     Can  it  be 
doubted  whether  they  would  not  as  readily  exert  their  Powers  for  the 
Affiflance  of  thefe  Supplicants,  and  as  diligently  difcharge  the  Duty 
of  relieving  them,  as  a  Judge's  Officer,  or  a  Prince's  Servant  performs 
the  Commands  of  his  Mafter  ?     And  fo  long  as  thefe  things  are  done 
according  to  the  general  Order,  and  under  fuch  Conditions  as  are  a- 
.greeable  to  Nature  and  Reafon,  they  can  be  no  more  deem'd  repug- 
-     nant  to  the  Order  of  Nature,  or  the  Laws  appointed  for  the  Go- 
vernment of  the  World,  than  civil  Government  and  the  Laws  among 
Men  are.    Here  is  nothing  contrary  to  or  inconfiftent  with  the  Laws 
of  univerfal  Nature:   for  it  does  not  leem  any  more  repugnant  to 
thefe,  that  Angels  ffiould  ufe  their  Powers  for  the  Relief  of  fuch  as 
qpray  to  God,  than  that  Men  ffiould  help  each   other   according   to 
their  Abilities.     If  it  be  granted  that  thefe  things  are  fo,  it  will  be 
very  apparent  how  our  Prayers  may  have  their  Effedt,  and  the  defired 
Changes  may  be  produced  in  our  Bodies,  and  the  Elements,  without 
doing  Violence  to  Nature,  or  difturbing  the  Order  eftablifhed   by 
God.     Nay  it  may  be  provided  by  a  Law,  that  our  Wiffies  be  thu* 

fulfilPd: 

*  Sie  the  ReUghn  of  ^a:ure  delinen'.eJ,  p.  io8,  io;j. 


Of  Moral  Evil  263 

fulfiU'd :  and  we  need  not  declare  how  much  this  Power  over  exter- 
nal things  granted  by  free  Agents,  may  tend  to  raife  our  Afledions 
and  incline  the  Wills  themfelves.  'Tis  very  well  known  how  great 
an  Influence  the  Temperature  of  the  Blood  and  Motion  of  the  Spi- 
rits have  over  thefe.  Since  then  our  Bodies  are  by  a  Law  of  Nature 
capable  of  being  moved  by  free  Agents,  at  leaft  when  we  defire  it, 
'tis  not  impoflible  but  that  by  the  Means  of  thefe  Bodies,  they  may. 
have  Accefs  to  the  Soul  ;  and  though  they  cannot  act  upon  the  • 
Will  immediately,  yet  they  may  indirectly  excite  it  to  exert  it  own 
Ads.  (97.) 

XII.  Tenthly,  There's  neither   any  occafion  nor  room  to  explain  ^°^,'^"'^''' 
how  agreeable  this  is  to  Reafon  and  the  Holy  Scriptures.     Let  it  fuf- °ake^away 
fice  to  obferve  how  large  a  Field  is  hereby  open'd  for  Prayer,  and  how  the  abufe  of 
eifedual  it  may  be  for  obtaining  the  Affiftance  not  only  of  God  him- ^^^6  he\as 
felf  immediately,  but  alfo  of  his  Minifters.  eftabiini'd 


Method 


of  affifting  his  Worfhippers. 

It  mufl  be  confefs*d  that  God  fometimes  relieves  the  Diftrefs'd/ 
and  when  apply 'd  to,  interpofes  in  Matters  relating  10  the  Will: 
but  thefe  things  are  effedted  according  to  the  Univerfal  Law  of  Na- 
ture. And  tho'  this  be  fuperior  to  that  which  is  implanted  in  the 
particular  Nature  of  fome  Beings ;  yet  it  is  no  lefs  natural  with  re- 
gard to  the  Syftem  of  Univerfal  Nature j  neither  are  we  to  believe 
that  this  is  often  done,  but  only  in  Cafes  where  a  particular  Nature 
cannot  be  left  to  itfelf  without  Detriment  to  the  whole.  Nor  is 
God,  becaufe  he  fometimes  vouchfafes  to  interpofe  and  help  the 
Supplicant,  alfo  oblig'd  entirely  to  remove  the  abufe  of  Free- Will; 
that  is,  in  reality,  to  deftroy  the  Nature  itfelf.  By  a  Law  of  Nature,  . 
the  Exercife  of  that  Faculty  belongs  to  fuch  Agents  as  arc  endow'd 

with 

N  o  r  E  S. 


(97.)  That  is,  as  a  Man  is  excited  or  inclin'd 
to  any  thing  by  a  Profpeft  of  the  Pleafurc  or 
Pain  which  may  attend  the  Profccution  or  O- 
miflion  of  it  ;  or,  as  we  commonly  fay,  by 
another's  working  upon  his  Paffions,  his  Hope?, 
or  his  Fears  :  For  that  fuperior  Beings  ail  up- 
on us  in  no  other  fenfe— that  their  influence 


confifts  only  in  occafioning  pleafant  or  difa- 
grceable  Ideas  in  ui> — in  reprefenting  Argu- 
ments, Motives,  £frV.  to  u',  may  perh.ips  be 
gathered  from  Note  95.  And,  I  think,  it  mull 
oe  allow'd  that  this  is  very  confillent  with  that 
Phyfical  Indifference,  or  abfolute  Freedom  of 
the  Will  above  defcribed. 


2  64-  ^  Of  Moral  Evil 

with  it,  and  tho'  that  Law  admit  of  an  Exception,  yet  it  cannot  be 
•quite  abrogated,  without  greater  Damage  done  to  the  whole  than 
what  may  happen  from  the  abufe  of  it.     Nor  is  God  obHged,  be- 
caufe  Prayers  have  their  EfFedl  with  him,  to  relieve  fuch  as  don't 
pray  to  him  at  all. 
T\\tE^cacy       ^WI-  Eleventhly,  This  feems  to  eftablifli  the  Efficacy  of  Prayers 
efPniyrs     much  better  than  their  Opinion  who  hold  that  all  is  fix'd  by  God  in 
countcd'V*^  a  fatal  Concatenation,  and  that  fuch  things  as  are  requeued  of  God, 
if  all  things  and  feem  to  be  obtain'd,  are  not  in  any  refpeQ  owing  to  the  Prayers, 
be  left  to  ne-  but  that  God  has  by  his  Foreknowledge  join'd   the  Actions  of  the 
fe  aiycaucs.-^ljl  ^'^^  corporeal  Motions,  in  fuch  a  manner  that  they  fhould  hap- 
pen together,  but  without  any  other  relation  to  each  other  than  what 
arifes  from  his  Pre-ordination,  as  appears  in  the  Agreement  between 
the  Index  of  a  Watch  and  the  Sun. 

For  inftance :  God  has  pre-ordain'd  a  Storm  from  necefTary  Caufes, 
and  that  fome  notorious  Offenders  {hall  be  failing  in  it ;  when  they 
are  in  danger  they  fhall  repent  and  pray  to  God,  and  at  length  the 
Wind  fhall  ceafe. 

Thus  a  Calm  enfues  upon  the  Prayers  of  the  Petitioners,  but  with- 
out any  Conne£lion  or  Dependence  on  each  other,  merely  by  the  force 
of  pre-difpofed  Caufes,  which  do  not  require  any  Interpofition  of  the 
Divine  Power.  (98.) 

The 

N  O  f  E  S. 


(98.)  The  foremention'd  Hypothefis  of  a 
pre-deteimin'd  and  necefiary  Connexion  be- 
tween Corporeal  Motions  and  the  Operations 
of  the  Will,  is  ad  vane' d  by  Leibnitz  in  what 
is  commonly  call'd  hi*  Svftem  of  the  Pre-e/ia' 
blijh^d  Harmony y  which  occurs  in  feveral  of  his 
Works,  an  account  of  which  may  be  feen  in 
Fabricins*.  An  Explanation  of  it  by  G.Ha/ifcius 
may  be  found  in  the  Prefcnt  State  cfthe  Republic 
of  Letters,  Vol.  4.  _/er  O£lob.  1729.  There  are 
fome  Objections  againU  it  in  Bayle^s  Diet. 
Article  Rozerius.     Rem.  L.» But    as   the 


whole  of  it  is  built  upon  a  Suppofition  that 
the  Mind  has  not  a  Liberty  o^ Indifference,  and 
of  confequence  no  proper  Liberty  at  all,  we 
need  not  fpend  any  time  in  confuting  it,  ha- 
ving, 1  hope,  fufficiently  eflablifh'd  the  con- 
trary Principle  above,  and  thereby  remov'd 
the  Foundation  of  it. 

Mr.  Whifto7i  in  particular  has  efpous'd  the 
Opinion  which  our  Author  alludes  to,  and  en- 
larg'd  upon  it  in  the  following  Manner  f. 
"  Our  ImperfcftioH  is  fuch,  that  we  can  only 
''  3.(X  pro  re  natay  can   never  know  beforehand 

"  the 


*  DeleBus  Argutnentcrum,  i^c.  p.  387,  &c. 
f  Ncw  Theory.,  B.  4.  C.  4.  Solution  87. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

The  Affertors  of  this  Opinion  are  ©blig'd  from  the  common  ienfe 
of  Mankind  to  allow  that  God  is  to  be  invok'd;   and  that  fuch  aS 
duly  offer  up  their  Prayers  have  their  Requefts  granted :  but  as  they 
are  of  Opinion  that  things  go  by  Fate,  and  that  Miere  is  no  room  for 
Contmgency^    or  a  particular   Providence,    they  have    invented  this 
Scheme  that  there  might  be,  or  at  leaft  might  feem  to  be  fome  room 
for  Prayers.     But  all  this  is  to  no  purpofe :  For  fincc  God  has  made 
Agents  free,  and  allow'd  them  the  ufe  of  Liberty,  he  muft  alfo  have 
refcrv'd  to   himfelf  a  Liberty  of  treating  them  according  to  what 
their  Nature  requires,  which  cannot  be  done  without  a  peculiar  Pro- 
vidence, and  immediate  Interpofition  j  without  thefc  no  Efficacy  will 
be  left  to  Prayer,  no  Worfhip  to  God,  no  Honour  to  Religion;  For 
if  the  Production  of  thofe  things  which  we  requefl  depend  upon  an- 
tecedent 

NOTES. 


i6s 


'  the  behaviour  or  a<Stions  of  Men,   neither 
'  can  we  forefee  what  Circumftances  and  Con- 
'  jundures   will  happen  at  any  certain  time 
'  hereafter.     And  fo  we   cannot    provide  for 
'  fatureE vents,  nor  prcdifpofe  things  in  fuch 
'  a  manner  that  every  one  fliall  be  dealt  with, 
'  or  every  thing  done,  no   otherwife   than  if 
we  were  then  alive  and  prefent,  we  fhould 
think  proper  and  rcafonable,  and  ihould  ac- 
tually do.    But  in  the  Divine  Operation  it 
is  quite  otherwife.     God's  Prefcience  ena- 
bles him  to  aft   after  a  more  fublime  man- 
ner, and  by  a  conftant  Courfe  of  Nature 
and  Chain  of  mechanical  Caufes  to  do  every 
thing  fo  as  it  fhall   not  be  diftinguiihable 
from  a  particular  Interpofition  of  his  Power, 
nor  be  otherwife  than  on  fuch  a  particular 
Interpofition  would   have  been  brought  to 
pafs.     He  who  has  created  all   things,  and 
given  them  their  fcveral  Powers  and  Facul- 
ties, forefees  the  Effefts  of  them  all  j  at  once 
looks  thro'  the  entire  Chain  of  Caufes,  Ac- 
tions and  Events,  and  fees  at  what  Periods, 
and  ia  what  manner  'twill    be  neceifary  and 
expedient  to  bring  about  any  Changes,  be. 
How  any  Mercies,    or  inflift  any  Punilh- 


"  ments  on  the  World.    Which  being  unque- 
"  flionabiy  true,  'tis  evident  he  can   as  well 
'*  provide   and   prcdifpofe  natural   Caufes  for 
"  thofe  Mutations,  Mercies  or  Judgments:   he 
"  can  as  eafily  put  the  Machine  into  fuch  Mo- 
"  tions  as  (hall,  without  a  Neccffity  of  his 
"  mending  or  correfting  it,  correfpond  to  all 
"  thefe  forefeen  Events  or  Adlions,  as  make 
*•  way  for  fuch  Alterations  afterwards  by  gi- 
'•  .ving  a  random   Force  to  the  whole  :  and 
*'  when  thefe  two  ways  are  equally  poffible,  I 
*•  need  not  fay  which  is  moft  agreeable  to  the 
"  Divine    Perfeftions,    and    moft   worthy  of 
*«  God.'     J»d  again:    "  »  We   pray  to  God 
"  for  Fruitful  Seafons,  for  Health,  for  Peace, 
"  for  the  Succefs  of  our  Endeavours,   for  a 
«  Blefljng  on  our  Food  and  Phyfick,  and  ds- 
'•  precate  the  contrary  Mifcrles  from  us.    Yet 
"  at  the  fame  time  we  fee  the  Seafons  depend 
"  on  the  fettled  Courfe  of  the  Sun,  or  other 
*(  natural  and  necefTary  Caufes ;    we  find  our 
"  Health  or  Sicknefs  to  be  the  proper  Effcfls 
**  of  our  Dyet  and  Regimen :  we  obferve  Peace 
'*  and  War  fubjeft  to  the  Intrigues  of  Princes, 
**  and  the  plain  Refults  of  vifiblc  Conjundlures 
"  inhuman  Affairs:  wc   know  that  worldly 

"  Prudence 


*  Ibid.  Corollary,  p.  562.  i ft  Edit. 


M  m 


c66  Of  Moral  Evil. 

tecedent,  natural,  and  necefl-iry  Caufes,  our  Delires  will  be  anfwer'd 
no  lefs  upon  the  Omiffion  than  the  offering  up  of  Prayers.  VoWs 
and  Prayers  therefore  are  made  in  vain.  If  it  be  faid  that  the  Suppli- 
cants could  not  omit  them,  fince  they  were  pre-ordainM.  I  anfwer : 
He  that  could  orrilt  them  could  not  poffibly  offer  them  :  his  Omiffion 
therefore  is  not  culpable :  And  he  that  is  employ 'd  in  Prayer  to  God 
undertakes  a  fuperfluous  Office :  for  thefe  Petitions  in  reality  contri- 
bute nothing  to  the  Effed:,  and  no  reafon  can  be  given  why  that  fhould 
be  required  which  i§  of  no  Benefit.  (99.) 

XIV.  'Tis 

N  O  r  E  S,  ' 


"  Prudence  and  Cunning  has  a  main  ftroke  in 
"  the  Succefs  of  Mens  Labours:  we  feel  the 
"  advantageous  EfFefts  of  fome  Food  and  Phy- 
**  fie,  and  have  reafon  to  believe  that  the  fame 
"  does  very  much  refult  from  the  Goodnefs  of 
"  the  Drug?,  the  fitocfs  of  the  Proportion,  and 
"  the  Skill  of  the  Phyfician,  ai^d  can  frequent- 
*'  ly  give  a  plain  and  mechanical  Reafon  of 
"  the  different  Operation  of  all  thefe  things; 
•*  neither  do  we  hope  for  the  Excrcife  of  a 
"  miracu/ouj  Power  in  thefe  or  the  like  Cafes. 
'*  In  Ihort,  '*  Second  Caufes,  fays  he,  will 
"  work  according  to  their  Natures,  let  Mens 
**  Supplications  be  never  fo  importunate :  and 
*'  |o  expeft  a  Miracle  in  anfwer  to  every  Pe- 
*■'  tioni  is  more  than  the  moft  religious  dare 
*'  pretend  to."  See  alfo  Mr.  WollaJion''%  excel- 
lent Illuftration  of  this  Hypothefis,  p.  104.  or 
Dr.  Fiddes^s  Body  sf  Divinity,   i ft  vol.   p.  154. 

We  ihall  propoie  an  Anfwer  to  it  in  the  fol- 
lowing Note,  Let  it  fuffice  at  prefent  to  ob- 
ferve,  that  this  particular  Interpofition  of  Di- 
vine Power  which  our  Author  contends  for,  is 
very  improperly  K\\t6.  miraculous,  as  may  be  feen 
from  Note  95.  and  the  6th  Paragraph  of  this 
Subfeflion. 

(99.)  Tho  this  Anfwer  is  very  folid,  and  may 
by  fome  perhaps  be  thought  fufficient ;  yet,  as 
the  Point  before  us  is  of  the  greateft  Impor- 
tance; fince  wrong  Notions  concerning  it 
caufe  Perplexities  which  difturb  the  MincS  of 


the  Scheme  of  Providence  fo  elaborately  di{^ 
play'd  by  this  Aathor.^vi]l  not,  I  fear,  help  to 
clear  them  as  he  here  promifes,  but  rather  oc- 
cafion  ViTorfe  ; — on  thefe  accounts  it  will  not  be 
improper  to  give  a  fuller  Confutation  of  it  from 
fuch  Authors  as  endeavour  to  prove  that  the 
foremention'd  Scheme  of  Providence  is  both 
impoffible  in  itfelf,  and  attended  with  Confc- 
quences  deftruftive  of  the  very  Notion  of 
Prayer,  and  moft  other  Duties  of  Religion. 
"  The  Abettors  of  the  n^echanical  Hypothefis,f 
''  fays  Dr.  Jcnkin,  argue,  that  he  is  the  beft 
"  Artift  who  can  contrive  an  Engine  that  fhall 
"  need  the  leaft  meddling  with  after  itis  made. 
"  But  it  ought  to  be  conlider'd  what  the  Na- 
"  ture  of  the  Engine  is,  and  what  the  ends  and 
**  ufes  of  it  arc  ;  and  if  the  Nature  of  it  be 
"  fuch  that  it  cannot  anfwer  the  Ends  for 
"  which  it  was  framed,  without  fometimes  an 
"  affifting  hand,  it  would  be  no  point  of  Wif- 
"  dom  in  the  Artificer,  for  the  Credit  of  his 
"  Contrivance,  to  lofe  the  moft  ufeful  Ends 
"  dcfign'd  by  it.  As  if,  among  other  ufes,  this 
"  curious  Engine  were  dcfign'd  to  reward  the 
"  good,  and  punifh  bad  Men ;  to  remove  the 
"  Punifhment  upon  Amendment,  and  to  renew 
*«  it  upon  a  relapfe :  fince  brute  Matter  is  inca- 
"  pabie  of  varying  its  Motion,  and  fuiting  it- 
"  felf  to  the  feveral  States  and  Changes  of 
"  free  Agents,  he  muft  affift  it,  unlefs  he  will 
*'  lofe  the  chief  End  for  which  it  is  to  fervc. 


moft  Men,  as  Mr.  Whijlon  obferves  *;  and  fince,**  It  is  no  defeft  in  the  Skill  and  Wifdom  of 

'  n  the 


•  Uevi  Theory,  p.  562. 

+  Rea/onablenefs  of  Cbri^ianityy  2d  vol.  p.  218.  Jth  Edit. 


Of  Moral  Evil.  267 

XIV.  Tis  fcare  poflible  for  one  who  reads  this  not  to  think  of  that 
famous  Difficulty,  viz.  how  the  Contingency  of  things  can  be  confi-  uoJ^jil'^^hi, 
ftent  with  the  Divine  Prefcience :  Neither  is  it  proper  to  meddle  with  isnotrepug- 
it  in  this  Place  :  For  it  would  require  a  whole  Book.     Let  it  fuffice  JJvinefy^ 
to  give  a  hint,  that  the  Solution  of  it  depends  upon  confidering  the/a>«f" 

M  m  2  Manner 


NOTES. 


**  the  Almighty,  that  Matter  and  Motion  have 
"  not  Free  Will  as  Men  have;  but  it  would 
"  be  a  great  defedl  in  his  Wifdom  not 
"  to  make  them  the  Inftruments  of  Rewards 
"  and  Punifhments,  becaufc  it  is  impoflible  for 
"  them  of  themfelves  to  apply  and  fuit  theni- 
"  felves  to  the  feveral  States  and  Conditions 
"  of  Free  Agents.  The  Nature  of  Matter  and 
*'  Motion  is  fuch,  that  they  cannot  ferve  all 
'•'  the  Defigns  of  their  Creator,  without  his 
*'  Interpofition,  and  therefore  he  conftantly 
*'  doth  interpofe  according  to  a  certain  Tenor 
"  which  he  hath  prcfcrib'd  to  himfelf,"  j^fiJ 
again,  "  *  We  may  well  fuppofe  that  God 
"  has  as  much  Regard  to  his  Wifdom  in  his 
"  Government  of  the  Moral  as  of  the  Material 
"  part  of  the  Creation  ;  and  yet  he  has  added 
*'  fupplemental  Laws  to  enforce  the  Moral 
"  Laws,  and  thefe  additional  Laws  have  been 
"  chang'd  as  the  Condition  and  Circumftanccs 
"  of  Men  required.  Why  then  Ihould  the 
"  Laws  of  the  Material  World  be  fo  much 
"  more  facred,  as  that  he  ftiould  never  inter- 
**  meddle  with  them  ?  He  affifts  Mo/al  A- 
**  gents  with  the  continual  Supplies  of  his 
"  Grace,  and  Natural  Agents  with  that  Help 
"  which  is  needful  for  them  co  perform  his 
"  Will  :  God  may  haften  and  alTift  natural 
"  Cau(es  upon  our  Prayers,  he  may  quicken 
**  the  Motions,  and  enforce  the  Powers  of  Na- 
"  turc,  and  remove  fecrct  Impediments,  to 
•*  help  and  make  way  for  natural  Operations ; 
••  or  he  may  fufpend  or  retard  natural  Cau- 
"  fes,  ijfc. 

He  proceeds  to  a  particular  Examination  of 
the  Pn-eJIaM^'d  Order  in   p.  221.  which   he  I 
oppofes  with  much  the  fame  Arguments  as  thefc  I 
thit  follow  from  Dr.  Fiddes\.     "  As  to  the" 


"  Opinion  of  thofe  who  fay,  God  upon  the 
"  Forefight  of  the  Prayers  of  Men  to  him,  dif- 
•*  pofed  the  Order  of  things  in  fuch  a  manner, 
"  that  what  they  pray  for  fhall  happeo,  or 
"  what  they  deprecate  be  averted,  this  is  alto- 
"  gether  inconceivable;  or  rather,  in  the  Na- 
"  ture  of  things,  fuppoling  Men  free  Agents, 
"  impofhble.  For  tho'  God  does  forefee  which 
"  way  Men  will  aft,  yet  nothing  upon  the 
*'  Mechanical  Hypothefis  can  follow  from  his 
**  Adiion,  but  according  to  the  Laws  of  Mc- 
'•  chanifm.  In  cafe  any  one,  for  inftance, 
"  fhould  pray  to  be  deliver'd  from  the  danger 

*  of  fome  infedlious  or  pellilentious  Diflem- 
*'  per,  the  Vapour  whereby  'tis  propagated, 
"  will,  notwithftanding,  purfue  its  natural 
••'  Courfe,  and  produce  its  Effeft  wherever  ic 
"  falls  upon  a  proper  Subjeft  ;  it  can  make  no 
''  manner  of  Diflindion  between  him  thatyi- 
**  crifiath  and  him  t^xiX  facrificeth  not.  God 
•'  may  indeed,  by  fome  fee  ret  Impulfe  on  the 
"  Mind  of  Man,  which  yet  he  is  at  Liberty 
"  to  follow,  be  the  occr-fion  of  diverting  him 
"  from  the  Scope  of  its  Motion ;  or  perhaps, 
"  on  fome  extraordinary  Exigence,  by  an  in- 
••  vifible  Power,  retard,  accelerate,  or  obttruft 
"  its  Courfe;  but  ftill,  if  all  things  operate 
"  mechanically,  whether  Men  pray  or  no,  it 
'*  will  unavoidably  have  its  proper  ElTeft. 
**  There  is  another  Cafe  wherein  the  Motives 
*'  to  Prayer,  if  all  things  come  to  pals  by  the 
**  fix'd  Laws  of  Mechanifm,  appear  ftill  more 
**  evidently  groundlefs.  A  Man  in  the  Heat 
*'  of  Battle,  prays  that  God  would  preferve 
"  him  from  the  Inftruments  of  Death,  which 

"  fly  every  where  about  him  ;  yet  a  Ball  from 
"  a  Cannon  or  a  Mufquet  will  neccffarily  pur- 
♦«  fuc  the  line  of  iu  dircftion;    it  «[epend» 

"  however 


p.  220. 


+  Theol.  Spec.  B.  3.  Part  2.  C.  4;  p.  292. 


3^8  Of  Moral  Evil, 

Manner  by  which  we  apprehend  the  things  of  God.  (loo.)     He  that 
underilands  that  manner  rightly  will  never  ftick  at  this  Difficulty. 

The 

NOTES,  1 


*«  however  on  the  choice  of  Man,  whether  he 
"  will  give  it  fucha  particular  Direftion  as  by 
"  the  natural  tendency  of  it  will  take  away  the 
**  Life  of  the  Perfon  who  deprecates  the  Dan- 
**  ger  wherewith  he  finds  himfelf  furrounded. 
"  In  this  Cafe  it  is  impoffible,  upon  any  fore 
'•  fight  of  his  Prayers,  that  the  order  of  Cau- 
'*  fes,  which  are  in  themfelves  of  arbitrary  and 
"  uncertain  Determination,  fhouJd  be  difpos'd 
*'  after  fuch  a  manner  as  certainly  to  produce 
"  the  defired  EfFeift  of  them."  Concerning 
the  Impoffibility  of  adapting  a  fix'd  and  immu- 
uble  Law  to  the  State  and  Condition  of  Free 
or  mutable  Agents,  fee  B.  2.  Part  i,  p.  154. 

Lallly  :  "  It  is  of  great  ufe  to  us  (fays  Dr. 
**  Sher/cckf)  to  underitand  this  which  teaches 
"  us  what  we  may  expedl  from  God,  and  what 
*'  we  muft  attribute  to  him  in  the  Government 
"  of  Nature.  We  muft  not  expedl  in  ordina- 
**  ry  Cafes  that  God  Ihould  rcverfe  the  Laws 
"  of  Nature  for  us ;  that  if  we  leap  into  the 
"  Fire  it  iliall  not  burn  us  ;  or  into  the  Wa- 
*'  ter  it  Ihall  not  drown  us :  and  by  the  fame 
**  reafon,  the  Providence  of  God  is  not  con- 
*'  cern'd  to  preferve  us  when  we  deftroy  our- 
"  felves  by  Intemperance  and  Luft  :  for  God 
**  does  not  work  Miracles  to  deliver  Men  from 
**  the  evil  Effeds  of  their  own  Wickednefs  : 
*'  But  all  the  kind  Influences  of  Heaven  which 
**  fupply  our  Wants,  and  fill  our  Hearts  with 
"  Food  and  Gladnefs,  are  owing  to  that  good 
'*  Providence  which  commands  Nature  to 
"  yield  her  Incrcafe;  and  thofe  Diforders  of 
"  Nature  which  afflift  the  World  with  Fa- 
"  mines,  Peftilence  and  Earthquakes,  are  the 
"  Effefts  of  God's  Anger  aed  Difpleafure,  and 
**  are  order'd  by  him  for  the  Punifhment  of  a 
**  wicked  World.  We  muft  all  believe  this, 
**  or  confefs  that  we  mock  God,  when  we  blefs 
**  him  for  a  healthful  Air  and  fruitful  Seafons, 
"  or  deprecate  his  Anger  when  we  fee  vifible 
**  Tokens  of  his  Vengeance  in  the  Diforders 
**  of  Nature.  Far  did  not  God  immediate- 
"  \y  intcrpofe  in   the   Government  of  Na- 

t  On  Providence,  p.  38.  1  ft  Edit. 


"  turc,  there  would  be  no  reafon  to  beg  his 
"  Favour  or  deprecate  his  Anger  upon  thefe 
"  accounts."— —And  to  the  fame  purpofe  he 
urges,  p.  71.  That  without  this  Belief,  that 
God  takes  a  particular  Care  of  all  his  Crea- 
tures in  the  Government  of  all  Events  that 
can  happen  to  them  (which  Belief  appears  to 
be  impoflible  upon  the  Mechanical  Hypothefs) 
there  is  no  reafon  or  pretence  for  moft  of  the 
particular  Duties  of  Religious  Worlhip,  as  is 
fully  proved  in  the  fame  place.  iSce  alfo  C.  9, 
Concerning  the  true  Notion,  as  well  as  the  Rca- 
fonablenefs  and  NcctJJity  of  Prayer,  fee  p.  381.  il>. 
(100.)  He  means  the  Scheme  o\  Analogy y 
concerning  which  fee  his  Note  £•  We  have 
given  our  Notion  of  the  Word  Prefcience  in 
Note  18.  X  e.  fee  alfo  Mr.  Jack/on  on  Human 
Liberty,  p.  62.  But  tho'  we  cannot  perhapa 
determine  the  precife  mnnner  of  God's  know- 
ing the  free  Afts  of  Men,  yet  we  are  certain 
that  he  does  and  muft  always  know  them : 
fince  otherwife  he  would  know  many  things 
now  which  he  did  not  know  once,  and  confe- 
quently  his  OmniJ'cience  ov  Infinite  Knowledge 
would  receive  addition  from  Events  which  (as 
we  have  made  appear  in  Xe.)  is  contrary  to 
the  true  Notion  of  Infinity.  This  general  Argu- 
ment drawn  from  God's  infinite  or  perfeil 
Knowledge,  feems  to  me  the  only  one  which 
can  come  near  to  a  Proof  that  he  muft  always 
have  a  compleat  and  equal  Knowledge  of  fuch 
a£lions  as  are  in  themfelves  abfolutely  con- 
tingent, as  all  thofe  evidently  are  which  de- 
pend upon  the  Free-Will  of  the  Creature. 
Thefe  aftions  (as  we  formerly  obferv'd)  may 
properly  be  call'd  Future  with  refpeft  to  us  or 
other  Men,  and  the  Knowledge  of  them  in 
the  fame  refpeft  be  ftiled  Fore- Knowledge.  But 
with  regard  to  the  Deity,  whofe  Exiftence  and 
Attributes  can  have  no  relation  to  time,  /.  e.  to 
which  nothing  can  be  at  a  diftance,  I  think, 
the  Expreflion  is  abfurd  ;  and  we  muft  necef- 
farily  either  admit  the  fore-men ti on 'd  abfurdity 

of 


Of  Moral  Evil 

The  Reader  may  obferve,  that  in  "this  and  other  Places,  I  interfper/e 
fomc  things  which  belong  to  Revealed  Religion,  contrary  to  what  I 
intended  at  firft ;  which  happen'd  becaufe  fome  Objedlions  feem'd  to 
arife  from  reveal'd  Religion,  in  oppolition  to  the  Principles  and  Ar- 
guments here  laid  down.  Since  therefore  1  had  determin'd  to  pro- 
duce nothing  but  what  was  pcrfecftly  agreeable  to  the  Articles  of 
Faith,  and  the  Principles  of  the  Chriftian  Religion,  I  found  it  necef- 
fary  to  call  in  the  Scripture  to  my  Afliftance,  that  the  Anfwer  might 
come  from  the  fame  Quarter  with  the  Objections. 

One  that  knows  nothing  of  Reveal'd  Religion  cannot  bring  thefe 
Objections  -,  one  that  does  not  believe  it  has  no  right  to  urge  them. 
For  if  he  be  fenfible  that  the  Objections  are  of  any  force,  he  muft 
of  neceffity  alfo  admit  the  Solutions,  fince  both  of  them  depend 
upon  the  fame  Authority.  (loi.) 


69 


NOTES. 


of  foppofing  his  Knowledge  limited,  or  elfe 
allow  that  all  things  are  at  all  times  equally  in 
his  view;  and  confequently  that  Knowledge, 
as  in  him,  hath  nothing  to  do  with  /ore  and 

If  we  admit  this  Notion  of  tilings  being  al- 
wayis  prefent  to  God,  tho'  fucceffive  to  us, 
which  fecms  to  be  the  only  way  of  conceiving 
how  Contingencies  can  poflibly  be  Objefts  of 
any  Knowledge  ;  If  this,  1  fay,  be  allow'd, 
then  all  things,  actions,  i^c.  which  can  pro- 
perly be  faid  to  exift,  will  be  equally  proper 
ObjeHs  of  God's  Knowledge,  fince  he  is  here- 
by fuppofed  not  to  know  them  in  fieri,  or  in 
their  Caufe  ;  but  in  effe,  or  in  their  aUual  Exi- 
fience.  Which  at  the  fame  time  gives  us  the 
Medium  of  their  being  knowable,  vix.  Their 
real  Exigence;  and  makes  it  as  ea(y  for  us  to 
imagine  how  God  Ihould  always  know  them, 
as  how  we  fliould  ever  know  a  thing  when  it  is 
immediately  prcfented  to  us. 

*Tis  fubmittcd  to  the  Reader,  whether  this 


old  Notion  of  the  Schoolmen  be  not  ffill  the 
bell  we  are  able  to  frame  upon  the  prefent 
Subjeft. 

(loi.)  This  general  Argunwsit  lies  agaiutt 
all  thofe  who  bring  Objeftions  from  the  Scrip- 
ture Account  of  the  Creation,  Fall,  ^c.  viz. 
either  th«y  believe  the  Truth  and  Divine  Au- 
thority of  thofe  Books,  or  they  do  not ;  if 
they  do,  then  they  muft  believe  them  alfo  whcii 
they  declare  that  all  the  Works  of  God  are  ho- 
ly and  juft  and  good  ;  and  confequently  that 
the  foremention'd  Difficulties  are  no  real  Ar 
guments  againft  the  Divine  Attributes :  if  thev 
do  not;  then  the  whole  falls  to  the  Ground- 
For  to  admit  one  part  of  an  account  and  re- 
je£l  the  other,  when  both  depend  upon  the 
fame  Authority,  is  evidently  unreafonable. 

Objeftions  therefore  drawn  from  the  Scrip- 
ture account  of  thefe  Matters  can  but  be  mere 
Arguments  ad  homintm  at  bcft:  and  are  of 
no  force  either  to  make  or  juftify  an  Unbe- 
liever. 


SUBSECT 


ayo  Of  Moral  EviL 

S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     V. 

Why  God  does  not  tranjlate  Man  to  fome  other  Tlaccy 
"where  nothing  "would  occur  that  could  tem^t  him  to 
choofe  amifs. 

I.  /  J  ^  I S  plain,  that  in  the  prefent  State  of  things  it  is  impoflible 
fii^elsiflt       '   -1     ^^^  ^^^  ^°  ^^^^  without  natural  Evils,  or  the  danger  of 
were  ask'd.    erring.     *Tis  a  common  Queftion,  why  does  not  God  change  this 
^^^?v°e^hl'^  State,  and  tranllate  Man  to  fome  other,  where  all  Occafions  of  Er- 
Earth  to  be  Tor,  and  Incitements  to  Evil  being  cut  off,    he  might  choofe  only 
inhabited  by  Good;  i.  €.  in  reality,  Why  has  he  placed  Man  upon   the  Earth? 
onV^^"^"     Why  did  he  not  leave  it  to  be  inhabited  by  the  Brutes  alone?  There 
arc  fome  perhaps  who  expedt  fuch  things  as  thefe  from  the  Divine 
Goodnefs,  but  without  any  Senfe  or  Reafon  -,  fince  it  manifeftly  ap- 
pears to  be  better  that  we  fhould  contend  with  the  prefent  Evils, 
than  that  the  Earth  fhould  be  void  of  all  rational  Inhabitants.  (102.) 

fome 

NOTES. 


:•- '  _  —    /t  o         —     --     — ^■ 

is,  i.  e.  confifting  of  a  Soul  and  a  Body,  this  ders  as  could  be  conceiv'd  to  exift  between 
World  was  a  proper  place  for  him.  To  the  himfelf  and  nothing:  or  fo  long  as  Exiftence 
Queftion,  Why  fliould  he  be  made  of  fuch  a  in  the  very  loweft  Order  might  be  a  Benefit 
Nature  as  denominates  \\\m  Man,  or  placed  in  either  to  the  Beings  of  that  Order,  or  to  thofe 
this  lower  Clafs  of  Beings  ?  a  fufficient  An- j  of  fome  other.  The  Confequence  of  which  is, 
fwer  is  given  in  Note  35.  where,  I  think,  it 'that  we  muft  either  have  been  placed  in  the 
is  render'd  probable,  that  the  fame  Goodnefs  Clafs  we  are  in  at  prefent,  or  no  where,  fince 
which  excited  the  Deity  to  create  Beings  of  by  the  Suppofition  every  other  Clafs  is  full, 
the  higheft  Order,  would  induce  him  both  to  \  And  there  will  appear  fufficient  reafon  for  our 
create  as  many  of  that  Order  as  could  commo- 1  being  created  in  this  Order,  and  placed  where 
.^ioufly  exift  together,  or  be  confillent  with  the  I  we  are,  rather  than  not  created  at  all,  provided 

that 


\ 


of  Moral  Evil  271 

Some  make  it  a  Queftion,  why  fo  great  a  Part  of  the  Earth  is  given 
av-  ay  to  the  Brutes ;  but  tbefe  Men  would  have  it  all  left  to  *em  ; 
and  Mankind   itfelf  exrindt. 

II.  We  hive  often  declared  that  Evils  are  chiefly  to  be  avoided,  ^^^  '^  ^"* 
nay  that  they  are  prohibited  by  God,  becaufe  they  are  prejudicial  to  Sran^flri 
human  Nature,  but  how  much  worfe  would  it  be  to  take  that  Na- a^od  Men  to 
rure  enrirely  away?     They  therefore  who  require  this  of  the  Divine  bu'^t*^JJj"p/g^f* 
Goodnefs,    defire    the    greateft   Evil    of  all   as  a  Remedy  for    E-  Tent  is  as  ne- 
vils.     The  fame  Perfons  alfo,  that  with   fuch  EarneRnefs  defire    a  g^'^^'^j  **  . 
Change  of   their  Condition,    are   afraid  of  Death,    forgetting   that  to  Harvcft. 
this  Change  of  their  Condition  is  what  they  dread  the  moft:  of  all 

in  Death. 

III.  Mankind  believes  indeed  from  the  Light  of  Nature,  that  God  This  is  total- 
will  tranflate  good  Men  into  a  better  State,  but  it  is  neceffary  that  they  J^^^K""^' 
ihould  be  prepared  here,  as  Plants  in  a  Nurfery,  before  they  be  re- 
moved into  the  Garden  where  they  are   to    bear  Fruit.     God   has 
therefore  decreed  this  Life  to  be  as  it  were  the  PafTage  to  a  better. 

Thus  this  Earth  is  replenifli'd  with  Inhabitants,  who  being  educa- 
ted under  Difcipline  for  a  while,  till  they  have  finifh'd  their  Courfe, 
fhall  depart  into  another  State  fuited  to  their  Deferts.  They  who 
find  fault  with  this  in  God,  feem  to  me  to  do  the  fame  as  if  one 
who  is  ignorant  of  Agriculture  and  Harveil  fhould  laugh   at  the 


Sower 


NOTES, 


thit  Exiftence  be  a  Bleflings  to  us,  or  that  wej"  Dungeons  wojld  othcrwifc  be  empty.     But 


receive  in  general  more  Happinefs  than  Mifery 
in  this  prefent  State;  which  point  will  be 
confider'd  in  the  next  Subledlion. 

Thu  thefe  feveral  ClafTcs  may  be  fuppofed 
to  advance  gradually  towards  Perfeftion,  and 
of  confequence  that  we  in  time  may  be  remo- 
ved into  fome  better  State,  fee  Note  30. 

Thefe  Confiderjiions  will  fupply  us  with  an 
Anfvrer  to  Bayle's  Objcftion  againft  what  our 
Author  advances  in  this  Paragraph.  "  This 
"  (fays  he)  is  juft  like  as  if  a  King  fhould  con- 
"  fine  feveral  of  his  Subjefts  in  his  Dungeons, 
*'  till  they  were  60  Years  old,  becaufe  thefe 


to  make  any  likenefs  at  all  in  thefe  two  Cafes, 
it  muft  be  made  appear  in  .the  firll  place,  that 
we  really  meet  with  more  Evil  of  all  kinds 
than  Good  in  this  World ;  and  confequcntly, 
that  it  were  better  for  Ui  to  be  out  of  it  than 
in  it:  contrary  to  what  our  Author  has  proved 
in  Ch.  2.  par.  7.  Ch.  4.  §.  8.  par.  7.  and  in  the 
following  Subfeftion :  and  fecondly,  it  muft 
be  fhcwn  alfo,  that  we  might  have  been  placed 
in  fome  better  World,  without  any  Inconve- 
nience to  the  rej}  of  ike  U/ir.  f'e,  contrary  to 
what  may  be  concluded  from  the  former  Part 
of  this  Note,  and  that  other  to  which  it  refers. 


272  Of  Moral  Evil. 

Sower  for  throwing  away  his  Corn.  For  there  is  no  doubt  but  the 
prefent  State  of  things  is  as  necelTary,  not  only  to  the  Earth  left  it 
,  (houid  be  void  of  Inhabitants,  and  to  the  Animals,  which  for  the 
moft  part  depend  upon  the  Labours  of  Men,  but  alfo  to  Men  them- 
felves:  and  as  requifite  in  the  Divine  Adminiftration,  in  order  to 
feme  better  Life,  as  Seed-time  is  to  Harveft.  (103.) 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 


NOTES, 


(103.)  Say/e  oh]cd:3,  that  our  Author^scom- 
parifon  here  is  not  a  juft  one,  fince  God  can- 
not be  ty*d  to  the  ufe  of  common  means,  and 
a  flow  Progrefs  of  fecond  Caufes.  He  is  not 
obliged  to  nurfe  us  up  as  a  Gardener  does  his 
Plants,  but  might  as  well  have  produced  us 
adult  and  ripe  in  Perfeftion,  and  have  made 
us  happy  at  once.— But  perhaps  it  may  appear 
a  little  doubtful  to  a  Perfon  who  attentively 
confiders  Note  30,  whether  this  could  be  done 
even  in  natural  Pleafure.  However,  I  think, 
*tis  abfolutely  inconceivable  how  it  fhould  be 
effefted  in  Moral  Happinefs.  If  we  confider 
the  Nature  of  Virtue  and  of  Man,  it  will  not 
be  poflible  for  us  to  imagine  how  this  could 
be  implanted  in  him  at  firlt,  or  infufed  into  him 
afterwards,  or  he  be  in  any  wife  made  moral- 
ly perfeft  or  good  on  a  fudden.  The  Idea  of 
Virtue  confifts  in  a  repetition  of  free  AEts,  and 
therefore  it  cannot  be  receiv'd  pajprely :  and 
tho'  the  Difpofition  might  be  thus  communi- 
,cated,  yet  to  compleat  its  Natiwe,  and  make 
it  a£lually  produdive  of  true  moral  Hnppi- 
ncfs,  there  muft  neceffarily  be  requir'd  due 
time  for  Kxercife,  Experience  and  confirmed 
Habits,  as  may  be  gather' d  from  the  Prelimi- 
nary Dijfertation ;  and  will  farther  appear  from 
Notes  1 06  and  108. 

From  the  Nature  of  Man  alfo,  or  a  Being 
in  his  imperfeft  State,  we  may  fairly  infer, 
that  he  could  not  have  fo  great  an  Idea  of  the 
moral  Perfcftions  of  the  Deity,  nor  fo  clear 
an  apprehenfion  of  the  contrary  Qnalitics,  nor 


confequently,  a  fuitable  afFcftion  for  the  one, 
and  an  abhorrence  of  the  other,  if  he  had  not 
fome  experience  of  both  *. 

We  know  not  the  real  Value  of  a  good 
thing,  we  cannot  he  duly  fenfible  of  its  Ex- 
cellence, except  we  have  been  in  fome  meafure 
acquainted  with  its  Oppofite,  or  at  leaft  have 
perceiv'd  the  want  of  it  on  fome  occafion. 
"  Does  any  one  (fays  Leibnitz  ■[)  fufficient'y 
"  relifh  the  Happinefs  of  good  Health  who 
"  has  never  been  fick  ?  Is  it  not  moft  times 
**  neceffjry  that  a  little  Evil  fhould  render  a 
*'  Good  more  fenfible,  and  confequently  grea- 
"  ter?'*  See  alfo  Note  30.  The  fame  holds 
,  ftronger  ftill  in  Moral  Good:  which  is  a  con- 
',  firmation  of  the  Altermtive  that  LaBantius 
I  fpeaks  of  |l;  and  which  is  well  defcrib'd  by 
^  A.  GelliusW.  It  does  not  therefore  feem  pof- 
lible fttr  us  to  have  a  due  Knowledge  of  Virtue 
if  we  never  had  feen  Vice.  Without  this 
Knowledge  of  Virtue,  we  could  not  ardently 
defire  it,  without  fuch  a  dcfire,  and  a  fedulous 
profecution  of  that  defire,  we  could  not  attain 
to  the  proper  exercife  of  it,  and  without  this 
attainment  we  could  not  have  any  confciouf- 
nefs  of  defert,  any  comfortable  felf-approba- 
tion,  or  true  Moral  Happinefs. 

It  appears  then  that  Virtue  is  an  h€i  of  our 
own,^  that  a  Series  of  thefe  h€is  is  requifite  to 
conftitute  an  habit  of  Virtse,  and  of  confe- 
quence  that  this  cannot  be  irfpired  into  any 
Being,  or  however  not  produced  tn  one  of  our 
weak  frame  on  a  fudden  :  and  in  the  laft  place, 

tkt 


*  See  Note  90.  f  Memoirs  of  Literature,  v.  3.  Art.  zi;.  p.  1 18. 

\  Dg  Ira  Dei,  §.13;  feft.  fub  fin.  and  15..  ft  B.  6.  Ch.  i. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


573 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     VI. 

Concerning  the  Scarcity  of  Ha^y  Terfons,    and  the  Gcne^ 
:  ~.ral  Corruption  of  Mankind, 


I.  I3UT  it  may  feem  ftrangc,  that  of  fo  great  a  Multitude  of  Men, 
|2)  fo  few  fliould  attain  to  Happinefs.  For  whether  that  be  fup- 
pofed  to  arife  from  the  fruition  of  fuch  things  as  are  agreeable  to 
the  natural  Appetites,  or  from  free  Eledions,  'tis  manifeft,  that  not 
even  one  of  a  hundred  thoufand  is  truly  happy.  In  vain  then  do  we 
enquire  about  the  Means  which  lead  to  Happinefs  j  the  Power  of  E- 
ledtion  is  beftow'd  on  Man  to  no  purpofe,  fince  it  fo  rarely  attains 
the  end  for  which  it  v^as  imparted. 

II.  Secondly,  The  far  greater  part  of  Mankind  negleding  this 
Power  of  pleafing  themfelves  in  Eledions,  or  rather,  to  confefs  the 
truth,  not  in  the  leaft  obferving  that  they  have  it,  or  that  Happinefs 
is  to  be  expe(ftcd  from  the  ufe  of  itj  give  themfelves  up  entirely  to 
the  Government  of  their  natural  Appetites  and  Senfes,  and  are  plain- 
ly hurried  on  according  to  the  Impetus  and  Diredion  of  the  Animal 

Nature^ 

NOTES, 


S  ome  Objec 
tions  propo-j 
fed  conccr- 
ning  the  Ra- 
rity of  Hap- 
py Perfons. 


That  the 
power  of  E- 
Icdion  is  not 
regarded. 


that  this  prefcnt  State  is  necefiary  (as  our  fta- 
thor  (ays)  to  train  us  up,  and  fit  us  for  a  bet- 
ter. That  this  Life  Is  properly  a  State  of 
Iryni  znd  Probation,  and  the  Virtues  of  it  ab- 
iblutely  neceiTary  to  the  Happinefs  of  the  next, 
fee  Ryf/ifi's  General  Reprejtntathtt  of  RevcAfd 
R.iigtun,  Part  2.  Ch.  3.  p.  385,  bV.  and  S(ott\ 
CinjUiW  Life,  Vcl.  2.  Ch  4.  ^.3.  p-32«,35$, 
i:V.  8c5,  ;ind  Shtrlock  on  Death,  C.  i.  ^3- 
f-  TJ,  Izc-  4th  Edit. 

N 


To  the  fame  purpofe  is  that  excellent  Paper 
in  the  5/>fA//or,  N".  447. — "  The  laft  ufc  I 
•*  fhall  make  of  this  remarkable  Pioperty  in 
**  human  Nature,  of  being  delighted  withthofc 
"  Aftions  to  which  it  is  accnftom'd,  is  to  fhcw 
•*  how  abfolutely  ncccirnry  it  is  for  us  to  gain 
•♦  habitj  of  Virtue  inthi.Life.if  wc  would  enjoy 
«•  the  plcafiires  of  the  next.ThcState  of  Blifs  we 
•*  call  Heaven  will  not  be  capable  of  affefling 
<♦  thofc&linds  which  arc  not  thu^qualify'd  for  it ; . 

wc 

n 


a  74 


That  there  is- 


bgion. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

Nature  as  much  as  Brute?.  If  therefore  we  have  this  Power  in  uX 
it  feems  to  be  given  us  in  vain,  /'.  e.  to  fuch  as  neither  ufe  it,  nor  are 
confcious  that  they  have  it.  jir*v-  zi  . ' 

III.  Thirdly,    Hence  all   Mankind  lie  polluted  and  immters'd   in 
m'univerfirVice  and  Wickednef«ij  and  'tis  not  one  or  two,  but  everyone,  that 
Corruption,  deviates  from  the  right  ufe  of  Eledtion.     How  can  thefe  things-be  re- 
concii'd  with  the  Care   and  Providence  of  an   infinitely  gpQci  jujtl: 
powerful  God  ?  . 

.  IV.  I  confefs,  that  this  Corruption  of  Manners,  and  almoft  univer 
anfwer'd  by  f^l  Deviation  from  the  way  to  Happinefs,  is  better  folv'd  from  Re- 
rcveai-d  Re-  vcal'd  than  Natural  Religion,  and  that  the  neceffity  of  a  Revelation 
is  from  hence  rightly  proved.  For  fince  the  true  Cauie  which  gave 
rife  to  this  is  a  matter  of  Facl,  'viz,  tlie  Fall  of  the  firft  Man,  it 
cannot  be  difcover'd  merely  by  the  Strength  of  Reafon  ;  but  we  ftand 
in  need  of  Hijiorical  Tradition  to  tranlmit  this,  as  well  as  other  mat- 
ters of  Fad:,  down  to  us.  But  tho'  tliere  had  been  none  fuch,  and 
we  were  ignorant  of  the  Fall  of  the  Firft  Maii^  yet  we  iliould  have 
been  furniih'd  with  a  proper,  tho'  not  fo  clear  an  Anfwer,  fmce  the 
Mifery  or  Corruption  of  Mankind  tho'  really  lamentable,  yet  is  not  fo 
great  but  that  it  may  be  reconciled  with  the  good  Providence  of 
God.  • .  -.^-m-fiH 

V.  For  as  to  the  firft  Objedtion  takea  from  the  fewnefs  of  them 
r^rmodera'te  that  attain  to  Happinefs,  we  may  reply  that  Happinefs  is  two- fold, 
Happinefs.    perfeB  and  abfolute^  or  moderate  and  partial.     I  call  that  perfeft  which 
anfwers  in  every  refpeft  to  our  Wifhes,  and  that  moderate  which, 

tho* 

N  O  t  E  S. 


Many  attain 


**  we  nriuft-  in  this  Worli  gain  a  Relirti  of 
*'  Truth  and  Virtue,  if  we  would  be  able  to 
•'  tafle  that  Knowledge  and  Perfeftion  which 
*'  arc  to  make  us  happy  in  the  next.  The  feeds 
"  of  thofc  Spiritual  Joys  and  Raptures  which 
"  are  to  rife  up  and  flourifh  in  the  Soul  to  all 
"  Eternity  mull  be  planted  in  her  during  this 
••  her  prefcnt  ^'tate  of  Probation.  In  Ihort, 
*'  Heaven  is  not  to  be  look'd  upon  only  as  the 
■"  Reward,  but  as  the  natural  EiFcft  of  a  Reli- 
•'  gious  Life.''  See  alfo  Ti/fat/of/'s  Serm.  ift 
vol.  Fol.  I>.  51,  82,  85,  {^£.  and  the  78thSerin. 


2d  vol.  p.  591.  Concerning  the  true  End  of 
Man,  and  the  Means  of  obtaining  it,  and  the 
Nature  both  of  thofe  Virtues  which  will  con- 
ftitute  the  greateft  part  of  Heaven,  and  of 
thofe  Injiratnental  Duties  by  which  we  are  to 
acquire,  improve,  and  perfeft  thefe  Heavenly 
Virtues,  or  make  our  own  Heaven,  fee  Scott's 
incomparable  Treatife  of  the  Chrijiian  Life, 
vol.  I.  particularly  Ch.  3.  which  Notion  is  al- 
fo well  defended  by  Dr.  R^jmer  in  the  Chap,  a- 
bove  mention'd.  See  alfo  Dr,  Laughttn'i  Serm. 
«n  Rifn.  6.  23. 


Of  Moral  Evd. 

tho*  It  does  not  equal  our  Defires,  yet  is  not  quite  deftitute  of  agrec^ 
able  Enjoyments,  with  which  Life  being  accompanied,  and  fvveeten'd 
as  it  were  by  the  Mitigation  of  its  Evils,  and  the  Alleviation  of  its 
Cares,  becomes  a  Bleffing,  and  worth  a  prudent  Man's  Choice.  As 
to  the  former,  'tis  certain  that  it  cannot  fall  to  the  Lot  of  any  Man 
in  this  prefent  State,  nor  is  it  a  Debt  due  from  God  to  a  Creature^ 
tho'  never  fo  innocent.  Since  the  Condition  of  Men  is,  and  muft  ne- 
ceflarily  be  fuch  (while  we  inhabit  this  Earth  in  its  prefent  State)  as 
will  by  no  means  admit  of  this  abfolutely  perfed:  Happinefs.  For 
Pain«,  Griefs,  and  the  reft  of  thofe  which  wc  call  natural  Evils,  can- 
not, as  things  now  ftand,  be  totally  avoided,  but  by  the  preternatural 
Favour  of  the  Deity.  The  Earth  then  muft  either  be  left  deftitute 
of  Inhabitants,  or  we  muft  take  up  with  a  moderate  (hare  of  Happi- 
nefs; this  alfo  is  a  Gift  worthy  of  God,  and  fit  tphe  accepted  and 
embrac'd  by  Man,  Neither  is  this  a  rare  Felicity,  and  which  hap- 
pens to  few  Men ;  for  all  may  enjoy  it,  and  moft  adually  do ;  efpe- 
cially  if  they  will  make  a  prudent  ufe  of  their  Eledions.  For  if 
there  be  any  hitter  thing  in  Life,  it  generally  flows  from  depravad 
Elections,  and  by  a  right  ufc  of  thefc,  any  thing  which  creates  un- 
cafinefs,  or  can  make  us  weary  of  Life,  might  be  mitigated  or  re-» 
tHOv'd.  To  conclude,  tho'  we  complain  6f  the  Miferies  of  Life,  yet 
we  are  unwilling  to  part  with  it,  which  is  a  certain  Indication  that 
k  is  not  a  burden  to  us,  and  that  not  fo  few  attain  this  moderate 
Happinefs,  as  the  Objcdion  would  infimsate.  (104.) 

N  n  2  VI.  As 


t* 


r^o  T E  s. 


(ib4 )  To  calculate  Whether  the  Sum  of 
Happinets  in  (his  World  exceed  the  Sum  ot' 
•Mifcry,  upon  the  whole,  would  be  an  endlefs 
piece  of  Work,  afid  what  no  Man  perhaps  is 
nble  precifcly  to  determine  :  I  Diall  therefore 
only  jsroduce  the  Opiaion  of  one  or  two  Au- 
thors on  the  Queftion,  which  may  fcrvc  at 
lead  to  confroivt  the  Teftiraony  fo  oAen  and 
•  fo  largely  repeated  by  Say/e  in  all  hisWorks,— 


"  I  am  fure  (fays  Dr.  Sherlock  •}•>  we  are  rc- 
*•  ry  ungrateful  to  Almighty  God  if  wcdo  not 
•*  acknowledge  th.it  bountiful  Provifion  which 
•'  he  has  made  for  the  Happinefs  of  ManlttiU 
"  in  this  WorU.  For  what  is  wanting  on 
"  God's  part  to  make  Man  as  happy  as  he  can  be 
••  here  ?  Wc  want  no  fcnfc  which  is  ufeful  tq 
"  Ltft  ?  wc  wat?t  no  Objc£ls  to  gr.uifie  thole 
«  SenfcS,  and  which  is  very  conJiderable,  the 

•♦  moft 


f  On  PrcvUfHcty  Ch.  7.  p.  r43.  ^'<-  ad  Edit. 


'5'j^  Of  Moral  Evil. 

VJ.  As  to  the  fecond  thing  objeded,  viz.  that  moft  of  us  are  either 
ufe "rthu  ^gf^^^^"^  °r  regardlefs  of  this  Power  of  pleafing  ourfclves  by  Elec- 
Elcftive  tion;  upon  a  thorough  Enquiry  it  will  be  manifeft,  that  the  ufe  of 
Power  tho'  ^\^\^  Powcr  is  neither  difrcgarded,  nor  fo  rare  as  might  appear  at  firfl: 
oblcrw  it!  Sight.  I  own  there  are  few  who  take  notice  of  this  in  themfelves, 
or  obferve,  that  the  Pleafure  which  they  feel  in  aifling  arifes  from  the 
Exercife  of  it.  But  neverthelefs  they  do  excrcife  it,  and  tafte  the  Plea- 
fure arifing  therefrom.  And  the  fame  thing  feems  to  befal  us  in  the 
Exercife  of  this  Power  which  happens  in  fome  Organs  of  Senfe,  tho* 
we  are  entirely  ignorant  which  they  are,  or  of  what  kind,  yet  we 
ufe  them,  and  by  the  ufe  of  them  perceive  external  things.  Thus 
we  pleafe  ourfelves  in  choofing,  tho'  we  are  not  aware  that  things 
pleafe  us  becaufe  they  are  chofen.  Now  that  this  is  fo  will  be  evi- 
dent, if  we  examine  thofe  things  which  afford  Pleafure  to  both  young 
and  old,  wife  as  well  as  foolifh.  For  if  the  far  greater  part  of  them 
have  no  manner  of  Connedtion  with  the  natural  Appetites,  nor  with 
the  Neceflities  of  Nature,  it  will  appear  that  they  have  pleafed  us 
no  otherwife  than  by  virtue  of  Eled:ion.  Let  us  weigh  the  trifles  of 
Children,  and  the  ferious  Affairs  of  Men;  the  Temerity  of  Fools,  and 
the  Counfels  of  the  Wife  -,  and  it  will  be  evident  almoft  in  all  of 
them,  that  they  pleafe  by  Eledion  only  *.     This,  among  other  things, 

may 

NOTE  S. 

*'  moft  ufeful,   and   nccefTary,  and  delightful  **  rich.— Thefe  indeed  at  beft  are  but  mean 
Objefts,   arc   moft   common,     and    fuch  as,*'  Pleafures,  the  Pleafures  of  Senfe,  which  are 

"the  loweft  a  leafonable  Soul  is  capable  of; 


*'  Mankind  pretty  equally  (hare  in.  There  is 
**  not  fuch  a  mighty  Difference  as  fome  Men 
*•  imagine,  between  the  Poor  and  the  Rich  : 
*'  in  Pomp,  and  Shew,  and  Opinion,  there  is 
*'  a  great  deal,  but  little  as  to  the  true  Plea- 
•'  fures  and  Satisfadlions  of  Life :  they  enjoy 
*jlj  the  fame  Earth,  and  Air,  and  Heavens  ; 
^  'Hunger  and  Thirft  makes  the  poor  Man's 
*•  Meat  and  Drink  as  pleafant  and  relifhing  as 
*'  all  the  Varieties  which  cover  a  rich  Man's 
y  Table  :  and  the  Labour  of  a  poor  Man  is 
i*^  more  healthful,  and  many  times  more  plea- 
^  iant  too,  than  the  Eafe  and  foftnefs  of  the 


but  yet  they  are  fo  entertaining,  that  the  ge- 
*•  nerality  of  Mankind  think  it  worth  living 
**  to  enjoy  them. — And  yet  there  are  mote  no- 
*'  ble  aad  divine  Pleafures  which  Men  may  en- 
*•  j.py  in  this  World  ;  fuch  as  gratify  the  no- 
"  bier  Faculties  of  the  Soul,  the  Pleafures  of 
"  Wifdom  and  Knowledge,  of  Virtue  and  Re- 
"  ligion  ;  to  know  and  worfhip  God,  to  con- 
*•  template  the  Art  and  Beauty  and  Perfeflion 
"  of  his  Works,  and  to  do  Good  to  Ment 
"  Thefe  indeed  are  Pleafures  that  do  not  make 
**  us  very  fond  of. the  Body,  nor  of  this  World; 

••  for 


*  St*  mort  of  this  in  Scft.  i,  Subfeft.  5.  par.  11,  12,  l^c. 


OpMoral  Evil 

may  appear  from  the  Diverfions  of  Cards  and  Dice.  Nothing  is 
more  agreeable  to  all,  or  pleafes  more;  but  upon  no  other  account, 
if  we  examine  it  thoroughly,  than  becaufe  we  will  be  thus  em- 
ploy *d. 

Nay  that  dire  Lufi  of  Rule  which  bewitches  mortal  Minds,  and 
tranfports  them  beyond  themfelves,  which  cannot  be  fatisfy'd  un- 
lefs  the  whole  World  be  fubdued,  and  even  not  then;  this  nei- 
ther receives  its  Origin  nor  Approbation  from  Nature  or  any  innate 
Appetite. 

But  the  force  of  Eledion  is  never  more  apparent  than  in  fome 
Men's  infatiable  Avarice,  and  continual  Study  to  heap  up  unprofita- 
ble Riches,  for  no  ufe,  no  end,  but  to  fatisfy  their  Choice.  Behold 
the  covetous  Man  brooding  over  his  Gold;  a  Curfe  to  his  Relations, 
a  Jefl  to  his  Neighbours,  a  Reproach  to  Nature ;  depriving  himfelf 
of  Food,  Sleep,  Rell,  and  other  Neceflaries,  and  yet  applauding  him- 
felf ftill.  Why  do  thefe  tkiftgs  pleafe  which  are  fo  unnatural,  fo 
abfurd,  fo  prepofterous  ?  This  is  felt,  this  is  purfu'd,  tho'  he  that 
does  this  be  not  confcious  that  he  is  doing  it,  neither  obferves  what 
it  is'  which  pleafes  him.  It  is  not  therefore  the  Diredion  of  the 
Senfes,  or  the  Impulfe  of  Animal  Nature  only,  which  tranfports  us 
into  Vices  and  unlawful  Adtsj  thefe  are  commonly  done  againft  the 

Remonftrancc 

NOTES. 


•'  for  they  do  not  arife  from  the  Body,  nor 
"  are  they  confin'd  to  this  World.  We  have 
"  r«afon  to  hope,  that  when  we  get  loofe 
■*^  from  thefe  Bodies,  our  inteJleflual  Facul 
"  ties  will  be  vaftly  improv'd  ;  that  we  Ihall 
"  know  God  after  ano:hcr  manner  than  we 
"  now  do ;  and  difcover  new  and  brighter 
"  Glories  which  arc  conceal'd  from  Mortal 
"  Eyes  ;  but  yet  the  Pleafures  of  Koowledge, 
"  and  Wifdom,  and  Religion  in  this  World, 
"  are  very  great  and  ravifliing,  and  therefore 
"  we  either  do  or  may  enjoy  at  prefent  fuch 
"  Plcafures  as  make  Life  very  defirable :  Were 
"  there  no  other  nor  happier  State  after  this, 
•*  yet  it  were  very  defirable  to  come  into  this 


"  World,  and  live  as  long  as  we  can  here,  to 
*'  enjoy  the  Pleafures  and  Satisfaftlons  which 
"  may  be  enjoy'd   in  this  Life." 

An  Explication  of  Ece/.  Ch.  4.  v.  2,  3.  may- 
be found  in  the  fame  excellent  Chapter,  fee  al- 
fo  p.  225. 

LeiinitZt  Efais  de  Theodicee  *.  "  It  will 
*♦  be  faid,  that  Evils  are  very  great  and  nume- 
"  rous  if  compar'd  with  good  things  ;  but  it 
"  is  a  Miftake;  Want  of  Attention  is  the  on- 
"  ly  thing  that  Icflcns  our  Happinefs  ;  and 
"  'cis  neceffary  that  this  Attention  fhould  be 
"  rais'd  by  a  mixture  of  Evih  Let  us  fupply 
"  by  Refleftion  what  is  wanting  to  our  Percep- 
"  tion,  to  be  more  fenlible  of  our  Happincls. 

"  Were 

•  Mtmoirs  of  Literature^  V.  3.  p.  118. 


5^8.  Of  Mt>ral  Evil 

Remoriftrance  of  thofe  Appetites  Which  arc  implanted  by  Natur€,agamfl: 
the  Reftiohrtrance  of  Senfe  and  Inftin(5t,  no  lefs  than  Reafon,  and  thj 
lead  Crime  we  commit  is  in  obeying  them.  We  may  learn  then,  to  our 
great  Misfortune,  that  we  are  not  entirely  driven  by  the  Impel i^s  of  A- 
hi>rial  Nature^  and  that  this  Power  of  pleafing  ourfelves  by  Election 
does  not  lie  idle ;  but  rather  that  it  is  the  too  great  and  iiiordinate 
nfe  of  it  which  tranfports  us  into  Wickedneis. 
El  aions  ^^^'  ^^  ^^  ^^  ^^^^^  Objedion,  viz.  that  the  Cbtruptim  of  Man- 

produce  the  kind  is  almoft  iinherfaly    it  is  to  be  obferv'd  in  the  firft  place,  that 
^J^e  jf^eft  in  Eiedions  produce  the  fame  eifefl  in  tlie  Moral,  as  Motion  does  in 
Worid°asMo-  ^^^  Natural  World  j  neither  is  it  any  more  to  be  expeded,   that  in 
tiondoes  in  our  prefertt  State  all  Eledions  llitJuldbe  confident  and  uniform,  than 
'the  Natural.  ^|^^  jjj|  Motic^s  fli^Juld  be  fo.     Now  as  roiitraribty  of  Motion  is  a 
neceflary  Gaiife  of  natural  Corruption,  fo  the  interfering  of  Eleflions 
h  of  Vice  br  Moral  Corruption.     God  could  indeed  take  away  both, 
i}iz.  by  deftroymg  Motion  and  free  Choice ;  but  while  thefe  are  pe?r- 
fei'tted-,  neither  of  the  Evils  x;otild  be  prevented  in  the  prefent  Sta^e, 
^ef  things. 

Vlil.  8^t>ndly-,  Wfe  may  t^bfervi;  that  things  are  conne6tfcd  toge- 
^^.  .^r,  abd  h^Vta  rtvutu^i  dependence  on  each  other,  <m  this  account, 

■  Things  are      ,        '  r  „     ^  j  > 

conn^edto-   ""    ''l,    '  -'      ■-^-^-^■^■^H' .^^\i    C    f-'ii   iUlV/iilflU- k:5  a*Ol  <        aS 

gcrhcr,    and  a'DefeS^lfl'Trffifc  sSe^ts  many  others. 


■i^^ 'Were  ft  hot  for  the  Knowledge  of  a  future 
•*•  Life,  I  believe  riioft  People  would  be  wil- 
^*  iing  at  Chc  point  of  Death  to  begin  a  new 
"-Lfic,  upon  condition  that  they  mfculd  en 
:*'  joy  as  much  Good,  and  undergo  -as  many 
"  Evils,  efpeci'illy  if  they  were  of  another 
*•  kitid.  They  would  be  cbiitentcd  with  a 
**  Change,  vsithout  rlequirrng  a  nror^  happy- 
"  Condition." 

The  fame  Conclufion  is  drawn  by  Mr.  Huche- 
fin  after  an  accurate  Enquiry  into  fhe  Frame  of 
iiYiiftian  Nature,  aiid  a  Comparifon  of  tlie  Pka-* 
fiarcs  a'nd  Paita,s  attending,  its  feveral  ^eafes  f . 


'*  thers^  Perjaries,  Prauus,  l^nffairjn,  A/fiiffitia» 
*'  tims,  they  have  ever  either  he,ird  of  or  rcid 
•'  in  Hiftory  ;  thence  concluding  all  Mankind 
"  to  be  very  wicked^  as  \i  ^^  Court  of  Ju^ice 
"  were  the  proper  Place  of  making  an  Efti- 
*Vinate  of  the  Morals  of  Mankind,  or  an  M- 
^*  fprtal  of  the  Healthfulnefs  of  a  Climate. 
'•  Ought  they  not  to  confnler,  that  the  Num- 
*'  ber  of  honeft  Citizens  and  F'arfners  far  furpafs 
"  thiit  of  all  forts  of  Criminals  in  any  State  ; 
"  and  that  the  innocent  or  kind  Adlions  of  e- 
"  ven  Criminals  themfelves  furpafs  their 
Crimes  in  number?     That  'tis  the  Rarity  of 


Here  Men 'are  apt  to  let  their  Idiagi  nation*  ["  Crimes,  in  comparifon  of  innocent  or  .good 

«  Aftion.%    which  engages   our    attention  to 

"  them 


"  Ytfn  b"ut  upon  all  the  Robberies,  Piracies,  Mar- 
f  £Jay  IT!  the  Pv^^x,  •p.xyjs^c.  /«*/  in  particular  p.  184. 


Of  Moral  EviL 

as  Machines  which  require  the  moft  Workmanfliip  may  be  flopped 
or  difordered  by  the  defedt  of  a  fingle  Nail  or  Wheel :  fo  the  Error 
OF  Ofl^nce  of  one  Man  puis  the  rational  Syftem  or  Society  of  Man- 
ktFid  out  of  Order.  Any  Perfon,  by  aimofl  one  fingle  free  Ad:,  may 
deftroy  a  Hqufe  or  Ship,  nay  a  City  or  a  Fleet  by  Fire  or  Wreck. 
Any  King  or  Governor  can,  by  an  eaiy  and  free  Ad,  ©verwhelin 
whole  Nations  with  War,  Rapine,  Slaughter  and  Villany.  A  Fa-? 
ther  may  beget  Sons,  who  being  yet  unborn,  are  fure  of  inheriting 
his  Difeafes  and  Infirmities  as  well  as  his  Goods.  Nor  could  it  be 
other  wife  while  the  Nature  and  Condition  of  Men  and  of  tlie  Earth 
are  fuch  as  we  experience  them  to  be.  Either  tl^erefore  Liber- 
ty and  the  Ccnnedion  of  things  muft  be  deflroy'd,  or  thefe  Evils 
tolerated.  -;'}•/,. 

IX.  Thirdly,  'Tis  certain  that  God  does  not  permit  any  bad  E- 
lettions,  but  fuch  as  may  be  reconciled  with  the  Good  of  the 
whole  Syftem,  and  ha^  dig€fte4  and  order'd  every  thing  in  fuch  a 

manner, 


^79 


■'■■I 

T.l 


Vice  and 
Wicf^ed- 
nefs,  tho* 
deform  "d 
in  thcm- 
Telvcs ,  do 
not  impair  the  Bea^^ty  of  the  whole. 


N  0  ^  E  S. 


them,  and  makes  tfeem  to  be  recorded  in 
Hiftory;  while  incomparably  more  honeft 
generous  domeftick  Anions  arc  overlook'd 
only  becaufe  they  aie  fo  common  ;  as  one 
great  Danger,  or  one  Month's  Sicknefs  {hall' 
become  a  frequently  repeated  Story,  during 
a  long  Life  of  Health  and  Safety.  The 
Pains  of  the  external  Senfes  are  pretty  fre- 
quent, but  how  fhort  in  comparifon  of  the 
long  Tiafts  of  Health,  Eafe,  and  Pleafure  ? 
How  rare  is  the  Inftancc  of  a  Life  with  one 
Tenth  fpent  in  violent  Pain  ?  How  few 
want  abfolute  Neceffaries,  nay  have  not 
fometh-ing  to  fpend  on  Gaiety  and  Orna-, 
mints  t  The  Pleasures  of  Beauty  are  cxpos'd 
,to  all  in  fotiie  Meafure.  Thefe  kinds  of 
Beauty  which  require  Property  to  the  full 
Enjoyment  of  them  are  not  ardently  defir'd 
by  many.  The  Good  of  every  kind  in  the 
Univerib  is  plainly  fupcrior   to   the  Evil. 


*'  How  few  would  accept  of  Annihihtioit  ra- 
"  ther  than  Continuance  in  Life  in  tl;ie  twiddle 
"  State  of  Age,  Health,  and  Fortune?  Or 
"  wiiat  feparatcd  Spirit  who  had  confider'd 
'*  human  Life,  would  not,  rather  than  pcrifli, 
"  take  the  hazard  of  it  again,  by  returning  in- 
"  to  a  Body  in  the  State  of  Infancy  ?  " 

"  m  i.,       lyho  would  hfe 

•'  For  fear  of  Pain  this  intelleBual  Beings 

"  Thofe  thoughts  which  wander  thro" Eternity 

*'  7<;  perijh  rather,    fzu allow' d  up  and  hli 

••  In  the  wide  Worrib  cf  uncreated  Night  j 

"  Devoid  of  Senfe  and  Motion  ?•  •  . .     « 

Milton'/  Par.  hfi,  B.  2.' 

See  alfo  Mr.  Chubb'' i  Supplement  to  the 
Vindication  of  God's  Moral  Charaftcrff,  or 
Lucas* i  Enquiry  after  Happin«fs,  V.  i.  ♦•  *r 
C.  2.  p.  41. 


ff-  Trtias,  Y^tSi,  l5fr. 


?8o  Of  Moral  Evil 

manner,  that  thefe  very  Faults  and  Vices  (hall  tend  to  the  Good  of 
the  whole.  For  as  in  Mufick  Difcords,  if  heard  feparately,  grate 
and  offend  the  Ear  with  harfhnefs,  but  when  mix'd  in  confort  with 
other  Notes,  make  a  more  fweet  and  agreeable  Harmony  s  in  like 
manner  bad  Eleftions,  if  confider'd  alone,  are  look'd  upon  as  odious 
and  deteftable,  but  compared  with  the  whole  Syllem,  they  promote 
and  increafe  the  Good  and  Beauty  of  the  whole.  For  when  they  are 
temper'd  they  become  medicinal  to  each  other  by  that  very  Con- 
trariety, and  thofe  which  would  poifon  feparate,  when  mix'd  be- 
come a  Remedy  *. 

For  inftance.  One  by  a  depraved  Choice  raifes  an  immenfe  Sum  of 
•Money,  and  a  vaft  Eftate,  and  either  the  fame  Perfon  oi?  his  Heir,  by 
his  Vanity  and  Profufenefs,  compenfates  for  what   he  had  acqwir'd 
by  his  Extortion,  and  perhaps  does  as  much  Good  by  fquandering  a- 
way  his  ill-gotten  Wealth  to  the  mofl  idle  Purpofes,  as  if  he  had  be- 
ilow'd  all  upon  the  Poor.  For  he  applies  a  Spur  to  Induflry,  where- 
as he  would  otherwife  afford  an  handle  to  Sloth.     The  rich  Man 
offends  in  Luxury  and  Idlenefs :  the  Poor  tranfgreiles  no  lefs  by  too 
much  Labour  and  Solicitude,  which  he  indulges  perhaps  for  no  other 
End  than  to  provide  Inftruments  of  Luxury  for  the  Rich :  but  each 
of  them  pleafes  himfelf  in  his  Choice,  and  'tis  almoft  the  fame  thing 
-with  refpedt  to  the  benefit  of  the  Univerfe,  as  if  one  had  converted 
to  pious  Ufes  what  he  fpent  in  Luxury,  and  the  other  had  labour'd 
moderately   to  provide  only  what  was  ufeful.     The  fame  ahnoft  may 
be  faid  of  all  Vices,  they  are  prejudicial,  but  only  to  the  Criminals 
themfelves,  or  thofe  that  deferve  to  fuffer  j  nay  they  are  often  bene- 
ficial to  others;   and  fo  long  as   the  whole  comes  to  no  harm,  'tis 
fit  to  allow  every  one  the  ufe  of  their  own  Will,  and  let  them  fuf- 
fer for  their   Sin.     God  could  indeed  cut  off  all  Occafion  of  Sin,  by 
taking    away    free  Eled:ions :     But  it  is  plain    that    this  would  be 
far  from  an  Advantage  to  intelligent  Agents.     'Tis  our  Bufinefs  to 
prevent  bad  Eletf^ions,  and  if  wd  will  not,  we  fuffer  for  our  Folly: 

But 


*  See  Lcihnif/.  in  tks  Mifncirs  of  Literature  refi.rr''d  t:  aloir. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

But  God  will  procure  the  Good  of  the  whole  by  our  Folly  no  Icfs 
than  by  ouji;  WiliiQi»«  ,(105.) 


2S1 


a-, 


f^n  **) 


•*(•  y  t .  '»■< 


X.  If 


NOTES, 


(105.)  We  may  add,  and  by  our  Sin  no  lefs 
tha«  by  our  Righteoufnefs.  Thus  it  may  be  faid 
in  a  good  Senfe  that  private  Vices  (as  well  as 
j)rivate  Misfortunes)  often  becomes  public  Bs- 
vefitSy  tho'  the  Autliors  be  no  lefs  liable  to  Pu- 
niftiment :  But  it  will  be  objeded,  that  this 
makes  Vice  to  be  necelTary  for  the  Public 
Good,  and  therefore  to  be  no  Vice  at  all  ;  nor 
coafequently  punifhable.  For  a  tendency  or 
oppofition  to  the  general  Happinefs  of  our 
Syflem,  is  the  very  Criterion  of  Virtue  and 
Vice:  If  then  what  is  call'd  my  Wickednefs 
tends  to  the  Good  of  the  World,  how  can  I 
be  punifti'd  for  it  ?  And  if  my  Aftion  pro- 
motes the  Glory  of  God,  why  doth  he  yet  find 
Jauh  ?  We  anfwer.  Vice  naturally  and  in  ge- 
neral tends  to  the  Mifery  of  any  Syftem ;  fo 
that  if  </// were  vicious,  all  would  be  wretch- 
ed ;  and  on  the  contrary,  if  every  one  were 
virtuous,  all  mull  be  happy;  to  be  vicious  and 
to  be  productive  of  Pain  or  Mifery,  would 
then  be  convertible  terms.  But  in  a  mix'd  ir- 
regular State,  where  fome  purfue  the  Rules  of 
Virtue  and  others  do  not,  the  Cafe  is  very  much 
alter 'd,  there  Pain  or  Evil,  and  fuch  Adlions 
as  produce  it,  may  often  be  the  moll  proper 
means  to  remedy  fome  greater  Evil,  or  procure 
feme  fuperior  Good  ;  to  reform  a  Vice,  or  im- 
prove a  Virtue;  in  which  Cafe,  tho'  that  way 
■of  a£ling  which  in  general  tends  to  Mifery, 
happens  to  be  produ£live  of  fome  real  Hap- 
pinefs which  could  not  have  been  produced 
without  it,  yet  this  is  not  fufficient  to  cxcufe 
or  juflify  it,  nor  is  it  fomuch  the  confequencc 
of  its  own  Nature,  and  attributable  to  its  im- 
mediate Author,  as  an  efFedl  of  the  fuperin- 
tcndcncy  of  forne  other  Agent,  who  applies  it, 
a!i(i  raalics  it  inllrumcntal  to  fome  End  of  his' 
own,  who  brings  Good  out  of  Evil,  or  from 
JEvil  takes  occafion  to  do  ftill  more  Good  than 
he  could  be  coucciv'd  to  have  done  without 
ahat  Evil. 

All  this  I  think  may  be  fuppofed  of  God, 


land  yet  the  different  Natures  of  Good  iYid^'E- 
vil  continue  fix'd.  Man,  who  cannot  fee  all 
the  Confcquences  and  Connection  of  things, 
muft  be  obliged  to  fome  general  Rule's  of  afl- 
ing,  and  whenever  he  deviates  from  thefe 
Rules  he  does  amifs  ;  at  leaft  when  he  intends 
to  aft  againft  the  very  End  of  thefe  Rules,  /.  e. 
the  general  Good,  he  evidently  fins,  let  the 
Confequencc  of  his  Afts  be  what  it  will. 
Thus  the  Aftions  of  a  Man  may  be  oftenrmo- 
rally  Evil  to  himfelf,  tho'  they  prove  natural- 
ly Good  to  fome  others  :  they  may  proceed 
from  a  bad  Intention  in  him,  or  he  may  be  a 
Tranfgreflbr  by  afting  againil  his  Rule;  and 
tho'  God  may  have,  an  occafion  of  Glorifying 
himfelf  thereby,  of  difplaying  hisWifdomand 
Goodnefs,  &c.  to  a  higher  degree  than  they 
could  otherwife  have  been  exhibited;  and 
therefore  may  reafonably  permit  the  Aftions  of 
this  Man,  and  convert  them,  either  to  the 
Punifliment  and  Correftion  of  himfelf  or  o- 
ther  Sinners,  or  to  the  BlelCng  of  fome  righ- 
teous Perfons  ;  yet  the  immediate  Author  is 
neverthelefs  accountable  both  to  God  and 
Man  for  fuch  his  Aftions.  Inflances  of  this 
kind  are  innumerable,  and  may  be  feen  in 
Sherlock  on  Pravidenct-.  See  particularly  what 
is  required  from  God's  Goodnefs  in  a  State  of 
Difcipline.  p.  221,224,  230,  ^f.  2d  Edit,  or 
in  Simpliciiii  on  Epiilctus,  p.  83.  4th  Edition, 
Lond.  1670. 

What  has  been  faid  here  only  relates  to- 
God's  permitting  Moral  Evil,  fo  tar  as  it  is  a 
means  of  fome  prepollent  Good. 

S.  C.  in  his  Imparl i.il  Enquiry,  ^c.  carries 
the  Matter  farther,  and  fuppofes  that  God  may 
for  the  general  Good  decree  fome  fuch  AiXi  ta 
feem  to  be  morally  Evil ;  which  I  can  fee  na 
reafon  or  ncceflity  for  fuppofing.  How  he  en- 
deavours to  make  this  out  and  reconcile  it  with 
the  Holincfs  and  Jujiice  of  the  Deity,  may  be 
fecn  in  Part  I .  Ch.  1 1 .  prop.  9.  p.  94,  ^r. 


O  o 


<ii  aoi) 


X.  If  this  be  true,'  it ' 


^    Of  Moral  Evil. 


1  jqjulioa  3"ii>  LmjjafM 


IS  a  fumcient  Vindication  or  the  Dn'in^ 
Ifthisbe  ar-QQQjjj^g^g^  notwithftanding  fuch  a  plentiful  Crop  of  Vices  be  pejr^- 
ticuiar cifes,  niitted ;  nor  need  we  infift  upon  a  longer  enquiry  how  this  may  be 
it  accounts  applied  to  particular  Cafes  j  for  whether  this  Corruption  was  oc- 
vTrfli  Cor-"  cafion'd  by  the  Fall  of  our  firji  Parents  as  Truth  itfelf  declares,  or 
fuption.  by  any  other  Caufe  whatever,  'tis  certain  that  God  would  never  have 
permitted  it,  if  it  could  have  been  prevented  vvithout  greater  Da- 
mage to  the  whole.  ^106.)     We  may  wonder  indeed  that  almoft  all 

Mankind 

N  O  t  E  S. 


(106.)  Perhaps  rucli  a  Scheme  as  this  of  the 
F<??/ appears  to  be  from  the  Reprefentation  gi- 
ven of  it,  and  its  efTefts  in  Scripture,  was  ne- 
cefTary  to  malce  us  duly  fenfible  of  the  Nature 
of  Good  and  Evil,  to  acquaint  us  more  fully 
with  the  Moral  Perfeftions  of  the  Deity 
(which  could  not  have  been  lb  clearly  exhibi- 
ted to  us  if  there  had  never  been  any  room  for 
the  ExerciTe  of  them)  and  confcquently  to 
bring  us  to  an  Imitation  of  thefe  Perfeftions, 
and  thereby  to  the  greateft  and  moll  refined 
Happinefs  that  our  better  part  is  capable  of. 
Man  (as  we  obferv'd  in  Note  103.)  is  a  very 
impcrfedl  compound  Being,  who,  by  the  con- 
ftitution  of  his  Nature,  feems  incapable  of  be- 
ing made  truly  wife  and  virtuous,  or  which  is 
the  fame  thing,  morally  happy  on  3  fudden,  he 
muft  therefore  receive  Improvement  gradually, 
and  as  he  is  to  compteat  his  good  Habits  by  a 
Series  of  virtuous  Afts,  fo  it  fcems  proper  for 
him  to  be  trained  up  by  various  Difpenfations, 
and  a  Series  of  Events  adapted  to  the  fevcral 
Faculties  of  his  Body  and  Mind ;  the  various 
conftituent  Parts  of  his  Nature,  and  different 
Sources  of  his  Happinefs:  accordingly  we  find 
Tl»t  the  Happinefs  of  Man  in  his  firll  Eftate 
was  chiefly  Animal,  to  which  an  Earthly  Para- 
dtfe  was  exquilitely  fitted  ;  a  Change  in  this 
was  probably  rcquifite  to  introduce  the  ratio- 
nal or  moral  kind  into  the  World,  and  to 
make  him  tfire£l  his  Thoughts  to  fbmething 
higher  than  mere  fenfitive  Delights.  This  we 
are  told  v.ms  the  Method  of  Divine  Providence 
with  the  'Jewijb  Nation  in  particalar,  who  had 


a  Law  of  Carnal  Ordinances  to  exercife  them 
for  a  while,  and  lead  them  on  to  the  Expec- 
tation of  better  things;  to  fpiritiialjze  their 
Notions  by  Degrees,  and  prepare  them  for  the 
Heavenly  Doftrines  of  Mrffiah.  And  why 
might  not  the  like  Method  be  made  ufe  of  in 
the  Government  of  Mankind  in  general,  or  c- 
ven  all  rational  Beings  ?  What  if  God,  wil- 
ling to  make  known  the  greater  Riches  of  his 
Glory,  fui'Fer'd  our  firft  Parents  ta  fall  foon 
from  that  Condition  wherein  he  created  them 
at  firft,  in  order  to  raife  them  and  their  Pofte- 
rity  to  a  much  higher  State  of  Glory  and  trire 
Happinefs  after?  And  who  can  prove  that 
the  former  was  not  conducive  to  the  latter  ? 
We  believe  that  the  Blifs  of  Heaven  will  in- 
finitely exceed  the  Pleafures  of  a  Terreftrial 
Eden  ;  why  then  fhould  we  not  fuppofe  that 
the  Icfs  might  be  in  tome  manner  ufeful  and 
introduftory  to  the  greater  ?  Why  might  not 
a  fhort  Life  in  Paradife  be  as  proper  a  State  of 
Probation  for  the  Virtues  of  this  prefent 
World,  as  this  World  is  for  the  Glories  of  a- 
nother  ?  There  is  a  Paffage  concerning  Para- 
dife in  Scott'' s  Chriflian  Life  '•^  which  confirms 
this  Notion  :  But  it  is  the  moft  fully  explain'd 
by  Mr.  D'Oyly  in  his  fir/}  Dijfertation,  C.  3. 
p.  31,  i^c.  I  fhall  tranfcribe  fo  much  as  may 
be  neceffary  to  fhew  his  general  Defign.  ♦•  If 
"  we  confider  our  Nature  as  it  came  in  Inns- 
"  (e.ice  out  of  the  hand  of  its  Creator,  God 
'•  forefiw  how  very  foon  it  would  fall  from 
*'  its  primitive  Purhy,  and  therefore  defign'd 
"  it  farther  for  a  much  happier   State,  raifed 

and' 

*  VoL  I.,  p.  26, 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

Mankind  are  polluted  in  Wickednefs,  and  that  God  piits  no  ftop  to 
the  Progrcfs  of  thofe  Vices  which  deform  his  Work;  but  in  reality 
this  is  no  more  to  be  wonder*d  at,  than  that  this  inferior  World  is 
by  Motion  univerfally  fubjeded  to  natural  Corruption.  For  as  Con- 
trariety of  Motions  neceflarily  works  a  Change  in  folid  and  hetero- 
geneous Bodies,  and  tranfpofes  them  into  another  Form  and  Condi- 
tion, whence  neceflarily  proceed  Diflblution  and  Concretion,  Cor- 


ruption 


NOTES. 


a83 


and  refined  by  a  clearer  and  more  extenfive 
Manifejiation  of  \i\mk\i :  But  had  it  ftood 
the  Reward  (at  leaft  as  far  as  we  know) 
would  have  been  the  indefcafable  Pofleflion 
of  a  Paradife  in  this  World,  the  enjoying  of 
an  immortal  Life  here  on  Earth,  chequer' d 
as  it  were  with  Spiritual  and  Senfitive,  or 
Animal  Pleafures.  And  for  their  Conduft 
in  that  State  God  fecms  to  have  left  them 
(one  or  two  Inftanccs  excepted)  under  the 
Di reft  ion  of  the  Law  of  Nature,  the  Spiritual 
or  Religious  Part  of  which  taught  them  to 
look  up  to  him  as  the  Creator  of  the  World; 
the  Lord  and  Author  of  their  Being,  and  to 
fear  and  obey  him  as  their  Almighty  So- 
vereign. The  Civil  part  of  it  furnifli'd  them 
with  right  Reafon,  didlating  what  was  ne- 
ceflary  to  be  done  in  order  to  their  well- 
being  in  this  World.  So  that  had  they 
ftood,  their  Happinefs  would  probably  have 
been— what  that  of  Mankind  was  afterwards— 
a  mixture  of  rational  and  Jenfitive,  or  bodily 
Enjoyments.  And  as  to  any  Knowledge  of 
God,  farther  than  that  now  mention'd  ;  it 
may,  I  conceive,  be  thought  reafonable  to 
pre(ume  that  they  had  the  fame  awful  fcnfe 
of  his  Veracity  as  of  any  other  Attribute  : 
and  yet  how  very  eafily  were  they  wrought 
into  a  Belief  by  the  firft  Story  they  heard, 
and  from  they  know  not  whom,  that  he  had 
afted  collujively  in  barring  them  the  Fruit  of 
the  I'rte  of  Knowledge y  dcfigning  by  it  only 
to  keep  them  down  under  the  Veil  of  Igno- 
jrance,  and  that  there  was  no  fuch  imminent 


«  Danger  of  Death  confequent  to  their  tafting 
"  it,  as  they  were  at  firft  made  to  believe  ? 
'*  Whatever  fuch  Knowledge  therefore  we  fup- 
"  pofe  them  to  have  had,  it  may  be  doubted, 
"  its  Impreffions  were  not  vivid  and  forcible 
"  enough  to  influence  tiieir  Wills  to  fuitable 
"  Efforts  in  lo^jing  and  cleai'ing  fteadily  to 
"  him  :  fincc  no  one  can  love  whom  he  does 
"  not  believe,  and  without  Faith  'tis  as  im- 
"  poflible  to  hve  as  to  pleafe  God :  So  that 
"  thofe  Impreffions  could  not  confequcntly  be 
"  very  inftrumental  in  making  an  Addition  to 
"  their  Happinefs,  as  has  been  fliewn  above. 
'•  Nay  as  to  Adam  himfelf  in  particular,  it 
"  may  perhaps  feem  reafonable  to  think  he 
"  had  not  that  profound  Reverence  and  awful 
"  regard  for  the  Divine  Majcfty  which  he 
"  might  juftly  have  been  cxpcAed  to  exprefs, 
"  (tho'  not  under  the  Circumftances  of  a  Cri- 
"  minal^  fince  after  the  Faft  committed,  he 
"  fcems  attempting  to  fcrcen  his  Guilt,  evca 
"  by  throwing  the  blame  obliquely  upon  God 
"  himfelf,  where  he  anfwers.  Toe  Woman  whom 
"  Thou  gavcft  to  be  with  me,  fbe  gave  me  ofthi 
"  Tree  and  I  did  eat  *." 

The  Author  proceeds  to  enquire  into  the 
State  of  Religion  in  the  Antcdeluvian 
World,  the  Patriarchal  Ages,  and  down  to 
the  Jetvijh  Difpcnfation,  and  fhcws  that 
Mankind  could  not  from  the  Works  of 
Creation  and  Providence  only  (which  yet 
were  their  only  means  of  Knowledge)  hav« 
fo  extenfive  and  perfe£l  a  Knowledge  of  God 
as  was  requiftte    to  advance  their  Happinefs 

properly 


DifTert.  i.  p.  33. 


38+^  Of  Moral  Evtt^ 

ruption  and  GeiKefation :  In  like  manner  free  Choice  necefTarily  ad- 
minifters  occafion  of  Sin  to  Agents  cndow'd  with  an  imperfect  Vnk 
derflanding,  and  obnoxious  to  Paflions  and  AfFedlions.  And  as  in  the' 
natural  World- the  Corruption  and  Contagion  of  one  thing  extends  it-' 
felf  to  others,  and  acquires  Strength  by  Spreading  j  fo  alfoin  the  mo- 
ral, if  Election  once  deviate  to  Evil,  the  Poifon  is  difFufed  along 
with  it,  and  feizes  and  infcds  all  about  it. 

But 

NOTES. 


properly  {o  call'd,  as  rational  Agents,  to  any 
confiderable  Degree  j  nor  confcquently  to  be 
the  foundation  of  a  Worfhip  worthy  of  him. 
From  whence  he  concludes,  "  The  Faculties 
**  of  our  rational  Nature  muft  have  lain  dor- 
"  ment  and  ufelcfs  as  to  the  greateft  Happinefs 
•*  it  was  capable  of  attaining  by  the  Exercife  of 
*^  them;  and  as  to  the  higheft  Honour  and 
**  moft  exalted  Worlhip  it  was  in  itfelf  qua- 
*•  llfy'd  to  pay  to  the  Divine  Majefty,  unlefs 
•*  he  had  pleas' d  to  make  provifion  for  the 
"farther  Manifejlation  of  himfelf:  which,  in 
**  what  manner  he  has  in  his  infinite  Wifdom 
"and  Goodnefs  determined  to  efFeft,  will  ap- 
**  pear  by  laying  open  the  moft  advantageous 
"  Changes  which  has  been  made  as  to  thefe 
"  and  other  refpefts,  by  the  appearance  of 
"  Chrift  in  the  Flejh,  For  if  it  be  fhewn,  that 
•*  by  that  amazing  Tranfaftion  he  has  fo  dif- 
•*  pUy'd  the  infinite  Excellencies  and  Perfec- 
••  tions  of  his  Nature,  as  to  give  the  utmoll 
V  pofGble  Scope  to  the  whole  rational  Crea- 
"  tion,  to  exert  their  nobleft  Faculties,  and 
*'  ftrain  them  up  to  the  moft  exalted  aftonifh- 
**  ing  Thoughts  of,  and  feraphical  Devotion  to 
*•  him :  if  farther  he  has  thereby  apply'd  the 
•*  moft  proper  and  forcible  means  to  reftify 
•*  the  Moral  Errors,  reform  the  Vices,  and  o- 
•*  vercome  the  daring  Wickednefs  of  Mankind  ', 
•'  and  laftly,  if  it  be  fhewn  that  he  has  done 
•'  all  this  in  fuch  a  manner  that  it  could  not 
"  have  been  effe61:ed  to  fo  great  Advantage  any 
•'  other  way,  then  will  it  be  demonftratively 
*^  evident,  Uwt  whereas  he  forefaw  from  all 


"  Eternity,  that  Man  whom  he  had  decreed  to 
"  create  would  abufe  his  natural  Liberty,  and 
'•  fo,  being  tempted,  fall  into  Sin  :  There 
*'  was  infinite  reafon  on  this  account  as  well 
'*-  as  that  mentioned  before,  why  he  might 
"  have  pleas'd  alfo,  in  his  infinite  Wiidom 
"  and  Goodnefs,  to  have  decreed  to  permit  it, 
"  thereby  to  open  a  way  for  the  ftupendous 
"  Manifejlation  of  himfelf,  as  above  exprefs'd, 
'*  And  particularly — that  by  what  followM 
"  from  it.  Mankind  might  become  capable  of 
"  attaining  far  greater  Happinefs  than  they 
♦«  would  have  been  had  our  firft  Parents  con- 
«  tinued  innocent."  p.  43. 

How  this  Author  makes  out  the  fore-men- 
tioned Particulars  may  be  fecn  in  the  remainder 
of  his  Differ  tat  ion. 

See  alfo  Dr.  Jenkin  on  the  fame  Subjeft  *. 

Now  this  is  not,  as  Bayle  objefts  f,  "  To 
"  compare  the  Deity  to  a  Father  who  fliould 
"  fuffer  his  Children  to  break  their  Legs,  on 
"  purpofe  to  fhew  to  all  the  City  his  great 
'•  Art  in  fetting  their  broken  Bones.  Or  to  a 
"  King  who  Ihould  fuffer  Seditions  and  Fac- 
'*  tions  to  encreafe  thro'  all  his  Kingdom,  that 
*'  he  might  purchafe  the  Glory  of  quelling 
•*  them."  But  rather  like  a  King  who  permits 
fome  of  his  Subjefts  to  put  their  feditious  De- 
figns  in  praftice,  and  to  promote  a  Revolt, 
in  order  to  illuflrate  his  Wifdom,  Power  and 
Goodnefs  more  fully  in  reducing  them  to  their 
Duty,  and  to  convince  theri  more  clearly  of 
the  Expedience  and  abfolute  Neceffity  of  obey- 
ing him,  and  thereby  to  confirm  them,  or  at 

leafl 


•  Reafonablenefs  ofChrifiianityy  zd  vol.  C.  1 2. 
t  Crit.  Dia.  p.  2488. 


Of  Moral  Evil 

'^But  yet  both  natural  2Lnd  moral  Corruption  have  their  Bounds,  nei- 
ther does  God  permit  them,  to  fprcad  farther  than  is  conducive  tq 
to  the  Good  of  the  whole*.  It  may  feem  ftrange  to  us  that  .he  fuf- 
fers  both  of  them  to  winder  over  this  World  of  ours  without  Re- 
fh-aint;  but  what  is  our  World  to  the  whole  Syftem  of  the  Univerfe  ? 
How  fmall  a  Parti  how  next  to  nothing !  (107.)  Let  this  whole  Earth 

of 
•    ^    ■•    .     '        ^r^^i^.  o  .     : ...: 


']     f»J     S^'JtJW    V* 


N  0,T  E  S, 


leaft  all  the  reft  of  his  Subjefts,  in  a  well 
grounded  Obedience  to  his  Government,"  in 
which  their  Happinefs  entirely  confifts  :  Or 
like  a  Father  that  finding,  his  Children  obili- 
nately  difobedient,  fuffers  them  fometirnes  to 
wander  aftray,  and  to  fall  into  fome  Dangers 
and  Inconvenicncies,  and  lets  them  fmart  un- 
der the  Mifery  which  they  bring  upon  thbm- 
felvcs,  in  order  to  make  them  more  fenfible  of 
their  need  of  his  Afliftance  and  Direflion,  and 
thereby  more  dependent  on  him  for  the  future, 
and  more  fubjeft  to  him,  and  therefore  ntore: 
fi}re  of  Happinefs.  This  Coraparifon  is  well 
explained  by  Sherlock  on  Providthcey  Chap«  7. 
p.  262.  .  -./.-'.  J,  J    . ,     ,, 

i  Hence  then  it  will  perhaps  appear  that  we 
have  reafon  to  fuppofe,  that  the  Fall  of  Man 
from  Earthly  and  Animal  Delights,  \vas  de- 
fign'd  to  raife  him  to  a  Rational  and  Heaven- 
ly State  of  Happinefs,  and  to  make  way  for 
fuch  a  wonderful  Difplay  of  all  the  Divine 
Attributes  in  that  Expedient,  as  could  not 
have  been  exhibited  at  all,  or  not  to  fo  high  a 
Degree  without  it ;  and  confcquently  that  this 
Method  was  the  very  beft  even  for  our  own 
Syftem.  But  if  this  Suppofition  feem  impro- 
bable, or  infufficient,  yet  ftill  why  may  not 
all  the  Mifery  in  this  Syftem  of  ours  promote 
and  encreafe  the  Happinefs  of  fome  others f  ? 
We  have  good  reafon  to  believe  that  there  is 
fome  Conneftion  between  the  different  Sy- 
ftems  of  the  Univerfe ;  but  have  fmall  ground 
to  imagine  ours  the  beft,  why  then  may  it  not 
be  fubfervient  to   a  better  ?    This  indeed  is 


only  Conjefture  ;  however^  I  think  it  would 
be  no  eafy  Matter  to  cc(nfute  it;  ,till  which  be 
done,  we  may  very  fafely  conclude  with  our 
Author,  that  the  Fall  it/elf,  as  well  as  all  the 
Sin  andMiferyconfcqueht  upon  it,  cou'd  not 
h\ve  been  prevented  without  greatei  detriment 
to  the  whole :  and  one  may  lay  the  fame  df 
Eve  as  the  Poet  did  of  the  hand  of  Mutm 
Sccevola :  8i  non-  errnjjet,  fecerat  ilia  minus  jj. 

(107.)  "  It  will  be  objected,  that  even  afttr 

"  this  Life  Mifery  will   prevail  above  Happi* 

*•  nefs  (fince  therp  are  but  few  EleR)  which 

"  appears  inconfiftent   with  the  Goodnefs  of 

*•  the  fupreme  Beitig.     "  In  anfwer  to  this 

*'  Difficulty,    granting-  that  the    Nomber  of 

*'  thofe  who  are  to  be  tormented  in  Hell  will 

"  be  incomparably   greater  than  that    of  the 

"  Blefled,  the  Evil  will  flill  appear   like  no- 

"  thirig  if  compared  with  the  Good,  confidcr- 

"  ing  the  true  Extent  of  the  City  of  God.     The 

'•  Ancients  had  a  narrow  Notion  of  the  Works 

*'  of  the  Author  of  Nature  ;    and  St.  Augufiin, 

**  for  want  of  knowing  the  modern  Difcove- 

'•  rics,  was  not  a  little  pcrplex'd  when  he  un- 

"  dcrtook  to  juftify  the  prevalcncy  of  Evil. 

*♦  It  was  in  former  times  a  common  Opinion, 

**  that  the  Earth  was  the  only  part  of  the  World 

"  furniftied  with  Inhabitants;  nay  the  Antients 

"  were  afraid  of  admitting  any  Antipodes :  they 

««  believ'd  that  the  reft  of  the  World  did  only 

"  confift  of  fome  ihining  Globes  and  Cryftal- 

"  line  Spheres :     But  in  our  Days  it  will  be 

*'  acknowledged  that  there  is  an  innumerable 

♦'  Number  of  Globes,  as  large  and  larger  than 

•'  ours. 


*  See  SheAock  Oft  Providence,  Ch.  7;  p.  261.  2d  Edit,  and  ScotVs  Cbrijiian  Life,  V.  2.  Ch.  4 
par.  3.  p.  318,  &c.  %vo. 

t  See  the  next  Note*  ||  See  Leibnitz  EJJais  de  Tbeeditee,  Part  2.  *H  239. 


iS$  Of  Moral  Evil. 

of  ours  be  ftain'd  with  Corruption^f  both  kinds  ;  >  fppppfe  jt  clouded 
and  benighted  with  Darknefs  and  Vice,  yet  it  wULbiH:  be  like  a 
very  fmall  Spot  in  a  very  beautiflil  Body,  which  is  fo  far  from  lef* 
fening,  that  it  encreafes  the  ComeUnefs  and  Beauty  of  the  whole. 
The  Earth,  notwithftanding  its  Obfcurity,  has  its  Ufe  and  Place  in 
Nature,  which  it  could  not  commodioufly  fill  if  thofe  things  which 
render  it  liable  to  Darknefs  and  Corruption  were  removed.  The 
fame  mud  be  faid  of  Men,  they  have  their  proper  Ufe  and  Station, 
and  in  order  to  fill  it  commodioufly,  they  were  to  be  created  of 
fuch  a  Nature  and  Difpofition-  as  might  eafily  be  corrupted  with 
Vice.  Neither  have  we  any  more  reafon  to  conclude  that  all  free 
Agents  are  involv'd  in  Evil  Eledions,  becaufe  this  happens  almofl 
univerfally  to  Men,  than  that  all  the  Regions  of  the  Heavens  are 
fubjecl  to  the  fame  Changes  that  our  Air  is  liable  to.  The  whole 
.Work  of  God  may  be  bright  and  beautiful,  tho'  that  Point  which 
conftitutes  our  World  feem  by  itfelf  rude  and  unadorn'd :  and  tho' 
fome  Parts  appear  to  us  who  have  not  a  View  of  the  whole  Contex- 
ture, larger  or  lefs  than  the  juft  Proportion  requires,  yet  they  may 
agree  with  others  in  the  moft  perfect  Symetry.  Nor  need  we  pre- 
fume  upon  the  Divine  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  in  the  Moral,  any  more 

than 

N  o  r  E  S, 


**  ours,  which  may  be  inhabited  by  rational 
"  Creatures,  tho'  it  does  not  follow  that  they 
**  are  Men.  Our  Earth  is  only  a  Planet,  that 
*'  is,  one  of  the  fix  principal  Satellites  of  our 
*•  Sun.  And  becaufe  all  fix'd  Stars  are  fo 
**  many  Suns,  'tis  plain  the  Earth  is  a  very 
"  inconfidcrable  part  of  the  Univerfe,  fince 
*'  it  is  only  an  j^ppendix  of  one  Sun.  Perhaps 
*'  all  the  Suns  are  inhabited  by  happy  Crea- 
•  *•  tures,  at  le.ift  we-liave  no  reafon  to  believe 
**  that  many  of  their  Inhabiunts  will  be  dam- 
"  ned.  Befides,  coniidering  that  there  is  no 
"  reafon  to  affirm  that  there  are  Stars  every 
-"  where,  it  may  very  well  be,  that  there  is  a 
-'*  vaft  Space  beyond  the?  Region  of  the  Stars. 
*'  Whether  it  be  the  Empyreal  Heaven  or  not, 
*'  that  immenfe  Space  wjiich  furrounds  all  that 


Region  may  be  filled  with  Glory  and  Hap- 
pinefs.  It  may  be  conceiv'd  like  an  Ocean, 
which  receives  the  Rivers  of  all  happy  Crea- 
tures, when  they  have  attain' d  to  their  Per- 
fe^ion  in  the  Syftem  of  the  Stars.  What 
will  then  become  of  the  Confidcration  of 
our  Globe  and  i»s  Inhabitants  ?  Will  it 
not  be  a  thing  incomparably  lefs  than  a 
Phyfical  Point,  fince  our  Earth  is  like  a 
Point  with  refpeft  to  the  diltance  of  fome 
fix'd  Stars  ?  And  therefore  the  Proportion 
of  that  part  of  the  Univerfe  which  we  know 
being  loll  in  a  kind  of  Nothingnefs,  it  ipay 
very  well  be  faid  that  all  Evils  arc  almofl: 
nothi^  in  comparifon  with  all  the  good 
things  that  are  in  the  Univerfe  f. 


f  Leibnitz  InMmeirs  of  Literature ,  Vol.  3. 


Of  Moral  Evil,} 

than  in  xht.  Natural  World.  The  Crimes  ajid  Vices  thcmfelvcs  are 
^e'ry  few  in  comparifon  of  the  free  Agents,  and  may  contribute  to 
the  Good  of  the  wh^le,  no  lefs  than  natural  Corruption  does  to  the 
Prefervatibn  of  the  Syflem.  Nay  one  Man's  Fauh  is  very  often  cor- 
red:ed  by  the  Vices  of  another,  and  the  Deformity  ftamp'd  upon  the 
W^orks  of  God  by  the  Wickednefs  of  fome,  is  obHteratcd  by  the  fu- 
pervening  Iniquity"  of  others.  By  the  vitiated  Eledions  of  fome,  a 
Stop  is  put  to  the  Wickednefs  of  many ;  and  the  Virtue  and  Hap- 
pinefs  of  a  great  many  is  confirmed  and  increafed  by  the  Mifery  of 
a  few  J  nay  an  Opportunity  of  doing  Good  is  offer 'd  to  fuch  as  are 
fo  difpofed,  which  never  could  have  been  if  none  had  abufed  their 
Choice.  (io8.) 

S  U  B  S  E  C  T. 


^ 


NOTES. 


(loS.)  Upon  the  Avhole,  from  that  little 
which  we  know  of  the  Scheme  of  Divine  Pro- 
vidence in  the  Formation  and  Government  of 
the  M^'ra/  World,  it  fecms  very  reafonible  for 
us  to  conclude  concerning  this,  in  the  fame 
manner  as  we  did  concerning  the  Katural 
World,  viz-  That  no  confiderable  part  of  it 
can  be  alter'd  for  the  better  ;  or  that  no  E- 
vil  in  it  could  either  have  been  originally  a- 
voided,  or  may  now  be  removed,  without  in- 
troducing greater— Since  the  whole  Contro- 
vcrfy  depends  upon  the  truth  of  this  general 
Conclufion,  'tis  proper  that  we  fhould  be  as 
fully  fatisfy'i  as  poffible  about  the  ground  of 
It. 

But  to  attempt  to  dcmonftrate  h  by  an  In- 
duftion  of  Particulars  would  be  infinite,  Ifhall 
therefore  choofe  rather  to  illuftratc  it  by  a  re- 
view of  fome  of  the  Principles  before  laid 
down.  In  the  firft  place  then  the  Deity  is  fup- 
pofed  out  of  pure  Benevolence  to  have  created 
as  many  immaterial  Beings  of  the  noblcft  kinds 
as  were  agreeable  to  the  Order  and  Conve- 
nience of  his  Syftem  ;  for  his  Benevolence  be 
ing  unbounded,  feems  to  require  this  as  much 
as  it  does  the  Creation  of  any  Beings  at  all  : 
The  fame  Benevolence  alfo  prompted  him  to 
produce  more  imperfcft,  mixt  ones,  becaufe 
even  thofc  were  better  than  none.     He  en- 


dowed thefe  with  an  abfolately  free  Principle 
of  Folitton  and  .ASion,  becaufe  fuch  Freedom 
was  abfolutcly  requifitc  to  that  Happinefs  for 
which  he  defign'd  them  ;  viz.  Goodnefs,  Vir- 
tue, or  a  refemblancc  of  hi*  own  Moral  Qua- 
lities, which  is  the  only  true  Happinefs  or  a 
rational   Being. ■  He  continues  this  Free- 

dom to  them,  tho'  many  abufc  it  to  the  Cor- 
ruption of  their  Natures,  and  Introduftion  of 
the  greatcft  Mifery  ;  becaufe  this  abule  pro- 
portionably  improves  the  Nature,  and  increa- 
fes  the  Felicity  of  others,  and  fo  Liberty  ftill 
tends  to  the  Good  and  Pcrfeftion  of  the 
whole  :  and  this  it  may  be  conceived  to  do  in 
the  following  manner.  The  miferable  Effcft 
of  the  abufe  of  Freedom  by  fome  in  this 
World,  makes  all  others  much  more  fenfible 
of  the  Nature  and  Confequences  of  Sin,  and 
thereby  renders  them  confcious  of  a  double 
Pleafure  in  ufing  their  Powers  aright  :  it  ex- 
ercifcth  fome  Virtues  in  them  which  could 
have  no  place  without  it;  it  improveth  and 
cxaltcth  others,  and  confequently  raifes  their 
whole  Nature  to  an  higher  degree  of  Pcrfeftion 
than  it  could  othcrvvife  acquire.  By  parity  of 
Reafon  we  may  believe  that  in  the  next  World 
alfo,  the  Happinefs  of  them,  as  well  as  of 
fome  other  Syllems,  will  be  infinitely  advan- 
ced by  reflcd\ioas  naturally  arifing  from  their 

View 


388 


Of  Moral  Evil 


,0 


<if».  t  ifi 


S  U  B  S  E  C  T.     VII. 


Wherein    the   Trinciples  before  laid  down  are  afplyd  to 
the  Solution  af  fome  Objeilions, 


Moral  Evils''*  IT^R^M  the  foregoing  Principles  it  feems  not  impoflible  to  an- 
are  not  ne-  \P  Avcr  fuch  ObjedioHS  as  are  commonly  brought  againft  the 
ceflaiy  in     Goodncfs  and  Providence  of  God.    For  in  the  firft  place,  when  it  is 

refpect  of  u*    n.   j 

Free- Will,  objeCtcd 

but  they 

*x=c  neccflary  with  regard  to  God,  fo  that  he  mull  either  tolerate  thcfe  or  greater. 


NOTES. 


View  of  the  Mifery  which  fome  fhall  undergo : 
(which  feems  to  be  the  beft,  the  only  folid  rea- 
fon  that  can  be  affign'd  for  the  Creation  of 
thofe  Beings  who  fhall  be  finally  miferable,  and 
for  the  continuation  of  them  in  their  mife- 
rable ExiRence  *.) 

*'  To  have  efcaped  Hell,  and    to  find  our^. 

"  felves  in  the  unchangeable  PofTeffion  ofSali 

"  vation  by  the  free  Mercy  and  Goodnefs    of 

"  God,  and  by  the  Death  of  his  own  Sor,arQ 

*'  Thouglits  which  muft  create  a  new  Heaven 

"  as  it  were  in  Heaven  itfelf;  I  mean,  they 

"  will  enlarge  our  Souls  to  the  utmoft  Capa- 

•  •*  city   of  our    Natures,  and    fill  and  aftuate 

•**  them  with  fuch  Divine  Ardors  of  Love,  as 

**  if  we   had   been   kept   neceffarily  from  all 

-*'  Sin,  feem  impoffible  to  have  been  raifed  in 

j^ "  us  -f. 

This  then  we  may  with  Reverence  prefumq 
to  have  Bcett  the  principal  Dcfign  of  God  in' 


permitting  all  Mankind  to  brittgthemfelves  in- 
to fuch  a  dangerous  Eftate,  and  fome  of  them 
to  fuffer  under  it  ;  and  perhips  the  fame  rea- 
fon  will  hold  for  his  permitting  the  Fa/l  cf 
Angel s:  For  I  think  it  plainly  appeared  from 
Note  23.  that  the  Good,  or  rather  Goodnefs  of 
the  Creature,  is  properly  the  ultimate  End  of 
all  the  Difpenfations  of  God,  and  not  hi':  own 
G!cr^,  as  fome  love  to  fpeak:  This  Glory 
feems  to  be  difplay'd  no  otherwife  than  as  It  is 
fubfervient  and  necefl'ary  to  that  End  ;  and 
necefTary  it  is  (as  has  been  partly  fhewn  a- 
bove.)  For  Goodnefs  is  of  our  own  making, 
and  mufl  require  Knowledge,  Love,  ^c.  as 
Motives  and  Means  to  further  us  in  the  gra- 
dual Formation  of  a  fui  table  Temper  and  pro- 
per Habits  here,  the  Enlargement  and  Im- 
provement of  which  will  conftitute  our  Hea- 
ven hereafter,  as  Scott  and  Dr.  Ryner  have 
fliewn  at  large.  •t  <i   an; 

Virtue 


-*  See  the  Appendix,  S  2.  par.  9. 

f  JenkiM,  2d  vol.  Ch.  12.  p.  2.\^,is'c.  5th  Edit. 


% 


Of  Moral  Evil 

objeded,  that  Moral  Evil  is  not  a  necefTary  concomitant  of  human 
Nature,  and  therefore  is  voluntarily  permitted  by  God,  and  that  no 
Benefit  arifes  from  the  permiffion  of  it,  as  there  does  from  Hunger, 
Thirft,  and  the  Paffions :  We  muft  reply,  that  Liberty  of  Choice  is 
a  necefTary  Concomitant  of  our  Nature,  and  that  the  Exercife  of  it 
cannot  be  hinder'd,  as  w&  have  feen,  without  greater  Evils :  In  re- 
fped:  then  of  our  ov^m  Will,  Moral  Evil  is  not  necefTary,  but  in  re- 
fped  of  God  it  is,  /.  e.  he  mufl  either  tolerate  this  Evil  or  a  greater; 
from  hence  alfo  proceeds  no  fmall  Advantage  to  univerfal  Nature,  as 
well  as  to  Mankind. 

II.  Secondly,  Hence  we  perceive  the  Anfwer  to  Cicero's  Objedion 
in  his  third  Book,  De  Natura  Deorum,  where  Cotta  is  introduced  ar- 
guing 

Pby£cian  who  gives  his  Patient  Wiue  when  he  knows  that  he  will  dye  of  it.  Or  a  Father 
hrs  Eftate  to  a  Prodigal   Son. 


a89 


C'Ui'to'  s 

Objeftion. 
propofed 
which  is  ta- 
ken from  a 
who  Icatcs 


N  O  "T  E  S. 


Virtue  therefore  or  Moral  Good  cannot  (as 
Hayle  imagines)  be  infufed  into  us  miraculoufly; 
neither  could  God,  according  to  the  Order  of  our 
Ideas,  have  acquainted  us  with  fo  much  of  his 
adorable  Nature,  his  Mercy,  Long-fuffering, 
•Goodnefs  ^TiA  Tra/^  (as  he  himfelf  defcribes  it  •) 
nor  confcquently  have  brought  us  to  fo  great  a 
refemblance  of  it  by  any  other  Method,  The 
fole  Idea  of  a  Being  infinitely  perfeH,  &c.  (as 
Bayle  objefts  f )  would  not  do  the  Bufinefs,  nor 
i'f  it  were  perceiv'd  and  would  have  been  at- 
tended to,  could  it  be  of  fufficient  force  to  in- 
fluence the  Minds  of  Men,  and  regulate  their 
Praftice,  as  is  evident  from  daily  Experience 
The  prefent  Scheme  of  Providence  was  there- 
fore neceffary,  in  order  to  produce  in  the  ge- 
nerality of  Men  the  greateft  degree  oiGoodnefs 
in  this  Life,  which  is  the  ground  and  founda- 
tion of  their  Happinefs  in  the  next..  Even 
fhcre  alfo  may  the  Memory  of  their  former 
'IVials  (as  was  hinted  above)  the  Confciouf- 


nqfs  of  their  own  happy  Choice,  when  others 
did,  and  they  had  the  fame  Power  and  the 
fame  Temptations  to  have  done  otherwife  :  the 
joyful  Refleftion  on  their  paft  Dangers  and 
prefent  Safety,  and  the  natural  Confequcnce  of 
all  this  Love  and  Gratitude,  and  Glory  to 
God  in  the  Higheft,  and  mutual  Congratula- 
tions of  each  other. — Thcfe  and  the  like  Con- 
templations will  (as  Dr.  jfcnkin  fays)  create  a 
new  Heaven  in  Heaven  itfelf  ^ 

And  tho'  in  one  refpeft  a  view  of  the  Rlife- 
ry  which  the  damned  undergo,  might  feem  to 
detradl  from  the  Happinefs  of  the  Blcfled,  thro' 
Commifcration,  ^c.  Yet  under  another,  a 
nearer,  and  much  more  afFefting  Confidcra- 
tion,  viz.  that  all  this  is  the  Mifery  which 
they  thcmfelves  often  expofed  thcmk-lves  to, 
ana  were  in  imminent  Danger  of  incurring  ; 
in  this  View,  why  may  not  the  fcnfe  of  tlieir 
own  Efcape  fo  far  overcome  the  Scnfe  of  a- 
nother's  Ruin,  as  quite  to  extinguifh  the  Pain 

that 


<*  Exod   ^4.  6,  7. 
i    Crit.  Jidl.  p.  248^. 


^90  Of  Moral  Evil 

guing  in  this  manner  :    "  If  a  Phyficim  knows  that  his  Patient,  who 

*  *  is  order'd  to  drink  Wine,  will  drink  too  much  and  dye  of  it  im- 

**  mediately,  he  is  greatly  blameable  for  allowing  him  it.     Thus  is 

"  this  Providence  of  yours  to  be  blamed,  which  has  given  Reafon 

"  to  fiich  as  it  knew  would  make  a  perverfe  and  wicked  Ufe  of  it." 

He  proceeds  alfo  to  confute  thofe  Perfons  who  endeavour  to  excufe 

Providence,  by  faying,   "  that  it  does  not  follow  that  we  are  not  ve- 

*'  ry  well  provided  for  by  the  Gods,  becaufe  a  gre^t  many  ufe  their 

.'    "  Gifts  perverfely  j    fmce  many  make  a  bad  ufe  pf  their  Paternal 

"  Eftates,  and  yet  thefe  cannot  be  faid  to  have  no  Benefit  from  their 

**  Fathers."     To  which  he  replies  in  thefe  Words :     "  I  wifli  the 

"  Gods  had  not  beftow'd  that  Cunning  upon  Men  which  very  few 

"  make  a  right  ufe  of :   In  fo  much  that  this  Divine  Gift  of  Reafon 

"  and  Deliberation  may  feem  to  be  imparted  for  a  Snare  and  not  a 

**  Benefit  to  Mankind."     He  adds,  "  We  leave  Eflates  to  our  Chil- 

"  dren  in  hopes  of  leaving  them  well^  wherein  we  may  be  dcceiv'd  j 

"  but  how  can  God  be  deceiv'd  ?  " 

♦tts  {hewn        III.  To  all  which  we  reply,  Firft,  That  it  is  very  unfair  to  com- 

*^ar[fon ?s°iii' "  P^^^  ^^^  Rcafon  which  is  granted  to  Man  with  Wine  given  to 

put  between  thc 

Reafon  and 

Free- Will,     and    the  giving    of  Wine;   and  that   Gcd,    if  he  took   away  Liberty  for   fear  we   fliould 
Sin,    would  be  like  a  Man  that  kills  his  Son  for  fear  he   ihould   be  fick. 

N  0  7'  E  S. 

thatflfually  attends  the  Idea  of  it,  and  even  ren-  j     I  fliall  conclude  with  another  Paflage  from 
der  it  produftive  of  fome  real  Happinefs?  To  j  Dr,  Jenkin*,  which  fets  them  in  the  ftrongeft 


this  purpofe  apply  that  of  Lucretius,  B.  z. 

Suave  mart  magna  turbantibus  tequora  vgntis 
E  terra  alter  m  magnum  Jpe  Rare  labor  em, 
Hin  quia  vexari   quenquam  eft  jucunia  volup- 

tas. 
$ed,  quibus  ipfe  malis  cartas,  quia  cernere  fua- 

vt  eft. 

Eat  however  this  be,  mod  of  the  foregoing 
Reflections  feem  juft  and  unexceptionable. 


Light. 

"  It  muft  advance  the  Happinefs  both  of 
♦'  Ailgels  and  Men  in  Heaven,  that  upon 
"  Choice  and  Trial  they  have  preferr'd  God 
"  before  all  things,  and  upon  that  find  them- 
**  felves  confirm'd  and  eftablifh'd  in  the  per- 
"  pctual  and  unalterable  Love  and  Enjoy-, 
"  ment  of  him.  This  very  CoMfideration, 
"  that  they  might  once  have  fallen  from  his 
"  Love,  infpires  them  with  the  higheft  Ar- 
"  dors  of   Love,   when  they  rejoice   in  the 

"  infinite 


p.  242. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

the  Siek.  For  a  fick  Perfon  may  enjoy  Life,  and  even  recover,  with- 
out Wine;  but  Man  cannot  be  v^^hat  he  is  without  Reafon.  The 
Comparifon  therefore  is  very  improperly  made  between  things  that 
are  difperate.  Neither  is  there  a  lefs  difference  between  finning  and 
dyiti^.  'Tis  very  true,  that  no  body  would  let  a  fick  Perfon  take 
Wine  which  he  knew  would  kill  him :  but  yet  any  prudent  Phyfi- 
cian  would  allow  his  Patient  to  take  fome  Meat,  without  which  he 
knew  that  he  certainly  mufl  die,  tho'  he  underflood,  that  upon  ta- 
king it  the  Fever  would  encreafe  a  little.  In  Like  manner  God  has 
given  Reafon  to  Men,  without  which  they  would  not  be  Men, 
tho'  he  forefaw  that  fome  Evils  would  arife  from  it.  Reafon  there- 
fore ought  to  be  compared  to  Life,  and  natural  Evils  to  the  Diflem- 
per.  If  then  God  were  to  take  away  Reafon  left  Men  fhould  ufe  it 
amifs,  he  would  be  like  a  Man  that  kills  his  Son  for  fear  he  fhould 
be  fick. 

IV.  Secondly,  Human  Reafon  is  improperly  compared  to  a  Pa- 
trimony, fince  it  is  the  very  Being  and  Life  of  Man  :  and  who  would 
rather  put  his  Son  to  Death  than  fuifer  him  to  lead  a  fort  of  an  ir- 
regular Life  ? 

V.  Thirdly,  We  ought  to  remember  that  we  are  not  born  for 
ourfelves  alone,  but  are  fubfervient  to  Nature  as  Parts  of  the  Uni- 
vjerfe,  'tis  reafonable  therefore   that  we   fhould  bear  fuch  things  as 

P  p  2  tend 

the  ufe  of  Free-WilJ:  for  we  had  rather  be  what  we  are  than  in  the  Condition  ofBrutcsi^ 
Reafon. 


9' 


Reafon  is  no 
lefs  impro- 
perly com- 
pir'd  to  an 
Eftatc. 

It  tends  to 
the  good  of 
the  whole, 
and  of  our- 
felves too, 
that  we 
fhould  have 
or  without 


NOTES. 


infinite  Rewards  of  fo  cafy  and  fhort  a 
Tryal  :  and  the  Refleftion  upon  the  Dan- 
gers efcapcd,  heightens  even  the  Joys  of 
Heaven  to  them,  and  makes  an  addition  to 
every  Degree  of  Blifs.  The  remembrance 
of  their  paft  Sins  and  Temptations,  and 
t?ie  Scnfe  of  their  own  Unworthinefs  ari- 
fing  from  that  Remembrance,  will  conti- 
nually excite  in  the  Bleffed  freih  A6ls  of 
Love  and  Adoration  of  God,  who  has  rai- 


fed  them  above  all  Sin  and  Temptation, 
and  fix'd  them  in  an  everlafting  State  of 
Blifs  and  Glory.  The  Trial  ihu  the  Righ- 
teous underwent  here,  makes  up  fome  part 
of  their  Happinefs  in  Heaven;  and  iu 
what  Degree  foever  their  Happine  s  can 
be  fuppofed  to  be,  yet  it  is  in  fome 
mcafura  increafcd,  and  as  it  were  en- 
deared to  them,  by  reflecting  on  their 
former    State   of    Trial,    in    which    they 

♦'  were 


Of  Moral  Evil 

tend  to  the  Good  of  the  whole »  tho'  they  be  a  little  inconvenient  to 
OS.  Now  we  have  fhewn  before  that  the  Abufe  of  Reafon  cannot 
be  prevented  without  Violence  done  to  the  Laws  of  the  Univerfe, 
without  Detriment  to  Mankind  and  to  ourfelves.  If  therefore  a 
Father  could  not  refufe  a  Son  his  Inheritance,  without  breaking 
the  Laws  of  his  Country,  without  injuring  his  Family,  and  laftly, 
without  the  Lofs  of  his  Son's  Life,  he  would  not  deferve  to  be 
blamed  for  giving  him  it.  tho*  he  underftood  that  he  would  make 
a  bad  ufe  of  it :  Efpecially  if  he  forefaw  that  the  Brothers  of  this 
Prodigal  vvould  take  warning  by  his  Error  and  become  frugal,  and 
that  the  Ellate  which  he  fpenj:  would  turn  to  their  Benefit.  The 
fame  muft  be  faid  of  the  Phyfician  who  gives  his  Patient  a  Glafs 
at  his  Requefl;  which  if  he  did  not  give,  the  Patient  would  im- 
mediately ftab  himfelf.  Is  he  culpable  if  he  compound  for  a  Icfs 
Evil,  in  order  to  avoid  a  greater  ?  More  efpecially,  if  many  labour 
under  the  fame  Diftemper,  and  w^ould  not  be  convinc'd  of  the  dan- 
ger of  ufing  Wine  but  by  Experiment :  would  it  not  be  better  to 
let  one  or  two  make  the  Experiment  than  that  all  fhould  perifh? 
God  therefore  knowingly  permits  us  fick  Perfons  to  ufe  Wine  ; 
for  tho'  we  abufe  it,  yet  our  Condition  will  be  better  than  if  he 
had  not  beftow'd  it  upon  us.  If  any  urge,  that  it  is  better  not  to- 
be  at  all,  than  to  be  miferable,  and  confequently  that  'tis  more 
proper  to  deprive  us  of  Life,  than  to  fuffer  us  to  abufe  it.  I  an- 
fwer»as  before.  That  we  mufl  make  a  Diftindlion  in  Mifery;  for 
where  there  is  more  Evil  than  Good,  it  is  indeed  preferable  not  to- 
be,  than  to  be  involv'd  in  this  kind  of  Mifery,  but  that  which 
attends  human  Reafon  is  not  fuch,  by  our  own  Judgment.  For 
we  had  rather  be  what  we  are  than  not  be  at  all,  or  be  with- 
out Reafon.    Elfe  why  are  we  unwilling  to  change  our  Condition 

with. 


N  O  "t  E  S, 

**  were    fubjeft    to     Temptation    and    Sin."  j  Eternity   of  Hell-Torments,  Argument   the  4th. 
See  the  fame   handled  more    diftinftly  in  I  p.  73,  y^.    or  Scotr&  Chrijiian  Lifey    Vol.  5. 
tiie  firft  of   Mr.   D'Oylfs  four  Differtations, '  p.  100. 
Ch.10.  or.  A-Bp.  iJiKf/i's  5  th  Sermon   on  the]' 


Of  Moral  Evil 

with  the  Brutes,  or  Mad-men,  if  we  do  not  think  it  better  than 

theirs  ? 

VI.  But  to  conclude,  Cotfa  in  Cicero  has  neither  brought  perti- 
nent Similitudes,  nor  given  good  Advice  to  Providence.  For  Godi 
as  a  Phyfician,  does  not  give  Wine  to  the  fick  Perfon  to  kill  him  j 
but  to  one  that  will  die,  in  order  to  prevent  his  dying  fooner. 
Neither  has  the  Divine  Father  given  an  Inheritance  to  his  Sons 
that  they  may  wafte  it,  but  has  beflow'd  it  upon  fuch  as  will  wafte 
it,  left  they  Should  want  Neceffaries.  Whereas,  if  Cotta  had  been 
Counfellor  to  Providence,  he  would  have  advifed  Phyficians  to  let 
their  Patients  die  with  Thirft,  left  fome  of  them  fhould  drink  too 
much  ;  he  would  have  perfuaded  Parents  either  to  kill  their  Chil- 
dren, or  never  beget  them,  left  they  fhould  make  a  bad  ufe  of  their 
Eftates  when  they  came  to  Age.  (109.)  :''.'{i   ■. . 

VII.  From 

i,i  N  O  "T  E  S. 


295 


Cicero  has 
neither 
brought  ap- 
pofite  Simi- 
les, nor  gi- 
ven good 
Advice  to 
Providence- 


(109.)  The  fame  holds  good  againft  all 
B.iy/e's  Comparifons,  Crit.D'M.  ^r/.  Paulicians, 
Rem.  E.  F.  K  A  A,  ^c.  p.  2488.  where  he 
f\ys,  that  to  permit  Men  to  fin  rather  than 
over-rule  their  Wills,  is  like  a  Mother  that 
lets  her  Daughters  go  to  a  Ball,  where  fhe  is 
fure  they  will  lofe  their  Honour,  and  then 
pleads  in  her  own  J\iftification,  "  that  Ihe 
"  had  no  mind  to  reftrain  the  Liberty  of  her 
"  Daughters,  nor  to  fhew  any  Diflruft  of 
"  them."  j^gain-\.  If  a  Son  fhould  fee  his 
'*  Father  ready  to  throw  himfelf  out  of  the 
**  Window,  either  in  a  fit  of  Frenzy,  or  be- 
"  caufe  he  is  troubled  in  Mind,  he  would 
*'  do  well  to  chain  him,  if  he  could  not  re- 
'•  ftrain  him  otherwife.  If  a  Queen  fhould 
"  fall  into  the  Water,  any  Footman  that 
*'  fhould  get  her  out  of  it,  either  by  embra- 
"  cing  her,  or  taking  her  by  the  Hair  (j,  tho' 
"  he  fhould  pluck  off  above  one  half  of  it, 
"  would  do  a  Mzty  good  Aftion  ;  fhe  would 
"  not  certainly  complain  of  his  want  of  Re- 
t'  fpeft  to   her.     If  any   one  fhould  fufier  a 


"  Lady  finely  drefs'd  to  &11  into  a  Precipice, 
"  would  it  not  be  a  very  foolifh  Excufe  to 
"  fay,  that  it  had  not  been  poflible  to  flop 
"  her  without  fpoiling  her  Ribbons  and 
"  Head-drefs  ? "       And   to    name    no    mere*, 

"  To  hive  regard  to  the  Free-Will  of  a 
"  Man,  and  carefully  to  abftain  from  laying 
"  any  rellraint  upon  his  Inclination,  when  he 
*'  is  going  to  lofe  his  Innocence  for  ever,  to 
"  be  eternally  damn'd,  can  you  call  that  a 
"  lawful  Obfervation  of  the  Laws  of  Liberty? 
"  You  would  be  lefs  unreafonable  if  you 
"  would  fay  to  a  Man  who  gets  a  Fall  near 
"  you,  and  breaks  his  Leg,  iJbat  wbUb  bin- 
"  der''d  us  /rem  preventing  your  Fall  it,  that 
"  we  were  afraid  tt  undo  fome  Folds  of  your 
"  G(w/7,  we  bad  fo  great  a  refpt£l  for  its  Sy- 
"  metry^  that  uie  would  not  undertake  to  fpoil 
"  it,  and  we  t bought  it  was  mucb  better  ta 
'*  let  you  run  the  hazard  of  breaking  your 
•*  Bones,'' '  &c- 

In  all  which  this  Author  evidently  miflakes 
the  Cafe,  by  comparing  the  Dejlruilion  of  Free- 


f  Crit.  DiSl.    p.  2497. 

II  Thus  4^  Chriflina  was  taken  out  of  a  Lake  at  Stcckholmc. 

*  P-  2497- 


aj4 


The  Objec- 
tion of  Epi- 
cunis  pro- 
pofed  which 
accufes  God 
of  Impotence 
if  he  was  not 
able;  or  of 
EnvT',  if  he 
was  able  to 
removcEvi!5, 


'Tis  a  Con- 
tradidion, 
that  all  E- 
vils  be  re- 
moved 
from  crea- 
ted Be- 
ings :  God 
is  not  im- 
;potent,   thcr 


Of  Moral  Evil. 

VII.  From  the  fame  Principles  we  may  folve  that  ftrong  Objec- 
tion o(  Epicurus  againfl  Providence,  v/h'ich  La^anthis  enforces  in  his 
Book  De  Ira  Dei  -f*,  and,  as  fome  think,  does  not  fufficiently  nn- 
fwer.  It  flands  thus:  *'  Either  God  is  willing  to  remove  Evils, 
"  and  not  able,  or  able  and  not  willing,  or  neither  able  nor  wil- 
"  ling.  If  he  be  willing  and  not  able,  he  is  impotent,  which  can- 
"  not  be  apply'd  to  the  Deity:  If  he  be  able  and  not  willing,  he 
"  is  envious;  which  is  equally  inconfiftent  with  the  Nature  of 
"  God.  If  he  be  neither  willing  nor  able,  he  is  both  envious  and 
"  impotent,  and  confequently  no  God.  If  he  be  both  willing 
"  and  able,  which  is  the  only  thing  that  anfwers  to  the  Notion 
"  of  a  God,  from  whence  come  Evils .?  Or  why  does  he  not  .re- 
"  move  them  ? 

VIII.  We  muft  take  the  third  of  thofe  four  Branches  of  his 
puzling  Argument ;  viz.  That  God  neither  will  nor  can  remove  E- 
vils.  (no.)  Yet  we  deny  the  Confequence.  He  is  neither  to  be  e- 
fteemcd  Envious  nor  Impotent,  becaufe  he  does  not  work  Contra- 

.didions : 

cfore  becaufe  he  does  not  remove  them. 


.NOTE  S. 


Will  (for  that  is  the  only  thing,  as  we  have 
prov'd,  that  can  prevent  the  abufe  of  it) 
which  Will  has  been  fhewn  to  be  the  very 
Life  and  Soul  of  Man  ;  to  fuch  mere  trifles  as 
tearing  his  Hair,  or  difcompofing  bis  Habit : 
Whereas,  from  the  foregoing  account  of  the 
ineftimable  Worth  of  Liberty  to  each  Indivi- 
dual, and  the  many  Advantages  that  arlfe  in 
common,  even  from  the  abufe  of  it,  it  plain- 
ly appears,  that  to  abridge,  or  which  is  the 
ver^  fame,  to  deprive  a  Alan  of  Liberty  for 
fear  he  fhould  abufe  it,  would,  in  regard  to 
him,  be  juft  as  good  as  to  knock  him  on  the 
Head  for  fear   he  fliould  maim  or  disfigure 


himfelf.  And  with  refpeft  to  the  Publicic,  he 
would  be  far  more  unreafonible  who  Ihould 
defire  the  abfence  of  this  Liierty,  becau-fe 
of  its  frequent  abufe,  than  he  who  fhould 
wifli  that  there  were  no  fuch  things  as  Fire, 
Wind,  or  Water,  in  the  World,  becaufe  fo 
many  Men,  Houfe?,  and  Ships  are  dellroy'd  by 
them. — As  the  reft  of  Bay/e's  elaborate  Similes 
are  founded  on  the  fame  Mifreprefentation, 
one  hint  of  this  kind  is,  I  ihirik,  enough  to 
invalidate  them. 

(no.)  Leihiiiz  would  rather  fay,  "  that 
**  God  could  take  them  away,  but  he  was 
"  not  willing  to  do  it  abfolutely  ;  and  for  a 

"  very 


f  §.i2.  p.435.  Cam'r.  Edit. 


Of  Moral  Evil. 


395 


didions :  But  it  is  a  Contradiction  that  all  Evils  fliould  be  remo- 
ved, without  removing  the  whole  Univerfej  which  would  be  the 
greateft  of  all  Evils.  For  fome  kind  of  Evils  adhere  (as  we  have 
often  declared)  to  the  very  Natures  of  things,  and  cannot  be  remo- 
ved while  any  created  Nature  continues.  For  when  a  Circle  is  once 
made,  all  the  Lines  drawn  from  the  Centre  to  the  Circumference, 
muft  necefTarily  be  equals  neither  is  God  impotent  becaufe  he  can- 
not make  them  unequal  while  it  continues  to  be  a  Circle:  In  like 
manner,  when  he  has  made  a  Creature,  he  mufi:  necefTarily  tolerate 
the  Evil  of  Imperfedion  in  it,  which  is  as  eflential  to  it  as  an 
Equality  of  the  Radij  is  to  the  Circle.  When  therefore  Matter, 
Motion  and  Free-Will  are  conftituted,  he  muft  necefTarily  permit 
Corruption  of  things,  and  the  abuie  of  Liberty,  or  fomething 
worfe.  For  thefe  cannot  be  feparated  (as  was  ftiewn)  without  a 
Contradiction.  God  therefore  is  no  more  impotent  becaufe  he  can- 
not remove  thefe  Evils  from  things  while  the  things  themfelves  re- 
main, than  becaufe  he  cannot  feparate  an  Equality  of  the  Radij 
from  a  Circle.  The  Confequence  then  is  falfe  which  charges  God 
with  Impotence  becaufe  he  cannot  remove  Evils. 

IX.  Neither  is  that  AiTertion  lefs  falfe  which  attributes  it  to  Envy  God  always 
that  he  will  not.     For  he  that  always  wills  the  beft,  and  the  lead  {1.^^°^°^"  ^^f 
of  many  Evils,  is  abfolutely  Good,  and  the  fartheft  from  Envy:  and  vih.  and 
we  have  fhe  wn  that  this  is  the  Cafe  with  refped  to  God.    If  a*^*^'^^°'P  " 

r  _      .      not  envious. 


Pcrfon 


NOTES. 


*'  very  good  rcafon,  becaufe  he  fiiould  have 
"  taken  away  the  Good  at  the  fame  time,  and 
"  becaufe  he  fhould  have  taken  away  more 
"  Good  than  Evil  f." 

The  Anfzoer  */"La£lantius  is  as  follows.  '«  De- 
'*  us  poteft  quicquid  volet,  &  imbccillitas  vel 
"  invidia  in  Deo  nulla  eft  :  potell  igitur  ma- 
"  la  tollere,  fednonvult,  nee  ideo  tamcn  in- 
"  vidus  eft,  id  circo  enim  non  tollit  quia  fa- 
"  pientiam  (fictit  edocui)  fimul  tribuit,  &  plus 
"  eft  boni  ac  jacanditatis  in  fapientij,  quam 
"  in    mails     moleftiae  i    Ciplcntia  cnim    fa- 


"  cit  ut  etiam  Deum  cognofcamus  &  per  earn 
"  cognitionem,  immortal itatcm  aflcquamur, 
"  quod  eft  fummum^Bonum.  Itaque  nifi  pri- 
"  H3  milum  agnoverimuj,  ncc  poterimus  ag- 
*•  nofcere  Bonum,  fed  hoc  non  videt  Epicw 
"  rusy  nee  alius  qnifquam,  fi  tollantur  mala 
"  toHi  pariter  S..pientiam,  nee  ulla  in  ha- 
"  mine  remanerc  virtutis  veftigia,  cujus  ratio 
**  in  iuftincnda  &  fuperanda  malorum  a  ccrbi- 
"  tate  confiftit-  Itaque  propter  exiguum  com- 
"  penJium  fublatorum  malorum,  maximo  tc 
"  Tcro  &  proprio  nobis  boao  carci'cmust 


f  Remarjues,  p.  488, 


2q6  Of  Moral  Evil, 

Perfon  had  his  Choice  either  to  abolifli  or  not   to   abolifli  Evil,  he 
would  be  malicious  if  he  did  not  abolifli  it.     But   when  the  choice 
is  between  this  and  a  greater  Evil,   he  that  choofes  the  lefs   is   far 
from  being  malicious.     The  Divine  Goodnefs  therefore  reduces  God 
to  this  Difficulty,  that  he  mufl  choofe  to  make  either  no  Creature  at 
all,  or  an  impcrfe(fl  one  j    either  no  fuch  thing  as  Matter  and  Mo- 
tion, or  tolerate  Contrariety  and  Corruption   in  things  j    cither  no 
■  free  Agent,  or  admit  a  Power  of  finning.     He  mufl:  neceflarily  have 
chofen  one  of  thefe,  and  'tis  eafy  to  fay  whether  of  them  was  more 
dircclly  oppofite  to  Envy. 
God  could        X.  To  fpeak  my  Thoughts,    I  dare  confidently,    but  with  Reve- 
concdv'd^to  ^cncc,  pronouncc,  that  God  would  nei  her  have  been  infinitely  pow- 
be  infinitely  crful  nor  good,  if  he  could  not  liave  made  any  thing  which  we  call 
powerful,  if  £vil.     For  there  are  fome  things  poffible  which  are  not  confident 
able  to  crerte  with  cach  Other,    nay  are  repugnant  and  mutually  deftrud:ive,  i.e. 
imperfcaBs- are  Evils   t;o  each  other  :     If  God  were  unable  to  produce  any  of 
cfeatures?    thcfc,  how  would  he  be  infinitely  powerful,  fince  he  could  not  do 
or  things. that  all  that  is  poiTible?.  Nor  would  it  be  lefs  injurious  to  his  Goodnefs  to 
10^30^0-^  be  unwilling,  for  by  this  means  his  Power  muft  lie  idle  and  ne- 
ther; i.e.    ver  effe(ft  any  thing  at  all;  fince  nothing  can  be  fimply  Good  and 
Evils:  nor   exempt  from  all  manner   of  Evil,  but  God  himfelf     If  therefore 
Good^^ifJie  the  Divine  Goodnefs  had  deny'd  Exiftcnce  to  created  Beings,  on  ac- 
hadbeen      count  of  the  concomitant  Evils,  he  might  really  have  been  efteem- 
Wmfetrand  ^d  Envious,  fincc  he  had  allow'd  none  to  exift  befide  himfelf,   and 
deny'd  Exi-  while  he  rcfufcd  to  admit  of  any  kind  of  Evil,  he  would  have    re- 
^^"hin"eU  j^<^^^  ^1^  ^^^  Good.     Thus  vaniflics  this  iiZi?r<:^<:/^^;/ Argument,  which 
induced  the  Epku7ra?is  to  difcard  the  good  Deity,   and  the  Mamcbe- 
ans  to  fubftitute  an  Evil  one. 
Bpicurm  XI.    Epicurus  then   is   both   a   Deceiver  and    deceived    himfelf, 

isdeceiv'd  when  from  the  prefent  Evils  he  concludes  againfl  the  Omnipotence 
who  en-  ^nd  Goodnefs  of  the  Deity,  Whereas  on  the  contrary  God  would 
trattH-  neither  have  been  powerful  nor  Good  if  he  had  not  tolerated  E- 
bute  im-  vils.  From  a  competition  or  (if  we  may  be  allow'd  the  expreffion) 
^°d  Env  ^  Confix  of  two  Infinites^  i.  e.  Omnipotence  and  Goodnefs,  Evils  ne- 
tn  the  Dei-  .  ccffarily 

ty,  when 

he  ought  to  have  inferr'd  the  highcft  Power  and  Goodnefs. 


Of  Moral  Evil,  ^  «  « 

ceflfarily  arlfe.  Thefe  Attributes  amicably  confpire  together,  and  yet 
reflrain  and  limit  each  other.  There  is  a  kind  of  Struggle  and  Op- 
pofition  between  them,  whereof  the  Evils  in  Nature  bear  the  Sha- 
dow and  Refemblance.  Here  then,  and  no  where  elfe,  may  wc  find 
the  Primary  and  mofl:  certain  Rife  and  Origin  of  Evils  j  and  here  ' 
only  mud  we  look  for  that  celebrated  Principle  of  the  Antients 

The  Peftilential  Strife  and  Bloody  Fight. 

Empedocles. 


A  P  P  E  N- 


CLq 


V 


398 


MMBIMiHtfa 


APPENDIX: 

Concerning  the  Divine  Laws. 


Why  God  made  Laws  when  he  knew  that  they 
would  not  he  ohferv^d. 

The  Divine  ^'  /"'■   ^  ^  E  Divine  Laws  are  either  thofe  which  God  has  implan- 

Lawssireei-  I       tcS  in  the  Nature  of  every  Being,  or  thofe  which  he  has 

^^^'^  "^'."J"^^  JL      publifli'd  to  Mankind  in  a  particular  manner,   by  certain 

Mejjengers  chofen  and  fent  for  this  Purpofe.     For  fince  a 

haw  is  the  Will   of  a  fuperior  fufficiently  promulgd  to  a?i  Inferior, 

and  attended  with  the  Hope  or  Fear  of  Reward  or  Punifiment :   'tis. 

plain  that  God  may  be  conceiv'd  to  nave  made  this  Declaration  of 

his  Will  to  his  Creatures  two  Ways :     Firft,  by  giving  them  fuch  a 

Nature  as  requires  that  fome  things  be  done,  and  others  avoided,  in 

order  to  its  Prefervation :  thofe  things  which  are  made  known  to  us 

in  this  manner,  are  commanded  or  forbidden,  we  fay,  by  the  Law 

of  Natui'e:  and  that  Lav/  which  thus  difcovers  itfelf  to  our  Under- 

flanding 


ATTENDIX.      ■  ^^^ 

derftandlng  we  look  upon  as  the  Will  of  God  promulg'd  to  his  Crea-  "" 

tures:  For  we  are  very  certain  that  God,  according  to  his  GooJnefs, 
wills  the  Good  and  Prefervaticn  of  all  things  which  he  himfelf  has 
made,  as  far  as  is  pofllble  :  and  confequently  hates  any  thing  that  is 
hurtful  to  the  Creature. 

II.  Now  it  muft  be  obferv'd  that  thefe  natural  Laws  are  either  Particular 
Univerjhl  or  Particular ,  and  'tis  fit  the  particular  ones  fliould  giv€  ^-^^''.^  ought 
way  to  the  more  Univerfal,  and  thofe  of  lefs  Moment  to  the  more  Jo  Sorc^ge-*^ 
important.     For  inftance,  'tis  of  the  Nature  of  Body  that  it  be  capa-  "-'■*^'  ""«• 
ble  of  Motion,  that  it   be  flopp'd  and  broken   in  Pieces  by  meeting  of  Repug'.""^ 
with  others  in  Motion,  and  this  is  the  Unherfal  Law  of  Bodies.     But  f^^n^y  could 
it  is  of  the  Nature  of  an  Animal  to  prefer ve'itfelf,  and  ufe  its  utmoft  "^-^j^^j  '" 
Endeavour  that  the  Parts  of  its  Body  be  not  feparated  or  diflblv'd^ 
and  this  is  the  particular  Law  of  Animals. 

Now  fince  thefe  Laws  are  fometimes  inconfiftent,  it  is  reafonablc 
that  the  latter,  as  being  a  particular  one,  and  of  lefs  Confequcnce, 
fliould  yield  to  the  former:  and  this  is  evidently  the  Will  of  God. 
If  it  be  aik'd.  Why  did  God  make  Laws  which  in  fome  refped  inter- 
fere With  one  another  ?  I  anfwer,  as  before,  That  this  could  not  be 
avoided  without  a  greater  Evil :  Since  therefore  of  two  Evils  the 
lefs  is  to  be  chofen,  God  will'd  that  particular  Laws,  and  thofe  of 
lefs  confequence,  (hould  give  place  to  the  more  Univerfal  and  thofe 
of  greater  Importance,  rather  than  remove  that  Inconfiflency,  for 
there  arifes  lefs  Inconvenience  to  Nature  from  thence. 

III.  'I'he  fame  mufl  be  faid  of  thofe  Laws  which  relate  to  Mora-  The  fame   ,. 
lity.     'Tis  the  Univerfal  Law  of  Free  Agents,  that  they  ftiall  pleafc  ^^^iJ^^j^Lawi 
themfelves  by  Eledion,  but  there  are  fome  things  eligible  which  may  which  relate 
be  prejudicial  to  fome  particular  Beings.     Now  it  is  better,  as  was  !?,^^f\'^o"^ 
faid  before,  that  Particulars  be  injur'd,  than  that  the  Univerfal  Law 
of  Free  Agents  be  violated.     We  muft  fuppofe  then  that  God  willed 
this  as  the  lefs  Evil  of  the   two.     Men  are  permitted  therefore  to  a- 
bufe  their  Free- Will,  and  it  is  neceflary  tliat  God  fliould  tolerate  ci- 
ther this  Inconvenience  or  a  greater.     But  it  is  not  at  all  neceflary 
that  Man  fhould  make  an  Evil  Choice;   therefore  he  alone  is  faulty  ; 
for  it  proceeds  from  hisAdl  that  God  is  reduced  to  a  neceflity  of  choo- 

fing  the  leaft  among  many  Evils. 

IV.  From 


goo  -rATTENDIX. 

IV.  From  hence  it  appears  that  all  the  Laws  of  Nature  are  always 
So^e  an'ot^ferv'd  according  to  the  Will  and  Intent  of  God.     For  he  will'd  that 
grj'withSin-the  Particular  Ihould  give  place  to  the  General  ones,  and  that  Man 
hi'rwiT''^    fhould  fin  ratlier  than  be  driven  from  Sin  by  force.     You'll  fay,  Why 
always  done,  then  is  he  angry  at  Sinners,  fince  nothing  is  done  againil  his  Will  ?    I 
,  ^fwcF;,  When  Anger  is  attributed  to  God,  'tis  after  the  manner  of 
Men  -^  \  whereas  it  is  ordcr'd  and  effecfled  by  the  very  Nature  and 
. '    •       Conftitution  of  things,  that  whoever  does  any  thing  in  oppofition  to 
any  Law  of  Nature,  tho'  it  be  a  particular  one,  fliall  bring  fome  In- 
convenience upon  himfelf     By  which  contrivance  God  has  taken  care 
that  the  very  leaft  Law  fhould  not  be  violated  rafhly  and  without 
Neceffity.     When  an  Offender  therefore,  who  \a  illingly  breaks  a  par- 
ticular Law,  brings  certain  Milery  upon  himfelf,  God  who   wifely 
coupled  thefe  together  is  faid  to  be  angry :     Becaufe  a  Man  in  Anger 
would  not  take  any  other  or  more  effectual  Revenge  on  the  Perfon  that 
provoked  him ;  and  the  Evil  which  naturally  attends  a  bad  Eledion, 
is  to  be  efleem'd  a  Punifhment  inflidled  as  it  were  by  an  Angry 
God. 
wr°orTdd  to      ^*  ^^  ^^  ^^^  fecond  fort  of  Divine  Laws,   'viz.  the  Pcfitive ;  'tis 
the  Laws  of  Certain,  that  God,  who  is  the  Author  of  Nature  and  eflablifh'd  the 
Nature,  and  L^ws  of  it,  cau  either  alter  them  or  add  to  them  when  he  fees  it  pro- 
fance"that  he  per.     Neither  does  he  want  Means  whenever  he  pleafes,   to  affure 
intends  to  do  jviankind  that  he  will  do  it.     When  therefore  we  find  any  Altera- 
^rl^ToVpoJ^'^^^  in  the  Laws  of  Nature,  we  may  from  hence  conclude  that  God 
fuive  Laws,' demands  Qur  Attention.     And  hereupon  we  efteem  the  Promulga- 
andaReve-  ^-^j^   ^jp  ^  j^g^   L^^^  recommended  to   us  by    this    Token,    to  be 
an   authentic    Declaration    of    the   Will  of  God.      In    this    man- 
'  litr  were  the  Mojaic  and  Evangelic  Laws  eflablifhed  -,  viz.  by  Mi- 
racles. 
Laws  VI.  But  it  is  ufually  afk'd.  Why  did  God  eflablifh  and  promulge 

are  the  ^  thofe  Laws  which  he  knew  Men  would  not  obfervei^  It  mufl  be 
informing  anfwct'd,  That  thcfc  Laws  are  Means  of  acquainting  Free  Agents 
Frce-A»       ^j^j^  YYhat  is  expedient  for  tliem,  and  of  moving  them  to  the  choice 

gents   of  ^  ° 

what  is  Ot 

uteful    or    prejiviirial  to   them 

■•  -''^  -f  Siflf'Chap.  I.  §  3.  pir.  10.  anl  Nott  E. 


''  A  T  T  E  NT)  I  X.  [      . 

of  it.  Neither  docs  their  Nature  admit  of  any  that  are  'mofe  effica- 
cious: for  it  is  fuch  as  mufl  be  perfuadcd  and  not  compell'd.  Not- 
withftanding  therefore  God  knew  that  his  Laws  would  not  be  cb- 
iferv'd  by  all,  yet  he  propofcs  them  to  all,  for  by  this  Means  a  great 
maiiy  learn  their  true  Intereft,  thankfully  embrace  the  Laus  and  o- 
bey  them;  and  the  reft  are  no  worfe  for  them,  fince  they  would  be 
involv'd  in  the  fame  Evils  which  they  feel  from  the  San(5tIou  of  the 
Laws,  and  perhaps  greater,  tho'  thefe  Laws  had  never  been,  (in.) 

But 

':.  o '/ 

NOTES, 


:oi 


(ill)  'Tis  a  very  ufeful  Ob'en'ation  which 
our  Author  makes  in  this  place,  and  illuftrates 
in  the  followirg  Seftion,  par.  3.  c/z.  that  the 
Divine  Laws  (elpecialiy  thofe  of  the  Chrijlian 
Difpenfacion)  are  chiefly  Declarations  of  the  na- 
tural and  neceliary  Effeds  of  Sin,  or  Dire£llons 
and  Means  to  avoid  them;  which  neceflury 
EfTcds  are  conceived  to  be  the  real  SanSlion 
cf  thefe  Laws.  Coniequently  thefe  Laws  can- 
not properly  bring  us  into  a  worfe  State  than 
we  Ihould  have  been  in  without  them.— — — 
They  do  not  introduce  a  new  Train  of  arbi- 
trary and  additional  Evils,  but  on  the  con- 
trary are  defign'd  in  pure  Goodnefs  to  leflen 
the  Number  of  the  old  ones,— to  forewarn  us 
of  the  natural  Confequcnces  of  our  own  A<^s 
and  Habits,  and  prevent  thofe  Moral  Evils 
to  which  we  are  expofed  by  the  very  confti- 
tution  of  our  Being,»-which  the  univerfal 
Law  of  Liberty  makes  it  poffible  for  us  to  in- 
cur, and  impoffible  for  God  to  hinder,  by  any 
other  means,  as  has  been  fhewn  above.  Far- 
ther; this  Notion,  that  mod  of  the  Mifery 
both  in  this  World  and  the  next,  is  the  necef' 
fary  dnfequence  of  finful  Aftions,  according  to 
the  fixd  Laws  of  Nature,  rather  than  any  po- 
fitive  Punifliment  immediately  inflided  by  the 
Deity,  will,  lam  apt  to  think,  have  the  grea- 
tcrt  Influence  on  molt  Men  to  deter  them  from 
fuch  Aftions.  I  am  fure  I  find  myfelf  more 
deeply  affefted  with  this  Refleftion,  that  Mi- 
fery will  follow  of  Courfc  upon  fomc  certain 


Pra£llce?,  and  that  by  indulging  them,  I  na- 
turally and  neceflarily  deftroy  myfelf,  than  I 
fhould  be  by  a  Profpefl  of  the  very  fame  De- 
gree of  Pain  threatned  as  a  Punifliment  for 
(uch  Praftices.  And  the  Reafon  of  this  is  e- 
vident :  I  am  apt  Hill  to  hope  that  the  latter 
may  pofSbly  be  remitted :  but  the  former 
leaves  no  room  for  Hope.  Again,  A  due 
attention  to  this  Doflrine,  that  all  our  moral 
Happincfs  in  this  World  mull  be  of  our  own 
making,  and  that  difordered,  evil  AfFeftions, 
irregular  and  perverfe  Habits,  i^c.  will  con- 
ftitute  the  greateft  part  of  our  Hell  in  the  next, 
(which  might  be  Ihcwn  in  the  fame  manner  as 
was  hinted  concerning  virtuous  Habits,  in 
Note  103.  but  is  render'd  unneceflary  by  the 
Authors  there  mentioned.)  This  Doftrinc,  I 
fay,  if  rightly  underflood  and  apply 'd,  would 
difcovcr  the  weaknefs  of  all  fuch  pretences  to 
Salvation  as  are  built  upon  the  bare  Belief  of  a 
Confidence  in  what  any  other  has  done  or 
can  do  for  us;  or  even  of  what  we  do  our- 
felves  purely  by  way  oi  Opus  operatum.  i.  e.  as 
ultimately  relying  on  the  bare  Difcharge  of  or 
ny  Duty,  and  not  ufing  and  applying  it  as  a 
me.ins  to  fome  farther  End,  v.  g.  on  Prayer ^ 
as  the  mere  Labour  of  the  Lips,  on  the  Sacra- 
ment as  a  Charm,  on  Repentance  as  a  fimple 
AfX  entitling  us  to  Happinefs,  iifc.  In  fhort, 
of  any  thing  which  does  not  enter  the  Heart 
and  improve  the  Temper.  If  Heaven  be  not 
fo  much  the  Reward  of  Religion,  as  the  na- 

turai 


>n'jn" 


granting  that  fome  who  tranfgrefs  the  Laws  meet  with  greater  and 
more  Inconveniencies  than  they  would  have  done  without  them,  'tis 
better  that  fome  fhould  fufFer  Inconveniencies  ihra-  their  own  fault, 
than  that  all  ftiould  be  deprived  of  the  Benefit  of  the  Divine  Laws; 
God  therefore,  out  of  infinite  Goodnefs,  which  is  always  inclined  to 
the  beft,  promulg'd  thofe  Laws  which  he  knew  all  Men  would 
not  obferve. 


NOTES. 


tural  Confequence  of  a  Religious  Frame  of  Mind, 
and  vice  verfa ;  then  how  abfurd  is  it  for  us 
who  arc  afpiring  after  that  State,  to  flop  by 
the  way,  to  reft  in  any  particular  Afts  of  Re- 
ligion as  arbitrary  Inftitutions  procuring,  and 
as  it  were  pur  chafing  it  for  us,  inftead  of  u- 
flng  them  as,  what  they  really  are,  fit  Inftru- 
ments  to  work  out  our  Salvation,  by  producing 


this  frame  of  Mind  in  us,  as  proper  Helps 
and  Afliftances  enabling  us  to  acquire  this  Hea- 
venly Temper?  And  on  the  other  Side,  how 
vain  muft  be  our  Hopes  of  efcaping  Hell  by 
any  fuch  Methods  as  thefc,  if  we  ftill  carry  our 
Hell  within  ,us.  jSeeMi:»  *l.  of  the  follow- 
ing Seaion.  If.,.,,.,  ,,•,.;:  ^^         \ 


i\Oi>  ryAVn 


SECT. 


-id  .o."' toi. ifi jiv^; v^'3 1?'*  rfv; *- 


o  J  „  1  n ;  I  i  ),| 


AT  T  E  Nf>  IX. 


S  E  C  T.    IL 

Concerning  Divine  Rewards  and  Punijhments. 

I.  "IT  was  proper  to  fay  fomething  concerning  thefe,  fince  Punlfh- 

J    ment  is  a  nai!ural  Evil,  viz.  Pain,  Difappointment  of  Appetite,  isTnatuwT ' 
or  Damage  annex'd  to  a  wrong  Choice,  by  a  Forefight  whereof  we  EviUonnec- 
might  be  deterr'd  from  making  a  wrong  Choice.     In  thefe  confifts  detraved  * 
the  Power  and  Efficacy  of  Laws,  nor  would  they  be  of  any  force  Choice 
without   them.     Now  Good    or  Evil,  /'.  e.  Rewards  and   Punifh- 
ments,    may  be  annex'd,    cither  by  Nature,    or  by  Laws   of  pofi- 
live  Inflitution. 

II.  As  to  Nature^  all  Evil  is  prejudicial  to   it,  /.  e.  interrupts  its  evH  is  vio- 
Courfe:  Evil  therefore  proceeds  from  fome  Violence  done  to  Nature,  icnccdone 
and  that  which  offers  Violence  mufl  necelTarily  fuffer  it;  for  every  [J^^^*^"'"^ » J 
natural  Adion  has  Re-a<fcion  join'd  with  it.     According  to  the  Laws  turai  Aaion 
of  Mechanifm  then  Evil  done  to  another  is  for  the  moft  part  re- **" '"'^■^'^'oa 
pair'd  with  Evil   to   the  Doer,  i.  e.  with   Punifhment.     By  which  jcn'j^^tQ^JJ" 
piece  of  Machinery  or  Contrivance,   God  has  manifefted  both  his  therefore  he 
Wifdom  and  Goodnefs.     For  by  this  means  he  has  taken  effedual  ^^^ ^^'^^ 

J  Violence 

Care  that  none  fhould  trnnfgrefs  the  Laws  of  Nature  widiout  Pi>- muft  necefTa- 
nifliment,  or  offer  unnecefTary  Violence  to  the  Appetites  of  others  ;  Iji^'y  ^"'fcr 
or  if  it  were  necelTary  to  offer  it,  yet  that  it  fhould  not  be  without  ^^^  ^^^^^ 
fome  Inconvenience  10  him  that  does  offer  it.     For  it  is  better  that  a  may  fin 
Creature  fhould  be  able  to  provide  for  its  own  Safety  with  fome  In- ^'"^'^"^  ^^ 

conveniencies^ 


ic4 


ATTEND  I  x}^ 

convenlenclcs,  than  tiat  it  fliould  be  at  Liberty  to  offer  needlefs  Vio- 
lence to  otliers,  and  the  Laws  belonging  to  their  particular  Nature 
J  be  broken  to  no  manner  of  end:     For  by  that  means  there  would 

J  be  more  Evils  in  Nature  than  there  are  at  prcfent,  and  they  would 
>  ■•  be  multiply'd  unnecefll\rily.  Hence  it  appears  how  worthy  it  is  of 
God  to  have  framed  the  Nature  of  things  in  fuch  a  manner,  that 
from  the  very  Conftitution  of  them,  the  Intemperate,  Injurious,  the 
Thief,  Robber,  Adulterer,  Proud,  Envious,  &c.  fhould  have  fome- 
thing  to  dread.  If  any  one  aj(k,  why  there  are  not  fuch  Punifliments 
as  might  effeclually  imprint  a  lively  fenfe  upon  our  Minds,  and 
thereby  totally  reftrain  us  from  a  wrong  Choice?  I  anfwer  :  A 
greater  Evil  muft  not  be  done  on  account  of  a  lefs ;  but  if  the  Pu- 
nilhments  and  Dread  of  them  were  increas'd  to  fuch  a  Degree,  as  to 
be  fudicicnt  to  prevent  all  kind  of  Evil,  they  themfelves  would  be 
the  greateil  of  all  Evils,  and  the  dread  of  them  would  more  deeply 
affect,  and  be  a  greater  Afflidion  to  the  Minds  of  Men,  even  of 
thofe  who  would  net  do  amifs,  than  the  Evils  themfelves  are,  for 
the  Prevention  of  which  thefe  Punifhments  are  propofed  by  God. 
It  was  therefore  ft  that  there  fliould  be  feme  meafure  in  Puniili- 
ments ;  'viz.  leff  by  being  always  prefent  to  the  Minds  of  Mortals, 
they  {hould  prove  a  greater  Prejudice  to  our  Eafe  and  Happinefs, 
than  thofe  very  Evils  which  are  proliibited  under  the  Penalty  of  them 
would  be,  were  we  forced  to  undergo  them. 

III.  As  to  the  Punishments  which  God  has  affix'dby  vf2iy  o{ SanBion 

Ltulin^lT^  ^^  /o////t;^  Laws,  we  muff  affirm,  that  they  are  to  be  efleem'd  as  Ad- 

witkthe  Pu- monitions  and  Notices  of  the  Mifchiefs  confequent  upon  evil  Elec- 

'^'h^T""  jtioi^s,  rather  than  that  God  himfelf  will   immediately   inflid:  them. 

deprav'd  E-  Natural  Confcience  is  for  the  mcft  part  fufficiently  able  to  inform  us 

kaions  from  what  is  Good  and  what  is  Evil :  but  it  was  impoffible  for  Nature 

the  thmgTra-  ^^  acquaint  us  with  all  the  Confequences  which  attend  our  Adions  in 

thcr  than  in-  an  infinite  Train  and  Continuance  of  things-     Now,  left  we  fliould 

flift  new      ^g  involv'd  in  Evils  unawares,  and  contrary  to  our  Expedatior#s,  God 

has  inform'd  us  by  pofitive  Laws  what  our  Condition  muft  be  if  we 

•will  indulge  ourfelves  in  Evil  Eledtions.     And  has  promulg'd  them 

t>y  way  of  Pumjh?nents  deiiounc'd,  rather  than  by  fimple  FrediBion 

that 


J  T  T  E  N^  I  X.  3o5j 

that  they  might  enter  more  deeply  into  our  Minds,  and  oblige  us  to 
take  care  of  ourfelves. 

IV.  But  if  there  be  any  thing  which  is  not  reducible  to  this  head,  That  the  de- 
and  feems  to  prove  an  immediate  Inflidfion  by  the  Deity,  neitlier  is  treeing  and 
that  done  without  Reafon.     For  it  is  fit  that  God  fhould  remove  that  i';I!;f!^!iSnf. 
iseing  out  of  the  World  which  cannot  be  made  confident  with  the  i-revenrs 
Good  of  the   Univerfe :     and  reform  that  by  Chaftifement  which  S^"^"  ^^*^- 
would  otherwife,  thro'  its  irregular  Motion,  prove  ofFenfive  to  the 
Author,  and  all  about  it.     Punifliments  then  are  annex'd  to  Evil  E- 
ledions,  in  order  to  prevent  them,  and  inflided  to  correB  and  amend 

the  Offenders,  or  to  deter  others  from  the  like  Offences.  If  therefore 
the  Appointment  and  Inflid:ion  of  Punifliments  prevent  greater  Evils 
than  they  are  themfelves ;  it  follows  that  God  has  chofen  the  better 
Part  in  eftablifhing  and  exading  them. 

V.  It  may  be  afk'd,  how  this  can  agree  with  the  Punilhments  of  .-p;^  35,.,^  j^ 
the  Wicked,  which  the  Chrifiian  Religion  declares  to  be  Eternal.     Fonhehrftpince, 
in  the  firft  place,  'tis  plain  that  they  are  not  inflided  either  to  reform  !^°^^'^'*"?, 
the  Guilty  (for  there  is  no  room  for  Reformation  in  Hell)  or  to  deter  with  eternal 
others  from  the  like  Guilt:  for  Sin  will  be  at  an  end,  and  the  very P^^iiirncnts, 
poffibility  of  finning  taken  away  bef  re  they  (liall  be  inflicted.     They,^^g^^„p°bie 
can  neither  be  of  ufe  to  the  Dead  therefore,  nor  to  the  Living;  for  either  of  re- 
they  are  kept  fecret  while  they  might  be  of  any  ufe.     Confequcntly  p'JJ^^JjJ^^^^*^ 
there  feems  to  be  fome  other  end  of  thefe  Punilhments,  viz.  to  make  of  being 'a 
Satisfadion  to  the  Divine  Fengeance  for  the  Injury  and  Affront  offer'd '^ ""'"S  '<' 
to  his  Majefty. 

VI.  Secondly,  Thefe  Eternal  Torments  appear  to  be  not  very  a-  ,^5^  ^jj.,^ 
greeablc  to  the  Divine  OEconomy  in  another  refped.     For  it  is  to  be  m  the  fc- 
oblerv'd  that  God  has  framed  all  things,  .''nd  difpofed  them  in  fuch  a  ^°"^ f  J^^^j^^ 
manner,  that  nothing  can  repent  of  its  having  been  made  by  him  imcnts  can 
for  when  it  is  come  to  this,  that  its  Mifery  exceeds  its  Plcafurc,  the  J«  "'^/".^J* 
Being  perilhes,  and  is   withdrawn    from   both.     Not  to  exi/I  there- jp.g'^abic 
fi^re,  or  not  to  perceive  any  means  of  Relief,  is  the  very  worft  Con- to  Good 
dition,  as  was  Ihewn  before  f.    A  violent  Object  not  only  deftroys  jJ^J^'^  ^^^°^j^_ 

the  ted  all  things 
in    fuch  A 
mariner  that  nothing  mi^ht  repent  of  its  being  created, 

f  Ch.  4.  V  8.  pu.  5. 

R  r 


3o6  ATTEN'DIX. 

the  Scnfory,  but  takes  away  the  Senfe  itfelf  j  the  Divine  Goodnefs 
providing  that  no  Creature  fhould  be  worfe  by  its  Exigence  than  if 
it  had  not  exifted.    And  as  far  as  appears,  thinking  Beings  ought  to 
be  dealt  with  after  the  fame  manner,  viz.  When  Pain,  Sorrow,  Fear, 
Anxiety,  and  the  reft  of  the   Paffions  and  Affections  increafe  to  fo 
great  a   Degree  that  the  Mind  receives  more  Evil  than  Good  from 
the  Scnfe  of  its  Exiftence,  'tis   reafonable  that  the  Excefs  of  thefc 
fliould  extinguish  Thought  itfelf,  as  the  Excefs  of  bodily  Pains  de- 
ftroys  the  Senfe :  Otherwife  thefe  miferable  Beings  feem  to  receive  no 
Benefit  from  God,  fince  Providence  has  reduced  them  to  a  State  worfe 
thin  that  Non-exiftence  in  which  it  found  them^.     Neither  does  it 
feem  a  fufficient  Vindication  of  the  Divine  Goodnefs,    to   fay,  that 
this  befalls  them  thro'  their  own  Fault,  for  it  is  hardly  agreeable  to 
Goodnefs  to  have  placed  any  Being  in  that  State  which  was  obno- 
xious to  fuchexcefliveMifery  :  For  who  would  choofe  Exiftence  atten- 
ded with  a  danger  that  fo  very  much  overballances  it  ?     He  is  not 
a  wife  Man  that  expofes  all  his  Eflate  to  hazard,  nor  a  good  Man 
that  obliges  any  one  to  do  it. 
'Tis  ask'd,         VII.  3^/)'.  Whatever  is  perpetual  muft  have  a  fiatural  and  perpetual 
thirdly,  how  Cauje-,  for  a  perpetual  Miracle  is  not  to  be  expected.     If  therefore 
Tan^^Sbfiir^  the  Punifhments  of  the  Wicked  be  eternal,  it  feems  neceffary   for 
without  a      thefe  Punifhments  to  arife  from  the  Laws  and  Conftitution   of  Na- 
mtural  caufe.  j^j-g^     Pqj.  -j.  |g  fcarce  conceivable  how   a   State  of  Violence  fliould 
be   perpetual.     I  have   propofed  thefe  Objed:ions   at   length,    left  I 
fliould  feem  to  have  declined  them  on  account  of  their  Difficulty, 
(112.) 

vm.  As 

NOTES, 


(112.)  Thcchief  of  thofc  Authors  who  feem 
to  oppofe  the  ftrift,  abfolute  Eternity  of  Hell- 
Torinents,  are  A-Bp.  Tdhtfrn,  T.  Burnet,  de 
Stfifu  Mi,rt.  Ch.  10.  p.  290,  (^t.  T.  SwinJeti 
in  the  J^^pendix  to  his  Boole  on  Hell.  The 
Author  of  the  Annotuions  on  Lux  OrientaUs, 
p.  73,  74  5.  Lolltler  in  his  Impartial  Ertquiry, 
p.  105,  i^c.  and  his  £/7'.^  on  RtveaCd  Religion, 
p.  142,  k^c.  Whitby  Appendix    to  the  2d  iheff. 

*  5^^  Matth.  26.  24.  andy[.\t\<i  14.  21. 


Bafle,  Epifcopius,  and  the  Fratres  Poloni.  See 
3\{o  Fabncii  DeleBus  Argumentoruniy  isfc.  C.  47, 
p:720.  concerning  fome  Pieces  in  the  Phe- 
nix,  &c. 

Some  of  thofe  who  have  particularly  in- 
filled on  the  Defence  of  it  are  A-Bp.  Dazueiy 
Jenkin,  Fiddes,  Lupton,  Lake,  Sherlock  on  Pro- 
vidente,  Ch.  2.  and  Difcourfe  concerning  the 
Hippinefs  of   good  Men  and  Punilhment  of 

the 


ATTEN'DlA  307 

VIII.  As  to  the  firflObjedion,  I  anfwer:  It  appears  from  the  Light  To  the 
of  Nature,  that  there  (hall  be  future  Funijloments   but  not  that  thefe  firft  Ms  an- 
{hall  be  Eternal ;  we  muft  not  therefore  enquire  of  Natural  Reafon  ^^^"l^^^'^j'  p'' 
why  they  are  inflided ;  for  they  belong  to  reveal'd  Religion,  by  which  nifliments  ' 
they  are  denounced:  that  is,  there  may  be  a  Reafon  for  them,  but  fuchf^  '^^^'^ 
as  is  beyond  the  mere  natural  Sagacity  of  Man  to  difcover.     Now  we  us  by  Vele- 
iind  many  things  of  this  kind  in  Nature;  it  does  not  therefore  follow,  •^"o"«  an^ 
becaufe  the  Goodnefs  of  God  has  reveal'd  to  us  that  thePunifhmentof  [^^„^j°^ 
the  Wicked  fliall  endure  for  ever,  that  he  is  alfo  obliged  to  reveal  why  therefore 
and  how  that  comes  to  pafs.     For  perhaps  it  may  be  above  the  Power  °b^'8'^  t" 

.  .*.,  ^     -,      ^        ■  ^  reveal  how 

of  our  Mind  to  conceive  it  in  the  prefent  flate  of  Things.  or  why 

they  are 
fo  :  for  pcrh.ips  the  Eeafcn   is  above  cur  Ccirprehenfion. 

IX.  Secondly,  Who  will  undertake  to  {hew  that  the  Eternal  Pu- 
nilhment  of  the  Wicked  has  no  Tendency  towards  confirming  good 
Men  in  the  Choice  of  their  Duty?  (113.)  If  God  make  ufe  01  Means 
for  that  End,  and  do  not  immediately  exert  his  Omnipotence  alone, 
fcarce  could  any  other  more  effedlual  means  be  found  out  to  make 
the  Bleflcd  approve  ihemfelvcs  in  their  Choice  conformed  to  the  Di- 
vine Will,  and  perfevere  therein,  than  the  continual  Contemplation  of 
thofe  miferable  Beings  who  have  done  otherwife.  Ele(5tion  is  matter 
of  Freedom,  and  not  to  be  excited  or  prevented  by  other  means  than 

R  r  2  a  Rcpre- 


Tt  does  not 
?ppear  but 
that  the  Pu- 
nifhments  of 
the  Wicked 
ui:.y  be  of  ul'e 
to  the  Good. 


N  o  r  E  s. 


■tiie  Wicked,  &r.  Rymtr,  Part  ift.  Chap.  7. 
Nich'.ls  Conference  toith  a  The  if}.  Part  3,  p.  309, 
Sec.  Scotrs  Cbrijlian  Life,  vol.  5,  p.  91,  l^c. 
8s'o.  and  Difcourfc  22d.  p. 435,  ^c.  2d  vol.  of 
his  Works,  Fol  Patrick,  Witnejfes  efChriftia- 
fiity,  P.irt  2d.  Bates  on  the  Exiflence  of  God, 
'Jc.  Ch.  12. 

(iiV)  See  A-Bp.  Datoes's  Serm.  5.  p.  73, 
CV  or  Note  loS.  Or  it  may  be  for  the  pcr- 
j^etual  Benefit  ind  Improvement  of  fome  other 
SyHcms;  fee  the  latter  end  of  Note  106.  Or 
perhaps  for  a  ihnding  .Monument  and  Warning 
to  the  Heathen  Woild   during  their  State  of 


Probation,  which,   for  onght    we  knew,  mny 
be  extended  beyond  this  Life,  tho'  \vc   Chri- 
ftians  have  no   reafon   to  cxpeft  any   farther 
Trval. 
Sec  Seotrs    Chriflan   Life,  9,vo.  2d  \'"ol.    p. 

35'- 

Something  of  this  kind,  I  himibly  appre- 
hend, miili  be  concciv'd  a^  the  Reafon  for 
Hell-Torments,  in  order  to  make  them  confi-. 
(lent  with  perfcd  Goodnels  f,  whatever  we 
fuppofe  the  Nature  of  thcfc  Torments  to  be ; 
of  which  below. 


f  Sec  Note  23. 


a  Reprefehtation  of  Good  or  Eiil  to  the  Underftanding.     Since  there- 
fore  God  has  undertaken  to  condiid:  and  preferve  an  almofl:  infinite 
Multitude  of  thinking  Beings  to  all  Eternity,  thro'  all  the  Change.? 
and  Succeffions  of  things,  in  as  great  a  degree  of  Happinefs  as  pof- 
fible,  without  Violence  done  to  Ele(5tions5  where  is  the  Wonder  if  he 
leave  a  few  to  the  Mifery  which  they  brought  upon  themfelves  there- 
by to  give  the  reft  a  Warning  how  much  they  ought  to  ftand  upon 
their  guard  againft  the  like?     There's  no  neceffity  therefore  to  attri- 
bute eternal  Punilhment  to  the  V>WmQ  Vengeance  (nor  is  there  proper- 
ly any  fuch  thing  in  God,  but  it  is  afcribed  to  him,,  as   other  human 
PafTions  are  in  condefceniion  to  our  Capacity.)  For  fince  thefePunifli- 
ments  may  be  conceiv'd  to   promote  the  good  of  the  whole,  they 
may  arife  from  the  Goodnefs^   and  not  the  Vengeance  of  the  Deity. 
To  the  fe-        ^'  ^-^  ^^  ^^^  fecoiid  Objedion,  The  Matter  is  yet  in  debate,  whe- 
cond  'tis  re-  thcr  it  Were  better  to  be  miferable  than  not  to  be  at  all,  and  there  are 
the'matS^is  Arguments  on  both  Sides.  (114.)     'Tis  manifeft:,  that  what  the  Ob- 
yct  in  debate jedtion  mentions,  viz.  thofe  Evils  which  cverballance  the  Defire  and 
^^f^\V^  '* Happinefs  of  Life,  put  an  end  to  Life  itfelf,  and  that  fuch  Objeds  as 
be  n^fcrable  ^^^e  hurtful  to  the  Senfe  at  length  deftroy  it.     The  fame  feems  to  hold 
or  not  to  be  o;ood  in  thinkino;  Subftances,  viz.  thofe  things  which  affed:  the  Mind  to 


Mifery  of  the  ^  higher  Degree  than  it  is  able  to  bear,  may  in  like  manner  put  an 
Damned  ma>  end  to  it.  For  they  may  be  fuppofed  either  to  drive  us  to  Madnefs^ 
H  x}\  ^^^^  or  fo  far  to  diforder  the  thinking;  Faculty,  as  to  make  us  think  of 

ot  Mad-men  .  111°  t      1  1        t-»       •  1  ^1 

nothing  at  all.  Who  can  tell  then  whether  the  Funiihment  of  the 
Wicked  may  not  lead  them  into  a  kind  of  Phrenfie  and  Madnefs ; 
Thus  they  may  indeed  be  very  miferable,  and  become  a  fad  Spedacle 
to  others ,  they  may  be  fenlible  of  their  Mifery  alf©,  and  flrive  againft 

it 

NOTES. 


(114.)  A  moft  elaborate  Difputation  on  this 
Subjeft  may  be  fcen  in  Bp.  Bar/mo^s  Remains, 
p.  470,  feV.  But  our  Author,  in  the  laft  Sub- 
iedi  of  his  Book,  par.  5,  (ffc.  very  reafonably 
giants,.  Tiat  Nsn  exijlence  becomes  preferable  to 
Exijlence  whenever  the  ^um  of  Mtjery  exceeds  that 
of  Happ'inejs,  and  Evil  becomes  predominant  in 
the  yihole  i  sod  therefore,  if  he  takes  this  Que- 


ftion  in  the  fame  Senfe,  he  had  no  great  occafion 
to  ftart  it.  Nay  the  Queftio'n  will  be  about  an 
abfolutc  I'mpoffibility,  if  any  Mifery  which  o- 
verballances  the  Happinefs  of  Life  do  ipfo  faSio 
put  an  end  to  Life,  as  our  Author  maintains 
in  this  very  Paragraph  ;  Concerning  which. 
Notion  fee  Note  55. 


ATTEN'DIX.  ■  ,509 

TSifey^ht^^l  tfeeir  Power    but  while  they  don't  obferve  or  believe  that 
oJj'Af.is  foufded  in  perverfe  Eledion,  they  may  hug  themfelves  in  the 
^    C4i?fc  the  Effedls  whereof  ihey  abhor  j  being  ilill  wife  in  their  own 
.■,, Opinion,  and  as  it  were  pleaiing  therafelves  in  their  Mifery. 
^;t  1"'  Thus,  the  more  they  labour  under  it,  the  more  they  embrace  the 
...  :Caure  of  it,  and  thereby  become  their  own  hindrance  from  ever  get- 
;     ting  free;  and  will   not  fuffer  themfelves  to  be  anything  but  what 
they  are.     This  we  fee  done  daily  by  mad  and  frantic  Perfons,  and 
reckon  it  a  part  of  their  Uiihappinefs.     The  Divine  Goodnefs  there- 
fore is  not  to  be  charg'd  with  Cruelty  for  letting  them  continue  in 
that  Exi/lence,  tho'  it  be  very  miferable,  when  they  themfelves  will 
not  have  it  remov'd:  or  for  not  altering  their  Condition,  which  they 
utterly  refufe  to  Iiave  alter'd.     'Tis  better  for  them  indeed  not  to  be 
than  to  be  J  but  only  in  the  Opinion  of  wife  Men,  to  which  they  do 
not  affent.     For  they  indulge  ihernfelves  in  their  obftinate  Elediion, 
and  tho'  every  way  furrounded  and  opprefled  with  Woes,  yet  will  they 
not  alter  what  they  have  once  embraced.     We  have  frequent  exam- 
ples in  this  Life  refembling  this  kind  of  Obftinacy. 

XI.  We  fee  perverfe  People  voluntarily  undergoing  Pains,  Afflic- T^he  Damned 
tions,  Torments,  and  even  Death  itfelf,  rather  than  repent  of  their  mif^raVie*^"^ 
Refolution  and  change  what  they  have  once  determin'd  in  their  Mind.  StJte,  asLo- 
Nor  is   it  uncommon  for  fomc  to  indulge,  and  in  a  manner  pleaj'e''^^^.  f^Z^V' 
themfelves  in  their  very  Miferies.     Thus  the  forrowful  love  all  fuch  envious  Per. 
things  as  aggravate  and  foment  their  Grief:    and  in  like  manner  the  'j'"*  indulge 
Envious,  the  Angry,  the  Ambitious,    the  Defpairing :    not  that  they  iiJ^'iJ  thingl" 
are  infenfible  of  Uneafinefs  under  thefe  Pafiions,  or  don't  believe  them- "hich  in- 
felves  to  be  miferable;  but  becaufe  they  had  rather  have  that  MifpryJ^j^j*^^^  '^^'^ 
fo  long  as  they  enjoy  their  Choice,  than  want  it  and  them  too  j  or  at 
leafl:  they  can  perfift  in  it,  becaufe  they  do  not  obferve  that  this  Mi- 
fery arifes  from  thence.     When  therefore  the  Wicked  obftinately  op- 
poie  themfelves  to  God,  and  refufe  to  make  their  Elections  conforma- 
ble to  his  Will,  they  take  delight  perhaps  in  that  very  Oppofition  :  to 
hate  Gcd,  to  difobcy  his  Commands,  and  ftrive  againll:  him  with  all 
their  Power,  is  pleafing  to  them;  and  tho'  they  fee  themfelves  ovcr- 
whelm'd  with  innumerable  Evils,  yet  they  had  rather  endure  them  all 
than  repent.     As  Men  that  are  defperately  in  Love,  ambitious,  en- 
vious, choofe  to  bear  Torments,  iofs  of  EUate,  and  hazard  of  Life, 

rather 


ATTENT)IX. 

rather  than  lay  afide  thefe  foolifh  and  bewitching  Affedlons.  We 
may  eafily  conceive  then  how  the  Wicked  in  Hell  may  be  in  very 
great  Mifery  upon  the  increafe  of  their  Obiiinacy  and  Folly,  and  yet 
unwilling  to  be  freeS  from  them.  All  fee  and  exclaim  againll:  the 
Folly,  Mifery,  and  Madnefs  of  thofe  Men  who  fpend  their  Eftate  in 
Vice,  impair  their  Health,  and  bring  on  an  untimely  Death;  who 
involve  themfelves  in  Labours,  Dangers,  Deaths;  and  for  no  other 
end  but  becaufe  they  will  do  fo:  yet  they  perfifl  in  this,  and  their 
Obftinacy  increafes  with  their  Evils.  Thefe  arc  fome  Preludes  of  the 
Mifery  of  the  Damned,  and  from  hence  we  may  underhand  that  thefe 
Perfons  are  extremely  miferablc,  and  yet  will  not  be  fet  at  Liber- 
ty. (115-) 

It  may  be  objected,  that  thefe  miferable  Beings  may  receive  fome 

kind  of  Pleafure  from  their  EleBions.  But  we  place  Felicity  not  bare- 
ly in  the  Adi  oi  ckoofmg,  but  much  more  in  the  Enjoyment  of  theOb- 
jeds  chofen.  The  more  obftinately  therefore  any  one  chcofes  abfurd 
and  impoflible  things,  the  more  miferable  will  he  be  when  fruftrated 

of 

N  0  H  E  S. 


(115.)  From  hence  likewife  we  may  under.* 
ftand  what  a  natural,  abfolute,  and  indifpenfi- 
ble  Neceflity  there  is  for  watching  over  all  our 
Habits,  Affecli'jns,  Appetites,  Sec.  for  curbing 
our  Paflions,  and  corre6ling  our  Defires  by 
Rtafmi  for  taking  a  ftriil  and  conftant  care 
that  thefe  be  neither  violent,  irreg»lar,  nor 
fix 'd  on  improper  Objefts  in  this  Life,  if  we 
iiope  to  avoid  Mifery  in  the  Life  to  come. 
For  if  thefe  accompany  us  into  the  other 
World,  (and  if  we  confider  what  Scott  and 
Rymr  have  faid  on  the  Subjeft,  it  will  appear 
infinitely  probable  that  they  do)  the  fame  or 
greater  Unhappinefs  muft  unavoidably  attend 
them  there.  If  we  fhall  have  any  Memory  in 
lh«  other  World  of  what  pafs'd  in  this  (which 
we  ravA  have,  in  ov^^r  to  give  us  either  a 
good  or  evil  Ccftfdence,  and  to  nwke  us  capable 
of  Rt\^rd  or  Ptmifhmcnt  in  that  refpeft)  how 
•proijable  is  it  that  we  fhall  thon  alfo  feel  the 
force  of  all  thofe  Habits  and  AJfociatlons  which 
ill  this  Life  Veere  fo  ftrolig  as  to  raife  Paffions, 


Affedions,  l^c.  in  us,  and  make  us  conflantly 
proceed  upon  them  for  felf-evident  Principles, 
and  purfue  them  for  ultimate  Ends  of  Aftion, 
as  appear'd  from  the  Preliminary  D'Jfirtation  ? 
"  And  this  being  {o,  ofwh.it  unfpeakable  con- 
"  fequence  are  the  Adions  of  Men,  that  thus 
"  draw  after  them  a  Chain  of  Joys  or  Woes, 
"  as  long  as  Eternity?  And  how  careful 
"  ought  we  to  be  to  what  courfe  of  Life  we 
"  determine  ourfelves,  confidering  that  our 
"  Eternal  Fate  depends  upon  wh.u  we  are 
"  now  doing,  thnt  every  moral  Aftion  we 
"  perform  is  a  Step  Heaven  or  Hell  wards,  that 
"in  every  b.id  Choice  we  make,  we  are  plan- 
"  ting  our  fophet,  or  our  Parndife,  and  that 
"  in  the  Gonfequents  o\  our  prefent  Aflions 
"  we  fhall  rue  or  rejoyce  to  eternal  Ages? 
"  Scott,  2d  vol,  p.  26.  See  alio  4th  vol.  "Ch. 
"  6,  p.692,  (ifi.'.  Fol.  Edit,  or  Hutckejlnon  the 
Conduct  of  the  Paffions  and  Af}e£tions,  tii  4, 
and  6.  or  Note  103,  111,  116.  and  par.  14,  1$ 
of  this  Scdi. 


o 


AV  T  E  N'D  I  X.  3,1 

if  nis  choice  J  and  we  may  imagine  the  damned  to  be  always  fru- 
flrated :  neverthelefs,  after  fo  much  Warning  and  Experience,  they 
don't  intend  to  alter  their  Eleflions,  but  ftili  perfift  in  them, 
opprefTed  with  the  Senfe  and  Weight  of  iheir  Mifcry,  and 
plung'd  in  deep  defpair.  For  it  is  pofiible  that  they  may  be  regardlefs 
or  ignorant  that  tliere  is  no  other  Way  for  them  to  be  freed  from 
thefe  Miferies,  but  by  ahering  their  Elections,  and  not  know  ho.w  to 
do  this,  fo  as  to  perfift  in  them  for  ever,  and  become  more  defpcrate 
by  Difappointments,  and  to  augment  and  multiply  their  Mifery  by 
new  Attempts,  u  hich  prove  no  lefs  unhappy.  The  Power  of  wil- 
ling the  State  they  are  in  is  not  therefore  of  any  Service  to  them  to- 
wards the  Attainment  of  Happinefs,  but  renders  them  capable  of  E- 
ternal  Mifery.  For  fuch  E4e^ion  may  have  the  fame  Relation  to  this 
kind  of  Mifery,  as  the  natural  Appetites  have  to  Pain. 

XII.  Now  it  is  fufficiently  confonant  to  the  Divine  Goodnefs  to  such  Punifh- 
permit  or  inflid:  this  kind  of  Punishment,  nor  would  it  be  lefs  fub-  ment  >s  very 
fervient  to  the  Ends  for  which  Puniihments  are  wont  to   be  impo- ^^"^'^^[j"^ 
fed,  viz.  that  by  a  previous  Apprehenfion  of  them  we  may  learn  to  .mfwers  the 
be  wife,  and  others  be  deterr'd  from  offending  by  our  Example.  For  ^"^  p  ^'" 
who  does  not  dread  Fury  and  Madnefs  as  the  moft  miferable  ftate  ments 

of  Mind  ?  Who  does  not  condemn  the  Folly  and  Madnefs  of  Men 
in  Love,  of  envious  and  ambitious  Perfons  ?  Efpecially  when  he  be- 
holds them  labouring  thereby  under  innumerable  Evils^  from  which 
they  will  not  be  delivered  ? 

XIII.  But  allowing  that  Exiftence  is  worfe  than  Non-exiftencc  to  God  ought 
the  Damned,  let  them  imagine   their  Mifery  to   be  greater  than  it  to  prefer  the 
really  is.     Let  it  be  a  part  of  their  Mifery,  to  beconfcious  that  they  y°J"g"^°"^jJ'j 
were  the  only  Caufe  of  all  their  Grief:  yet  fince  that  could  not  be  of  particulars 
prevented  without  greater  detriment  to  the  whole,  there's  no   room 

for  objediing  againft  Providence  which  always  does  the  beft.  If  God 
had  made  nothing  at  all,  and  been  contented  to  have  remain'd  alone, 
there  would  have  been  nothing  that  could  fin,  that  could  choofe  a- 
mifs,  that  could  be  miferable.  But  fince  it  is  impoflible  that  there 
fhould  be  more  Gods,  the  Deity  made  Creatures  fuch  as  the  Nature 
of  a  Created  Being  allow'd.  Now  it  was  expedient,  for  the  Good  of 
the  whole,  that  fome  of  thefe  fliould  have  a  Power  of  bringing 
Mifery  upon   themfelves  by  evil  Eledion.     Nor  can  any  thing  be 

charg'd 


312  A  T  T  E  N  T>  I  Xr 

charged  iipC)n  the  Goodnefs  of  God  in   this,  unlefs""  that  Tie '^enr^ 
Men^  and  not  Gods  equal  to  himfelf ;  and  that  he  pieferr'd  the  Salva- 
tion of  the  Generality  to  that  of  fome  Particulars.     He  chofe  there- 
fore that  fome  fhould  regret  their  having  been  made  by  God,  viz. 
thro'  the  abufe  of  their  Free-Will,  rather  than  that  none  fliould  be 
happy  by  ufing  it  aright. 
A  r  -,  f«        XIV.  As  to  the  third  Objedion,  I  believe  it  to  be  a  great  Truth 
the  third  Ob  that  the  Mifery  of  the  Wicked  ariles  from  the  very  Conftitution  of 
^*^'^b°bi  '^'^^^^  Sinner,  and  that  the  Laws  of  Nature  hold  in  evil  Eledions.  We 
that  the\li-  fee  that  our  Bodies  may  be  maim*d  for  ever,  and  our  Limbs  diflo- 
fery  of  the    catcd  and  diftorted  to  fuch  a  degree  as  to  become   totally  incapable 
ffs'tromthe  ^^  ^^o^c  Funftions  for  which  Nature  defign'd  them.     Why  iliould 
very  Nature  we  uot  havc  the  fame  Opinion  of  the  Mind,  viz.  that  by  depraved 
of  Sin.        Elections,  PafTions,   and  Affeflions,   it  may  be  fo  far  diverted  from 
the  right  way  of  thinking,   as  to  become  equally  difabled  and  un- 
fit for  governing  its  A8ions  according  to  the  Didates  of  Right  Rea-  . 
fon,  as  a  lame  Man  is  for  a  Race  ?     We  may  fee  fevery  Day  that  right 
Notions  of  things  are  capable  of  being  perverted  by  a  perverfe  Ha- 
bit of  thinking  ;  and  it  is  evident  from  Experience  that   we  miftake 
and  are   ignorant  of  ufeful  things.     We  are  wont  to  labour  under 
Prejudices,  and  be  averfe  to  fober  Counfels;  in  fhort,  we  are  willing 
to  endure  any  thing  rather  than  alter  our  Choice.     'Tis  a  common 
thing  for  us  to  pleafe  ourfelves  in  Dangers,  in  the  Ruin  of  our  For- 
tunes, in  the  Lofs  of  Eafe,  and  Life  itfelf;    and  oar  Volition,  per- 
verfe as  it  is,  fometimes  appears  more  defirable  than  Friends,  King- 
doms, Pleafures,  or  even  Life.     If  therefore  God  does  not  interpofe 
his  Omnipotence,  the  fame  Errors,  the  fame  Ignorance,  the  fame  ha- 
bits of  a  perverted   Mind  and  obltinate  Propenfity  to  Evil,  which 
here  draw  us  afide  from  the  right  Path,  may  continue  with  us  for  e- 
ver  :  nor  will  the  Soul  that  is  immers'd  in  this  kind  of  Evil  be  capa- 
ble of  curing  itfelf :  For  one  that  is  infedted  with  thefe  Maladies,  is 
as  unfit  to  help  himfelf,  as  one  that  has  cut  off  his  Elands  and  Feet  is 
unable  to  run  or  feed  himfelf  ( 1 16.) 

XV.  Secondly, 
N  O  t  E  S. 

(i  16.)  This  is  the  true  Meaning  of  that  Ma-  •  Enmity  with  God,  and  under  a    natural  Inca- 
cula  Peccati  which  always  remains  and  fets  us  at  |  pacity  of  Happincfs,  and  feems  to  malvC  it  im- 

I  poffibk 


A  T  T  E  Nft  I  X. 


3'3 


XV.  Secondly,  A  Pcrfon  of  this  Difpofition  of  Mind  hares  God,  for'T'hc  wicked, 
he  fees  thar  he  has  chofen  fuch  things,   in  the  Enjoyment  whereof  ^'^'°' ^S"?;. 
he  places  his  Delight,    as    cannot   be   coniiltent   with    the  Divine  ror.  win  de- 
Will.     He  therefore  looks  upon  God  as  his  Enemy,  and  confequent-  ''?^^ '"  *"^^ 
ly  avoids  all  Commerce  with  him,  and  endeavours  to  abfcond  from  they^cannot 
him,  but  never  thinks  of  changing  his  own  Will :   For  thro'  Error  ^^'py^  an<i 
and  Ignorance  he  knows  not  how  to  take  delight  in  any  thing  elfe. 'J'n^^"°^„^y 
Therefore  he  applies  all  his  Endeavours  to  the  Attainment  of  fuch  to  take  de- 
things  as  cannot  really  be  attain'd,  and  ftrives  for  ever  in  vain  with  'j?^'  '?-  '^"^ 
a  more  powerful  Being,  i.e.  God ,   nor  ceafes  he  from  ftruggling, 
tho'  full   of  Mifery  and    Defpair.     For  tho'   he  feels  himfclf  tor- 
mented with  a  moil  exquifite  Pain,    yet  he   dreads  a  greater  from 
the  change  of  his  Refolution  :  he  fees  Mifery  invading  him  on  each 
hand,  and  is  forced  either  to  oppofe  the  Deity  without  any  profpeft 
of  Succefs,  or  to  give  over  the  Contcft,  and  lay  aiide  all  Hopes  of 
enjoying  the  Objed:  of  his  Choice  :     He  embraces  the  former,  as  the 
lefs  Evil  of  the  two,#and  yet  a  greater  can  fcarce  be  devifed.    The 
perverfe  Fool  may  be  pleas'd  with  the  very  Conteft,   tho'  it  proves 
to  no  manner  of  purpofe.     In  the  interim  God  leaves  fuch  an  one 
to  himfelf,  who,  by  purfuing  abfurd  and  impoflible  things,  will  be- 
come troublefome  to  himfelf  and  others,  aiTaulting  fome,  and  being 
attack'd  by  others  like  himfelf.     We  fee  in  this  World  how  much 
bad  Men  delight  in  heaping  Mifery  on  others,  and  who  are  there- 
fore bad  Men  becaufe  they  take  delight  in  Mifchief     The  Servant 

of 


NOTES. 


pofljb'e  for  future  Punifhmcnts  to  have  any 
other  Period  than  the  total  Extinftion  or  An- 
nihilation of  the  Subjefts  of  them  :  and  what 
Ground  there  can  be  to  hope  for  that  may 
be  fecn  from  the  Authors  referr'd  to  in 
Note  .  I  2. 

Our  Author,  in  the  following  Paragraph, 
explains  how  this  Matula  may  be  conceiv'd 
to  render  God  and  good  Men  our  Avcrfi- 
on,  and   'tis    eafy    to  aj-prchcnd    how  utterly 


incapable  of  Happinefs  that  Man  mud  be, 
whofc  whole  Soul  is  bent  another  way  ; 
whofe  every  Motion,  Thought,  and  Inclin-- 
tion  J  whofe  Defigns,  Defires,  and  Hftpr% 
are  all  fix'd  and  riveted  to  thofe  ObjcfiS 
which  can  never  fatijfy  them,  which  are  ei- 
ther quite  different  from,  or  conu.»ry  to  the 
very  Nature  and  Idea  of  true  rationtl  Hap- 
pinefs. A  view  of  the  Confcqucnces  atteo- 
ding  each  inveterate  evil  H.ibit,   each  un^:©- 

vernublc 


S  f 


31+ 


AT  T  E  NT>  I  X. 

of  an  abfurd  Maftcr  is  unhappy,  and  fo  is  he  who  lives  near  a  ma- 
levolent and  morofe  Neighbour.  Suppofe  then  the  Wicked  w^ho  are 
baniflied  from  God,  and  odious  to  all  good  Men,  aflbciating  toge- 
ther, and  'tis  eafy  to  conceive  what  kind  of  Society  that  of  Repro- 
bates and  Devils  muft  be,  how  grievous  and  offenlive  to  each  other. 
We  may  obferve  how  very  pernicious  a  wicked  Governor  is  in  his 
Province,  how  miferable  they  that  are  fubjed:  to  fuch:  how  much 
more  wretched  mud  the  flate  of  the  Wicked  be,  who  are  fubjedted 
to,  and  joined  with  none  but  mad,  malicious,  envious  and  froward 
Beings  ? 

XVI.  'Tis  to  be  believed  that  God  has  provided  a  place  that  is 
fuitable  and  proper  for  them,  and  to  which  they  are  as  much  con- 
fined by  the  Laws  of  their  Nature,  as  Fifhes  to  the  Sea,  or  terreflri- 
Companions  ^j  Anlmals  to  the  Earth.     What  fort  of  a  Place  that  is  we  know 
of  Nlturer  ^°^>  ^^^  ^^  ^^  rcafonable  to  believe  that  there  is  fuch  an  one.     Men 
as  wc  are  to  in  this  Life  choofc  for  thcmfelves  Habitations  and  Companions  accor- 
the  Earth,     ^jj^g  ^^  ^j^^jj.  ownGenius,'remper,  and  Difpofition  of  Mind :  and  likenefs 
begets  Love :  and  who  can  doubt  but  the  fame  thing  may  attend  the 
bad  and  good  after  Death?     The  Good  refort  therefore  to   the  So- 
ciety of  Godf  Angels^  and  Spirits  of  Good  Men^  but  the  Wicked  choofe 
thofe  Ghojis^  which  were  Partakers  in  their  Iniquity,  and  Devils  fof 
their  Companions:     And  this  may  poffibly  be   brought  about  by 
natural  Inftind,  and  mere  human  Difpoiition.    Nor  is  God  want- 
ing in  Goodnefs  if  he  fuffers  them  to  live  in  their  own  way,  and 

enjoy 


The  Wicked 
are  confin'd 
to  certain 
places  and 


J^  O  T  E  S, 


vcrnable  Paflion,  or  AfFeftion  mifapplyM,  will 
fhevv  the  abfurdity  of  fuppofing  any  Perfon  in 
fuch  a  Cafe  to  be  happy  even  in  Heaven  it- 
felf  *.  But  this  important  Dodlrine  of  the 
force  of  Habits,  i^c.  in  this  World,  as  well 
as  the  Continuance  of  them  in  the  next,  has 
been  fo  well  ftatcd  and  inforced  by  the  Au- 
thors referr'd  to  above,  that  an  attempt  to 
give  any  further  Illullration  of  it   feems   im- 


prafticable.  I  ftiall  therefore  difmifs  it  with 
a  Paffage  from  the  Caufes  of  the  Dfcav  of  Chri- 
liian  Piety,  Ch.  I.  "  Thofe  immaterial  Fclici- 
"  ties  we  expcft,  do  naturally  fuggell  to  as 
"  the  neceflity  of  preparing  our  Appetites, 
"  and  hungers  for  them,  without  which  Hea- 
"  ven  can  be  no  Heaven  to  us :  For  fince 
'*  the  Pleafure  of  any  thing  refults  from  the 
"  Agreement    between   it    and    the    Defue, 

"  what 


*  See  tie  SpcaatOT,  N".  90. 


ATT  ENT>  I  X. 


315 


enjoy  the  Life  themfelves  have  chofen.  For  this  could  not  be  pre- 
vented without  doing  Violence  to  the  Laws  of  Nature.  And  thefe 
Punifhments  which  the  Wicked  voluntarily  bring  upon  them- 
felves, tend  to  the  Benefit  of  the  Univerfal  Syflem  of  Rational  Be- 
ings. 

XVII.  So   much   for  Moral  Evils,  Laws,    Rewards  and  Punijh-J^^f^^l^i 
ments.     In  which  fome  things  may  appear  too   fubtle  for  common  ff^/ relates 
Apprehenfion ;  but  we  ought  to  remember  that  the  Difpute  is  con-  ^° J^^  ^^^^ 
cerning  one  of  the  niceft  things  in  Nature,  viz,  the  Operations  of  mions,  aS' 
our  own  Mind :    and  whatever  is  faid  in  order  to  explain   thcie,  °"  ^^^  *^" 
muft  necelTarily  be  fubtle.    On  this  Account  the  Art  of  Logic  is  neoTfraHiy  be 
caird  fubtle,  bccaufe  it  has  thefe  for  its  Obje6t,  and  any  thing  that  I'omewhat 
is  more  fubtle  than  ordinary,  is  reckon'd  Logical.     He  that  does  not  ^"^^'^' 
like  any  thing  that  is  fubtle  therefore,  ought  not  to  difpute  about 
what  relates  to  our  own  Minds.    Moral  Evil  is  as  it  were  the  Di- 
ftemper  of  our  Minds  arifmg  from  the  irregular  Motion  of  the  co- 
gitative Faculties  i   now,  as  'tis  difficult  to  difcover   the  Caufes  of 
thofc  Diflempers  which  infe£t  the  Body,  fo  it  is  much  more  diffi- 
cult to  find   out  the  Caufes  and  the  Motions  of  thofe  Maladies   ^ 
which  afflidl  the  Mind.     For  it  is  neceffary  that  we  pcrfedly  un- 
derhand our  own  Minds,  the  Notions,  Operations,  and  Means  where- 
by the  Will  is  moved,  and  the  Underftanding  operates,  before  we 
can  hope  to  make  a  full  Difcovery  of  thefe  Paffions  of  the  Mind, 
and  the  Caufes  of  them.    And  'tis  evident  to  any  one  how  difficult 

S  f  2  that 


N  0  7'  E  S. 


"  what  Satisfaftion  can  Spiritual  Enjoyments 
"  give  unto  a  Carnal  MiniJ  ?  Alafs,  what 
"  Delight  would  it  be  to  the  Swine  to  be 
"  wrapt  in  fine  Linen  and  laid  in  Odours  ? 
*'  His  Scnfcs  are  not  gratify'd  by  any  iuch 
"  Delicacies ;  nor  would  he  feel  any  thing 
"  befides  the  Torment  of  being  withheld 
"  from  the  Mire.  And  as  little  Complaccn- 
*'  cy  would  a  brutifh  Soul  find  in  thofc 
"  purer  and  refined  Pleafures,  which  can  on- 


"  \j  upbraid,  not  fatisfy  him.  So  that  could 
"  we,  by  an  impoflible  Suppofition,  fancy 
"  fuch  an  one  affum'd  to  thofc  Fruitions,  his 
"  Pleafure  fure  would  be  as  little  as  his  prc- 
"  paration  for  it  was.  Thofe  Eyes  which 
"  have  continually  beheld  yanity,  would  be 
"  dazled,  not  delighted  with  the  l/eatijie  Vi- 
"  fttn;  neither  could  that  Tongue  which  has 
"  accaftom'd  itfclf  only  to  Oaths  and  Blafpht- 
"  mieiy  find  Harmony  or  Mufic  in  Hallelujahs. 

'Tis 


3i6    .     .t  IA9  T  E  ND  I  X 

that  IS;  what  fubtlc  Abflradions,  and  long  Dedudion  of  Confe- 
quences  it  muft  require.  'Tis  no  wonder  then  if  the  Inveftigation 
of  the  Caufes,  and  Orgin  of  the  Evil  of  the  Mind  require  feme 
things  which  arc  too  fubtie  for  all  to  comprehend. 


NOTES. 


**  'Tis  the  peculiar  Privilege  of  the  pare  in 
"  Heart,  that  they  (hall  fee  God  ;  and  if  any 
**  others  could  fo  invade  this  their  Inclo- 
*'  fure,  as  to  take  Heaven  by  Violence,  it 
"  furely  would  be  a  very  Joylefs  Poffeffion 
"  to  thefe  Men,  And  only  piace  them  in  a 


"  Condition  to  which  they  have  the  grea- 
"  teft  Averfion  and  Antipathy.  So  that  Ho- 
"  linefs  here  is  not  only  neceffary  to  the 
"  acquiring,  but  the  Enjoyntent  of  Blifs 
"  hereafter. 


Hd^jih  ^vini  ni^  m\  tI 


at  A\ 


Tti 


»C.;4 


SECT. 


.  i».  hi.;: 


AT  T  E  N  D I  X 


3'7 


SECT.     III. 

Concerning  the  QueSiion,   Why  had  Men  are 
J^^ppy^  ^^d  good  Men  mijerable. 

I.  '  I  ^HIS  Queftion  feems  to  have  fome  relation  to  the  former. ™»'Qii«' 

X  ^  For  if  Punijhment,   that  is,  Natural  Evils,  be  infliaed  inJeenlbwdl 
Proportion  to  the  defert  of  Evil  Elections,  whence  oome  good  things  treated  by 
to  evil  Men^  and  Evil  to  the  Good?     'Tis  not  fo  difficult  to  anfwer  ^'^"J^'j*^*^ 
this  Queftion  upon  the  Suppofition  of  a  future  States,  as  to  make  it  fcarcc  any 
necefTary  for  us  to  infift  much  upon  it.    And  it  muft  be  confefTcd,  "o"™  ^^^ 
that  it  has  been  treated  of  in  a  very  proper  Manner  by  feveral  Wri-  ^^"^  ^' 
ters:  (117.)     fo  that  there's  fcarcc  any  Room  left  for  Scruple.     Nc- 
verthelefs  a  few  things  fhall  be  touch'd  upon,  and  very  briefly,   that 
we  may  not  repeat  what  has  been  faid  already. 

II.  In  the  firft  place  then  the  matter  of  Fadl  is  very  often  doubt-  -Yy^^  ^^^^^^ 
ful,  notwithftanding  the  Complaints  which  many  Perfons  make  to  of  Faa  is 
the  contrary.    We  lee  indeed  good  Men  frequently  miferable,  but  it  is  f^^^for^Ji, 
a  Query  whether  their  Goodnefs  may  not  be  owing  to  their  Mifery,  not  good 
and  they  would  have  prov'd  wicked  if  they  had  been  tempted  by  ^^«"  ^J*^  **'* 

Profperity?bttt  rather 

icform'd  by 
by  Adverfity  :  Nor  are  bad  Men  profperous,  but  made  bad  by  Profperity. 

NOTES. 


■  ■('*7-)  V.  G.  Sherlock  on  Judgmtnt,  Ch.  i. 
S  3'  p.  76,  k^c.  lit  Edit. ■  on  Providence^ 

Ch-7.  p.  258.  2d  Edit.  Cudviorth^  P-  877. 
Cockburn,  Effay  5.  prop.  7,  8.  p.  137,  (^c 
WolJaflon,  p-  7 1 ,  ana  1 1  o,  i^c.  Cradock  on 
Eicl.  9.  2.    Setuca,  Ep.  24.     Fiddes  Sermons, 


Fol.  14  and  19.  Scott^  z  vol.  Ch.  4.  VS-  P- 
331,  {jV.  8p«.  and  Difcourfc  16.  p.  320,  l^c. 
2d  vol.  Fol.  StiU'tngfieet,  Origines  Sacra,  B.  3. 
Ch.  3.  V  *!•  P-  326,  i^c.  Fol.  Grttv,  Ccj- 
nuhgia  Sacra,  B.  3.  Ch.  2.  V  57»  jS. 


5i8  AT  T  E  N  T)  I  X. 

Profperity?  it  is  not  the  Good  then  that  are  afflicled,  but  the  mife>- 
rablc  that  are   reclaimed.     On  the  other  hand,    we  behold  happy, 
rich,  and  powerful  Men  that  arc  wicked ;  but  their  Wickednefs  may 
be  attributed  to  their  Profperity,   and  they  would  perhaps  be  very 
good  if  the  Incitements  to  Evil  were  removed.     'Tis  not  the  Wicked 
therefore  that  are  happy,   but  the  happy   that  are  corrupted  with 
Profperity,  and  thereby  fall  into  Wickednefs. 
Wc  arc  par-       III.  Secondly,  We  are  blinded  with  Prejudice,  and  thereby  ren- 
M^ruf  fronf *^^^'^  Very  partial  Judges  of  the  Goodnefs  or  Badnefs  of  other  Men. 
thcinftance  He  that  is  our  Acquaintance  and  befriends  us, is  a  good  Man,   he 
^^dTcfT^  that  favours  our  Enemies  is  a  very  bad  one.     Thus  Scipio  is  celebra- 
ted by  the  Roman  Hiftorians,  and  if  any  hard  or  unprofperous  Acci- 
dent befal  him,  they  begin  to  afk  whether  there  be  any  Gods }     Whe- 
ther Divine  Providence  takes  care  of  human  AjSairs  ?     But  Hannibal  is 
condemn'd,  his  Vidlories  are  charg'd  as  Crimes  on  Providence,  and 
they  repine  at  his  having  been  fo  long  fuccefsful.     Whereas  'tis  real- 
ly dubious  whether  of  the  two  was  the  worft  Man ;  both  certainly 
were  very  bad  :  For  their  Aim  was  to  put  the  World  into  Confulion,  to 
fubdue  Nations  by  force  of  Arms,  the  one  intending  to  make  Car- 
thage,  the  other  Rome^  Head  of  the  World,   by  Slaughter,  Rapine, 
War,  and  Injuftice.     Now  the  Man  that  ftudies  to  opprefs  the  whole 
World  in  Servitude,  and  bring  it  under  the  Power  of  that  Nation  to 
which  he  belongs,  this  Man  is  truly  wicked  and  unworthy  of  Succefj, 
however  he  may  veil  his  Ambition,  Pride,  and  Fury  in  fome  parti- 
cular Inftances,  under  the  fpecious  pretence  of  Clemency  and  Love  of 
his  Country. 
We  are  bad       IV.  Thirdly,  As  WC  are  partial  Judges  of  the  DeferU  of  other  Men, 
judgesof  the  y-Q  ^^^  ^^  ^^  j^^g  unqualifv'd  to  pronounce  on  their  Felicity.     For  we 

riappinels  oi  .11  j         -A  it*  •  r  i        r   1  ■> 

Men :  for     are  taken  with  the  pomp,  and  noile,  and  glittermg  outlidc  of  things,  and 

thofe  arc      confcquently  judge  the  Rich,  the  Potent,  the  Noble,  and  the  Learned  to 

moll  mifera-  be  happy.  And  yet  herein  we  are  very  frequently  miftaken,  fince  neither 

biewhomvveof  them  are  what  they  appear  to  be.     For  Life  is  often  attended  with 

Lrthe  con- 1^0^^  ^^PP'i^^^^  among  Cottages,  Hufbandry,  and  Trade,  nay  in  the 

trary.  midil  of  Bodily  Pains  and  Difeafes  j   than  among  Sceptres,  Diadems, 

high  Pedigrees,  and  fuperfluous  Heaps  of  Books  j  fince,  as  we  have 

fhewn  before,  and  Experience  teftifics,  Happinefs  lies  chiefly,  if  not 

folely,  in  Ele(5tion. 

y.  Fourthly, 


ATTENDIX,  519 

V.  Fourthly,  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  the  greateft  Part  of  the  Hap- T^he  chief 
pinefs  in  this  Life  confifts  in  Hope,  and  that  the  Fruition  of  the  defi- Happincfs 
red  Objed  is  not  anfwerable  to  the  Hope  pre-conceiv'd,  which  mu{l^"L^°"^|^* 
be  efteem'd  an  Indication  that  complete  Happincfs  is  referv'd  by  Na-  which^  \ 
turc  for  another  Life  j  the  more  then  we  afpire  after,  and  adhere  to  ^^S"  *^^^  p^'^ 
the  prefent  Objeds,  the  lefs  Care  we  (hall  take  of  thofe  things  which  l^efs  ilrefbr- 
tend  to  our  future  Happinefs.     It  was  therefore  wifely  provided  by  ^cd  for  ano- 
God,  that  the  Good  fhould  not  be  corrupted  with   too  plentiful  an  an  thVf?'^"** 
Enjoyment  of  the  things  of  this  World,  but  that  the  Bad  fhould  have  things  which 
them  in  abundance  :  For  by  this  means  all  may  underftand  that  their  KH  F^'^  °'' 
time  ought  not  to  be  fpent  in  thefe  things,  but  that  the  Space  of  this  means  to' it. 
{hort  Life  fliould  be  employ*d  in  looking  after  other  Matters,  /".  e,  fuch 

as  regard  Eternity. 

To  conclude,  we  muft  affirm  that  nothing  happens  to  good  Men 
which  may  not  prove  a  Means  of  greater  Good ;  nor  to  the  Bad,  which 
may  not  be  for  their  Punifhmcnt  or  Reformation. 

VI.  And  I  hope  it  appears  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  the  Ob-  Conciufion 
jedtions  of  the  Manicheans  and  Paulicians  are  not  fo  formidable  as°^^^^^^° 
they  have  feem*d  to  fome ;  and  that  human  Reafon  is  not  fo  blind 

but  that  it  can  folve  thefe  Difficulties  from  the  Principles  laid  down, 
and  fuch  Suppolitions  as  are  generally  admitted ;  and  tho'  not  abfo- 
lutely  certain,  yet  probable  however,  and  fuch  as  wc  ufe  to  acquiefcc 
in,  in  the  Solution  of  other  Phaenomena. 

But  I  offer  all  thefe  things  to  the  Cenfure  of  the  Learned:  I  fub- 
mit  them  entirely  to  the  Judgment  of  the  Catholic  Church,  efpecial- 
ly  to  the  Govcrnours  of  thofc  Parts  of  it  which  conflitute  the  Chur- 
ches of  England  and  Ireland.  If  there  be  any  thing  herein  which 
feems  not  perfecflly  agreeable  to  their  Faith,  as  I  hope  there  is  not, 
and  would  not  have  it,  I  dclire  that  may  be  look'd  upon  as  abfo- 
lutely  unfaid  and  retra(^ed. 


FINIS. 


m»i'm»' 1.011'if^i^ioitf 


^\»1^ 


vJM-'#*i**»?'r 


■;*.<!  |l?;^:lnii4  l^v 


\ 


5fi 


Index  to    the  Notes. 


A. 

A  B/o/«/^  Infinity,  what  it  is.  .      ^  Page  12,  70 

Abfolute  Neceflity,  an  abfurd  Term,  37,  ^5.  Cannot  be  the  ground 
of  the  Divine  Exiftence,  ih.  The  fame  as  Caufe,  tb.  Cannot  be 
apply'd  to  the  Relations  of  things,  194,  195, 196.  Inconfiftent 
with  the  Divine  Freedom  and-Diverfity  of  Attributes,^  49»50 

■Abjlra5f  Ideas,  how  made,  7.  Not  form'd  by  Analogy,  ib.  Have  no  Ob- 
jeds  correfpondent  to  them,    .  ib. 

yf^/o»  twofold,  155,  156.    Cannot  be  heceflary  in  either  fenfc,  ib, 

Jdam,  whether  naturally  mortal,  iii,  138.  Whether  his  Powers  were  dif- 
ferent from  thofe  of  his  Pofterity,  ib.  The  Scheme  of  Providence  in 
his  Fall,  138,  139,  146,  282,  283, ^f.  -His  Happihefs  not  fo  great  as 
that  which  is  attainable  by -us,  283,284 

Aheration^  there  can  be  no  partiaf  one  in  this  Syftcm  for  the  better,  107,108. 
A  total  one  inconceivable,  ib.  The  fame  may  be  fhewn  in  the  moral 
World,  .  287,288,289 

Alternative  of  Good  and  Evil  neceflary  to  improve  our  Happinefs,  88,  272. 
If  we  were  incapable  of  the  one  we  could  not  attain  to  fo  high  a  Degree 
of  the  other,  ib.  and  247,  273,  288,  289.  A  general  Anfwer  to  Bayle^s 
Objedions,  247 

Analogy y  not  to  be  apply'd  to  the  whole  Nature  of  the  Divine  Attributes,  but 
only  to  the  Medus  of  them,  68,'  69,  70,  82.  Nature  of  any  thing  di- 
ftindt  from  the  Modus  of  Exiftence,    ^  70 

Angels  J  whether  they  ftill  have  not  Freedom  of  Will,  241.  Some  Reafons 
why  their  Fall  might  be  permitted  ;  vide  Fall.  288 

Antecedent  Neceflity  not  the  ground  or  reafon  of  the  Divine  Exiftence,  37, 
38.     The  very  lame  as  a  Caufe,  ib. 

Anxiety  does  not  determine  the  Will,  i54»^55>i^5 

Appetites  may  be  oppofed  and  overcome  by  the  Will  alone,  203 

-^r^i/r^r^f,  in  what  Senfe  the  Divine  Will  is  fo,  195 

Argument  a  priori,  cannot  be  apply*d  to  the  Divine  Being,  36,  49 

T  t  ^nti- 


3«a  INDEX. 

4ttrihutes  of  God  primary  and  fccondary,  46,  47.    How  wc  get  our  Ideas  of 
.„.',  t(>cm|,67,,68,     '^qi  irova  Analogy ^  .i^'aUaM-*  ^-79 


B 


Eifig  of  God,  Proof  of  it,  45 

BeingSy  whether  all  ought  to  have  be^^  ?rcated  at  firft  in  the  higheft  De- 
gree they  tre  capable  of,  84,  85.  Arguraejils  &)•  the  Affirmative,86. 
Anfwer,  87,  88,  89 


C. 


r  |0  £'"/tfi«^)',  wherein  it  con fiftsj  1  '17,^1$ 

.f\^  Chafm^  none  in  the  Chain  of  Beings,  \  94,95,  103 

o£'/tf^j  of  Beings  down  from  God  to  nothing,  91,  94.      The'Neceflity  for 
»  ,        fuch,  102,  103,  270,  271.     Anfwer  to  Baylie*s  Objedion,  ib. 

/■Comparijbnsy  the  Impropriety  of  thofe  of  5^^^?  concerning  Free-wiU,  292, 

293 
■JConfclence  of  Guilt  and  Mifery  very  diftind  Perceptions,  zoi,  202.      *Tis  im- 

i^.^'  pofllble  to  have  a  guilty  Confcience  without  Liberty,  ;/>.  The  Con- 
fcience  of  having  ufed  our  Liberty  aright  is  the  fouircc  of  ail  our  moral 
Happincfs,  247,  248 

i^Confctoufnefs  oi  Liberty  proves  that  we  arc  abfolutely  free,  113 

Contingency  as  certain  to  the  Divine  Knowledge  as  Neceffity,  232 

Coniiflgent  Actions  may  be  Objcds  of  the  Divine  Knowledge,  269 

Creation  did  not  add  to  the  Divine  Happinefs  or  Perfedign,  52.      Why  no 
:         fooner,  z^.     The  Effedt  of  Goodnefs,54.     In  what  fenfe  it  was  indiffe- 
rent to  God,  189,193 
CreatureSy  not  all  made  for  the  «fe  of  Man,  91.     But  for  each  others  Happi- 
ncfs, i^.    Whether  all  ought  to  have  been  made  equally  perfed,         84, 

D. 

DEatby  a  nccef&ry  Confcquence  of  the  general  Laws  of  Nature,  iii.. 
Could  not  have  been   prevented  naturally  in  Paradife  i/>.  and  138. 
•  •  NecelTary  for  the  Government  of  this  World  in  the  prefent  State,  139. 

The  Fear  of  it  necefTary,  1 14.    Of  great  Benefit  to  the  World,      128 
Z)tff//;zrt//o«  of  the  Earth's  Axis,  the  Neceffity  for  it,  121 

j[)i?/<r^,  whence  this  Evil  arifcs,  89,90 

Degree,  infinite,  what  is  to  be  underftood  by  it,  70 

J^^r^,  the  fame  with  Volition,  165.    Cannotbcoppofedto.it,  166 

v,>- ,/  ^  '  >  J^ijlanc/y 


;o  2£5M  luo  19*,  -yr  wof-T    -f  ,  *^    ^     E    JC, 

-Diflancel^h^t  it  is,  ^     "     ^^^^Ko. -r  ^^^'^"^  -  ^  ?^  '^^«^^^^^^ 

Duration,  what,  58.    Not  applicable  to  the  Deity, ^9;     IhcaikWe'bF  abfo- 

lute  Infinity,  13,6^ 


^.         '  "  E. 


Eyfr/ip,  the  Advantages  of  its  prcfent  Figure^  120.    Situatioii>!  XiSifi   .Ac- 
tion, Inclination  of  its  Axis,  Parallelifm,  ~wv 
Earthquakes,  the  Caufes  of  them,                                                          i22,ia3*> 
EJfence,  what,  '4,  • 
Eternal,  fomething  muft  be  fo,  45.       Every  thing  cou'd  not  be  fo,  61,  62. 
This  Syftcm  cou'd  not,  i^.       Whetker  the  Matter  of  it  was  Etcsnal^, 

29 

Mermt-j,  not  made  up  of  fucceflive  Duration,  5 fr.       Not  inflantancous,  59. 

The  Meaning  of  that  Attribute,  58,59,60 

Extftence^  our  own  felf-evident,  5^ 

Extenftoh,  not  applicable  to  the  Deity,  27.     Nor  to  any  immaterial  Being, 

Evils  of  Life,  whether  they  ever  exceed  the  Benefits  of  it,  137.  Whether 
they  generally  do  fo,  ,, ,.  ./  ,        -  "  275,276,0fr. 

Ef^l  Principle,  the  Manicheattt^olion  of  it,  74»  75.  The  abfurdity  of  fuch 
a  Suppofition,  y^,  y6.  The  Creation  cannot  be  owing,  to  it,  76,  jy. 
The  Argument  for  it  propofcd  at  length,  ih 

F. 

FAil  of  Man,  the  Neceflity  for  it  in  the  Scheme  of  Providence,  281,285, 
284.     The  Advantages  arifing  to  Mankind  from  it,  ik     Ofajcftions  an- 

fwer'd,  284,285 

F.JW  of  Death  neceflary,  114.    0f  grcati  Benefit  to  the  World,  128. 

Fermentation  the  Caufe  of  Earthquakes,  Storms,  Thunder,  Lightnings,  (sfc, 

122,123.     The  Neceflity  for  it,.  Of. 

F/f«r<?  of  the  Earth,  the  Advantages  of  the  prefent,  r 20,1 21 

fit  in  itfelf,  an  abfurd  Expreflion,  22,23,66 

I^tnefs  of  things,  what  it  fliould  mean,  47,  105.       A  relative  Term,  22,  65, 

In  what  Senfe  eternal  and  immutable,  lA  and  195,  196.       In  no  Scnfc 

antecedent  to  the  Will  of  God,',,'   v.       " «.  .  '^» 

Foreknowledge,  an  improper  Term  when  apply'd  to  the  Deity,      6r«, 268,269  ; 
Freedom  of  God,  Proofs  of  it,  46.      Of  Man,  ai2,ai3. 

Free-fVill,  the  Meaning  of  thofe  Words,  "^'''  -.i'.V-^~«6i 

T  t  2  Genera 


I  N  2>  E  JC  ; 

«-   ''  /    r,.     .  .\        .  .. '- ^      •  -  -    ---:S  c.T  b*Ylqqfi  ad  Jpnn-O 

Gfw^rtf/ Ideas,  what  they  are,  4.     Howform'd,         s:^l  Mi^/  ^^M      i^.  • 
CenerationSy  infinite,  impofTible,  I3j56,57  .0. 

G/^jr^f  of  God,  what  thefe  Words  meanj  54,       How  Gpd.may  b.^  faid.  to.do 

•    all  things  for  bis  ownGlory^. ;;;,-  ;t  f,  H,:^;^-.  .,,-ti' tR/J  i^roiq  znoiBA  iwi*^^lj^^ 
Gody  a  Proof  of  his  Exiftencc  and' AttributeSv  -        .-rr.')rf^5,56^<:. 

G(i4  a;  relative  Term,  >.;/    *-',  '^.Tfsn  r   ■  .63»'^\ 

Good  \&  that  which  produces  Happinefs,  66.     Nothing  Good  or  Evil  in  itfelf,  V 

;■  ■      ■  '     ^  ■  '  ih, 

GoodnefSy  Divine,  Proofs  of  it,  47, 48.      The  Rule  of  all  the  Moral   Attri-  ;v 
butes,  48,  49,      The  Reafon  of  the  Creation,  54,  5$,  287.      This  no  •/ 
^Bar  to  the-Divine  Liberty,,  ,.    .^,.,1^9^^^; 


.-.*■ 


HAbits.  the  Strength  of  them,  310.      The  Foundati9n  of  our  Happi- 
.  -.•nefs  or  Mfery  in  the  next  Life,  273,  274,  301,  302,310,  313,314.^'-  '. 
'    The  Uf^  and  Application  of  this  Dodlrine,  301,  302 

Happinefs y  whether  the  Sum  of  it  exceeds  the  Sum  of  Mifery  in  this  World,-'- 
■^  "275,  276;  i^ci    Whether  it  will-do  fo  in  the  next,  285,  286.    Founded 
chiefly  in  Virtue,  241,288,289 

i/(f//-Torments,  the  Authors  who  have  treated  on  the  Eternity  of  them,  306, 
'  307.     They  don't  feem  capable  of  ^ ny  other  Endbefide  the  Annihila-  ^i 
tion  of  the  Subjefts  of  them,  313,  314,  315.      Have  a  natural  Founda- 
,    tion*^  in  the'  Evil  Habits  co^ntrafted  in  this  Life,  273,  301,  3 '0,31 3. m^- 
The  Ufcs  xo  which  they  .may  ferve,  -i  •„,    :t:  ]j  :288,  307 

Hqlinefs  o{  Gody  v    1   .  49 

Holy  Gbofiy  in.  what  manner  it  influences  the  Mind,  155.    This  is  not  de-  . 
'  flrudivc  of. our  Natural  Powers,  256,  257.    But  rather  afTifting  and  re-.; 
floring  them, -25  7,  2^8.    In  what  w<iy  w.c  m^y  conceiYe  this  Influence 
to  be  exerciled,    .;■,■  .^^ri.i  ^.,:^  ihui'^upT^nfjJ  i'-'VT-  i^     ir^:'25i8j25^  •; 
■  ;    .  "  •    '  '"■      "■  '    ^-jr  ibrit  iz      "  ■■■-." 

«  L'.—  .■.M'-zT'..":  r^ir:-  vy-'>*'*^  '. 

I  Dm,  what  the  Author  means  by  that  Word,  -  .  -  6, 7 

'"Jdea  of  Gody  whether  it  proves  his  Exiftcncjfi,  :{«%<  ?;M.  20,21'' 

Impfrfe^Hony  whence  it  arifes,        ""       '}•■  -  — '  »''  ^--f'*  ir\i'.-    «.  gp^  90 
JnmhprebenftbiUtyy  .^ .    .  ^   --.    -      -.:'>•    H^ --'  ^^^-Jn^"-.^  !>n*,'  "'  '47-^. 

*..,-•--  Indifference  ^^ 


i 


rfi0erenee,  the  Author's  Notion  of  it,  174,  175.  Cannot  be  apply »d  to 
the  Whole-man,  but  only  to  the  Powers  of  wiJhng  and  afting,  ib. 
Cannot  be  apply'd  to- Perception  or  Judgment,  184  Miift  be  apply'd* 
to  the  Will,  212.      The  Benefit  of  it,  '    213,214,215    | 

Indifferent,  in  what  fenfe  the  Creation  was  fo  to  God,  189, 1013.  This  .con- 
fiftent  with  his  being  determin*d  by  his  Goodnefsy  '  ■'■^;-.  >*>  -'.'     n,^ 

Indifferent  A&\om  prove  that  the  Mind  determines  itfelf^  i'53'^  xS/^.'  fnftan-  ,. 
ces  of  them,  i^^    ]^ 

Infinite,  what  is  meant  by  that  Word,  12,  13,  1 6,  60.  The  fame  as  Per-  ^''* 
fedion,  70,  71.  The  Idea  of  it  pofitive,  ib.  And  previous  to  that  "' 
of  finite,  ii'.       How  it  differs  from  a  Mathematical  Infinite,  14    .. 

Infinite  Degree,  what  is  to  be  underflood  by  it,  70 

Infinite  Scries,  the  abfurdity  of  it,  45.  In  Generations,  56,  ^y.  In  Number, 
Motion,  Magnitude,  &c,  i  ^ 

InJiinSf,  none  innate, .  67 

Judgment 4ocs  not  determine  the  Will,  I54»i55>i63 

Jufiice.  Divine,  Proof  of  it,  48,  Infinite  Juftice  not  inconfiftent  with  in- 
finite Mercy,  S'iiJ^iJ'i- 

Jufiice,  punitive,,  what  it  pieans,  7 1 .        Cannot  be  faid  to  oblige  or  demand:^ 
anything,  ^-jf-u  J  --^'*  72 

V  '  - '    •  -  .  I       ^      -*,  • .  i      •.  -  -   . , 

-  .  ;      ,   .  ■  ;      •      T^  ,  V  -v  ij. 

LJbour,  the  NecefTity  for  it,  and  Advantages  of  it,  124,125 

La^antiuSy  his  Anfwer  to  the  Objedion  of  Epicurus  againfl  Providence, 

-.■•.■.--^:-  295 

LawSy  Divine,  the  Defign  of  them,  30t.      They  arc  Declarations  of  the  • 
natural  Effedh  of  Sin,  and  Diredions  to  avoid  them,  ib.      They  do  not  ^   _ 
bring  us  into  a  worfc  State  than  we  Ihould  have  been  in  without  them,     '. 

ib.  '  ' 

Laws  of  Nature,  the  Neceflity  for  fome  efVablifh'd  ones  in  the  Saturat 
Worlds  99.       The  Wifdom  of  it,  132,  244.      The  fame  in  the  Morcd  <  • 
World,  ibid.      The  ill  Confequences  that  would  attend  the  contrary, 
ib.      Yet  thefe  are  not  left  entirely  to, thcmfelves,  252.      The  Divine  t 
Intcrpofition  fometimes  neceifary,  267,268 

Liberty,  whether  we  experience  it  in  ourfelves,  19^,  213.  We  are  confcious 
of  it  before  we  try  it,  164,  165.  The  different  Notions  of  it,  153. 
Applicable  to  Volition  as  well  as  to  A£lipn,  154,  160.  The  Poffibility 
of  it,  214.  The  Value  of  it,  213,  214,  ^2^.  Inconvcniencics  that 
wou*dattcnd  the  wantof  it,  234,  235,  Or  the  over-ruling  it  on  par- 
..     ,    .,  .  ticulaj  • 


X 


V?         't         ^      7  fl        ^- 

I  jsr  z)  £  j^. 

,       ticular  Occafions,  244,  293,  294.      Even  the  abufe  of  it  tends  to  the 
-^^  »-Good  of  the  whole,  ■■   -'{^v:-^^.hJr  ?^^r^\^    --f    287,288 

Hibirty  fhewn  to  belong  to  God,  46.      An^  alfo  to  Man,  212,213 

Life,  as  much  in  the  World  as  it  is  capable  of,  94,  95,101,119.      The  pre- 
fcnt  Life  better  than  Non-exiltence,  -  C^i: ,  141 

lAmUation  of  any  Attribute  in  the  Deity,  is  an  EfTe^'  without  a  Caufe,  62, 

^  fjtekini'Glafsj  the  abfurd  Confequence  of  applying  that  Simile,  as  is  done 
by  the  Author  of  the  Procedure,  Extent  and  Limits  of  Hum.   Underfi. 

69j70 
M. 

Acula  Peccati,  the  true  Meaning  of  thefe  Wordis,  31 2^3 13 

Alany  why  not  made  more  perfed,  91,  270.       Why  placed  in  this 
.;'.  World,  ib.      The  head  of  the   lower  part  of  the  Creation,  9.1, 

All  things  not  made  immediately  for  his  ufe^  but  to  enjoy  them* 
Y.  felves,  and  be  fubfervient  to  each  other,  ib. 

i  Matter,  the  Idea  of  it,  2.  Not  Eternal,  29.  Incapable  of  Thought  and 
^^^  Self-motion,  92.  The  Ufes  of  it  in  its  prcfent  State,  fi'.  Why  not 
.  ^^^        made  more  perfedt,  93.      The  Source  of  Natural  Evils,  97 

Mechanical  Hypothefis,  an  account  of  it,  264,  265.       A  Confutation  of  it, 

266,267, 268. 

I^fer^,  not  fo  great  in  general  as  the  Happinefs  in  this  Life,  275, ^J*;:.     Nor 

in  the  next,  285,286.      Whether  that  of  the  Damned  will  increafe  the 

^         Happinefs  of  the  BlefTed,  ;^  &">  yir  ^xf  >^j  289,296 

^  i|Wi?/w«  cannot  be  Eternal,  '  ^^         "*  *     '  24 

tiijftft/ffw,  whether  the  Mind  be  always   determin'd  By   them,    212,  213. 

;>        Ih  what  fenfe  fome  arc  called  7?r<?«g?r  than  others,  ib. 

i  Moral  Attributes,    certain,    tho*   not    capable    of   ftrid    Demon (Iration, 

4^  t£'i^-:'  .^^"  ■'-'.,_         47 

uAmrc^Crbod  and  Evil  confifts  in  producing  Natural  Good  and  Evil, 
-i\..-,-.]^,.   ^  .  f ^.  and 64, Se, 

Moral  Senfe  alone  direfts  us  to  do  Good  to  others,  64.      The  fame  with 
Confcience,  (^^.      Not  innate  or  implanted  in  us^  (>'] 

% 

i^t,  Necejfary 


I  N  i)  E  ^. 

»^^®r<?^;*y,  Always  arrelative Term,  zz/i^.  N^GefTaryin  Kfelf',  or'ab- 
;,X>I      folutely  fuch  in  its  own  Nature,  abfurd  Expreflions,  i^. 

^sNeceJhry-Exii\.cnce,  what  it  means,  22.  The  fame  as  Self^Exiftence,  62.* 
3«.  How  proved,  j^.  ^Cannot  be underftoodpofitively,  3-6.  Built  upon  a 
.-.*%d  ,  falfc  Maxim,       "x'- •    •  go 

}WeceJ^ty,  whether  the  perceiving  none  in  our  Adions  be  a  Proof  that  there 
?         is  none,  igg 

'-Nothings  in  what  fenfe -things  arofe  from  it,  89.  This  caufcs  the  Evil  of 
■:         DefeA,  90 

Ncvdtyy  an  Improvement  of  our  Happinefs,  88 


V  f  : 


o. 


OBljgatioK,  what  that  Word  means,  66.      Whence  Moral ,  Qbligation  a- 
ri^es,  .'.>;  i^* 

Ob/linacy,  what  it  is  founded  in,  208,209 

Omnipotence  proved,  46.     Does  not  imply  a  Contradidion,  SZ'    How  it  may 
be  faid  to  be  not  able  to  do  feveral  things,  53 

Omniprefence,  what  it  means, ,  63,64 

Omnifcience^  46.  Proof  of  it,  265.  Contingencies  may  be  proper  Objc6U 
of  it,  469 

PJin,  we  do  not  always  defire  to  remove  it,  138 

Paradife^  the  difference  between  that  State  and  the  prcfent,  282,  283. 
No  Arguments  can  be  drawn  from  that,  or  the  ftate  of  Angels,  againft 
the  Goodnefs  of  the  prefent  Syftem,  114,241 

Pdrallelifm  of  the  Earth,  the  Advantages  of  it,  121 

Particular  Wills,  the  Deity  does  not  aft  by  them  in  the  Government  of  ei- 
ther the  Natural  or  Moral  World,  244,  252.  Yet  his  Interpofition  is 
fometimes  neceffary.  260,267,268 

Pajftons^  the  Ufes  of  them  with  refped  to  the  Body,  113.      To  the  Mind, 

115 

Perfa^^  no  Creature  can  be  fuch,  81.      Whether  all  ought  to  have  the  fame 

Degree  of  Perfeftion,  84,  102.      Whether  all  ought  to  be  fixed  in  one 

certain  Degree,  84,  85.      Arguments  for  the  Affirmative,  %6.      An- 

-    -Arcf,  ,  *  87,88,89 

PUafureii 


■I  N  7)   E   X. 

Pleafuresy  fenfible  and  intelleftual,  fuited  to  our  prefent  State,  107,  138 
moft  of  them  arifc  from  pad  Defeds,  88 

PaJfiHlity^  no  Argument  from   infinite  PofTibilities,  that  a  Pawer  aflually 
cxifts  which  can  bring  them  into  Being,  50 

Powers  of  the  Mind  adlive  and  paflive,  I53»I54 

Prayer,  the  natural  good  EfFeds  of  it  upon  our  Minds,  2^59,  260.  God's 
End  in  requiring  it,  260.      It  is  properly  a  natural  Duty,  261 

Prayers,  the  Efficacy  of  them,  266,  267,  268.  Of  no  ul'e  without  a  parti- 
cular Providence,  ih. 

Pr£^efiabli/h*d  Harmony,  an  account  of  that  Syftcm,  264,  265.  Inconfiftent 
with  the  Ends  of  Religion,  266,267 

Prefcience  of  God  an  improper  Term>  61,      What  ihou*d  be  meant  by  it» 

268,269 

Probation,  the  Neceflity  for  fuch  a  State  in  order  to  improve  our  Happinefs, 

272,273 

Providence,  the  manner  of  its  Government  of  both  the  Natural  and  Moral 
World,  252,  253,  266,  267,  268.  T-he  Belief  of  a  ^«r/it:«/^r  one  necef- 
fary  to  moft  of  the  Duties  of  Religion,  ib. 


R 


R. 

Elations  of  things,  what  fhoii'd  be  meant  by  them,  65.  In  what 
fenfe  they  are  immutable  and  eternal,  ih.  Not  antecedent  to,  or 
independent  of  the  Will  of  God,  ib.  and  195,  196.  Not  neceflliry  to 
the  Determination  of  it,  193.  Their  Neceffity  is  only  Hypotheti- 
cal and  fubfequent  to  the  Creation,  194,  195.  It  does  not  from 
hence  follow  that  God  may  alter  thfem  while  the  Creation  continues, 
195,  196,  157.       Xhey  are^not-to  be   chofen  for  their  awn  fakes., 

'T:?.'n.  65,66 

S. 

SCale  of  Beings  necefTary  for  the  Good  of  the  Univerfe,  91,94,25,102, 
103,270,271 
Scripture,  Objeilions  from  it  concerning  the  Fall,  &c.  are  of  no  force,  269 
Self-Exijience,  what  it  means,  38,  61.      How  proved,  ib.      The  fame  with 
Independence,  45 

Situation  of  the  Earth,  Advantages  of  the  prefent,  1 20, 1 2 1 

.S^ace,  what  it  is,  91-40.      Not  capable  of  abfolute  Infinity,  i-o.      Not  necef- 
.  iarily  cxiftent,  31,  32.      May  be  fuppofed  all  away,  but  cannot  be  an- 
nihilated 


tiihilated  by  Parts,  35.      The  SubAratvm  of  Fxtenfion,  40,  41,      pif 
ferent  from  the  Idea  of  a  Facuumj  2^.      ^Vhat  is  meant  by  our  not  be- 
in^  able  to  fct  bounds  to  it,  U 
Spirit f  not  extended,                                                                              32j33 
;^/(?r/«j,  the  Caufcs  of  thera,                                                                        uj 
SMifianef,''vfh^tit  commonly  fignifies,  2.    "Whether  it  bc'any  thing  real,  '1^, 
SvhJiratUm,  particularly  belongs  to  Matter,                                                 qj 
Succejftotty  none  In  the  Deity,                                                                   59i6o 
5;(^ri>«^  feafon  for  every  thing,  a falfeMaxim,                          \            *39 
Sum,  whether  t'hat  of  Happinefs  exceeds  the  Sum  of  Mifery  hi  this  World, 
i75i  2>^,-  ^c,     ■  Whether  it  will  do  fo  in  the  nixr,                   285,286 
^ Summum  Bomm,  thr  reafon 'why  Phil6ipphers  were  fo  uncertain  about  it, 

■ '   '    !-       *   .  .^  .vj    ..  168,169 

Sfifprtifiotiy  the  Power  of  it  S  a  Proof  that  die  Mind  js  abfoliitely  free, 

170.       Not  founded  in  the  general  Defire  of  Happinefs,  j;!.      Not 

different  trbm  gny  other  Exercjfe  gf  the  'Will,  iK 

Htmder^    the  Caufe  of  it,  jlj 

Time^  what,  58.      Not  applicable  to  the  Deity,  59.    Incapable  of  ab- 

fi?lute  Infinity,       >  13,60 


V- 


■yff»^w,  different  from  Space,  25 .     Often  confbunded  with 'It, /^    Ar- 
guments ul'ed  againft  it  when  k>  confounfdcd,  li 
Variety,  neceflary  to  improve  bur  Ha J)pinefs,                         85,272,277,278 
^<«r/>/y  of  ufes  of  rftoft  things  in  Nature,                                         105,106 
^<?nja7y,  or  rather  Fflf/^/«/»^y},  an  Attribute  of  God,                             48,49 
Vice,  how  it  may  tend  to  the  Benefit  of  the  Public,  281,      And '  therefore 
is  permitted  by  the  Deity,  tho*  it  be  never  the  lefs  punilhable,  ib» 
Virtue,  the  foundation  of  our  greatclV Happinefs,  288,  289,      Cannot  be  in- 
fufed  into  us  miraculoufly,  or  on  a  fudden,  ik  and  272,  273,    Produced 
only  by  Exercife  and  Experience,  241,  289,  290,  291.      Cannot  fub- 
fift  without  Liberty,  241.      Anfwer  to  the  Arguments  drawn  from  An- 
gels and  Saints,                                                                                 ib, 
UrKhartgeablenefs' of  God y  46.                                                                             46 
Volition,  diftinft  from  Adion,  153.      The  Advantages  of  Tuch  a  Power, 
225.      The  Inconveniencics  that  wou*d  attend  the  want  of  it,  234,23  J 
Uffs,  many,  of  almoft  every  thing  in  Nature,                                    105,106 

vt  mit. 


99^  INDEX 


W7Z,X,  its  Freedom  from  both  Compulfion' and  i^ccefTity,  154,. 
Not  properly  determined  by.  any  thing  without  itfelf,  i^.  Creates 
Pleafurc  in  things  by  choofmg  them,  1 79.  But  cannot  incrcafe 
the  Pleafurc  in  infinitum,  180.  Its  Freedom  ftatcd  and  defended, 
212,  213,  214.  Whether  it  can  be  determined  to  particular  Ob^ 
jefts,  235.  The  Confequences  that  wou*d- attend  fuch  a  Limita- 
tation  of  it,  239.  Or  a  Sufpenfion  of  it,  244.  The  Abufcs  oi 
it  tend  to  the  Good  of  the  whole,  287,  288.  Will  conftitutc 
the  greateft  Part  of  our  Happinefs,  in  the  next  Life,  241.  An* 
fwer  to  Bayle*s  Objeftions,  ib.  The  Method  of  treating  it,  244. 
Never  determin*d  Phyfically,  255,  Anfwer  to  the  Objedion 
drawn  from  the  Operations  of  the  Holy  Ghoft,  256,257,258 
JViJUom^  Divine,  Proof  of  it,  ^  4$ 

World  J  not  Eternal,  s^.      Nor  Infinite,  83,  84.-      Why  no  fooncr  made,  5  a 


FINIS,* 


^A    ^.     f?   -^.A    1 


w 


E  R  R  ^  7'  A 

Page  6.  Column  2.  Line,  4?.  read  Platonu.  p.  lo.  c.  1.  I.  29.  dele— or  a  Body  tf  fuch  Di« 
roenfions.  lb.  1.  30.  dele— other,  p.  iz.  1.  39.  r.  X  1.  p.  89.  c.  2. 1.  30.  r.  all  at  once.  p.  41. 
1,  18.  r.  Contaft.  ib.  1.  22.  r.  of  it.  p.  49.  1.  laft,  r.  Subfeft.  p.  53.  1.  laft,  r.  Subfcft.  p.  §8. 
col.  1. 1.  laft,  dele  (.)  p.  6..  col.  2.  1.  36.  r.  cxifts.  p.  67.  col.  z.  1.  8.  T.Veltbuyfen.  p.  68. 
col.  I.  1.  9.  for  are  r.  were,  p.  76.  col.  2.  1.  8.  r.  external,  p.  78.  col.  i.  1.  4.  t.  Hamartigenia. 
p,  81.  1.  lo.'  r.  would.  /^.  1.  12.  r.  fliould.  p.  92.  1.  14.  r.  Exiftencc.  ib.  col.  i.  1. 9.  r.  for. 
p.  105. 1.  14.  r.  there.  ;^.  1.  23.  r.  becaufe.  p.  1 1 1.  col.  2*  1.  27.  r.  than.  p.  114.  coK  2. 1.39. 
r.  the  State,  p.  ii;.col.  i.  1.  laft,  r.  confider'd.  ib.coX.z.  1.  3.  r.  ftir  it  up.  p,  130.  1.  4.  r: 
comes,  p.  138.  col.  i.  1.  22,  dele(.)  p.  142.  r.  Seft.IX.  pi54-  col.  i.  1.  28.  r.  Motives, 
p.  162.  col.  I.  1.  6.  r.  determining,  p.  163.  1.  8,  for(.)  r.  (,)  p.  164.  col.  i.  1. 14.  r. could, 
p.  195.  1.  xo.  r.  God.  p.  201.  col.  I.  1.  10,  r.  breaks,  p.  203.  col.  2.  for  Habit  r.  Appetite. . 
p.  205.  1. 24.  dele— alfo;  ib.  1.  25.  inferf  alfo.  p.  258.  col.  2.  1.  22.  r.  debilitated,  p.  271.' 
N.B.  the  Contents  of  the  2d  and  3d  Paragraphs  are  tranfpofed.  p.  295.  col.  i.  I.  6.  r.  veiit.  ib. 
col-  2.  1.  5.  r.  vidit.  p.  301.  col.  2.  I.  20.  r.  or  confidence,  ib.  1.  24.  r.  of  any  Duty.  p.  xxji,  1,  z, 
for  the  Plcafurc  r.  this  Plcafure.  p.  30.  r.  the  Relations,   p.  liii.  r.  chargeth. 


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